

[ 7 CONFIDENTIAL ]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 127

FILE 4

ACC. 1998/0283

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HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS CELL  
BRIEFING NOTES

AIM

1. The aim of the briefing is to acquaint you with the operations of the Humanitarian Affairs Cell (HAC) of UNAMIR.

SCOPE

2. The scope of this briefing will cover:
- a. Brief background to the problem of refugees/displaced persons in Rwanda.
  - b. Organisation of UNAMIR HAC.
  - c. Responsibilities/Tasks.
  - d. Deployment.
  - e. Current activities.
  - f. Constraints.
  - g. The future.
  - h. Conclusion.

BACKGROUND

3. The problem of refugees/displaced persons in Rwanda is closely linked with the wars that have been fought in the country within the past years.

4. The problem became more pronounced during the wars of 1990 and 1993. An estimated 350,000 Rwandese were known to be displaced within the country. Additionally there were over 270,000 Burundian refugees in the south of the country. These refugees fled to Rwanda due to hostilities in Burundi at the time.

5. Although this problem was significant, it was nevertheless manageable. UN Agencies and NGOs were able to keep it under control. The involvement of UNAMIR in the management of the problem included:-

- a. Provision of escorts to Agencies and NGOs.
- b. Supervision of relief aid distribution at distribution centres.

6. With the outbreak of fighting and the massacres on 7 Apr 94 many people throughout the country went into hiding while others

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sought refuge in areas controlled by UNAMIR especially in Kigali. Foreign nationals were evacuated through a joint effort by UNAMIR and French and Belgian Forces.

7. As the war progressed many persons became displaced whilst others became refugees in neighbouring countries (Tanzania and Zaire). The current displaced persons/refugees situation is as follows:

- a. Northern and Eastern Rwanda - 350,000 (Displaced).
- b. French Humanitarian Protection Zone - 600,000.
- c. Goma in Zaire - 1.2m (refugees)
- d. Bukavu in Zaire - 150,000 (refugees).
- e. Ngara in Tanzania - 500,000 (refugees).
- f. Kigali before 4 Jul 94 - 25,000 in known locations.

10. The displaced persons in Kigali were under the protection and care of UNAMIR in co-ordination with Agencies and NGOs. However since the capture of the city by the RPF on 4 Jul virtually all these people have returned to their houses. Only a few remain under the protection of UNAMIR.

ORGANIZATION OF HAC

11. Before 7 Apr 94, UNAMIR had only one officer responsible for humanitarian affairs under the Plans Cell. However in response to the huge humanitarian catastrophe which developed since 7 Apr, the UNAMIR HAC was restructured and expanded as follows:

- a. CHO - Col.
- b. DCHO - Lt Col.
- c. Staff Officers Operations.
- d. Staff Officers Liaison/Field.
- e. EDP Team for data bank and missing persons.
- f. Liaison Teams in Nairobi and Kabale.

12. As of 23 Apr the cell has been augmented by the Advanced Humanitarian Assistance Team (AHAT) representing various UN Agencies.

DEPLOYMENT

13. The current deployment of the HAC is as below:-

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- a. Nairobi - UNREO HQ and UNAMIR Liaison office.
- b. Kabale - UNAMIR LO.
- c. Kigali - HAC Cell HQ and AHAT.
- d. Goma - UNREO Rep.
- e. Gikongoro - UNREO Rep (Projected).

RESPONSIBILITIES

14. The HAC's responsibilities include the following:

- a. Briefing the commander on all humanitarian activities inside and outside Rwanda as they are reported by UN and NGO agencies.
- b. In co-ordination with UNREO, carry out periodic assessment of the humanitarian situation in the country.
- c. Arrange the security requirements for relief operations in the country.
- d. Co-ord with UNAMIR operations for escorts for relief convoys.
- e. Conduct meetings with appropriate government Agencies concerning humanitarian affairs.
- f. Plan, execute, monitor and evacuate relief operations in coordination with UN Agencies and NGOs.
- g. Arranging the security requirements for the transfer of displaced persons within the country.
- h. Keeping a record of missing persons until such time that operations can be undertaken to locate them.

