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FROM:

DE: A. E. Nesterenko,  
Under-Sec'y, PSCA.

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AA-37

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
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Political Affairs Division

9 March 1967  
PhP:pmm

SURVEY OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS

(February 1967)

## SURVEY OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS

(February 1967)

### General Comments

1. The Volkskammer (People's House) of the German Democratic Republic on 20 February unanimously adopted a law establishing a separate "nationality of the GDR".<sup>1/</sup> On the same day the spokesman of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) declared that "there is only one German people" and that the new law was in contradiction both with a German citizenship law of 1913 (Delbrück Law) and the GDR Constitution.
2. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Romania and the Soviet statement of 28 January on neo-Nazi activities in the FRG were followed by a number of Socialist statements, generally stressing post World War II realities in Europe, including the existence of two German States. A Romanian broadcast of 1 February called the step she had taken a "contribution" to European security. On the other hand, a GDR broadcast on 2 February asserted that the prerequisites for such a move were not as yet forthcoming.
3. Following the meeting of Warsaw Pact members on 8-10 February in Warsaw, a distinction was emphasized by Socialist leaders between diplomatic relations and a "real normalization". The GDR and Poland on 13 and 17 February re-stated conditions for "normalization" of relations with the FRG. First Secretary Kadar of the Hungarian Communist Party on 23 February said that his government was ready to take up diplomatic relations with the FRG.
4. In January, the GDR placed renewed emphasis on the status of West Berlin. An article in Neues Deutschland, on 2 February, asked that the FRG and the GDR agree by treaty to treat West Berlin as an autonomous territory ("eigenständiges Territorium"). The Socialist countries' view that West Berlin "has nothing to do with" the FRG was also reaffirmed by Chairman Kosygin on 9 February in London.
5. There were increasing East-West bilateral contacts. In addition to progress in economic and technological collaboration between the Soviet Union and France,

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<sup>1/</sup> On 5 February Neues Deutschland reproduced the ten-point new year programme towards a Confederation of the two German States which the GDR regards as "unavoidable steps" (European Survey for January, para. 16, pp. 4-5). The Warsaw Pact members at their meeting on 8-10 February reportedly emphasized that such proposals served the interests of all European States (GDR News Agency report in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18 February).

there were new prospects in British-Soviet cooperation and the first post-war visit of a Polish Foreign Minister to London (21-27 February) during which the first Consular Convention since World War II between Poland and a Western power was signed.

6. Chairman Kosygin was in Britain on 6-13 February. The main developments, on this occasion, resulted from Soviet initiatives. According to the communique of 13 February, Britain "welcomed" a Soviet proposal for a treaty of friendship and peaceful cooperation. The communique also revealed important possibilities of "longer-term arrangements" in trade.

7. Following the visit of Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu to Belgium on 6-10 February, a joint communique recalled that the two countries had been amongst "the Nine" <sup>2/</sup> i.e. the co-sponsors of the draft A/C.1/L.357 of RES/2129 (XX) on good-neighbourly relations in Europe; and joint efforts were advocated for the strengthening of the role and activity of the UN Economic Commission for Europe. The "trends towards a detente" in Europe, and in particular the efforts by the Nine to promote good-neighbourly relations in Europe also received recognition during the visit to Austria of President Tito of Yugoslavia and Finnish visits to Bulgaria and Romania.

8. Albania's views continued to coincide with those of the PRC. On the German question a newspaper editorial broadcast by Tirana Radio on 8 February pointed out that Albania was prepared to sign a peace treaty with the GDR and thus defend the GDR and the Oder-Neisse line.

9. Britain pursued her soundings of members of the European Economic Community (EEC) with Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Brussels, Bonn and The Hague. Belgium was particularly anxious that the "supra-national" character of EEC should be fully understood, and accepted, by the British Ministers. Britain's concurrence on this point would only make support of a possible British application by President de Gaulle, an opponent of supra-nationality, more unlikely.

10. Partly due to a controversy between Britain and the FRG on the frontier question, FRG support to Britain's European plans was less warm than had been hoped in London.

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<sup>2/</sup> The so-called "club of nine" comprises four neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia); two Nato countries (Belgium and Denmark), and three Warsaw Pact members (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania).

# I. THE GERMAN QUESTION

11. The problems of the status of the GDR and frontiers were debated in connexion with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Romania, and with Soviet Notes on "neo-Nazi forces" in the FRG. The question of FRG access to nuclear armament was also an issue during this period. In further reply to the GDR plan of 1 January on progress towards a Confederation of the two German States, the FRG Minister for All-German Affairs, Herr Wehner, a Social-Democrat (SPD) continued to expound his own and/or his Party's views on the German question.

## Herr Wehner's "Informative Talk" with the Washington Post Correspondent and Interview of 3 February

12. The plans of Herr Wehner were an enlargement of ideas expressed in answer to Herr Ulbricht's ten-point programme of 1 January 1967. <sup>3/</sup> Promptly reacting to the SED First Secretary's plan, Herr Wehner had declared that Herr Ulbricht's proposal to set up a mixed commission of the GDR and the FRG was "worth considering". Herr Wehner, who had already suggested in January that the mandate of the Commission could be enlarged, now said that it could discuss whether the "shootings at the Berlin wall" were really necessary or there were other ways to satisfy the two sides' various interests.

13. The main innovations in the "informative talk" with the Washington Post (1 February) were that a four-power conference should be entrusted with the task of alleviating the tensions between the two parts of Germany. Representatives of "both West Germany and Communist East Germany could participate in such a conference as they had in the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference of 1959".

14. The Four Powers, according to Herr Wehner, should start from the premises that "there was no agreement possible now on reunification", and consider other possibilities, such as an exchange of declarations on renunciation of use of force in Central and Eastern Europe, and agreements on troops and armament levels in the two parts of Germany, <sup>4/</sup> and traffic between the two parts of Germany and within, from and to Berlin. <sup>5/</sup> Herr Wehner also said that the FRG could "begin to re-examine

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<sup>3/</sup> European Survey for January, para. 17, p. 5; and para. 19, pp. 5-6. In the GDR plan, the terms of reference of the Commission - to be established on a parity basis - would be to study the question of the Potsdam Agreement's implementation and make remedial recommendations.

<sup>4/</sup> A first stage would be the freezing of the present level, the second stage reductions.

<sup>5/</sup> Herr Wehner pointed out that the FRG recognized "that a completely free, uncontrolled traffic is politically unacceptable for East Berlin", and was "prepared to discuss new proposals which might ease German distress and at the same time be mutually acceptable".

the question of recognition even of a Communist East Germany, if it could be liberalized along the lines of present-day Yugoslavia".

15. In newspaper interviews published in advance on 3 February by the FRG press agency, Herr Wehner said that, if "East Germany was to evolve politically in such a way that its people obtain and are able to use democratic rights, then the question of recognizing such a relatively liberal communist state would be worth considering"; the model for such an evolution could be a country like Yugoslavia.

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the  
FRG and Romania (31 January 1967) and Question of  
Similar Decisions by Other Socialist Countries

16. The decision by the two Governments on 31 January to establish diplomatic relations as of that date and to exchange Ambassadors was followed by a joint communique and by separate statements by the two sides, <sup>6/</sup> as well as by GDR and other Socialist comments. Both Romania and the GDR based themselves on the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact members of 6 July 1966, but placed the emphasis on different passages of the Declaration. Other Socialist countries discussed the relationship between the need for a change in basic FRG policies, and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Hungary and - should the FRG take the initiative - Yugoslavia, indicated readiness to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG.

17. The joint FRG-Romanian communique of 31 January on the visit of Foreign Minister Manescu to Bonn <sup>7/</sup> announced that --

"The two parties express their satisfaction with the favourable development of the economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries and intend to increase their cooperation. It is in this spirit that the Government of the FRG and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania have agreed to enter into diplomatic relations and exchange representatives with the rank of Ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary."

18. The two parties were convinced, it was further stated, that, in so doing, they were serving peace, security, comprehension between the peoples of Europe and international detente.

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<sup>6/</sup> A FRG note verbale dated 31 January which remained unpublished was presented to all governments with which the FRG entertains diplomatic relations. The note reportedly pointed out that the FRG, when opening relations with Romania, did not abandon its claim to speak alone for the whole German people.

<sup>7/</sup> Mr. Manescu was in Bonn on 30-31 January, then visited Cologne, Dusseldorf and Munich, from where he flew back to Bucharest on 3 February.

19. On 2 February in the Bundestag Chancellor Kiesinger declared:

"The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Romania does not signify any change in the German legal viewpoint repeated in the Governmental declaration of 13 December 1966, and according to which the Federal Government alone is qualified to speak for the whole German people and is bound to do so."

20. In the same debate a Christian-Democratic leader, Herr Rainer Barzel, declared:

"Our legal, moral and historical positions remain unchanged. Our methods can and must change."

21. Romania's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG was deplored in the GDR. Neues Deutschland, "Organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany", in a statement on 3 February pointed out that the Hallstein doctrine contained two main elements - the interdiction of the establishment of diplomatic relations with states that have diplomatic relations with the GDR and the claim of exclusive representation:

"If the foreign minister of the Socialist Republic of Romania was not ready in the negotiations to reject the claim of exclusive representation and to declare clearly that, in the context of the claim of exclusive representation and other revanchist claims, the prerequisites for diplomatic relations were not yet forthcoming, this is deplorable. (bedauerlich)."

22. On 4 February the Bucharest radio broadcast an editorial in Scinteia of the same date which pointed out that "due to the favourable evolution of economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries", Romania and the FRG agreed to establish diplomatic relations (FBIS, summary on 6 February and complete text on 7 February). It was further stated:

"...the recognition as a historic fact of the existence of the two German states ... is one of the key problems in improving relations throughout the European Continent. The need to establish and maintain normal relations with both German States is a logical result of this."

23. In direct answer to the Neues Deutschland article, Scinteia wrote:

"The foreign policy of a socialist state is laid down by the party and government of the country in question and ... they have to account only to their people and nation."

24. In the case of Hungary, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG seemed a distinct possibility as early as 2 February. A Budapest radio broadcast pointed out that "one of the basic principles of Hungarian foreign policy has been continually to develop relations with any country that is willing to do so on the basis of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect for one another's interests".<sup>8/</sup>

<sup>8/</sup> As "learned reliably" in Bonn, contacts were continued with Hungary and "competent quarters" confirmed that Herr Lahr during his visit to Hungary in January was handed "some questions" which the FRG was asked to answer (FRG Radio broadcast, FBIS, 6 February).



25. Yugoslavia, while repeatedly expressing approval of Romania's decision, made reservations as to FRG policy, including its intentions towards Yugoslavia. Foreign Minister Nikezic in a press interview of 16 February in Vienna said that Yugoslavia was ready to resume diplomatic relations with the FRG without conditions, provided that Government "meant what it said" in its Eastern policy. Yugoslavia would welcome an extension of the normalization process to Sofia and Budapest, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister added (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 18 February).

26. Poland appeared least sympathetic of all Warsaw Pact active members, except the GDR, to the Romanian move. The Polish Government placed the emphasis on the basic issues in Europe and the security question rather than on individual diplomatic relations. On 7 February in Katowice, First Secretary Gomulka stated (Le Monde, 10 February):

"The establishment of diplomatic contacts between the FRG and the Socialist States will not have the slightest influence on the improvement of the European climate if the West German Government does not radically revise its position on the basic questions that concern the interests of the Socialist States."

27. Czechoslovakia adopted a position similar to that of Poland. On 23 February President Novotny said that the FRG Government would "have to consider the present situation as it has developed after World War II if we want to negotiate with each other".

28. The GDR Government hailed the outcome of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact members except Albania on 8-10 February in Warsaw.<sup>9/</sup> The State Council of the GDR on 16 February expressed thanks to the Socialist States for their "decided attitude" in the question of the relations between the two German States.

29. The Warsaw Pact members except, of course, Albania, appeared to have reached a consensus that more attention should be paid to the distinction between the establishment of diplomatic relations and actual normalization of relations with the FRG. First Secretary Ulbricht, while saying on 13 February that diplomatic relations should be established between all States of the East and of the West, added that "normal diplomatic relations are possible only if Bonn gives up its claim of sole representation of Germany". On 17 February Foreign Minister Rapacki said that Poland wanted a normalization of relations with the FRG. A real normalization demanded, however, that the need for European security should be recognized - while

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9/ The final communique reported "a friendly exchange of views on questions relating to the efforts of the Socialist countries to reduce international tensions and strengthen peace, security and cooperation in Europe". The conferees also reportedly concerned themselves with the situation on the European Continent since the adoption in July 1966 of the Bucharest Declaration on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

the FRG obstinately fought against any steps which aimed at guaranteeing such security (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 19 February).

30. On 23 February in Budapest First Secretary Kadar reportedly said that his Government was "ready to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic and to extend cultural and economic relations with it".

#### Albania

31. Albania took a different stand from other Warsaw Pact powers on the German question, as on other international problems. On the day of the opening of the meeting in Warsaw of the Warsaw Pact members (8 February) an editorial article in Zeri I Popullit broadcast by Tirana Radio pointed out that

"the Foreign Minister of the Albanian People's Republic, who by right should take part, has not been invited to this meeting but even had he been invited he would not have attended..."

"We said to you: 'Gentlemen revisionists, although we are engaged in a lifelong fight to the death against you, we are prepared to sign a peace treaty with the GDR and thus defend the GDR and the Oder-Neisse border.'"

#### Question of "neo-nazi" forces in, and "revanchist claims" by, the FRG (including claim of sole representation)

32. The exchange of statements between the Soviet Union (28 January) <sup>10/</sup> and the FRG (29 January) was followed by Polish and Czechoslovak condemnations of FRG "maneuvers" and "revanchist forces" and by a new Soviet Note to the FRG published on 10 February.

33. Poland's head of State Ochab, at a plenary meeting of the All-Polish Committee of the National Unity Front on 31 January, said that the "crisis of the cold war compels the Kiesinger Government to various maneuvers". President Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia, First Secretary of the Central Committee, at the 6th Trade Unions Congress on 31 January in Prague, said that "the revanchist forces in West Germany" were "a perpetual source of unrest and a threat to world peace" (Neues Deutschland, 2 February).

34. The issue of the GDR status, which was at the core of the debate on relations between Socialist countries and the FRG, also arose in connexion with the signing of the Outer Space Treaty. On 28 January the Soviet Government handed the FRG a list of the signatories of the Treaty which included the GDR. On 4 February the FRG

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<sup>10/</sup> January Survey on foreign relations of the Socialist countries.

Government addressed a Note to the USSR, repeating the claim to exclusive representation of the whole German people and stating that the FRG, in connexion with the signing of the Treaty did not recognize "any territory as State and any regime as Government".<sup>11/</sup>

35. In the Soviet Note, delivered to the FRG on 7 February and published on 10 February, reference was made to the FRG statement that it "has the right and is empowered to speak on behalf of the entire German people" and it was stated:

"This statement of the FRG Government contradicts the actual state of affairs in Europe and does not tally even with the international agreements of which the FRG is a signatory and which clearly say that the FRG Government effects its power exclusively within the confines of its own territory. The Government of the FRG is unquestionably aware of the Soviet Union's positions on this question, and in sending to the Soviet Government a note of this content it could not count on any positive response of the Soviet side. In view of this, the Soviet Government has instructed the Embassy of the USSR in Bonn to return the text of the aforesaid note in view of its deliberately unacceptable contents."

36. The FRG should reckon with the actual state of affairs in Europe as demanded in the Warsaw Pact Declaration of July 1966 and take measures to curb the neo-nazi and military forces, the Soviet Note stated, and the FRG by its actions including the Note of 31 January "actually connives at the forces of neo-nazism and militarism".

37. On 11 February FRG Chancellor Kiesinger, at a CDU (Christian Democratic Union) Congress in Oberhausen (Rhineland), stated that he must protest against Soviet slander of the FRG desire for peace; the "Germans" did not want revenge, but only asked for justice, and no one planned to annex the Soviet Zone and to regiment the people in "Central Germany". Herr Kiesinger also made the following points:

(i) The important thing was to bring about a reunification in peace and freedom with the consent of the people in both parts of the country;

(ii) Chances to achieve contact with the "Germans" beyond the "demarcation line" must be sought without prejudice, with the aid of the political organs of the "Soviet Zone" if there was no other solution. Yet the "German" legal claim must not be given up: all such efforts were neither aggressive nor revanchist;

(iii) The FRG offered an exchange of declarations on non-use of force in which the "Soviet Zonal regime" could be included;

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<sup>11/</sup> It was recalled in this connexion in Neue Zurcher Zeitung on 4 February that the Social-Democrats before being "in control of the Foreign Ministry", had often criticized the legalistic attitude of the previous government.

(iv) The problem of the German eastern borders could only be solved in a peace treaty. This was no expression of "revanchism" either.

Visit of FRG Minister for All-German Affairs to Finland (15 February)

38. The FRG made an effort to correct its "image" in neutral Finland. Following a speech by President Kekkonen on 6 January <sup>12/</sup> FRG Minister for All-German Affairs Wehner on 15 February had conversations in Helsinki with President Kekkonen and Premier Paasio, the Social-Democratic leader. At a press conference Herr Wehner said that his purpose had been to tell Mr. Kekkonen how a positive solution of East-West European relations could be reached, in the opinion of the new FRG Government (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 18 February).

The Frontier Question and West European Powers

39. Foreign Secretary Brown, at a press conference of 13 February in London, was asked whether the words "territorial integrity" <sup>13/</sup> implied that Britain now recognized the Oder-Neisse line and he answered:

"Yes, in a way. What we have said here is that we respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the countries of eastern and western Europe, and I think the words speak for themselves. Of course, from our point of view, Germany under this definition is a country."

40. As recalled on this occasion by the Diplomatic Correspondent of The Times of London, the British position had been made clear as early as September 1965 by Michael Stewart, then Foreign Secretary, at a press conference: <sup>14/</sup>

[Mr. Stewart] "did not agree that there was contradiction in the Labour Party's attitude to the Oder-Neisse line before and after taking office, and he reiterated that only as part of a general German peace settlement could this question be finally resolved. When the time comes to make this decision, the wishes of the peoples living in the territories should be taken into consideration."

41. According to a leader in Gaullist La Nation, France's endorsement since 1959 of the present frontiers of Germany "in the North, South, East and West", <sup>15/</sup> together

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<sup>12/</sup> European Survey for January, para. 55, p. 12. Mr. Kekkonen said that a policy of strength against the Soviet Union and planned FRG participation in nuclear armament was a war policy.

<sup>13/</sup> (In the joint statement on Mr. Kosygin's visit), para. 65, p. 15.

<sup>14/</sup> This occurred during Mr. Stewart's visit to Poland (European Survey for August-September 1965, paras. 38-40, p. 11, and paras. 62-63, p. 18), not to Czechoslovakia, as stated in error by The Times of London.

<sup>15/</sup> President de Gaulle's press conference on 25 March 1959 (European Survey for September 1965, p. 9, footnote 32).

with French backing of the new FRG Government, should reassure Poland that "the frontiers inherited from the war would, no doubt, one day be legally recognized".

Question of FRG Access to Nuclear Armament

42. In the conversations with Chairman Kosygin during his visit to Britain, Mr. Wilson apparently stood behind existing arrangements for nuclear consultation within Nato, including the nuclear planning group of which the FRG is a permanent member. In his statement of 13 February in the House of Commons, Mr. Wilson declared:

"We made wholly clear to Mr. Kosygin the policy on which we are working with our allies as regards nuclear consultation within Nato."

43. FRG political and diplomatic circles were concerned with the implications of a possible Non-proliferation Treaty for the FRG. As reported from Bonn at the beginning of the month, the FRG Government was keeping in close touch on the one side with the United States - which reportedly would submit in advance the text of the Treaty to the FRG - and, on the other, with such non-nuclear powers as India and Japan (Le Monde, 1 February).

44. Foreign Minister Brandt, in a statement of 14 February in the SPD (Socialist Party of Germany) Parliamentary group, said that the FRG and other countries were prepared to renounce nuclear weapons, but were determined to take part without restrictions in nuclear science and nuclear industry for peaceful purposes. Secondly it was important to find satisfactory answers to the questions of security concerning the Atlantic Alliance and Europe (FBIS, 15 February).

45. On 9 February in London Chairman Kosygin was asked at a press conference whether the policy of the FRG was "an important factor" in connexion with such a Treaty, and he said:

"As to the FRG, I must say that it will have to join the agreement on non-proliferation, whether it wants it or not. We will not allow the FRG to have nuclear weapons and we will take all measures to prevent it getting nuclear weapons. We say it with utter resolution."

46. On 17 February Chancellor Kiesinger in a television address referred to the question of whether the FRG would sign a non-proliferation treaty as follows:

"Our signing depends on our confidence and our conviction. Indeed preventing other powers from securing or manufacturing atomic weapons is an important purpose, but some economic interests are at stake. Peaceful use of atomic energy, research must not be handicapped. Moreover there is the problem of the vehicles. In this field also, exploitation of technical data can benefit the economy. In such an exploitation which the Americans call 'spin off' <sup>16/</sup> we must participate. We must not stay behind. There is also the control question."

16/ Defined by Lord Chalfont, the British Minister of State, as "immediate technological advantage in the civil field from a military program".

47. As reported on 25 February, US-FRG consultations were taking place in Geneva, notably on the "spin-off".

## II. EUROPE -- EAST AND WEST

48. In addition to British contacts with Socialist countries, four high-level meetings in February <sup>17/</sup> involved six members of the "club of nine" and joint communiques - Belgian-Romanian and Austrian-Yugoslav - dealt with the progress in normalizing European relationships across ideological frontiers and future methods.

Visit of President Uhro Kekkonen <sup>18/</sup> of  
Finland to Bulgaria (30 January - 1 February)

49. On 31 January at a dinner in honour of Mr. Kekkonen, President Georgi Traykov of the Praesidium of the Bulgarian National Assembly referred to the urgent task of setting up a European security system, and stated that the Finnish President's proposals "for an atom-free zone in Northern Europe and for guaranteeing security and peace along the borders of the northern countries, are an expression of the peace-loving foreign policy of Finland, and have our full support":

"The Government of the Bulgarian People's Republic, on its part, is also exerting every effort to create understanding and cooperation among the Balkan peoples and for making the Balkans a zone of lasting peace. We are of the opinion that the most important task confronting all responsible European statesmen today is to facilitate a healing process which can lead the countries of our continent - countries with different political and social systems - to all-European cooperation, all-European security, and a lasting peace on this continent."

Visit of Foreign Minister Manescu of  
Romania to Belgium (6-10 February)

50. Mr. Manescu was received by King Baudoin and had talks with Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. The two ministers in the final communique of 10 February noted that their governments were militating for the achievement of detente in the economic, military and political fields and particularly for the consolidation of peace and security on the European continent. Within this framework they achieved an identity of views regarding the basic principles of the development of relations between the European countries (FBIS, 13 February).

51. Mr. Manescu's visit to Belgium was an occasion for an address to the "Institute

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17/ Finnish visits to Bulgaria and Romania; Romanian visit to Belgium; Yugoslav visit to Austria.

18/ The conversations of Foreign Minister Karjalainen on 10 February in Moscow concerned coordination of economic and trade relations (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12 February). Foreign Ministers Karjalainen and Manescu discussed mutual relations on 15-20 February in Bucharest and a long-term trade agreement was signed.

for International Relations" in Brussels in which he defined his country's policy of peaceful coexistence in an active sense, which made preferential use of continuous development of bilateral relations without taking into account the political and social systems. This led Romania to an active diplomacy, the object of which extended from the development of foreign trade through industrial collaboration and cultural exchange to tourism. On the basis of the principle of universality of foreign policy in a world of interdependence, Mr. Manescu said that Albania would be included in this policy - in the framework of collaboration in the Balkans - as well as Spain with which Romania had an economic and consular agreement.<sup>19/</sup> The establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG found its justification in the argument that it was a positive element in the detente in Europe.

