

ICFY

BRCKO, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2 MAY - 29 JUNE 1994

[1 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

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ACC. 2011/0195



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



010/9

CRYPTO-FAX TRANSMITTAL

' URGENT

TO: Mary Fisk, SRSG's Office, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

DATE: 29 June 1994

PAGE: 1 OF: 1

FROM: David Ludlow *[Signature]*
Private Secretary to Lord Owen

FAX: 41-22-9170096


TEL: 41-22-9173422

Ref our telcon

Map and description of parameters for Brcko area.

BRCKO

- Invincible solution ie Federation to have sovereign territory extending to a fly-over complex on outskirts of town, and including built up area of town to west of, and including railway from Tuzla. Serbs to construct new road over which they will have sovereign control, running east-west through fly-over complex. An area in the immediate vicinity of the fly-over as well as the town of Brcko, will be demilitarized and placed under UN control. Both the Federation and the serb entity will be able to use the passage by and under fly-over complex for the transit of military personnel and equipment but will not be permitted to station military personnel and equipment in the vicinity of the fly-over. The Serbs will be offered special protection for this road by UN/Russian forces.



11-0-11 01:22 5603

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK 001 F

UNOD: Information Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ 428 CYZ 205 P1/3

CODED CABLE

Reg.

4153
010/9 ✓

'94 MAY 17 -3 :16

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 16 May 1994
NUMBER: 1615
SUBJECT: Brcko Resolution

00 00 00 00 00

As discussed in telecon Johnson-Tharoor, there is no indication at the moment of further progress in the Security Council on the Brcko resolution, the latest version of which is attached as requested. The French Permanent Representative advised Tharoor this morning that he would be consulting the Russian Permanent Representative on the possibilities of further action, but did not judge that this would be imminent. We shall keep you informed.

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK
FRENCH MISSION

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CN2 428 CYZ 205 P3/3

5. Invites the Secretary General to ask UNPROFOR to begin negotiations with the parties on confidence building measures in relation to the zone defined in paragraph 1 above ;

6 - Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution, and in particular progress achieved in the negotiations on confidence building measures including separation of forces along the current lines of contact ;

7 - Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

CZ N 658

(CZG 340)

Coded Cable # 4124
010/9A . /3UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONSCBZ AS
94 MAY -8 16:38UNPROFOR
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

SSN 869

IMMEDIATE - UN RESTRICTED

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 707 1642
STOLTENBERG, GENEVAFROM : DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Alley: cos for Fe*

INFO : SRSG, G3, G3 Air, BHC (Fwd), NATO LO, COS (Log Admin)

DATE : 08 MAY 94

NUMBER : Z- 709

FILE : FAX 1132

SUBJECT : AIDE MEMOIRE - BRCKO

REF. : ANNAN's Code Cable 1457 dated 05 May 94.

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1. We wish to comment in more detail on the option of a 10 km radius zone, a disengagement line and a heavy weapons no fire zone in the context of trying to prevent Brcko becoming a new hot spot similar to that of Gorazde.

2. 10 km Radius Zone. A 10 km radius zone is unlikely to be agreed upon by the two parties involved, for the following reasons:

- a. BSA will reject the idea (Mr Akashi has already been told this by Dr Karadzic) because it will weaken their possibility to defend BRCKO and consequently to keep the POSAVINA corridor open. To keep the POSAVINA corridor open is to assure one of their vital security interests.
- b. BiH will see the creation of a zone as a way of preventing them from attacking targets in the vicinity of BRCKO and in the areas adjacent to the POSAVINA corridor. The linkage with the ORASJE pocket must not be overlooked, however any attempt to link up with the pocket is very unlikely to be successful.
- c. To impose this zone without the agreement of BSA and BiH will probably be impossible and, as they have pointed out in Reference A, the use of air-power in support of the zone concept would probably cause a lot of collateral damage. In the worst case this would lead to major conflict between UNPROFOR and BSA

d. Proposal. We are reluctant to support calls for a 10 km zone around BRCKO, however if the Security Council decides otherwise, their resolution must contain a clear statement, which specifies the threat of air strikes to both sides (BiH and BSA) if they violate the terms of the Council's resolution.

3. A Disengagement Line.

a. A disengagement line should be viewed as a positive measure. In concert with a limited forces area (LFA) it will be neutral to both parties. Taking into consideration the width of the POSAVINA corridor, a disengagement line could be imposed of around 1-2 km in width in the BRCKO area, which is enlarged in both a NW and SE direction to form a LFA. The number of troops and equipment in the LFA should be determined by the amount necessary to protect BRCKO and yet maintain a free passage in the POSAVINA corridor. Weapon Collection Points are unacceptable in the LFA.

b. It is understood that this idea will have to be agreed upon initially by the UN Security Council and then at UNPROFOR level by both parties. Strong pressure will have to be put on BiH to accept this proposal.

c. In the meanwhile there are insufficient troops to engage in an operation of this kind, although with the arrival of the Pakistani contingent this AOR (one infantry battalion and one logistic battalion) could fall to them. Comd Sector NE would have more troops to allocate to the SAPNA area further south as a result.

d. With the arrival of the Norwegian and Pakistani logistic elements, it should be possible to establish a logistic base, in Sector NE.

e. This disengagement concept has already been made easier to implement through the recent deployment of UNMOs in the corridor.

f. Proposal. We favour the implementation of a disengagement line of 2 km, which would be imposed in the following sequence:

- (1) Call for cease - fire.
- (2) Marking of CFL.
- (3) Withdrawal of factions at least one km from CFL, and agreement on a LFA widening from 2 to 6 km.
- (4) Interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops.

