ICTY

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2 JAN- 8 MAY 1994

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CZG = 212
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P1/2
010/9

MAR 29 18:48

IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
1302 SSN=579
'94 MAR 29 18:07

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, NEW YORK
ROSE, BH COMMAND, SARAJEVO

FROM : DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 29 March 1994

CODE RESTRICTED

NUMBER : **UNPROFOR Z-505**

SUBJECT : **BiH OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL BOSNIA**

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
SAR
'94 MAR 29 18:15
BUZ

1. The following information is provided to assist in the clarification of today's earlier cable on the same subject. UNPROFOR assesses that the objective of the BiH offensive, emanating westwards from the Maglaj Pocket is the highway that runs south from TESLIC and not TESLIC itself. The BiH has not taken seven kilometres since the start of the offensive, rather the attack has been dispersed across a seven km front . The frontage was earlier thought to have been three to five kms, but reporting on 27 and 28 Mar would suggest that this initial assessment was low. Despite conflicting claims, the UNPROFOR assessment is that the BiH have advanced up to 2 kms; this is not sufficient to take their probable objective, which is the highway.

2. The BiH in the area have stated that they have launched an offensive which is achieving success. The BSA have likewise said that the BiH is on the offensive and they admit to having lost some ground.

3. The BSA have begun to react, mainly by shelling TESANJ. In addition, they have regrouped some of their assets in the BANJA LUKA area; UNPROFOR has, at this time, no indications that those forces are moving towards the conflict area.

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UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
NYK
'94 MAR 29 18:10
BUZ

Internal: SRSG, FC, DFC, COS, G2

CODE RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

BSA

TESLIC

BSA

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BiH

TESANI

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AREA OF BiH OFFENSIVE

REPORT OF HV & HVO TROOPS - 28 MARCH

CL

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1: 50,000

C2V2-463

010/9

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS

OUTGOING CODE RESTRICTED

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

SSN-535

'94 MAR 24 15:58

CZN-434
CZG-192

DISTRIBUTION:
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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: AKASHI, C/O ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: for AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB YA

DATE: 24 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-476

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR. MURATOVIC AND AMBASSADOR SACIRBEY

'94 MAR 24 17:01
UNUG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Please refer to your MSC 821 on the above subject.

2. We have the following comments to offer on the question of the recruitment of local personnel referred to in paragraph 6 of the note on the meeting with Mr. Muratovic and Ambassador Sacirbey. This issue was first raised by the representative of the BH Government during the negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement.

3. The BH Government proposed in this connection that a quota system be established for the recruitment of such personnel so that each ethnic group would be represented roughly in proportion to the demographic composition of BH. We indicated that this was not possible under United Nations personnel policy which was based on the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations staff regulations. At the same time, we assured them that we

CODE RESTRICTED

INT. DISTRIB: SRSG, HCA, CAO

would see that recruitment procedures were applied which would ensure, through advertisement of vacancies and testing of candidates, that there was for each vacancy a number of candidates from which the best qualified one would be selected. The application of such procedures would thus indirectly respond to their concern with regard to the representation of the different ethnic groups in UNPROFOR's local personnel in BH. Our Administration has assured us that the above-mentioned procedures are being consistently applied in BH. **ENDALL.**

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS '94 MAR 24 16:02 UNZ

010/9

CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE

Palais des Nations, 1211 Genève 10

FROM : UNPROFOR military liaison team.

TO : M. Stoltenberg / Lord Owen.

DATE : March 23, 1994.

SUBJECT : UNPROFOR military assessments for the short term in Bosnia.

****

1. BIHAC POCKET :

The situation along the internal confrontation line will remain unstable with an increasing level of military activity. Abdic may try to force Dudakovic to face two fronts at the same time. However, **it is assessed that neither Abdic's forces nor 5th Corps have the capability to launch a significant attack.** On the external confrontation line, the situation is expected to remain active with BSA artillery used against civilian targets.

2. NORTHERN BOSNIA :

The situation will remain relatively stable. There will continue to be reports of shelling in the Doboj-Gradacac area. It is also likely that the situation might flare up in the Olovo-Vares area, especially after the cease fire agreement in Dastansko and if the Serbs are provoked by BIH.

In the longer term, the situation in the Posavina corridor will have to be monitored carefully in the wake of the New Federation agreement between BIH and HVO and the possibility of a joint offensive from Northern Bosnia pushing north and from the Orasje Pocket against the south. Besides, the village of Brcko is of vital importance to BIH all the more since it is a major river port and a former Moslem city.

3. EASTERN BOSNIA :

Although the BSA have penetrated the neutral zone between Srebrenica and Zepa, **an imminent offensive of either the Serbs or the Moslems is unlikely.** BSA's aim is to keep control of the area mainly because they do not want the two pockets to be linked. BIH are trying to secure the movements through the neutral zone. There is a lot of trade between Srebrenica and Zepa, and a number of soldiers from Zepa belong to the Srebrenica BIH Brigade.

4. SECTOR SARAJEVO :

The peace process is making progress and the cease fire is likely to hold. The main objective is to restore freedom of movement for civilians as much as possible. **However, even if the peace process seems unlikely to be stopped, the actions of extremists and especially those of snipers might well hamper it.**

010/9

CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE

Palais des Nations, 1211 Genève 10

From: UNPROFOR Military Liaison Team

Date: 22 March 1994

MEMORANDUM

Subject: MAGLAY POCKET

GENERAL

1. There are about 100,000 people in the pocket, with some 40,000 around the town of Maglaj (20,000 in the town itself and 20,000 in the area) and some 60,000 around Tesanj. The pocket was created in July of 93 when the HVO effectively changed sides at the local level and began to cooperate with the BSA Forces in the area. The BSA\HVO cooperation cut off the pocket area from the rest of the BiH Forces South of the pocket area.

2. The military situation in the Maglaj is complicated even by Bosnian terms. The BiH controls roughly the Southern two thirds of the pocket (four Brigades). The HVO has forces in the North of the pocket (one Battalion). The area between the pocket and BiH controlled territory to the South was controlled by a joint BSA\HVO force that formed a joint HQ for this reason following the fighting in the area in July 93. The HVO had four Brigades in this area. They had cooperated with the BSA by allowing them to transit the area with troops etc. The BSA has forces to the East and West of the pocket. To the West, centred North and South on Teslic are three Brigades, to the East there are two Brigades.

3. The UNMO's had not been able to establish a presence in the Maglay pocket area. They currently report that there is no need to open an office in Maglay as they can patrol the area from the existing office in Zepce.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

4. The UNHCR were unable to deliver aid into the area since 25 October 93 (Maglaj) and 10 December 93 (Tesanj). Their convoys were turned back by either Bosnian Croats or Bosnian Serbs. There have been airdrops, but the success of these has not been measurable due to the lack of UNPROFOR personnel in the area.

5. UNHCR field officers were in Maglay on 15 January 94. They stated that the humanitarian situation was ''dramatic''.

6. The reports now being received as a result of the UN personnel now in the area suggest that Tesnj is only slightly damaged as compared to Maglaj itself. There no reports of ethnic cleansing being carried out in either town. The population in regards to food and clothing was stated to be ''not to bad''. As was earlier assessed, the situation in the pocket had been exaggerated by the BiH radio and BiH representatives. There are , however, seriously wounded people (120-150) in the Tesanj hospital. The UNHCR already has a list stating specific requirements in medical goods.

CEASE FIRE 23 FEBRUARY 94

7. The cease fire severely soured relations between the BSA and the HVO. This cooperation that had kept the pocket isolated had now evaporated and the BSA began to take steps to ensure that the isolation remained.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES

8. The HVO reported that their Main Supply Road (MSR) from the Maglaj pocket has been cut off (17\18 March). It is worth noting that the HVO probably does not want, or does not want to admit, that this road could be kept open. By doing so, it would then be evident that they could have allowed the UNHCR into the area after their cooperation with the BSA felt apart.

9. Various sources have reported a steady build up of BSA troops West of the Maglay pocket on a line running from Teslic to Novi Shere. Total numbers of weapons and troops are not know, but a reasonable estimate based on all sources would suggest 100 heavy weapons, including at least 10 tanks.

10. There was a meeting between BiH and HVO Commanders to discuss permission of the HVO to allow BiH troops to transit through HVO controlled territory. If there was an agreement reached, then the BiH troops would be able to move through Zepce area into Zavidovici. The discussions also included ideas on how to attack through BSA lines and into Maglaj itself in order to relieve the isolation of the pocket. Both

the BiH and the HVO have stated that they will cooperate in the plan to attack the BSA.

11. The 20 March the BSA was completely withdrawing from the Southern part of Maglaj. The HVO is now occupying some of the former BSA trench works along the former BSA\BiH CL. A UNHCR convoy moved the same day from Zepce to Maglaj.

12. Neither the BiH or the HVO are capable of matching the strength of the BSA in this area. Even combined, their strength would be lacking.

ASSESSMENT

13. The BSA troops and weapons withdrawn from Novi Shere may be remaining nearby so as to isolate the pocket again if the situation changes again. There remains a considerable BSA presence both East and West of the pocket despite the withdrawal from around the MSR\Novi Shere area. The BSA might also move some troops into the area of Bujogno where the BiH is pressuring the BSA held town of Donji Vakuf or to the general area of Doboj and Gradac.

FORCE COMMANDER COMMENTS

14. At the present time, there are 16 liaison and monitoring officers in the Maglaj pocket and they will remain there until further notice.

15. While initial reports are that the humanitarian situation may not be as bad as previously thought, the opening of the pocket to humanitarian aid is a major breakthrough and BH Commander will continue to develop and secure a route into Maglaj. It would appear that we may now have unimpeded access and that any discussion on the use of force has been overtaken by events. In any case, it has not and will not be UNPROFOR's intention to use force to gain entrance.

16. General Rose has six pre-conditions to the establishment of Maglaj as a safe area:

a. the availability of sufficient UNPROFOR troops for the task (1500);
b. full consent by all involved parties;
c. a guarantee of unimpeded access to the pocket, including air corridors;
d. UN control of all checkpoints;
e. an agreement to a peace accord in the area; and
f. agreement for convoy movement to be achieved through notification rather than negotiation.

The Force Commander is in full agreement with this proposal. He stated that UNPROFOR is developing a certain momentum, particulary in BH, and it would be unwise to squander this momentum by taking on unachievable tasks.

17. The military situation in the Maglaj area appears to be changing favourably and should have a resultant positive

effect on the humanitarian situation. Accordingly, the Force Commander thinks that safe area discussions with respect to Maglaj may be premature. From a military point of view, he believes that the situation should be allowed to evolve in its present favourable direction.

NOTE

18. Mr Akashi is in complete agreement with this point of view.

CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE
SUR L'ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE

Palais des Nations, 1211 Genève 10

From: UNPROFOR Military Liaison Team

Date: 22 March 94

MEMORANDUM

Subject: HVO KONJIC POCKET

GENERAL

1. The pocket located South West of Konjic (also referred to as the Ljubina Pocket) was formed after BiH successful offensive in Central BH in September 93. It is high ground located in the area of Zabrde-Turija-Zaslivje (6 to 4 Km) and is a key position from which to control Mostar-Sarajevo MSR. It also has the electric power line that runs from Jablanica to Sarajevo (a 400 KV and a 220 KV line). There is also a large transformer station in the area. This is the only 400 KV line running North\South through Central Bosnia. There is also an ammunition factory in good condition in the pocket.

2. There are 150 villagers and about 700 HVO troops in the pocket. Their situation is assessed as being desperate and they all want to leave the pocket.

3. As of September 93, the situation was stable with the status quo acceptable to all sides. Following the ceasefire agreement between BiH and HVO the BSA has probably stopped from supplying food and ammunition to the HVO as they had been doing. As a result of the new situation, the HVO Commander is now afraid that his Force could come under attack from both BSA and\or BiH.

4. The HVO Commander after discussions with the BiH Commander has the following request to UNPROFOR:

a. the territory is put under UNPROFOR control;
b. the HVO soldiers are evacuated by UNPROFOR;
c. artillery is either destroyed or handed over to UNPROFOR;
d. possibility (sic) of keeping personal weapons.

UNPROFOR may be faced with the evacuation of some 850 personnel if all the troops and villagers are to be evacuated.

ASSESSMENT

5. The pocket is a key terrain feature that controls some main lines of communication in Central BH. It is of high interest for the BiH and the BSA.

6. If the HVO were to evacuate the pocket, both BSA and BiH will try to occupy it immediately, using force if necessary. Neither the BSA or the BiH could tolerate this pocket being held by the other side.

7. The Mostar area is one of great sensitivity to the entire BiH\HVO cease fire process. This small pocket has the potential to be''flashpoint'' between forces of the BiH, the HVO and the BSA. If the pocket were to be attacked by either the BiH or the BSA while it is still held by the HVO, all three sides would likely become embroiled in combat.

8. There seems to be a secret agreement between the HVO and the BiH on this matter. In effect, the BiH would allow the HVO to leave, if in turn the BiH agrees not to occupy the pocket. Both parties feel that UN control would be acceptable, but this agreement does not include the BSA.

9. It is assessed that each of the three sides is willing to do without control of the pocket, as long as none of the other two sides has the opportunity to gain control. As such, UN control would eliminate a flashpoint that would have potential to have all three warring factions involved over control of this piece of very important key terrain. There is a possibility that fighting, while localised to at the start, may spread.

10. The HVO pocket in Konjic remains a serious issue and BH Command assesses that the HVO Commander is quite serious about leaving the area and will do soon. The vacuum than created will encourage both BiH and BSA to move into the area.

CURRENT ACTION

11. One Company has been asked to move to the area to set up a series of checkpoints around the HVO area. The Company will not, of course, have any authority to use force to hold the area against the BSA or the BiH should they decide to attack the area.

CNZ 280 CYZ 127 P1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Attn. SRSG/FC

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 21 March 1994

NUMBER: 821

SUBJECT: **Meeting with Mr. Muratovic and Ambassador Sacirbey**

Attached please find for your information a self-explanatory Note for the File on the above meeting. We would appreciate your comments regarding the question of the recruitment of local staff referred to in paragraph 6 of the Note. As to the issue of the Sarajevo Coordinator, a couple of candidates are under active consideration. Though we will attempt to put the chosen candidate in early contact with the Bosnian authorities, we have provided no undertakings to consult the Government in the process of selection. We had earlier advised Ambassador Sacirbey that the Secretary-General was well aware of the Government's concerns and would take them into account in making his appointment.

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations
'94 MAR 22 -3 :38

Note for the File

Meeting with Mr. Muratovic of the BiH Foreign Ministry and Ambassador Sacirbey

21 March 1994

1. Mr. Muratovic and Ambassador Sacirbey met with Messrs. Tharoor and Schmitz to discuss follow up action in response to Security Council resolution 900 (1994).

2. Mr. Muratovic expressed his Government's disappointment that the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo had not yet been appointed. Ambassador Sacirbey repeated his earlier point that his Government would like to be consulted in the process of selecting a suitable candidate. He emphasized the importance of the Special Coordinator and indicated that his Government had far reaching plans in the context of the reconstruction of Sarajevo. Mr. Muratovic would be in the United States until 31 March and would like to meet with the Special Coordinator if one were appointed before his departure, since Mr. Muratovic would be acting as his counterpart in Sarajevo.

3. With regard to the trust fund to be established by the Secretary-General, Ambassador Sacirbey pointed out that it should be clearly identifiable and that his Government would like to be kept informed as to its balance and the way moneys were going to be disbursed. He was advised to seek an appointment with the Controller, Mr. Takasu, to obtain information on this matter.

4. In response to Ambassador Sacirbey's enquiry as to the status of the Turkish troop offer, Mr. Tharoor said that the matter was under very active consideration. If the Secretary-General agreed to the offer, the Council would also have to give its consent to including Turkey among the UNPROFOR troop contributors. In this context, Ambassador Sacirbey pointed out that his Government would welcome troop offers from Greece as well.

5. Mr. Muratovic expressed the interest of his Government to provide personnel for both the United Nations Secretariat as well as field missions. He was advised that personnel offers from under-represented countries would be considered as a matter of priority and that staff from Bosnia and Herzegovina would be welcomed in peace-keeping operations except UNPROFOR.

6. Mr. Muratovic reiterated his concern raised in the meeting with Mr. Akashi in Sarajevo in January regarding the recruitment of local staff in UNPROFOR and the imbalance between Bosnian Serbs and Bosniacs in this respect.

7. Ambassador Sacirbey took the opportunity to mention that President Izetbegovic, at his meeting with President Clinton, had expressed his Government's appreciation for the way General Sir Michael Rose was performing his difficult tasks.

Peter Schmitz
21 March 1994

010/9
Tuz A.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ 217 CYZ 102 P1/7

'94 MAR -8 -4 :03 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 7 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: MSC- 649

SUBJECT: **Tuzla airport**

1. With reference to your Z-353, please find attached a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation containing the text of the agreement reached in Moscow on 2 March regarding the reopening of Tuzla airport.

2. Also attached is a letter from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina objecting to the above agreement. I would appreciate your suggestions for a reply to Ambassador Sacirbey, taking into account the most recent developments.

3. According to information received from the Permanent Mission of a troop contributor to UNPROFOR, 6 Russian observers have reported for duty in Tuzla. Please advise whether this information is correct and, if so, under what arrangements these observers are functioning.