52. As regards Belgium's general attitude towards Eastern Europe, it will be recalled that Defence Minister Poswick was recently in Poland;<sup>20/</sup> and Soviet readiness to discuss the matter of compensation for confiscated Belgian property in territories which are now part of the Soviet Union was unofficially regarded in Brussels as another favourable circumstance for a policy of contacts between Belgium and the East (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 9 February).

Visit of President of Yugoslavia Tito to Austria (13-17 February) <sup>21/</sup>

53. As reported in the joint communique of 17 February, international economic cooperation - particularly with developing countries - was foremost in the discussions; the importance of the second UN Conference on Trade and Development, as well as of the setting up of UNIDO, was emphasized; and trends towards a detente in Europe offered new possibilities for constructive cooperation between European States (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 19 February).

54. According to unofficial reports from Vienna, the Austrian Government pointed out that the "club of nine" should not raise undue expectations and that no institutionalization should be attempted; President Tito agreed, but hoped that, with time, participation may be extended (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 17 February).

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<sup>19/</sup> European Survey for January, para. 71-73, pp. 15-16.

<sup>20/</sup> European Survey for January, para. 80, p. 17

<sup>21/</sup> President Tito was accompanied by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Nikezic, and Austrian Foreign Minister Toncic also participated in the conversations.

VISIT OF CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN OF THE USSR COUNCIL  
OF MINISTERS TO BRITAIN -- 6-13 FEBRUARY

55. The visit of Premier Kosygin to Britain on 6-13 February, though differing in some respects from his visit to Paris - as there were no similar attitudes on Viet-Nam and towards the US role in European affairs - was successful enough to be called by Mr. Wilson "a landmark in Anglo-Soviet history".<sup>22/</sup>

56. On 7 February in a speech to the Confederation of British Industries, Premier Kosygin made suggestions for joint trade planning between Britain and the Soviet Union so that the respective industries may be developed accordingly. Turning to Europe's future, he declared:

"In recent times there are slanderous attempts to speak about the so-called technological gap between the European countries and the United States. We hold other views. If you take Europe and the USSR, combine them and estimate their natural resources, then you would understand that they are bigger and greater than the United States. If you take technological advance, you will see that we are not in any way poorer than the United States and on many occasions the knowledge of our technicians and scientists is even vaster than the United States' ..."

Premier Kosygin added that his country wanted more scientific cooperation with Britain and France.<sup>23/</sup>

57. On 9 February in the House of Lords, Chairman Kosygin said that his Government was "in favour of disbandment of both groupings - both Nato and the Warsaw Pact or, as a first step, of the elimination of their military organizations". A passage in Mr. Kosygin's statement suggesting a treaty of friendship, peaceful cooperation, and non-aggression between the Soviet Union and Britain <sup>24/</sup> was reported in The Times of London as follows:

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<sup>22/</sup> On 6 February the talks opened with an hour-long private meeting of the two heads of government. There followed a two-hour meeting with Ministers and senior officials which was described as an exchange on "several topical international issues". European security, the German problem and Viet-Nam were apparently taken up. On 7 February two formal sessions were mainly on bilateral trade and financial matters except in the last fifty minutes, when the Ministers turned back to "topical international issues", including European security. On 9 February official talks reportedly centered on Viet-Nam and on 10 February, the last day of official talks, the Ministers began drafting the final statement (Diplomatic Correspondent of The Times of London, 7, 8, 10 and 11 February).

<sup>23/</sup> This statement was interpreted in the West as opening up prospects for Britain both within the Common Market - through all-European cooperation - and, if her attempts failed, through bilateral USSR-British cooperation or a tripartite arrangement with France (European economic correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, 9 February).

<sup>24/</sup> On 15 February in the Atlantic Council M. de Leusse, the French Permanent Representative, said that France had received a similar proposal (The Times, 16 February).



"In following a policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union and Great Britain can and must live in peace and friendship and resolve all arising problems by negotiation. On our side we see no obstacles to Soviet-British relations being placed on a firm, broad foundation of peaceful cooperation. In this connexion I should like to say that if we take a broad look at relations between our two countries we would say it was possible for the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to conclude a treaty of friendship, peaceful cooperation and non-aggression. We believe a treaty of this kind, if it were signed, could be an important step forward in strengthening Soviet-British relations. It would not be spear-headed against any third countries. On the contrary, the treaty would be a substantial contribution to the development of international cooperation, to an international detente, and to stronger peace and security for nations.' It could be an example to many other nations and would help to promote stronger universal peace."

58. In answer to the above Soviet proposals and views, Mr. Wilson, on 13 February told the House of Commons that a European conference should not "detract from the importance of the bilateral method of solving problems and easing tension", and, in obvious reference to the question of US participation, he declared:

"Mr. Kosygin also is fully aware of our concern to see that all countries which have a stake in European security must be enabled to play their full part in such a conference."

59. Further, Mr. Wilson said that his Government "accepted" the Soviet proposal for a treaty of friendship and peaceful cooperation which could "provide the framework within which all ... kinds of bilateral contact " could be developed:

"It has always been our position, and the Soviet Government fully understands this, that we remain loyal to all our alliances and obligations, as they do to theirs."

60. The final Joint Statement of 13 February revealed no significant progress in agreeing on international problems:

"... while important differences remained in ... assessments of some major international problems ... the discussions ... were useful in promoting a better understanding of... respective views."

61. In addition to references to Viet-Nam and disarmament, the communique dealt with the UN role:

"The two sides exchanged views on the activities of the United Nations which is called upon to play an important role in safeguarding and consolidating peace throughout the world. Both Governments confirmed their interest in strengthening the United Nations and enhancing its effectiveness on the basis of strict observance of its Charter, and they expressed themselves in favor of an active and constructive cooperation of states within the framework of the Organization."

62. In bilateral relations, the important areas of agreement included the principle of the establishment of "an Anglo-Soviet Consultative Committee consisting of leading figures in culture, science, sports and other fields" for the purposes of developing contacts "at all levels and in a wide variety of activities". Further, it was "agreed to establish a direct teletype communications line between the Kremlin and 10 Downing Street".

63. In trade and scientific and technological cooperation great possibilities appeared. As regards trade, it was stated that:

"... while there had been a useful increase in trade under existing arrangements, it was desirable to develop longer-term arrangements, related to the forward planning of ... respective economies, to enable on both sides the development of productive capacity for expanding trade in both directions."

64. Britain's agreement in principle to the Soviet proposal for a treaty of friendship and cooperation was recorded as follows:

"In the context of the progress and the prospect of further progress in bilateral fields, the British Government welcomed the proposal made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the treaty of friendship and peaceful cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. They looked forward to negotiations leading to the conclusion of such a treaty."

65. Regarding Europe, the communique noted with satisfaction "the growth of bilateral contacts and cooperation between European countries":

"... the encouragement of such cooperation between all the countries of Eastern and Western Europe on the basis of respect for their sovereign equality and territorial integrity<sup>25/</sup> should continue to be a major aim of both governments."

66. It was agreed that a conference to discuss the problem of safeguarding security and developing cooperation in Europe could be valuable, subject to the necessary preparation; the exchange of views on this matter would be continued, and all the countries of Europe should be among the participants.

67. In Moscow, an article of 14 February in Izvestia pointed out that greater Soviet-British friendship and cooperation was in accord with the interests of the two peoples and of European security and world peace.

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<sup>25/</sup> For developments arising from this reference to "territorial integrity", see The German Question, paras. 39-40, p. 9.

Visit of Foreign Minister Rapacki to Britain (21-27 February) 26/

68. The visit took place under favourable circumstances, following Mr. Kosygin's meetings in London and Mr. Brown's remarks on the Oder-Neisse line.

69. On 22 and 23 February the two Foreign Ministers discussed European security and the German question. 27/ They reportedly agreed that bilateral contacts were a better method than group negotiations, and that holding a security conference was desirable, but that it should be carefully prepared. The British Minister emphasized the need for US participation in such a conference in view of the size of its commitments in Europe; and, concerning the agenda, Mr. Rapacki referred to earlier Polish plans, while Mr. Brown said that one should await the result of current Geneva negotiations.

70. On the German question Mr. Brown said that attacks against the FRG Government and criticism of the democratic process there should be avoided by all European States for fear of a renewal of pre-World War II developments. Mr. Rapacki saw no basic change in the FRG Governments' attitude and demanded that it should accept European realities.

French-Soviet Permanent Mixed Committee 28/  
Meeting (26-31 January)

71. The so-called "Grande Commission" met for the first time on 26-31 January in Paris. Joint chairmanship is held by M. Debre, the Minister for Economy and Finance, and Mr. Kirillin, the Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers. At a press conference on 31 January, M. Debre pointed out that the purpose of this organ was to evaluate results, give specialized organs a programme of work, ascertain new fields for collaboration and submit new directives to the governments. Messrs. Debre and Kirillin, together with M. Peyrefitte, the Minister for Scientific Research, gave information to the press on technical results of the Commission's Session.

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26/ Further assessment of the visit will, if required, be included in the European Survey for March.

27/ The Viet-Nam question was taken up in private sessions on the 22nd. Accounts of the proceedings at plenary sessions were given by the Diplomatic Correspondent of The Times and by Le Monde.

28/ The Commission was set up on the basis of the Declaration of 30 June 1966 issued at the time of President de Gaulle's visit to Moscow; and adoption of its Statute by Messrs. Debre and Kirillin was announced in the Joint Declaration of 9 December 1966.

Albania

72. Albania maintained an assessment of international developments which differed from all other European countries <sup>29/</sup> and coincided with that of the PRC. On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty on Outer Space, Tirana Radio stated that this fell "within the general framework of Soviet-US policy aimed at insuring the nuclear arms monopoly and at establishing the domination of the two powers over the world" (FBIS, 7 February).

QUESTION OF POSSIBLE BRITISH APPLICATION FOR  
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)

73. British "soundings" of EEC governments in January had on the whole brought about favourable political results, i.e. warm Italian support and French belief in the "sincerity" of Britain's intentions. In February, however, the British visit to the FRG took place in an atmosphere which was described as cool or even chilly. There was no question of the FRG opposing the British move; but, in addition to a West German desire to have better relations with France, <sup>30/</sup> bilateral British-West German differences may prompt the FRG Government to avoid taking a strong position on what are, in any case, difficult economic and financial problems.

British Visit to Belgium (31 January - 1 February)

74. On 31 January - 1 February the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Harold Wilson, and George Brown, were in Brussels. The general and technical aspects of the question of Britain's entry into EEC were discussed. At a dinner on 31 January, the Belgian Premier, Paul Vanden Boeynants, stated that both governments had the political will to succeed in this enterprise and that "all difficulties must yield". Mr. Wilson said that a re-grouped Europe could exercise a decisive influence in world affairs, particularly if she managed to make use of all her industrial, commercial and technical might.

75. At the meeting on 1 February, Mr. Wilson apparently accepted the "political finality" of economic integration. Britain reportedly understood that the principles and aims of EEC were of a political nature, and that its institutional rules must be recognized as unexceptionable. As pointed out by the Belgian Ministers, such

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<sup>29/</sup> For Albanian views on the German question, see para. 45 above.

<sup>30/</sup> France's political condition for support of the British candidacy was unofficially reaffirmed in Gaullist La Nation as acceptance of a fully independent European policy (Rene Doucet, 6 February).

rules, the essence of which was a renunciation of national sovereignty, were formally expressed in the "supra-national" terms of reference of the EEC Commission, and the possibility of majority decisions by the Council of Ministers; <sup>31/</sup> and Premier Wilson assured the Belgian Ministers that Britain was ready to assume the same obligations as the Community's founders. <sup>32/</sup>

76. Assuming that the important political implications of "supra-nationality" may be accepted by Britain, financial and agricultural difficulties remained delicate issues as between Belgium and Britain. <sup>33/</sup>

77. At a press conference on 1 February, Prime Minister Wilson said that his Belgian partners at the meeting had shown enough understanding for the British thesis that the position of sterling as a reserve currency would not be a burden for EEC. <sup>34/</sup> Similarly, as reported by the British delegation, there was great comprehension for Britain's view that she was requiring only accommodations of agrarian policy, which could not be regarded as altering the system.

Prime Minister's Report to the House of Commons (2 February)

78. On 2 February in the House of Commons, Mr. Wilson reported on the visits to EEC members "at the half-way stage" <sup>35/</sup> (The Times of London, 2 February): He

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<sup>31/</sup> Contrary to the Ministers in the Council the members of the Commission of EEC do not represent their national Governments, any more than High Authority's members in the European Coal and Steel Community.

<sup>32/</sup> An article in the Belgian Roman Catholic leftist newspaper "Volk" was still referring to the French view that Britain was "an ally against supra-nationality".

<sup>33/</sup> Regarding agriculture, the two outstanding problems related to New Zealand and the agricultural fund. Britain apparently regards it as "inequitable" that, "as things stand, she would be contributing to the Fund as much as all the other members together, and by reason of her efficient agriculture be receiving back far less" (The Times, 1 February).

<sup>34/</sup> Neue Zurcher Zeitung wrote that "no comments" were available on this point from the Belgian delegation.

<sup>35/</sup> After visits to Italy and France (European Survey for January, paras. 100-103, p. 21, and paras. 105-109, pp. 22-23), and to Belgium (paras. 74-77 above).

rebutted objections based on the weakness of sterling and rejected French hopes that bilateral technological cooperation should increase irrespective of the question of Britain's EEC membership.<sup>36/</sup>

79. Mr. Wilson described the main problem as follows:

"... some members of the Six have feelings, not of any opposition to the EFTA countries or to ourselves, but the feeling that they have now got the Community working as a compact agreement and piece of machinery - they have had many difficulties - and now it is running relatively smoothly they see difficulties in reconstructing it to accommodate - not ourselves, or any given EFTA country - but a considerable number of other countries. Some of them still fear the effect on the Community of that degree of widening. We have told them that, in our view, widening the area far from weakening would mean strengthening it."

80. Lastly, the Prime Minister said that the question of the so-called British special relationship with the United States had been "raised to an infinitely smaller extent than at one time many of us would have thought it would have been".

Visit of Prime Minister Wilson to the FRG (15-16 February)

81. The climate of the meetings was unfavourably affected by the fact that it immediately followed the visit to London of a leader of the Soviet Union, a severe critic of FRG policy; and that, during his stay in Britain, Chairman Kosygin indeed expressed such criticism; while a remark by Foreign Secretary Brown on the question of the Oder-Neisse line was resented in West Germany.

82. The questions of foreign exchange costs of British troops stationed in the FRG and the current negotiations on non-proliferation were also reported to be areas of differences.

83. Little became reliably known on the conversations, except that Mr. Wilson at a press conference on 16 February said that the two Governments had discussed, in a very precise manner, the problems raised by Britain's possible entry into EEC.

Visit of Prime Minister Wilson to the Netherlands (27 February 1967)

84. Following a day of talks in The Hague, Mr. Wilson, at a press conference, was asked how soon Britain would make a decision on whether to apply for EEC membership. The Prime Minister answered that his government was "determined to see that the momentum is not lost". Since there were no visible changes in the methods envisaged to overcome agricultural and other difficulties,<sup>37/</sup> the basis for Mr. Wilson's confidence may be found in political support from the Netherlands.

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<sup>36/</sup> European Survey for January, para. 105, p. 22

<sup>37/</sup> Inasmuch as the Prime Minister in office Dr. Zijlstra is governor-elect of the Bank of the Netherlands, the role of sterling was an important theme in the conversations. Difficulties were seen in the reserve role of sterling.

Asked whether his government favoured an early British application, Foreign Minister Luns said that it was "inclined" not to lose the momentum".

#### CONCLUSION

85. Although the Government of France was already more concerned with the opening on 13 February of the electoral campaign for the National Assembly, European relationships across ideological frontiers did not stand still. The Times of London, which wrote that Mr. Wilson had been "slightly carried away" in calling Mr. Kosygin's visit "a great success", nevertheless agreed that "both Prime Ministers have every reason to be pleased with themselves".

86. The progress in Anglo-Soviet relations was largely due at this stage to the positions taken by Chairman Kosygin, but the results of the recent conversations also confirmed the British desire "for the best possible relations" with the USSR and other Socialist countries, <sup>38/</sup> as earlier evidenced by exchanges of high-level visits. In addition, the present Government shows a greater concern for "a wider, fuller unity in Europe as a whole", so that Europe may "exert a more powerful influence in world affairs". <sup>39/</sup>

87. Following British soundings of Belgium and the FRG on the question of British entry into EEC, agricultural problems proved difficult "as an acceptance by Britain of the common agricultural policy would impose a severe strain on the British balance of payments". <sup>40/</sup>

88. A positive - but very minor - factor in favour of Britain was the view of the Netherlands that Britain should apply before the "momentum" was lost. In spite of technical issues, and Dutch support of close West European integration - unacceptable to Britain - the Netherlands was anxious that French and FRG influence should be counterbalanced by the presence of Britain in Europe.

89. In East-West relations in Europe, the question remains whether the FRG may be associated in the current detente without improving its relations with the Soviet.

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<sup>38/</sup> Mr. Wilson, on 13 February in the House of Commons, said that Britain had made clear she shared a reciprocal desire on the part of the Soviet Government (The Times, 14 February).

<sup>39/</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40/</sup> The Times of London, 16 February.

Union and officially departing from traditional positions, which were again criticized by Socialist countries. Britain's "suspended recognition" <sup>41/</sup> of the Oder-Neisse line is likely to add to the continuing pressure on the FRG of the French stand in favour of the present frontier. Even concerning the status of the GDR, on which there are no official differences within the West, a leading article in The Times of London on 1 February read in part:

"Any progress in healing the division of Europe must start with mutual respect for existing alliances. East Germany, as an important member of the eastern alliance, cannot be left out of the process without inviting trouble from her allies. This does not mean that she should expect formal recognition, which cannot at present be realistically demanded of the West Germans, and is not, in any case, necessary. What it does mean is a conscious effort to include her in the processes of relaxation."

90. Such Western views, official and unofficial, are unwelcome in Christian-Democratic (CDU) circles in Bonn, but they bolster the position of Social-Democratic leaders - notably Herr Wehner - who entertain unorthodox views on the German question. Reaffirmation of FRG's claim of sole representation of the whole German people, in Chancellor Kiesinger's statement of 2 February, could but draw GDR counter-measures such as the law on GDR nationality of 20 February. A policy of "including" the GDR in "the process of relaxation", in broad harmony with U Thant's plea for "political tolerance" on 3 May 1966 in the Council of Europe and with his stand on UN universality, appear, from the UN viewpoint, a more promising approach to the German problem. By the same token, the reported intention of Hungary to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG was in itself a positive February development.

91. The activities of the Nine European governments showed that, in the words of Foreign Minister Karjalainen of Finland, the smaller countries were conscious of their "responsibilities" in solving international issues (press conference in Bucharest, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 February).

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<sup>41/</sup> "Reconnaissance à terme", in the words used, in an Agence France Presse dispatch, to interpret the British stand (Le Monde, 19-20 February).



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FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

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The Secretary-General

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FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
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MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
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23/4/67

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CR. 13 (11-64)

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PSCA

*[Signature]*

AA-38

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

5 April 1967  
PhP/lab

MONTHLY SURVEYS OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

E U R O P E

(MARCH 1967)

Copy No.....

## MONTHLY SURVEYS OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

### E U R O P E

(March 1967)

#### General Comments

1. Chancellor Klaus of Austria paid a ten-day visit to the Soviet Union. Chairman Kosygin declared during the visit that Europe, in spite of differences in social regimes and the existence of various economic groupings, must increasingly discover her unity and original features; and there appeared to be genuine Austrian-Soviet agreement in this respect. In the words of the joint communique of 21 March a pan-European Conference, properly prepared, could help settle European problems; it was reported in the West that the Soviet Union was favourably inclined towards Vienna as a possible site for such a Conference.
2. On the German question, treaties avowedly directed at "militarism" and "revanchism" in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were signed by Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland. This appeared to be a sign of particularly close solidarity of these three Warsaw Pact members.
3. In both treaties signed by the GDR, a normalization of relations between the two German States was said to correspond to the requirements of European security. The GDR Foreign Minister on 19 March accordingly declared that the FRG could no longer pursue a policy of détente and widening of diplomatic relations with East European countries, while denying the existence of, and isolating, the GDR.
4. The press in the Federal Republic of Germany deplored references in the GDR-Polish and GDR-Czechoslovak Treaties to the desirability of a German peace settlement, based on the recognition of the existence of two German States, as a re-affirmation of earlier plans for separate peace treaties with the two States.
5. The FRG Government continued to seek an opening to the East without sacrificing its traditional positions on the German question. A Social-Democratic (SPD) leader made a statement indicating that a March 1966 offer

of an exchange of declarations renouncing the use of force, may soon be officially extended by the FRG to "the other part of Germany"<sup>(1)</sup>.

6. In the National-Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)<sup>(2)</sup> of the FRG, openly neo-Nazi leaders appeared to have the upper hand, at least temporarily, following the failure of the Party Federal Chairman, Herr Thielen, to exclude his Deputy, Herr von Thadden.

#### I. EUROPE - EAST and WEST

7. In a statement of 9 March, President Podgorny said that since the Warsaw Pact meeting of July 1966 in Bucharest some "positive shifts" had occurred in relations between East and West European states. In March 1967 such developments continued at a slow, steady pace.

##### A. Visit of Chancellor Klaus to the Soviet Union

8. As stated in the final communique of 21 March issued in Moscow at the close of the visit,

"all efforts accomplished with a view to improving European co-operation must be supported and developed by all means. An all-European Conference, properly prepared, could be a forum to bring the views of the countries concerned closer together and help settle the problems before them ... Practical preparations for the conference will be the subject of a further exchange of opinions"<sup>(3)</sup>

9. Any rebirth of the National-Socialist ideology which had brought the peoples of Europe so much suffering, the joint communique continued, must be prevented by all means in the interest of the maintenance of peace.

10. The independence and neutrality of Austria "represent a valuable contribution to the preservation of peace in Europe and to the lessening of international tensions", in the words of the communique. During the conversations Austria reportedly pointed out that she was seeking only a regulation of relations with the European Economic Community (EEC), which could in no way raise a possibility of violating Article 4 of the State Treaty forbidding measures leading directly or indirectly to political or economic union with Germany.

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(1) On 25 March 1966 the FRG Government in Notes to "Governments throughout the world" made "new proposals for peace and friendly relations", including an offer that the FRG should exchange formal declarations "with the Governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and any other East European State, in which either side gives an undertaking to the other people not to use force to settle international disputes;" and Chancellor Kiesinger, on 11 February 1967, said that "the regime" could be included in that offer.

(2) Present membership is estimated at 25,000 members, and the NPD received 1,000,000 votes in 1966 in Hesse and Bavaria. The NPD came into existence through a merger of Herr Thielen's "German Party" with the "German Reich Party" of Herr von Thadden which was said to include many former Nazi high officials.

(3) Chairman Kosygin, at a dinner in honour of Herr Klaus on 20 March, said that "such a conference may make a substantial contribution to solving cardinal political problems in Europe".

11. Also in connection with the Chancellor's views on his country's "active neutrality" he reportedly raised during his visit the question of his Government securing ground-to-air defensive missiles<sup>(4)</sup>.

12. No agreement was reported either on this last point or on the question of Austria's relationship to EEC. Chancellor Klaus on 20 March at a press conference in Moscow said that "we managed to eliminate some misunderstanding" as to Austria's efforts "to reach an agreement on the regulation of relations" with EEC. While Austria had found "understanding" for Austria's economic losses due to EEC's common outside tariff, the Chancellor acknowledged that "the political objections of the USSR statesmen continue to be very grave". Herr Klaus added that, in the final phase of the talks with EEC,

"we shall have to seek from the Western countries understanding for our political reservations to the same extent as we have to seek understanding for our economic needs here in the Soviet Union".