A suitable timetable, taking into account the impending arrival of the Pakistani contingent, requires to be worked out.

4. A Heavy Weapons No Fire Zone. The notion of a heavy weapons no fire zone will be difficult to implement without considerable additional resources. These include:

- a. Counter-battery radars (The Jordanian radars are in transit to Tuzla at present).
- b. CAS on call within minutes to provide a timely response and to avoid a cat and mouse game with NATO aircraft and BiH/BSA heavy weapons.
- c. More TACPs and FACs deployed at sensitive areas, a measure that might not be accepted by the parties involved.

It must be clearly stated that all parties (BiH as well as BSA) will be targeted in case of violations. Collateral damage may well occur if heavy weapons are deployed near villages or houses and such damage would be unacceptable in the peacekeeping context.

Comment. For this reason we cannot support the imposition of a heavy weapons' fire zone.

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

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'94 APR -5 23:45

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
(UNPROFOR)

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

CODE RESTRICTED

Page 1 of 5

UNUC Telecomm Unit

Palais des Nations

INFO
FROM '94 MAY -6 -0 :32

: ANNAN/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK -23522

: STOLTENBERG, ICFY GENEVA
ROSE, SARAJEVO

: AKASHI, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

DATE : 5 May 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z - 689

SUBJECT : Visit to Brčko by HCA and Military Team

DISTRIBUTION:	
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1. Dr. Karadzic called me yesterday from Belgrade and proposed that HCA Sergio Vieira de Mello and RS "Vice-President" Nicola Koljević, accompanied by senior military colleagues, meet today at Brčko for high-level talks on the deployment of UNMOs and other preventive measures as broadly agreed at Pale during my visit there on 3 May. I agreed and we immediately informed B-H Presidency and PM Silajdzic.

2. Vieira de Mello was accompanied by his two Military Assistants, Col. G. de Battista and Maj. B. Smith, Col. R. Duburg, Deputy Military Negotiator, as well as G-2 Capt. Quiggin, all from Zagreb HQS. In Brčko they were joined by BHC North-Eastern Sector COS Col. Engelen and Deputy Chief for BHC UNMO Col. Nielsen. On the Bosnian Serb side, Koljević was accompanied by BSA Corps Commander Gen. Simić, Col. Tolimir, other brigade commanders and local senior officials.

3. Our team travelled by road from Belgrade via Bijeljina, and observed no military presence on its way in and out. Commercial

Fc/DPC/HCA

CZM-641
CZG-325
CZS-337

-2-

and passenger traffic, especially at border between Serbia and BH was, however, considerable. After meetings, the team visited one of the proposed OPs (silo in the eastern part of Brčko town, with excellent visibility on Posavina corridor as well as on Sava river and Croatian bank), hospital, one factory and centre of town. Bosnian Serbs had invited a number of journalists from Belgrade for whom a press briefing was organised at the end of the programme.

4. Brčko area and eastern part of Posavina corridor were calm and population appeared to lead normal life (agricultural production seems adequate and most factories were open although their output is said to be well below 50 % of their normal capacity).

5. Shelling was reported in the early part of the day. Gen. Simić said that in recent days he had been less concerned by shelling from the southern BH positions than from HVO or "Muslim" units in Orasje pocket (we have just established an UNMO presence there and shall investigate).

6. OUTCOME OF MEETINGS - Two meetings took place: one preparatory at the military level, the second, for review and approval, in the presence of heads of delegation.

7. The following was agreed on UNMO deployment:

- a) on Saturday 7 May, a first group of 7 UNMOs will arrive to be followed by another group of 9 the next day;
 - b) these 16 UNMOs will permanently operate the "silo" OP (for observation of artillery/tank fire) mentioned above in Brčko town as well as on a 7-day rotating basis, one of the three OPs identified along the confrontation line (for skirmishes on the latter), according to the trends and needs of the moment.
- ... Please see attached map for locations. Incidentally, effective today we have initiated a similar UNMO

rotating observation system along the BiH side of the line with UNPROFOR troops manning OPs on the high-ground overlooking the Posavina corridor;

- c) investigation patrols within or outside the OPs rectangle area, as necessary.

8. You will be interested to know that at no time was the question of UNMO's nationality raised or any request for Russian UNMOs put forward. We shall, however, include two Russians in the team.

