

Q. Now, it was said that you received reports from the accused as to the condition of the prisoners, didn't he?

A. I was not at the HQ at that time so I am not certain, but I believe he did receive reports.

Q. Now did he order that the prisoners had to move from SANDAKAN to RAHAYU irrespective of their physical condition?

A. As I was not at the HQ I do not know the wording of the order.

Q. Do you know whether your HQ issued an order to the effect that any prisoners who were unfit to continue the march were to be killed?

A. I have not heard anything about that.

QUESTIONED BY THE COURT

Q. It is said that of over 2,000 prisoners at SANDAKAN, six are now alive; as a senior staff officer what have you to say about that?

A. I think that it is a very regrettable business.

R.P. 53 B is complied with.

Witness retires.

Sworn
SWORN WITNESS FOR DEFENCE

IWABASHI Kenabu having made a solemn declaration through the sworn interpreter, states :-

My rank is Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Officer 37 Japanese Army.

Defending officer examines witness :-

Q. Between May and June 1945 what were your duties?

A. I was in charge of the operational areas during this period.

Q. Regarding the movement of the PW at SANDAKAN to RAHAYU, did you know anything about this?

A. Yes I did.

Q. 37 Army HQ issued an order for the PW to be marched to RAHAYU, what were the main points of the order?

A. The order was that the commander of the ~~37 Army~~ ^{37 Army} ~~at SANDAKAN~~ ^{at SANDAKAN} ~~was to~~ ^{was to} ~~request assistance from the OTSUKA Unit at SANDAKAN and the WATAMANE Unit at RAHAYU, and other units in between. That is the main principle of the order given by the supreme commander. According to the order given by the supreme commander, the chief of staff officer issued instructions that regarding the march, the various units at SANDAKAN concerned at SANDAKAN ought to discuss about this matter.~~ ^{to march his prisoners to RAHAYU and ~~request~~ ^{request} assistance from the OTSUKA Unit at SANDAKAN and the WATAMANE Unit at RAHAYU, and other units in between. That is the main principle of the order given by the supreme commander. According to the order given by the supreme commander, the chief of staff officer issued instructions that regarding the march, the various units at SANDAKAN concerned at SANDAKAN ought to discuss about this matter.}

Q. And what was the reason for the march to RAHAYU?

A. First reason was because of the war conditions on the ~~west~~ ^{west} ~~east~~ ^{east} of BORNEO namely MORTAI, CHILLES and LEYTE. Also, we ~~knew~~ ^{knew} that the Allied air force were gathering numerous planes at MORTAI in preparation and also the operations at LEYTE were becoming worse and Australian troops had landed at TARAKAN; besides this, the OTSUKA Unit informed us that the Allies were probably going to launch SANDAKAN and from other intelligence reports we decided to move the PW. The second reason was that the Japanese strength at SANDAKAN at that time was about 1,000 and as ~~their~~ ^{their} line of defence was very long we did not have enough troops to cover all that area and should the PW be left in SANDAKAN they would become troublesome and endangered. Third reason, the food supply position had become difficult as supply ships could not enter SANDAKAN and we did not know when the next supplies would arrive. The PW rations were very short so we decided to evacuate them to a place where ~~there~~ ^{there} they would be comfortable.

Q. What date was this order issued?

A. 10th May.

Q. Regarding this order, did Capt TAKAHARA ask you for further advice?

A. Yes. A message came from TAKAHARA. That message said that under the present conditions if the PW were to be marched to KUMU, only one fifth could survive.

Q. And so what measures did Army HQ take?

A. We were very concerned and sent back the following message. Send only the healthy ones to KUMU.

Q. Was this message sent by telegram?

A. We sent that message by wireless with second highest priority.

Q. Do you remember the date and time you sent that signal?

A. I cannot say exactly but I think it was the 25th of May.

Q. About July 1945 did Army HQ issue an order to the KUMU PW Camp that the PW were to be used in transporting weapons of the KUMU Unit?

A. We did not say to use the PW but the orders stated to use all the available strength and transport weapons from KUMU to KUMU. These orders were issued to Major HAYASHI.

Q. In the ~~XXXX~~ between SHIMAZU and KUMU, do you know how many Japanese soldiers died and what the conditions of the march were?

A. I cannot remember the actual figures but many died and I can quote one instance when cavalry troops under Major General ARAKI, marched from SHIMAZU to KUMU but only 40 arrived, around the end of May.

Q. Can you remember other instances besides this?

A. There are other instances but I cannot recall them.

Prosecuting officer cross-examines witness :-

Q. Is it a fact that your HQ knew that nearly all the prisoners at SHIMAZU were sick and suffering from malnutrition?

A. Yes, we were aware that many PW were sick.

Q. Is it a fact that the original order was to move the lot irrespective of their condition?

A. Yes, the Chief of Staff issued those orders.

Q. And it was after those orders were issued that TAKAHARA sent you the signal which you mention in the Court?

A. Yes.

Q. Now on what date did you receive the signal from TAKAHARA?

A. ~~I think it was on the 25th~~ TAKAHARA sent his message on the 25th, and it arrived on the same day.

Q. Is it not a fact that TAKAHARA sent his message on the 25th and not the 26th at all?

A. It was on the 10th that the first message was sent from Army HQ and I think it was the 26th when TAKAHARA sent his message.

Q. And the position is that you are not sure of the date when 37 Army HQ received the message from TAKAHARA?

A. I cannot tell exactly but I am pretty sure it was the 26th.

Q. Did the original order that was sent from 37 Army HQ say that the prisoners had to move on the 26th May?

A. There was no date of departure in the orders, but as this was an operation order TAKAHARA was expected to carry it out as soon as possible.

Q. How soon after you received TAMAKURA's message did Army HQ reply to it?

A. On the same day that it arrived.

Q. ~~Since your message was sent the second highest priority, should it have reached TAMAKURA by the 27th of May at the latest?~~

A. Because of the high priority, the message was liable to reach him on the same day it was sent or the following day.

~~Before this order to move the prisoners was issued, were there any other orders?~~

xx

Q. Now in those orders which were sent, was anything said about killing any prisoners who fell out of the march?

A. No, nothing like that was said.

R.F. 83 B is complied with.

Witness retires.

The Court is closed until 0730 hours 5 Jan 45.

At 0730 hours 5th January, 1945 the Court reopens.

Witness for the DEFENCE.

OTSUKA Mitsugi. Colonel. 353 Ind. Inf. Batt. Commanding Officer. having made a solemn declaration through the sworn interpreter is examined by the Defending Officer.

Q. What was your duty at SANDAKAN.

A. I first arrived in SANDAKAN on 10th November, 1942, but after three months I was transferred to SLAM for one year and I arrived back at SANDAKAN in March, 1944.

Q. My duty was the to take charge of the Garrison at SANDAKAN.

Q. Do you know anything about the movement of P.W.s from SANDAKAN to RAMAU about the end of May, 1945.

A. Yes I do.

Q. What date did these prisoners leave.

A. I think it was 28th May.

Q. Was your unit connected in any way with movement of P.W.s

A. Lt. SUZUKI of the TSURANUKI Force was ordered to assist in the security of the P.W.s on the march and he was to take 100 men with him.

Q. Do you know anything else about the departure of these P.W.s namely, the difficulty of marching them because of their weak physical health and the message that was sent to Army H.Q.s to this effect and the awaiting of an answer to this message.

A. Yes I did know of this.

Q. You were the commanding officer of the Garrison Force at SANDAKAN at that time so could you tell me what the conditions were.

~~A. I divided my force into three sectors - 1st on the Eastern side to guard the approach from the coast.~~

A. The strength was approx 1,500 to 1,600.

Q. Did Captain TAMAKURA start the P.W.s on the march in such short period because of the existing circumstances.

A. Yes.

Witness examined by the Prosecuting officer.

Q. Was Captain TAMAKURA's unit under your command whilst they were at SANDAKAN.

Q to Capt MATSUMOTO - Do you apply to give evidence yourself as a witness?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you intend to call any other witnesses in your defence?

A. Yes, two.

Q. Are they witnesses as to character only?

A. Yes.

Takuo

Capt MATSUMOTO having made a solemn declaration through a sworn interpreter is examined by defending officer.

My name is TAKUO Takuo and my unit is Borneo PW and Internment Unit, and I was in charge of the SANDAKAN PW Camp. Upon orders I took command of the SANDAKAN PW Camp on 26 April 1945. I was not told what my duties would be so I wrote down to KUCHINO asking them for advice so during that time I really was not responsible for the PW Camp until 17 May 1945. On that day I received an order from Army HQ stating that an AMBUSH was being subjected to Allied bombardment which also included the PW Camp. It would be best to evacuate the prisoners, to KALANSI. I found that these orders had been received after I had taken over from KUSHIYAMA. KUSHIYAMA was not quite sure if there were enough rations for the prisoners at KALANSI, so for this reason he sent 1/Lieut HORITAKU to KALANSI, to see if there was any food there. Then on 10th May as they found out that it was no use sending the prisoners to KALANSI, Army HQ ordered them to be evacuated to RANAU. In the orders it stated that all the PW were to go to RANAU and to be put into the compound with the other PW already at RANAU and that I was to take command of the RANAU camp and also to close down the SANDAKAN camp. At this time in SANDAKAN, there were many sick prisoners and I thought if they were to be moved to RANAU at least 400 would have to be carried on stretchers. There were very few who bear the trip to RANAU the rest would probably break down after two or three days marching. After thinking all this out I thought that if I carried out these orders from HQ and marched the lot to RANAU, many of them would die, so I sent a message to Army HQ giving them the facts and asked for further advice. In the meantime as I had already received orders I had to act on it and made preparations. In the meantime I waited for an answer to my last message but up to the day I was supposed to leave none came. In the meantime aerial bombardment had become fierce and even the PW camp was being bombed and strafed. Some of the British PW became casualties in these air attacks and the head of the British PW requested that they evacuate from the camp. Also in the Australian camp, over ten were killed from the result of these air attacks, and then the officer in charge of the Australians also requested that they be evacuated. Also at that time British torpedo boats were bombarding the shore and on the 27th a heavy naval bombardment started followed by an aerial attack by hundreds of planes. The garrison unit (OTSUKA Unit) had taken up the defence positions and then on the 28th OTSUKA Unit received an intelligence report from Army HQ saying that one division intended landing on SANDAKAN and two divisions at KEDAT. Following this the OTSUKA Unit took up their positions on the 11 mile point. This left the PW Camp as the closest unit to the coast so I thought that it was best to withdraw back for the safety of the PW. Then we received an order from the OTSUKA Unit telling us to escort the Japanese sick patients and to evacuate them. These orders were sent to 1/Lieut SUMI at the hospital and he came to show it to me, so I sent Capt MATSUMOTO to liaison OTSUKA Unit. He arrived back that evening at 6 o'clock and we left at 8 o'clock that night. The reason for leaving at night was so that we would not be seen by aircraft. As the enemy were supposed to land on the morning of the 30th, we had very little time for preparations. I decided to carry out my original orders and called the officer in charge of the British and Australian PW for a conference. As I said before, no reply was received to my signal to Army HQ so I decided to leave the sick PW behind and send 500 or the best conditioned prisoners forward. Even then I did not think that many of these 500 would survive the trip to RANAU. So after telling the English and Australian officers in charge to send 500, they got together 11/ 540 for the trip. The road from SANDAKAN to RANAU was in a very bad condition and thousands of Japanese soldiers had died on the way.