13. It may thus be assumed that the meetings resulted in no basic change from the Soviet position, unofficially set forth prior to the conference, (Pravda, 13 March), that Austrian association with the Six would be a "serious danger" to Austrian neutrality. Such a step would mean the abandonment of neutrality, as entry into the Community was connected with political as well as economic obligations, Pravda wrote.

B. Balkan Détente

14. In an article of 5 March, Izvestiya dealt with the efforts by Socialist and Capitalist countries in the Balkans to develop "real neighbourly relations"; the USSR proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans was recalled on this occasion.

15. While Albania continued to emulate the PRC in its internal policies<sup>(5)</sup>, a Yugoslav assessment of Albanian diplomacy was not entirely negative<sup>(6)</sup>.

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(4) The issue was reportedly discussed during the visits of Defence Ministers Marshal Malinovsky to Vienna in 1965 and Dr. Prader to Moscow in 1966.

(5) See note on the Socialist countries.

(6) A further sign of a slight detente in Albania's relations with the West was an announcement on 14 March in Washington that the State Department would lift restrictions on US travel to Albania.

16. In addition to internal developments, the Balkan countries also looked towards the outside, particularly in renewed consciousness of their possibilities as a center of touristic attraction<sup>(7)</sup>.

(i) Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations (including Turkish visit)

17. In keeping with Yugoslavia's renewed emphasis on her role in European affairs "Borba", in an article summarized on 7 March by Belgrade radio, expressed optimism on the possibility of a satisfactory economic arrangement between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Yugoslavia. It was recalled that the Yugoslav Government also had "informative talks" with the other West European economic organization, the European Economic Community (EEC)<sup>(8)</sup>.

18. The first visit in twelve years<sup>(9)</sup> of a Turkish Foreign Minister to Yugoslavia took place on 7-11 March. During Mr. Caglayangil's stay in Belgrade, agreement was reached in principle on abolishing visas, opening consulates - in Ismir and Zagreb - and exchanging experts and technicians. The two parties also declared their readiness to conclude a consular convention and a treaty on road traffic and to develop touristic exchanges as much as possible. As regards East-West European relations, Mr. Caglayangil declared himself in favour of a rapprochement, referring to the improvement in his country's relations with Bulgaria and Romania.

19. A Yugoslav press assessment of Albanian foreign policy<sup>(10)</sup> was that attacks against Yugoslavia had not been reduced in number or intensity. However, "although such an attitude by Tirana is certainly not in the interest of, first, Albania, the Balkans, or Europe, still a step forward has been made, at least with respect to practical issues".

Albanian-Yugoslav negotiations were under way on the opening up of traffic - notably railroad - and the commodity exchange had improved.

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(7) Such prospects were reportedly discussed during Bulgarian visits to Scandinavian countries.

(8) It was pointed out in Vienna that the Soviet Union had made no objection to such plans, and this was used as an argument to justify comparable Austrian intentions.

(9) A short-lived Balkan Pact grouped Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece (1953-1955).

(10) Reproduced in FBIS, 28 February.

20. Regarding Albanian policy towards countries other than Yugoslavia, "co-operation with Peking remained Albania's main support in international relations", according to the Yugoslav unofficial estimate; yet there had been serious contacts with some Western countries - France, Austria, Turkey, Italy - and the positive evaluation of de Gaulle's European policy, as expressed by the congress of the Albanian Workers Party, showed that Tirana had realized a few new things,

"... primarily that (Albania) ... is logically connected with Europe both economically and culturally, and there are also certain changes in Albania's relations with its present partners".

## II. THE GERMAN QUESTION

### Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland<sup>(11)</sup>

21. On 1 March in Warsaw a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid was signed between Czechoslovakia and Poland. Regarding the German Question, it was stated that the Munich agreement was null and void ab initio with all ensuing consequences (Article 6). The two parties would take all necessary measures to prevent aggression on the part of West German "militarism and revanchism" or of any State or group of States which should join them (Article 8) and every possible aid, including military aid, would be granted in case of military attack in the circumstances defined in Article 8 (Article 9). A provision on the inviolability of the existing state frontiers in Europe (Article 7) also concerns the German Question, both with respect to the GDR and the Oder-Neisse line.

22. On 15 March a Polish-GDR Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed in Warsaw<sup>(12)</sup>. As in the Polish-Czechoslovak Treaty, the basic provisions concerned the German Question. Articles 4 and 5 provided for prevention of aggression by "West German militarism and revanchism" and, should such a conflict occur between the FRG and one of the parties, immediate assistance to the other party. Under Article 7 the parties would continue their efforts to bring about a German peace settlement on the basis of the recognition of the existence of two sovereign German States. Article 6 declared West Berlin to be a "special" political entity<sup>(13)</sup>.

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(11) For other exchanges of visits among Socialist countries, see Survey on the foreign relations of the Socialist countries.

(12) On 6 July 1950 a Polish-GDR Treaty declared the Oder-Neisse line to be the final frontier. The present agreement is, however, the first Treaty of this nature between the two States.

(13) The 1964 Soviet-GDR Treaty referred to West Berlin as a "separate" political entity (Article 6).

23. In Article 10 of the Czechoslovak-GDR Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in Prague on 17 March 1967 provisions similar to Articles 4 and 5 of the Polish-GDR Treaty were contained with respect to prevention of aggression by "West German militarism and revanchism" and military and other assistance in the event of an armed attack on one of the contracting parties. Article 7 declared that the Munich Agreement was constantly invalid from the outset. Further, under Article 8 West Berlin was regarded as "a special political entity" and Article 9 stated that

"the evolvement of a German peace settlement on the basis of the recognition of the existence of two sovereign German States, and the normalization of the relations between them, corresponds to the requirements of European security".

24. Among comments in the FRG on the new Treaties, note was taken of a reference to the desirability of a German settlement based on the recognition of the existence of two German States and the normalization of relations between them, and this was regarded as a return to earlier demands by Socialist countries that separate peace treaties should be signed with the two German States.

Soviet statements during the electoral campaign (14)

25. The Soviet interpretation of FRG policy, including its "opening to the East" may be found in the following statement made on 11 March by General Secretary Brezhnev:

"The Government of the FRG seeks to use any move in foreign policy to support its absurd claim to speak for all Germans. This claim alone is sufficient proof of the aggressive nature of West German policy. To act in this way is to infringe the sovereign rights of another German State, the GDR, and to try to undo the vast social and political changes. The aggressive and reactionary nature of the FRG's attitude on this question is further emphasized by Bonn's obstinacy in clinging to the notorious 'Hallstein doctrine' ... "

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(14) See special Note and Monthly Survey on the foreign relations of Socialist countries.



FRG Relations with East European Countries

26. In the context of the strongly reasserted Soviet positions and the new Treaties between Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland, the movement towards establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG and other related measures was apparently slowed down. While Romania and the FRG have not as yet exchanged Ambassadors, Hungary and Bulgaria were apparently not about to take any step in the immediate future.

27. On 9 March, during a visit to Norway, Foreign Minister Bashev of Bulgaria at a press conference declared: (Le Monde, 12-13 March, page 5).

"Bulgaria is ready to have diplomatic relations with all the countries that may so desire, on condition that they accept the basic principles of Bulgarian foreign policy", including "a recognition of the political realities arising from the Second World War".

28. As reported "from official sources" in Budapest to Le Monde (22 March) it was desirable that the establishment of diplomatic relations should go hand in hand with "a certain rate of normalization", i.e. some progress on political problems; but it was denied in Budapest that this should be an actual "condition" for such a step.

29. In Yugoslavia where interest had earlier been shown in the FRG opening to the East, criticism in the news media of the FRG's "same policy with new methods" became stronger; and the emphasis was placed on "outstanding problems" in bilateral relations, i.e.

"indemnity to Yugoslav victims of nazism, connivance at the goading of diversionist and terrorist activity of Ustashi-Chetnik gangs in the territory of the FRG, and others" (FBIS, 14 March).

FRG Official Foreign Policy Statements<sup>(15)</sup>

30. The tone of such statements varied, generally along party lines, with the Socialists (SPD) using more urbane language. On 9 March, Herr Brandt, although stressing the FRG's "moral duty" to represent everywhere in the world the interests of the Germans in the "other part" of Germany, said that the words "exclusive" and "right" of representation should not be used<sup>(16)</sup> since the FRG could not "claim any competence outside the purview of the basic law".

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(15) Including speeches by leaders of the two coalition parties, the Christian-Democratic (CDU) and the Socialists (SPD).

(16) The word "exclusive", Herr Brandt said, reminded him of Cassius Clay. The Foreign Minister further deplored an interference of lawyers in politics.

31. On 9 March, Rainer Barzel, the Chairman of the Christian-Democratic (CDU) Parliamentary Group, addressing CDU Bundestag members declared that "a recognition of the Zone would be a capitulation of the Germans to Communism".

32. In the framework of the Socialist (SPD) more conciliatory approach, Chairman Helmut Schmidt of the SPD Parliamentary Group, on 2 March made the following points:

- (i) the question of the lost territories was less important than a re-establishment of German unity;
- (ii) a détente, normalization and reconciliation within the whole of Europe were prerequisites to German reunification;
- (iii) a peaceful European order should inter alia include mutual reduction of armaments, renunciation of co-ownership or co-disposition of nuclear arms in Central Europe and reciprocal control of military installations<sup>(17)</sup>.

33. Such a scheme was reminiscent of disengagement plans which around 1957 were submitted both in the East and from unofficial Western sources, including Social-Democratic (SPD) leaders and Labour leader Gaitskell<sup>(18)</sup>.

34. In addition to FRG efforts to improve relations with East European States, Foreign Minister Brandt, on 9 March, said that his Government was "really serious about an improvement in Soviet-German relations".

35. As in previous weeks the emphasis in the foreign policy of the new FRG coalition Government remained on relations with France, which was regarded as the greatest potential ally in the pursuit of German reunification. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Chancellor Kiesinger said that, on that issue, French and FRG interests "seem to me to coincide very widely" and he added:

"Moreover, an identity of interests shows itself before all in an attempt to surmount through peaceful means the status quo in Europe. Our efforts in this direction will be more worthy of confidence and more convincing if we accomplish them jointly with France...For me it is primarily important that our Western neighbour, which has credit in the East, should be ready to help us solve peacefully the German problem".

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(17) Herr Schmidt also mentioned the possibility of an FRG offer of renunciation of force in connection with frontiers "and demarcation lines".

(18) Moscow radio recently noted that Labour leaders on their part had "even buried the plans for consolidating European security which were supported by the late Hugh Gaitskell". (20 March).

Opposition Parties

(i) "Free Democratic Party"

36. Although the Liberal Party (FDP, Freie Demokratische Partei) is no longer in the Government, recent internal party discussions on the reunification question were regarded as indicative of trends in West German public opinion. The FDP treasurer, Hans Wolfgang Rubin, in the weekly Stern recently appealed for what Le Monde summarized as "a moment of truth in German policy". Herr Rubin stated:

"Without a recognition of the facts accomplished since 1945, there will be no reunification. Whoever wants reunification must recognize the Oder-Neisse line and acknowledge the existence of the Communist State on German soil, with all its unavoidable consequences".

37. Similar suggestions were made during the month by other Liberal leaders, namely, Herr Schwoller, "permanent" party representative and Herr Leverenz, a Minister in the Schleswig-Holstein Land Government.

38. While sanctions were taken against some of the unorthodox Liberal leaders, their statements were regarded by Le Monde as indicative of slow but deep changes in West German public opinion "towards the decisive problem, that of relations with the German Communist State which imply an acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier".

39. Progress in the direction of recognition of the GDR also appeared to be a prerequisite to serious consideration of the disengagement proposals which were apparently regaining favour in FRG Social-Democratic circles.

(ii) National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)

40. The international significance<sup>(19)</sup> of the developments in the NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) is due to the fact that the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have taken the position indicated in the Soviet Statement of 28 January:

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(19) Another international aspect of NPD activities consisted in a report on 7 March in Johannesburg in the newspaper, The Star, on the founding of a movement "which will work from South Africa and is intended to change the democratic political system of West Germany". The name of the new movement is "German labour group of nationally loyal associations in South Africa"; and it was said that it would work in support of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and was itself supported by at least six German organizations in South Africa. All "Germans" resident in Johannesburg had reportedly been invited to the meeting at which a speaker, Rolf Wenzlaff, attacked the United Nations. (The Times of London, 8 March).

"The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that the Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, in accordance with their commitments under the Potsdam<sup>(20)</sup> and other international agreements, continue to bear the responsibility for preventing the resurgence of German militarism and nazism. To forget this responsibility would be to encourage the forces of militarism and nazism, which are today rearing their heads higher and higher in the German Federal Republic".

41. Developments in March within the NPD were as follows:
- (a) on 8 March a Land court in Bremen ruled that the election<sup>(21)</sup> of Herr von Thadden as leader of the NPD executive in Lower Saxony was invalid;
  - (b) on March 10 NPD Chairman Fritz Thielen ousted Deputy Chairman, Adolf von Thadden, and seven other leaders, from the NPD;
  - (c) as announced by another Deputy Chairman, Wilhelm Gutmann, on 11 March in Frankfurt, the NPD Federal Executive Committee over-ruled Herr Thielen, suspending him from the chairmanship, and re-instating Herr von Thadden as Deputy;<sup>(22)</sup>
  - (d) on 22 March the Eighth Civil Chamber of the Bremen Land Court empowered Herr Thielen to remain as Chairman until other legal positions were decided;
  - (e) on the same day the NPD Executive Committee called on Herr Thielen to convene a national conference to elect a NPD chairman.

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(20) The report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) of July-August 1945, in its section on "Political Principles" lists as one of the purposes of the occupation of Germany:

"To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda".

- (21) In replacement of Herr Luthar Kuhne who appealed to the court.
- (22) The Federal Executive Committee also on 11 March confirmed a decision by the Bremen Land party branch to exclude Herr Thielen from the party. On the following day Herr von Thadden was cheered at a party rally in Mainz.

III. QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE BRITISH APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP  
IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)

42. The matter is reportedly to be taken up in private conversation during Vice-President Humphrey's visit to Europe. While, in the opinion of The Times of London (27 March), "the United States has not dropped its desire to see Britain as a member of the EEC", it was recalled "how self-defeating American eagerness proved at the time of Mr. Heath's negotiations, encouraging fears of Britain as the transatlantic Trojan horse".

43. Whereas during earlier British soundings of EEC members agriculture had been in the forefront, together with financial issues, the problem of coal and steel were discussed during the British leaders' visit to Luxembourg on 8 March. Prime Minister Wilson reportedly said that there were no insuperable difficulties in this field; Britain wanted a transition period for coal and only minor adjustments for steel<sup>(23)</sup>.

44. Following the completion of the series of visits, Britain has not as yet announced her decision on whether to enter into actual negotiations for EEC membership. In the meantime, Mr. Wilson sought to reassure the EEC members; his Government, the Prime Minister said, would not invoke EEC provisions for assistance to its members in case of currency difficulties, if such problems arose for reasons "external" to the Community<sup>(24)</sup>.

45. It is now expected that, following a series of Cabinet meetings, Britain will consult with other Commonwealth Governments and members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)<sup>(25)</sup>.

46. A statement by Foreign Minister Brandt<sup>(26)</sup> in support of a possible British application did not dispel earlier doubts that the FRG Government, with its present emphasis on relations with France, should take a strong position on this issue.

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(23) It is acknowledged in Britain that major changes would be required for the nationalized coal industry, which is at present protected from outside competition. On the other hand, British steel would benefit by access to cheaper coke.

(24) Statement in the House of Commons on 9 March.

(25) Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland, with Finland as associate member.

(26) Statement to the FRG newsagency on 6 March.

CONCLUSION

47. Persistence of European issues, relating to Germany and, to a lesser extent, Austria's neutrality status, may be interpreted in two ways. Those who are sceptical of any real improvement except through US-Soviet agreement could maintain the view that Viet-Nam, by keeping apart the two super-powers, also precluded a true European rapprochement. On the other hand, progress in normalization of relations through the continuation of high-level visits and a regional détente, notably in the Balkans, could be regarded as part of a slow process of reconciliation between the Europeans themselves.

48. The present FRG Government, for its part, was reported to be closer to France than to its own predecessors in Bonn, in that Chancellor Kiesinger is "more patient" and envisages "long-term" solutions to the "obsessive problem of national unity"<sup>(27)</sup>. For such an approach to bear fruit, further reassessments of traditional FRG positions seemed in order. This is why unorthodox statements by a few Liberal leaders in the FRG may be regarded as a constructive development.<sup>(28)</sup> A trend - such as noted in Le Monde - in West Germany itself towards recognition of post-World War II realities in Europe including the two German States would also strengthen the position of the UN Secretary-General in favour of UN universality and "tempering the violence of ideological differences".

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(27) C.L. Sulzberger in the New York Times, 24 March 1967.

(28) As noted above, new FRG positions on relations with the GDR could also facilitate serious consideration of disengagement proposals which, in other respects, now appear more promising than at any time since 1957-1958.

## ROUTING SLIP

## FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:

The Secretary-General

A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

*Thanks.*  
*12/16/64*

Date:

14 June 1964

FROM:

DE:

A. E. Nesterenko  
 PSCA

CR. 13 (11-64)

*A. E. Nesterenko*

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

PhP:js

Political Affairs Division

MONTHLY SURVEYS

E U R O P E

(May 1967)



1 June 1967

E U R O P E

(May 1967)

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. The East-West detente in Europe continued to be hampered by differences between the United States and the Soviet Union and those supporting them.
2. General de Gaulle's emphasis on the economic and financial problems raised by British application on 11 May for membership in the three six- member Communities <sup>1/</sup> seemed to be largely due to his political disagreement with a basic aspect of Britains's foreign policy, namely her special relationship with the United States.
3. Except in Eastern Europe, in neutral countries <sup>2/</sup> and, perhaps, in some sectors of public opinion elsewhere in Europe, there was little active support of French opposition to US policy. At the same time continuing high-level contacts across ideological barriers, particularly between members of the Club of Nine, <sup>3/</sup> could be regarded as a symptom of growing all-European solidarity and desire to maintain positions independent from the two super-powers.
4. The slow but steady pace of a normalization of relations in Central and Eastern Europe <sup>4/</sup> was again exemplified by the belated Romanian Agreement on 22 May to the appointment of FRG Ambassador Erich Stratling to Bucharest, <sup>5/</sup> almost four months after the agreement of 31 January to exchange ambassadors.

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- <sup>1/</sup> Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Community for Atomic Energy (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC).
  - <sup>2/</sup> The Bulgarian-Swedish communique confirmed a large measure of agreement on the Viet-Nam Question. (see paragraph 30 below). There appeared to be growing sympathy in Sweden with the North Vietnamese demand for a cessation of the bombings.
  - <sup>3/</sup> Two of the high level meetings during the month were between Club of Nine members, i.e. Austria and Hungary, and Bulgaria and Sweden. Belgium, also a member, sent her Foreign Minister to Czechoslovakia in the wake of a similar visit to Hungary.
  - <sup>4/</sup> A minor setback in Balkan relations consisted in a denunciation on 13 May by the military regime in Greece of the Agreement of 18 June 1959 with Yugoslavia on frontier zones with free circulation. Road and railway traffic is not affected by the Greek move.
  - <sup>5/</sup> This decision was preceded by a visit of Foreign Minister Manescu to Bonn on 20 May.

5. Typical of the limited ambitions - and sometimes even more modest achievements - of the pioneers in East-West European reconciliation was Austria's "small step" policy led by Chancellor Klaus and pursued during his visit to Hungary on 2-5 May.

I. QUESTION OF BRITISH APPLICATION OF 11 MAY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN  
THE THREE WEST-EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

6. Early in May there were signs that Britain was anxious to stress her independent position from the United States. On 8 May, Prime Minister Wilson, in a television interview, indicated that his Government was unlikely to buy the Poseidon missile from the United States as a replacement for the Polaris. On the following day La Nation, the French Gaullist (UNR) newspaper, wrote that "Great Britain has lately been acting as though she belonged to the Common Market" (9 May).

7. On 9 May in the "European Parliament", in the absence of the French deputies <sup>1/</sup> representatives of the other five EEC member countries welcomed Britain's announced application.

8. On 11 May the British Ambassador to the Communities, Sir James Marjoribanks, submitted <sup>2/</sup> his country's applications for membership in EEC and Euratom to EEC Council President Renaat Van Elsdande - the Belgian Minister for European Affairs and Flemish Culture. On the same day, Sir James handed the British application for membership in the European Coal and Steel Community to ECSC Council President Antoine Wehenkel - the Minister for Economics of Luxembourg. <sup>3/</sup>

9. On 16 May at his press conference General de Gaulle, "on the level of general ideas" and without making any "advance judgment about what negotiations could eventually - I say eventually - be", reviewed the "destructive disorder" which, in his opinion, would arise from British membership. Stressing the solidarity of the "group of Continental countries", he dealt with the questions of the EEC's agricultural system and **financial features** and with the political

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<sup>1/</sup> Following the French elections, the French representatives on the European assemblies - the "European Parliament" of the Six and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe - are in the process of being appointed.

<sup>2/</sup> Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 13 May 1967.

<sup>3/</sup> The applications from Ireland and Denmark were also submitted on the same day.

implications of British membership as follows:

(i) Agriculture

"If she submits to the rules of the Six, then her balance of payments will be crushed by "levies" and, on the other hand, she would then be forced to raise the price of her food to the price level adopted by the continental countries, consequently to increase the wages of her workers and, thereby, to sell her goods all the more at a higher price and with more difficulty."

(ii) Finance

" ... monetary parity and solidarity are the essential conditions of the Common Market and assuredly could not be extended to our neighbours across the Channel, unless the pound appears, one day, in a new situation and such that its future value appears assured; unless it also frees itself of the character of reserve currency; unless, finally, the burden of Great Britain's deficit balances within the sterling area disappear. When and how will this happen?"

(iii) Politics

" ... Considering the special relations that tie the British to America, with the advantage and also the dependence that results for them; considering the existence of the Commonwealth and their preferential relations with it; considering the special commitment that they still have in various parts of the world and which, basically, distinguishes them from the continentals, we see that the policy of the latter, as soon as they have one, would undoubtedly concur, in certain cases, with the policy of the former. But we cannot see how both policies could merge, unless the British assumed again, particularly as regards defense, complete command of themselves, or else if the continentals renounced forever a European Europe."

10. On the above basis, the President of France said that there were three possibilities. An "entirely new edifice" could be built, ending with "the creation of a free-trade area of Western Europe, pending that of the Atlantic area, which would deprive our continent of any real personality." Secondly, a system of EEC association could be established with "Britain and some States of the 'little' free-trade area." Thirdly, one could "wait until a certain internal and external evolution, of which Great Britain seems already to be showing signs, is eventually completed."

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11. Britain, through Prime Minister Wilson, on 18 May said that "she would not take No for an answer", that she was determined to proceed with the negotiations as fast as possible; and that it was in the interest of Europe not to delay the negotiations, since all countries must know within a few months exactly how things stood. (Speech at a Confederation of British Industry meeting).

12. General de Gaulle's press conference brought about expressions of support of the British application by other EEC members. On 19 May, following a Cabinet meeting in Brussels, Premier Paul vanden Boeynants read a communique, including a statement that conditions existed for the Six to open negotiations with Britain for her application. Belgium, it was pointed out, favoured an enlargement of the Community in accordance with the Rome Treaty provisions, provided essential conditions were respected, namely, that a strong Europe based on "solid institutions" should be promoted.

13. As reported in a dispatch of 21 May (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 23 May), Premier de Jong of the Netherlands in a speech at a meeting of the European Movement said that, for his country, the decisive priorities in integration developments in Europe consisted in the widening of the Communities "to the whole of free Europe." On the specific issues of the financing of the agricultural system, Commonwealth trade and capital movements, Mr. de Jong said:

" .. Contrary to the French head of State, I am of the opinion that, if the political will is forthcoming among the other six partners, technical solutions can without the slightest doubt be found for such problems."