9. During the meeting, the BSA also requested UNPROFOR to pass the following cease-fire proposals to BiH side, which we agreed to do:

- a) a meeting between Gen. Simić and BiH 2nd Corps Commander Gen. Šadić could take place tomorrow on Saturday, 7 May at "neutral" location in the vicinity of Brčko;
- b) BSA proposed following agenda items:
 - i) immediate local cease-fire, which Simić said he had authority to agree to and sign;
 - ii) exchange (we and ICRC would say release) of POWs;
 - iii) opening of crossing points for civilians (à la 17 March 1994 Sarajevo Agreement);
 - iv) hot-line between corps commanders;
 - v) methodology for UNMO observation, monitoring, investigating and reporting roles.
- c) in this connection, BSA indicated that if cease-fire were to ^{be} led, as we hope, to agreement on total cessation of hostilities, UNPROFOR would then be invited to deploy military units along confrontation line, with modalities to be agreed upon in due course.

CONCLUSION

10. This appears to have been a first important step towards improving our presence in the Posavina corridor and our

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CZG-325
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-4-

preventive role in that strategically sensitive area. No illusions, however, should exist that UNMO teams alone are a sufficient guarantee against offensive military action by either side.

11. The formula of dispatching to the field high-level civilian and military delegations empowered to negotiate, agree and initiate implementation - which we had already successfully tested in Gorazde -, may be worth making greater use of in future.


12. Our team also took the opportunity to discuss with Koljević the present fragile situation around Gorazde and our proposed steps to resolve the outstanding issues (withdrawal of Serb forces - including militia - from 3 kms zone and related difficulties). I have written today to PM Silajdžić and Dr. Karadžić on this question and may ask Vieira de Mello to visit Sarajevo and Pale to follow-up on my discussions of 3 May and try and reach agreement on compromise formula for Gorazde.

13. If that could be achieved, today's progress in Brčko area could represent a stepping stone towards a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a freeze of the movements of troops as well as military equipment and supplies.

Endall.

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Permanent OP as of 7/8 May



Rotating OPs (OP in BRD to be named 7/8 May)

UNOC Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ - 404 / CYZ - 192 P1/3 010/9

4112

'94 MAY -6 -4 :17

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Attn: SRSG/FC
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 5 MAY 1994
NUMBER: 1457
SUBJECT: Brcko

[Handwritten signature]

1-10-94

1. Attached please find an aide memoire which I handed to Ambassador Merimee of France and Ambassador Inderfurth of the United States this evening. In that context, we also informed them of your successful negotiations in Brcko regarding the deployment of UNMO teams in the corridor.

2. Ambassador Merimee pointed out that his Government strongly believed a political warning and preventive measures were needed. The draft resolution (see attached revised text which has not yet been approved by either capital) was meant to provide a framework and general direction for operational details to be worked out by the military commanders of UNPROFOR to work out locally with their counterparts. Therefore, the sponsors would proceed with the resolution. In this context, constructive proposals from UNPROFOR would be taken into account before its adoption. Given the above, I would appreciate any further proposals you may have to contribute on the issue.

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Aide-Mémoire

BRCKO

CNZ - 404 / GYZ - 192 P2/3

The present aide-mémoire is intended to assist members of the Security Council by reflecting the Secretariat's views regarding the draft resolution currently before the Security Council on Brcko.

We are aware that the French and US Governments are keen on a resolution and that its adoption may therefore be inevitable. However, given the likelihood that, in the judgement of the Force Commander, UNPROFOR will not be able to implement it satisfactorily, we believe it appropriate to make our views known in advance to the Security Council, so that Member States adopt the resolution in full knowledge of the Secretariat's concerns.

The position of DPKO and of UNPROFOR is as follows:

- We accept that Governments may well be right in focusing on Brcko as a potential problem area. In recognition of this, we have negotiated the deployment of UNMO teams with all three sides to the conflict. We believe the presence of these teams, three of which have already been deployed (the remainder may well be in place in the course of next week), will serve the same objectives as the draft resolution, i.e. to prevent an eruption of fighting there.
- The proclamation of a "no-fire zone", as suggested by the French, is not in itself problematic. However, the threat of air strikes may be counter-productive, in view of the strength of Serb feeling on the issue. The Force Commander has pointed out that air power is not a credible deterrent in a "chokepoint inhabited by a large number of civilians."
- The interdiction on reinforcement of troops and equipment is not implementable. First of all, we do not know what the current levels of both are, and cannot judge credibly what constitutes reinforcements. Secondly, the corridor is used daily as a vital logistics lifeline for the Serbs, and men and materiel are traversing it all the time. For this reason we would prefer the more general formula "military activity that jeopardizes the cease-fire".
- The US proposal of a disengagement zone poses additional problems. The Serbs, who have fought hard to gain the corridor, will see it as directed against them. They may not withdraw (and it is not clear from the US proposal what the Security Council will do if they do not withdraw). If they do withdraw, UNPROFOR cannot take on the patrolling of the resulting buffer zone without at least another two self-supporting infantry battalions, which we simply have no prospect of obtaining. (We still have no indication that we will receive all the troops already authorized for existing tasks).

CNZ - 404 / CYZ - 192 P3/3

5 May 1994 - 1.00 p.m.

The Security Council.