I gave each prisoner ten days rations of rice which ~~included~~ 500 grams per day. I also gave them tea and beans for cooking on the journey and advised them to take blankets and any clothes they wanted to. Army HQ had ordered that the PW were only to receive 100 grams of rice a day but I knew this was not enough and gave them 500 grams. I also wished to give them medical supplies but as this was very scarce I could not do so. I requested more from the SAILAN hospital but was refused. Up to the time medical supplies for PW and Japanese soldiers were arriving from MASHU, in separate lots. The Japanese soldiers were receiving more medical supplies than the PW and so they were able to bring some on the march, but as they had plenty of gear to carry they could not bring too much. I then called my officers and NCOs together and issued out orders. The orders I issued were that as the march would be difficult and PW would probably die of illness on the way, and fall out ~~because of weariness~~ because of weariness the soldiers were to do everything they could to help them along, but as the enemy would be landing and advancing quickly those PW who could not go on any more and were likely to die ~~would be put out of their misery by being shot~~ would be put out of their misery by being shot. It was said that the Japanese soldiers had more rations than the PW, this is because all Japanese soldiers carried reserve rations with them and which were not issued to the prisoners. It was for this reason that I gave the PW 500 grams per day, but prisoners who fell down on the march used to throw their rice away so I ordered all the rice to be taken off the PW and put together for safe keeping. Then as there were eleven groups of PW, I divided this rice into eleven parts. With regard to the PW compound at SAILAN, this camp could accommodate 2,000 PW and as I thought the enemy would utilise the buildings when they landed, I ordered the whole buildings to be burnt. I left one building standing to house the 250 sick PW that were left behind. I also left them a stock of rice. I also left 20 or 30 thousand pieces of tobacco and spinach to enable the PW to regain their health. I left orders with Maj. KUROGUCHI that when the 7 sick PW regained their health they could be marched to RANAU also and that Lt. KUROGUCHI would take charge of them when he returned from KANABU. As I had completed preparations for food and the march, I also left SAILAN. PW who died on the way could not be buried as we did not have any shovels so I ordered them to be taken into the jungle where they could not be seen by people from the road. After I left SAILAN the death rate of sick PW increased greatly. ~~It was the same with the Australians as we had been together for the last three years and had become affectionate towards each other. So the Japanese soldiers had never thrown away the dead bodies of PW and the soldiers took the dead bodies of PW and treated them respectfully. I have also seen during the trip, Japanese soldiers treating the PW well and giving them food and tobacco. At KANABU I gave each PW three days rations of 100 grams each. This was repeated at KOTO and at KANABU. I gave them each three days rations of 500 grams per day. At KANABU I gave them two days rations of 100 grams per day. This was the way I supplied them with rice but besides this I let them gather bamboo shoots, bananas and other roots on the way to cook at night. Therefore I do not think there was such a great difference between the PW ration and the Japanese ration. As I said before the journey was very difficult and many sick fell out on the trip. Also, every day there were quite a few attempts to escape, so I ordered that those attempting to escape could be shot, as they would not stop running even when told to stop, so there were some cases when the Japanese soldiers killed prisoners attempting to get away. Therefore when I said before in my statement that about 10 were killed this number included those who attempted to run away. The number that succeeded in escaping was 54. Of the 540 that left SAILAN, 163 arrived in RANAU. As the RANAU PW camp was also being bombed by Allied planes the camp shifted to the 110 mile point and I took the PW up there. When we reached RANAU I found that there was a shortage of food, so when the remaining PW arrived in RANAU I could only give them 100 grams per day although they could get vegetables before, the position got worse at RANAU and no vegetables were procurable. On the 2nd July I was wounded in the leg and confined to bed and I took every step possible to procure foodstuffs by ordering soldiers to do so. So they managed to get some tobacco from the field ~~warehouse~~ and also kill a few cattle of which the intestines ~~warehouse~~ and other meat were given to the PW, but this became impossible later on and the death rate from those PW from SAILAN grew higher every day. Also there were other attempts to escape.~~

As the position became worse and many sick were dying and others were attempting to escape we did not have any more PW to carry rice and when belonging to the KAWA Unit, I decided it was best to dispose of them as they became very cumbersome. On the 1st of August I issued orders that all the PW were to be killed. This order of killing the PW was entirely based on the necessity of our operations and another reason was that the circumstances at that time had obliged me to take such a desperate action towards the PW. The further thing, it has been stated that the PW were killed with machine-gun fire also, this is not true. The machine-gun we had in the compound was only mounted for anti aircraft purposes. This can be proved by the HP examination which was left at RANAU and brought from RANAU. Capt. MALCOLM has a record of the number of rounds he brought to RANAU and not one round is missing. As I had issued the orders to the NCOs and soldiers to kill the PW and being a military order it had to be carried out. The entire responsibility is on my shoulders. I in turn had to carry out the original orders from Army HQ to march these PW from SANDAKAN to RANAU which I could not refuse to carry out the order.

~~Examination of the accused.~~

Defending officer: ~~examines~~ accused

Q. In Sgt Major STICHTON's statement he said that 140 sick were left behind in SANDAKAN, should this be true?

A. Yes.

Q. Also, he said that on the 15th of May rice was issued to the PW but this was later ordered to be given back, is this true?

A. As I said before, as the sick PW who were dying on the way were throwing the rice away, I gathered all the rice together and split it into the eleven groups to be issued daily.

Q. Also, Sgt Major STICHTON stated 140 PW arrived in RANAU including 70 Australians and 60 British, but you say 163 arrived, which is right?

A. 163 definitely.

Q. STICHTON also said that when you burnt the compound down at SANDAKAN you burnt all the records and PW papers although this was requested to be saved by the PW, is this true?

A. In the bank there is 20,000 Yen belonging to the Australians and over 300 Yen belonging to the British and I cannot remember any request for this money to be taken along by the PW.

Q. Another point in STICHTON's statement, Capt JACK got his face slapped for having ~~two~~ two sheets as a Red Cross flag to overhead, is this true?

A. I do not know when this took place but between 17th May to 22nd May I was not in SANDAKAN so I do not know about this.

Q. Is it also true that when you burnt the camp you burnt some medical supplies with it?

A. With respect to this I ordered the medical sergeant major to take all the medical supplies he could and leave the rest to the hospital but as there was no time to take the rest to the hospital I suppose it was burnt with the compound. Actually we had no ~~medical supplies~~ medicine left for the PW and very little quinine.

The medical supplies that were burnt were surgical instruments, bandages alcohol and other medicines used for operations.

The court is adjourned until 0900 hours 4 January 1946.

The Court reassembled at 0900 hrs 4th Jan 1940.

Present: The same members as on 3rd Jan 1940.

Accused, TAKAKURA Takuo, resumes his seat on the witness stand, and is reminded that he is on his former oath.
Prosecuting Officer cross-examines witness:

Q: Is it a fact that you never received any orders from 37 Army HQ regarding the removal of PWs but only got your information from MORIHATA?

A: The orders to evacuate the PWs to ~~XXXXXX~~ RANAU were sent to Lt. MORIHATA, but when these orders were changed to RANAU they were sent direct to me.

Q: Who signed the order on behalf of 37 Jap Army HQ?

A: It was a signal message and there was no signature.

Q: You did not receive any orders from 37 Jap Army to kill the prisoners did you?

A: No, no orders were issued to kill the PWs. Only to evacuate ~~XXXXXX~~ all the prisoners to RANAU.

Q: What was the name of the Australian officer whom you saw requested you to evacuate the PWs ~~XXXXXX~~?

A: Capt. ~~XXXXXX~~ COCK.

Q: Do you mean to tell the Court that he suggested they be moved to RANAU?

A: He did not specify any place to evacuate to.

Q: Do you deny that on 5th May last all PWs who were in SANDAKAN camp were weak, and thin and suffering from malnutrition?

A: Yes, they were weak and thin and suffering from malnutrition.

Q: Isn't it a fact that there was not one PW in the whole of the camp who was fit physically to undertake a march to RANAU?

A: This is not so. There were about 100 healthy ones who were used in the kitchen and on working parties.

Q: Is it a fact that before you left SANDAKAN that you made up your mind to kill any of the prisoners that fell out of the march?

A: I gave orders to my officers and men before leaving SANDAKAN to do all they could for the PWs on the march, but if any happened to fall out and could not continue, as it would delay us, and be a burden under the war operations, it would be best to kill them.

Q: Were you trying to prevent these prisoners from falling into the hands of the enemy?

A: Yes. And also because I was afraid they might influence the natives against us and give information to the enemy.

Q: Now you didn't leave any medical supplies with the PWs/men you did leave at SANDAKAN, did you?

A: No I did not leave any medicine;

Q: And you knew before you left that many of these too, would die from lack of medical supplies, didn't you?

A: Yes I knew that some would probably die but we did not have any internal medicine to leave them.

Q: Isn't it true that after you left SANDAKAN you sent an order to Lt. MORIHATA to kill any of that 250 who were still alive?

A: No this is not true. When I left SANDAKAN I sent MORIHATA was still at SANDAKAN and I sent a message to him saying to bring the PWs who recovered to RANAU and to do all he could for them. A lot in the orders I said that should they fall out on the march and be unable to carry on, that it would be best to kill them.

Also I left instructions with Sgt. Maj. ~~MONZANI~~ who was left in charge at SANDAKAN that if the enemy landed ~~anywhere~~ before their departure to hand the remaining PWs over to the enemy.

Q: Do you know whether in fact any of these PWs did die or were killed?

A: We had no communication with SANDAKAN but later on Sgt. Maj. ~~MONZANI~~ ~~was~~ told me that all the prisoners were dead. He told me this ~~was~~ ~~at~~ SANDAKAN ~~was~~.

Q: Before you left SANDAKAN how long did you estimate this march would take?

A: ~~When~~ ^{In} the Japanese Army there is a standard distance in which they could walk per day but as the PWs could not do this I allowed two days for the standard distance, and we took about 25 or 27 days to arrive at RAU. I thought it would take ^{over} 20 days.

Q: And yet you only issued the Jap with ten days rice, didn't you?

A: ~~I knew the Japanese would not last as long as that.~~ Yes.

Q: You left these 180 PWs behind without orders didn't you?

A: Yes.

Q: Will you admit then that you were entitled to disobey orders in certain circumstances?

A: As the Army order was to take all the PWs of RAU, but as I had to leave the 180 PWs at SANDAKAN I thought this point of my order was against the order from the Army, and it was my own responsibility.

Q: ~~anyway~~ Is it not a fact that where you think an order is unlawful or practically impossible to fulfil you are entitled to disobey it?

A: Yes, that is so.

Q: Did you order your guards to beat these prisoners to keep them moving fast?

A: No I didn't.

Q: Would you deny that they did beat them frequently?

A: I have seen them beaten.

Q: Isn't it a fact that before you began this march you knew most of the prisoners would die before they reached RAU?

A: Yes, I did know it.

Q: Will you agree that only a very small proportion of the PWs who did die, died ~~anywhere~~ otherwise than by being shot?

A: In my ~~original~~ report only about 10 died from being shot and the rest through natural causes.

Q: No Japanese soldiers died on the march did they?