14. The FRG, while also favouring Britain, adopted a less clear-cut approach. On 17 May at a press conference, the Deputy spokesman Ahlers said that his Government would maintain an "open door" policy. On the other hand, Britain must be willing and able to accept not only the Rome Treaties but the subsequent development of the Community as it had proceeded since the EEC's setting up and may also proceed in the future. At the same press conference Herr Schiller, the Federal Minister for Economics, was asked what tactics the FRG would adopt as between London and Paris, and he answered that it would steer a cautious course in the spirit of the recent policy of circumspection and mediation. Herr Schiller referred in this connection to his collaboration with M. Couve de Murville in Brussels during the last stage of the Kennedy Round. Further, the FRG Minister again referred to the FRG's industrial interest in a widening of the EEC. <sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> For the decision taken by the Six on 30 May on the question of Britain's application, see Section II below.

II. ROME SUMMIT MEETING OF THE SIX MEMBERS OF THE  
THREE COMMUNITIES (29-30 MAY 1967)

15. The Five heads of government and President de Gaulle, at the first "Summit" of the Six since 1961,<sup>1/</sup> considered the questions of the British application; of the strengthening of political ties between the Six; and of the merger of the "executives" of the three Communities.

16. On the 30th, the Six took note of the British, Irish and Danish applications and decided that, in conformity with the European Treaties, the Council of Ministers would be seized with, and would start considering, the various problems raised by the candidacies at its next meeting.

17. It was further agreed that a new Conference of the Heads of State and Governments would be held, if possible before the end of 1967; and, in the meantime, the six foreign ministers were instructed to study the means of strengthening existing political ties between the Six (Le Monde, 31 May). Further, the question of setting up the new unified "executive" was also entrusted to the foreign ministers, who are to meet on 5-6 June in Brussels.

III. THE GERMAN QUESTION

18. The Government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), pursuant to the Declaration of 20 April by the 7th Congress of the Socialist Unity of Germany (SED) Party that the GDR was ready to seek ways to a detente in relations between the two German States, made a direct approach to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); and the latter regarded this as a continuation of the process marked inter alia by the FRG Chancellor's proposals of 12 April.<sup>2/</sup>

19. On 10 May GDR Premier Willi Stoph sent<sup>3/</sup> a letter to FRG Chancellor Kiesinger in which he proposed "direct negotiations" on the following matters:

"Establishment of normal relations between the two German States;  
renunciation by the two German states of the use of force in their

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<sup>1/</sup> While two West European "Summits", held on 10-11 February 1961 in Paris and 18 July in Bad Godesberg, were devoted to the question of "political co-operation with the aim of European unification", lack of agreement on the Fouchet plan in 1961-1962 led to a discontinuation of such meetings. Following an indication of French readiness to resume the meetings - at General de Gaulle's press conference on 21 February 1966 - and a meeting between foreign minister Fanfani and the French President in December 1966, the Government of Italy sent invitations to the new Summit Meeting.

<sup>2/</sup> European Survey for April, paragraphs 13-16, pages 3-4.

<sup>3/</sup> FBIS, 12 May.

mutual relations; recognition of the frontiers existing at present in Europe, particularly the frontier between the two German states; reduction of the arms expenditure of the German states by half in each case; renunciation by the two German states of possession, of control, or share in the control over nuclear weapons in any form and readiness to take part in a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; work by the GDR Government and the Federal Republic Government for normal relations between the two German states on the one hand and the other European states on the other and for the establishment of diplomatic relations between all European states on the one hand and the two German states on the other."

20. On 12 May, Chancellor Kiesinger reportedly told the CDU Executive Committee that he would reply to the letter - without acknowledging the GDR demands, but referring himself to GDR readiness to take up certain "basic questions". The FRG Government spokesman reportedly added that such a reply to the letter from Herr Stoph would not alter the FRG policy of non-recognition of the GDR.

#### IV. EUROPE - EAST AND WEST

21. Although high-level meetings continued at the same pace between countries with different social/economic systems, there were continuing differences between Nato and Warsaw Pact viewpoints on Viet-Nam. Progress in bilateral relations was not apparently hampered but the prospects for close political co-operation continued to be better between the Socialist Camp and Western Governments which, like France and Sweden, were largely in agreement with Eastern positions on Viet-Nam.

#### Visit of Austrian Chancellor to Hungary (2-5 May).

22. In advance of the meetings there was speculation in the West that Hungary may seek to promote a policy of co-operation in the Danube basin with a view, perhaps, to the setting up of an "area of peace" in that part of Europe (Le Monde, 3 May). It should also be recalled that Hungary was one of the first East European countries which expressed interest in a "European Europe". <sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> This occurred during the visit of Foreign Minister Janos Peter to Paris in January 1965 and in a speech of First Secretary Kadar in the National Assembly (European Surveys for January 1965, para. 29, p. 8 and February 1965, para. 48, pp. 12-13).

23. As far as Austria is concerned, Chancellor Klaus has long since campaigned for renewed efforts to finish "the European House of the Future" on which, in his opinion, work has stopped before the "eastern wing" was built. <sup>1/</sup>
24. Earlier meetings between Austria and Hungary included Foreign Minister Kreisky's journey to Hungary (October 1964) and Foreign Minister Janos Peter's trip to Austria in April 1965. <sup>2/</sup>
25. The May 1967 visit of Herr Klaus to Hungary - the first by an Austrian head of Government to Hungary since World War II <sup>3/</sup> - was an occasion for the Austrian Chancellor to re-define his country's active neutrality. He said that <sup>4/</sup> Austria's foreign policy was based on the principles of peace, collaboration and strict neutrality. Neutrality was for Austria not a state of isolation but a motive for an active policy in the international field. Austria was accordingly ready to weigh every proposal, and to join any initiative, that could contribute to a real detente.
26. The final communique of 5 May, in addition to expressing "concern about the situation in South East Asia", twice referred to the Danube Basin as follows:
- "The Hungarian side once again stressed the importance of the Austrian state treaty and of Austrian neutrality which are regarded as important factors for assuring European peace in general and peace in the Danube Basin in particular";
- "In the course of the exchange of views on international questions, they stated good neighborly relations between Hungary and Austria, which are situated in the Danube Basin, may greatly contribute to a detente in Europe. Both parties regard a well-prepared all-European conference as useful."
27. In mutual relations the following reference was made to the question of obstacles on the Hungarian side of the border:

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- <sup>1/</sup> Statement in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. (European Survey for February 1965, para. 47, p.12).
- <sup>2/</sup> European Survey for April 1965, paras. 43-44, pp.14-15. Frontier and traffic questions were then discussed and improvements were made.
- <sup>3/</sup> As well as the first visit by a Western Premier to Hungary.
- <sup>4/</sup> Lecture on 3 May in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on "Active policy of international relations in the Danube area."

"On the Hungarian side, information was given about work which is being carried out for a satisfactory settlement of the frontier situation."

28. The following interpretation of the outcome of the conversations on this subject was given by Le Monde (8 May):

"For Austrian public opinion the most noticeable result in this field (Danube area cooperation) will be a disappearance of 're-inforced obstacles' and of the minefields which, on the frontier, periodically caused accidents."

Visit of Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel to Czechoslovakia

29. In the communique issued on 5 May, the question of European security and co-operation was reviewed as follows:

"The ministers thoroughly discussed questions of strengthening peace and creating of a security system in Europe, and they expressed the desire to try to take measures, both bilateral and multilateral, that would help to create the conditions for a real normalization of relations between countries with different social systems.

During their talks they agreed that it is necessary to make use of all possibilities that arise for taking mutually agreed steps to achieve a lessening of the tension and a normalization of the situation in Europe.

The Czechoslovak and Belgian foreign ministers agreed that in the political sphere an agreement should be reached on ways of applying the principles of peaceful coexistence between European states with different social systems. These principles should be based on the renunciation of the use or threat of force, the peaceful solution of international disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, the respect of sovereignty, and the fulfilment of valid international commitments.

They also expressed themselves in favour of calling a conference on European security and cooperation after proper preparation."

. Swedish Foreign Minister's Visit to Bulgaria (7-13 May).

30. In contrast with meetings between Nato and Warsaw Pact members which, even when Club of Nine members were involved, showed continuing disagreement at least at government level on the Viet-Nam question, the visit of Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson ended with a communique of 13 May which stated:

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"The ministers expressed their grave concern over the situation in Viet-Nam. They agreed that the escalation of the Vietnamese war would exacerbate the international situation and bring unexpected consequences relative to world peace. Thus they held that it was absolutely necessary that all bombing of the DRV be stopped as a first step toward negotiations between the two parties. Peace must be sought on the basis of the 1954 Geneva agreements, securing for the Vietnamese people the right of self-determination without foreign intervention."

31. On the other hand, the reference to a possible European security conference differed little from a number of other statements agreed by East and West leaders:

"The two ministers greeted the improvement of the contacts achieved and the rapprochement among the European countries of different political and social systems. Opinions also were exchanged on ways to aid the development of this positive development. They agreed that a European conference on security and cooperation would be useful and timely. This would require careful preparatory work and general acceptance."

Visit of Foreign Minister Fanfani to the Soviet Union (12-16 May)

32. While the recent visit of President Podgorny to Italy had largely been an occasion for discussion of mutual economic relations, the communique of 16 May <sup>1/</sup> showed a slightly more precise wording of the common viewpoint on the procedure for preparation of a possible European security conference:

"When discussing problems of relaxation of tension and of security on the European continent, the sides also concentrated on a proposal for calling a conference to discuss these problems. Such a meeting, duly prepared, could represent a forum fit for bringing viewpoints closer together and concerting the efforts of the states concerned. The sides agreed that it would be useful for the states concerned to keep in touch with each other in order to facilitate practical preparations for calling such a conference."

Foreign Secretary Brown's Visit to the Soviet Union (23-25 May)

33. In addition to Viet-Nam and the Middle East, questions of European security and disarmament were reportedly in the forefront of the conversations of Mr. Brown with Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as Chairman Kosygin.

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<sup>1/</sup> FBIS, 17 May. "Concern" was also expressed by "the sides" over the situation in Viet-Nam. Further, bilateral Consular, tourism and agricultural agreements were signed on 16 May.

34. Summarizing Mr. Brown's visit, the Soviet spokesman, Mr. Zamyatin, at a news conference on 26 May said that the talks were frank and useful "although the approaches of Britain and the Soviet Union still differ on a number of questions."

35. In this respect, therefore, the British visit to the Soviet Union was typical of a number of meetings during the month involving Nato Governments; in spite of their desire to normalize political relations in Europe - as also advocated by Warsaw Pact members - differences on crucial, acute issues precluded such possibilities of co-operation as remain open in the case of France's or non-aligned countries' relations with the Socialist States.

36. In the case of British-Soviet relations, this apparent lack of achievements at the latest meeting was all the more surprising as an earlier visit <sup>1/</sup> had been an occasion for agreement in principle on a Treaty of friendship and co-operation.

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1/ Visit of Chairman Kosygin to Britain, (6-13 February 1967).  
European Survey for February, paragraphs 59, page 14 and 64,  
page 15.

TO: The Secretary-General  
A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

*See. Thats.*  
*W. H. Nesterenko*

Date:  
11 May 1967  
CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:  
DE: *W. H. Nesterenko*  
A. E. Nesterenko  
FSCA

AA-40

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

2 May 1967  
PhP:js

Political Affairs Division

MONTHLY SURVEYS

E U R O P E

(April 1967)

E U R O P E  
(April 1967)

General Comments

1. In a message to the Economic Commission for Europe, at a meeting commemorating its twentieth anniversary which opened on 11 April in Geneva, U Thant pointed out that "normalization and improvement of political relations" in Europe were essential, not only for that region but "for the world as a whole." A Declaration which was unanimously adopted reflected this view and stated that :

" ... besides co-operation on a bilateral basis and within the framework of economic groupings, it is necessary to do everything possible to develop co-operation on a multi-lateral basis."

2. In the view of the Government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) reunification with an "imperialistic, militaristic" Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was not possible; and only the workers' class could make reunification possible by turning the FRG into a "socialist and democratic" State. Even a Confederation, which had been envisaged under the GDR ten-point programme of January 1967, <sup>1/</sup> was now ruled out. Yet, in answer to a FRG Government proposal for closer unpolitical relations between the two parts of Germany, <sup>2/</sup> a Declaration adopted on 20 April at the 7th Congress of the Socialist Unity of Germany (SED) Party stated that the Government of the GDR was ready "to seek ways to a detente" between the two German States through factual negotiations on a basis of equality, either in Berlin or in Bonn.

3. There were no new developments concerning FRG relations with East European countries. Solidarity among Socialist countries was reaffirmed by the early renewal of the Polish-Bulgarian Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance; <sup>3/</sup> and it was speculated in Le Monde that the East European States which "would have been tempted to exchange ambassadors with Bonn adopted an attitude of expectancy until the FRG should give concrete signs of a new political orientation, notably by giving up a claim to speak for the whole of Germany."

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<sup>1/</sup> In his New Year message First Secretary Ulbricht set forth a ten-point programme as a first stage towards a Confederation of the two German States. (European Survey for January, paragraph 16, pages 4-5).

<sup>2/</sup> While the SPD leader and Minister for all German Affairs Wehner would have liked to include disengagement proposals in the FRG offer, Chancellor Kiesinger was apparently against inserting "ticklish" matters. (see paragraph 23 below)

<sup>3/</sup> See Monthly Survey on the Socialist Countries.

4. The influence in East-West European affairs of the Club of Nine, the members of which had been particularly active in January and February, was again felt in April with Belgian-Yugoslav, Hungarian-Swedish and Hungarian-Belgian meetings. As stated by Premier Vanden Boeynants following a Cabinet meeting on 7 April, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mario Nikezic was impressed by the freedom of movement enjoyed by Belgian foreign policy. <sup>1/</sup>

5. Following US Vice-President Humphrey's visit to Europe, the main issue within the Atlantic Alliance appeared to be whether the purpose of a detente, which had by now secured almost universal acceptance, was compatible with a consolidation of NATO. A positive answer was given by Mr. Humphrey when he said that changing conditions required continuing Atlantic unity and closer political co-ordination, as the alliance tried to match its past military deterrence with a new policy of "peaceful engagement" towards the Communist side. <sup>2/</sup>

6. The Government of Italy similarly stressed its NATO membership - while expressing readiness for closer contacts with East European countries - on the occasion of an exchange of views with visiting President Ochab of Poland.

7. While Belgium, as noted above, prided herself on her freedom of movement towards her NATO allies, Premier Vanden Boeynants also made clear that there was no question of his Government loosening the Atlantic Alliance in any way.

8. France "a member of the Atlantic Alliance" remained "the friend of the United States", <sup>3/</sup> but stressed the desirability of "a rapprochement with the countries of the East" with a view to "the peaceful settlement of the European problems", in the words of Prime Minister Pompidou's Declaration in the National Assembly on general policy.

9. As a prerequisite to Europeans "living more peacefully and co-operating on the European continent" Borba of Belgrade wrote that a reported US intention to withdraw 12,000 troops from Europe <sup>4/</sup> might create a climate "for an agreement gradually to withdraw NATO and Warsaw Pact troops now confronting each other." (FBIS, 19 April 1967).

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<sup>1/</sup> Belgium is one of two NATO countries, Yugoslavia and Sweden two of four non-aligned countries and Hungary one of three Warsaw Pact members which form the Club of Nine, i.e. the sponsors of the draft (A/C. 1/L. 357) of RES/2129 (XX), on good neighbourly relations in Europe.

<sup>2/</sup> For a negative answer, see an article by Walter Lippman which apparently reflects, in blunter terms, French positions, and current efforts by non-aligned powers in Europe. Mr. Lippman wrote that "two opposing military alliances cannot make a detente." (World Journal Tribune, 4 April 1967).

<sup>3/</sup> "Even though she is led to disapproving its action in a particular part of the world."

<sup>4/</sup> Reported US plans with which the FRG apparently concurred were for 12,000 in fighting units and 18,000 in supporting personnel to be withdrawn from Germany. Tentative agreement has reportedly been reached along these lines.

I.

THE GERMAN QUESTION

1/

10. Although the relationships between the GDR and the FRG, and the issue of possible FRG access to nuclear weapons were in the forefront, the activities of the neo-Nazi National-Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) continued to raise the question of implementation of the Potsdam agreements.<sup>2/</sup>

(i) Questions of a new FRG policy towards the East and of FRG-GDR contacts

11. According to reports in the West German weekly Echo der Zeit,<sup>3/</sup> the two majority parties, Christian-Democratic (CDU) and Socialists (SPD), recently envisaged making a joint offer to the SED party of the GDR for maximum co-operation in "unpolitical" questions - such as economic, cultural and scientific.

12. As far as the Chancellor and his Christian-Democratic (CDU) party are concerned, the current proposals should be replaced in the framework of the programme for an "opening to the East" announced on 13 December in the Bundestag, and thereafter confirmed in various public speeches. For instance, Chancellor Kiesinger on 9 April at an election meeting in Schleswig-Holstein said that efforts for peace would have a prominent part in his policy. (Frankfurter Rundschau, 10 April 1967).

13. On 12 April in the Bundestag the Chancellor made proposals to the SED (Socialist Unity of Germany) party of the GDR which he introduced as follows :

" ... In as much as this depends on us, we want to prevent the two parts of our people from getting used to living apart; we want to relax - not harden; we want to fill the ditches - not make them deeper. This is why we have in mind to encourage, by all means, human, economic and intellectual relations with our fellow countrymen in the other part of Germany."

14. As examples, the Chancellor listed measures with a view to lightening the daily life of the human beings in the two parts of Germany, i.e. a liberalization of travel for the members of the same family, the grant of safe-conducts in Berlin and between neighbouring areas of the two parts of Germany, facilities of payment for travellers and for sending prescriptions and gifts.

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1/ For British remarks on the frontier question see paragraph 56 below.

2/ For a Soviet Statement of 28 January 1967 referring to commitments of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition under the Potsdam and other international agreements, see Monthly Survey for Europe, March 1967, paragraph 40, pages 9-10.

3/ Frankfurter Rundschau, 11 April 1967. According to the New York Times, Herr Wehner, the SPD leader and Minister for All German Affairs, inspired the move. (13 April).

15. The Chancellor then proposed co-operation measures in the fields of economy and transportation, such as a widening of inter-zone trade through the grant of public guarantees and the setting up of credit institutions; exchanges between the two energy markets and a definition of a nationally organized economy in the field of electricity; the promotion or establishment of new communication lines, speedways, canals, railways; an improvement of postal services and the re-establishment of normal telephone connections in Berlin; and the creation of technical and economic communities.

16. Lastly Chancellor Kiesinger proposed that broad frameworks should be defined for subsequent agreements with a view to achieving scientific, technical and cultural exchanges between the higher schools, research institutes and scientific societies; a freeing of book, review and newspaper purchases; exchanges of youth groups and whole school grades; normal inter-German sport relationships.

17. Also in his Bundestag speech of 12 April, Chancellor Kiesinger deplored that the intentions of his Government's new policy towards the East had been "crudely distorted"; and he declared :

" ... The Federal Government wants detente. The aim of its detente policy is a peaceful European settlement that will be regarded as just and permanent by all participants. In this peace settlement all applications of force should be renounced."

18. Regarding the attitude of the other coalition party, it will be recalled that the Socialists (Socialist Party of Germany, SPD) had joined the SED (Socialist unity of Germany) party of the GDR in abortive negotiations in April-June 1966 <sup>1/</sup> for an exchange of visits and joint meetings of the two parties; the present position of the Socialists (SPD) is, however, quite different since they are participating in a coalition Government with the Christian Democrats (CDU).

19. On 13 April the Steering Committee (Vorstand) of the SPD sent to the Congress of the SED an open letter signed by Party Chairman Brandt inviting the SED to examine the proposals from the Chancellor for inter-German Co-operation. It was pointed out that there might be points of contact (Berührungspunkte) between the Chancellor's offer and Herr Ulbricht's proposals of January 1967 - which included the setting up, on a parity basis, of a Commission to verify the implementation of the basic provisions of the Potsdam Agreement.

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<sup>1/</sup> European Surveys for April paragraphs 14-30, pages 5-9, for May paragraphs 26-38, pages 7-9 and for June paragraphs 12-36, pages 4-9.



20. Further, the SPD, in Herr Brandt's letter of 13 April, recalled the plan for an exchange of speakers, stating that it had been disowned by the SED, although the latter had itself made the proposal; the SPD would still now regard such a comprehensive discussion as useful, but it should not be made more difficult by "doctrinaire" claims and polemics with "poisonous" implications.

21. As stated by the SPD leader Wehner (Minister for All-German Affairs as well as SPD vice-chairman) his own party would have liked also to include in the FRG Government proposals a number of other points <sup>1/</sup> relating to a decrease of armament levels in East and West Europe; to the strength of foreign troops stationed there; to the right of disposing of, or sharing in the disposal of, nuclear weapons in Central Europe; and to a renunciation under compelling international law provisions of the use of force. Chancellor Kiesinger, however, did not want to include "ticklish" subjects in the all-German initiative and a more restricted compromise formula was adopted, according to Herr Wehner.

22. The proposals of the FRG Chancellor were immediately noted in the GDR press, <sup>2/</sup> which wrote : (Neues Deutschland, 14 April).

" ... We find it quite interesting that the West German Government should have regarded it as necessary to occupy itself so exhaustively with our Congress ... But, if the West German Government wanted to regulate affairs of State, it should have addressed itself to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR - although Herr Kiesinger is still always so afraid of the word 'GDR' that he did not use it once in his declaration before the Bundestag."

23. On 17 April First Secretary Ulbricht <sup>3/</sup> at the 7th Congress of the SED Party proposed that Chancellor Kiesinger and Premier Willi Stoph should meet

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<sup>1/</sup> Although Herr Wehner did not use the word disengagement in this connection, SPD leaders were among Western Socialists and other non-Governmental leaders who in 1957-58 drafted disengagement schemes similar, at least in purposes, to Professor Kennan's plans. Moscow Radio recently noted that the Labour leaders on their part had "even buried the plans for consolidating European security which were supported by the late Hugh Gaitskell." (European Survey for March paragraphs 32-33 and footnote 18 page 8.)

<sup>2/</sup> FRG offers, i.e. the Chancellor's proposals, Herr Brandt's letter and an addendum by SPD Praesidium member Nau were issued to the 2,500 members of the SED 7th Congress by the editor in chief of Neues Deutschland, Herr Singer.

<sup>3/</sup> Herr Ulbricht is also Chairman of the State Council (head of State) of the GDR.

" ... at a place to be decided upon in order to conclude an agreement of normalization of inter-German relationships as well as a treaty on mutual renunciation of the use of force, and to exchange identical declarations on recognition of the present boundaries in Europe."

24. While First Secretary Ulbricht repeated the January proposals which, at the time, were regarded as "a first stage" towards a German Confederation, Herr Ulbricht now called upon the "workers' class" to make reunification possible. He said that the GDR had "not written off the German State" and that what the Imperialists had torn apart, the workers' class would join again. First, "Imperialist" West Germany had to become socialist and democratic, and, once two progressive German States existed, "it could not take long until they agreed on the way to set up a people's anti-imperialist German State."

25. On 20 April the Seventh Congress adopted a "position" (Stellungnahme) which read in part : (Neues Deutschland, 21 April).

" ... the Government of the German Democratic Republic was ready and will be ready in the future to seek for ways towards a detente, disarmament and a normalization of relations between the two German states in factual negotiations, on a basis of equality, with the Government of the West German Federal Republic. The negotiations could be held at the seats of the Governments in Berlin and Bonn."