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia,

Stressing the need for an overall cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a condition for the resumption of the negotiations aimed at achieving an overall political settlement,

Determined to this end to ensure that no deterioration of the situation on the ground occurs which could impede the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the frame work of the Contact Group with the participation of representatives the European Union, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Nations,

Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and its freedom of movement for all its missions and, to these ends, as regards UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1 - Demands that, within the perimeter of 10 kilometers from the center of Brcko and within the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all parties and others concerned immediately cease all hostilities, comply with a ceasefire and refrain from any military activity, including any reinforcement in troops or equipment, that might jeopardize the cessation of hostilities ;

2 - Requests the Secretary-General ^{UNPROFOR} to implement the provisions of paragraph 1 above ;

3 - Requests Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to assist UNPROFOR by means of air observation to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 above ;

4 - Decides that any violation of the provisions of paragraph 1 above by any party constitutes an impediment to the execution of UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizes, in accordance with resolutions 836 (1993) and 913 (1994), in the case of such violations, the resort to the measures set out in paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 836 regarding the use of air power ;

5. Underlines the usefulness, within the perimeter as defined in paragraph 1 above, of establishing a disengagement line and a heavy weapons no-fire zone ;

6 - Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution, and in particular of paragraph 5 above ;

7 - Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

UNPROFOR

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PAGE 1/1

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'94 APR -5 15:24 IMMEDIATE - UN RESTRICTED

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM : DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO : STOLTENBERG GENEVA, GEN ROSE SARAJEVO

DATE : 05 MAY 94

NUMBER : Z-686

FIL : FAX 1122

SUBJECT : BRCKO-SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

REF : ANNAN CODE CABLE 1435 DATED 04 MAY 94

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94 APR -5 15:27

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

BRCKO-SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

1. The French draft resolution dated 4 May 94 is one basis upon which UNPROFOR can continue to fulfil its mandates in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have 2 observations:

a. The first demand, which relates to parties refraining from reinforcing troops and equipment, will be almost impossible to monitor and/or stop. Provided that we obtain total freedom of movement on the ground and in the air (for light helicopters) and that we receive approximately 2 self supporting battalions (2000+ men) to deploy as an interpositioning force, the resolution could be worked. Currently the troops are not available.

b. The resolution depends upon the use of air power as the ultimate deterrent. This is not considered to be a credible option in a choke point, inhabited by a large number of civilians.

2. The Brcko /Posavina Corridor need not necessarily be the appropriate region, in which we would wish to see such a resolution. If the aim is to continue the peace process, we might be better to consider regaining the initiative in smaller chunks, by concentrating on minor successes throughout the BHC area. Thus, a creeping peace is what we consider to be a more appropriate response to international demands than tackling a major and sensitive area such as Brcko.

3. You will be aware that the situation in Brcko is rapidly improving in that the BSA has asked us to insert UNMOs into the area. This move has been similarly supported by the Croats, who have allowed our UNMOs to be located on the North Bank of the Drina.

4. Although perhaps indirectly commenting on the resolutions, we wish to steer clear of a resolution which we are unlikely to be able to enforce.

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IMMEDIATE

CZN-640
CZG-324

94 APR -5 23:45 CD5 ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK - 2384Z
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 5 MAY 1994

NUMBER: Z - 688

SUBJECT: BRCKO CORRIDOR

94 MAY -6 -0 :32

UNUO Inform. Unit
Palais des Nations

I concur with the comments of the Force Commander UNPROFOR in his FAX 1122 of 5 May 94.

Our Head of Civil Affairs conducted today a successful negotiation with the Serbs at Brcko that will result in deployment of UNMOs into good observation positions over the next days. Details have been reported separately.

With the agreement to deploy UNMOs in Serb and Croatian portions of the corridor, and coordinated observation from Bosnian areas, I expect to achieve the objectives of improved observation and stabilization as outlined in my cable of 2 May 1994.

It remains our objective to move as rapidly as possible towards a comprehensive cessation of hostilities followed by a negotiated settlement. It is therefore essential that we retain a wide view, guard our limited flexibility to react with existing forces to unforeseen difficulties and opportunities, and continue intensive negotiations with all parties to avoid misunderstandings.

The timely measures that we have taken in the Brcko area are for the present prudent, appropriate, and affordable. We must now gather more information on both Brcko and the general situation before undertaking further commitments. Finally, the Brcko region is uniquely sensitive to all parties. Considerable care must therefore be taken to ensure in advance that any further initiatives we might take will not have unintended consequences on the perceptions and interests of the parties, which in turn could set off a process of mutual escalation or other negative consequences. Your efforts to keep us informed on the issue of Brcko are therefore appreciated.