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4. We are looking forward to receiving the necessary elements from you to permit us to finalize the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council seeking authorization to proceed with your plans for the opening of Tuzla airport.

Hand delivered letter SG
4 copies and Annex
Distributed
5-3-94

New York, March 4, 1994

Dear Mr.Secretary-General,

Upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to convey to you the message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mr. Andrei V.Kozyrev regarding the Agreement on measures in order to open the airport in Tuzla which was reached in Moscow on 2 March 1994 with the Bosnian Serb Side which reads as follows:

"The Agreement on measures in order to open the airport in Tuzla was reached between Russia and the Bosnian Serb Side in Moscow on 2 March, 1994. Its principal elements are as follows.

The Sides agree with the provisions of the draft Memorandum of the UNPROFOR Headquarters on the resumption of the activities of the Tuzla airport.

The Sides proceed from the understanding that the number of humanitarian flights to Tuzla will be increasing gradually starting from 1 to 2 airplanes per day.

The Bosnian Serb Side is ready to participate in the work of the Liaison Committee and can delegate to the Committee no less than 10 of its liaison officers during each tour of duty on the basis of daily rotation.

H.E.Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, N.Y.

94-0438

The Russian Side is ready to participate significantly in the established international monitoring to ensure the non-military use of the airport and to send its observers to monitor the unloading of the cargos.

Both Sides will be guided in their actions by provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions related to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

So, we are implementing the initiative which goes at the same direction as the first scenario laid down in your letter to the President of the Security Council, of 28 January, 1994 i.e. achieving progress through negotiations and the consent of the parties to the conflict. In doing so Russia acts in the spirit of the relevant Security Council resolutions and fully takes into account the responsibility of the United Nations for a settlement in the former Yugoslavia.

We are sure that this development will contribute to increasing the chances to achieve peace in Bosnia. Propitious opportunities are being created for reaching an agreement on the Tuzla airport in order to place it under strict UNPROFOR control.

The positive experience, gained in Sarajevo, is beginning to extend to other safe zones in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of us are getting closer to a peaceful settlement which would be acceptable for all the parties to the conflict".

Yours sincerely,

Yuli M.Vorontsov

Постоянный Представитель
Российской Федерации
при
Организации Объединенных
Наций

CNZ 217 CYZ 102 P5/7
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

136 East 67 Street
New York N.Y. 10021

г.Нью-Йорк, "4" марта 1994 года

Уважаемый господин Генеральный Секретарь,

В соответствии с указаниями моего Правительства, имею честь довести до Вашего сведения послание Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации А.В.Козырева относительно договоренности России с боснийской сербской стороной по мерам в целях открытия аэропорта в Тузле, оформленной в Москве 2 марта 1994 года, в котором говорится следующее:

"В Москве 2 марта оформлена договоренность России с боснийской сербской стороной по мерам в целях открытия аэропорта в Тузле. Ее основные элементы следующие.

Стороны согласны с положениями проекта памятной записки Штаба СООНО о возобновлении работы аэропорта в Тузле.

Стороны исходят из того, что количество полетов с гуманитарными грузами в Тузлу будет наращиваться постепенно, начиная с 1-2 самолетов в день.

Его Превосходительству
г-ну Бутросу Бутросу-Гали
Генеральному Секретарю
Организации Объединенных Наций
г.Нью-Йорк

Сербская сторона готова участвовать в работе Комитета по связям и может направить в него не менее 10 своих офицеров связи в одной смене при ежедневной ротации.

Российская сторона готова принять существенное участие в установленном международном контроле за невоенным использованием аэропорта и направить в этих целях своих наблюдателей за приемкой грузов.

В своих действиях стороны будут руководствоваться положениями соответствующих резолюций СБ, касающихся доставки гуманитарной помощи.

Таким образом, мы осуществляем инициативу в том же направлении, в котором идет первый сценарий, изложенный в Вашем письме Председателю СБ ООН от 28 января 1994 года, т.е. прогресс через переговоры и с согласия сторон в конфликте. Действуя таким образом, Россия проводит линию в духе соответствующих резолюций СБ и полностью учитывает лежащую на ООН ответственность за урегулирование в бывшей Югославии.

Мы уверены, что это событие внесет свой вклад в улучшение шансов для мира в Боснии. Создаются благоприятные возможности для заключения соглашения по аэропорту в Тузле с тем, чтобы он перешел под эффективный контроль СООНО.

Позитивный опыт Сараево начинает переноситься на прочие зоны безопасности в БиГ. Мы все продвигаемся к мирному урегулированию, которое было бы приемлемо для всех сторон в конфликте".

С уважением,

Ю.Воронцов

CNZ 217 CYZ 102 P7/7

cired to all concerned

3/3 11:30 am
HS/SM PS

(49)

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
New York

2 March, 1994

RECEIVED
MAR 2 1994
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

Excellency:

We welcome efforts to finally open Tuzla airport for flights to relieve the humanitarian situation in that region and throughout our Republic. We also recognize the potential positive role that the Russian Federation can contribute in bringing a broader peace to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We, however, would like to inquire what are the terms for the opening of Tuzla airport; who has negotiated these terms; and what role will the Russian Federation have in this project. We fully acknowledge the commitment by UN forces to insure the types of goods that may be transported through Tuzla airport and we pledge our cooperation. On the other hand, we will not feel bound to any understanding resulting from bilateral discussions between the Russian Federation and an occupying force in our country, a sovereign state of the United Nations whose territorial integrity is threatened.

May I request your kind assistance in circulating this letter, under agenda time 42, as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Muhamed Sacirbey
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

cc S6
OMJ Sukhodrev
A C Bali
Goulding
Annan
CG/IK/CA/AS/-
EH

866 UN Plaza, Suite 580 • New York, NY 10017 • Phone (212) 751-[illegible] • Fax (212) 751-9019

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS

'94 MAR -7 15:46

OUTGOING

IMMEDIATE

UNOG Telecomm. Unit SN-342

Palais des Nations

1/6

OUTGOING CODE CABLE '94 MAR -7 15:58

IMMEDIATE

CODE RESTRICTED

CZN-324 6K
CZG-121
CZK-073
CZS-132

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
ROSE/ANDREEV, UNPROFOR BH COMMAND FORWARD, SARAJEVO

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 07 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: Z-353

SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS WITH DR. KARADZIC AND PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC YESTERDAY

1. Yesterday I met with Dr. Karadzic in Pale and President Izetbegovic in Sarajevo. My talks focused on, among other issues, 1) the issues related to the reopening of Tuzla airport, 2) the review of developments concerning cease-fire in Sarajevo, and the next steps towards normalisation of life in the city, 3) the significance of the recent Washington framework agreement, and 4) the question of humanitarian convoys and their freedom of movement. Please find below relevant points raised in the meetings.

Meeting with Dr. Karadzic

2. Although Dr. Karadzic reiterated his earlier announcement in Moscow agreeing to the opening of Tuzla airport, he firmly insisted on the stationing of Bosnian Serb liaison officers at the airport in addition to the Russian UNPROFOR officers. I stated that the UNPROFOR presence would consist of three components : 1) Nordic Battalion to control and secure the airport, 2) UN military observers to monitor the airfield and inspect the perimeter to guarantee the non-abuse of the airport, and 3) UN CivPol to inspect the incoming cargo to guarantee the humanitarian nature of the airlift operation. I said that the one third of UNMOs and UN CivPol could come from the Russian Federation, numbering approximately 10 Russians at the fully UN-controlled airport in Tuzla. Despite my repeated argument that UNPROFOR could be entrusted to guarantee the non-abuse of the airport and the airlift operation, Dr. Karadzic insisted on the presence of Serb LOs on the basis of his agreement with the Russian Foreign Minister in Moscow as well as of the earlier inclusion in the UN plan of Serb LO presence at the airport. Dr. Karadzic read out the MOU signed by himself and the Russian Foreign Minister in Moscow, which included the following : 1) that the Russians should constitute "substantial" part of UNPROFOR presence to ensure non-abuse of the airport, 2) that no less than 10

CZN-324 2/6

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(to form a shift) Serb LO should be placed at the airport, 3) that there should be no more than two flights a day in the beginning, (with the possibility of increasing the number of flights at a later stage), and 4) that the sides should fully comply with relevant UN resolutions concerning the humanitarian operations. No agreement was obtained on the issue of Serb LO in the meeting. Dr. Karadzic, however, agreed to the two air corridors to Tuzla over Bosnian Serb controlled territory.

3. Concerning the Sarajevo cease-fire, Dr. Karadzic appeared satisfied with the current situation, especially with the fact that BiH army trench-digging activities have stopped after UNPROFOR intervention. I emphasized that the cease-fire itself should not be our goal and that we should move forward to normalising the life in Sarajevo through the opening of routes and the freedom of movement for civilians and goods, as well as the restoration of essential services. (Attached document prepared by General Rose was handed to Dr. Karadzic.) Dr. Karadzic agreed with our plan of actions generally, and stated that he would not object to normalisation of life in Sarajevo as long as the Serb interest is not compromised. We agreed that the both sides should work on the details in our plan as soon as possible through the existing mechanism chaired by UNPROFOR. (Dr. Karadzic later registered his strong view on "divided Sarajevo" as one of the most important issues for the Bosnian Serbs.)

4. Regarding the Washington Framework Agreement, Dr. Karadzic remained non-judgemental by stating that the Bosnian Serbs were still studying the exact terms of the Agreement, although he did express his fear of the Agreement possibly turning into an anti-Serb alliance between the Muslims and Croats. In his view, the agreement materialised only because of the western countries' pressure to contain Islamic fundamentalism in Europe by creating a "Muslim-Croat package". He said that he could not see much possibility of the Serbs joining the Federation : the Bosnian Serbs would not accept a strong central government in the Federation, common monetary system or any further territorial concessions. Only if all their demands were met, he said, the Bosnian Serbs would join the agreement, upon the approval of their Assembly.

5. Dr. Karadzic registered his objection to the possible additional troop reinforcement from Turkey and Italy based on the historical relations of those nations with the former Yugoslavia. Concerning Italy, he said that the relationship between the Italians and the Serbs are improving due to the recent deterioration of Italy's relationship with Croatia, but he would still consider Italian troops to be "too sensitive" in the former Yugoslavia.

6. Concerning safe areas particularly the Bihac situation, Dr. Karadzic said that he would speak to his military authorities to stop the current Serb offensives. However,

CEN-324 3/6

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he also stated that the concept of safe areas should be redefined, so as to ensure the demilitarisation of the areas. On Maglaj, he also said that he would check with his military authorities on the situation, but remained non-committal on stopping the offensives.

7. Dr. Karadzic agreed with us that we should make a clear distinction between the UN and NATO. In this regard, we both reiterated our understanding that the process for the current Sarajevo cease-fire started on 6 February, and not following the NATO ultimatum.

Meeting with President Izetbegovic (Present: Vice President Ganic and General Delic)

8. President Izetbegovic completely ruled out the possibility of placing Serb LO at the Tuzla airport (he rejected Prime Minister Silajdzic's earlier positive communication to us on this issue), although he did not register any objection to the Russian presence within UNPROFOR. (He was fully satisfied with my reply to his letter concerning the behaviour of the Russian troops in Sarajevo.) He said that since the BiH side would fully trust UNPROFOR, the Bosnian Serb side should place the same trust in UNPROFOR. No flexibility was obtained from President Izetbegovic on this issue of Serb liaison officers at the Tuzla airport.

9. President Izetbegovic said that Dr. Ganic is in charge of all issues concerning normalisation of life and restoration of essential services in Sarajevo. Neither of them expressed any objections to the points contained in the document prepared by Gen. Rose, and Dr. Ganic suggested that a committee represented by civilian and military authorities should work out the details, with the help of UNPROFOR's good offices. He said that he would like to see the simultaneous opening of four routes in and out of Sarajevo. The BiH side agreed to the reduction of the number of check points as a first step.

10. Regarding the Washington Framework Agreement, President Izetbegovic stated that the agreement is open to the Serb side, and that the Union of the Federation and the Bosnian Serb side would be also open for consideration. I welcomed his statement, saying that I was concerned that the Bosnian Serb side may be feeling more insecure in light of the recent Croat/Muslim agreement. He was also optimistic for the implementation of the Croat/Muslim cease-fire, and expressed his satisfaction with the recent developments in Mostar and in central Bosnia.

11. President Izetbegovic stated his grave concern over the situation prevailing in Maglaj, and inquired the possibility of UNPROFOR's deployment in the pocket also in view of the latest Resolution 900. I said that I shared his concern over the situation but told him that we were so short of troops at this stage to take any immediate actions. (President Izetbevogic said that he would send a letter to the Security Council on Maglaj.) On Bihac, I

CZN-324 4/6

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stated that we would continue to try to provide our assistance, within our limits, in their endeavour to resolve the internal conflict with Mr. Abdic, as well as to continue our talks with the Serb side on containing the external attacks on the pocket.

Some observations

12. Regarding the LO issue in Tuzla airport, I do not see much possibility of bridging the wide gap between the two positions unless we succeed in persuading the Serbs to drop their insistence on LOs. I believe that, in light of the various assurances given (i.e., the presence of the Russians at the airport, limiting the use of the airport to the UNPROFOR and UNHCR flights only, and making the cargo manifests public) as well as due to the difference between Tuzla and Sarajevo (i.e., Sarajevo airport had been occupied by the Serbs prior to the reopening, while Tuzla airport has always been well within the BiH territory), we should aim at opening the airport without any LOs presence. In this regard, I have been working to obtain Russian diplomatic support in convincing the Serb side, and have spoken to Mr. Churkin today again on this matter.

13. Given the new political and strategic situations in BiH, the parties are no doubt reviewing their overall strategies and policies. In this context, I am inclined to believe that more UNPROFOR additional troops are very much in need between now and the conclusion of the political settlement to contain the situation on the ground, than it could be in the post-agreement period. For the time being, the BiH side is likely 1) to attempt to achieve full implementation of the Croat/Muslim cease-fire and cooperation, 2) to focus international attention on other contested areas such as Maglaj and Bihac, in order to prevent further territorial loses, and 3) to regain some territories from the Serbs, on the basis of renewed alliance with the Croats. The Bosnian Serb side is, as indicated by Dr. Karadzic, reviewing its "defense" strategy in light of the new developments. Dr. Karadzic said that if the Framework Agreement was to have anti-Serb nature, then the Serb side would claim 72 % of BiH territory, instead of less than the 50 % discussed up to now at ICFY. Thus the Washington accord seems to have opened the door to intensified fighting with the Serbs in Bosnia as well as in the UNPAs, and President Izetbegovic seems fully conscious of such adverse consequences which have arisen.

14. Best regards.

CZN-324

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TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE

Phase 1

- Ceasefire
- Interposition of troops
- Withdrawal of heavy weapons
- Establishment of Joint Commission

Phase 2

Utilities and Routes

In order to restore normality to the city of Sarajevo, the issue of utilities must be addressed. Targets and dates must be set to successfully reestablish these utilities with common agreement.

Issue	Responsibility	Date
Water		
- Opening supplies at:	UN Administrator	
- IRC Bentbasa.		Immediate
- Faletici) - Moscanica)	UNPR escorts reqd	
Gas		
- Semizovac valve to be opened		
- Raise gas pressure (Butila)	)	
- Opening of valves throughout Sarajevo - Zenica	)	
- Repair of damaged supply lines	) FoM UNPR escorts	
- Both sides to repair their own side.	) & engineers	
- UNPROFOR to escort near CFL.	)	
- Continuous maintenance arrangements	)	

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CZN-324 6/6

Electricity

• Repairs on existing lines - Raljevo - Vogosca - Raljevo - Buca Potok - Kakanj - Jablanica - Ugljevik - Banja Luka • Both sides to repair on their own side.	Repair switch on. Current supplied to all simultaneously Work on lines in the order listed here. UNPROFOR to assist escort.	Immediate

- Reconnaisance by helicopter of other lines.
  - Visegrad - Gorazde - Foca
  - Visegrad - Zvornik - Tuzla

Rubbish disposal

• Grbavica to Zuc via bridge (to be confirmed)	UNPROFOR Joint CPs

Telecommunications

- Political and military hotlines.
- Reestablishment of telephone lines across the city.

Routes around the city

- Grbavica bridge - Open road to Lukavica via Dobrinja - Airport road to Stup-Bijelo Polje-Lukavica - Stup flyover- Ilidza (direct road)	) UNPROFOR -) Controlled) Joint CPs

Routes in and out of Sarajevo

• Pale road - Vogosca - Visoko - Zenica - Mostar - Hadzici - Sarajevo	) UNPROFOR/Joint CPs

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Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Date : March 6,1994

To : INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ATTENTION : CO-CHAIRMEN

From : Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Pages : 1 including the cover page

COMMENTS :

Sirs,

Please find attached the letter of the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,H.E.Mr. Alija Izetbegovic relating to the problems of Bosnian Muslims in Sandjak.

Accept sirs assurences of my high consideration.