26. Just as the relationships between the two German States showed possibilities of increasing contacts, the Soviet attitude towards the FRG was more open-minded, perhaps, than in recent weeks. General-Secretary Brezhnev in his speech of 18 April at the SED Seventh Congress stated : (FBIS, 18 April 1967).

(i) the crisis of FRG foreign policy, with which even capitalist powers of Europe were disassociating themselves, threatened Bonn with utter political isolation;

(ii) the "Grand Coalition" which came into power in these conditions took a number of diplomatic steps, in connection with which Bonn raised "an incredible noise" ;

(iii) yet the Kiesinger-Brandt Government in no way changed the FRG foreign policy from aims of revenge and war preparations to aims of peaceful co-operation and the strengthening of the security of the peoples of Europe;

(iv) indeed many West German leaders admit that diplomatic stratagems in the field of "relations with the East" are regarded by Bonn as a means of splitting the ranks of the Socialist countries and above all isolating the GDR: "Bonn truly stretched out a hand to the Socialist countries of Europe. But a stone lies in this hand." ;

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(v) the Socialist countries of Europe are in favour of normalization of contacts with all states including the FRG, but will never agree to do so at the expense of their unity or individual countries, especially the GDR. The rights and interests of the GDR, the interests of building Socialism there are just as close to the Soviet Union as they are to SED members;

(vi) the policy of the FRG is not something unchangeable, bearing the eternal mark of Cain: "We have no intention whatsoever of disregarding in advance all the new that may appear in it" ;

(vii) at the same time "Europe cannot permit itself to wait passively for the FRG to change its dangerous foreign political course and to start taking down the barrier of isolation and mistrust erected by it, itself. The Socialist countries are conducting a most active struggle for security in Europe" on the basis of the Bucharest Declaration of the Warsaw Pact members of July 1966.

27. While the above statement contained only a hint of Soviet open-mindedness towards the FRG, a subsequent statement by Mr. Brezhnev confirmed the significance of that brief remark. On 24 April at the Conference of European Communist Parties General-Secretary Brezhnev declared :

" ... The Soviet Union by no means considers that the European nations should fight shy of West Germany. A road lies open before it, as before all countries, to equitable international co-operation."

(ii) NATO Meetings (nuclear planning Group, and Council)

28. There were differences between NATO allies, particularly between the United States and the FRG, on various provisions in the draft treaty on non-proliferation, and also on the question of US and UK troop withdrawal from the FRG. Further, there was a continuing distrust in Socialist countries, both as to present NATO activities notably by the nuclear planning Group of which the FRG is a member and the related matter of a FRG alleged intention of securing access to nuclear weapons.

29. Commenting on the opening on 6 April in Washington of the first meeting of the NATO nuclear planning Group, <sup>1/</sup> which includes the FRG, Tass denied <sup>2/</sup> that this could act as "a kind of lightning-rod" by which it will be possible to contain the nuclear aspirations of the FRG; and Bonn's nuclear appetite was said to be demonstrated by its opposition to the non-proliferation treaty, notably in connection with a possible European nuclear force. A US guarantee to Bonn that the proposed treaty would not be in the way of a European nuclear force would only mean, according to Tass, "the undermining of the basic principles of a Treaty on

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<sup>1/</sup> On 14 December 1966, in the absence of France, fourteen NATO allies in the planning committee established a Committee for nuclear defense affairs (all North Atlantic allies except France, Iceland, Luxembourg and Norway) and, subordinated thereto, a seven member permanent "nuclear planning Group" of which the FRG is a permanent member.

<sup>2/</sup> FBIS, 5 April 1967.

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

30. A decisive stage was reached in US consultations with its allies, notably the FRG. On 20 April the Council of the Atlantic Alliance met in Paris.

31. In advance of the meeting, the FRG Government made its position known to Britain on 13 April during a visit of Foreign Minister Brandt. Herr Brandt reportedly listed (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 and 17 April) the following five conditions on the FRG signing a treaty : 1/

- (i) the peaceful use of nuclear energy may not be hindered by an interdiction in the treaty ;
- (ii) there must be a connection between that agreement and disarmament;
- (iii) existing organs of NATO, primarily the nuclear planning group, may not be affected by the treaty;
- (iv) the setting up of a European Confederation must not be prejudiced by the Treaty and a united Europe must be in a position to have nuclear weapons ready for its defence;
- (v) the inspection system must not supersede existing European arrangements.

32. While in London, Herr Brandt reportedly emphasized the first of the above five points, declaring that the non-nuclear industrial countries should have the same rights, as to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as the atomic powers. It was also reported that one of the main issues was that of assured future delivery of fissionable material. (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 April).

33. On 20 April following a Cabinet meeting<sup>FRG</sup> spokesman von Hase described as follows his Government's views on the current negotiations :

- (i) the FRG had a positive attitude on such a treaty's purposes;
- (ii) the Cabinet had not taken a detailed position on the US draft;
- (iii) the procedure to be followed (US-USSR negotiations in the near future) had been noted;
- (iv) the FRG Government would like bilateral and multilateral consultations to go on with the Governments concerned, "particularly those with which no common viewpoint has been achieved."

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1/ Herr Brandt's reported five points may be regarded as an authorized summary of the FRG substantive position on the draft treaty as defined in a memorandum of 19 April to ENDC. (Le Monde, 21 April 1967).

34. At the NATO Council meeting on 20 April, the FRG representative apparently agreed that the United States could proceed with negotiations with the Soviet Union on the draft treaty. (Le Monde, 21 April 1967).

35. Both at meetings of the nuclear planning Group and in bilateral US-FRG conversations in Washington <sup>1/</sup> the question of US troop withdrawals from the FRG was discussed. The FRG Government reportedly regarded as "promising" a US plan for withdrawal of 12,000 in fighting units and 18,000 in supporting personnel. <sup>2/</sup>

(iii) National-Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)

36. The NPD, which had polled some 1,000,000 votes in November 1966 in Hesse and Bavaria alone received 5.8 per cent of the votes in Schleswig and 6.9 per cent in the Palatinate. <sup>3/</sup>

37. NPD leaders were, on the whole, disappointed and believed that internal party differences <sup>4/</sup> had prevented better results. It was considered as particularly surprising that the NPD received a greater percentage of the votes in Rhineland-Palatinate than in Schleswig-Holstein - traditionally a Nationalist stronghold.

38. International implications of NPD activities again included contacts with South Africa. <sup>5/</sup> On 9 April a 23 member party delegation left for a two week information journey to South Africa. The leader of the group was Waldemar Schutz, member of the NPD executive committee. Another member was a Professor Oberth reportedly a ballistic missile expert who joined the party a year ago and is scheduled to give lectures in South Africa.

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- <sup>1/</sup> At a meeting between Defence Minister Schroder and Mr. McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense, problems of military policy, armament and military supplies were reportedly discussed. (Frankfurter Rundschau, 10 April 1967).
- <sup>2/</sup> In tripartite US-UK-FRG talks ending on 28 April in London, it was reportedly agreed that the USA would withdraw about 30,000 troops and Britain 5,000 men in the first quarter of next year. (The Times of London, 29 April).
- <sup>3/</sup> Since the NPD failed to replace the Liberals (Free Democratic Party) as the third largest party, this was regarded by the New York Times as a neo-Nazi "stumble".
- <sup>4/</sup> European Survey for March, paragraph 41 page 10. In April Party Chairman Herr Thielen again ousted his Deputy Adolf von Thadden, a former leader of the neo-Nazi Deutsche Reichspartei.
- <sup>5/</sup> For the setting up in South Africa of a movement of German supporters of NPD, see March Survey, footnote 19 page 9.

II. QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE BRITISH APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP  
IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)

39. The British Government, which seemed to regard no economic difficulties as insuperable, was apparently seeking, both internationally and in internal politics, to build up a strong political case for British membership. <sup>1/</sup>

(i) Meeting of Western European Union (WEU)

40. On 5 April in Rome Foreign Secretary Brown informed the other six representatives on the Western European Union (WEU) <sup>2/</sup> of the "sense of urgency", as well as due care, with which his government was going about the task of deciding whether to apply for EEC membership. He listed three types of problems from the British viewpoint - agricultural, monetary and relating to trade with the Commonwealth.

41. In a wider sense, Mr. Brown said that the British approach to Europe was political recognition of the need for a Europe both strong enough and united enough to play an effective role in the world.

42. The British statement could be regarded as an effort to meet the French demand that, in M. Couve de Murville's words, West "European countries must strive to build in common their economy, their foreign policy and their defense." (Speech of 14 April 1966 in the French National Assembly).

43. The French representative at the WEU meeting M. Alphand, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, was quoted as saying that his Government was still studying the matter and that some of the problems seemed to him to be "formidable".

44. Apart from France, Britain appeared to enjoy unanimous support among the Six. Foreign Minister Brandt of the FRG said that his country favoured enlarging EEC for reasons of national policy and European policy. (The Times of London, 6 April).

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<sup>1/</sup> On the other hand, it was argued in the press that Federalism - which would have placed Britain before a choice between isolation and membership - had been "halted in its tracks" by President de Gaulle; the Common Market was therefore no longer a political necessity for Britain. (Manchester Guardian Weekly).

<sup>2/</sup> Britain is the only WEU country which does not belong to the three six-member Communities.

(ii) Foreign Secretary's speech of 6 April

45. The speech made on 6 April by Mr. Brown to a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party was widely circulated by the British Government. The Foreign Secretary, in addition to discussing difficulties - such as Commonwealth problems, "distortion in the pattern" of British agriculture, capital movement, regional policies and the question of sterling - dealt with the political questions, that is, mainly the place of Europe in the world and the possibility of a French veto.

46. As to the political role of a united Europe, Mr. Brown stressed current opportunities for agreement with the East at the present juncture :

" ... Europe is the continent in which we live; we have had centuries of other experience and communications, but in the end it has always been in Europe that we have been forced to establish the basis of our power and influence and in which we have often invested men, money and blood. Then we have to consider the role Europe has to play in the world today. We are no longer living in the world of the cold war - blocks and tensions are drastically changing, and Europe, as a continent, has an enormous role to play, to urge for a detente, and to create a strong economic and political entity to play a world role." There was, he believed, a tremendous opportunity to use the flexibility now existing between the eastern and western blocks. "People are thinking differently - more for themselves. In our own block, for example, it is now more easy to get discussions about the non-proliferation treaty with the USSR. We should follow this up."

47. As to the probable attitude of France, the Foreign Secretary declared :

" ... The question is asked - will France veto us, and should we be deterred from application for fear that they will? I think the situation in 1967 is markedly different to what it was in 1963. It is not only different for us. Considerations for others are markedly different too. For example, I do not think that it will be as easy a decision for the President of France to consider a veto on this occasion even if he wished to - and frankly there is nothing to support the view that he would wish to. There are considerable interests in France - farmers, for example, and large sectors of business - which depend greatly now on the Community and who have great interests in seeing it widened to include Great Britain and stand to gain a good deal from it. General de Gaulle has great power, but he, like every politician and Statesman, will surely consider the interests of his constituents."

III. EUROPE - EAST and WEST

(i) "Club of Nine"

Yugoslav Foreign Minister's visit to Belgium

48. In advance of the Belgian-Yugoslav meetings, Tanyug pointed out that the two Governments would consider the activity of the "club of nine" <sup>1/</sup> and that they had a common interest in reaffirming the role of small countries and "in pointing to their better organized contribution to an all-European co-operation." (FBIS, 4 April).

49. At a press conference on 7 April in Brussels, Foreign Minister Nikezic said that there existed between the two Governments agreement on many points relating to the detente and to the co-operation between West and East.

50. In connection with the visit it was recalled that Belgium had in recent years played the part of an "honest courtier" between the FRG and Yugoslavia. Mr. Nikezic, at his press conference, pointed out that he had thanked Foreign Minister Harmel for his role as a go-between. <sup>2/</sup> The Yugoslav Minister neither denied nor confirmed that his Government may soon enter into official relations with EEC.

Swedish visit to Hungary

51. The final communique of 11 April on the visit of Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson of Sweden to Hungary read in part :

" ... The two foreign ministers noted that, although in Europe at present a detente is discernible in some respects, factors obstructing a detente still exist. The two foreign ministers agreed that an all-European security conference might be useful if prepared carefully and rationally. They regard the intensification of co-operation between European states, regardless of differences between their social and political regimes, as necessary."

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<sup>1/</sup> Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

<sup>2/</sup> Belgium is regarded as having secured the lifting of an FRG veto against Yugoslavia's efforts at a rapprochement with the European Economic Community. (EEC).



52. On the basis of the above communique, it appeared that the members of the "Club of Nine" were fully aware of the limitations which the grave Viet-Nam crisis was placing on the current process of European normalization and eventual reconciliation. Yet, the fact that three of four high-level East-West visits this month took place between the Nine showed special efforts by this group towards a continental rapprochement.

Visit of Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel to Hungary

53. In the final communique issued on 29 April the question of European security was dealt with as follows (Le Monde, 30 April - 2 May) :

" ... A carefully prepared conference bearing on the problems linked to European security and to the development of co-operation in Europe would be useful and desirable."

(ii) Official Visit of President of State Council  
Edward Ochab to Italy

54. The final communique of 8 April (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 10 April) which ended President Ochab's conversations with Italian officials including President Saragat, announced an early signing of a Consular Convention and of an Agreement on tourism. There were also favourable prospects for an increase in trade and closer co-operation in the industrial field.

55. The two parties declared themselves in favour of an East-West detente, general disarmament and the signing of a non-proliferation treaty. There was also agreement on the desirability of a Conference on European Security.

(iii) British Minister of State's visit to Czechoslovakia

56. Britain, the relations of which with the Soviet Union are at an important stage, is also pursuing a policy of active contacts with East European States. <sup>1/</sup> On 19-24 April Minister of State for Foreign Affairs George Thomson was in Czechoslovakia where he had talks inter alia with Foreign Minister Vaclav David. At a press conference on 22 April in Prague Mr. Thomson reaffirmed the British stand on the frontier question, <sup>2/</sup> i.e. that the Oder-Neisse frontier must be

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<sup>1/</sup> Including a recent visit of Foreign Minister Rapacki to London (February 1967).

<sup>2/</sup> For earlier statements of the British position in September 1965 and February 1967 see European Survey for February 1967, paragraphs 39-40 (page 9).

(vi) Quai d'Orsay official's visit to the Soviet Union

62. A week-long visit of M. Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere, who is in charge of UN and International Organizations Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, was an occasion for an interview with Mr. Gromyko and consultations at the USSR Foreign Ministry on questions connected with the United Nations and with international - legal aspects of outer space.

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## ROUTING SLIP

## FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General  
 A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POUR INFORMATION

*Trans.*  
 19/5/67

Date: 19/5/67

FROM: A.E. Nesterenko  
 DE:

CR. 13 (11-64)

*A. Nesterenko*

AA-41

CONFIDENTIAL

PSCA/DAD/37  
17 May 1967

Question of European Security -- Recent Developments

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V. <u>Participation of Non-European Powers in European Security Arrangements</u>	5
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Annex I -- Bucharest Declaration

Annex II -- Final Communiqué of the Conference  
on European Security in Karlovy Vary

Question of European Security - Recent DevelopmentsI. Introduction

The question of European Security is linked with two of the most difficult problems: those of Germany and of disarmament. Disarmament is of course not an exclusively European problem, but is closely related to the development of relations in Europe. Therefore, the question of European security has been debated in connection with disarmament for several years.

The debate on this problem was intensified after the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest, Romania in July 1966. Since that time, the question of European security was mentioned more frequently in communiques after talks of governmental leaders, declarations of political parties in Europe, in statements of politicians and was considered in the UN and organs connected with it, mainly at the ENDC. Most recently the leaders of the Communist parties of Eastern and Western Europe met in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia in April 1967 at a conference, convened exclusively for the consideration of problems of European security.

II. Position of Warsaw Treaty Countries

Until now the Warsaw Treaty countries initiated most of the international debate on European security. (The basic document of their position was the Declaration of Bucharest of 6 July 1966 -- for excerpts see Annex I). The Warsaw Treaty countries suggested on different occasions at the UN, but mainly in the ENDC, that there should be certain measures adopted, which would enhance European security. They tabled a number of proposals such as the creation of denuclearized zones in Central Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean area, the removal of foreign troops from Central Europe, a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries and, finally, that both military blocs in Europe should be abolished.<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> See ENDC 27 January 1966 - 25 August 1966; EV. 235, 247, 256, 257 and 270.

They suggested at the same time that it would be appropriate to convene an international conference for finding a basis for agreement on these questions.

The position of the Warsaw Treaty countries was supported by leaders of the Communist Parties of Eastern and Western Europe at a meeting on European security in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia in April 1967. The statements at that meeting called for creation of a wide public movement for calling a conference of all European states on the question of security and peaceful cooperation in Europe.

The final communique of the Conference called for a conclusion by all European States of a treaty renouncing the use of force or threat of force in their relations and interference in internal affairs; a treaty guaranteeing, inter alia, normalization of relations between all states and the GDR, between both German States and between the GDR and West Berlin as a separate political entity.

The Conference in Karlovy Vary advocated further the conclusion of agreements aiming at partial solutions above all in the sphere of disarmament. In this respect it repeated the previous East European proposals at the ENDC (see above) and added that also zones of thinned-out or frozen armaments and zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of the continent should be considered.

In the view of the participants of the Conference, no effort should be spared to develop a broad movement for an immediate agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of the Atlantic Pact and Warsaw treaty. They did not elaborate on whether, by calling for a "liquidation of the military organizations of NATO and Warsaw Treaty" the alliances can remain, but serve non-military purposes only. (For excerpts from the Final Communique of the Conference on European Security in Karlovy Vary, see Annex II).

### III. Position of NATO Countries

The NATO Powers in general approached the problem of European security with some hesitancy and caution. Basically, they expressed general agreement with the necessity of strengthening European security measures. However, they warned that in some areas disarmament cannot be considered in isolation from political solutions. 2/

At the ENDC negotiations in 1966, Canada seemed to express the opinion of at least some of the NATO Powers when it stated that in Europe there exist special security problems and that the proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries do not seem to offer an immediate possibility of fruitful negotiations. <sup>2/</sup>

In many West European countries, especially in Britain, it was pointed out that a conference on European security would raise many difficulties, such as the seating at the conference of East Germany, participation of the United States, etc. and that therefore it might be better for the moment to concentrate on developing individual bilateral relations between East and West Europe. <sup>3/</sup> Such bilateral talks have already been going for several months.

However, the prevailing opinion in Western Europe appears to accept the idea that a Conference on European security and developing cooperation could be valuable, but "subject to necessary" preparation. This opinion was expressed in the official Kozygin-Wilson Communique on 13 February 1967, in which both governments also stated that they regarded "as essential that all countries of Europe should be among the participants of such a conference". According to the Manchester Guardian of 15 May 1967 the UK Foreign Secretary, Mr. Brown, told the House of Commons that consultations on such a conference are going on. Corriere della Sera, in a despatch from Moscow, of 14 May, reported that Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Fanfani, proposed in Moscow that the Conference on European Security should be subordinate to an agreement on non-proliferation, satisfactory to all parties concerned. Indications of a similar approach were reported by the Manchester Guardian on 15 May 1967.

#### IV. Position of the two German States.

It is generally considered that the German problem remains one of the basic factors for dealing with the problem of European security. However, from East European statements on that problem, it appears that these countries do not intend that a system of European cooperation and security materialise while Germany remains divided. They seem to consider it sufficient to remove the acuteness of this problem which gives rise to conflicts and distrust.

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<sup>2/</sup> ENDC 1966, PV. 285.

<sup>3/</sup> See The Times (London), 20 December 1966.

Both East and West Germany stressed the importance of the strengthening of European security. But the former FRG Chancellor, Mr. Erhard, rejected the participation of the FRG at a European Security Conference for fear that the German problem would very rapidly become the center of discussion. He further expressed apprehension that such a Conference would become "bogged down in debate on the Rapacki Plan". The new West German Government of Mr. Kiesinger has not expressed its stand on a European Security Conference as yet. It vowed that West Germany would embark on a "great policy" of peacemaking with East European countries, <sup>5/</sup> but did not put forward officially and specific proposals for a European security arrangement. However, the FRG Minister for All German Affairs, Mr. Wehner, was reported, in the Manchester Guardian of 17 April, as having listed the following aims of the Social Democratic Party with regard to relaxation of tension in Central Europe:

"...A reduction of armaments in East and West Europe and in the strength of military forces, with the condition that a balance of power must be kept.

"Renunciation by the States of Central Europe of national or joint control of nuclear weapons.

"Mutual control of arms production. A general renunciation of the use of force from which no part of Central Europe would be excluded.

"Improved relations with the Soviet Union and the assumption of diplomatic relations with all the States of Eastern Europe.

"Increased industrial, scientific, and cultural contacts including those between the two parts of Germany."

The East German Government stated repeatedly that European security is possible only on the basis of the status quo and peaceful coexistence. Mr. Ulbricht expressed on 2 May 1967 in the East German Parliament the full agreement of the East German Government with the conclusions of the Conference in Karlovy Vary. <sup>5/</sup>

Apparently in connection with the parley in Karlovy Vary the Prime Minister of East Germany sent a letter to the West German Chancellor offering to meet him for talks with a view to creating normal relations "between the two German States". The latter stressed that the normalization of relations between the two German States was essential to the maintenance of peace and security and would contribute towards the solution of other European problems.

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<sup>2/</sup> New York Times, 18 January 1967.

<sup>6/</sup> FBIS, 3 May, EE 1.



V. Participation of Non-European Powers in European Security Arrangements

It is possible that the participation of the United States in talks on European security may pose a problem. The statements of Eastern European governments are inconclusive on this point, but they tend to emphasize that a European Security Conference should not be dependent on the agreement and participation of the United States. Mr. Kossygin stated at a press conference in Paris on 4 December 1966 that the question of participation of the United States at a Conference on European Security should be settled by the European countries themselves.<sup>1/</sup>

There are not many US statements concerning the question of a European Security Conference, but it seems to be the understanding between the US and the Western European nations that such a conference could not be convened without full participation of the United States because, among other things, of the presence of US troops in Europe.

VI. Conclusion

After the recent Conference of Communist Party leaders of Eastern and Western Europe in Karlovy Vary, some intensified attempts to create public support in both Eastern and Western Europe for convening a European Security Conference might be expected. But, in spite of more frequent statements on European security during the last months, the convening of a European Security Conference does not appear to be in the offing.

The problems which have to be solved before the convocation of such a conference remain the same as several months ago, e.g. the question of participation (representation of both German States and participation of the U.S.) and agenda (how much importance to give to the German problem, which disarmament measures to include on the agenda in order to ensure at least a partially positive outcome of the conference, etc).

Annex I

The final declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of  
the Member States of the Warsaw Pact, 6 July 1966. (Excerpts).

...  
"The states signing the declaration held that measures for the  
strengthening of security in Europe can and should be taken, primarily  
in the following main directions:

"1. -- The states parties to the meetings call upon all European states  
to develop good neighborly relations on the basis of the principles of  
independence and national sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal  
affairs, and mutual advantage on the basis of principles of the peaceful  
coexistence of states with different social systems. ...

"2. -- The socialist countries have always consistently opposed  
the division of the world into military blocs or alliances and advocated  
elimination of the dangers stemming from this for universal peace and  
security. ...

"The countries that signed this declaration consider that the necessity  
has arisen to take steps towards the relaxation, above all, of military  
tension in Europe. A radical way to do this would be the simultaneous  
dissolution of the existing military alliances, the present situation makes  
this possible. The governments of our states have more than once pointed out  
that in case of discontinuation of the operation of the North Atlantic  
alliance, the Warsaw Pact would become invalid. Their place must be taken by  
a system of European security. Now they solemnly reaffirm their readiness to  
simultaneously liquidate the aforementioned alliances.