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SSN-836 010/4

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'94 APR -5 13:49

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1 OF 10

IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB *S. M. U.*

DATE: 5 MAY 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-685

SUBJECT: BRCKO CORRIDOR - TANK ACTION

1. Attached are cables of interest on Brcko and tank activities that you may not have seen.

ENDALL

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- CDS
94 APR -4 19:40

UNPROFOR
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IMMEDIATE - UN RESTRICTED

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM : DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

De la Presle COS for FC

DATE : 04 MAY 94

575-74

NUMBER : Z-676

Date:

FILE : FAX 1121

TRSG:

SUBJECT : POSAVINA CORRIDOR

ORSG:

REF : YOUR 1408 DATED 3 MAY 94

CA:

MA:

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
94 APR -4 19:40

BRCKO

1. You requested information on the dispositions and deployment of our UNMOs in Brcko together with a view on a cease fire zone of some 6 kms in the area. Your Code Cable 1408 dated 3 May 94 refers.

2. Dispositions Of UNMOs. Attached at Annex A is the projected disposition of UNMOs for the Posavina corridor. The numbers on the front page refer to the OPs on the second page. To save time, the Annex is forwarded in draft form, since the exact composition of each team, by nationality, is not yet known. There should be at least one Russian UNMO in each team deploying onto BSA held territory. We will update you as informatio is obtained.

3. The Posavina Corridor. Our latest G2 (Mil Info) report on the corridor is attached at Annex B. You should appreciate that with limited observer presence in the area in the recent past and with no intelligence gathering assets available to us within the Force, the dispositions are likely to be inaccurate as at today.

4. Safe Area/Cease Fire Zone. We have achieved much over the past few days in gaining approval to insert UNMOs into BSA held territory in the Brcko area. In addition, we have also obtained authority to place them North of the SAVA River, in Croatia. As you will be only too aware, the Brcko choke point is a strategic one, for which both sides have spilt much blood and sweat. Tense though the situation in the area

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has been, it is felt that our presence (UNMOs) will provide the much needed stability in the region. Mutual respect for us by both sides is a vital ingredient to the continued peace process, and the Brcko area is a key feature in this. Confidence in UNPROFOR will not be built up overnight; our honest reporting of activity to both sides to alleviate further blood- shed is very important.

In our view, talk of a safe area or demilitarised zone here would be destabilising at a time when the first step to a peace settlement in this area has been made. From the military perspective, this should be explained. To demilitarise, weapons have to be taken away or military forces have to withdraw. To impose this over such a vital life-line for the BSA, an ultimatum would probably be required. This could not be fairly imposed, since it would hand the BIH a moral victory.

To demilitarise without an ultimatum (and inherent threat of air strikes), the next step after withdrawal would be to interpose an UNPROFOR force between the 2 sides, along the current confrontation lines. We could then be subjected to provocative, sporadic fire from both sides, and be entrenched for an indeterminate amount of time. Frankly, this is a non- starter with the current level of forces available to us now or in the foreseeable future. Not only would we have to dig ourselves in, we would then have to mount mobile patrols to monitor the cease-fire/confrontation/separation lines. This would require even more resources.

UNPROFOR force levels are already stretched. Current commitments throughout the theatre are likely to increase, as the peace spreads throughout the mission area.

Deployment of UNMOs
monitoring POSAVINA
corridor and approaches.

ANNEX II 10
 FAX 1131 VUCOVAR
 1970 4.11.94

CZG-321

4/10

SLAV BROD

CERNA

OTOK

ZUPANJA

BOSNA RIVER

GRADACAC

DRNOVCI

BRCKO

SREBRENIK

MACLAI

ZAVIDOVICI

TUZLA

ZECE

KLADANJS

VARES

OLOVO

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SREBRES

UNMOS TEAM IN POSAVINA CORRIDOR

OPS #	LOCATIONS	PERS IN TM	NATIONALITY
1	BRCKO CQ 2771		
2	MAOCA CQ 1560		
3	ORASJE CQ 1989		
4	BIJELINA CORPS LN CQ 5857		
5	VLASENICA CORPS LN CP 3694 SAME AS DRINA CORPS		
6	ZVORNIK CQ 3694		
7	VLASENICA CP3694		
8	DOBOJ BQ 6958		
9	DOBOJ CORPS LN BQ 6958 SAME AS 3 KRAJNA CORPS		
10	TESLIC YK 2643		
11	GRACANICA BQ 8754		
12	GUNJA CQ 2972		

1. 1/2 UNMO GUNJA TEAM operates from UNMO OTOK location, patrolling the AOR above the corridor. Verbal authorization for deployment by CO CA OSIJEK was already given. As soon as the written one is received by the UNMO GUNJA team will operate on 24 hrs basis.

2. UNMO ORASJE team will be in the location today - operational from tomorrow morning.

3. UNMO BRCKO and BIJELINA teams were identified. UNMO HQ BH COMD is negotiating with bsa military authorization for deployment. Teams to be deployed as soon as this is received.

4. UNMO MAOCA team has been deployed today. They maintain 1 op on 24 hrs basis and 4 others on "as required".

5. The goal:

GUNJA - 7 UNMOS;	BRCKO - 12 UNMOS (including 7 from GUNJA)
ORASJE - 6 UNMOS;	BIJELINA - 4 UNMOS;
MAOCA - 7 UNMOS.	