M Bijedic

Mustafa Bijedic
Ambassador

22bis rue Lamartine, 1203 Geneve tel. 022/345.88.44, 88 345.88.58, fax. 022/345 88 89

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
PRESIDENT
OF THE PRESIDENCY

Sarajevo, 4 March, 1991

Dear Sirs,

The delegates of the Muslim National Council of Sandžak, being legal and legitimate representatives of the Bosniac people who lives in the province of Sandžak, have addressed the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the request to be included in the negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosniacs in Bosnia and Sandžak are one nation and they lived in the same state until the Berlin Congress in 1878. By the decisions of the Congress the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina were altered, and Sandžak became disassociated from Bosnia and divided between Serbia and Montenegro. The people of Sandžak was exposed to various pressures and acts of violence between 1878 and 1945, massively migrating to either Bosnia or Turkey. The pressures on Muslims in Sandžak intensified upon the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, culminating with the war in Bosnia. Organized state terror over Bosniac minority has resulted in new migrations of Muslims from Sandžak, not lagging much behind the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having the world attention drawn to the tragedy in Bosnia, our people outside the Bosnian borders, exposed to the terror exercised by the same powers, and even same people who planned and committed genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been neglected.

Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia are actively involved in Geneva negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus creating conditions to overall settlement of national status of Serbs and Croats, but not of Muslims who live in the territories of former Yugoslavia. It is evident that the issue of the Bosniac-Muslim people outside Bosnia cannot be settled by occasional inclusion of the Working Group for Sandžak, that participated in the work of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia in London, the Hague and Geneva. Therefore, we consider it to be necessary to meet the request of the Muslim National Council of Sandžak and to include the representatives of this Council in the negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina as concerned party.

Please, Sirs, accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,
A. Izetbegović

Alija Izetbegović

Lord David Owen and Mr Thorwald Stoltenberg
co-Chairmen of the ICFY
Geneva

010/9

THE SANJAK COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

Address: Osmana Djikica 2, 36 300 Novi Pazar Sanjak, PO Box: 146
Tel/Fax: 381 20 29 312

2 March 1994,

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Committee of CSCE Senior Officials, Prague
and Center for Prevention of Conflict, Vienna

Dear Sirs:

By desolution of Yugoslavia numerous issues on future republics, regions and peoples in them have been actualized. Thus issue of Sanjak and Sanjak Muslims has been raised and internationalized.

Since the very beginning of the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina in April 1992, situation in Sanjak has become extremely dramatic. From Sanjak regions, being surrounded by tanks and canons and Yugoslav Army units thousands of refugees the frightened Muslim families set off towards European refugee camps. Real fear from spreading of the war and tragedy, happened to the Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina. On the other hand numerous robberies burning of property, mysterious abductions in of people in Sjeverin in October 1992, and 21 Muslims on the railway line Belgrade Bar in February 93, as well as frequent wanders into Pljevlja and Prijepolje region of paramilitary units from Bosnia and Hercegovina have increased removal of Muslim people from this region. All Muslim villages in the border line have been dissoluted, and the people from those villages can not get refugee status since Yugoslavia is not officially in war. Words that have been heard for a longer period from senior officials in Serbia and Montenegro, openly confirming that Muslims and Serbs can not leave together in Bosnia and Hercegovina open new dilemma among the Muslims whether it refers also to these parts. More and more Muslims are thinking over a mass removal of Muslims from Sanjak. Here should be mentioned that many Muslim experts have been dismissed from their posts, many streets and schools´ names have been changed. There is no higher school or university in Sanjak. The Muslims want to leave with other people in these parts together and on the principle of equality of their rights and thus no question on coexistence they put or ask, but the question is whether other peoples in this country wish the same and under what conditions.

I would like to remind you that migrations of Muslim people last from 1912, when Sanjak had been devided between Serbia and Montenegro in the Balkan Wars. Today, more Sanjak Muslims live in Turkey than here in Sanjak, and there is a saying that one had to go somewhere. In the former Yugoslavia Muslims had a constitutional status to be one of the Yugoslav nations. Today, in the Federal Yugoslavia when it is being spoken about peoples it is exclusively spoken about Serbs, Montenegrins. Hungarians and Albanians re treated as minorities. The Muslims are never even mentioned, except that they are more and more mentioned as a religious group.

Therefore, I would like to stress it here that Muslims are people and unseparable part of Muslim people in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Alongside with events in Sanjak Montenegrin and Serbian police carry out searches of Muslim houses searching for weapons. Where a rifle is found a person is accused that he wanted to create "Republic of Sanjak", as if somebody could have started a war against so powerful military techniques, stationed in this region. Muslim leaders and Muslim institutions are constantly being presented as very dangerous and the war-mongering propaganda presents Muslims of Sanjak, persistently as fanatics and Djihadians, trying to justify the policy, which is authorities are applying here. The Sanjak Committee for Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms possesses large number documents from 1991 to now on different forms of violation of human rights and freedoms, about which we have timely informed domestic and foreign institutions. We had not very much of help and understanding. Representatives of humanitarian and other institutions who were comming to Sanjak could see on their own situation of human rights and freedoms in Sanjak.

Main problem of Sanjak is not the weapons found among the Muslims but in security and equality of this people. I would like to point out that Muslims make only 3.14 percent of the entire population in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and it is absurd to persuade anybody that they make a danger in this state.

Therefore please, within the framework of your competencies, take situation in Sanjak under your consideration and influence on the authorities the police torture to be stopped and Muslims to be guaranteed all citizen´s and national rights in accordance with the UN Charter and the Hague Declaration, to be truly applied.

Finally, we request the CSCE Mission to be returned in Sanjak, which would also help the tensions to calmed down and a start of democratic dialogue in atmosphere of peace and tolerance.

Safet Bandzovic
President

cc
Emassies in Belgrade
Intermnational Conference
on Foremer Yugoslavia in Geneva

FAX OUT = 105
ZAY = 020
T = 290

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OUTGOING FAX NO.: FAX 914	DATE: 2 MARCH 94
TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB AKASHI
FAX NO.:	FAX NO.:
ATTN:	DRAFTER:
INFO: ANNAN UNATIONS NEW YORK, GHAREKHAN UNATIONS NEW YORK, STOLTENBERG ICFY GENEVA, COT UNPROFOR ZAGREB, ROSE BHC FORWARD SARAJEVO FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: REPORT OF T-55 TANKS MOVING -27 FEB 94	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, COS	

MESSAGE

1. At 0315 there was a report by an UNMO team of a convoy of 7 tanks moving North from BP 8057. However this sighting was never corroborated and Sector Sarajevo had insufficient troops to react quickly to the incident.

2. Although the UNMO grid reference was incorrect it was possible that some tanks moved from the repair plant at Hadzici. We cannot confirm their whereabouts, though if there were tanks, it is unlikely they are now within the exclusion zone.

3. However what is clear is that the ceasefire and demilitarisation plan is holding and that the weapon sites are controlled.

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94 MAR -2 17:44

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CODED CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
ROSE/ANDREEV, UNPROFOR BH COMMAND

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

Y. Akashi

CODED CABLE

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DATE: 02 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: Z-330

SUBJECT: MY VISIT TO MOSTAR, TUZLA AND VITEZ

1. I had very useful visits to Mostar, Tuzla and Vitez on 28 February and 1 March. I believe my visits may have contributed to normalising the situation in BiH after the NATO shooting down of four Serb airplanes on 28 February. (I talked to Dr. Karadzic on the phone from East Mostar on 28 February, who assured me that the Bosnian Serbs were not "dramatizing" the incident.) Please find below the highlights of my visit.

Mostar

2. In East Mostar, I met with the local authorities, the key figures amongst them being S. Klaric (President of the War Presidency of the Municipality of Mostar), S. Orucevic (President of the SDA party in Mostar) and Gen. Drekovic (Commander of BiH Army IV Corps). They appealed to me to assist them in improving the living conditions in East Mostar, which I found to be indeed appalling : we need to restore water and power urgently, as well as continue to provide them with humanitarian assistance. The authorities emphasized that the solution to the Mostar problem was crucial to the overall peace between the Muslims and Croats in BiH, and that any administration of Mostar should be based on the principles that 1) Mostar should be an open and unified city, and 2) Mostar should be an integral and constituent part of BiH. They also insisted that an international commission be established to investigate the war crimes and human rights violations during the war between Muslims and Croats, and that the criminals be brought to justice. I impressed upon them with the new positive momentums created thus far in BiH such as the Sarajevo cease-fire and Delic/Roso cease-fire agreement, and assured them that Mostar is on top of our priority list of concern. I asked for their support to our current efforts by urging their compliance with the cease-fire agreement. When I walked around the old part of East Mostar together with Mr. Klaric, I could not help feeling the overwhelming expectations amongst the population on our

SSN-306

2/3

efforts to improve their dire conditions of life.

3. In West Mostar, I met with the Bosnian Croat authorities represented by Dr. Prlic (Prime Minister of "Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia") and Mr. Bender (Speaker of the Bosnian Croat Assembly) and others. While we did not discuss the latest Washington talks, I noted their distinct reference to "Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia and its capital Mostar". They stated that they fully support the current Sarajevo cease-fire, and that they would comply with the Delic/Roso agreement. Dr. Prlic registered his concern over the possible BiH troop movements out of Sarajevo towards Central Bosnia to fight against the Bosnian Croats. He stated that while Bosnian Croats support peace, they need to have a "stable peace". I emphasized the importance of maintaining the current positive momentum with cooperation from the parties.

4. Dr. Prlic (like Dr. Karadzic on the phone) was particularly concerned about the recent press reports regarding the possible change of procedures for clearing convoys in BiH, and asserted that there would be no obstructions created by HVO against humanitarian convoys. I, together with the Special Envoy of UNHCR Mr. Morris, welcomed his new guarantee for unimpeded convoy passage through HVO-controlled areas, and informed him that, while we hoped that the current convoy clearing procedures would be simplified given the new guarantees for freedom of movement, we were not changing the procedures unilaterally.

Tuzla

5. In Tuzla, I met with the BiH authorities, key figures being Mr. Beslagic (Mayor of Tuzla), Mr. Kulenovic (newly appointed Minister for Tuzla Region) and Gen. Sadic (Commander of BiH Army 2 Corps). BiH Army has already started the withdrawal of its troops from Tuzla airport, in preparation for the handing over of facilities to UNPROFOR. I reiterated our determination to open the airport for humanitarian flights, but informed them that there were no fixed dates. The authorities stated that the negotiations on steps towards the opening of the airport were handled by the central government, but assured me that the local views were fully incorporated. In this context, the authorities registered their objection to the placement of Liaison Officers from the parties at the airport, (we had been informed by the central government previously), while they did not state their objection to the Russian troops as a part of UNPROFOR presence at the airport. I took note of this, and said that we would modify the previous Aide Memoire so as to make it more acceptable to both sides.

6. On the humanitarian situation in the region, Mr. Beslagic stated that they have survived the winter without major disasters. However, he emphasized the importance of continuing efforts by UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies particularly in providing seeds as well as the international community's assistance in restoring the

SJN-306

3/3

city's water and power supplies. In this context, he stressed again the importance of the airport to supplement the land corridors, and requested that UNHCR establish its logistics centre in Tuzla for BiH, once the airport is opened. He also stated that the railway should be opened from Tuzla to Gunja (Croatia) through Brcko and to Doboj.

Vitez

7. During my short stay in the Vitez pocket, I visited the small BiH pocket as well as the HVO side. The BritBatt had established a check point at the entrance of the BiH pocket, and the freedom of movement into the small pocket had been obtained.

Some Observations

8. I feel that a positive atmosphere had been created in each location where I visited. I was impressed by the high expectations of the population regarding UNPROFOR's activities on bringing about durable peace. In this perspective, I cannot overemphasize the vital importance of our urgent action to obtain additional troops, so as to allow us to maintain the momentum and to implement our tasks on the ground. The current cease-fire is extremely fragile unless it is soon sustained by additional tangible progress through substantial reinforcements. Such an opportunity is most unlikely to recur for sometime to come.

ENDALL

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Attn: MARC VAN WYNSBURGHE CVAO	Drafter : Releasing Off: Title/rank :
Info. : SRSG/ COS, KISELJAK/ SECTOR COMMANDER & CIVIL AFFAIRS, SARAJEVO/ ALL OTHER CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICES Fax No.:	
Subject: MEETING WITH DR KARADZIC ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	
Internal Distribution: BH COMMANDER	

MESSAGE

1. Met in Pale with Dr Karadzic who was accompanied by Prof. Koljevic and General Gvero, to discuss the draft agreement for freedom of movement requested by the High-Level Committee for Cooperation. Had previously made arrangements to meet just with Koljevic but on arrival it was explained that the Bosnian Serb side had a number of serious concerns to be immediately addressed, by a delegation led by Karadzic.

Karadzic registered strong protest and said their side was most concerned that UNPROFOR was not fulfilling its commitment of the 9th February agreement on a ceasefire in and around Sarajevo. He stressed that the BiH side was flagrantly violating the agreement and UNPROFOR was doing nothing to prevent this. Several people have been killed since the signing of the agreement. They have evidence of the BiH side digging trenches and advancing towards their positions in several locations, e.g. towards the Jewish Cemetary from Skenderija direction, from Dobrinja towards Mojmilo, from Vojnicko Polje towards Nedzarici and from Brijesce towards Rajlovac.

C2G-95
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3/4

Karadzic also said he intended to write a strong protest to the SG, the SC and the SRSG demanding the withdrawal of all BiH forces to the positions they held before 9 February. The experience of the Bosnian Serb side with the BiH side is that they inch their way forward as they did on Igman and Bjelasnica.

Under the circumstances, he therefore considered it premature to open the routes to Zenica and the Bratstva-Jedinstva bridge as proposed for unrestricted use by UNPROFOR and the UNHCR. Especially in the case of Bratstva-Jedinstva bridge between the city and Grbavica, where they are expecting BiH infantry to take advantage of the convoys to get to the other side. They are concerned because this road cuts through Serb positions and they feel at this juncture it is better to make a small step forward and concentrate on civilian traffic on the proposed routes, rather than risk disastrous consequences. He reiterated their commitment to freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR, but not unrestricted and with routine checks on one checkpoint on the confrontation line, which they consider to be the border.

They agreed to buses on the two proposed roads, and to pedestrian movement across the Bratstva-Jedinstva bridge. He reiterated agreement to freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR but at this juncture not unimpeded movement and not at the confrontation line which they consider the border.

Karadzic said he saw it as a first step to allow total freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR but as a future step, once sufficient trust has been built, and especially after the BiH infantry returns to the positions they held before the 9th February. He proposed that the paragraphs of the draft agreement be deleted dealing with the unconditional and unrestricted freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR on the proposed routes and the Bratstva-Jedinstva bridge.

He also voiced alarm at the statement made by the BH Commander yesterday, that UNPROFOR would not allow the city to be divided, and said this was not UNPROFOR's decision, but would be made via the negotiating table in Geneva and New York.

Explained to Karadzic that the BH Commander and Sarajevo Sector Commander yesterday went specifically to evaluate the situation on the ground with regard to the alleged digging of trenches by the BiH side. Instructions have been given to UNPROFOR units to patrol between the two sides in sensitive areas, to mark the position of trenches in sensitive areas, and to photograph present trench positions.

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2. In seperate discussion with Karadzic, at his request, he mentioned that their side is considering, subsequent to the attempt by the BiH side and the Croat side to form a confoderated state, the comprehensive solution for the problem of the former Yugoslavia on the basis of 2 states: Croatia and the Muslim side of Bosnia; and all the Serb states. The proposal includes exchanges of territory between Serbs, Croats and Muslims with Sector East joining Serb territory, Sector West, all the Pink Zones and part of the UNPA's going to Croatia, and includes access to the sea for the Serb state at Prevlaka.

He said if a confederation of Muslim Bosnia and Croatia materialised, the Serbs would have no choice but to unite.

/... ENDALL

best regards

UNOG Intecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations
UNPROFOR
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FEB 24 17:

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010/9

CZN=259
CZG=82

CODE RESTRICTED

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 94 FEB 24 17:05

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ONLY ONLY

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA MOST IMMEDIATE

GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: AKASHI, ZAGREB

DATE: 24 February 1994

NUMBER: Z=286

MOST IMMEDIATE

BR

SUBJECT: Meeting between PM Silajdzic and the SG

With reference to your MSC-542, the following are suggested speaking points:

(a) On withdrawal from and regrouping of heavy weapons within 20 km exclusion zone: Verification arrangements are fully in place (36 land teams, helicopters, some counter-battery radars but more to come, NATO air surveillance) and every effort is being made to tighten the control of weapons that remain scattered (not a significant number) but have been made inoperable through the removal of vital parts and ammunition.

(b) On Sarajevo, tasks that could be entrusted to a possible UN "Civilian Coordinator", should the Security Council request the Secretary-General to appoint such a person: enhanced political liaison, rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure, services and utilities, general coordination, planning and promotion of such activities, revival of trade, reopening of land and air routes as well as of crossing points within Sarajevo with a view to restoring freedom of movement of people, hence confidence between the two sides (note that although BH Government was opposed to the notion of a UN Administration of Sarajevo prior to a global settlement, President Izetbegovic recently stated in a press interview that he would contemplate it as a temporary solution, pending a determination of the final status of Sarajevo).