A: Of the soldiers in my charge up to the time we reached RAU 12 died.

Q: What did they die from?

A: Malaria.

Q: All those who did arrive at RUSAU were weak and very ill when they got there weren't they?

A: Yes.

Q: And they never regained their health again did they?

A: That is so.

Q: Isn't it true that of those that did arrive, apart from two who escaped, all but 33 had died before the 1st. August?

A: Yes that is so.

Q: Was Capt. WATANABE in charge of the disposal of the sick PWs who fell out on the march?

A: I did not think he was in charge of them.

Q: Isn't it a fact that you passed your orders to Sgt. Maj. TSUJI through Lieut. WATANABE?

A: Yes, I passed these orders to Sgt. Maj. TSUJI through Capt. WATANABE but he had nothing to do with the disposal of PWs.

Q: Why did you insist that every guard had to take part in the killing on the march?

A: I did not insist on the guard but I told TSUJI that if there were any PWs that could go no further they were to be disposed of.

Q: What was your reason for killing the 33 PWs on 1st Aug because they were weak and too ill to be of use to the Japanese?

A: There were not the only reasons. The biggest reason was because the PWs might attempt to escape, also there was a shortage of food and they could not transport rice or carry weapons for the KAWA Unit.

Q: Would you deny that no Allied forces ever landed within 100 miles of any position occupied by your troops between 25th May and 1st August last?

A: I did not know of this. I personally thought they were much closer.

Q: Is it not true that Capt. WATANABE knew before he ever left SANDAKAN that all the PWs who were ill and fell out, were to be killed?

A: Yes, he did know.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Defending Officer re-examines witness:

Q: You said that there were about 100 killed on the march from Sandakan to RUSAU - were they killed because they simply could not move at all?

A: Yes, but those shot while trying to escape are also in that 100.

Q: It has been stated that it took 26 days to get from SANDAKAN to RUSAU - is this the correct figure?

A: It took 26 days, arriving there on the 18th day.

Q: It has been stated that 15 Japanese soldiers died on the march. What percentage of the total Japanese involved does this constitute?

A: "10 per cent."

Q: Yesterday, the Prosecuting Officer read a document from the Chief of Staff. In it it said that orders had been given for only the healthy PWs to be taken on the march. The sick ones were to be left behind until they were completely cured and then they were to proceed. Did you know anything about this?

A: No. I never received this order at all.

R.P. 63 (B) complied with.

Accused, TAMAKURA, retires from the witness stand.

SECOND Witness for the defence:

WATAMAE, Capt., Capt., having made a solemn declaration through a sworn interpreter examined by Defending Officer:

My name is WATAMAE Sanno. My unit in the SUWA unit. I went to Sandakan from KUCHING on 2nd June 1944. I became an Officer of the PW Detachment Camp on 5th Sept. 42. I was stationed at KUCHING for 21 months and at SANDAKAN for 18 months. While at KUCHING my CO was Lt.-Col SUGA. When I came to SANDAKAN my CO was Capt. IKA KUSHIMURA and later on Capt. TAMAKURA. I was ordered by these three to look after the prisoners well and see that they had good conditions and good treatment all the time. I then passed these orders on to my NCOs. There were quite a few times when the situation became difficult but we always did our best to see that the prisoners were well taken care of. From about July or August 1944 we started to receive Allied air raids. Foodstuffs became scarce and what was grown in the field was burnt by enemy air action. Also from about that time the number of Japanese soldiers in the SANDAKAN area greatly increased. Because of this the food situation became much worse. The natives said that due to enemy air activity their crops had been burnt and so they could not give us any. We then did our best to grow foodstuffs ourselves. Due to growing our own foodstuffs we were able, even in during the period of Jan and Feb 45, to obtain about 2000 bottles of vegetables a day. We also made an effort to grow tapioca for our own purposes. We did our best not to use the tapioca we grew ourselves but to keep it in reserve in case of a very bad period. We did our best to obtain tapioca from other sources and we often had quarrels over this with other Japanese units in the area. The vegetable and tapioca position was not too bad but meat and fish were scarcely obtainable. In February 45 Capt. KUSHIMURA sent officers out to other units in an attempt to procure more fish. These officers managed to obtain some fish but not a large quantity. Once Capt. KUSHIMURA even killed his own horses and gave the meat to the sick PWs. We also went out and shot wild buffalo in order to obtain more meat. We also killed cattle and secretly distributed the meat. This action of ours was unlawful. The Doctor of the Hospital and others did all they could to get medicines as the stock was running low. We did all these things so that the best possible could be done for the PWs. Then the war situation became very bad and we received orders to take prisoners to RAJAH. We set out from SANDAKAN on 29th May 45. In order that the compound at SANDAKAN would not be bombed we constructed boards 10 metres square and wrote on them in white paint the letters "PW"; we put these boards on the ground around the camp. However we were ordered by 37th Army HQ to remove them. We did all these things in order that the prisoners would be well looked after but enemy air raids greatly increased and there was fear of an early landing. Due to this the Army HQ ordered us to leave and so we set out on the trip to RAJAH. I went along on the march. There were 99 members from the SUWA unit in the OKUMURA Battalion who came to assist us in guarding the prisoners on the march. There were 48 men from our unit that went along. There were divided into three groups, one group being attached to the SUWA Unit, another group under Sgt Major TANI and a third group under my command. Every day the PWs were split into three groups. The first group leaving at 0600 in the morning and the other two at half hour intervals after the first group. Then at about 10 o'clock I started out with my group of guards and Sgt Major TANI started out about 10 o'clock.

My group would get the names and particulars of any prisoners that had fallen to the Japanese and try to take them on with them. However, if the Japanese simply could not do so, my group went ahead leaving one man to guard him. They would be picked up by Sgt. Major TOSHI's group. Every morning the guards in the three groups would be changed around and I could give Sgt. Major TOSHI orders as to what time to start and what to do. Then my group would leave an hour and a half after the prisoners and one hour before his group. My group would usually reach the resting place for the night at about 4 o'clock and Sgt. Major TOSHI's group would arrive about 5 o'clock. After his group arrived Sgt. Major TOSHI would come to me and make a report on the number of prisoners who had been shot, died of sickness or escaped. Then I could take this figure to my superior. In this manner we proceeded to RABU. We did all we could to see that as many PW as possible made the march. Sometimes the Japanese guards would carry what luggage the PW had for them or give them a little extra food or do little things to make things a bit more pleasant. On one occasion I saw a prisoner being chased by Japanese guards while making an attempt to escape. I remember that I made a report to the effect that five prisoners had attempted to escape and while one had succeeded the other four had been shot. When we arrived at RABU the prisoners were quite weary. There was a shortage of food and although we did expect to try and obtain more it was not possible. We did receive supplies from the KATALAN Unit which had been captured at RABU. Now and then we would go out at night and steal cattle which we would kill and share the meat with the PW. Although we did all this it was still far from enough and the death rate increased all the time. The deaths increased until there were only 33 prisoners left. My CO told me that ~~practically~~ all of them were very sick and would die sooner or later that they should be shot. It was 1st August 1945 when he gave me these orders. The prisoners and the Japanese guards had been together for three years and had become friendly with each other. The Japanese soldiers had had no wish to kill all the PW both on the march and later on at RABU but they were given orders by their superior officers and they had to carry them out. Some of the NCOs and men refused to do this but I told them that it was an order and had to be carried out. In STRICKLAND's statement read yesterday it said that Capt. TOSHI and myself had visited the compound at SARDAN at 2 o'clock on the morning of 28th May 1945. It also said that he saw the compound medicines and other things being burnt. This is not correct. It also said that I had been asked to supply a Red Cross flag or other type of markings which could be used to shot the Allied bombers that that was a PW and that I had refused this. That is not true. As I stated this morning we had constructed signs that had been ordered by Army HQ that they were not to be used. I would like to state again that we had no wish whatever to kill the prisoners but had been forced to do so by order given to us.

Defending officer further examines witness :-

Q. Were there any mistakes in Capt. TOSHI's evidence, the lot of which was read back to him this morning?

A. No, there were no mistakes.

Q. How were the dead bodies of the prisoners disposed of during the march? Was a machine gun used to kill the prisoners?

A. The bodies of the PW were taken into the jungle and where possible were buried and ~~where~~ where not were covered over with dead foliage. We did have a machine gun on the march but this was never used. When we arrived at RABU we accounted for every round that we had started out from SARDAN with.

Q. In your interrogation report you stated that you heard firing every day, is this right?

A. No, that is not right.

Prosecuting officer cross-examines witness :-

Q. Is it a fact that all the prisoners who were at SARDAN on 28th May last were sick and suffering from malnutrition?

A. No, there were healthy PW who worked in the kitchens and did various other jobs.

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I, ~~SHIMAZU~~ Takuo, testify as follows -

On the 26th April, 1945 I first received orders from 37th Army H.Q.s that I was to commence duties with the Borneo F.W. Unit. The order did not state where I was to commence duties so I communicated with H.Q.s of Borneo F.W. Unit, KUCHING. On the 17th May, 1945 I took over duties from Captain HOSHIOJIMA at Sandakan F.W. camp.

While I was in Sandakan I received my orders relating to the treatment of P.W.s from 37th Army H.Q.s and also a confirming order from Lt. Col. SUGA at Kuching. All 37th Army instructions had first to be confirmed by Col. SUGA before I acted on them. Normal channels for instructions for SUGA Unit was from the Information Bureau, TOKIO, through ~~Army H.Q.s to H.Q.s~~ 37th Army thence to Col. SUGA. At the last when the war situation deteriorated and these channels closed 37th Army issued orders direct to Col. SUGA who was then bound to obey these instructions. When I took over Sandakan Camp there were regulations regarding the administration of the camp in existence. These set out how the P.W.s were to be treated and fed and how the guards were to ~~behave towards them~~. ~~Relationship~~ towards them. Rice supplies to Sandakan had been cut off during the time of Captain KOSHIMIZU and I was unable on taking over to issue the quantity of food then laid down. When 37th Army were informed of this food position they issued fresh ration instructions with which I was able to comply. The Japanese received their food rations through the army but P.W.s only had what they grew themselves. I officially issued no rice to them while I was there and I consider that they did not have sufficient to live on. I tried to get rice for them but orders forbade it so I let them have the tapioca they were growing. Captain KOSHIMIZU himself during his period of administration had often demanded an increase in rations for the P.W.s from 37th Army H.Q.s but to no avail. 37th Army was fully aware of the condition of the P.W.s.

On the 29th May, 1945 I left with 536 P.W.s for Ranau. It was originally intended by 37th Army to move the P.W.s to Komanai, but there was insufficient food there and instructions were changed saying to proceed to Ranau. I was told by 37th Army to take all P.W.s regardless of their condition. I therefore signalled back to Army H.Q.s saying there were 400 stretcher cases and 200 could not walk and only about a fifth would reach their destination. I also pointed out in my signal that the staff officer at 37th Army H.Q.s was fully aware of these facts. I received no reply to this signal and interpreted this as confirmation to carry out the previous order. On my own responsibility I left 288 P.W.s behind and later was reprimanded for this. Besides my Formosan guards I had extra guards from OTSUKA Unit. These were made of the remnants of OKAYAMA Force who had been left behind in hospital. 2/Lt. SUZUKI (at present on LABUAN) was in charge of these.