CURRENT ACTIVITIES

15. Currently the HAC is actively engaged in the following activities:-

- a. Gathering data on the humanitarian situation throughout the country.
- b. Updating records on missing persons and undertaking operations to locate such persons.
- c. Transfer of displaced persons from displaced camps to their homes.

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- d. Arranging escorts for relief operations by UN Agencies and NGOs.
- e. Conducting meetings on the humanitarian situation in general and the rehabilitation of the utility services in Kigali in particular.

ACHIEVEMENTS

16. Since the restructuring of the HAC, the cell has been able to achieve the following:-

- a. Successful evacuation of over 100 expatriates and Rwandese out of the country.
- b. Safe transfer of over.....persons trapped behind battle lines to safety before 4 Jul.
- c. Transfer of.....displaced persons from camps to their homes after 4 Jul.
- d. Establishment of data base on expatriates and missing persons.
- e. Providing relief aid to the many displaced persons within Kigali.

CONSTRAINTS

17. The main problems that adversely affected the work of the HAC were lack of security and inadequate logistics. With the cessation of hostilities and the declaration ceasefire on 19 Jul 94, the cell is now able to carry out many of its tasks without much hindrance.

18. With improved logistics (personnel and materials) the cell will be in a position to achieve a great deal more than it has done.

THE FUTURE

19. The situation in Rwanda is still far from stable. How far the cell can achieve its mission will be highly dependent on how fast stability is achieved.

20. However the future activities of the cell will involve the following:-

- a. Carrying out a comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian situation throughout the country.
- b. Evolving a workable plan to manage the situation.

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CONCLUSION

21. For the past few minutes I have given you a bird's eye view of the operations of the HAC to include:

- a. How it is organised.
- b. Its tasks.
- c. Current activities.
- d. Some major achievements.
- e. What it hopes to do in the future.



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ANNEX 2 TO  
UNAMIR SOPS  
PART 9 SECTION 8

LEAVE/R/R APPLICATION FOR HQ STAFF

PART I - APPLICANT'S PARTICULARS

1. Name: MHONE ALICK B. Rank: MAJ Date: 10/08/95  
Sec/Sector: HAC UNID: M4799  
Leave Address: \_\_\_\_\_ Appointment: HUM OFFICE 12  
Tel: 11138

PART II - LEAVE/R/R APPLICATION AND RECORD

2. Annual Leave Entitlement  
a. DOA 13/10/94 DDM 18/10/95 = 12 months  
b. Total AL for the mission = 30 days

APPROVAL BY

APPROVED

APPROVED/NOT

- c. AL balance B/F (if any) = 15 days  
d. Total AL entitled = 30 days  
e. Leave applied for  
From 11/9 To 27/9 = 15 days  
f. AL balance c/f = \_\_\_\_\_ days

Signature: [Signature]  
Rank: \_\_\_\_\_  
Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
Appt: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

3. R/R Entitlement

- a. Duty performed continuously  
From 28/9 To 30/9 = 3 days  
b. Total R/R earned = \_\_\_\_\_ days  
c. Total R/R entitled = 3 days  
d. R/R Applied for:  
From \_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ = \_\_\_\_\_ days  
e. R/R Balance c/f (if any)  
4. Total leave applied = 18 days

-----Detach the below portion-----

PART III - NOTIFICATION FOR LEAVE/R/R APPROVAL

Date: 11 Aug 95

To: Name Mhone Allick Rank MAJ Branch/Sector HAC

Your application for:

- a. Leave from 11/9/95 To 27/9/95 APPROVED/NOT PROVED  
b. R/R from 28/9/95 To 30/9/95 APPROVED/NOT APPROVED  
c. Total leave approved from 11/9/95 to 30/9/95