(c) It is essential that BH Government fully respect (1) cease-fire in and around and refrain from launching any ground attacks out of Sarajevo city or into 20 km zone; (2) cease-fire signed on 21 February with Bosnian Croat side so as to bring combats in Central Bosnia to a halt (this could end the siege of Mostar and fighting around Vitez and Kiseljak and enable UNPROFOR and UNHCR to reopen Route Lifeline, the main humanitarian corridor from the coast to Sarajevo and Central Bosnia).

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(d) Prime Minister Silajdzić should also be encouraged not to seek further territorial gains from the Bosnian Serbs through military means, in Central and Northern Bosnia.

(e) On Tuzla Airport: UNPROFOR will continue to negotiate its reopening with Bosnian Serbs, after the Canadian/Dutch rotation in Srebrenica is completed. No deadline should be set so as not to provoke Serbs but UNPROFOR has every intention of proceeding, with or without Serb agreement, but giving the latter all practical guarantees that the airport will only be used for UNHCR/UNPROFOR humanitarian/resupply/rotation purposes.

(f) On Bihać: UNPROFOR is attempting to promote dialogue through an early meeting between the Central Government and Mr. Abdić, the autonomist leader.

(g) Recent restoration of "balance of power", to which Mr. Silajdzić has made many references as of late, should also be an encouragement for the Bosnian Presidency side to display greater flexibility at the Geneva talks.

Endall

CONFIDENTIAL
BY COREU
FROM LORD OWEN'S OFFICE

ICFY: CO-CHAIRMEN'S VISIT TO ZAGREB - 23 FEBRUARY 1994

SUMMARY

1. Co-Chairmen discuss way forward in Bosnia with Akashi and Annan. Akashi keen to build on current positive momentum, but worried that unrealistic demands will be placed on UNPROFOR without any strengthening of their resources and undue emphasis attached to repeating the "Sarajevo approach" elsewhere. All agreed on importance of avoiding the de facto division of Sarajevo. Akashi concerned about international pressure to reopen Tuzla airport. Akashi interested in idea of EU administration of Mostar beginning before overall settlement if conditions right. Lord Owen believes this question should be considered urgently by the EU.

DETAIL

2. As part of their regular series of meetings, the Co-Chairmen visited Zagreb on 23 February to meet UN Special Representative Akashi. Their visit coincided with that of Under-Secretary Annan, who participated in their meeting.

3. Akashi outlined his general strategy of building on the current positive momentum. This would first involve solidifying peace in Sarajevo, establishing freedom of movement, improving infrastructure and normalising life. UNPROFOR would then try to get ceasefires in other safe areas and in areas such as Mostar, and move on to more global arrangements such as the general Croat/Muslim ceasefire which was negotiated at the time of our meeting by Delic and Roso at Pleso airport. (Akashi, when informed by telephone that the parties might be tempted to leave without reaching a result, showed the resoluteness of his character by telling Cot's staff to "move the beds in". Later an agreement was reached.)

Akashi emphasised the importance he attached to frequent meetings with the Co-Chairmen in order to ensure that the global ICFY approach coincided with the ground up approach being pursued by UNPROFOR.

4. There was a long discussion about the way forward in Sarajevo, and in particular how the UN could avoid being trapped in to overseeing a de facto division of the city, which was the last thing they or the Co-Chairmen wanted. De Mello, who had just come from Sarajevo, described the situation on the ground, emphasising that the siege had not yet been lifted - check points were still in place. Lord Owen pointed out that as they were talking there was a debate in the Security Council as to whether there should be a political figure as Administrator or an official as Coordinator, which reflected in part the American wish not to close the option on a deal with the Serbs which would avoid the need for a UN administration of Sarajevo. The general consensus was that

introducing UN administration as soon as possible offered the best chance of ensuring that the confrontation line did not become a permanent "green line", and this did not foreclose the option of the Serbs agreeing to give up significant parts of Sarajevo, though no one thought this likely, and that the exclusion zone as at present in place suited the Serbs. It would take a figure as administrator with real political clout and access to resources, if the Serbs were to be cajoled into bringing down the barricades and genuinely opening up the city. Appointing a technician, however well qualified, to coordinate the restoration of power, water, and other elements of normal life (on which a lot of progress had in any case been made, according to Akashi) might not achieve this. It was felt that the Bosnian government who had voiced the loudest opposition to a UN Administrator were possibly doing so without realising the full consequences. All agreed that whatever was agreed by the Security Council, there would have to be a very clear understanding of what the UN role in Sarajevo would be. Lord Owen feared that Sarajevo could become a fifth UNPA following the abysmal situation in Croatia where the Serbs completely controlled their areas.

6. Akashi was very worried about the importance being attached to opening Tuzla airport on 7 March come what may. He had never agreed this date and wanted more time for negotiations with the Serbs. The Co-Chairmen noted that Russian involvement, such as the 50 airport monitors that had been offered by Kozyrev, could sweeten the pill for the Serbs, and that Churkin was pursuing a negotiated solution. Annan remarked that UNPROFOR had already had difficulties with the Bosnian government about the deployment of the 400 Russian troops to Sarajevo.

7. The Co-Chairmen warned Akashi that pressure in the EU and NATO and in the wider international community to go ahead with reopening Tuzla airport was intense, and would be hard to resist. Obviously Mostar, after the ceasefire, was the highest priority, but Akashi would have to explain publicly if he felt that the opening of Tuzla had to be delayed. Lord Owen suggested that it might be possible for EU administration of Mostar to begin ahead of an overall settlement, if the UN thought this appropriate, though he warned that the EU had made their offer only in the context of an overall settlement.

It might be easier to have a political figure accepted as administrator in Mostar than in Sarajevo, and establish its worth.

8. There was a brief discussion, before Lord Owen's departure to meet the US Ambassador to Croatia, of the UNPROFOR mandate which comes up for renewal at the end of March. Annan was keen that the associated report to the Secretary General should reflect the changing situation, and not just portray business as usual. Member states had to face up to the fact that peace had a price and that meant more troops. Lord Owen warned against expecting more troops and noted the importance of maintaining flexibility for deploying within the Former Yugoslavia as shown by the ability to

rapidly redeploy troops from Croatia to Sarajevo. Annan and Akashi agreed, but mentioned that the Russian deployment to Sarajevo had initially been opposed by the Krajina Serbs.

9. Lord Owen deliberately did not see anyone form the Croatian government, feeling it wiser to let the US pursue their Croat/Muslim initiative without any possible misunderstanding or offering the Croats to play the Co-Chairmen off against the Americans. Lord Owen had a full discussion, however, with Ambassador Galbraith.

10. Lord Owen will be seeing Churkin at the weekend in the UK and will be able to raise any points which ministers might wish to raise with him if ministers contact him before hand at Leeds Castle on 44-622-880362 (telephone, 24hrs) or 44-622-880545 (fax).

CZN- 240
CZG- 072

OUTGOING
CODE RESTRICTED UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
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SSN- 210
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'94 FEB 21 19:06

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTELNBERG, GENEVA
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 21 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: Z-267

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DR. KARADZIC AND PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC

Please find attached two notes of meetings with Dr. Karadzic and President Izetbegovic held on Friday, 18 February 1994 for your information.

Regards.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations
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UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
94 FEB 21 19:19

C2N-240
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A MEETING WITH DR KARADZIC, 'PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC SRPSKA', MR KRAJISNIK, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND GENERAL GALIC, COMMANDER OF THE SARAJEVO ROMANIJA CORPS.

1. Both Mr Akashi and Dr Karadzic acknowledged that the current peace effort in Sarajevo could, if successful, act as a model for peace throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and signal the start of the end of the war. This meeting was thus taking place at a critical juncture in which there was a need for a clear understanding between all sides in order to avoid a disaster. Failure to seize this opportunity could, Mr Akashi noted, result in history judging the participants severely.

2. Dr Karadzic thanked Mr Akashi for his prompt response to his invitation to meet and said that there was a need to hold regular meetings in order to allow the momentum for peace to continue. Mr Akashi concurred with this opinion, stating that the United Nations was fully conscious that the future of the Bosnian people was at stake and every effort would be made to secure peace for all ethnic groups. He assured Dr Karadzic that he would act in accordance with Security Council resolutions and the authority given to him by the Secretary-General and he hoped that the Bosnian Serbs would be confident of his impartiality and objectivity.

3. Dr Karadzic welcomed the assurance that UNPROFOR's actions would be dictated by Security Council resolutions with which his side was fully ready to comply with. He claimed to have no knowledge of the NAC decisions and sought clarification on the issue of the Pale exclusion zone - was this a straight line or a circle around Pale?

4. Turning to the Sarajevo agreement, Dr Karadzic again said that this should serve as a model for the whole of BH and, as such, there was a need to ensure that nothing was left unsaid or unclarified. The specific issues which the Serbs required clarification on were the following:-

a) the exact definition of heavy weapons. It was their opinion that the definition that should be applied was that of international law. This would allay the psychological fears of the Serb population over the inability of the BSA to defend them if they handed in all their weapons.

b) would the Serbs be allowed to retrieve their weapons to defend themselves if attacked by the Bosnian Muslims? In this regard, Dr Karadzic raised the fear of an attack by Muslim infantry on Serb positions from without the exclusion zone. He believed that if UNPROFOR did not control the tunnel under the Sarajevo airport, this would be used by Muslim troops to exit the city and launch an attack from the Visoko area. He insisted on the Serb right to retrieve their weapons for self-defence, noting the necessity for such action in view of the imbalance between Serb artillery and Muslim infantry.

5. In response to the issues raised by Dr Karadzic, General Cot noted that there was a need for a common definition of heavy weapons by all sides. He recommended that this technical issue be addressed in the Joint Commission Meeting to be chaired by General Soubirou. General Rose assured Dr Karadzic that it was the intention of UNPROFOR to place troops in sensitive areas in order to reassure vulnerable populations of their security.

It was also proposed to have a single or double line of troops interposed between forces and, along with regular patrols, it was hoped that this would demonstrate the lack of need for weapons in such areas.

6. On the issue of self-defence, General Rose noted that it would not be possible for the Muslims to attack Serb regrouping centres due to the presence of UNPROFOR at such sites. However, in the event of such an action, UNPROFOR would provide the first line of defence but, it was also understood that if the Serbs wished to withdraw their weapons, for example in the face of a massive attack, there was nothing UNPROFOR could do to stop them. It was hoped that such an eventuality would not occur as it would indicate a total breakdown of the peace process in Sarajevo.

7. Turning to UNPROFOR control of weapons, General Rose said that there was a need for full political support for the operation. The need to avoid any mis-understanding on the exercise was critical as weapons in the exclusion zone would be visible both from the air and the ground. Consequently, verification of control on the ground needed to coincide with air reconnaissance and this could only be done through regular daily patrols of such sites by both UNMOs and UNPROFOR troops. It was in the Serbs interest, and their best form of insurance, if their compliance could be physically demonstrated by providing full freedom of movement to UNPROFOR to inspect such sites. It would also be necessary to establish hot lines with Serb HQs in order to respond to any queries from the air with immediate coordinated verification on the ground.

8. Dr Karadzic agreed to the need for patrols but suggested that all UNPROFOR patrols in BSA territory be accompanied by a BSA liaison officer and an interpreter. The first was necessary to ensure that Muslims did not attack UNPROFOR on BSA territory and blame it on the Serbs, while the second would enable the patrols to talk to the local Serb population, thereby fostering good will and understanding between them and UNPROFOR. In addition, the BSA would inform all the necessary checkpoints of the movement of UNPROFOR patrols in order to ensure that they were given full cooperation. However, in order to do this, UNPROFOR would need to provide the BSA with the necessary communications equipment to maintain contact with both its liaison officers and check-point positions.

9. General Rose stated his intention to base an UNPROFOR liaison officer at BSA HQ along with the communications equipment necessary for the establishment of hot lines between UNPROFOR and all BSA HQs. He insisted, however, that if the BSA was unable to provide a liaison officer when required, UNPROFOR was to be free to go on patrol without one. The patrols would, nonetheless, inform BSA HQ of their destination irrespective of whether or not they were escorted by a liaison officer. Dr Karadzic did not agree to a proposal from General Rose to allow some patrols to be conducted by helicopters, stating that this method of transport was too dangerous given the numerous confrontation lines that would be passed and the greater possibility of them being shot down by the Muslim side.

10. Turning to the number of regrouping centres for heavy weapons and forces, Dr Karadzic and General Galic insisted that the Serbs be given a minimum of ten sites for regroupment due to the practical problem of withdrawing weapons in such a limited time and in the current bad weather conditions. They would, over time, reduce this number to seven, excluding Lukavica.

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11. Mr Akashi said that the issue of control was highly sensitive and that UNPROFOR was already being criticized for being too flexible on this issue. Thus, there was a need to insist on stringent control in a limited number of sites, five or six at the maximum. While it was recognized that in the process of regroupment, the number of sites might be more than this, it was essential that the number be reduced in as short as time as possible in order to avoid accusations of a lack of seriousness on the part of the Serbs. UNPROFOR was pleased at the cooperation given by the Serbs to date and, if more could be done by 20 February, we would be willing to go public that encouraging progress towards full compliance had been made but that more time would need to be given to complete the process. This could not be done, however, unless there was agreement on the urgency of making substantial and demonstrable progress before the expiration of the NATO deadline. If not, the situation would be exploited by those who wished to launch air strikes against Serb positions.

12. Dr Karadzic concurred with Mr Akashi that the process should not be stalled by the NATO deadline and said that it was the intention of the BSA to attempt to complete its regroupment by mid-night of 19 February. He proposed that the number of sites be seven, again excluding Lukavica. After some negotiations, this number was agreed, conditional on an UNPROFOR control presence also being maintained in Lukavica, and the regroupment process being completed in as short a time as possible. In addition, it was also agreed that the Serb proposals for the location of the seven sites would be subject to discussion in the Joint Commission and that the final decision would rest with the Chairman, General Soubirou. It was further agreed that the UNPROFOR would deploy a 20-30 man armed military presence in each site to secure weapons and that patrols could start at 1200 hrs the following day.

13. In response to a query by General Cot on reports of Serb withdrawal of weapons from the exclusion zone, Dr Karadzic said that the Serbs had taken more than 50% of their weapons outside of the exclusion zone and intended to remove more that day. He noted that the total number of weapons UNPROFOR would be required to control would be less than 50%. General Cot said that it would be important that this information be made public in order to avoid a mis-understanding regarding the reported number of weapons in the exclusion zone and the final amount UNPROFOR would be controlling.

14. Several additional points raised by Dr Karadzic included:-

- a request for UNPROFOR to control the tunnel under the Sarajevo airport runway to ensure it was not used by Muslims to deploy infantry to Central Bosnia.

- a reiteration of a request, allegedly agreed to by Generals Mackenzie and Morillon, that the Serbs be allowed to use Sarajevo airport communications equipment or, alternatively, that there be free passage for all through the airport. The Serbs asked that this item be discussed in the next few days.

- a demand that there be an eventual withdrawal of Muslim forces from Igman.

- a request for fuel in order to maintain roads and allow the BSA to withdraw their weapons.

15. The meeting ended with UNPROFOR presenting an oral draft protocol on the

agreements reached at the meeting. The protocol contained the following three points:-

1. Effective 1200 hrs on 19 February 1994, there would be unrestricted movement for UNPROFOR verification control in the 20km exclusion zone without prior clearance but giving prior notice to BSA HQ. When possible, such patrols would be accompanied by BSA liaison officers. BSA check-points would be informed of patrols to avoid delays.

2. Direct and permanent communications (hot lines) would be established between UNPROFOR and BSA Headquarters.

3. There would be placement of UNPROFOR permanent armed presence for control purposes at seven mutually agreed sites and Lukavica Corps HQ, if possible by 2400 hrs on 19 February 1994, and not later than 2400 hrs on 20 February 1994.

B MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC, VICE-PRESIDENT GANIC AND GENERAL DAHIC AT THE SARAJEVO PRESIDENCY.

1. Mr Akashi briefed President Izetbegovic on his meeting with Dr Karadzic, noting that the main emphasis of his talks had been on the need to take full advantage of the momentum for peace in Sarajevo. While a lot of details still remained to be discussed, Dr Karadzic had agreed that verification and control procedures by UNPROFOR should start at noon the following day. He had also agreed to try to withdraw and regroup Serb weapons by 2400 hrs of 19 February 1994.

2. President Izetbegovic asked whether the Serbs had decided to withdraw or concentrate their forces. Mr Akashi said that they would be doing both and that the exercise was being taken very seriously by UNPROFOR, which would deploy 20-30 armed soldiers at each site to ensure compliance. While the process would be an ongoing one, Mr Akashi had emphasized the need for rapidity to the Bosnian Serbs.

3. Continuing, Mr Akashi said that UNPROFOR would continue negotiating to ensure a durable ceasefire and peace in Sarajevo, with a view to extending the model throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The reinforcement of UNPROFOR troops in the city would, it was hoped, provide the necessary reassurances to both sides. He hoped that the Bosnian side would cooperate with the process and comply with its obligations under the agreement.

4. President Izetbegovic gave his assurances for cooperation and stated that it was the Bosnian' intention to also regroup by mid-night of the following day, most probably in only one location as opposed to the two they had originally proposed. The Bosnians would also be withdrawing weapons from the exclusion zone, as had been done by the Serbs. It was hoped that UNPROFOR would do all possible to ensure respect by the BSA side, including intervening if necessary, as there were real fears of the Serbs having hidden weapons in the exclusion zone.