I instructed ICHIKAWA (Q.M.) to arrange for ration points along the route. The first point was at the 49 mile where ten days rations were issued. After this rations were distributed by him travelling two days ahead of the main party and from time to time allowing it to catch up and again issuing further ten days supply. There were no medical posts along the route to look after those P.W.s who became too sick to travel. My initial plan was to leave those that became too sick to travel behind with someone to look after them but the numbers were so great that this scheme proved impracticable. I therefore instructed S/W ~~XXXX~~ TSUJI to bring along whatever P.W.s that he could and as a last resource to shoot the P.W.s rather than leave them behind to die. These orders were issued on my own responsibility and were not issued from any higher authority. I was in a theatre of war and believed that the enemy were behind me and had to act on my own initiative. When I arrived at Ranau I reported to Major WATANABE Yoshio. When I told him that I had been forced to kill many of the P.W.s on the way over he said it was a very difficult march and could not be helped. From Boto to Ranau I was in territory commanded by Major WATANABE and it was he who instructed me to take the P.W.s to the 110 1/2 mile camp and stay there. At this camp the food position was just as bad as in Sandakan. There was no food

TAKAKUMA Takuo Statement (continued)

in Ranau. This had all been used by troops staging at Ranau on route to Kamungga. I discussed the situation with Major WATANABE who said it was no use applying to the Q.M. department for rations as they did not have any and vegetables could not be supplied. About the end of July Major WATANABE instructed me to send some of my soldiers to Kalawat I believe for rice. About 15 or 20 went and brought back 20 kilos of rice. All the P.W.s were dead by the time this party returned. When I first arrived in Ranau Major WATANABE wanted to know if the P.W.s could be used in work. I told him that even if they were given a full ration of 300 grams of rice a day they were still too sick to work so he said to me to do the best I could with them.

(X) See paragraph inserted at the end of the statement. As far as I know Major WATANABE was not aware of my intention to dispose of the P.W.s on the 1st August. I did not confer with him on this subject and disposed of them on my own responsibility. Although in bed I knew what was going on in the camp through 1/Lt. WATANABE. I knew that I would have to move in the near future and rather than be encumbered and hampered with sick P.W.s thought it best to kill them. My other reasons were that there was no food and I feared that they would all escape. When the order to move finally arrived all the P.W.s were dead.

The movement order from 37th Army H.Q.s told me to make the P.W.s available to KANNO BUTAI (Machine Gun unit) to assist them in carrying their ammunition to Beaufort and it did not matter if they died while employed on this task.

The Camp at Sandakan was destroyed on orders received from 37th Army H.Q.s. An Allied landing was expected there on the 27th May and all installations in the area were to be denied to the enemy. Consequently the barracks were destroyed so that the enemy could not use them. I know these orders were in existence since I had prepared the plan for the defence of Sandakan area. For this reason I destroyed the barracks.

I, TAKAKUMA Takuo, solemnly affirm and declare that the above statement is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

(Sgd) Takuo TAKAKUMA.

I, HASEGAWA certify that I have this day read the above statement to the declarant in Japanese and I solemnly declare that I have truthfully and faithfully conveyed the meaning of the English to the best of my ability.

(Sgd) HK HASEGAWA

Declared before me at LABURN on 12 Dec 1945

(Sgd) JB ORAM Lt

Re In the course of a conversation with Col OTSUKA on 27 May 1945 before I left SANDAKAN, he mentioned that under the present conditions it would be inadvisable to leave any P.W.s behind while marching to Ranau. Far better that they should be disposed of as they would be in the way of any fighting that took place along the track. On many occasions prior to this Col OTSUKA had expressed the opinion that it would be better if all P.W.s were dead.

(X) When I reported to Major WATANABE, Yoshio on my arrival at Ranau and he learned that the P.W.s would be of no value for working parties he expressed the opinion that it would be better if the P.W.s at Ranau were to die off quickly implying that they might be assisted to die. I told him that they were receiving 100 gms of rice per day at the moment and that this was not enough for them to work on. I suggested increasing the ration to 300 gms per day but he said that they had already tried that before on the Ranau P.W.s and that they were still unable to work on it. He therefore refused my request to increase the rations.

I certify that I have compared the within statement with the original statement of Captain TAKAKUMA Takuo and that it is a true copy thereof.

..... Lt. Col.
President.

STATEMENT BY 1 LT. WATANABE Genjo

Made in the presence of Lt. J.T. Cross 30 Nov. 45

Lt. Lt. WATANABE, Genjo of SUGA BUTAI and TAKAKURA TAI landed at Kuching about 8 Sept 42 and stayed there until 30 May 44. I then went to Sandakan arriving on 2 Jun. 44. I was adj. to Col. SUGA and later performed Adj. duties at the P.W. camp. Document for movement from one camp to another passed through my hands. On arriving at Sandakan I carried out the same duties as at Kuching under CAPT. HOSHIOJIMA. HOSHIOJIMA was Comdr. until May when TAKAKURA took over. When I arrived MAGAI was there but he left 10 days later with the P.W. (100) for Labuan. I heard that later some of these P.W. went to BRUNEI under S/M SUGINO. On May 29 1945 I moved to Ranau with P.W. on orders from Army H.Q. We were then formed that an Australian landing at Sandakan was imminent and other reasons for movement being the severity of air-raids at Sandakan. Capt. TAKAKURA was i/c and I was 2 i/c for the movement. 2 Lt. SUGUJI from OKAYAMA BUTAI was also present and in addition were S/Maj. TSUJI S/Maj. ICHIKAWA(24), S/Maj. FUJITA(25), OZAWA(CIV. INTER), the last named for 4 days only. I remember S/Maj. STICPENICH. There were 536 P.W. in the party on leaving camp. There were 91 English and 439 Australian P.W. At 2100 hrs. on 1st. day of March 4 P.W. returned to Sandakan by truck from 11 mile. WO STICPENICH assumed charge of no. 2 group. There were only 6 short. Total 530. On leaving Sandakan I had no nominal roll of P.W. for movement. At the end of the asphalt road at end of the first day I called for nominal rolls of all P.W. then present. These were supplied by squad leaders. The first check from nominal rolls revealed discrepancy in numbers of about 6. I gave orders for FUKUSHIMA & TSUJI(S/Maj) to come along at the rear to make out list of dead & put such P.W. in the jungle. These men were assisted by other guards who were changed round from time to time. The last 2 soldiers to join the force at Sandakan were SUZUKI, Mitsuo and KOBAYASHI, Tetsuo. 3 parties of MG camp, to Tambunan in charge of YANO, Shoji and another. They were also OC of 3 party and I do not know the names of the OC of the other one party. I do not know who they are now. Throughout the march from Sandakan men dropped off along the track and others could not move in the mornings and were left at the previous night's camp. I remember the total destruction of Sandakan camp on 29 May 45. The P.W. were allowed to take some documents or medical supplies from the camp. There were burnt by us. A P.W. was only allowed to take what he could actually carry, the rest was left behind and destroyed. This was all done on TAKAKURA's orders and I was present while the destruction was carried out. I do not think that the destruction of the medical supplies was ~~justified~~ humane, or lawful. About 183 English and Australian ex P.W. arrived at Ranau out of the 536 that left Sandakan, of these 142 were Australians, and also 1 Australian who died on last day was carried in dead. Of the 352 unaccounted for 54 escaped and about 90 were ill and were put out of their misery by being shot. They asked for death rather than be left behind. I do not know exactly nor did reports show exactly accurately how death occurred. FUKUSHIMA & TSUJI dragged bodies into the jungle at TAKAKURA's orders soldiers were told to dispose of sick P.W. and to see that none were left behind. I was i/c of ~~the~~ the disposal of sick P.W. but was not present at the killings. I moved with the rear group with the exception of FUKUSHIMA's party. Each morning all those P.W. who were unable to travel were placed in groups for FUKUSHIMA & TSUJI. The disposal of these P.W. was done behind me and I never knew who killed them. I arrived at Ranau on the 25 June 45 and camped at the foot of the mountain 2 miles from Ranau. Next day everyone moved to Tambunan working camp at the 110th mile. (I clearly understand the sketch you have shown me) When I reached this camp there were already 9 P.W. under command of 2nd Lt. SUZUKI, this made a total of 192 P.W. in the camp under the command of TAKAKURA. The figure of 54 escapees was arrived at as the number unaccounted for on my lists. This was the only way I could account for them. I did not make out any death certificates and I cannot remember any being made out.

When S/M STICPESWICH escaped the orders were to recapture him and find out the plans made by others to escape. There was no order to shoot him.

The investigation into JOHN HORE'S escape was conducted by MORITAKE and HOSHIMURA. HORE was killed and his body placed on the P.W. camp sign. HOSHIMURA and I viewed the body there. I think HORE was shot in the chest by HIGATA Genzo.

Prior to that escape P.W.s were caught going under the wire at the end of the camp to get food through a drain pipe. These men were taken back to H.Q.s and placed in the guard house and were later put in the cage, as we viewed this as a serious offence. The KEMPEI TAI were not concerned with this. I saw the men in the cage but had nothing to do with their treatment. I know that one who was very sick, died in the cage. HOSHIMURA was in charge and gave orders to MORITAKE as to the treatment of these P.W.s.

Three days after S/M STICPESWICH escaped at RAMAU sick P.W.s were taken on stretchers up the hill to the cemetery. This was the 1st August, 1945. Since I arrived at LABUAN I have made further enquiries and as far as I can determine the date the P.W.s were taken up to the cemetery and killed was the 1st August, 1945. There were 17 of these sick men. I was in charge and Sgt. OKADA and approximately ten Formosan guards were also present at the killing. All the Formosan guards were actually posted to the camp were in the camp area on that day. I may be able to recognise some of these guards if I saw them.

After these 17 were killed there were about 16 left in the camp and these were also shot on 1st August, 1945. 11 of these were taken about 100 metres along the road towards TAKAHARA and shot. S/M TSUJII with a fresh lot of about 15 or 16 Formosan guards shot the second batch. These two killings were at the same time - 1000 1000 hours on 1st August, 1945. I do not know the names of the P.W.s killed. PEGGON, COOK, CHOPPIN, CATSHOT, DANIELS (English Doctor), MASKEY, and EVANS may have been among them. I only knew a few at SANDAKAN and only knew a few of the section leaders on the march.

Civilian FUJITA (interpreter) was present in camp but had nothing to do with the killings. Sgt. BEPPU took five P.W. officers about 100 metres towards RAMAU he had ten Formosan guards with him. Also at 1000 hours on 1st August, 1945, at the 11 1/2 mile junction of two roads and behind rice store Sgt. BEPPU's party shot the five P.W. officers.

Sgt. IWASE was out searching for STICPESWICH and had nothing to do with the killings. S/M MORIEMAI had not yet arrived from SANDAKAN. I did not know that it was a general order from Army H.Q.s to kill P.W.s. I do not know what MORITAKE's orders were. They were given direct from TAKAHARA. My orders came only from my commander TAKAHARA.

FUJITA (medical Sargeant) had been wounded and was in bed in the camp area at the time of the killings. I do not know what the reason was for the killings, but I think it possible that the commanders feared that the P.W.s would escape.

Sgt. BEPPU's party killed	6	P.W.s
" OKADA's " "	17	P.W.s
" TSUJII's " "	11	P.W.s
	33	

The order for the killing was secret. I have carefully checked the date and am sure that the killings took place on 1st August, 1945. Information other than this must be mistaken.