ANNEX 3 TO

FAX 1131

DATE 4 MAY 94

6/10

CZG-321

6/10

MILITARY INFORMATION OFFICE
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: COS

From: G2

Date: 04 MAY 1994

Subject: REPORT ON THE POSAVINA CORRIDOR

1. In the beginning of APR we received BSA reports (unconfirmed) that the BiH was mounting low level operations against them in the BRCKO area. Since mid APR and up to last week we got confirmed reports that the BSA has been conducting low level infantry attacks in the area SE of BRCKO, sketch attached. Part of the operation appears to have been an attempt to cut the BiH's supply routes in the area. For the last week there has only been a low level of military activity in the area. Shelling has been very low compared to the week before. E.g. 03 MAY a total of 15 rounds were reported in the areas of URANOVACA, BODERISTE and CELIC all on the Eastern part of the corridor.
2. No reports have been received whatsoever about movements of units into the area by any party. Air RECCE has been focused around safe areas, and UNMOs are not yet deployed in the area.
3. Map attached shows the units of all parties deployed in the area. Reports from UNMOs will allow to update it.

WARRING FACTIONS IN POSAVINA CORRIDOR

7/10

CZG-321

7/10

SECTOR
EAST

CROATIA

B-H.

CROATIA

SERBIA

GRABACAC

BRCKO

ATTACKS IN
THIS AREA

MSR

SREBRĒNIK



SCALE: 1:500000

3-2

ZAGREB

0134

94-05-05 13:49

Date: 27 April 1994

Subject: WARRING FACTIONS IN POSAVINA CORRIDOR AND ORASJE POCKET.

a. Warring Factions

A. Commanders

- A1. HV
OZ OSIJEK: Maj Gen Duro DECAK
- A2. HVO
OG ORASJE: Ilija VINCETIC
- A3. BSA
BIJELINA CORPS: GEN SIMIC
1 KRAJINA CORPS: GEN SKENDERJIA
3 KRAJINA CORPS: GEN LISICA
- A4. BiH
2 CORPS: GEN SADIC
1 OG: COL HINDIC

B. Forces involved

- B1. HV
131 Bde: ZUPANJA
- B2. BiH
21 Bde: SREBRENIK
107 Bde: GRADACAC
108 Bde: OGRADENOVAC
108 HVO Bde: ZOVIK/PRIJEDOR
208 Mountain Bde: VARZICI
TUZLA Bde: CQ 175-664
- B3. HVO (ORASJE POCKET)
102 Bde: N. OSTRA LUKA
106 Bde: MANALA
* 101 Bde: VUCILOVAC
* 103 Bde: MASICI

* NOT CONFIRMED by Comd OG ORASJE

CZG-321

9/10

~~Page 2 of 2~~

(C)

B4. BSA
POSAVINA CORRIDOR
 1 POSAVSKA Bde
 4 SEMBERIA Bde
 13 ARTILLERY Regiment
 16 KRAJISKA Bde
 MAUSER Bde
 Helicopters unit

BRCKO
 BRCKO
 BRCKO
 BRCKO
 BRCKO
 BRCKO

ORASIE POCKET
 * 2 x Motorized Bdes
 * 3 x light Bde
 * 1 x Arty regiment
 * 2 x Arty Bde
 * 1 x Arty Bn
 * 1 x LUNA rocket unit

* HVO source

C. Main Equipment

C1. BiH
 Mortars 82m/m - 120 m/m
 10 Tanks T34 - T55 - M47
 1 M80A

C2. BSA
 Tanks T55 - T72
 Mortars
 Artillery 122 m/m - 105 m/m - 152 m/m

C3. HVO
 Mortars
 Artillery ?

C4. HV
 Mortars

COM

CZG-321

10/10

'94 MAY ^{CD5} -4- 18 10IMMEDIATE
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DE LA PRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

Military: cos for FC

DATE: 4 MAY 94

REF: FAX 1120

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-675

SUBJECT: BSA TANK MOVEMENT THOUGH SARAJEVO TEZ

1. Following yesterday's discussions in Pale between SRSG and Dr Karadzic, during which it was eventually agreed that UNPROFOR would monitor and escort the transit of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons through the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, UNPROFOR stopped tanks within the TEZ today.
2. At 041445B May an OP sighted a BSA tank on a low loader in the TEZ. It was stopped and escorted back out of the TEZ in a southerly direction. A second tank on a low loader tried a similar course of action at 041645B May. It too was escorted by UNPROFOR back out of the TEZ with instructions that the terms of the verbal agreement of assistance by UNPROFOR had not been met.
3. The BSA were reminded that Gen Milovanovic had been instructed to submit the appropriate papers to HQ BHC for the 5 tanks, which they wished to move from West to East across the TEZ. Only then would we inform them of the time, route and other details necessary to escort them.
4. There may be media coverage of this eventual move, although we have tried to play it down.