5. Mr Akashi said that in order to allay the fears of the population, UNPROFOR would have strict verification procedures to ensure compliance. However, there was a need to take the process further - to disarm the city completely in order that normal life could be resumed.

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Agreeing with President Izetbegovic that this was a first step towards peace, Mr Akashi said that the first step was often the most difficult and also the largest.

6. With regard to the concerns raised by the President over the deployment of Russian troops in Sarajevo, Mr Akashi assured the President that these troops would be operating under the full control of the United Nations. He further stated that it was BH Command's intention to deploy these troops in multi-national patrols which would also include Muslims. It was hoped that the presence of the Russian troops would facilitate Serb cooperation on the overall process.

7. Dr Ganic took the opportunity to raise his concerns about the situation in Bihac, a situation which had deteriorated while the focus was on Sarajevo. He said that despite the fact that Bihac was a safe area, nothing was being done by either UNPROFOR or the Security Council to ensure that the Serb attacks on the pocket were halted. In order to demonstrate to the population Sarajevo's concern, there was a need for UNPROFOR to provide assistance in transporting a delegation to Bihac as well as to Gorazde and other cut-off pockets.

8. President Izetbegovic agreed on the need for a delegation to visit Bihac in order to ameliorate the situation in the pocket. He said, however, that the issue of Bihac and Tuzla airport could be addressed after the Sarajevo situation had been resolved.

9. Mr Akashi informed the President that the issue of Bihac was on UNPROFOR's agenda and that he would soon inform him of the initiatives being taken in that regard. Unfortunately, the media were only interested in one issue - Sarajevo - to the detriment of others. However, UNPROFOR would continue to support the Bosnian concerns despite the fact that it was unable to do all it wanted due to a lack of resources and, in some cases, mandate.

10. General Cot concurred with the comments of Mr Akashi but pointed out that there were two problems in Bihac:- the BSA confrontation line and the internal Abdic confrontation line. As regards the latter, the concept of a safe area did not apply and UNPROFOR was required to maintain absolute impartiality on this matter.

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CZS-068

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'94 FEB 20 18:07

IMMEDIATE 94 FEB 20 17:56

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
ROSE, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

NUMBER: ~~22~~ - 261

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1994

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH DR. KARADZIC AND PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC

1. Further to my meetings with Dr. Karadzic and President Izetvegovic on 18 February, I returned to Sarajevo/Pale yesterday to meet with them again to accelerate the on-going process of demilitarization and disengagement.

Meeting with Dr. Karadzic in Pale on 19 February

2. Although Dr. Karadzic repeatedly expressed his concern over the possible attacks or provocations from the Muslim side and insisted that the lines of 9 February must be maintained, the Bosnian Serb side appears to be taking the necessary steps towards the compliance with the principles agreed on 6 February. The following are the major points raised in the meeting :

1) Regarding the definition of UNPROFOR "control" of re-grouped weapons, Dr. Karadzic raised no objection to our definition, although he emphasized their right to self-defense, therefore the right of regaining their weapons in the event of attacks from the Muslim side. I reiterated UNPROFOR's determination in having both sides adhere to the current cease-fire, adding that its reinforced presence should be considered as the security guarantee for the Serb side.

2) Dr. Karadzic reiterated the Bosnian Serb commitment to the withdrawal from or regrouping of heavy weapons in the 20 km exclusion zone. However, due to the weather conditions and the very short time left before the deadline, he stated that there may be some weapons which could not be moved from the current positions on time. He stated that BSA will notify UNPROFOR regarding all those weapons, and may either request UNPROFOR's technical/logistical support in moving the guns, or request UNPROFOR's monitoring on the sites until such time when the guns can be physically removed. [BSA has informed UNPROFOR that there are approximately 20 of those positions, and our UNMOs are in the process of verifying all sites. I told Dr. Karadzic that those guns

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would have to be "neutralized" (i.e., making them inoperative) with UNPROFOR assistance, and would have to be regrouped or withdrawn as soon as possible.

3) Dr. Karadzic also reiterated that UNPROFOR elements should be deployed on all sites, and should have complete freedom of movement in the entire zone, as agreed to previously. [As at 14.00 20 Feb, UNPROFOR is yet to be deployed in 2 of the 8 sites, due to the difficult weather conditions. We are requesting the use of helicopters to reach those sites, given the extreme importance of UNPROFOR presence on all sites.]

4) Dr. Karadzic also informed us of the BSA weapon repair plant in Hadzic in the 20 km exclusion zone, and wanted to continue the maintenance and repair of their weapons, with UNPROFOR monitoring. [Please also see below para. 4-4)]

3. Dr. Karadzic also expressed his eagerness to open direct routes into/around Sarajevo by establishing joint UNPROFOR/BSA or BiH checkpoints. I responded to him by expressing my eagerness to maintain the momentum of the current process, which I hope will lead us eventually to the opening of routes and to the UN administration of Sarajevo, as well as my hope for the possibility of the Sarajevo model being applied to other critical areas in BiH.

Meeting with President Izetbegovic

4. While he stated his appreciation to UNPROFOR's effort in the demilitarization and disengagement process in/around Sarajevo, I noted the negative shift in President Izetbegovic's attitude on the current process in the meeting this morning. According to President Izetbegovic, there are following 4 "deficiencies" in the on-going process :

1) The Serb side has "dictated" in deciding 8 regrouping sites which are all well-known positions from which the city has been shelled in the past 22 months, as opposed to the 5 sites previously agreed by the parties;

2) One of the regrouping sites is in the heavily populated area in Corbavica only 200 meters from the centre of Sarajevo, which would make it impossible for NATO to do airstrikes even in case of Serb firing; [He also claimed that 15 tanks have been gathered in this area - UNPROFOR is verifying this information.]

3) He stated if in fact 20 % of the heavy weapons in the exclusion zone remain outside of UNPROFOR's control, it should constitute a clear violation of the agreement. He and particularly Vice President Ganic emphasized that the Serbs are to be blamed for their non-actions in the past 7 days, and therefore should not be excused by the weather conditions.

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4) He stressed that no access to the gathered weapons should be granted to the Serb side, particularly for maintenance or repair purposes. I noted this point, and promised him that we would raise this matter with the Serb side.

Some Observations

5. I emphasized to President Izetbegovic that the 8 sites are simply the interim sites, and they will be reduced to 5 sites rapidly as previously agreed. I believe that the two key issues for the success of our current process are 1) the deployment of UNPROFOR elements on all sites before the "deadline" and the establishment of control of weapons, satisfactory to both sides (in this regard, UNPROFOR should not be seen "side by side" with the BSA elements as I observed in Lukavica today), on those sites, and 2) those weapons which will remain in the 20 km zone without full UNPROFOR control should be made "unusable" by UNPROFOR until they are either withdrawn or regrouped. (When I met with Mr. Churkin briefly in Sarajevo today, I requested him to transmit to the Serb side our concerns over the Serbs raising new technical points.)

6. Our UNPROFOR personnel in BiH questioned, as a mid to long term concern, the destination of Serb heavy weapons withdrawn from the area. [This was not raised by President Izetbegovic.] It is assessed that BSA may be moving those weapons to the Brcko, Gorazde or Olovo areas. The military situation in those areas may intensify as a result.

7. Despite all our efforts, I have observed the continuing tendency by the Bosnian side to feed and encourage the "incident hungry" press in Sarajevo. I shall keep you updated of the developments on the ground, particularly on the preceding two paragraphs.

ENDALL

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
94 FEB 20 18:00

CONFIDENTIAL
BY COREU

FROM LORD OWEN

BOSNIA

1. Seen from Geneva and the negotiating process, the NATO 10 day immovable deadline dove-tails neatly with the negotiating strategy being pursued by Mr Akashi and Generals Cot and Rose on the one hand, and Thorvald Stoltenberg and myself on the other. I attach a press notice in which we give the history of the "Sarajevo first" approach (annex 1).

2. Paragraph 5 of the NATO Council Declaration is very important in terms of the first of the six objectives I set out at the FAC on 7 February (annex 2), namely of holding firmly to the EU package, as does the last paragraph of Manfred Woerner's letter to the Secretary General. We also now seem on course on the second objective of Sarajevo first, although the Bosnian Government will need to be kept firmly to this. Their so called new proposals for a 17/18 or 4 canton solution are not acceptable to Croatian Foreign Minister Granic or Karadzic. At today's meeting we will focus on confidence building measures in the 15 disputed areas. We will also be exploring with Ambassador Redman any new ideas the Americans might have.

3. I am confident that we can hold the Russian Federation on board on the basis of the third objective, that airpower is being used in an impartial way to protect UN personnel and enforce the UN's role. We remain in constant touch with Churkin.

4. Understandably we did not have time to consider my fourth objective, EU administration of Mostar, and we may have to see if we can move on this ahead of a settlement. I asked whether we could consider naming the EU administrator in advance of an overall settlement, and involving him or her in any preparatory negotiations. I spoke today to Granic, who said that for the moment he would prefer to keep a link between Mostar and central Bosnia in his negotiations with Silajdzic.

5. The Fifth objective I mentioned was the dialogue with the neighbouring states. In the event, Cetin did not come because his president wanted him to remain in Turkey during the NATO meeting, and so we only had the seven neighbouring states. All except Hungary were represented at foreign minister level. Jeszensky was detained on Parliamentary business and sent his deputy, Janos Herman. We had a very worthwhile meeting with only the 9 principals present, no record and no decisions.

6. Foreign Minister Andreatta explained in some detail the Italian-German proposition to the EU over a phased timetable for suspending sanctions and the all important difference between suspending and lifting. I think that the EU sanctions policy can be further refined, first and foremost after

consultations with the Americans, but also with the involvement of the regional countries, for their support is crucial, and they are feeling the pinch. They can all accept sanctions continuing, but they want to develop the stick and carrot concept. Discussion took place over the draft document, "The economic consequences of sanctions on the FRY and its neighbours" prepared by the ICFY working group on economic issues. The seven have been asked to make detailed comments on this regarding a reconstruction conference. We are considering ways of having a similiar paper produced on regional security issues, and I am in touch with the WEU Policy Unit on this.

7. We all agreed that this meeting of neighbouring and Balkan countries was a valuable process and agreed it should be repeated at official level on economic issues or at Ministerial or Head of Government level when the timing was right. I will keep in close touch with Foreign Ministers Papoulias and Andreatta, and we will keep the EU informed as appropriate.

Annex 1

Background to the "Sarajevo First" initiative

In negotiations during the summer of 1993 it became evident to the Co-Chairmen that the Bosnian parties would be unable to resolve their conflicting claims in the Sarajevo area The proposal for UN administration for a period of two years was made by the Co-Chairmen on the basis that, during this period, solutions not apparent during war time could emerge to provide a long term resolution of the issue.

August 16th: The parties agree to interim UN Administration and accept as part of a draft settlement the following:

> " ...there shall be established the Sarajevo District bounded by the outer boundaries of the opstinas (municipalities) of Trnovo, Hadzici, Ilidza, Ilijas, Stari Grad and Novo Sarajevo."
>
> "Sarajevo District shall be governed, for an interim period, by a UN Administrator appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations."

September 20th: In the meeting on board HMS Invincible, the parties agree to the following wording on UN Administration.

> "The period of UN participation in the governance of the Sarajevo district is planned for two years. The parties commit themselves to finding a permanent solution during this period. The period of UN presence can therefore be shortened if so recommended by the Presidency, it being understand

that the participation of the United Nations in the governance of that District shall at all times be as determined by the Security Council of the United Nations."

NOTE: During these negotiations the parties accepted that the proposed Union of Republics of Bosnia & Herzegovina would be demilitarised.

Following the rejection of the Invincible package by the Sarajevo Assembly, there were further bilateral negotiations regarding Sarajevo between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb parties including four meetings at Sarajevo Airport and a further meeting in Geneva on the eve of the 29 November meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the European Union.

30 November and 1 December: The Co-Chairmen continue mediating with the parties on the issue of Sarajevo. It is again evident that agreement is not possible and the Co-Chairmen seek to confirm acceptance of UN administration of Sarajevo for an interim period. This is resisted by the Bosnian Serbs.

December 22 : At a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Brussels, the European Union asks the parties to accept UN administration of Sarajevo as an element of the European Union plan to end the conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina. There is no agreement on a settlement and the Bosnian Serbs withdraw their acceptance of UN administration for Sarajevo.

Early January: The Co-Chairmen undertake an intensive round of private diplomacy including a meeting, in Belgrade, on 5 January with President Milosevic and Dr Karadzic at which the Bosnian Serbs again accept UN administration for Sarajevo.

19 January: The three parties, meeting in Geneva, agree to UN administration of Sarajevo. However there is no agreement on an overall settlement. The Co-Chairmen urge the Bosnian Serbs to accept immediate implementation of UN administration of Sarajevo including demilitarisation and lifting the siege of the city. The Bosnian Serbs agree to consider the proposal. With no agreement on an overall settlement, the parties agree to meet again on 10 February to discuss Confidence Building Measures.

5 February: In consultations in Pale as preparation for a Confidence Building Measures meeting later that day at Sarajevo Airport, Brigadier General Pellnas of ICFY is told by Dr Karadzic that the Bosnian Serbs are ready to enter negotiations on a separate peace for Sarajevo in advance of an overall settlement.

6 February: Following the shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo, the Co-Chairmen travel to Zvornik in Bosnia for a lengthy meeting with Dr Karadzic confirming Bosnian Serb

readiness to negotiate UN administration for Sarajevo District and demilitarisation.

Annex 2

Objectives

First and foremost, to hold the parties to the EU post-Invincible package for a negotiated settement. Namely 33.3% for a viable Muslim republic of mainly compact territory from the Sava to the sea, with UN Administration of Sarajevo and EU Administration of Mostar for an initial period.

Secondly,to promote a series of confidence-building measures, the most important of which to prevent another tragedy in Sarajevo, it is proposed to take Sarajevo out of the package now for an overall settlement, and negotiate UN administration and demilitarisation for Sarajevo district. By building on the previously agreed UN administration of Sarajevo as the first all-important building block we would be taking a decisive step towards an overall settlement.

Thirdly,to present to the parties air power undertaken by NATO at the request of the UN as an impartial way of protecting UN personnel and enforcing the UN's role and humanitarian mandate in relation to the passage of humanitarian convoys ,the airlift of humanitarian supplies and the protection of the 6 safe areas, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Goradze, Tuzla and Bihac.

Fourthly,a readiness to consider EU administration of Mostar in advance of an overall settlement and building on previously agreed UN administration for Sarajevo.

Fifthly, to further under the Co-Chairmen a dialogue with the neighbouring states and Turkey,which starts on Wednesday 9 February in Geneva with the eight Foreign Ministers,with a view to setting the activity of the ICFY within a regional framework.

Sixthly, to consider how the EU and the UN can design an incentive package where sanctions can be progressively suspended as specific steps are undertaken on the path to an overall peace settlement.

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CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE

Palais des Nations, 1211 Genève 10

BrigGen Bo Pellnäs

Geneva 9 February 1994

MEMORANDUM
ON DE MELLO'S/ANDREV'S PROPOSAL ON 15 TOWNS

1 Comments on the proposed seven arrangements

a) Demilitarisation

The basic question is of course: Will the Serbs and Croats really take their forces away from the towns and place their hope on the arbitration-process ?

Presuming this will be the case, one has to discuss how the demilitarisation shall take place. It will most certainly only include the withdrawal of troops from the town and not involve taking artillery etc. out of range.

b) UN presence

It is doubtful if UNMO and civilian presence is enough to allow the safe return of refugees. This question will also depend on how the free access to the towns would be guaranteed. To the best of my understanding this will initially require check-points, probably along several incoming roads to each town.

The problems may vary from town to town but could easily call for a force of battalion size or at least a reinforced company. My estimate is that we are talking of a combination of troops, UNMOs, civil affairs officers and civilian police.
It would be realistic to count on a need of around 350 soldiers, 20 UNMOs and 50 civilian police officers for each town, which raises the total figure to somewhere around 6000. This would mean a need for 6-7 fresh battalions.

c) Mixed police force

I have a great respect for the difficulties involved in this question after my efforts in April 1993 to establish a mixed police force in Mostar. The main problem is where the administrative power over this force would rest. One is likely to face Muslim demands for their own police, working integrated with the Serb/Croat police and a strong Serb/Croat demand to be fully in control.
The question of which law should be applied will probably also be raised.

d) The safe return of prisoners

I believe this question to be related to the question of conducting a census.
First we have the problem with **whom** is entitled to return ? Provided the documentation is available this may not be too difficult to decide.
The 1991 census should be the base for an agreement.

Depending on when the proposed census would take place the parties are likely to take completely different lines of action: The Bosnian government trying to push refugees back and Serbs/Croats trying to delay the return as much as possible before the census takes place.

I fear this census will always be too early or too late.

The safety of the returning refugees is of course most important in the beginning, when even small intimidations could severely frighten them not to come. Thus there may be a need for troops as pictured in paragraph a) above.

e) The free access to the towns

See para a) above.

f) Conducting the census

See para d) above.

g) The arbitration

It is not very clear what the aim of the arbitration would be. Is it to determine whether a town should belong to and be governed by the Bosnian, Croat or Serb society? Or is it merely to decide the rules for the local rule of the town?