I first knew that the war was over on the 2nd September, 1945. Documents from H.Q.s gave this information. I heard some surrender bills were dropped from aircraft about 20th August, 1945, but did not believe them and thought that they were just propaganda.

On the 28th July, 1945, I remember Captain COCK bringing documents to me from deceased P. W.s for despatch to allied command. These were all burnt with my personal gear at BAKAU. After 1st August, 1945 the camp moved first to TAMBUNAN arriving there 20th August, 1945 and later moved to BAPONG.

I, 1/Lt. WATANABE Genzo, do solemnly affirm the above statement to be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

(sgd.) WATANABE Genzo.

Affirmed before me at LABUAN on 8-12-45.

(Sgd.) J.T. ORAM Lt.

I, Allen Reginald TOWNSEND, solemnly and sincerely declare that I have read the above statement to the 1/Lt. WATANABE Genzo carefully and truthfully interpreting the meaning of the English to the best of my ability.

(Sgd.) A.R. TOWNSEND, Corp

Sworn before me at LABUAN on 8-12-45.

(Sgd.) J.T. ORAM Lt.

I certify that I have compared the within statement with the original statement of 1st Lieut. WATANABE Genzo and that it is a true copy thereof.

[Signature]
.....Lt. Col.
President.

500
SERIAL N.

INTERVIEW WITH INTERVIEWER OF THE WITNESS

- Q. You were one of the last to start on the daily march?
A. Yes.
- Q. Many PWs were too sick to start marching and just lay at the starting point?
A. There were some too ill to start and were left with a rear party.
- Q. The rear party caught up later?
A. About 4 or 5 hours later.
- Q. Some of the left behind marched on did they; but just died?
A. Yes.
- Q. This rear party just shot anyone too weak to march?
A. Yes there were some cases.
- Q. Normally a man with an ILL was left behind wasn't he?
A. 3 days in the guard group.
- Q. What did the guards use to finish off those too ill to go on?
A. Rifles.
- Q. Actually you heard shooting and knew what was going on?
A. Yes, I knew what was going on.
- Q. There were probably 100 PWs died that way?
A. I don't know for certain but believe about 1/3 died that way.
- Q. There were hospitals on the track but no PWs were admitted were they?
A. There were hospitals en route and we did not admit PWs. There were aid stations.
- Q. Some Jap troops were admitted?
A. Yes.
- Q. Why were PWs not admitted?
A. That is the doing of the unit command.
- Q. What was that?
A. TAKEMURA. And I took orders from him.
- Q. There was no Officer in charge of this rear party?
A. That is so.
- Q. They were just a group of Pannuan civilian guards?
A. Yes.
- Q. Actually you were in charge of that group?
A. Yes.
- Q. Who ordered that the ILL be shot if unable to march?
A. These were the unit command's orders, TAKEMURA.
- Q. What were TAKEMURA's actual orders?
A. TAKEMURA's orders were that because of the landings and because it was necessary to speed up the march that those who were too sick or too tired to continue the march would be shot. This was partly because we had no medical supplies and little food.
- Q. Do you think TAKEMURA was ordered to issue that order or did it on his own account?
A. I do not know.
- Q. When did TAKEMURA issue that order?
A. I heard about it before leaving TAKEMURA.

- Q. TAKERU told you that the PWs unable to proceed would be shot. He told you that before the march and again later didn't he?
- A. TAKERU spoke to me about it before and during the trip but there were no actual orders.
- Q. When the orders issued?
- A. During the first days march.
- Q. When you discussed it before the march with TAKERU did you protest?
- A. It was only a discussion. I did not protest as TAKERU was senior.
- Q. How many times did you witness these shootings?
- A. I did not actually see it but heard shooting every day.
- Q. Were the shootings carried out decently?
- A. They were decently without atrocities. I only saw one shooting.
- Q. There were only 183 PWs who arrived at RAHAW out of 537?
- A. Yes.
- Q. During the march the PWs frequently had to live on roots of trees without other food hadn't they?
- A. When vegetables were scarce this was so.
- Q. Some days this was all they had to eat?
- A. At the commencement they had rice ration but there might have been times when all the PW had to eat was roots and shrubs.

I certify that I have compared the above copy extracts with the original statement of 1st Lieut. WATANABE Genzo and that such copy extracts are true copies of the respective portions of the original statement.

(Sgt) R. G. Reynolds Lt. Col.
President.

EXHIBIT W

STATEMENT BY CHADA Toshiharu, Sgt. W. C. 491.

I, Sgt. CHADA, Toshiharu (491) former member of Suga Butai, testify as follows:

I landed at Kuching in Dec 1943. I stayed there about 5 months. On 22nd June 1944 went to Labuan Island. When I arrived there there were already 100 PWs on the island. Capt HAGAI was in charge. I arrived in Ranau on 23 Feb 1945, in company with Capt HAGAI, and Lieut SUZUKI Yasukazu and Sgt BEIYU. I heard from FUGITA (interpreter) that there were then 323 PWs in the Ranau area, including 100 at FUGITA's.

I remember the two men that escaped from Ranau PW camp and who were later recaptured and brought back to the camp by the KEMPEI TEI. One of them had escaped again and I have not heard of him since. The other man was placed in the guard house, probably on the orders of Capt HAGAI and was on half rations (200 grams of rice). He died in the guardhouse of sickness and lack of medical attention. His death was probably due to starvation.

On 27 April 1945 I moved to No. 1 Jungle camp. Sixty (60) Prisoners of War went with us. After staying there for two nights I left this camp on the morning of 29th April and with Capt HAGAI inspected a proposed camp site at the 1101 mile. In the course of my duty I revisited No. 1 Jungle camp on several occasions. The last time was on the 7th or 8th of June 1945 when there were about 22 or 23 PWs still alive. I remember HAGAI bringing ten PWs over to No. 2 Jungle Camp on 10th June 1945. About the same time 2nd Lieut SUZUKI Yasukazu died at No. 2 Jungle Camp on 2nd July 1945. He was shot by one of the Japanese soldiers.

On 1st August 1945 Capt TAKAJIMA called a conference of all NCOs and issued instructions for the disposal of all the remaining PWs. I was ordered to take all the sick to the cemetery and kill them. I then detailed a party of Formosan guards as follows:

MARUDA Rebenaga	SEJOI Shinoko	HIKETA Ginjaro
MIYAKE Tadao	YOSHIOKA Shigeo	HIRAGUCHI Jiro
YASUYAMA Eikichi	YOSHIOKA Teiji	TAKAHARA Koji (deceased)

I posted four guards in the camp area. They were not present at the killing. Their names are as follows:

YOSHIOKA Saburo, FUJIMURA Tetsukichi, YOSHIMURA Tetsuhiko and HAYASHIDA Mitsujiro. (I am not sure whether this man was at the killing or not).

One or two of the 17 PWs walked up to the cemetery, the remainder were carried up on stretchers. The Formosans, excluding the 4 guards, carried the PWs on the stretchers. As I had no interpreter with me the PWs were not told what was going to happen to them, but they probably realized their fate when they got to the cemetery. The PWs were put on the ground, the guards lined up and I ordered them to open fire. The Formosans did not want to shoot and neither did I, but I had my orders and so had to fire first to set an example to them. We then kept firing until they were all dead. After the death of the prisoners YOSHIMURA Tetsukichi brought up spades and shovels for us to dig the graves. He did not remain but returned to camp. The Formosans then dug two holes and buried the Prisoners of War.

Of the four guards mentioned above, as not being present at the killing, I am not sure of the movement of HAYASHIDA Mitsujiro. He may or may not have been present.

1/Lt MATSUMOTO gave no instructions to commence carrying out Capt TAKAJIMA's order prior to taking the PWs up to the cemetery. He came up while we were burying the PWs.

I, Sgt CHADA Toshiharu, solemnly affirm and declare that the above statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

(Sgd).....

I, P.L. Hasegawa, certify that I have this day read the above statement of the declarant in Japanese, and I solemnly declare that I have and faithfully conveyed the meaning of the English to the best of my ability.

Signed H.K. Hasegawa

Comment by WO 1 Stilepewich: I have had no contact with this man since he arrived from Labuan with Capt MAGAI. While in RANAU camp he spoke of nothing but in the PWs whatever.

Signed W.H. Stilepewich

Declared before me at Labuan on 12 Dec 1945

J.T. Oran
Lt.

I certify that I have compared the within statement with the original statement of Sgt. OZADA Toshiharu and that it is a true copy thereof.

(Sgd) R.C. Reynolds Lt.
President.

STATEMENT BY HIROTA GINJIRO.

Formosa

SUGA HIDEKI

I, HIROTA GINJIRO, Formosa, former member of SUGA HIDEKI, testify as follows:

I left SANDAKAN on 29th May with about 536 PWs en route to RAHAT. A number of PWs dropped out and never reached RAHAT. Each morning PWs who were too sick to move out were rounded up by the guards according to WATANABE's orders. Sgt. TSUJI Tetsuji and FUJIMURA Masao taking their names and numbers. Then WATANABE would order the guards to kill the PWs. Every guard who was on this trip from SANDAKAN to RAHAT was killed at least one PW, and the officers and NCOs saw to it. Our duty changed daily and every third day I would be with the rest of my section engaged in the morning killings at the camp site.

I remember the time that WO STORICH escaped, and also the 1st of August when all the guards were called up by WATANABE and NCOs and given instructions to dispose of the rest of the PWs. Parties were detailed. I was detailed to Sgt. OKADA for this disposal of the sick PWs who were left when those who could walk were removed from the camp. The PWs who were carried up the hill on stretchers and those who could move at all (crawl) were forced up to the grave site.

The killing party on the 1st Aug. were as follows:-

Sgt. OKADA Toshikazu,
HIROGUCHI Jiro,
SHOJI Shinzuke,
YASUYAMA Kiyochi,
MORIYAMA Tetsuji,
FUJIMURA Tetsukichi,
SUZUKI Mitsuru (who is now dead)

MATSUDA Nobuharu,
TAKAHARA Koji,
MIYAKE Tadao,
HAYASHIDA Mitsunori,
TOGO Saburo,
YOSHIMIZU Tatsuhide

I saw Sgt. OKADA borrow a rifle from a guard and shoot a PW. This was the first shot fired. Then of all of us who were present were ordered to shoot. The PWs were mostly shot through the head and practically no suffering was noticed. We then buried the bodies in two graves, those who died naturally in one, the murdered ones in the other.

I remember 3 PW escaping from SANDAKAN No. 1 Camp. Also I heard about a MALAY who came a few days later at about 7.30 p.m. and reported having seen the three escapees in his Kampong. I heard that Lt. MOTOHARA 2/Lt MORITAKE and Sgt. SHOJI and two truck loads of guards went to airfield. While they were searching for the escapees in groups and the guards from the airport came to report that two had already been shot.

I saw a picture from a photo the soldier who shot the two PWs. The orders were to capture the PWs and question them and later shoot them. As far as I was told those two PWs were in a small native boat.

I remember the second shooting of a PW who had been found outside the compound. I don't know the number of cartridges which took place after the PW was caught but I know he was shot. I know that MOTOHARA was in command and MORITAKE gave the order to shoot the PW. The order was carried out by HIRATA Gensei.