"It, however, the member states of NATO are still not ready to accept  
the complete dissolution of both alignments, the signatories deem it  
expedient even now to reach an understanding on liquidation of the military  
organizations, both of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, they  
declare that as long as the North Atlantic bloc exists, and aggressive  
imperialist circles encroach on world peace, the socialist countries  
represented at the meeting maintaining high vigilance, are fully resolved  
to strengthen their might and defense potential.

"At the same time, we deem it necessary that all NATO and Warsaw Pact  
member states, and also those countries not participating in any military  
alliances, exert efforts on a bilateral or multilateral basis aimed at  
advancing the cause of European security.

"3. -- Great importance also is now acquired by such partial measures  
towards military relaxation on the European continent as the liquidation  
of foreign war bases; the withdrawal of all foreign forces from alien  
territories to within their national frontiers; the reduction on an agreed  
scale and at agreed deadlines in the numerical strength of the armed forces  
of both German states; measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear  
conflict -- the establishment of denuclearized zones, the assumption of a

commitment by the nuclear powers not to use these weapons against states party to such zones, and so forth; and discontinuance of flights by foreign planes carrying atom or hydrogen bombs over the territories of European states and the entry of foreign submarines and surface ships with nuclear arms on board into the ports of such states.

"4. -- Bearing in mind the danger of the nuclear claims of the Federal Republic of Germany to the cause of peace in Europe, the states must concentrate their efforts on excluding the possibility of access by the German Federal Republic to nuclear weapons in any form -- directly or indirectly through alignments of states, under exclusive control, or in any form of participation in the control of such weapons. The way of solving this problem will largely determine the future of Europe and not only European peoples. On the question, too, half-hearted decisions are impermissible.

"5. -- The immutability of frontiers is the foundation of an enduring peace in Europe. The interests of normalisation of the situation in Europe demand that all states, both in Europe and outside the European continent, proceed in their foreign political actions from recognition of actually existing frontiers between European states, which took shape after the most devastating war in the history of mankind, including the Polish frontier on the Oder-Neisse line and the frontiers between both German states.

"6. -- A German peace settlement is in accordance with the interests of peace in Europe. The socialist states represented at the meeting are ready to continue the search for a solution to this problem. This solution must take into consideration the interests of the security of all countries concerned and the security of Europe as a whole. ...

"7. -- Convocation of a general European conference to discuss questions of insuring security in Europe and organizing general European cooperation would be of great positive importance. The agreement reached at the conference could be expressed, for example, in the form of a general European declaration on cooperation for the maintenance and strengthening of European security. Such a declaration could provide for an undertaking by the signatories to be guided in their relations by the interests of peace, to settle disputes by peaceful means only, to hold consultations and exchange information on questions of mutual interest, and to contribute to the all-round development of economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations. The declaration should be open to all interested states to join. ...

## Annex III

Statement by European communist and workers parties, participants in conference in Karlovy Vary, 26 April 1967. (Excerpts).

...  
"The communist and workers parties of Europe submit for the consideration of public opinion and of all political and public forces concerned a program for actions in the interests of creating a system of collective security based on principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. This requires, primarily, that all states recognize the existing situation as it has developed in Europe in the postwar period.

"This means: Recognition of the inviolability of existing frontiers in Europe, particularly on the Oder and the Neisse, and also of the borders between both German states; recognition of the existence of two sovereign and equal German states, the GDR and the German Federal Republic, which requires of the latter the renunciation of its claim to represent all of Germany; preclusion of any opportunity for the German Federal Republic to gain access to nuclear arms in any form, either European, multilateral, or Atlantic; and recognition of the Munich treaty as invalid from the moment of its conclusion.

"The European and working class movement and all democratic peace forces now face the task of insuring the development of peaceful relations and cooperation among all European states on the basis of respect for their sovereignty and equality. With these aims in view, it is necessary to fight for the realization of a number of aims which can be achieved in a new situation, namely:

"Conclusion by all European states of a treaty renouncing the use of force or threat of force in their relations and interference in internal affairs; a treaty guaranteeing the solution of all disputes by peaceful means only, in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter; normalization of relations between all states and the GDR, and between both German states and between the GDR and West Berlin as a separate political entity; consistent defense and development of democracy in the German Federal Republic -- the right to demand this is given to the peoples by law, the experiences of history, and postwar international agreements. This envisages universal support for the struggle of progressive forces in the German Federal Republic for the banning of neo-Nazi organizations and all revanchist propaganda, annulment of the emergency legislation, freedom of activity of the democratic and peace-loving forces, lifting of the ban on the Communist Party of Germany; and conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty as an important step toward halting the arms race.

"The system of European security must contain a recognition of the principle of neutrality and unconditional respect for the inviolability of neutral states. A more active peace-loving policy of these countries and their contribution to the cause of disarmament would help to establish such a system.

"Striving to open the road to European security and cooperation, we resolutely advocate the conclusion of agreements on partial solutions, above all in the sphere of disarmament, which would create a favorable

climate for more far-reaching treaties. All proposals in this field, advanced by governments, parties, public organizations, political leaders, and scientists, deserve thorough examination. Particularly topical among these proposals are those which deal with the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of European states, liquidation of foreign war bases, establishment of demilitarized zones in central Europe, in the Balkans, the territory of Danubian countries, in the Mediterranean, and in northern Europe, and also zones of thinned-out or frozen armaments, and in general zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of the continent. These, just as other steps, would check the tendency toward intensification of the arms race.

...

"Warsaw Pact states have repeatedly stated and solemnly confirmed in the Bucharest declaration their readiness for a simultaneous liquidation of both military alliances. We second the moves of these states regarding an immediate agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of the Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Pact.

...

"We fully support the proposal to call a conference of all European states on the question of security and peaceful cooperation in Europe. The proposal to call a conference of representatives of all European parliaments also deserves support." ...

AA-42

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: The Secretary-General

*From 17*

DATE: 6 July 1967

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

REFERENCE:

FROM: Aleksei E. Nesterenko, Under-Secretary for  
DE: Political and Security Council Affairs

*G. Nesterenko*

SUBJECT: Note on Cyprus  
OBJET:

..... I am sending you herewith a short note on recent developments with respect to the question of Cyprus. This note contains some information concerning the official aspect of the problem. Regardless of how this official aspect appears, one can't help feeling that at the present moment the serious development in the political life is taking place in Cyprus.

CONFIDENTIAL

PSM:js  
5 July 1967

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS

1. Upon assuming power on 21 April the Revolutionary Government of Greece declared that no changes would come about in the established patterns of the country's foreign policy. Thus it was regarded natural that it be declared that the Government "will actively pursue the attainment of Enosis of Cyprus with Greece."
2. The Greek Foreign Minister on 15 June during a NATO meeting in Luxemburg was reported as having held a lengthy talk with his Turkish colleague. It was presumed that this was pursuant to the agreement to continue the Greco-Turkish "dialogue".
3. The Cyprus press, which is not under Government control, has been largely critical of the Greek Revolutionary Government but mainly with respect to its internal policies. Some ten days ago President Makarios made a statement supporting the Greek Government and asked the press to exercise restraint. Meanwhile a campaign was on the way in Cyprus to establish a National Front so as to foster unity on the Island regarding its ties with Greece.
4. At a meeting of the House of Representatives of Cyprus the Speaker of the House, Clerides, stated that the Government of Cyprus had come under pressure and that he would resign his office as a sign of protest. Reportedly President Makarios persuaded Mr. Clerides not to resign.
5. On Friday 30 June, coinciding with the arrival to Athens of Mr. Georkadjis, the Cyprus Defense Minister and close friend of President Makarios, Brigadier Pattakos, the Greek Interior Minister declared that the solution of the Cyprus question has top priority among the objectives of the Government.
6. The next day all Athens newspapers carried the same editorial which in substance (a) stressed the need for a "realistic approach" to the question of Cyprus and (b) condemned "certain members of the Government of Cyprus who are opposed to a realistic solution" of the problem which provides also for Enosis. The editorial urged that such persons be removed from power "where they affect the leadership of Cyprus" so that the "true Nationalists who realistically face the issues can bring about a final solution that conforms to the national interest and is generally acceptable."

7. The London Observer of 2 July carried a front page story giving excerpts from the above editorial. It went on to express the opinion that the Greek Government in order to hasten Enosis would be prepared to make large concessions to Turkey including territorial ones.

8. While the Greek Foreign Minister declared on 3 July that no solution of the Cyprus question is envisaged that does not have the concurrence of President Makarios there is reportedly considerable anxiety in Cyprus that a deal is being negotiated between Greece and Turkey that would not respect the territorial integrity of the Island. (This is according to The National Herald Greek-American Daily of 4 July).

9. The joint communique of 3 July issued in Paris at the end of the talks between President de Gaulle and President Sunay of Turkey included a passage with reference to the question of Cyprus which reads as follows:

"The two leaders discussed the situation that prevails with regard to Cyprus and President de Gaulle expressed the hope that the bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey will lead to an honourable settlement of the dispute through the respect of the rights of both communities on the Island."

10. While it is too soon to foresee any change in the Cyprus policy of the Greek Government, the Soviet Government has already expressed its concern in a Tass dispatch of 4 July "with developments around Cyprus, with attempts to aggravate again the situation in that area and endanger the existence of the Republic of Cyprus." Tass stated that the Western Powers were interested in seeing the military regime of Greece extended to Cyprus.



## ROUTING SLIP

## FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: U Thant, Secretary-General  
A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
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AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

*Handwritten signature*  
28/10

Date:  
27 Oct. 1967

CR.13 (11-64)

FROM: A.E. Nesterenko

DE:

*Handwritten signature*

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

CONFIDENTIAL

PLP/lab

13 October 1967

GENERAL DEBATE

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

European States - Major views and positions

GENERAL DEBATE  
TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

European States - Major Views and Positions

I. GENERAL

1. The active Warsaw Pact members<sup>(1)</sup> varied slightly in their appraisal of the state of East-West relations in Europe, but continued to offer a solid political front against what they regarded as US "aggression."
2. Albania made charges<sup>(2)</sup> of "collusion" between the United States and the USSR "against the peoples."
3. Among other European powers there appeared, in the general debate, to have been a polarisation of positions, with some close friends of the United States - whether allied or not - unwilling or hardly in a position to challenge that super-power; while other Western States which had previously decided to steer an independent course made sharper their disapproval or at least their differences.
4. In their assessments of a European détente, governments differed not along clear-cut lines of military, political and ideological frontiers, but according to an irregular pattern which, faint as it is as yet, may show a trend towards different alignments. Together with the establishment of the Club of Nine - a first, perhaps not very successful attempt in this direction - European statements in the general debate both on Continental and world-wide affairs tend to confirm the assessment that the European détente could prepare for a significant change in the relations of nearly all European States.

Bulgaria  
Denmark  
Iceland  
Romania  
Yugoslavia

II. EUROPE

5. There were considerable variations as to the appraisal of East-West relations in Europe not only, as expected, between Warsaw Pact and NATO governments respectively, but even within these two groups. Indeed, the five mutually closest as well as most sanguine assessments were made by two NATO powers, two Warsaw Pact members and one non-aligned country.

- 
- (1) Albania, although technically still a member, has not been represented at the meetings in recent years.
  - (2) A/PV.1573, p. 37 (for speeches delivered in French, page numbers refer to original texts).

6. Denmark stated<sup>(1)</sup> that M. Manescu's election "is a sign of one of the most positive trends in today's international situation, the relaxation of tension between East and West". This remark was significant in two respects, since Mr. Krag said that the détente was already in progress and, secondly, regarded it as an "East-West" rather than merely regional development. M. Bashev (Bulgaria) declared<sup>(2)</sup> that "confidence between the European peoples is increasing, the relations between the States of the East and the West are improving and tension in Europe is diminishing"<sup>(3)</sup>. Mr. Jonsson (Iceland) stated<sup>(4)</sup> that M. Manescu's election "constitutes a confirmation of a gradual and gratifying relaxation of tension between East and West".

7. Romania took note<sup>(5)</sup> of the "trends" in Europe which are "overcoming the reactionary, revenge-seeking elements"; and M. Malitza gave as an example his country's "fruitful contacts" with at least ten countries in Europe - in addition to the Socialist States, relations with which were "at the center" of Romania's policy.

8. M. Nikezic (Yugoslavia) was also among those who recognized<sup>(6)</sup> as a fact an East-West détente in Europe, although with reservations:

"In Europe, the détente between East and West and achievements of increasing importance in the field of European co-operation - in spite of certain developments which express contrary trends - are in the process of creating a new state of mind, a new consciousness of what this Continent could be in the future".

Luxembourg 9. M. Grégoire, expressing<sup>(7)</sup> the hope that Western relations with the countries of the East may be liberalized, with respect to the movements of persons as well as economic exchanges, noted that "much has already been done in this direction", but that "the last barrier" made up of concepts and practices - both political and economic - should fall, so as to make possible "a true freedom of movements and exchanges".

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(1) A/PV.1562, p. 32.

(2) A/PV.1575, p. 48.

(3) In other parts of his speech M. Bashev said that "the international political situation has deteriorated" (p. 37) and that, in Europe, the FRG policy, backed by certain Nato States, was an obstacle to a further improvement of the political climate (p. 51).

(4) A/PV.1579, p. 36.

(5) A/PV.1584, p. 36.

(6) A/PV.1580, p. 43.

(7) A/PV.1568, p. 33.

Austria  
Belgium

10. In comparison with the above optimistic statements, Austria, although a pioneer in the East-West rapprochement in Europe, made<sup>(1)</sup> a sober assessment of "the relatively encouraging development in Central Europe" and expressed a "hope that our efforts will be met with a corresponding spirit of co-operation from all parts and with the wish to avoid all incidents that might harm this development"<sup>(2)</sup>.

11. An even more reserved appraisal was given by Belgium. M. Harmel, himself a promoter of the European détente within the Club of Nine, acknowledged<sup>(3)</sup> that, in spite of increased exchanges of all kinds, there was not as yet "a truly positive, concrete balance-sheet".

U.K.  
USSR.

12. There was a similar lack of emphasis on, and confidence in, the European détente in the statements of two differently aligned countries - both at the same time European and world powers, i.e. Britain and the Soviet Union.

13. Mr. Brown did refer<sup>(4)</sup> to Europe, but only in connection with internal West European affairs<sup>(5)</sup>, even though he said that "as a result of our joining the European community, Europe will be able to speak with a much stronger voice in the counsels of the world". Wider, all-European plans such as a European security system were only indirectly - and critically - referred to by Britain. "Those who advocate the immediate dissolution of alliances", Mr. Brown said, "are proposing, I fear, to remove the scaffolding before the arch has been completed".

14. The British speech was an indication that her contacts of the past few years, which included high-level meetings both with the Soviet Union and East Europe and, only recently, far-reaching plans<sup>(6)</sup>, have been so far superficial and will, in all probability, so remain until the Viet-Nam war is ended, or until Britain should distance herself from U.S. policies there.

15. While in the Soviet speech the United States was the main target, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) shared the blame for European dangers. True,

(1) A/PV.1578, p. 38.

(2) An assertion by Austria of "the role which a permanently neutral State with a keen interest in the United Nations and its activities can play" in the field of international gatherings was a symptom of a keen interest in hosting UN organs to the full extent that present or future UN circumstances may allow.

(3) A/PV.1570, pp.3-5.

(4) A/PV.1567, p. 46.

(5) Poland pointed out that Mr. Brown "tried incorrectly to identify the Common Market area with the whole continent" (A/PV.1577, p. 27).

(6) Longer term trading arrangements and the possibility of a Treaty of Friendship and peaceful co-operation were discussed during Mr. Kosygin's visit to London in February 1967.

Mr. Gromyko took note<sup>(1)</sup> of "the strengthening trends towards a détente in relations between the East and West of that continent, towards the development of mutually advantageous co-operation among European States in various fields" and of Socialist Governments' proposals to that effect. Yet most of the page-and-a-half passage on Europe was a review, and condemnation, of "the revanchist policy" of the Federal Republic of Germany which was "supported" by the United States.

16. While Britain and the Soviet Union have not come noticeably closer together as a result of recent contacts at a high level, the two speeches, in certain respects, matched each other. Mutual differences - British support of US policies and Soviet criticism of the Federal Republic of Germany - still remained more important, or at least, more in evidence than favourable - bilateral - developments.

Other Warsaw  
Pact Powers  
Ukrainian SSR

17. The Ukrainian SSR said<sup>(2)</sup> that "the attempts by the West German revenge-seekers to gain access to nuclear weapons for the purposes of revising the post-war boundaries of Europe" gave "special urgency" to the non-proliferation question.

Czechoslo-  
vakia

18. In the Czechoslovak speech there was, compared with the Soviet Union, an even greater emphasis<sup>(3)</sup> on the importance of respecting "the situation established" in Europe and on a condemnation of West German attempts "to bring about a change in the status quo in Europe". Also, Czechoslovakia went somewhat deeper into the current aspects of the German question as she dealt with the recent GDR proposal to the FRG Government.

Hungary

19. Hungary emphasized<sup>(4)</sup> the beneficial role which the German Democratic Republic (GDR) played in Europe, notably to counteract West German "militarism and revanchism"; and Mr. Peter referred to the GDR proposals for direct talks with the FRG Government on "the national problem of the German people".

20. Even when dealing with the question of progress towards European security, active Warsaw Pact members did not place the emphasis on the

(1) A/PV.1563, p. 56.

(2) A/PV.1576, p. 12.

(3) A/PV.1565, p. 58.

(4) A/PV.1578, pp. 17-21.

Poland

current increase in East-West contacts but on the Socialist proposals made by the Warsaw Pact Governments in 1966 at Bucharest and by the European Communist and Workers parties in April 1967 at Karlovy Vary<sup>(1)</sup>. Poland did refer<sup>(2)</sup> to "certain encouraging positive developments: increased contacts and the easing of barriers that had divided our continent", and specifically to her "expanding ... bilateral relations, so successfully developed with almost all European countries". Mr. Winiewicz also recalled "Polish initiatives on détente and disarmament in Europe", but denounced certain forces "that obstruct and attempt to scuttle such efforts"; stressed the need for an acceptance of the status quo; and deplored that the FRG Government failed to recognize such "basic premises".

France

21. France maintained a position on European affairs diverging both from the NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. Her refusal to envisage the political future of Europe either separately from her Eastern part or jointly with the United States was a double contrast with Mr. Brown's Atlantic speech. Europe must not renounce her international responsibilities, but she must discharge them on her "own account", M. Couve de Murville declared. On the German question a reminder of "the demons" that made for Germany's and Europe's "misfortune" was such as to be favourably received by Germany's Eastern neighbours;<sup>(3)</sup> while a reference to the role which "a peaceful Germany" could play in the international community and the UNO was a reminder that France continues to share Western views on the question of German reunification including non-recognition of the GDR.

Albania

22. Albania pointed out<sup>(4)</sup> the alleged danger of European "tranquillity" as follows:

"In Europe too the situation is not favourable for the imperialists and the Soviet revisionists, although they would wish to enjoy a tranquillity to their liking, so that their daggers may be driven, as if into butter, into the democratic rights and freedoms of the peoples - including the people of the German Democratic Republic, which the Soviet revisionists conspire to sacrifice on the altar of the Soviet-American alliance".

(1) Ukrainian Sbk, A/PV.1576, p. 16.

(2) A/PV.1577, p. 26.

(3) Poland did quote this part of the French speech (A/PV.1577, p. 27).

(4) A/PV.1573, p. 37.

23. On the whole, the references to Europe by her various governments in the General Debate confirmed the following Hungarian assessment:<sup>(1)</sup>

"Last year we heard in the General Debate much more about the prospects of European security than we are hearing this year ...Representatives of some of the Western European Governments did not even pronounce the name of Europe, or, if they did, they did it either more cautiously or in a more polemical way than last year...On the one hand, the grave issues of other continents are occupying our minds to such an extent that less of our attention is being devoted to the problems of present-day Europe, but, on the other hand, it is true that the wars in Viet-Nam and in the Middle East have slowed down positive European developments by bringing to Europe also the international mistrust caused by the growing armed conflicts and the deepening international crisis".

24. It is a fact that European speakers at the 22nd session - including those from Socialist countries - chose to play down the European détente, all the more as they wished to show that the Viet-Nam war was blocking diplomatic progress anywhere. As to the objective situation in Europe, the following common-sense remark was made by Italy<sup>(2)</sup>:

"Europe, the breeding-ground of the First and Second World Wars, is now one of the continents beset by the least tension. Therefore, in Europe, at least, experience has taught us something of value. Why should the co-existence that has prevailed in Europe not also prevail in the Middle East and in Asia? Is it really utopian to cherish such a hope?".

### III. MAJOR WORLD ISSUES (with particular reference to Viet-Nam)

25. Irrespective of the importance of Europe's problems for her inhabitants, a truer test of a Member's foreign policy may be afforded by more acute issues, such as US policies, mostly but not exclusively with reference to Viet-Nam.

26. Considering Viet-Nam not in itself but as a measure of Western cohesion, it may be noted that several NATO members expressed sympathy with the purposes and/or policies of the United States. The Governments of Britain, Greece, Iceland, Italy and Luxembourg demonstrated continued solidarity with the United States. Such speeches were in contrast within the stands of Denmark and Norway, and, to an even greater degree, of France; while the position of the Netherlands may be regarded as intermediary.

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(1) A/PV.1578, pp. 16-17.

(2) A/PV.1579, pp. 52-55.



- Luxembourg 27. A particularly warm plea, in a personal style, for a return to the original inspiration of the Charter - "of the heart and of the mind"<sup>(1)</sup> - was made by M. Grégoire. A strong Western flavour was perceptible if not in the emphasis on the "spiritual" value of "wisdom" - made up of "truth, reason and common sense" - at least in the interpretation of the right of self-determination - as ruling out "subversion" in Viet-Nam and outlawing "guerrilleros" everywhere.
- Iceland 28. Another NATO country, Iceland, favourably commented<sup>(2)</sup> on the US attitude towards negotiations and added:  
"The Hanoi Government, however, has given no assurances nor made any conciliatory gesture that has satisfied the United States Government".
- Italy 29. Italy took the position<sup>(3)</sup> that "perhaps it is time for the United Nations to address a pressing appeal to the parties for a speedy reconvening of the second Geneva Conference". Italy thus avoided the most controversial issues and any attitude that could be regarded as objectionable by the principal NATO power.
- Greece 30. Greece expressed<sup>(4)</sup> "the greatest sympathy and understanding for the struggle of the South Viet-Namense people against subversion and infiltration".
- Netherlands 31. A delicately balanced position was taken by the Netherlands. Mr. Lum<sup>o</sup> informed<sup>(5)</sup> the General Assembly of a motion in the Dutch Lower House of Parliament for a cessation of the bombings which should not be subject to pre-conditions. Important as this new stand may be, the Netherlands firmly condemned the rejection - "scornfully and peremptorily" - of honest attempts at finding a solution and criticized the Soviet attitude towards "a Geneva Conference". The Dutch position apparently reflected a certain pressure from public opinion, together with a serious concern at government level to uphold Dutch-US ties, currently strengthened by their strong disapproval of French policy.

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(1) A/PV.1568, pp. 28-30, 37, 39-40.

(2) A/PV.1579, p. 42.

(3) A/PV.1579, p. 56.

(4) A/PV.1572, p. 12.

(5) A/PV.1576, p. 26.

U.K.

32. In comparison with the Dutch speech, the British stand on Viet-Nam appeared<sup>(1)</sup> surprisingly clear-cut. The North Vietnamese "authorities" were said to "have declined to grasp many opportunities to negotiate", and "the people of South Viet-Nam have shown their determination to follow constitutional processes in the midst of war". Among statements by the UN Secretary-General, Britain singled out the only one which was acceptable by the United States and, moreover, Mr. Brown failed to recall that U Thant's plan of March 1967, not having been accepted by all parties, was soon withdrawn.