Remarks: - Good Luck -

Signature: [Signature] Rank MAJ Appt CMPD

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ANNEX B TO  
UNAMIR SOPS  
PART 9 SECTION 8

LEAVE/R/R APPLICATION FOR HQ STAFF

PART I - APPLICANT'S PARTICULARS

1. Name: OSAE-ADDIE Rank COL Date: 29/6/95  
Sec/Sector HAC Appointment CHAO UNID M1215  
Leave Address: C/O BELGIAN VILLAGE, KIGALI  
Tel : 11202

PART II - LEAVE/R/R APPLICATION AND RECORD

2. Annual Leave Entitlement

- a. DOA 15/8/94 DDM 18/8/95 = 12 months  
b. Total AL for the mission =  
..... days

APPROVAL BY

APPROVED/NOT

- c. AL balance B/F (if any) = ..... days  
d. Total AL entitled = ..... days  
e. Leave applied for  
From 27/95 To 8/7/95 = 15 days  
f. AL balance c/f = ..... days

Signature \_\_\_\_\_  
Rank \_\_\_\_\_  
Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Appt \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

3. R/R Entitlement

- a. Duty performed continuously  
From 15/2/95 To 02/7/95 = 163 days  
b. Total R/R earned = NIL days  
c. Total R/R entitled = 03 days  
d. R/R Applied for:  
From 19/7/95 To 21/7/95 = 03 days  
e. R/R Balance c/f (if any)

4. Total leave applied 18 days

-----Detach the below portion-----



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ANNEX A TO  
UNAMIR SOPs  
PART 8 SECTION 8  
(REVISED FEB 95)

LEAVE/CTO APPLICATION FOR UNMO-UNAMIR

PART 1 - APPLICANT'S PARTICULARS

1. Name ALBERT Rank MAJ UNID M178 NAT CANADA  
Sector/Sec UNAMIR HQ Appointment HAC ORO  
Leave Address: KEGVA

Tel: \_\_\_\_\_

PART II - LEAVE/CTO APPLICATION AND RECORD

2. Annual Leave Entitlement

a. DOA 15 AUG 94 DDM 14 AUG 95 12 Months

Signature [Signature]  
of Applicant

b. Total AL for the mission 18 days

c. AL balance B/F (if any) 9 days

d. Total AL entitled 9 days

RECOMMENDED

Team Leader

Name [Signature]

Rank COL

e. Leave applied for  
From 1 JUN 95 to 10 JUL 95 = 9 days

f. AL balance c/f 8 days

Signature [Signature]

3. CTO Entitlement

APPROVED/NOT APPROVED  
BY SECTOR COMD/BRANCH  
HEAD/DCMO/CMO

a. Duty performed continuously

Name \_\_\_\_\_

From 24 APR 95 to 28 MAY 95

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

b. Total CTO earned 6 days

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

c. CTO Applied for

From 11 JUN 95 to 16 JUL 95 = 6 days

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Detach the portion below \_\_\_\_\_

PART III - NOTIFICATION FOR LEAVE/CTO APPROVAL

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_ Rank: \_\_\_\_\_ Sect/Sec \_\_\_\_\_

Your application for:

a. Leave from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ APPROVED/NOT APPROVED

b. CTO from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ APPROVED/NOT APPROVED

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Appt \_\_\_\_\_

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ANNEX A TO  
UNAMIR SOPs  
PART 8 SECTION 8  
(REVISED FEB 95)

LEAVE/CTO APPLICATION FOR UNMO-UNAMIR

PART 1 - APPLICANT'S PARTICULARS

1. Name Agbomun 3 C Rank Capt UNID M774 NAT Nigerian  
Sector/Sec HAC Appointment DC  
Leave Address: Nairobi - Kigali  
Tel: \_\_\_\_\_