On 1 Aug 1945 there was a search party out trying to recapture two PWs, STORICH and HIRATA. The party consisted of Sgt. IMADA, SAITO, ITO, and TAKAHARA Kiyuo.

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I remember the incidents of Iwa being put into the
penitentiary. This was carried out at the order of the
JAPANESE and MOROZAKI.

The sentences range from as high as 20 days as far as I
remember with no food up to 7 days. There were many who
part of the sentence and look sick from the treatment and
returned to the camp and later died as a result.

I, HIROTA Shinjiro, solemnly affirm and declare that the
on the face hereof is the truth the whole truth and nothing
the truth.

(Sgd)

The statement on the face hereof has been read over to me by
A. Townsend Cpl, and I clearly understand the meaning and
hereof. Further I make this statement voluntarily and without
any undue pressure or duress being brought to bear.

I, A. Townsend, certify that I have this day read the statement
the face hereof to the Declarant in Japanese and I solemnly
that I have truthfully and faithfully conveyed the meaning of
English to the declarant, to the best of my ability.

(Sgd) A. Townsend Cpl.

Comment by WO STICKFITCH: This man was in charge of garden
parties mostly sick Iwa and lashed them about plenty with sticks
and kicking.

(Sgd) W.E. STICKFITCH.

Declared before me at LAEGAN 10 Dec 45.

(Sgd) J.B. GRAM, Lieut.

I certify that I have compared the within statement with the
statement of HIROTA Shinjiro and that it is a true copy thereof.

(Sgd) E. REYNOLDS, Lt Col.
President.

STATEMENT OF LT-GEN BABA MASAO

I. I am Lt-Gen BABA Masao.

II. I was engaged in the operations in BORNEO from JAN 45 till the cessation of the hostilities as the GOC of the 37th Army. I regret from the bottom of my heart that some members of my command committed atrocities against a large number of Australian and British POWs during that period.

In order to make clear the truth of the facts alleged by the Prosecution in the Charge against me, I would like to frankly state what I know of these alleged facts, dividing them into three groups corresponding to the three groups of evidences produced by the Prosecution, that is:

1. The orders regarding the first march
- 160 2. The orders regarding the second ^{transfer} ~~march~~ 1304
3. The atrocities committed by the members of my command.

III. With regard to the orders regarding the first march.

On 21 JAN 45, I arrived at HQ the 37th Army, JESSELTON, NORTH BORNEO, from SUMATRA.

At that time, the units stationed along the EAST coast of NORTH BORNEO had already begun to move to the WEST coast.

On my arrival, I received a report from the Chief of Staff to the effect that:

1. At the end of DEC 44, the GOC the 37th Army was ordered by Marshal TERAUCHI, Supreme Commander of the South General Army to consolidate the defence of the areas surrounding the BRUNEI Bay, by concentrating the forces on the SOUTH CHINA SEA coast, moving them from the EAST coast of NORTH BORNEO.

Based upon the above orders the 37 Army orders were already issued on 12 JAN 45. According to this Army orders about 8 infantry bns out of 10 inf bns, the main body of the 37th Army, which had been stationed on the EAST coast and the neighbouring islands were at the moment moving to the WEST coast.

2. It was also decided on that the SANDAKAN POWs Camp be moved off to RANAU with this movement of forces.

As its first step, it was included in the above-mentioned Army

orders that about 500 POWs in good health should be moved to RANAU being escorted by the 2nd Bn (YAMAMOTO Bn) of the 25th Inf. Mixed Regt. The reasons for the movement of SANDAKAN POWs Camp were as follows:

(a) Anticipating that advancing operations of the Allied Forces against both the EAST and WEST coasts of NORTH BORNEO would be necessarily materialized, POWs had to be moved, out of the dangerous fighting areas, and to another place where it would be easy to secure their food for a long period.

In view of these two terms, RANAU was chosen for the place for the said POWs Camp to move to.

(b) RANAU completely possessed the above two terms. In other words, it was chosen because we considered as follows.

Against the advancing operations to NORTH BORNEO by the powerful Allied Forces, it would be possible for us to endure long-termed protracted operations, if we could hold, against the attack from the EAST, the boundary districts between EAST coast and WEST coast Residencies, WEST of BOTO, and, against the attack from the WEST, the mountains along the road between RANAU and TOARAN. And as, being located just in the central part between both the anticipated flanks, RANAU was the safest place and, moreover, in such a district where it was easy to procure rice, it would become unnecessary for POWs to move anywhere else thereafter, once they moved there.

(c) SANDAKAN had faced urgent food situation after the cessation of transportation by sea and it was expected the uneasiness would increase more in the future. And after this movement of the forces only one infbn was to be left behind at SANDAKAN. If such a small strength would be imposed with both duties of defending the vast SANDAKAN districts and of protecting the POWs Camp, there might occur unexpected results on account of their excessive duties. Therefore, it would be inadequate from every possible viewpoint that the POWs Camps would be left behind at SANDAKAN as they were.

3. The road for the march had been reconstructed since NOV 44 as a line of communication route for the units stationed in SANDAKAN

districts, along which staging points had been set up, so there was no anxiety for the march of POWs.

This road was used when a battalion of the defensive units on the EAST coast went from JESSELTON to SANDAKAN in about NOV 44. And also when a joint training of the recruits who ^{had been} were raised from among Japanese civilian residents in the EAST and WEST coast districts was held at RANAU in DEC 44, the men recruited at SANDAKAN came to RANAU along this road and after the training finished at the beginning of JAN 45, they safely came back SANDAKAN passing this road again. The 103 Road Construction Unit had been stationed along this road and still engaging in the repair of defective points.

4. The YAMAMOTO Bn, in charge of the escort of the moving POWs, came from MANCHUKUO to BORNEO in SEP 44 and was one of the excellent units in the 37th Army.

5. With regard to the days required for the march, there were sufficient days given, as that unit would be accompanied by POWs and the Bn Comdr was authorized to lengthen or shorten the number of days for the march, in accordance with the conditions (of the march).

6. Regarding the supply during the march, staging points had been established in main villages on this line of communication route, of which the portion in the EAST of the boundary between the EAST and the WEST coast Residencies had been taken charge of by the SANDAKAN Garrison and the other portion, in the WEST of the boundary, by the 1st L. of C. Unit, RANAU, where they had supplied passing troops with provisions and medical supplies. And also they had been directed to prepare aid stations to help acute patients taking ill in the course of the march.

Receiving this report as above-mentioned in general, I was satisfied with it within my knowledge which I had acquired by that time and did not feel at all uneasy about it. Since then, I had to direct the main point of my duties to setting up a new operational plan and appropriately proceeding to the operational attitude therein laid down.

IV. With regard to the orders regarding the 2nd transfer.

A. As the transfer of the SANDAKAN POW Camp to RANAU had been already decided on and was being carried out, it became my duty to carry out this important task safely. Therefore, I investigated various matters concerning the movement and carried them out, urging my staff officers and the units concerned. The main points were as follows:

1. In the middle of FEB, I dispatched Capt NAKAYAMA, in charge of supply, to HQ 1st L. of C. Unit, RANAU, to order it to accumulate provisions and medical supplies along the 1st line of communication route. A little time before that I ordered the OC SANDAKAN Garrison through wireless to take the same measures in respect of the same matters. At the same time I ordered the OC 1st L of C Unit, Maj WATANABE, who was also the OC 103 Road Construction Unit, to repair the 1st L. of C. route, especially their flooded parts and to reconstruct steep slopes and staging camps. And also I ordered him and OC SANDAKAN Garrison Unit especially to replenish the infirmaries at PAGINATAN, MILULU, BOTO, and MUANAT for patients taking ill during the march, and to establish new aid stations at SAPIRO (EAST of BOTO) and KALAPIS (SOUTH of BELURAN) to accomodate acute patients. I also dispatched Capt NAKAYAMA to the RANAU POW Camp to request the OC thereof to investigate the conditions of the march and the health condition of the POWs and to make efforts to enable the POWs to recover from exhaustion as immediately as possible. In addition, I informed Lt-Col SUGA, the OC KUCHING POW Camp, of the conditions during and after the first march and requested him to take necessary steps.

2. I called up Capt YAMAMOTO, OC of the first march to HQ the Army and heard of the conditions of the march from him, when I learned the following matters in general and made efforts to improve them.

(a) The march was more difficult than expected. Owing to the continued rains after the departure the EAST Coast Residency was flooded everywhere and entering into the WEST Coast Residency the road became comparatively better, but there were

so many steep ascents that they felt difficult to move on.

(b) The provisions to be rationed on the way were swept away by the flood, so it was difficult to receive as much as required. It was especially so in the EAST Coast Residency. 8-1

(c) As to the conditions of the march, about 50 out of 300 Japanese soldiers and about 100 out of 450 POWs died due to the exhaustion caused by this march. He also requested Maj WATANABE at RANAU to make further inquiry into these matters. 8-3

3. Hearing this report, I was surprised very much at its unexpected results and immediately took the following steps.

(a) I ordered, through the Chief of Staff who was also the General Military Administrator, the Governors of the EAST and WEST Coast Residencies to urge the delivery of foodstuffs and to help the COs SANDAKAN Garrison and RANAU 1st L. of C Unit in accumulating foodstuffs.

(b) I ordered the Military Topographical Branch to enlarge and revise the old military topographies upon the report of the first march and especially to investigate the conditions of waterway transportation between SANDAKAN and BOTO by the LAEUK River.

(c) I ordered the Staff Section to try more scrupulous research into the movement of the SANDAKAN POW Camp to RANAU.

(d) I told Lt-Col SUGA, OC the KUCHING POW Camp, to make full preparations for the movement of the SANDAKAN POW Camp to RANAU, which the Army expected to make on the completion of the repairing of the 1st L. of C. roads.

B. In regard to this movement, I had made such preparations as stated above. Meanwhile, as the Allied Air Force base proceeded to PALAWAN Is, the enemy's bombings to NORTH BORNEO became severer and severer. Although the advance of the Allied Forces to NORTH BORNEO was anticipated in the near future, I could not foresee on which coast, EAST or WEST, the enemy's landing would be carried out. Then, on 17 MAY, the commander of SANDAKAN POW Camp was changed under the orders of the South General Army and Capt TAKAKUWA succeeded

Capt HOSHIJIMA. I told Capt TAKAKUWA my desire regarding the treatment of POWs and at the same time told him to inquire Capt HOSHIJIMA fully about the latter's plan of the waterway transportation. I also so told and requested Col SUGA as well. I permitted Capt HOSHIJIMA to move to KAMANSHI by waterway, but I ordered him to establish a plan of movement by ship, from KAMANSHI to BOTO, going up the LABUK River, as the stay at KAMANSHI would be temporary and I intended to transfer the POW Camp to RANAU in due course of time. I also granted a permission to use the Marine Engineer Unit at SANDAKAN for that purpose.

C. About that time, I received reports repeatedly on the probability of the enemy's landing at SANDAKAN from the SANDAKAN Garrison Commander, so I was determined to transfer the SANDAKAN Camp to RANAU and issued the order regarding the transfer on 20 MAY. In this order the GOC's intention to transfer the SANDAKAN Camp to RANAU was manifestly shown, and in addition, it was included that, with regard to the preparations to be made for carrying this transfer out, and the CO's of the units concerned, (Capt TAKAKUWA, OC the Barge Engineer Unit, OC SANDAKAN Garrison, OC NAMI Unit, OC Military Hospital, and OC Supply Depot) should confer mutually. But the commencing day of the transfer and the classification of POWs into groups was not yet included.