I think this may well be the weakest point in the proposal but it may perhaps also create a flexibility when negotiating about the towns. Perhaps some of them could be foreseen to be arbitrated as to where to belong and some only as to the local balance of power, remaining inside the Serb or Croat society.

2 **Conclusions**

De Mello/Andreev have taken no further action with regard to their proposal.

My conclusion would be that it may offer some possibilities for the negotiators by providing a chance to delay the solution on certain disputed questions. It could , however, also complicate the negotiations by putting a lot of practicalities on the table, all of them more or less difficult to agree upon.

The weakest points are the question of arbitration (by whom, when and on what?) and the obvious need for more recources than the proposal anticipates.

Bo Pellnäs

(TRANSLATION)

As heirs to thirteen centuries of culture and civilization heritage of the Croatian people in Western European and Christian culture who constantly opt for peace, who are directed by the principles of the United Nations Charter, who respect all Security Council Resolutions, we representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia House of Representatives, at this critical period of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, promulgate a:

D E C L A R A T I O N

I

As the single, legitimate legislative authority of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina with representatives from the ranks of the Croatian people who received confidence during the first multi-party democratic elections, the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia House of Representatives has the right and duty to represent and realize their national, religious, cultural and economic freedom and independence, to preserve their historical and cultural traditions and to realize their statehood.

We support and continue to support an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina within internationally recognized borders as a state of three equal-under-law and statehood peoples.

The Croatian people and their legal, legitimate representatives in political, legislative and executive authorities of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed their readiness to work in state bodies by voting in a referendum that facilitated recognition of the independence of a state where they have been living for centuries. The correctness of the position and acts by legitimate representatives of the Croatian people in finding a solution to the state crisis of Bosnia and Herzegovina was confirmed at international peace negotiations about Bosnia and Herzegovina from the very beginning to today.

II

Respecting the present situation and relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking into account the present world order, realizing and accepting it as a dynamic process, confirming our lasting option for peace, we support an immediate end to the war and a political solution to the state crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina founded on the following principles:

1. The preservation of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent and internationally recognized state is only possible by the consent of each of the three equal-under-law and statehood peoples /Croatians, Muslims and Serbians/ through the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. The right of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to realize and guarantee self-determination, statehood, self-reliance and independence through the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to respect the rights of the other two statehood peoples /Serbians and Muslims/ to secure the same based on an equal principle.

3. Independent of the internal organization of the state, all rights of members of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina on their entire territory must be assured through the Peace Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina that is mediated by the international community and guarantees the application of the highest international standards in the realm of human and political rights while equally requesting the same for the other two statehood peoples /Serbians and Muslims/. We support cultural, religious and national autonomy, including local self-rule, for all peoples in each of the three republics.

4. The Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be organized as a democratic and multi-party parliamentary state that assures and guarantees all fundamental rights and freedoms to each of its statehood peoples and citizens regardless of national membership, religious affiliation, political beliefs, gender and social status.

5. We guarantee the constant effort and engagement of the entire, legitimate political leadership of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to assure all national, cultural, economic and human rights for Croatians outside the territory of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia on the basis of reciprocity with the other two statehood peoples.

III

Mostar is the capital of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and deserves all the rights of a capital city for a sovereign, statehood people as evidenced throughout the civilized world.

Mostar is the political, religious, cultural, historical, economic, intellectual, communications and every other center of the Croatian people in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and an indivisible urban whole that must be a guarantee for the survival and development of the Croatian people in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

IV

The Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the victim of the genocide of Serbian and Muslim aggression. Approximately 8,000 Croatian were killed and approximately 25,000 Croatians were wounded. Areas where Croatians made up a significant portion of the population, before the genocide, were ethnically cleansed: Bosanska Posavina (Derventa, Bosanski Brod, Odzak, Modrica and part of Bosanski Samac), Bosanska Krajina (Teslic, Kotor Varos, Skender Vakuf and Banja Luka), Kupres, Jajce, Travnik, Konjic, Kakanj, Fojnica, Bugojno and Vares. 377 settlements where Croatians made up an absolute or relative majority were completely ethnically cleansed, pillaged, burned and destroyed. Up to now, 480 slain Croatians are evidenced as a result of massacres against the Croatian civilian population from May 1992 to January 1994. There are approximately 13,000 civilians and 1,900 HVO members in Muslim prisons alone. As much as 350,000 Croatians were evicted from their homes. International political factors silently monitor this crime of enormous magnitude. Hence, we adamantly request that the European Union and United Nations directly influence the end of this tragedy.

V

We support the wholehearted respect of international humanitarian law on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and call and ask the same from the other two statehood peoples /Serbians and Muslims/. We representatives of the Croatian people in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia House of Representatives were elected at the first democratic elections and passed a Declaration about the Acceptance of Documents for the Protection and Realization of Human Rights.

We absolutely and unconditionally support efforts on all levels and take all necessary measures so that humanitarian assistance organized by international and other humanitarian organizations can freely and securely reach its desired destination to those in need of assistance regardless of national, religious or other membership.

We call on Croatian Defense Council soldiers to respect all of the regulations of international humanitarian and wartime laws. We equally call and ask the engagement of the other two statehood peoples /Serbians and Muslims/ in effectively realizing international humanitarian laws.

VI

As heirs to a proud culture, we are obliged to energetically condemn each forceful act of barbarism against the historical and cultural heritage of each of the three statehood peoples /Croatians, Serbians and Muslims/ and other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As an expression of a specific people, culture is closely related to that people and simultaneously a cosmetic, existential value and asset that a people and individual can not destroy, let alone the cultural heritage of another people. We ask that bodies of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Government make all efforts to preserve and protect the historical and cultural heritage in areas under its authority. We equally call and ask that the other two statehood peoples make efforts to preserve the historical and cultural heritage in areas under their control. We call on all international institutions that monitor the protection of world cultural heritage to assist in the preservation of historical and cultural heritage of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

VII

We welcome the establishment and work of the War Crimes Court on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. We do not doubt its righteousness and wish for readiness and efficiency concerning the adjudication of all crimes.

VIII

Constantly opting for peace, we accept and support the peace initiative and efforts by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia, to stop the war and establish peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.

We welcome the signing of the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia /Serbia and Montenegro/ concerning the establishment of governmental offices in Belgrade and Zagreb, and view this as the beginning of a process of the lasting arrangement of mutual relations and intra-state recognition.

We tell those who have yet to accept Dr. Franjo Tudjman's peace initiative to avoid seeking a solution to the state crisis in BiH through the continuation of war.

Livno, 8 February 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia

CHAIRMAN

Ivan Bender, dipl. jur.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Bosnia and Herzevgovina shall be a Union of three republics: A Croat majority republic, a Muslim majority Republic and a Serb majority republic. The definitive boundaries of the three republics shall be settled through negotiations. The parties agree that the Muslim majority republic shall have a minimum of 33.3% of territory. The provisional boundaries of the Muslim majority republic are as indicated in Annex I. The parties acknowledge that there are competing claims to the following areas: Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Brcko, Bugojno, Busovaca, Donji Vakuf, Gornji Vakuf, Kiseljak, Kresevo, Novi Travnik, Sanski Most, Ustikolina, Visegrad, Vitez, Zvornik.

The parties agree to continue negotiations to determine the status of the areas mentioned above among the three republics. The parties agree that nothing shall be done in any of these areas to alter their character or status or that could be prejudidicial to their eventual allocation. An International Joint Control Commission shall be established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, consisting of a member each designated by the Governments of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and chaired by a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In the event agreement is not reached on any area through negotiations, the difference can be referred to an Arbitration Commission appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the Parties. The recommendations of the Commission shall be addressed, in the first instance, to the Parties, and only if there is disagreement be referred to the Security Council.

The parties pledge their cooperation, within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, in further efforts to consolidate the peace, launch programmes of reconstruction, confidence-building and long-term security, and to arrive at negotiated and peaceful solutions to outstanding issues

Done at Geneva, this.....day of February, 1994.

M.AKMADZIC R.KARADZIC H.SILAJDZIC

Witnessed by:

DAVID OWEN THORVALD STOLTENBERG

010/9

CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE

Palais des Nations, 1211 Genève 10

BrigGen Bo Pellnäs

Geneva 7 February 1994

To:Lord Owen/Stoltenberg

Notes from the meeting with Dr Karadzic in Pale on 5 February

The meeting lasted for one hour and together with Dr Karadzic I also met Prof Koljevic. As requested by the Co-Chairmen the discussions concentrated on Sarajevo and on the map.

Sarajevo

I opened by stating it was high time for the Serbs to reshape the political landscape and create conditions that would facilitate to achieve a peaceful settlement. To find an immediate solution to the Sarajevo-problem most certainly would be a dynamic move and it would add a strong momentum to the negotiations in Geneva.

I urged Karadzic to show the necessary wisdom and courage to act **now** and accept the proposed solution about Sarajevo.

He answered that the Serbs were ready to find a solution to Sarajevo, provided that five conditions were met:

1) All three parties must agree,
2) Bosnia must be divided into three states,
3) Sarajevo should (after ending the UN administration-period) be divided between the Bosnian government and the Serbs,
4)Progress on suspension of sanctions,
5) The demilitarisation must be concluded in a way which prevented BiH Army "from using the 50.000 Muslim soldiers somewhere else."

I responded to this, that it would surely be of political benefit for the Serbs if they could announce a positive step for the solution of the Sarajevo-problem with as few pre-conditions as possible. This remark triggered off a discussion about the Serb handling of their media-relations. Karadzic complained that they had no money (as compared with the Bosnian Government) to buy the services of professional PR-consultants and when they tried to do this, the consultants were forbidden to work for the Serbs by their governments.

The map-questions

The most important result of this conversation (which was too short to really go into details) was the comments made by Dr Karadzic on the principle to resolve the problem with over-lapping Serb and Croat maps. He stated that "first one should settle

the problems with the Muslims and get them out of the picture. After that the Serbs and the Croats should together solve their own problems."

As we showed him the Croat map he immediately reacted on the Croat claim south of Sava in the Brcko-area (Posavina). "This was ridiculous. It would anyhow be solved by giving Sector West to the Croats and after that UNPROFOR could leave that area."

He continued by stating that problems like this best should be solved between President Milosevic and President Tudjman. He added that the Serbs could not be expected to compensate the Croats for their losses on the ground to the BiH Army.

I then tried to discuss some of the areas and to press him for some clear answers. We started with the salient south of Jajce-Travnik, north of Kupres-Prozor. Dr Karadzic said that the obvious solution should be for the Croats to give the Vitez-Busovaca-Kiseljak-pocket to the Bosnian Government and to divide the salient along the Jajce-Jablanica-line, giving the south-western part to the Croats.

He pointed out that a solution in the Dubrovnik-area could be found by giving Prevlaka to the Serbs and allowing the Croats to have "the ridge" south of Trebinje.

He strongly rejected any idea of giving away the Doboj-Petrovo Selo-pocket or the pocket south of Srebenica around Dile.

He further stated that due to strong internal resistence, it would be impossible to give any concessions east of Bosanska Krupa (Adjacent to the Bihac-pocket).

It is my conclusion that the 17,5 % of Bosnia, planned for the Croats, is likely to be a question the Serbs will try to link to an over-all Serb-Croat settlement. This could perhaps be an effort to gain from the Croat weakness in Bosnia and persuade them to give away territories lost to the BiH Army and the Vitez-Kiseljak-pocket against somewhat airy promises of a positive result in the UNPAs.

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK - 1802 Z

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
VIEIRA DE MELLO, BHC, SARAJEVO - 1800 Z

FROM: for AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB YA.

DATE: 4 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 171

CODED CACLE

SUBJECT: **FIFTEEN DISPUTED TOWNS IN BiH**

I attach for your consideration a proposal which I received today from Vieira de Mello and Andreev concerning 15 disputed towns in Bih.

Regards.

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SSN-56
2/4

4 February 1994

Note for Mr. Y. Akashi on the question of the Fifteen Disputed Towns

1. The proposal outlined below is an attempt at formulating, from the field perspective, some ideas which may help to move forward, on 10 February 1994, over one of the major remaining stumbling blocks. They are submitted to you on the basis of the limited knowledge we have of the latest round of negotiations on 18 and 19 January 1994 in Geneva, namely doc. S/1994/64 of 21 January 1994 (in particular paras. 8 to 11 and its Appendix II) and our contacts with the parties on the ground.

2. We are also aware that four countries are actively involved in the preparation of the 10 February meeting, although the nature and contents of their initiative is unknown to us. The ideas below, therefore, may help address a particularly difficult aspect of the problem.

Issue

3. The Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats appear to be ready for a peace settlement along the lines of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. The mainly-Muslim Bosnian Government, however, remains hesitant. One important challenge, therefore, is to find a formula which satisfies the Bosnian Government without losing the support of the other two factions, particularly over what seems to have led the last round of talks into an impasse: the fate of 15 towns/areas (eight Serb-controlled and seven Croat-controlled) where the Bosnian Muslim side claims, not entirely accurately, to have been in the majority before the outbreak of the conflict. The towns are Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Brcko, Bugojno, Busovaca, Donji Vakuf, Gornji Vakuf, Kiseljak, Kresevo, Novi Travnik, Sanski Most, Ustikolina, Visegrad, Vitez and Zvornik.

The position of the parties

4. The Bosnian Government has indicated that it might be willing to let an international arbitration commission determine the final status of these towns/area, provided Serb and Croat forces are removed therefrom.

5. The Bosnian Serbs are unlikely to give up any more territory than that which they are offering now (about one third of the 70% they now control). Due to their weak military position, the Croats might be forced to cede some further territory in Central Bosnia. This would go some way to satisfying the Bosnian Government, but probably not far enough. Neither the Serbs nor the Croats are in a position to make further significant territorial concessions. Their internal constituencies simply will not accept it. Although the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat negotiators have shown some willingness to accept the arbitration procedures put forward by the Co-Chairmen in January 1994, they certainly will not entertain the possibility that a series of geographically isolated towns will later be ceded to the Muslim-majority republic.

Possible solution

6. The Co-Chairmen may wish to propose an "Interim Agreement" which could leave the 15 towns inside the Serb- and Croat-majority republics, but which might still satisfy the Bosnian Government demands.

7. Such an "Interim Agreement" would be additional to the main Owen-Stoltenberg Invincible package, as subsequently adjusted (under which the Muslim-majority republic would get approximately 33.3 per cent of the BH land area, on the basis of the proposed maps, its access to the Sava would be guaranteed and the questions of Neum, Mostar and Sarajevo would be resolved; the Serb-majority republic would get about 50 per cent; the Croat-majority republic would get the reminder).

8. The "Interim Agreement" would go beyond previous plans, however, in giving a special status to the 15 towns/areas demanded by the Bosnian Government. The exact boundaries of these towns would be determined by independent arbitrators. They would conform as closely as possible to the actual built-up areas, and not to the opština boundaries.

The following arrangements could be considered:

(a) the towns could be demilitarized for a period of, say, two years or for the duration of the arbitration procedure;

(b) they would have an extended UN presence, both military (UNMO-type) and civilian (civil affairs officers and human rights monitors);

(c) a mixed police force (Serb/Muslim or Croat/Muslim, depending on the town, the respective proportion of which would have to be determined either uniformly or town by town) would be established with the assistance of and monitored by UNCIVPOL;

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(d) conditions are to be created for the safe and voluntary return, under UNHCR auspices, of refugees and displaced persons of all nationalities;

(e) the towns would be freely accessible from all three republics;

(f) a census would be conducted, say twelve months after the entry into force of the "Interim Agreement", on the basis of which the degree of special minority rights - cultural, religious and administrative - would be established, pending final settlement;

(g) during or at the end of the initial period of two years, the final status of these towns could be decided by arbitration (as proposed in doc. S/1994/64, Appendix II, para. c), by referendum or by some other mechanism acceptable to the parties. The arbitrators would have the authority to determine what special measures would be required in the towns to safeguard the long-term interests of all nationalities. Most of the towns would likely remain within the Serb and Croat majority republics.

Conclusion

9. The principal advantage of the proposed "Interim Agreement" is that is would bolster the position of those in the Bosnian Government who wish to make a peace agreement, but who feel unable to do so, because of political objections from hard-liners. The two-year time-frame would also allow for a "cooling off" period, during which the main package would be implemented, thus increasing the chances for a dispassionate and negotiated settlement of this major hurdle.

Sergio Vieira de Mello

Viktor Andreev

CZN 117 CZG 075

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
OGATA, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, ZAGREB **IMMEDIATE**

Y. Akashi

DATE: 28 JANUARY 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-130

SUBJECT: **EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE BH GOVERNMENT**

Attached please find copy of hand-written "Most Immediate" cable from Sergio Vieira de Mello, Sarajevo, with retyped version added to facilitate reading.

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UNITED NATIONS

Office of the
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

TO: AKASHI, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN/THAROOR, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
OGATA, GENEVA

FROM: SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO
DELEGATE OF THE SRSG IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, SARAJEVO
FAX NO: 871-144 65 02 OR 03

DATE: 28 JANUARY 1994 NO OF PAGES: 1

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE BH GOVERNMENT

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1. Apologies for this hand-written message.