PART II - LEAVE/CTO APPLICATION AND RECORD

2. Annual Leave Entitlement

a. DOA 15 Jan 95 DDM 15 Jan 96 = \_\_\_\_\_ Months

Signature \_\_\_\_\_  
of Applicant

b. Total AL for the mission \_\_\_\_\_ days

c. AL balance B/F (if any) ..... days

d. Total AL entitled ..... days

e. Leave applied for  
From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ = ... days

f. AL balance c/f ..... days

RECOMMENDED

Team Leader

Name J. K. ALBERT

Rank WMAJ

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

3. CTO Entitlement

APPROVED/NOT APPROVED  
BY SECTOR COMD/BRANCH  
HEAD/DCMO/CMO

a. Duty performed continuously

From 15 Jan 95 to 28 May 95 Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Rank \_\_\_\_\_

b. Total CTO earned 12 days

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

c. CTO Applied for  
From 28 May 95 to 03 Jun 95 = 6 days Date \_\_\_\_\_

Detach the portion below \_\_\_\_\_

PART III - NOTIFICATION FOR LEAVE/CTO APPROVAL

Name \_\_\_\_\_ Rank: \_\_\_\_\_ Sect/Sec \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

Your application for:

a. Leave from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ APPROVED/NOT APPROVED

b. CTO from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ APPROVED/NOT APPROVED

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Rank \_\_\_\_\_ Appt \_\_\_\_\_

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HAC

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UNAMIR  
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : SEE DISTRIBUTION

GH2/047/A

FROM : GHANBATT


DATE : 18 MAY 95

SUBJECT : CHANGE OF COMMAND - CO GHANBATT

1. Be informed that with effect from Tuesday 16 May 1995, the Commanding Officer of Ghanbatt 2 Lt Col JK Attipoe has handed over Command Responsibilities of Ghanbatt AOR to Commanding Officer Ghanbatt 3 Lt Col GE Amamoo.

2. Please accept for necessary action.

(2) CHAO  
for info  
may  
23/05

  
W AGYAPONG  
Lt  
for Commanding Officer

Distribution:

External:

Action:

List A

List B

List C

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UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: CO NICOY (through Maj Ike)

Info: **HAC** (for Col Iliya)  
DCOS Sp  
MA/DFC  
CMPO  
CO UNAMIR MP Coy

From: Provost Marshal HQ UNAMIR

Date: 22 Feb 95

Subject: LT ABDULLAHI - CURRENT AND FUTURE EMPLOYMENT

1. Following his return from sick leave, Lt Abdullahi came to my office to enquire about his future employment on Wed 8 Feb. I told him that:

a. I had been led to believe that his case had been passed to the Nigerian DA in New York for action. (This was subsequently confirmed for me when I received your UNAMIR/NICOY/7468.9/A dated 7 Feb 95.)

b. The circumstances of his traffic accident had made his future employment in the UNAMIR MP Company impossible.

c. It had been decided (amongst others, by the DFC) that his future employment must be for Nigerian authorities to decide.

2. It was, perhaps, an omission on my part that no letter was sent to ensure that you were aware of Abdullahi's position but it seemed clear to me that when he departed, these messages had been received and understood by him and that he was going to convey them to you. I had thought, anyway, that you were aware (from our own conversations) that Abdullahi could not return to his previous employment. Not seeing him in the area of HQ UNAMIR again except on two occasions when he passed through in plain clothes (visits which I presumed to be social in nature) and knowing that he was not in the employ of the UNAMIR MP Company, I believed that he had moved to Byumba and reported for duty.

3. As a result of the initiation of food allowance for MP Company personnel, however, I have learnt today that:

a. Abdullahi remains living in Kigali.

b. He has arranged the addition of his name to the nominal roll for food allowance - from which his name had been deliberately excluded.

c. He has visited the Finance Office to collect an advance payment of food allowance.

4. It is with regret that I have to ask you to:

a. Take Lt Abdullahi under command.

b. Recover the advance of food allowance and ensure that it is repaid to the UNAMIR finance officer.