STAFF'S OFFICE

Date: 5/5-94

SRSG: _____

DSRSG: _____

SA: _____

DIR: _____

MA: _____

SRSG
FC
DFC
COS

94 MAY -4 18 02 CD5

COMINT

CNZ 400 CYZ 189 P 1/6

ZAG - PLS PROTECT SARAJEVO

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB attn SRSG & FC
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
INFO: AKASHI, SARAJEVO attn ROSE
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 4 MAY 1994
NUMBER: 1435
SUBJECT: BRCKO - Security Council Action



UNPROFOR P 0002

010/9

1. The Security Council tonight adopted the attached Presidential Statement on Brcko, which is largely along the lines discussed in today's telecon with Tharoor.
2. However, the French, acting on instructions, also introduced their proposed resolution, not as an alternative to the Presidential statement but as a follow-up action. The talking points of the US representative in support of the French draft are also attached. These call for the establishment of a disengagement zone, withdrawal by 1 km from the confrontation line and UNPROFOR patrolling of the zone. The threat of air strikes is present in both resolutions. I persuaded both PermReps not to circulate today a draft resolution containing the American elements, in case these undermined your current efforts to deploy UNMOs in Brcko by agreement. However, further consideration of the resolution will not be long delayed, since the French have instructions from Paris to attempt to secure its adoption by the end of the week.
3. Your comments and advice would be welcome. Please let us have them by 10 a.m. New York time tomorrow.

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CNZ 400 CYZ 189 P 2/6

Presidential Statement

4 May 1994

8:00 p.m.

The Security Council calls upon the parties to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to agree to a complete cessation of hostilities, to comply fully therewith, and to resume immediately negotiations without preconditions for the conclusion of an overall settlement. It demands that the parties immediately refrain from any offensive military action, and any action likely to lead to renewed fighting.

The Security Council is concerned at recent indications of increasing tension in a number of areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the Posavina "corridor".

The Security Council welcomes the arrangements reported by the Secretariat to establish an UNPROFOR presence in the region of the Posavina "corridor". It encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to pursue this rapidly, and also to seek enhanced aerial surveillance of this and other areas of tension. The Council calls on all the parties to cooperate fully with the Special Representative and UNPROFOR in the planned deployment. It warns the parties of the serious consequences of any offensive military action in or around the Posavina "corridor".

The Security Council is considering further decisions on the matter and will remain actively seized of it.

French draft
circulated to Council

4 May 1994
CNZ 400 CYZ 189 P 3/6

The Security Council.

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia,

Stressing the need for an overall cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a condition for the resumption of the negotiations aimed at achieving an overall political settlement,

Determined to this end to ensure that no deterioration of the situation on the ground occurs which could impede the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the frame work of the Contact Group with the participation of representatives the European Union, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Nations,

Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and its freedom of movement for all its missions and, to these ends, as regards UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1 - Demands that, within the perimeter of 10 kilometers from the center of Brcko and within the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all parties and others concerned immediately cease all hostilities, comply with a ceasefire and refrain from any military activity, including any reinforcement in troops or equipment, that might jeopardize the cessation of hostilities ;

2 - Requests the Secretary-General to implement the provisions of paragraph 1 above ;

3 - Requests Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to assist UNPROFOR by means of air observation to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 above ;

4 - Decides that any violation of the provisions of paragraph 1 above by any party constitutes an impediment to the execution of UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizes, in accordance with resolutions 836 (1993) and 913 (1994), in the case of such violations, the resort to the measures set out in paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 836 regarding the use of air power ;

5 - Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution ;

6 - Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

*used (in shorter form) by
US Rep on Sec Co, 4.V.94*

Talking Points: U.S. Initiative for Brcko

-- The buildup of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons near Brcko indicates that it may be the site of the next Bosnian Serb offensive. Widening the strategic Posavina corridor may be the Bosnian Serbs' next major war aim. There have also been reports that BH forces might try to cut the corridor.

-- In the wake of gorazde, forward-looking action is needed to deter a new offensive that could further set back the peace process. Everyone here agrees on that goal.

-- In addition, increasing military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs is essential to current efforts to reinvigorate the peace process.

-- We have carefully considered a variety of options in this regard, including ideas raised by the UK, France and Russia. We believe our proposal incorporates much of your thinking.

-- The parties should agree to a cessation of hostilities in the Brcko region, with interposition of UNPROFOR units between the two sides. This is precisely what the Contact Group now is trying to negotiate for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

-- This formula should be applied first to the Brcko region, while negotiations continue on a country-wide agreement.

-- Since in the past there has been reason to believe that the Bosnian Government might launch a military offensive

-2-

to close the Posavina corridor entirely, the proposal is both neutral and fair. The Bosnian Government would see the international community acting to prevent a new Serb offensive. the Bosnian Serbs would see their concerns about a possible bosnian government offensive in this area addressed as well.

-- We believe the UN Security Council should adopt a resolution creating a disengagement area [which would require each side's forces to withdraw one kilometer from the confrontation line], expanding unprofor's mandate, establishing a heavy weapons no-fire zone within a 10 kilometer radius of Brcko, and inviting NATO to use air power to help enforce the proposal, along the lines set forth below.

-- UNSC action would be followed by a North Atlantic Council decision authorizing NATO military authorities to use air power to enforce the no use/presence of heavy weapons provisions, and reaffirming close air support for unprofor along the lines of procedures now in effect.