Denmark  
Norway

33. In sharp contrast with the British speech, two NATO members, Denmark<sup>(2)</sup> and Norway<sup>(3)</sup>, recommended a halt in the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a first step towards negotiations, a stand which France also reaffirmed<sup>(4)</sup>.

34. Both Denmark's reassertion of her stand on Viet-Nam and her views on "the relaxation of tension between East and West" helped to situate her between the core of the NATO membership and maverick France. Denmark's closeness to other Nordic countries, two of them neutrals, as well as her participation in the Club of Nine, may have been important factors in this new position.

France

35. In no statement, perhaps, was the joint action of the major power advocated so strongly and in a broader field as in the French address. M. Couve de Murville's speech, as a whole, may be regarded as an appeal for joint East-West action, both in Europe for the setting aside of the cold war and its remnants, and in the United Nations, particularly for the re-establishment of a "peaceful situation" in the Middle East by "principal powers". There seemed to be a French aspiration to the restoration and subsequent maintenance of peace by a "concert des puissances" not unlike the XIXth century Holy Alliance, yet avowedly based on the Charter understanding of the permanent members' special responsibilities, status and power<sup>(5)</sup>. France, at the same time, again rejoiced at a "reawakening" of "national personalities".

(1) A/PV.1567, pp. 52-53.

(2) A/PV.1562, p. 37. Mr. Krag said that a halt in the bombing of North Viet-Nam should be followed by a reduction in the military activities of both sides.

(3) A/PV.1578, p. 52.

(4) A/PV.1571, p. 27.

(5) There was no mention of an earlier French prerequisite to the reassumption by the permanent members of their normal duties, i.e. the presence at the United Nations of the PRC. Yet this apparently remains an implicit part of France's approach to the settlement of world-wide problems.

Romania

36. The ending of an era of "spheres of influence" was greeted<sup>(1)</sup> by Romania. M. Malitza stressed the principle of "equality of rights" of all States and, specifically, that "a viable solution of international differences cannot be the work of a restricted group of powers, but requires, on the contrary, the active co-operation of all the countries of the world, on the basis of the principle of equality of rights".

37. It was interesting to note both a re-assertion of similarities between Romanian and French diplomacy - a strong belief in national independence from even the greatest powers - and, at the same time, a slight difference in emphasis<sup>(2)</sup> between French confidence in the action of the "principal powers" and Romanian trust in small powers' initiative - a faith which was at the root of the setting up of the all-European "Club of Nine".

Finland  
Sweden  
Yugoslavia

38. Non-aligned countries, like Finland<sup>(3)</sup>, Sweden<sup>(4)</sup> and Yugoslavia<sup>(5)</sup> supported the long-standing proposals of the Secretary-General for a cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam; and, in all three speeches, the Viet-Nam question was treated rather briefly and without explicit denunciation of any country. Finland said that "no arguments in our view can justify the continued destruction of Viet-Nam". Sweden placed more emphasis on the "total civil war" and the fact that "Vietnamese inflict death and destruction on each other", but there was a friendly tone in the Swedish appeal to the United States to take the initial step in the name of her "ideals of liberty, shown not least during the two world wars", and which "the nations of Europe have particular reason to remember with gratitude". At the same time, Sweden asserted that the brave Vietnamese people "should now at last be allowed to live in peace and dignity - without foreign interference".

Austria

39. Austria, non-aligned but strongly Western-oriented, made a statement very close to the US view that it was not incumbent upon one party alone to make concessions even at an initial stage. Mr. Toncic-Sorinj declared<sup>(6)</sup>:

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(1) A/PV.1584, pp. 32-33.

(2) Romania also acknowledged the "particular position" of the great powers under the Charter on matters relating to international security.

(3) A/PV.1577, p. 6.

(4) A/PV.1563, p. 12.

(5) A/PV.1580, p. 41.

(6) A/PV.1578, p. 33.

"Mutual concessions and a de-escalation of military activity will be necessary to prepare the ground for a meeting at the conference table. We can only address an appeal to all parties concerned to take whatever initial step may appear likely to set in motion a process towards peace, and an equal appeal to all Governments to assist in this effort".

Warsaw  
Pact  
members

40. The active Warsaw Pact members strongly denounced "aggression" and "violence", both in general terms, which included a quotation from the Secretary-General's Introduction to the Annual Report<sup>(1)</sup>, and with specific reference to the policies of the United States.

Soviet  
Union

41. In the Soviet speech, the attacks against US policies showed no change in substance from the 21st session. Yet, in the language used, a switch in emphasis to the question of "aggression" could be regarded as verbal escalation from last year's leit-motiv - a denunciation of non-compliance with important UN resolutions or principles, such as non-intervention in internal affairs and prohibition of the threat or use of force.

Ukrainian  
SSR

42. The Ukrainian SSR quoted<sup>(2)</sup> a statement by a US State Department official that "intervention is justified whenever its absence will create regional instability of expanding proportions"; and he argued that the "Western Powers...are content with the fact that aggression remains undefined, since that lack of definition helps them to unleash aggression." Mr. Belokolos further declared that the war in Viet-Nam had turned from one waged "mostly by the army of the Saigon puppets" to "an annihilation war waged by the United States".

Byelo-  
russian SSR

43. The Byelorussian SSR listed<sup>(3)</sup> delegations which in the General Debate were in favour of a cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam; and Mr. Gurinovich quoted from a New York Times lead editorial, arguing that "talk of peace" should be "joined with an act of peace, a suspension of the bombing". The Byelorussian SSR also stressed the part allegedly played by Thailand in Viet-Nam war operations.

Hungary

44. Hungary came back to a point frequently made - for instance by France - that the war in Viet-Nam had been instrumental in unleashing the Middle East crisis.

(1) Bulgaria, A/PV.1575, p. 52.

(2) A/PV.1576, pp. 8-11.

(3) A/PV.1581, p. 22.

In Mr. Peter's words<sup>(1)</sup>, "Were it not for the general worsening of the international atmosphere brought about by the expansion of hostilities in South-East Asia, the attack of Israeli forces against neighbouring States would have been unimaginable". Hungary accordingly gave<sup>(2)</sup> a gloomy and pessimistic picture of world developments "overshadowed once again by ever-growing dangers". Mr. Peter quoted from the UN Secretary-General's Introduction to the Annual Report both regarding the general international situation and Viet-Nam; and he reached the conclusion that "without ending the war in Viet-Nam it is impossible to make any considerable progress" in international life.

- Bulgaria 45. Bulgaria said<sup>(3)</sup> that "outside this hall, American leaders justify an intensification of the war operations and of the bombings of the territory of the DRVN as a prerequisite to an American victory on the battlefield".
- Czechoslovakia 46. Czechoslovakia stated<sup>(4)</sup> that DRVN proposals had been met by US military escalation which "proves once again the fact that the Government of the United States is not interested in a peaceful solution of the conflict".
- Poland 47. Poland quoted<sup>(5)</sup> from an article by Quincy Wright in the "American Journal of International Law" to the effect that the US bombings in North Viet-Nam violated international law; and Mr. Winiewicz said that "it has been known to the United States well enough, and for a long time, that the road to political solutions can be opened only through the unconditional ending of all hostilities against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam".
- Romania 48. Romania condemned<sup>(6)</sup> the US "aggressive war"; and M. Malitza said that "every one of us" would be ready to make the "supreme sacrifice" to fulfill the aspirations for which the Vietnamese people were fighting. Romania demanded inter alia the immediate, unconditional stop of the bombing of the DRVN.
- Albania 49. Albania contended that "the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people has at the same time unmasked the role of a Trojan horse played by the Soviet revisionists"<sup>(7)</sup>.

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(1) A/PV.1578, pp. 12-15.

(2) Ibid, pp. 2-5.

(3) A/PV.1575, p. 41.

(4) A/PV.1565, p. 52.

(5) A/PV.1577, p. 21.

(6) A/PV.1584, p. 37.

(7) A/PV.1573, pp. 23-25.

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I am sending herewith, for your information, a paper entitled Problems and Progress of European Bloc Politics, which was prepared by the Political Affairs Division.

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L. Kutakov

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AA 44

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
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Political Affairs Division

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9 January 1969

PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN BLOC POLITICS

COPY NO. 1

## PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN BLOC POLITICS

### I. INTRODUCTION: BLOCs AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

1. A number of political thinkers both in Europe and the United States are of the opinion that there is at least a tacit understanding between the two superpowers as to spheres of influence. Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, a proponent of this theory, describes spheres of influence as requiring a dual power relationship: a relationship of extreme discrepancy of power between two nations which makes it possible for a major power to reduce another to the status of an object of its power and a relationship of "either discrepancy or balance of power which makes it possible for the major power to deny other nations any influence upon its relations with the object of its own power".<sup>1/</sup>

2. A different opinion is expressed by John McCloy.<sup>2/</sup> In his view there are no spheres of influence, only "the realities of logistics which can and do affect actions which can be taken in various parts of the world, but it is irresponsible to judge a far-reaching agreement as to spheres of influence where none really exist." He cites General de Gaulle as having ascribed the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia to the existence of spheres of influence established at Yalta. In support of his own theory Mr. McCloy refers to the statement made by Ambassador Bohlen, who was the only member of the American delegation at Yalta who knew Russian and acted as interpreter, that there was no such understanding arrived at in Yalta. Furthermore, he feels that the Soviet Union could not be a party to any such agreement as Communist ideology does not encompass limitation by boundaries "... and Communist designs on Western Europe have not been relinquished but only blunted by the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO". The term "Iron Curtain", he points out, was an Allied, not a Soviet expression. As further proof to his theory he cites, among other, the Soviet attempt to place nuclear weapons in the Caribbean and the so-called Brezhnev doctrine. "Are we to say that there was a sphere-of-influence or undertaking which we observe and the Soviet does not? I think it is more reasonable to conclude

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<sup>1/</sup> "Spheres of Influence", Hans J. Morgenthau (Unpublished paper, February 1969).

<sup>2/</sup> The Atlantic Alliance, John McCloy, New York Columbia University Press, 1969.



that there was none. Nor do I believe that such an understanding would be either possible or constructive."

3. The existence in the Europe of today of two groupings, whether called blocs or spheres of influence, is the foremost political reality. For purposes of clarification, the divisions may be ideological, politico-military and economic in nature. The object of this paper is to view the heightened political activity of the last few months in Europe from the point of view of their effect on the cohesion of the groups and their effect on the relations between the two groups.

# II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 70's

4. The last three months of the year 1969 witnessed increased political activity in relation to European problems. The initiatives proposed and actions taken by the Soviet Union, several socialist countries and the new Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the mellowing of attitudes of a number of Warsaw Pact countries and developments within Western groupings allow speculation on possibilities of rapprochement between the East and the West.

## A. Relations of the Federal Republic of Germany with Socialist Countries

5. The Federal Republic of Germany is maneuvering itself increasingly into a position of leadership through its overtures to the East and strengthening of its influence within Western groupings. Since coming to power Mr. Brandt has offered negotiations with the DRG (28 October); his Foreign Minister Scheel in a set of instructions to West German Ambassadors practically abolished the Hallstein Doctrine by saying that recognition of the DRG would no longer be viewed necessarily as a hostile act but would be decided on a case-to-case basis (4 November); sent a note to Poland proposing bilateral negotiations (12 November); proposed bilateral talks on the conclusion of an agreement on the renunciation of force with the Soviet Union (15 November); sent a roving Ambassador (Dr. Emmel) to Moscow to discuss economic matters especially the furnishing of natural gas to West Germany and the possibility of joint manufacture of certain types of steel tubes (beginning December).

6. The Soviet Union for a number of reasons among which the facts that the FRG signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that Mr. Brandt seems to be supporting a European Security Conference, agreed on the bilateral talks, suggested the West German note of 15 November and negotiations started on 8 December between Foreign Minister Gromyko and FRG Ambassador Helmut Allardt, ostensibly on the question of renunciation of force.

7. In his declaration of policy offered to the Bundestag after his election on 28 October, Mr. Brandt offered the DRG "negotiations on a governmental level without discrimination between the two Germanys which could lead to cooperation set down in a treaty". He stated that he wished to prevent further growing apart of the German nation so that we can come together through regular neighbourliness." He warned, however, that recognition of the GDR in international law by the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be considered. Even if two states exist in Germany, they are, nevertheless, not foreign territory for each other and their relation to each other can only be of special nature." Although no direct answer from Mr. Ulbricht has as yet been received and Mr. Brandt complained that outside the Albanians the East Germans are the only ones from whom not even a negative comment has come to his overtures, there are indications that Mr. Ulbricht's attitude may be more amenable than in the past. A statement of the DRG of 9 November describes developments in West Germany as "positive" and on 19 November Mr. Ulbricht followed by the leadership of the DRG Army flew to Moscow and it can be presumed that the offer of Mr. Brandt was one of the suggestions discussed. In his report presented on 15 November to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, no direct reference was made either but observers found his attacks against West Germany less virulent. It is also presumed that the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries which took place on 4 December in Moscow succeeded in overcoming the opposition of Mr. Ulbricht to bilateral talks. Finally, Mr. Ulbricht sent a letter to the Chancellor of the FRG, Mr. Heinemann, making a number of proposals to which Mr. Brandt is expected to answer in his State of the Nation address on 14 January 1970. It is hoped that talks between the FRG and the DRG will start shortly after.

8. Prospects for bilateral negotiations with Poland and possibly other Eastern European countries are promising and the fact that the FRG has considerable economic advantages to offer to the Socialist countries make the prospect of a thaw in the short run a distinct possibility.

9. The position of the FRG within Western groupings has been markedly strengthened as a result of the meetings in the beginning of December of the European Economic Community in the Hague followed by NATO in Brussels. Mr. Brandt is reported to have been most skillful in supporting the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market at the first meeting and laying the groundwork for stronger links between France and the FRG at the latter. Mr. Brandt had also a number of talks with his Western counterparts including Secretary of State Rogers in the last few weeks.

## B. NATO and the European Economic Community

10. An increased cohesion within each of these groupings may be interpreted by the Soviet Union rightly or wrongly as a hardening of the Western bloc. There were no definite indications at the NATO meeting of early December that cohesion has either increased or decreased. Nonetheless, it is believed now that early statements of President Nixon about disengaging in Europe have no great validity at this time. On the contrary indications are that there is an increase in U.S. interest in Europe. It is true that factors such as the Vietnam war, internal disturbances and alleged economic domination of Europe have diminished reliance of Western Europe on the United States. Nonetheless, Western Europeans realise that at the present time the disparity in military strength between the Soviet Union and Western Europe without American participation would continue to be significant. Europe is giving no indication of building up a defense system of her own comparable to that of the Soviet Union and therefore will continue to depend on U.S. leadership in military matters.

11. A note of caution was expressed at the end of the NATO meeting of December concerning East/West détente. The Atlantic Council in a statement separate from the communiqué indicated that conditions were not yet ripe for "real and lasting improvement in East-West relations. Experience has proved that the principles (included in para. 2 of the communiqué) are not yet interpreted in the same manner everywhere." The statement singled out especially the fact that Warsaw Pact powers had not yet reacted to a Western suggestion for a gradual and mutual reduction of military forces which was made in Reykjavik in 1968.

12. The decisions of the Seven at the Hague meeting of the EEC to widen the Common Market to include members of EFTA and to deepen it by a closer union which may even be of a political nature will exert its influence on problems of European Security.

13. The year 1970 will see in addition to the bilateral talks on armament limitations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, two sets of parallel negotiations. One series between members of the European Economic Community in order to deepen the Common Market and between members of the Community and prospective members to widen the Common Market, the other set of negotiations will be those between Western and Eastern Europe in view of the preparation of a Conference in European Security and at the same time the acceleration of a dialogue between the Brandt Government on the one hand and the USSR, Poland and the FRG on the other.

### III. THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

14. Even though no western country has openly opposed the principle of such a conference, there are varying attitudes within the Alliance. Some believe that the target date of April 1970 suggested by the Warsaw Pact Summit held in December is not realistic, as time is not long enough to do the necessary preparatory work, including the establishment of an agenda. Although an agreement has been reached on the principle of the conference, the concept of the conference is viewed with mistrust by a number of the members of the Alliance. The United States in particular has expressed its misgivings. In November Undersecretary of State Elliott Richardson stated in Brussels that the Nixon Administration held that "in its present form the Russian proposal is an obvious mousetrap--so obvious, as one observer has put it, that it would be a very blind mouse indeed that set foot in it." The Soviet Union at one time proposed that the European security conference deal with a large variety of political and economic questions. The United States opposed this on the ground that it did not want to enter "unchartered fishing expeditions" to make Europeans distrustful of the United States commitment to defend them.<sup>3/</sup> President Nixon and Mr. Henry Kissinger are reported to have no objections to talk about reciprocal and balanced defense cuts both by NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries after due preparations which seems to rule out the date of April 1970. An additional reason of the American government for viewing this date as premature is that it may render the position of the government of Mr. Brandt more difficult. To enter into a European security conference at this stage which may involve a reduction of troops in Europe may conflict with the current

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<sup>3/</sup> Economist Foreign Report No. 1126, 13 November 1969.

military offset agreement between the FRG and the United States, which is interpreted by Mr. Brandt as meaning that there will be no reduction of American troops in Europe in the next two years. Finally, the United States considers that a favourable eastern reaction to the FRG's overtures for bilateral talks may render a conference more meaningful later on. -

15. - The NATO meeting which took place in Brussels on 4-5 December accepted the American idea that the conference be made conditional on the progress of bilateral or multilateral east-west negotiations, especially those being undertaken by the FRG. Secretary of State Rogers also is reported to have won an additional point: Governments who are eager to have a European security conference, such as the Scandinavian countries, Canada and, to some extent, the United Kingdom, wanted to include in the communiqué a statement that the limited and vague proposals of the Warsaw Pact nations needed elaboration and clarification. The United States view is reported to have been that NATO should not as yet bargain over an agenda at this stage. On the other hand, the United States lost on two points, firstly, the inclusion in the communiqué of a condemnation of the Brezhnev Doctrine by inserting in the list of principles in which Europe's peace and security should rest (paragraph 2) the words "non-intervention in the internal affairs of any state by any other state of different or the same social system." Secondly, Mr. Rogers is reported to have asked the mention of Czechoslovakia as a case in point, but was opposed by most of the European governments and by Canada.<sup>4/</sup>

16. The reservations of a number of countries about the conference relate to two points in particular: the methods of preparing for the conference and the advantages to be derived from it. On the other hand, it is the view of observers in the West that recent developments have increased the Soviet impetus to hold a European security conference. In their view, such a conference would not only create a diversion operation to the forthcoming negotiation between the Common Market and Great Britain but would also hold out the hope of a wider European cooperation and at the same time warning against a further split between East and West that the entry of an Atlantic

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<sup>4/</sup> Washington Post, December 7, 1969, "U.S. Rebuff at NATO on Tougher Approach".

power like Great Britain would mean to the Common Market. It is felt that increased pressure may be expected from the Soviet Union, in the first place, on France because it accepts, rather than wishes, the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market and because the Gaullist Party memorandum on the Independence of Europe published on 16 November advocated that entrance of new states into the Common Market "should be preceded by an agreement on security and cooperation between EEC and COMECON".

17. Western observers also feel that the Soviet Union has a number of other reasons for favouring a European security conference.

(a) An all-European conference can only further the objective imputed to the Soviet Union, namely the consolidation of the status quo in the East, as no country would question the existing "political realities" and agreements would be based on these realities. Even if the conference did not attain concrete results, it would, by the sheer fact of it having taken place, consolidate the position of the DRG, a full member of the conference. Consolidation of the DRG would further be assured by the second point on the agenda proposed at the Prague meeting last October by the Ministers of the Warsaw Pact, namely "the widening of the commercial, economic and technical scientific links" between European states. In this connexion the Foreign Minister of the DRG, Mr. Winzer, did not fail to point out that the territory of the DRG constituted the shortest and the most accessible link between the two parts of Europe.

(b) Insofar as formal arrangements are concerned, Western observers feel that the advantage also lies with the Soviet Union. It is felt that after the success of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, united front will not be difficult to realize by an appeal to "Socialist solidarity". Even though some of the members of the Warsaw Pact like Romania favour preliminary talks on a bilateral basis, these bilateral talks will be followed by a conference. Such a conference will inevitably create a situation where the discussion will be from bloc to bloc, which was the main objection of France to the conference.

18. The West, on the other hand, feels that the advantages that it might reap from such a conference would be limited. One could be the

improvement of communications between the two Germanys and with Berlin. Negotiations on the access with Berlin have not progressed since the statement favouring negotiations made by Foreign Minister Gromyko last July. Even this, however, is primarily a problem for occupying powers.

19. Another proposal made by the United States was that the conference may well deal with "balanced reduction of armed forces in Europe" and was included in the NATO communique of 6 December and would inevitably imply negotiations from bloc to bloc. The Soviet Union which in the past had favoured the inclusion of this point in the agenda now seems no longer wishing to do so because, in the words of Pravda of 1 December, "this point raises other great problems of disarmament presently on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations."

20. Within their respective Alliances, France and Romania have come the closest to defining elements that would enhance the significance of such a conference. On the occasion of Foreign Minister Schuman's visit in Moscow in October, the French government has asked the Soviet leaders whether such a conference would present any chance of lessening the divisions of Europe in blocs and whether the Soviet Union was interested in this. Put differently, what France was asking was whether the result of such a conference would make it more difficult to re-enact operations like those of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 or whether, alternatively, the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine should be considered a constant factor of the problem on the continent of Europe. In the words of Mr. Schuman "it will be necessary to avoid pitfalls of vocabulary." If the declaration on renunciation of force is accepted in its present wording, it may imply that countries condone the efforts in Czechoslovakia and therefore it would be necessary to clarify that such a renunciation applies also as between states of the same Alliance.<sup>5/</sup> The French Foreign Minister considered it a success that the joint communique referred to the undesirable character of the blocs. The Soviet text, however, does not refer to blocs but to "politico-military groupings".

21. The communique of the Council of Ministers of Romania on 16 November expressed a similar idea : "European security demands a clear series of

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5/ Council of Ministers Communique of Romania, 16 November.

commitments from all states as well as concrete measures which can guarantee to each state protection from any danger of aggression or other manifestations of force". Romania is also reported to favour advanced publication of military maneuvers and troop movements and invitation to international observers to witness them.

22. The French and Romanian governments, as well as a number of others, preferred to prepare the conference through bilateral negotiations between all countries of the continent. This, in their view, would allow to ascertain the thinking of each of the prospective participants, whereas a collective discussion around the same table would bring into play the discipline of the blocs.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

23. The existence of blocs is an inheritance from the cold war years. This, however, is not in itself a reason to condemn their existence altogether. As political realities have changed throughout the years, so does the nature of the blocs. At the present time, the existence of two groupings corresponds to the present-day political realities in Europe. The justification for groupings is to be found especially in the problems connected with the question of Germany and the nature of armaments resulting from modern technology. For these two reasons, even though there has recently been a movement by countries such as France and Romania toward the periphery of the groups, it is unlikely that the movement would go further unless, of course, the rapprochement between the FRG and the Soviet Union would lead to a new Rapallo. It may be an advantage, a stabilizing factor for peace in Europe, to have both Germanys as members of groupings. As to the problem created by the present state of armaments, the only alternative to groupings is a bilateral understanding between the two super-powers with bypassing of their respective Alliances, a politically highly undesirable state of affairs from the point of view of the lesser members of the respective groups.



24. John McCloy<sup>1/</sup>, a strong defender of the Western Alliance, believes that a strong Alliance can parallel a constructive relation with the Soviet Union:

"The Alliance, although clearly incompatible with an expansionist motive on the part of the Soviet Union within the area covered by the members of the Alliance, does not threaten the physical security of the Soviet Union unless one is prepared to accept a Leninist doctrine that a Communist country is secure only in a Communist world....The record of the Alliance thus far has borne out its original and wholly defensive character. At no time has it either threatened the Soviet Union nor applied any pressure on its boundaries....Nor has it intervened in the internal revolts which have taken place in the Soviet-controlled areas of Europe."