My opinion as to the method of the transfer of the SANDAKAN Camp consisted of two ways put together, that is, march by land and waterway transportation. That is,

- (a) Those who could bear the long trip to be marched through the land course.
- (b) The rest to be transported by waterway.
- (c) Those POWs unable to move to be left behind at SANDAKAN.

So as stated above in this connection, I issued such orders, and at the same time ordered Capt TAKAKUWA to report the result of the conference to me and also ordered WATANABE Unit, RANAU, SANDAKAN Garrison and units then being between SANDAKAN and RANAU to assist the transfer.

D. In JESSELTON districts, however, the enemy's bombardments against

the railroad between JESSELTON and BEAUFORT were started in the morning of 21 MAY, so the Army HQ had to move to TENOM. Making the Chief of Staff with a Staff Officer, IWAHASHI, start ahead to TENOM, I started from JESSELTON on the night of 22 and arrived at the new Army HQ at TENOM before noon of 26. There I received from the Chief of Staff a report that he, the Chief of Staff, early in that morning received a telegram from Capt TAKAKURA, in which he asked for the instruction concerning his suggestion regarding the march of POWs through the signal station at SANDAKAN. So I sent back a telegram to the effect that only healthy POWs should be marched.

E. In the morning of 27 MAY, I received from the SANDAKAN Garrison a telegram that said, the Allied Naval Force in cooperation with the Air Force launched attack against SANDAKAN, from the dawn of the same day, and severe fightings were going on at the moment and five or six warships invaded into the bay and were shelling by ship-guns. But the communication was suspended before noon and we could not communicate with them for the ensuing ten days and thereabout.

On or about 10 JUN, the communication was re-established and we came to know the following facts by a report from the OC SANDAKAN Garrison.

1. For three days beginning 27 MAY, SANDAKAN was fiercely attacked by co-operated naval and air forces and especially bombings and shellings from warships were so severe that the aerodrome became completely unserviceable and the town was almost ruined by fires caused by bombings and incendiary bombs.
2. Capt TAKAKURA conducting POWs started on the night of 29 MAY for RANAU.
3. This battle was the first of modern fightings which took place in BORNEO, especially the fighting on 29 was severe. Owing to this, there occurred temporarily such a tumult as citizens fell into a state of panic and began to evacuate to the hinterland and so on. But at the moment peace and tranquility has been recovered.

F. The march of the POWs toward RANAU was started under such conditions at the discretion of Capt TAKAKUWA, OC the POW Camp, which was unavoidable. If the march was carried out by only healthy men in peaceful *K.O.* circumstance; and the others were moved on board transport ships, I believe such bad results would not have occurred.

As a commander of the Japanese armed force, I swear by the Almighty God and declare that I have never had such intention as to compel even *K.O.* such POWs as unable to move on to make a march and that I have never given such orders.

G. In those days, on the WEST Coast, not a day passed by without our being machine-gunned and bombed by Allied planes. Especially the KENINGO air-field was destroyed completely. After that, from 28 MAY on the bombings against the railway between TENOM and BEAUFORT were started. And by the beginning of JUN, all the railway bridges on that line were destroyed. On 5 JUN there took place big bombings against TENOM, whereby the town was burnt down and ruined within only one day. And the next day the Army HQ also was bombed, and the electric power-station was damaged, whereby the communications with various places were suspended for some time. On 9 JUN, the Allied Forces launched the landing operations on the LABUAN Is and on the coast of BURNEI and then on or about 20 JUN they landed at MILLI, and on or about 24 JUN they began to attack WESTON and BEAUFORT. After the end of JUN till the *K.O.* ^{hostilities} cessation of the war, for about two months, our Army had continued severe battles, defending stubbornly the bottleneck, SOUTH of BEAUFORT, against the attacks by the overwhelming Allied land and air forces in cooperation. H. As, on about 10 JUN, the communication with SANDAKAN was re-opened, I learned the fact that Capt TAKAKUWA had started with the POWs.

Worrying about this unexpected fact, I at once ordered Capt NAKAYAMA, in charge of supply, accompanied by supply officers, medical officers and some guards to leave TENOM on the same day for RANAU and investigate the march conditions of POWs, and more, to supervise and guide the march of TAKAKUWA Unit on the 1st line of communication route, and especially, if Capt TAKAKUWA had already arrived at RANAU, to effect immediate connection with the Army HQ and report on the conditions of the march of POWs. But, I did not receive any report both from Capt NAKAYAMA and

T.O. Capt TAKAKURA until the cessation of the hostilities.

It was due to the utter suspension of traffic and communication between TENOM and RANAU after the failure of our Army operations, and the influence of the landed Australian Forces extending to the vicinity of BEAUFORT.

My utmost efforts to which I had devoted myself for three months after having learned the results of the first march, came to naught by the unexpected course of events. Thus, the unhappy result was repeated. This is the most sorrowful fact to me, as well as the failure of the Army operations around the BURNEI Bay.

V. With regard to the atrocities committed by the members of my command.

A. Soon after I arrived at JESSELTON as the GOC 37th Army, on 21

N.O. JAN 45, I issued the following instructions to the all officers and men under my command, that is, "Whatever condition the operational situation may fall into, your deeds should be guided by the higher spirit which the "Imperial Rescript for Soldiers" teaches and the non-combatant personnel and POWs who laid down their arms must be treated with justice and benevolence."

Especially, I ordered the commanders of all the units to strictly supervise their subordinates to realize the above-mentioned spirit.

The reason why I issued such instruction and orders was that I feared my intention might not be understood fully by my subordinates, because the operational situation in BORNEO enforced us to take the scattered allocation of troops of the highest degree, and more, the N.O. inconveniency of communications made the operation of those units have just the same nature as those in isolated islands.

Nevertheless, my intention was not understood fully, and so, POWs were murdered by some of my subordinates in the first march. If the murders were committed under the orders of Capt YAMAMOTO, I should feel very sorry all the more.

B. Originally, the POW Camp was under the perfect command of the Supreme Commander of South General Army, and GOC 37th Army was N.O. entrusted with only a part of the command. That is, the commander of the 37th Army had no power in relation to the personnel affairs, N.O.

rewards and punishments of POWs and the maintenance of the camps.

Reports on such affairs from the OC's POW Camps were not, in principle, sent to the GOC 37th Army. This principle must have been applied to all the Armies under the Supreme Commander of the South General Army.

I took interests in the POW Camps, but I did not know the conditions of the camps in detail because of the above-mentioned restrictions, which I could not help.

On the other hand, I believed absolutely in Lt-Col SUGA, OC the POW Camps, one of my friends from the former days, who mastered English, and was versed in the foreigners' affairs and had the fittest character as OC POW Camps.

Thus, I could come to know neither the murder incidents in the second march nor the subsequent incidents in the RANAU Camp until the cessation of the hostilities.

Concerning these murder incidents, I, as a Japanese, express my hearty regret.

VI. As mentioned above, I explained the affairs relevant to the facts alleged on the charge against me through my memory. In the days when my command of operations took unfavourable turns all things became passive. As in all cases of the defeated, blunders became bigger and bigger one after another.

This state of things was more remarkable especially in remote localities. Unexpected incidents that we could not even think of in peaceful conditions occurred. We could have hardly dealt with incidents occurring in localities as far as 100 miles from the seat of the Army HQ and located in the mountains where the traffic ^{was} ~~were~~ very difficult, and, what is worse, there was no means of rapid communication. These various reasons caused these unhappy results, I think.

At the end of JAN 45, I proceeded to my new post in BORNEO, when a storm caused by the enormous material power, and powerful and skilful leading for operations of the Allied Forces began to rage, and I continued the battles as if I was propping up a big tree about to fall down. As the offensive by the Allied Forces developed and its wind-power increased, various unexpected incidents occurred and the results were as

if leaves were blown off, branches were broken and trunks were fallen down. Such conditions continued until the cessation of hostilities.

Unfortunately, I could not see the fruits of my efforts. I hereby express my sincere feeling of pity towards the spirits of ^{the} many dead persons, their surviving families and people of the Commonwealth of Australia, and at the same time, I make an apology to all of them.

馬場正郎
BABA Masao

I hereby certify that the above translation is true and correct.

Kiritani Chie

陸軍中府 馬場正郎陳述書

I 私ハ陸軍中府馬場正郎アリマス

II 私ハ第37軍司令官トシテ1945年1月ヨリ8月ノ終戦迄「ホルネオ」ニ於ケル戦事ニ従事シマシタ。其ノ期間向ニ於テ私ノ指揮下ニアリマシタモノノアル若カ多敷ノ失墜俘虜ニ対シ残滓行属ヲ行ツタコトニ就テ私ハ誠ニ遺憾ニ思ヒマセン。

私ハ私ニ對スル校事ノ提出シテ告訴事由ニ就キ事實ノ真相ヲ明白ツカニスル爲メ大ニ関シ私ノ知レルコトヲ校事ニヨリ提出セヨリテ証拠ノニ種類ニ依リテ之ヲ第一行軍命令、第二命令及部下ニコツテオカサレタ残滓行属ノミツニ区分シテ意見ヲ附陳シマス。

III 第一行軍命令

私ハ1945年1月21日「ズマトラ」ヨリ北「ホルネオ」「ゼンセルトン」ノ第37軍司令部ニ着任致シマシタ。

其ノ時ハ既ニ北「ホルネオ」東海岸ニ配備シテアツク部隊ハ西海岸ニ向ヒ移動ヲ開始シテイマシタ。

私ハ右着任當時軍參謀長ヨリ次ノ如キ要旨ノ報告ヲ聞キマシタ。

1. 1944年12月末南支那軍總司令官寺内元帥ヨリ第37軍司令官ニ對シ「ホルネオ」東海岸ノ兵カヲ南支那PP海岸ニ集結シ「ブルネー」湾周辺ノ地区ノ防衛ヲ強化スベキ命令ガアリマシタ。

此ノ命令ニ基キ北「ホルネオ」東海岸及其附近ノ島ニ配備シテアリシ第37軍ノ主力歩兵約10大隊ノ内8大隊ハDT北「ホルネオ」西海岸ニ向ヒ移動中ナル。

此ノ兵カノ移動ニ關スル命令ハ1945年1月12日發令セラレタ。

2. Sandakan p. o. w. 收容所ハ此ノ兵カ移動ニ伴ツテ Ranau 移スコトニ決定サレ其ノ第一着トシテ先ヅ建

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第11号P.O.W. 隊を海内25番隊より大隊（山本
大隊）へ移駐、下-Ranau へ同様に移動せしむべき命令が
1945年1月12日 発せられた