2. Have just been informed that Prime Minister H. Silajdzic is now presiding an emergency meeting of the BH Government to:

a) review events in Zenica leading to the death of one and the wounding of two UNHCR/ODA humanitarian workers yesterday, an act which the term "terrorist" and to review drastic measures to improve security in that area and bring criminals to court;

b) decide on the text of a message to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the latter "to address the question of the presence on BH territory of Croatian (HV) troops" and "to take all appropriate measures" to ensure their early withdrawal.

ENDALL

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28-01-1994

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UNITED NATIONS

Office of the
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

FAX TRANSMITTAL

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TO: AKASHI, ZAGREB
INFO: ANNAN/THAROOR, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG/GENEVA
OGATA, GENEVA
FROM: Sergio Vieira de Mello
Delegate of the SRSG in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo
Fax No: 871-144 65 02 or 03

DATE: 28 January 1994 NO OF PAGES: 1

SUBJECT: Emergency meeting of the BH Government

1. Apologies for this hand-written message.
2. Have just been informed that Prime Minister H. Silajdzic is now presiding an emergency meeting of the BH Government to:
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ENDALL

010/9

See also 070/1 for the declaration adopted by the Intn'L Conference of Parliamentarians on B+H. - 26/1.

ADRESS OF THE PRESIDENT ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ ON THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF PARLAMENTARIANS ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Kuala Lumpur,January 22, 1994

Mr Prime Minister,

Foreign Minister,

Excellencies,

Respected Parliamentarians and Delegates,

First I am obliged to express our appreciation to the Malaysian people and His Excellency Prime minister dr Mahathir Muhamed for his consistent efforts for justice for the Bosnian people which has gained undivided respect of our citizens.

Thank you for this opportunity to address this most distinguished group, and most importantly, let me express my delight at this wonderful welcome to Malaysia.

It is not a mere coincidence that this conference is being held in Malaysia and that the Bosnian people have enjoyed such unequivocal and comprehensive support from the Malaysian government and people. Like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malaysia is a multicultural and multireligious society.

My country and my people are going through the worse period of their long history. Not only the survival of the Bosnian state is at stake, but more importantly the sheer existence of the Bosnian people. You have had many

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reasons to undertake this initiative and to alert the international community to the danger.For, in the war initiated against Bosnia and Herzegovina, all principles of the international law have been breached. Civilians - children, men and women, young and old, have been murdered or cruelly driven from their homes, women have been systematicaly raped, concentration camps have reappeared on the territory of Europe, the schools and places of worship have been destroyed, human dignity in the most extraordinary fashion has been demeaned, and the force has become the only law that is recognised. When something like this is allowed to perpetuate, it not only affects the directly targeted country. Violation of certain basic democratic principles, taking place in Bosnia today, impacts every man and woman on the Planet.

All of us present here today know that an evil resulting in the crude violation of the international law and human rights can never be characterised as purely local in nature and presents a challenge to all. Unfortunately, many people do not share this view, including some political leaderships. This does not have to be a final outcome and it is still not too late; however, it is important that common people of all countries understand the dangers of the fascism and refashioned boljscevism, which once again raise their head and threaten mankind and our shared values.

I do not wish to enumerate on all of the crimes which have been perpetrated in the name of ultranationalist and expansionist policy of little nations greedy for greater territories. These crimes are elaborated upon in the materials of this conference which provide comprehensive information. Instead I would mention or - more precisely - repeat a few key facts which are at times obliterated by propaganda. The facts are:

1) In Bosnia there is no civil war. Against Bosnia there is an aggression by our two neighbours. First an expansionist Serbia then, unfortunately, an opportunistic Croatia. This is a war to conquer territory incorporating

#097 P11 : 2 JAN-23-'94 20:23M ID:

genocide i.e. a crime against humanity.

2) In Bosnia there is neither religious war. To the contrary, this is a war against every religion and against all religious values.

3) The crime in question can not be stopped with words, appeals and resolutions. There is no example in history where force and violence have been stopped by an appeal.Aggressors do not understand that type of logic. We confront force with force in Bosnia and we have been doing so for more than twenty two months. Whatever we have saved of our country, we have saved it with our courageous resistence.

4) Instead of adopting new resolutions, the international community should simply enforce the old ones. None of the more than thirty UN resolutions adopted have been effectively implemented. More accurately, only one has been ever implemented and that is the arms embargo resolution, the one which is against the interests of the Bosnian people.

5) Under Article 51 of the UN charter, a state that has been attacked has the right to two forms of defence, self and collective. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been deprived of both. Consequences are logical and very evident.

6) After the failure of the negotiating process we have been accused of rejecting peace. We do not reject peace, we reject capitulation, for really, what s offered to us is nothing but capitulation. They want to confine us and deprive us of our exits to the rivers Sava and Drina and to the sea. And even more than that: as a reward to the Serbians for the committed genocide and ethnic cleansing, they want us to give the Serbs our towns and villages which have been the very scenes of their crimes.

and

7) We are not seeking an ideological state of any kind. It is our goal to preserve the democratic secular state in which no one will be oppressed because of their religion, ethnicity or political views.Help us to preserve and

JAN-23-'94 20:23M ID: : 2 #097 P12

rebuild this state. Thank you.

P.S.

While reading this text, I remembered one fact I would like to add to it: your country is a proof that tolerance is not a European invention. Maleysia is an example of a multireligious and multicultural community.

I remembered as well that Hitler and Stalin were Europeans, and fascism and bolscevism European products.

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JAN-23-'94 20:23M ID:
1994-01-23 15:27 PAGE = 04

CZN-072
CZG-053

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UNPROFOR
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'94 JAN 20 10:06

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 20 JANUARY 1994

NUMBER: Z-079

SUBJECT: Weekly assessment BH

Attached for your information please find an interesting assessment on developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Civil Affairs Coordinator in Sarajevo.

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Palais des Nations
'94 JAN 20 10:55

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO: 170-199	DATE: 19 18:04 A January 94
TO: YOLANDA AUGER DHCA Zagreb FAX:	FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV Civil Affairs Coordinator UNPROFOR, BH Command FAX: 871-130.15.20
ATTN: EMMA SHITAKHA	FILE REF DRAFTER: LUC DUCHESNE TITLE: RELEASING OFFR:
INFO: SRSG, BH Cmdr, SRSG Delegate, All Civil Affairs Sub-Offices, UNPROFOR 5 ATAF LO (Vicenza, Italy)	
DISTRIBUTION: COS, G1-G5, Chief UNMO, UNHCR LO, ECMM	
SUBJECT: Weekly BH political assessment (#50)	

Introduction:

* The NATO declaration, adopted during the Brussels summit, and talks in Bonn between Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic have given BiH negotiators new space for discussion. Given their recent military successes in central BH and the perception in some quarters that NATO is closer to actually using air power against Serbs, there is little incentive for the BiH to accept current Bosnian Serb proposals at this juncture.

* On the eve of the Geneva talks, Bosnian-Serb leader Karadzic has issued a bellicose statement declaring the Serbs will never leave Sarajevo, withdraw all concessions given to BiH side and may declare war on them. These statements coupled with similar assertions from BSA and increased activity especially in Olovo area seem to suggest the Bosnian Serbs may look to settling their differences with the BiH on the battlefield instead of the negotiating table.

The Rump BiH:

* BiH negotiating strategy is now aimed at changing the whole structure of the peace process. During this Geneva round, truly the most critical in the recent series, they will seek to re-broker the current architecture. Mr. Mirko Pejanovic, a BiH Presidency member, made a statement to that effect before the BiH

DHCA, SRSG, CIVAFFAIRS, F

delegation's departure to Geneva. "If there will be no improvement at these talks, the Presidency will come up with a new initiative for the Security Council in order to find other solutions for BiH. This initiative is being prepared and the responsibility for the fate of BiH would be passed on to the Security Council". According to our information, possible changes sought are replacement of the two Co-Chairman of the ICFY process and bringing the peace talks directly under the aegis of the UN Security Council. With the letter and spirit of all resolutions adopted by the Security Council and with three of the permanent members of the Security Council clearly supporting their position, this arrangement may result as they expect in a much more BiH-favourable forum in which to conduct the efforts directed at ending the conflict.

* The recent NATO declaration and talks in Bonn provide the BiH added range for negotiation. The BiH will present such items as the re-opening of the Tuzla airport, the threat of air strikes, the "BiH-Croat alliance in all fields" and the "BiH-Croat Confederation" that claim 51% of the land. The idea of the "alliance" and "confederation" is calculated to bring more pressure to bear on the Serbs at the table. Serbs have already announced their refusal to discuss the above mentioned items.

* The BH Presidency supported some parts of the BiH-Croat initiative proposed by Tudjman but stated that they could not accept the whole agreement for several reasons: an agreement must be signed by internationally recognized entities, the Serbs are not mentioned in the agreement, there is no international legal subject guaranteeing the implementation of the agreement, the agreement does not envisage the possibility of existence of the Union with two republics, the solutions proposed for Mostar and Neum are not in accordance with what was agreed previously.

* President Izetbegovic clearly stated that 33.3 percent of the land is not the point anymore and added that the war would continue until ethnic Serbs had given back all the land which had been predominately Muslim before the conflict started including Zvornik, Prijedor, Visegrad. It was later specified in a private meeting that the Bosnian government would be satisfied if these three areas were to come under UN administration and if measures were taken to allow people to safely return to their homes. President Izetbegovic also said that he does not "want an Islamic Republic...but perhaps we, civilized and worldly, have been tasked to present Islam to the world".

* With the recent NATO declaration, the reopening of the Tuzla airport has taken on political significance well beyond its actual utility. Recent evidence indicates, contrary to often used assertions aimed at employing air strikes, the airport is not a vital augmentation in the humanitarian aid chain. WHO reports the Tuzla region is not suffering widespread food shortage. Further, a few Croat leaders in the region feel that the re-opening would have a negative impact on the peace process by encouraging the BiH to fight on longer. After the recent order to merge the HVO with the BiH Armija, many Croat have

expressed a desire to end the war as soon as possible to avoid loosing any more rights or property. The Serbs oppose it as the first step in a future NATO toehold in Bosnia.

* The situation in Bihac is calm but remains volatile as negotiations between the 5th Corps and Abdic forces continue. Ignored by the international community, Abdic has been unable to strangle the South economically and his forces have not been able to make any substantial gains against 5 Corps. However, 5 Corps is vulnerable to a coordinated attack involving the Serbs from Krajina. A cease-fire was agreed at the beginning of the week and appears to be holding. The two sides continue to meet in private with UNPROFOR facilitating the negotiation sessions. The unstable situation and the continued obstruction of the North have a negative effect on UNHCR deliveries of humanitarian aid.

* The humanitarian situation in BiH is still precarious. The Bosnian Serbs have prevented several convoys from reaching Maglaj pocket and the Eastern enclaves, specially Srebrenica and Gorazde. In Central Bosnia, stopping and ransacking of UNHCR and UNPROFOR convoys by members of the local population have become a major problem along Diamond road and near Kakanj, jeopardizing the UNHCR distribution program in Central Bosnia. Angry civilians have stopped convoys on several occasions, erecting barricades and throwing rocks, forcing UN forces to use warning shots. The crowds protested against the shortage of humanitarian aid (at the moment, UNHCR is meeting approximately 20% of the food requirements in Central Bosnia). UNHCR and UNPROFOR representatives discussed the problem with local authorities who promised to provide more protection. The issue was also brought to the attention of the Bosnian government.

The Bosnian Serbs:

* The Bosnian Serbs believe they have more than met the BiH demands by conceding to a 33% territorial concession to the BiH and UN administration of Sarajevo. There seems to be little mood for further acquiescence to future BiH demands the Serbs believe will follow. The Bosnian Serb leadership reiterated that to date the conflict has been fought without a formal RS declaration of war. They say that should this latest series of talks breakdown, then a general war effort is a distinct possibility.

* Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Karadzic, said that Bosnian Serbs would never leave Sarajevo and that the city would become the capital of his new state. He also rejected NATO demands to reopen Tuzla airport stating that opening of the airport would allow the BiH government to "sneak enormous amounts of weapons into the area" and prolong the war indefinitely. The Bosnian Serb leadership is advocating preparations for a long war if the Geneva talks fail.

* BSA commander Gen. Mladic told Gen. Briquemont and CAC that he agreed with the rotation of the Canadian troops. Efforts to

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deploy the Norbat unit into Srebrenica will not be obstructed.

The Bosnian Croats:

* Despite lack of official announcement, it does appear that the future of Matte Boban may be in question. Although still active in CRHB politics, he is not a current members of the Geneva negotiating delegation. Mr. Tudjman specified that the non-participation of Boban to the Geneva talks was a goodwill gesture of the Croats to accommodate the "Muslim" side. Mile Akmadzic, current Minister for international and inter-republic cooperation, is mentioned as the possible successor. Also a contender for succession, according to some sources, is Ramljak, former Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia.

* In the Lasva Valley, the BiH offensive has continued but at a significantly lower intensity. There were reports of HVO using aircraft to blunt BiH attacks and boost the morale of the troops. It appears that both sides are now harboring their strength for the period after the Geneva talks. If the talks fail, the BiH will probably resume their attack which would put the HVO in a very difficult position. The HVO in Southern Bosnia could launch an attack in the Gorni Vakuf area to force the BiH to redeploy their forces and lessen the pressure on the Vitez enclave.

* In Tuzla, the Croats continue to be worried about the future of their community following the recent amalgamation of HVO units into BiH army. There are reports that the situation has led several Croats to cross the lines of confrontation into Serb held territory in order to avoid being placed under BiH control.

Best regards

V. Au

010/9

UNITED NATIONS

Office of the
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

COPY: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Y. Akashi

DATE: 20 JANUARY 1994

SUBJECT: **Minutes of Meeting**

Please find attached Minutes of a Meeting between SRSG, Mr. Yasushi Akashi and the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mr. Alija Izetbegovic in Geneva on 18 January 1994.

Minutes of the Meeting
between the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia

Geneva, 18 January 1994

Present

H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic
H.E. Haris Silajdzic
(Prime Minister)
H.E. Muhamed Sacirbey
(Permanent Representative to the United Nations)

Mr. Yasushi Akashi
Mr. Peter Schmitz

1. Mr. Akashi explained the division of responsibilities between himself and Mr. Stoltenberg and offered close cooperation on all matters relating to UNPROFOR. The President appreciated the offer and congratulated Mr. Akashi to his appointment.

2. Asked for his assessment of the prospects of the resumed negotiations, the President said that he was not too optimistic. Prime Minister Silajdzic added, however, that there had been a positive atmosphere in preliminary talks with the Bosnian Croats. His Government had submitted a new proposal to the Croat side and it was hoped that it would be acceptable.

3. Mr. Akashi pointed out that the international community was impatiently waiting for a settlement. Some troop contributors to UNPROFOR even had indicated their intention to withdraw their contingents if a peace agreement was not conclude soon. Referring to his talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Bosnian Serb Leader Radovan Karadzic, Mr. Akashi said he had urged them to stop the excessive shelling of Sarajevo, even though at times this was in response to Bosnian Muslim attacks. Dr. Karadzic had admitted that the shelling was an overreaction and even counter productive in political terms, but had claimed that his soldiers were acting in self-defence. Mr. Akashi said he had urged Dr. Karadzic that his soldiers had to be brought under control.

4. President Izetbegovic said that it was the Bosnian Serbs who were taking the offensive. At present, they were trying to cut off the main line of communication between Sarajevo and Tuzla in a major offensive in the Olovo area. Prime Minister Silajdzic added that the Muslim offensive in Sarajevo was an act of self-defence. The siege had the political objective to produce a settlement at gun point. Sarajevo was hostage not only to the Bosnian Serbs but to certain countries which insisted on a settlement however unfavourable for the Bosnian Government. UNPROFOR's reports about Bosnian Muslim offensives were putting the aggressor and the victim on the same plane. According to United Nations reports, 130,000 Bosnians had been killed by the

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Serbs since the war began. With regard to the Croat side, it was no secret that tanks and units of the Croatian army were fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community could not expect the Bosnian Muslims to give in to a forced settlement. It was unfortunate, that the Security Council had not responded to the Serb aggression as it had in the case of the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait. There were three sides in the conflict, however, one was clearly an aggressor while the other was the victim. His Government was exasperated that the fact that a genocide had been committed by the Serbs was increasingly ignored by the international community. Turning to Sarajevo, the Prime Minister said that the Governments forces would have broken the siege long ago if they had had the arms. The Government's troops were not provoking the shelling, but fighting for their lives.

5. With regard to the NATO summit statement, Mr. Akashi said that there were not likely to be any further obstacles to the planned rotation of the troops as both President Milosevic and Dr. Karadzic had indicated their agreement. Tuzla was a more complicated matter, since the Serbs at this point insisted that it only be opened in the context of an overall peace agreement. Moreover, a forced opening of the airport may take more troops than UNPROFOR had at its disposal even if air power was used. Mr. Akashi explained that opening the airport would require an agreement with the Bosnian Government similar to the one in Sarajevo. Without an agreement, the countries participating in the Sarajevo airlift were unlikely to fly into Tuzla.

6. After a quick discussion between the President and the Prime Minister (not interpreted), Prime Minister Silajdzic said that the situation in Tuzla was different from the one pertaining to Sarajevo airport. He acknowledged the Serb suspicions as to the possible abuse of Tuzla airport for military purposes but claimed that the Serbs were abusing Banja Luka airport themselves. President Izetbegovic said his Government was willing to enter into a Sarajevo type of agreement for Tuzla. Prime Minister Silajdzic said that a draft agreement had already been submitted by his Government.