4. Thank you, in advance, for your cooperation in this unfortunate matter.



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HAC

Australian Medical Support Force



MINUTE

445-10-3

AS MED SPT FORCE 195

CO

OM 8/7  
Am after 2 update  
371

② UNAMIR HQ

Copies to SRSG's office,  
Lists A and B pls.

Col  
DCOS ops  
28.1

AUSMED INT COLLECTION - SECTOR 4C

Introduction

1. The Int Sect from AUSMED deployed to Sector 4C during the period 18-21 Jan 95, in order to assess the current situation in the area following a number of reports which could be interpreted as indicative of insurgency operations by the FRGF. The patrol was to include an officer from the HQ UNAMIR G2 cell, but due to other commitments he was unable to go.
2. The areas visited included Cyangugu GR 7824, Kirambo GR 0444, Nyamesheke GR 9841, Bugerama GR 8902, Uvira GR 8901, Gombaniro GR 9398 and the Rusizi crossing points
3. ETHIOBATT, MILOBS, NGO's, RPA soldiers, Zairean soldiers, commune leaders and civilians were spoken to during the visit. Information gained is provided in this report under the various placename headings.

Kirambo

4. Commune leaders and locals alike, expressed their fears following what they described as regular bandit activity by Interahamwe from the Isle of Ijwi. When asked to explain the involvement of Interahamwe, they said they meant bandits.
5. Locals claimed that the bandits are previous residents of the area who fled to Zaire during the last war and now live on Ijwi Island. The bandits are able to navigate the Lake and evade detection as they know the coastline well. Furthermore, they know those properties which are likely to have valuables, including livestock..
6. The RPA were reluctant to talk. They spoke in Kirarwandan telling locals not to speak to us.
7. The Commune leaders were concerned about the lack of UNAMIR presence in the area. Locals were asked specifically whether they had faith in Ethiobatt. They replied that they did not. They added that they did not see Ethiobatt as a UN force and would prefer to see European soldiers.

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②  
Staff A  
PHI Report File  
[Signature]

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8. A member of the party went to the Ethiobatt PL location to discuss the current situation. The officer in charge (rank unknown as he was in PT clothing) was not helpful, and would not discuss recent incidents which had been reported from that area. It should be pointed out that the staff of Ethiobatt BHQ in Kamembe had provided a useful brief to the party the day before.

9. A local secondary school aged male stated that his cousin had visited the commune on Tues 10 Jan from Bukavu and said that all the people from the villages should go to Zaire and join the "big group" otherwise members of the "big group" would come and kill them. The local added that Kirambo had been targeted and expected to be attacked again soon.

10. There appeared to be a prison in the buildings housing the commune offices. Two small rooms were full of Rwandans, and an RPA soldier on two occasions opened the doors, said something to the occupants and locked the door again.

**Nyamesheke**

11. The general consensus of opinion amongst the locals was that the almost nightly attacks in the area were by bandits, intent on stealing money, livestock, food and clothing.

12. The German doctor in charge of the local medical centre stated that attacks in the area were almost nightly until the end of Dec and it was suspected that the RPA were responsible in many instances. Since a Maj George took command of the RPA in the region, relations between them and the locals have improved and the attacks, less frequent but still a fairly regular occurrence, are now attributed to refugees (including FRGF, from Ijwi Island). The doctor added that she treats a lot of knife/machete wounds and some gunshot injuries.

13. The doctor treats many people from a local prison, which contains 70-80 persons and is located next to the commune office. Some have diseases such as dysentery, and others require attention to injuries which have obviously been caused by beatings.

14. Attacks always occur between midnight and 1 am.

15. 70 Tutsi families who fled the area during the war have recently returned to Nyamesheke. In some cases their houses have been destroyed and in others, the killers of family members are still resident in the villages. It appears to cause a lot of embarrassment rather than hostility.