25. Among those who favour the disappearance of blocs are France, Romania and Yugoslavia. The French policy against the existence of blocs has been enunciated as a principle by General de Gaulle but its implications and implementation have not been spelled out in a satisfactory manner. Under the present government, France's opposition to blocs led it to assume an extremely cautious position with regard to the holding of a European security conference. Other governments advocating this cause realize that it is the last stage of a lengthy and difficult series of negotiations and actions.<sup>2/</sup> From this point of view, the bilateral talks taking place in preparation for a security conference are possibly of greater value than the conference itself where per force groupings will face each other.

26. An entirely new approach has been suggested unofficially by Yugoslav diplomats. Foreign Minister Gromyko, in the course of a visit to Yugoslavia, is reported to have envisaged the possibility of a standing conference on European security whose first objective would be to develop cooperation between European countries. The Yugoslavs, pursuing this trend of thought, are reported to have then suggested the possibility of creating a European Security Commission within the framework of the United Nations and along the lines of the Economic Commission for Europe. The Regional Commissions of the United Nations present a number of advantages: not only do they exert their activities within the

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<sup>1/</sup> Ibid, page 1, footnote 2.

<sup>2/</sup> The steps which may lead to the disappearance of blocs were spelled out in a series of articles in the Yugoslav periodical, Review of International Affairs. For details, see article by Berislav Badonja entitled "Outline of a Model of European Security", Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, No. 473, 20 December 1969.

framework of the United Nations but, in addition, they bring together all the countries of the same region and Socialist countries are dealt with on the basis of equality with non-Socialist countries.<sup>9/</sup> Finally, it is possible to accredit observers to such groupings. The secretariat of this commission would be stationed in Geneva. Its functions would be to conduct research in security matters and to do the preparatory work for armaments control and the adoption of disarmament measures between the two European groupings. It would also study the best ways to develop cooperation among all countries of Europe and could be entrusted with the preparation of successive conferences on European security. The result of the first security conference could be considered satisfactory if it would do no more than establish this new organization within the framework of the United Nations.

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<sup>9/</sup> Le Monde, 26 December 1969, article by Jean Schwobel entitled "Scepticisme et Realisme des Yougoslaves".

TO: The Secretary-General  
 As:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

I am sending herewith, for your information, a paper entitled Problems and Progress on European Security Matters, which has been prepared by the Political Affairs Division.

*Seen. Thanks.*  
*Ham*  
*10/11/69*  
*Ham*  
*24/5/70*

Date:  
 10 November 1969

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:  
 DE:

*Z. Kutallak*

L. Kutakov

AA-45

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

CONFIDENTIAL

CdeH:RN/zmp  
30 October 1969

PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS  
IN EUROPEAN SECURITY MATTERS

## PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY MATTERS

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. Europe is approaching a quarter century of division and confrontation and, on the verge of this point, voices are heard that peace and security cannot be established upon division if they are to last. Increasingly, countries realize that the confrontation of blocs has so far been the principal obstacle to peace and security, and efforts are being made to find means with which a better understanding can be achieved. Among other proposals put forward towards achieving this end is the suggestion for a European conference—an initiative taken by both neutrals and allies, big and small, eastern and western countries.

2. The ground for the possible convening of such a conference was first prepared through bilateral contacts among the Warsaw Pact, NATO and neutral countries. In December 1965, at the United Nations, four Socialist countries (including three members of the Warsaw Pact), three neutral states, and two NATO members, co-sponsored a resolution concerning "actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European states having different social political systems". The participating nations, which are known as the Group of Nine,<sup>1/</sup> tried to intensify their contacts with other states with a view to creating an atmosphere of confidence that would be conducive to the settlement of the major problems and the relaxation of tensions that still hamper Europe and other parts of the world. The group, enlarged to 14 countries, met formally at the beginning of the General Assembly meeting in September. Attempts were also made to establish contact between the two major blocs, and more recently at the end of July this year when the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, visited Moscow.

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<sup>1/</sup> Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia. This group was joined by the Netherlands last year.

3. Suggestions for measures to be taken in order to ensure the best conditions for holding such a conference have been proposed from different quarters, among them an appeal by countries of the Warsaw Treaty; an initiative by Finland to play host to the European conference; an appeal by Romania to refrain from demonstrations of force and other moves which would disrupt the atmosphere in Europe; a proposal by the Italians for an all-European conference; a proposal by certain West European countries for the reduction in military forces in Europe; a proposal from the Scandinavian countries for participation of all interested countries in a conference on European security, as well as some other initiatives.

4. Finland, in a memorandum of 7 May, proposed to act as host to a European security conference. This memorandum was sent to 31 European governments, including the Federal Republic and Democratic Republic of Germany, as well as to the United States and Canada. By the beginning of October, 21 countries—among them all the five Nordic countries—have answered affirmatively and only one, Albania, has declined. The Finnish Foreign Minister, commenting on the visit of President Podgorny of the Soviet Union, stated that Finland believed that it was the right time to press for the holding of such a conference.

## II. THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

5. The Socialist countries expressed their views about the conference individually and/or as members of different organizations. The most relevant in this connexion was the initiative taken by the Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>2/</sup>

Warsaw Pact: At the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states held in Bucharest between 4 and 6 July 1966, a Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe was adopted. In this document, the seven Socialist countries expressed the opinion that "the real guarantee of the security and progress of each European country lies not in the existence of military groupings, which do not correspond to the sound present-day

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<sup>2/</sup> Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and U.S.S.R.

trends of international life, but in the establishment in Europe of an efficient security system, based on relations of equality and mutual respect among all the states of this continent, on the joint efforts of all European nations". They stated that the most efficient way to lessen military tension "would be the concomitant abolition of the existing military alliances", and they solemnly reaffirmed that "they are ready for the concomitant abolition of the above-mentioned alliances".

6. The seven countries mentioned that if "the North Atlantic Pact member states are not yet ready to go over to the complete abolition of the two military groupings", European states may proceed with partial measures aimed at a détente on European territory. Among such measures "of great significance" would be the convening of a general European conference for the discussion of the questions related to ensuring security in Europe and for the establishment of a general European co-operation. The understanding that would be reached by the conference could be expressed, for example, in the form of a European declaration on co-operation in the interest of maintaining and strengthening European security. Such a declaration could set forth the obligation that would govern the signatory states in their relations in the interest of peace, the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues, consultation and exchange of information on matters of mutual interest, as well as development of economic, technical, scientific and cultural links between them. The declaration would be open for adherence of all interested states.

7. The seven Socialist countries further stated that "the convocation of the conference on European security and co-operation could contribute to the formation in Europe of a system of collective security and would be a great event in the contemporary history of Europe. Our countries are ready to take part in such a conference at any date that is suitable to the other interested states, both to the members of the North Atlantic Bloc and to neutral states. The neutral European states could also play a positive role in calling this conference. It is obvious that the agenda and other matters concerning the preparation of such a meeting or conference should be established in common agreement with all the participating states, taking into account the proposals put forward by each and everyone of them.

8. On 17 March 1969, the seven countries issued a formal call for convening a General European Conference to Strengthen Peace and Security. Stressing that not a single

European government opposed the idea of such a conference, the Warsaw Treaty countries held that there were real possibilities for holding it now: "There are no valid, basic reasons whatever for postponing the convocation of a General European Conference." As a first practical step, a "meeting of representatives of all interested European states to establish by mutual consent both the procedures for the convocation of the Conference and the definition of the items on its agenda" was proposed.

9. As far as other Socialist countries are concerned, Yugoslavia supported the idea and gave a favourable reply to the invitation by the Finnish government to the conference on problems of European security. She also considered that attempts to seek European security through inter-bloc arrangements were roundabout and less promising paths. She agreed that a divided Europe was not the basis upon which peace and security could be established in a lasting way and that bloc concepts were the principal obstacle to peace and security, both in Europe and elsewhere.

10. In a note of 29 July 1969, the Yugoslav government stressed that European security could be achieved only by making efforts "for the setting up of an atmosphere of confidence and the development of extensive and all-round co-operation on the basis of principles of sovereignty, independence, equality, refraining from any use of force or pressure in international relations and non-interference in internal affairs of other states".

11. Albania and China have in general a negative view toward the conference; they suspect a plot to achieve peace in Europe at the expense of the security of Asia and accuse the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries of collusion with "Western German militarism in a vain attempt to maintain the so-called 'security' in Europe".<sup>3/</sup>

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<sup>3/</sup> FBIS, Green, August 1969, p.A5.



### III/ THE POSITION OF NATO

12. It is expected that an official answer from NATO to the Budapest appeal will be forthcoming after the next ministerial session to be held in Brussels in December 1969. In the course of last year, however, the Council considered these proposals. After the Czech events of August 1968, NATO retreated from its program of mutual and balanced reduction of forces announced after the Reykjavik meeting in June 1968. The NATO ministerial meeting which had been advanced to 15 and 16 November 1968 and took place in Brussels was held to evaluate the implications of the events in Czechoslovakia. The ensuing communique stated that "mutually beneficial relations between East and West" remained the political goal of the alliance. The communique warned, however, that any action similar to that in Czechoslovakia would create "an international crisis with grave consequences". A series of military reinforcing measures were also taken, and the necessity for continuing the alliance was underlined. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Foreign Minister of France made it clear that "unless events in the years to come were to bring about a radical change in East-West relations, the French government considers that the alliance must continue as long as it appears to be necessary." Article 9 of the communique asserted that "the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia has seriously set back hopes of settling the outstanding problems which still divide the European continent and Germany and of establishing peace and security in Europe and threatens certain of the results already achieved in the field of detente."

13. In the month that followed, the attitude of NATO members toward the Soviet Union represented different shadings of coolness. French and Belgian opinions were that the search for contact between East and West should not be abandoned because a return to the cold war was unthinkable.

14. NATO reactions to the Budapest appeal of March 1969 were discussed at the meeting of Foreign Ministers which was held in Washington on 10 and 11 April. It is reported that United States Secretary of State William Rogers, West German Foreign Minister Brandt, Foreign Minister Debre of France, and Foreign Minister Luns of the Netherlands counselled extreme caution in responding to the proposal. Italy's Foreign Minister Nenni, on the other hand, was in favour of responding to the Warsaw Pact proposals for a security conference on the ground that remaining on the defensive leaves "all the advantages of the initiative" to the other side.

Secretary of State Rogers suggested that the West explore intensively the position of the Warsaw Pact countries in order to ascertain their real interest in a European security conference. Any European settlement should be "evolutionary", Mr. Rogers thought, and the best start would be through identification of elements of settlement that would provide the most likely starting point toward negotiation. This, in the United States view, would be the future of Berlin, troop reduction, disarmament and disengagement in Central Europe. The Canadian Foreign Minister, Mr. Sharpe, was in favour of a thorough exploration of the possibilities raised by the conference. Mr. Brandt opposed a flat rejection of the appeal which he said constituted a change in tactics and thought that the reasons for this should be ascertained. NATO should indicate its willingness to hold a conference without any pre-condition and with American and Canadian participation and thorough preparation.

15. The ensuing communique was cautious in tone and limited in nature as no broadly based support for an early and affirmative answer developed in the course of the meeting. The Council was faced by what it considered a strongly worded statement made by the Soviet Union on 9 April which in the words of NATO Secretary-General Brosio showed "an attitude quite different" from the non-polemical language of the Budapest appeal. Article 5 of the communique pertaining to East-West issues stated that "the allies propose, while remaining in close consultation, to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution". The Council was instructed to draft a list of these issues and how a useful process of negotiation could best be initiated and to draw up a report for the meeting of Ministers to be held in December 1969. The same Article 5 added that "it is clear that any negotiations must be well prepared in advance and that all governments whose participation would be necessary to achieve political settlement in Europe should take part," the last phrase referring to the participating of the United States and Canada. This text left NATO members free to explore bilaterally any issues they wish with Eastern European nations.

A. France and European Security

16. The most recent statement of French policy was made on the occasion of the visit of Foreign Minister Schumann to the Soviet Union from 9 through 14 October. The joint communique contained a special section dealing with European security. Both governments will continue their efforts to secure a detente in Europe, to develop contacts and enlarge the co-operation among all European states independently of their political or social structures and of their alliances. The two parties hoped that this, in turn, would allow the establishment of a climate of confidence favouring discussion of the great problems still facing Europe, making possible their settlement and thus creating a stable peace based on "the principles of independence, national sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, and the obligation to refrain from the use of force".<sup>4/</sup> The communique also stated that a European conference "well prepared could constitute an efficient means to develop co-operation among all European states and, with their common efforts, put an end to the division of Europe into blocks and thus reinforce security and peace".<sup>5/</sup>

17. The working of the communique brought out clearly the French thesis inherited from President De Gaulle of the independence of states and rejection of any policy that would consolidate or strengthen existing blocs. In his report to the Cabinet, Mr. Schumann stated that his aim had been to make it clear that there was no contradiction between the desire of France to further develop the European community and, at the same time, increase co-operation, "inter-penetration", and exchanges with the Socialist countries of Europe, notably with the Soviet Union; none of the members of the European community should be prevented from negotiating freely its own accords with Socialist countries.

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<sup>4/</sup> This, with the addition of the word "equality", is identical with that of Article 4 of the NATO communique of 11 April 1969.

<sup>5/</sup> Translated from the French text in Le Monde, 15 October 1969.

18. On the question of Germany, the Foreign Minister reported to the Cabinet that a substantial area of agreement was achieved. Both sides had recognized the changing ("evolutif") character of German question insofar as the relations between either Moscow and Bonn or the two Germanys were concerned and took note of the fact that both among occidental allies and Socialist countries exploratory talks were taking place on the subject of West Berlin. France stated that the latest Soviet communication on this subject was encouraging enough to justify further pursuit of these talks.

19. The difficulties for holding a European security conference in the opinion of French commentators<sup>6/</sup> therefore did not arise so much from the problem of the German Democratic Republic but rather from the uncertainty in which France finds itself concerning the real goals of Soviet diplomacy in this connexion. Mr. Schumann reported that he did not obtain all the clarifications in this regard but was told that consultations were continuing among Socialist countries and would continue possibly even at a reunion of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries to be held at the end of October in Prague.<sup>7/</sup>

20. In addition, it was felt by France that there were divergencies with the Soviet Union on questions of methods to pursue to prepare the conference. The French continued to insist on bilateral negotiations which would make it possible for prospective participants to discuss with each other the question, regardless of what "bloc" they belonged to. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, remained in favour of a multilateral type of preparation, possibly even a preparatory conference where all, including the German Democratic Republic, would be present. On this point, French policy, as at the time of President De Gaulle, continues to be adamant: France felt that she could not associate herself with a project which would result in the consolidation of a system of blocs in Europe and would bring about a confrontation between the two camps of NATO and Warsaw Pact.

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<sup>6/</sup> Le Monde, 15 and 16 October 1969.

<sup>7/</sup> Soviet note of 13 September 1969.

21. Beyond these differences that seem to pertain to methods of preparation, there still seemed to remain divergence of principles, namely that the Soviet policy of wanting the consolidation and legalization of the status quo, both ideological and political, was contrary to the French policy of co-operation between independent states. On the occasion of Mr. Schumann's report to the Council of Ministers on 15 October on his trip, President Rappidor underlined this fact by stating: "We remain attached to our present principles, namely the will to overcome the blocs, the will to maintain good relations with all, without allowing that the friendship that we have for some should be transformed into an obstacle to a friendship towards the others."

B. European Security and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

22. The outcome of the elections in the Federal Republic of Germany on 28 September has, of course, considerable bearing on the handling of European security problems. Before the elections in the course of the summer, feelers were put out by the West to gauge the attitude of the Soviet Union on the possibility of talks. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany sent a note on 3 July to the Soviet Union reiterating the proposal first made by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard in March 1956 proposing an agreement on the renunciation of force.

23. The three Western Powers sent identical notes on 6 August asking the Soviet government whether it was interested in exploring ways of preventing further problems over Berlin in the future and in encouraging the two German states to enter into a dialogue.

24. The Soviet Union for its part has made statements on the question. Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Supreme Soviet on 10 July that the Soviet Union would be "ready to exchange views on how to prevent present and future complications associated with West Berlin". The answer to the Western notes of 3 July and 6 August came on 13 September and was interpreted by Western Europeans to be of a slightly more conciliatory tone than previous answers. Though the note referred only to talks about West Berlin and not to the improvement of communication between East and West Berlin, its tone was considered encouraging. The note defined West Berlin as a "special political entity"

instead of the earlier phrase, "independent political entity", and some observers saw in this change an acceptance of current state of relations between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. The note further not only acknowledged the Federal Republic as a necessary participant in any new talks on Berlin but voiced interest in improving political relations with the Federal Republic, with full respect for its sovereignty. Finally the Soviet note accepted the West German request that an agreement to renounce the use of force be formally concluded and recommended that the negotiation take place in Moscow. The Soviet note reached the West German public during the election campaign. Foreign Minister Brandt labelled it "non-polemical and to the point" and Chancellor Kiesinger called it "disappointing".

25. The new government, a coalition between the SPD (Social Democrats) and the FDP (Free Democrats), has not yet made its official policy known. Based, however, on the attitudes taken by Mr. Brandt before the elections and the political platforms of the two winning parties, it is safe to say that the new government will have a policy aimed at the acceptance of "the realities of Central Europe" namely to lay the foundations for the permanent improvement between the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union, with the Eastern European countries, and with the Democratic Republic of Germany.

26. Agreement with the Soviet Union on the renunciation of the use of force between the two countries seemed possible since the Soviet note of 13 September. Such an agreement implies in the view of the coalition the recognition of "territorial integrity" of West Germany's neighbours and of the "inviolability of the borders and demarcation lines" in Europe. This goes a long way towards meeting Soviet demands for West German "acceptance of the status quo" in Central Europe, including the division of the German nation and the loss of the eastern lands. In addition, Mr. Brandt seems to agree to the inclusion of the GDR in a supplementary network of bilateral pacts to renounce the use of force. The new coalition is also reported to be willing to go so far as to establish a "regulated juxtaposition" of the German states by offering to GDR a "general treaty" that would recognize "the existence of two states of the German nation" without for that recognizing it as a "foreign state". Neither the Social Democrats nor the Free Democrats have accepted the idea of a full

diplomatic recognition of the GDR. With regard to relations with Eastern Europe, the abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine will have far-reaching consequences. Both the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats have also alluded to a "settlement in the form of a treaty between Poland and the FDR", adding however that recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a border would not form part of such a treaty.

27. The actions of the new government of the FRG are crucial in matters of European security. Though Mr. Brandt's policies are conciliatory, their implementation will face a number of difficulties.

28. The narrowness of the margin of victory (majority of 12 in the Lower House of Parliament) and the avowed intent of the Christian Democrats (CDU) and their Bavarian sister party (CSU) to present a strong opposition to the government on the foreign policy front, especially against the signing of the non-proliferation treaty, will not facilitate the task of Mr. Brandt.

29. The expected opposition from the CSU party is strong. Its Head, Mr. Strauss, at a lecture at Columbia University on 12 October, qualified the proposed European security conference as a "chimera" and the policies of Mr. Brandt as "unrealistic". He even accused him of having overstepped his functions as Foreign Minister for having proposed Finland as a seat of the proposed conference. He further accused Mr. Brandt of wanting to throw his country "in the arms of the Soviet Union" and accused the Free Democrats of being gullible to Soviet promises.

30. The future relations of the FRG with the GDR will also depend on the effect the new West German government has on the East German regime. The reactions of Mr. Ulbricht have been up to now distinctly cool, in spite of the fact that Mr. Brezhnev, speaking at the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the GDR in Berlin on 6 October, said that the Soviet Union would be willing to respond to "a more realistic trend" in Bonn.

### C. The Belgian Approach

31. The joint communique published at the end of the visit of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Harmel, in Moscow from 23 to 26 July 1969 states that discussions took place "with great frankness" over a large spectrum of subjects. A substantial

part of the communique deals specifically with European security. In a subsequent press conference held on 29 July 1969 in Brussels, Mr. Harmel clarified his understanding of the contents of the communique. Both the governments were in favour of increasing bilateral and multilateral contacts in order to arrive at a formulation of subjects which would lend themselves to negotiation (themes de negociation) to facilitate the holding of a conference. Mr. Harmel stated that he did not have in mind an exhaustive list of subjects but the selection of a few "themes" acceptable to all participating states, such as their having to do with environment (communications, air and water pollution, electrical power, etc.) and some selected problems of a security nature, such as the parallel and controlled regional freezing of conventional and nuclear armaments.

32. Though Belgium had been speaking only in its own name, in Moscow the Minister stated that he had been in contact with the western allies before proceeding to Moscow and did inform them of the results of the meeting. The question of the number of states participating in the security conference remained open, but it was obvious that the two great Powers having special responsibility in the maintenance of peace would have to guarantee the security of Europe. It was inconceivable to hold such a conference without the presence of U.S.S.R. and the United States. It was equally clear that European countries not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact such as Austria and Switzerland should participate in such a conference.

33. As to the German question, the Minister stated that it was also discussed but each of the parties limited itself to express its own point of view and listen to the point of view of the other. Minister Harmel agreed with the viewpoint of West German Foreign Minister Brandt that the German problem was an "evolutionary" one and hoped that the German Democratic Republic would show as much flexibility as the Federal Republic, in which case a dialogue could usefully be started between them and the German question could possibly be included in the agenda of East-West negotiation. He thought, however, that if the German question was included in the agenda it should be only insofar as specific points were concerned because he did not see any advantage in considering at an early stage problems where points of views were still completely opposite each other.

34. The Minister underlined the gradualness of the approach by favouring the use of the terms "development of co-operation in Europe" together with "European security".



35. During his speech at the United Nations (APV.1765), Mr. Harmel emphasized again this drawing up of list of common problems on which agreement could rapidly be reached:

"It matters little that these lists are limited to start with, so long as the political contents of the resultant agreements give concrete evidence of a common will to multilateral co-operation and if thus we can translate into deeds the spirit of Chapter VIII of our Charter.

"It is in this direction that our efforts will have to be ceaselessly directed in 1970, and it is thus that the necessary meetings for the conclusion of such regional agreements can be expedited. Such agreements, we believe, will result in a strengthening of the United Nations."

D. The United States Attitude

36. The Budapest appeal included only European countries. However, it became clear since that time that for a number of states the presence of the United States was considered indispensable and that the Soviet Union and other Socialist states would not object to United States participation. Subsequently, the Finnish government sent an invitation both to the United States and Canada.

The willingness of the United States to participate in such a conference is reported to depend on the reception given by other countries to the invitation extended by Finland and the pressure brought on her by prospective participants.

37. President Nixon, addressing the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Washington on 11 April to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Alliance, did not mention the security conference by name but referred to the problem and indicated that a change in the mood of the international community would be useful.

"It is not enough to talk about European security in the abstract. We must know the elements of insecurity and how to remove them. Conferences are useful if they deal with current issues, which means they must be carefully prepared.

"Living in the real world of today means understanding and unfreezing of concepts of East versus West while never losing sight of great ideological differences."

38. Referring to the talks that were planned at that time and are presently underway in Helsinki on strategic arms control, President Nixon warned the meeting of Ministers

that any agreement in this field would have implications on the structure of NATO. Any agreement "would imply a military relationship far different from the one that existed when NATO was founded."

"In plain words, the West does not have the massive nuclear predominance today that it once had, and any sort of broad-based arms agreement with the Soviets would codify the present balance."

39. The American response could therefore be interpreted as a cautious "yes", it being understood that the proposed conference would not by itself solve the historical and political problems of Europe but would more modestly provide a vehicle for NATO and Warsaw Pact powers for concerted East-West diplomacy, constituting what Secretary of State Rogers called an "evolutionary approach".