-- The key elements of our proposal are as set out below:

Cessation of hostilities on Bosnian territory within a 10 kilometer radius of Brcko. This radius would be sufficient to encompass 18 kilometers of current lines of confrontation between the belligerent forces.

The creation of a disengagement zone. UNPROFOR and NATO, in conjunction with a Joint Commission, would mark the lines of confrontation; forces would be required to disengage one kilometer from either side of that line.

UNPROFOR would be encouraged to deploy a force to patrol the disengagement zone.

--NATO would help to enforce the cessation of hostilities by:

reaffirming Close Air Support for UNPROFOR,



CNZ 400 CYZ 189 P 6/6

-3-

including as it demarks and patrols the disengagement zone;

taking a new decision that a side firing heavy weapons to violate the Brcko regime would be subject to NATO air strikes. This formulation would enable NATO and UNPROFOR to judge whether use of heavy weapons was a violation of the regime, or an extraordinary act of self-defense. Also, heavy weapons present in the 2 kilometer disengagement zone defined above, whether used or not, would be subject to air strikes. We understand that air strikes can impose a heavy price for violations, but not compel compliance.]

NATO and UNPROFOR should promptly meet to determine implementation details.

-- Ideally, we would obtain the parties' consent, but we are also open to the possibility of sc action to declare ceasefire and disengagement regimes in the Brcko area if they do not agree.

-- NATO would be able to respond with air strikes to the use of heavy weapons whose effects fell within the 10 kilometer radius, or to their presence as well as use in the two kilometer-wide disengagement zone, even if unprofor forces were not deployed to the area. Thus, the air strike portion of the proposal could be put into effect even if the Bosnian Serbs oppose an UNPROFOR presence or UNPROFOR did not have the necessary troops to patrol the zone.

-- Although UNPROFOR forces are already stretched thin, given broad-based international concern about Brcko, there is a good chance that UNPROFOR might put at least a small force there--probably one able to cover the territory at least as effectively as its 500 men now cover the substantially larger ~~covered~~ exclusion zone.

-- Any UNPROFOR force, however, would have the mission only of monitoring and hopefully deterring rather than of actually enforcing a disengagement zone.



894-05-04 03:30 5603

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK 008 FC

UNOC Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

Reg No 010/9
CNZ - 397 / [CYZ - 187] P1/2

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'94 MAY -4 -3 :38

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 3 MAY 1994
NUMBER: 1418
SUBJECT: Brcko

Attn: SRSG/FC

Attached for your urgent comments please find a self-explanatory letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation regarding the deployment of observers in Brcko. At informal consultations of the Security Council today, Ambassador Vorontsov stated that the Bosnian Serbs had agreed to an UNMO deployment as a result of political pressure exerted by the Russian Federation. Please advise whether this was confirmed at your talks with Dr. Karadzic in Pale today.

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Постоянный Представитель
Российской Федерации
при
Организации Объединенных
Наций

Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

136 East 67 Street
New York N.Y. 10021


New York, May 3, 199

Dear Mr. Annan,

I have been instructed to inform you that the Government of the Russian Federation agrees that Russian UN military observers from the UNPROFOR personnel in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be sent to the area of Brcko.

I kindly request you to transmit this information to UNPROFOR and expect that it will be taken into account in the process of the consideration of issues related to possible deployment of UN military observers in this area.

Sincerely yours,



Yuli M. Vorontsov

Mr. Kofi Annan
Under-Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, N.Y.

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'94 APR 32 17:31

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'94 MAY -2 19:02

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 2 MAY 1994

NUMBER: Z - 665

SUBJECT: THE BRCKO "SAFE AREA" RA,

As you know, the Brcko corridor is of great strategic importance to the Serbs. It is only 6 to 15 km in width. If it is cut, it will completely isolate the Serb territory in the northwest, including UNPAs, from that in the southeast, as well as from Serbia itself. For precisely this reason, the Bosnian government and the Croats have attempted to exert great military pressure on the area, and conversely the Serb forces have tried to widen the corridor to improve their own security. Dr Karadzic told me today that if the proposal to declare Brcko a "safe area" is accepted, the Serbs would muster all their strength to fight it.

I have two major difficulties with any proposal to declare Brcko a safe area. First, our understanding is that the safe area concept is not intended to influence the course of military operations across BH. Rather, it should be applied to carefully selected areas where the survival of a significant civilian population is at stake, and other means to ensure their welfare (as were successfully applied at Maglaj) are not available. These circumstances do not apply to Brcko, which is a lightly populated rural area. Secondly, UNPROFOR has limited resources and cannot cope with protecting another safe area.

However, UNPROFOR is in the process of implementing as a high priority:

- a) The stationing of UNMOs, and
- b) Establishing observation posts in the region.

It is hoped that these steps will contribute to:

- a) Giving UNPROFOR greater capacity for observation and monitoring of troop movements, and
- b) Improved stability and the diffusion of tensions through an increased, if still rather symbolic, UNPROFOR presence.

Regards,

INTERNAL DIST: FC, HCA