Sandakan P.O.W. 収容所移動、理由ハ次の通りアリ
マス

a. 北「ホルネオ」失却、両海岸 対スル非合衆軍進攻作戦
ハ必然的 実現スルヲプロトタイプ P.O.W. 隊
ヲ他處地域外 移動セシムルニ及ビ長期 餉料食糧
ノ確保容易ナル場所 移動セシムルニト 此、ニツキ時
件 基キ Ranau - P.O.W. 収容所ヲ移スコト 決定
セラルシタ

b. Ranau ハ上記ノ一條件ノ完全 具備シテキレタ
即チ優勢ナル非合衆軍ノ北「ホルネオ」進攻作戦 対シ
東方即チ「ハ」ボト」西方 即チ東海岸側ノ境界
附近ノ保持シ西方即チ「ハ」ボト」 Ranau - 「ト」ン」
道 沿フ山頂ヲ保持シテオレバ長期ノ持久作戦ガ可
能ナリ Ranau ハ丁度其ノ中心部ヲアンテナトシテ
「アリ」 El Ranau ハ食糧持 米ノ獲得 容易ナ地ナ
リマス「アリ」 P. O. W. 隊 移動シタリハソレ以テ後述
移動セシムル必要モナクナルヲプロトタイプ「アリ」マス

c. Sandakan ハ海上輸送、杜絶、爲食糧事情ガ切
迫リ將米類々々ノ要需ガ増大スルヲプロトタイプセル
又此、處ノ兵力移動 件ヲ Sandakan ハ多兵
1大隊ノミガ設置カレ北、僅少ナル兵カノミ、廣大ナ
ル Sandakan 地域ノ防衛ト P.O.W. 収容所ノ保護ト
両任務ノ担ヒニハ「アリ」ハ着目シテ防衛「アリ」イロハ、諸
軍士等ノ近シ「アリ」 P.O.W. 収容所ノ Sandakan

「アリ」ハ北側ハ長ク 觀察ヲ不能ナリ「アリ」マス

d. 1945年1月12日 Sandakan 方面 北「アリ」部隊

へ、修路を道路トシ、改修セシメ、兵站が設営セシメ、ア
リツ行所、兵隊、及ハズ

此、道路ハ1944年11月陸軍海軍防衛部隊、1大隊ハ
「サンダカン」ヨリ Sandakan 行ツタリ使用セシメ、
1944年12月「サンダカン」ヨリ、東部沿海ヨリ徴集セシ
タル在陣内兵、折次合同教育が行ハレタリ Sandakan
へ徴収セシメタルハ此ヨリ、Ranau 未ダ45年
1月ヨリ教育終了後、又此、道ヲ取ツテ無事 Sandakan
へ歸ツタリ道路ナリ

此、道路ハ10下第1ニヨリ道路係が概括セシメ、アツ
テ兵隊所、修路、使ナレタル

4. 此、度、修路、徴集、任ズル、兵隊、大隊ハ、滿州ヨリ1944年
9月「ホルネオ」ヨリ、東部沿海ヨリ、ハ、兵隊、部隊ナリ

5. 行軍口、南シハ、同隊ハ、修路ト同行スル、行軍口、教
育、修路、兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教
育、修路、兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教

6. 行軍口、修路、南シハ、兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教
育、修路、兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教

Sandakan 防衛隊(大塚部隊)兵、Ranau
第一兵站地、兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教

兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教
育、修路、兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教

兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教
育、修路、兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教

兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教
育、修路、兵、大隊長、行軍、状況、急、行軍口、教

10

1. 月中旬、安治主任、中山大尉ヲ「ニナウ」第一兵站司令部
部、派遣シテ兵站路上、於ケル糧食、医薬、汎建ナル
集積ヲナサシメシム

又同時、道路隊長ヲ兼テ、居リマシタ渡田少佐、此ノ車站
路ノ改修時、河木部ヲ補修改築、急坂路ノ改築、橋
ノ設備、特設ヲ行ハシメシタ

又此縣Ranan收容所、ヨリ浮夢、對單又健康狀況の調査ニシテ所長、對シ此世ナル疲勞恢復、努ムコトヲ要望シマシク、此ノコト、肉シマシハ「クテン」、管中衆、此報に同中依メシ、必要ノ處置ヲ採シマシシ。

10. 竹竿ハ予意以上困難ナリマシテ時出後雨ガ既イ
 タノノ東海聖明於ハ到ル所水浸カリリ西海聖明
 入りヤスト道ハ比時雨コクマシタカ急ナ城ガ多ク
 竹竿困難ナリ

- [illegible]

次、5月17日、陸軍命令、サ Sandakan 分所長、安部大尉
リ高松大尉が年島大尉、後任、ナリマシタ、私ハ高松大尉ニ
対シ、修養、特進、内、ル、私ノ恩望ヲ傳ヘマス、共ニ、年島大尉
ノ水陸輸送計画ヲ、コソ、聞イ、置ウ、標、吾等、管中、佐、ニ、コソ、コソ
ノ傳ヘ、要領、シ、マ、シ、ク

私ハ、年島大尉、時、シ、所、輸送、コソ、カ、マ、ン、シ、移動スル
トハ、許ス、之ハ、一時的ノモノ、ガ、取、名、所、ハ、行、ク、行、ク、
「Ranau」ニ、移、ス、者、ハ、ナル、コリ、カ、マ、ン、シ、コソ、ア、ア、ア、
何、ノ、趣、行、シ、ガ、ハ、附近、迄、可、ガ、移動スル、計、画、ノ、為、ニ、
第、一、標、命、ジ、之、ハ、Sandakan、居、ル、船、船、工、兵、隊、ヲ、使
用、シ、コソ、ト、リ、許、シ、オ、キ、マ、シ、タ

C. 此、後、Sandakan 防衛隊長、コリ、ハ、連、合、軍、Sandakan
上陸、可能性、ヲ、再ニ、報告、シ、来、マ、ス、ガ、私ハ、Sandakan
分所、Ranau 移動、ヲ、決定、シ、5月20日、之、ガ、移動、内、ニ、
ル、命令、ヲ、発、シ、マ、シ、タ

此、命令、ハ、Sandakan 修養、収、容、所、ヲ、Ranau、移、ス
軍、司、令、官、意、志、ヲ、明、示、シ、且、此、移動、実施、ヲ、ス、準、備、ス
ベ、キ、事項、内、ニ、内、陸、各、部隊、(高松大尉、船、船、工、兵、隊、
Sandakan 防衛隊長、旅、部隊、長、陸、軍、病院、長、衛
生、隊長) 共、ニ、修、養、初、め、協、定、ス、ベ、キ、事、ヲ、合、セ、シ、
カ、キ、マ、ス

然、シ、移動、開始、日、及、移動、部隊、内、ニ、ハ、未、ダ、此、移動
命令、中、ハ、合、合、セ、シ、ナ、カ、ツ、タ

Sandakan 分所、Ranau 移動、内、ニ、ル、私、ハ、
陸、路、行、進、ト、水、路、輸、送、ト、ニ、ツ、方、法、ヲ、併、用、ス、ル、ノ、方、
ニ、シ、健康、ニ、シ、長、途、ノ、行、進、建、工、隊、ニ、ハ、陸、路、ニ、
行、キ、サ、レ、ル、ハ、水、路、ニ、移動、ス、ト、シ、テ、利、便、ニ、シ、タ、
Sandakan 分所、長、官、ニ、シ、タ

又、此、後、内、陸、隊、共、ニ、修、養、初、め、協、定、ス、ベ、キ、事、ヲ、合、セ、シ、
カ、キ、マ、ス

市街ハ 防空機状態 所ヨリ空地 向ヒ移動シ初ムル事
ナル混亂ヲ現出シクルニ因テ予部ニ聯セリ

F. Ramon - 同ノ保護ノ事ニ次ニ行軍ハ断クノ如キ状態
於テ P. O. W. 收容所長高橋大尉ノホムヲ得テモ獨斷
ヲ開始カレタモノデラス

若シ之ガ何カナル状態ニ於テ行ハレタラバ其ノ
ハ現ハレタカウシメント考ヘマス

日本軍司令部タル私ハ得テ 對シ行進シ合フイモ
軍サセル事ト意ハス次ニナク又実行ヲ命ズルガ如ク
ナヤコトヲ神明ニ誓ツテ申シ上ゲマス

G. 此ハ西海軍方面ニ於テマシテハ毎日飛行機ノ襲撃
ヲ受ケナイロハナク特ニ「クエーダウ」飛行場ハ機
的ニ破壊セラル次ニ5月28日頃ヨリハ「アノム
ーホート」向テ襲撃ヲスル機去ケ開始セラルソ
在リマシタ鉄道橋ハ6月ノ初旬迄ニ總テ破壊セラル
6月5日ハ「アノム」ノ大橋去ガテラ市街ハ此ノ
一日ニシテ又上破壊セラル尙翌日ハ軍司令部ニ
テ受ケテ電報所ニ故障ヲ生ジテ一時各地トノ連絡
中絶セル状態トナレタ

連合軍ハ6月9日ヨリ「ラッパ」島及ビ「グレイ」
沿岸ニ上陸作戰ヲ開始シ次ニ20日頃ハ「ミラ」
上陸シ24日頃ハ「ウェストン」「ボート」對スル
攻撃ガ行ワレ6月末以降半37年ハ「ボート」
南方ノ隘路口ノ周リニ終戦ニ至ル迄約2月ノ間
優勢ナル連合軍ノ陸軍協同攻撃ヲ受ケテ激戦ヲ經
ケル状態ガアリマシタ

H. 我ハ6月10日頃 Sandakan 1ノ地位ガ行ハレ
タルヲ知リ高橋大尉ハ P. O. W. として忠告ヲナ
シテ其ノ地ニテ其ノ状態ニ對シテ忠告ヲナシ

中山大尉、經理部特任、軍中特任、海軍兵第17
附設R.P.D.「アノム」の北東に先づ Ranau - 列
P.O.W.ノ行軍状況ヲ調査し、第一兵站線路、お
ける高梁田ノ行軍、監視指揮ヲスル様ニ命ジマシタ
特ニ高梁大尉が若し Ranau - 列南にノオレバ陸
軍司令部、連絡にて P.O.W.ノ行軍状況ヲ報
告スル様ニ命ジマシタが遂ニ終戦ニ至ル迄
中山大尉カモ、高梁大尉カモ、何等ノ報告ガ
アリマセデシタ

夫レハ軍ノ作戦ガ失敗シ、上陸セル陸軍ノ勢力
ガ「ボート」附近ニ進出スル、反シ「アノム」
ト「ラノウ」間ノ交通連絡ガ完全ニ遮断サレタ
結果デアリマシタ

斯クハ私ハ第一、行軍ノ結果ヲ知ツテカシ約
3ヶ月ノ間傾ケタ私ノ努力ハ全ク不遇ノ事態
ヨツテ失敗、且希シ不幸ナル結果ヲ繰リ返ハス
至ツタコトハ「ゴルネー」島周辺ニ於ケル軍作
戦ノ失敗ト共ニ私ニツテ最モ悲痛ナコトデアリ
マシタ

[illegible]

松山投信事件 龍江野人(1) 誠遠城意表
2011.11.13

[illegible]

前：月教，此者，吏曹及民，達族，朱，徐州
 建印，方，付，此，教，件，意，表，此，上，同，時，一，部
 部，中，上，分，此，部，1773

馬場正郎

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PRODUCTION DATA		INDEXING DATA		CODE NO.
STARTED 10 MAY 1988	PERIOD Mar. 1948-Jul. 1948 1946-1948 1945-1947	United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) Member Governments, other National Authorities and Military Tribunals PAG-3/2.2. boxes 158-159		
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I certify that the micrographs appearing in this reel of film are true copies of the original records described above.

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Camera Operator: Steven Z. T. a

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








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