7. Prime Minister Silajdzic said he was going to meet with Mme. Ogata and was wondering whether UNHCR could change its policy from providing humanitarian assistance to assistance for the revitalization of Bosnia's agriculture and other primary food producing industries. Mr. Akashi said that reconstruction and development would be more a task for agencies such as UNDP, FAO and the Worldbank. Prime Minister Silajdzic added that the war may continue for quite some time. Therefore, the Bosnian agriculture had to be enabled to produce food in a self-sustained manner. In this context, it was essential to obtain seeds, fertilizer and other agricultural inputs.

Peter Schmitz
19 January 1994

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TO: AKASHI, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

ANNAN, NEW YORK FAX NO. 1-212-963 9222

OGATA, GENEVA (PLEASE REPEAT TO MORRIS)
FAX NO. 41-22-739 8694

FROM: VIEIRA DE MELLO, SARAJEVO
FAX: 871-154 6345

No.: D-SRSG-SAR-0049

DATE: 12 January 1994

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN GEN. DELIĆ, COMMANDER BiH ARMIJA, AND GEN. ROSO, COMMANDER HVO, SARAJEVO AIRPORT

1. Following the request you received from Mr. Stoltenberg the evening of 10 January, an urgent meeting under Gen. Briquemont's chairmanship, was arranged at Sarajevo Airport today, at 11.00 a.m. The meeting was also attended by the Deputy BH Commander Feliú and BHC COS Ramsay.

2. The purpose of the meeting was to try and reduce tension and fighting in Central Bosnia, particularly around the Vitez/Bušovaća pocket.

3. Briquemont made two preliminary points:

(a) agreement had been reached on different occasions on the reopening of the main humanitarian corridor, south and north of Mostar. He demanded that guarantees given by Roso himself be respected on the ground and that corridor be immediately reopened. Roso argued that main corridor should not be reopened before the 18 January Geneva meeting, i.e. until "political guarantees are given and respect of boundaries is ensured". Security of his territory and troops was at stake, he said. HVO is in a "defensive position" vis-à-vis BiH Armija and cannot take risks as long as latter fires "one single round". Briquemont replied

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that 29 November agreement was never linked to a global political settlement. Eventually, Roso agreed to allow - as from tomorrow - the movement of ferry equipment to Bijèla and to authorize the reopening of the main corridor as soon as political agreement is reached between the two Presidents;

(b) in Visoko on 18 December, Roso himself had proposed a solution to the problem of the two BiH helicopters blocked at Medjugorje since October. There had been no positive development since. After their private exchange (see para. 4 below), Roso stated that he "thought a solution would rapidly be found through bilateral discussions, provided progress was made in updating lists of prisoners of war".

3. Briquemont, "on behalf of political leaders", then appealed to both commanders to take measures to reduce the intensity of combat in Central Bosnia, as recommended at Bonn by Izetbegović and Tudjman. Political negotiations leading to the 18 January meeting would be hampered if fighting continued in the Vitez area. Delić argued that the Vitez-Bušovaća pocket had a balanced Croat and Muslim demography before the war and tried to justify the recent attack by the impatience of Armija soldiers originating from that area to return to their homes.

4. We then left the two delegations face to face for a private exchange that lasted over an hour.

5. Full meeting then reconvened and, after some discussion, the following was agreed regarding Central Bosnia: Delić stated that no partial cease-fire was possible until a global settlement is reached. Despite pressure from Briquemont, he, therefore, did not commit himself to reducing military activity in the Vitez area. Agreement however, was reached on immediately implementing a comprehensive cease-fire, as soon as "political agreement is achieved" at next round of Izetbegović/Tudjman's discussions on 15 January or at any subsequent meeting, e.g. 18 January in Geneva. Delić and Roso also decided to meet again in Split on 18 January to work out practical cease-fire modalities, including demarcation lines and separation of forces. Both offered to press their respective political leaderships to reach earliest possible global agreement, which would make cessation of hostilities possible. Briquemont insisted that fighting around Vitez pocket - especially artillery fire, including against East Mostar - be reduced so as not to allow local military initiatives to further complicate political negotiations.

6. Attached press statement was read and approved by both parties.

ENDALL

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As requested by Mr STOLTENBERG, co-chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia and Mr AKASHI, Special Representative of the Secretary General, and as recommended by President TUDJMAN and President IZETBEGOVIC, General BRIQUEMONT invited General DELIC, Commander of the BiH army, and General ROSO, Commander of the HVO army, to meet at Sarajevo Airport this Wednesday 12 January 1994.

a. The two parties declared that they are ready to start discussions on the modalities of a total ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could become effective as from 15 January 1994, subject to President TUDJMAN and President IZETBEGOVIC reaching an agreement on this date.

b. The two parties also agreed to start bilateral discussions concerning the exchange of prisoners and to resolve the problem of the two BiH helicopters blocked in Medugorje.

c. General ROSO gave his authorization for engineer materials, including ferries, to be moved from Ploce to the Bijela bridge site through Mostar, using the main road. General BRIQUEMONT has therefore ordered the ferries to be moved tomorrow 13 January. General ROSO also stated that, should a bilateral agreement be signed between the political authorities of the two sides on 15 January 1994, he will authorise the humanitarian convoys to move on the main road Ploce - Mostar - Jablanica - Sarajevo.

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UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS '94 JAN 11 -9 50 NYK 07-M

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-Ø3Ø

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Karadzic and Prof. Koljevic

1. I should like to inform you of the relevant topics of my meeting with Dr. Karadzic and Prof. Koljevic in Pale today. As you will know, the "RS" parliament had been meeting in the morning to discuss what position to take at the resumed negotiations in Geneva. Except for some general remarks about the u**fulness of having parliamentary support before entering into negotiations, Dr. Karadzic did not disclose any details.

2. During the meeting, Dr. Karadzic informed me that his side was ready to accept, in principle, that Sarajevo be put under United Nations administration. In this context, he alluded to the future possibility of creating a confederation of all republics of the former Yugoslavia. Each republic should be able to enter such a confederation on its own terms. Dr. Karadzic also announced this point to the media during a short briefing we gave in Pale.

3. Dr. Karadzic expressed his frustration about the pressure exerted during the preparatory phase of the NATO summit and the anti-Serb bias of the international media. I emphasized that the recent excessive retaliations against the Bosnian Army infantry attack were counter-productive, as they killed innocent people and created a unfavourable climate for the negotiations in Geneva. He took the point, but expressed his impatience with the Bosnian Government's attitude in the Geneva negotiations. At the end of our meeting he strongly pointed out that if a peace

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agreement could not be reached soon, the "RS" would have to "declare war". Whether this is a threat for the benefit of the co-Chairmen or not, it is disconcerting as the international community has very little means left to discourage the Bosnian Serbs from such a move.

4. During the meeting in Pale, there occurred at least four NATO fighter overflights which did not go unnoticed, but appeared to only harden the Bosnian Serb position. I advised Dr. Karadzic of the Secretary-General's position regarding the authorization of close air support. I intend to raise the issue of such overflights with NATO during my meeting with Admiral Boorda tomorrow in Naples. While it is up to NATO to schedule flights of exercises, there is obviously a need for closer consultation with the political representatives of the United Nations.

5. Dr. Karadzic said that there was no need for the presence of tens of thousands of troops for the implementation of a peace agreement. He believes that once all issues have been resolved, the presence of some 2,000 observers should be sufficient - a point with which the Bosnian Government will obviously disagree. General Briquemont pointed out that, inter alia, the complex ethnic situation in Central Bosnia would require the presence of troops in order to stabilize the situation.

6. I advised Dr. Karadzic that the international community would very likely provide generous assistance for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, once there was a peace agreement. I recalled the UNTAC experience where an appeal by the Secretary-General for some 600 million U.S. Dollars had solicited pledges amounting to more than 800 million. Dr. Karadzic responded rather skeptically to the prospects of such assistance coming through.

7. At various points during the discussion, I had to underline the international character and impartiality of UNPROFOR. With reference to the recurrent threat of air strikes, Dr. Karadzic pointed out that his people were suspicious of the presence of UNPROFOR. This was one reason for their difficulties in

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preventing individual soldiers or units from hostilities against UNPROFOR or UNHCR. Moreover, he claimed that UNPROFOR soldiers were involved in smuggling arms or money for the Bosnian Muslims. I referred to the Greindl commission and underlined my firm intention to enforce the strictest discipline within UNPROFOR. However, Dr. Karadzic expressed the fear that the mandate of the troops currently deployed as UNPROFOR might be changed to an enforcement mission.

8. Dr. Karadzic agreed that the shelling of the airport and the resulting impediment of the humanitarian airlift was not acceptable. Likewise, he agreed that obstructions of the humanitarian convoy were counterproductive. I had confronted him with the finding of UNPROFOR specialists that yesterdays shell on the runway had originated from Serb positions, and had also advised him that the concern for the security of our personnel had reached a stage where a special report to the Security Council was required. It remains to be seen whether the shelling of the airport will recede and whether convoy operations particularly in Eastern Bosnia will not be obstructed in the future.

9. Dr. Karadzic agreed to the deployment of Dutch units to Srebrenica and Zepa. He said he had instructed General Mladic to work out the details. As to Tuzla, he made it clear that the airport could only be opened once a peace agreement had been signed. The suspicions as to a possible abuse of the airport for military objectives by the Bosnian Muslims appear to be rooted very deeply. He took objection to the pressure exerted by Foreign Minister Juppe on this issue at the meeting in Brussels with the Foreign Ministers of the European Union.

10. Despite these points of disagreement, I believe that a frank and candid working relationship has been established. Whether this will translate into an improvement of UNPROFOR's ability to implement its mandate remains to be seen.

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94 JAN -3 18:32

SRSG'S OFFICE

TO: AKASHI, ZAGREB

ANNAN, NEW YORK FAX NO. 1-212-963 9Date: 4/1-94

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA SRSG:

OGATA, GENEVA (PLEASE COPY TO MORRIS) DSRSG:
FAX NO. 41-22- 739 8694

SA:

FROM: VIEIRA DE MELLO, SARAJEVO DR
FAX: 871-154 6345 MA: TSA

No.: D-SRSG-SAR-0043

DATE: 3 January 1994

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN GAS SUPPLY TO FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) AND TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - REQUEST FOR UN MEDIATION FROM PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC

1. On Sunday 2 January BH Prime Minister Haris Silajdzić invited me to his office. Also present was Minister Hasan Muratović, President of the State Committee for Cooperation with the UN. One of the two main topics of our meeting (see separate fax on Croat community in BH-controlled territory) was again the supply of Russian gas to B-H (please refer to my fax of 15 November 1993 and the subsequent letter of Silajdzić to the UN Sanctions Committee).

2. I was informed of the following:

i) a comprehensive (including visits to Hungary and Serbia) survey carried out by Mr. Vickland of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), whose report of 18 December 1993 I have read, has concluded that some 75,000 m³/per hour arrived at Horgoš (Serbia) through the Russia/Ukraine/Hungary pipeline. Approximately 33,000 m³/h enter B-H at Zvornik and some 10,000 m³/h remain there. Consequently only some 23,000 m³/h reach the outskirts of Sarajevo, with half of that volume going to the Serb-controlled areas of Ilidza and Hadzići and the other half (i.e. about 11,000 m³/h) to Central Sarajevo under BH control, which BH Government

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finds unacceptably low. No gas whatsoever reaches other Central Bosnian towns such as Kakanj, Visoko, and Zenica;

ii) there was an obvious and urgent need to resolve the following issues which had been outstanding for many months:

(a) in addition to the scarcity of electricity aggravated by damage caused during recent fighting, the Sarajevo population was finding it increasingly difficult to survive (i.e. heating and cooking) without a reasonable supply of gas, let alone populations in other towns that were getting no gas or electricity at all. This situation cannot be allowed to continue as temperatures are now well below 0°C;

(b) Therefore, two options exist for the BH Government: either to call on the Sanctions Committee to address this issue and, possibly, to impose a total embargo on gas entering Serbia, or to find a "realistic" arrangement with the latter, without formally involving the Sanctions Committee or with its concurrence. Silajdzic and Muratovic said they obviously preferred the second for two reasons: in the event of a total embargo on gas to Serbia, Sarajevo and other BH-controlled towns would also be penalized; BH also understood the humanitarian need to allow the civilian population in Serbia also to continue to benefit from gas supply;

(c) if the "realistic", "conciliatory" (as opposed to the "hardline") approach were to prevail, then Serbia should agree to seriously and urgently address two issues: equitable sharing of volumes of gas and of outstanding and future payments to Russia. Both are extremely complex issues, more political than technical or financial, Silajdzic said.

iii) BH Government wishes the UN to act as an intermediary to pass the above pressing message to FRY and establish if they are willing to cooperate along the above lines. After an early and short UN preparatory mission, the BH Government would be prepared, if necessary, to hold bilateral, high-level and confidential discussions - preferably at a neutral location and with UN participation - with the FRY with a view to reaching an agreement. Silajdzic asked if I would be prepared to undertake the preparatory mission.

3. I replied that while fully understanding the complexity and urgency of the situation, I had to submit the question to you and seek your guidance as to whether the UN/UNPROFOR could play that role, who should actually do it and how to proceed. I also said that there may be a need, which was difficult for me to evaluate from Sarajevo, to informally consult the President of the Sanctions Committee and, possibly, the Russian Federation (Mr. Tchurkin?).

4. Silajdzić said that a letter would be addressed to me confirming the above request, which I received today and you will find in annex.

5. Briquemont, Andreev, UNHCR, IRC and myself have been devoting a great deal of time to this thorny and mind-boggling issue in recent months. Gas is undoubtedly vital for the survival of the Sarajevo population this winter and, as such, for the credibility of the UN. We would, therefore, welcome your urgent views and instructions.

6. For your information, I was told that should progress be made on this issue, other more important political questions could be resolved through bilateral talks with FRY. Gas was, therefore, "a crucial test".

ENDALL

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TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM : STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

DATE : 2 JANUARY 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- ØØØ2

SUBJECT: ALLEGED MASSACRES COMMITTED BY BOSNIAN PRESIDENCY FORCES

1. Your MSC 2338 of 3 December and our Z 1615 of 21 December refer to the above.

2. Further to the ECMM follow up of the alleged Grabovica massacre, the ECMM Humanitarian Activity report no. 50/93, covering the period 12-18 December 1993, reports that the ECMM Mostar team went to Grabovica on 17 December to investigate the allegations of a massacre by the BH Armija. A local Muslim confirmed the massacre of Croats during the night of 8/9 September, continuing into the following day, when rogue elements from the Sarajevo area entered the village. They are reported to have gathered Croats from their houses and led them towards the village bridge from where some were pushed into the river. Others were shot or simply pushed off the edge of the mountains into the river. Only a few children managed to escape, alerting the police and the Armija, who then took action and saved eight Croats. Allegedly, 30-33 persons were killed and their bodies maltreated as a result of this massacre. Other people from Grabovica were also tortured by the same rogue elements, of whom 17 were later treated by local doctors. Independent information given to the ECMM team by the HVO President of the POW Exchange Commission, Mr Pusic, confirmed the information given previously. The number of deaths are alleged to be 33 and the operation initiated by Safet Halilovic.

3. A report on Croatian radio on 27 December claimed that there had been a massacre by BiH forces at the village of Kriz Zicenvo Selo near to Dubravica in the Vitez pocket. It further claimed that UNPROFOR was taking no action on the matter. With regard to this incident, on 23 December, an HVO LO to Britbat alleged that a massacre had occurred in Kriz Zicenvo Selo on 22 December during the course of fighting in the area. The HVO presented a list of 53 names, all of which were males of military age except for one female. They contended that many of these people had been massacred, crucified and subjected to other unspecified war crimes.

4. An investigation team consisting of BRITBAT personnel, the

Vitez LO and ECMM attempted to examine the site of the incident. The team made it up the road and crossed into "no-man's" land where they got caught in a cross fire. During the time that they were near the site, they could not detect any signs of a massacre but did see BiH forces along the front-line. Repeated attempts to get HVO and BiH approval to visit the site have been denied. However, BRITBAT Commander 2 Coy was able to determine through questioning of local inhabitants that an initial attack was conducted by the BiH and the HVO counter-attacked but failed to clear buildings and fighting position to its rear. In a subsequent BiH counter-attack, the HVO forces were caught in a crossfire which resulted in a high number of dead.

5. The BiH have subsequently stated that there is a mass grave of 35 HVO. The HVO agree with this figure but claim that there is another grave with 8 bodies nearby. Apparently, three HVO have also been taken prisoner and are now in jail in Zenica. 19 bodies are believed to be in "no-man's" land - leading to a total of some 60 victims as opposed to the initial claim of 53.

6. Presently, the HVO appear to be satisfied with the accounting of the bodies and accept that those killed were casualties of war. However, a body exchange is the only remaining means of verifying if any atrocity did indeed take place. A request for a body exchange is expected from both sides. Both the HVO and the BiH have also been advised that the only means of verifying atrocities is for UNPROFOR to be given immediate access to sites following the perpetration of alleged atrocities.

7. We shall keep you informed of developments.

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