16. The incident of 5 Jan which was reported as an attack involving FRGF elements in the area of the Nyamesheke church, from locals accounts, appears to have been two RPA patrols in contact with each other.

**Bugerama Area**

17. Both the RPA and Zairean soldiers were open and friendly with the patrol. A good relationship also appeared to exist between the RPA and Zairean soldiers.

18. A Zairean soldier at the Uvira Border Post GR 8901 stated that there was a Para Commando Bn of 470 men stationed at Kamanyola, 6 km from the border, which had been trained by the Chinese. They were there to provide security for the refugee camp in the area. He further stated that the Zairean Government intended to push the refugees back into Rwanda at some time in the future.

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19. According to the Zairean soldiers, the FRGF elements fleeing Rwanda last year were disarmed and all their weapons are held in a warehouse in Kishasha. It was the opinion of both the RPA and Zairean soldiers that the NGO's were responsible for keeping the refugee population together in the camps.

20. The Border Post at Gombaniro GR 9398 appeared very quiet during the visit. The Immigration Officer confirmed that few refugees were arriving. Those that do are apparently from Zaire, and cross there because bandits are stopping them from crossing via the UVIRA post.

21. According to the immigration officer, refugees are able to exchange old currency for new at Gombaniro. Large amounts of cash were seen on the table in the Customs Office.

Rusizi I

22. The RPA soldiers appeared open and friendly to the patrol, as did their counterparts on the Zairean side. According to the RPA there were plenty of refugees returning through the crossing, although there was no evidence of this during the hour or so of the visit. The bulk of the movement seemed to be traders.

23. According to a UN employee based in Bukavu the majority of those returning to Rwanda are from earlier conflicts and very few are from the '94 war.

24. The Zairean soldiers appeared drunk and were noted searching crossers and taking money from them. A local trader in a wheelchair later explained that it would cost him 1500 RFr to cross.

25. The relationship between the Zairean soldiers and the RPA appeared cordial.

26. It was noted that a number (more than 15 in one hour) of bags of flour/maize or similar, were carried across the border, one per local male, from the Zaire side. They then appeared to be loaded onto civilian vehicles and driven away. The markings on the bags were "African Famine Relief". No NGO personnel were present.

Rusizi II

27. A Zairean soldier at the crossing stated that the Zairean Government had had enough of the Rwandan refugees, particularly the FRGF members, and intended to move them out of Zaire and into Rwanda. No time frame was known.

28. Both the RPA and Zairean soldiers were friendly to each other and the patrol.

29. Money was seen handed over by traders crossing into and out of Zaire.

30. Although the RPA claimed that plenty of refugees were crossing back into Rwanda from Zaire, there was no evidence of that during the visit and the RPA claimed not to maintain statistics.

Miscellaneous

31. An ICRC official mentioned that the Prefect of CYANGUGU had asked for RFr 1.5 Billion to effect the change-over of currency. He received only RFr 600 Million and this has caused many problems in the Prefecture.

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32. According to the same official, there is a camp close to the Burundi/Zaire/Rwanda border which has approx 4 000 well trained FRGF soldiers. He had heard this from another ICRC member and could not elaborate (Comment. It is difficult to attach any credibility to this report).

Conclusion

33. The patrol was extremely useful from a G2 perspective. Incidents which had been reported were discussed and clarified. The overall impression gained was that the activity taking place in the communes bordering Lake Kivu is probably banditry rather than military in nature and we are not at present facing insurgency operations by the FRGF. It is accepted that some Threat Force elements have been involved in a number of the attacks, but this is considered coincidental.

34. The local population is genuinely concerned that they have been and expect to continue to be targeted by bandits from the Isle of Ijwi, and they feel they could be better protected by an improved UNAMIR presence.

35. Surveillance of Lake Kivu is necessary to reduce the bandit activity of the present, and the potential Threat Force activity of the future.



G.A. TAPPING  
WO 2  
INT ANALYST

24 Jan 95

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