

UNAMIR

UN AGENCIES AND NGOS

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**PROCES-VERBAL DE LA SEANCE DE TRAVAIL
EFFECTUEE A BUTA LE LUNDI 10/10/94**

Présidée par le Vice-Gouverneur de la région du Haut-Zaïre, Monsieur UKELO, une séance de travail regroupant les membres du comité de sécurité de la sous-région du Bas-Uélé, le commandant de la 3^e Région Militaire, le Général NGWALA, le Directeur Régional du SNIP/Kisangani et la délégation conjointe ONU/gouvernement du Zaïre a eu lieu ce lundi 10 octobre 1994 à la résidence du Commissaire Sous-régional du Bas-Uélé.

Trois temps forts ont caractérisé cette séance de travail à savoir :

- Le mot de circonstance du Commissaire Sous-régional, Monsieur KESIBU DAMBO;
- Le mot du Vice-Gouverneur de la région du Haut-Zaïre, Monsieur UKELO ;
- L'intervention du Colonel Magistrat MBIDI, Chef de la délégation.

I. Mot de circonstance du Commissaire Sous-régional

Le Commissaire Sous-régional du Bas-Uélé, Monsieur KESIBU DAMBO, a d'abord souhaité la bienvenue à la délégation ONU/gouvernement du Zaïre, au nom de la solidarité africaine. Ensuite, il a présenté la situation générale de la Sous-région du Bas-Uélé. En effet, cette Sous-région est située au Nord de la République du Zaïre et fait frontière avec la République Centrafricaine. Elle a une superficie de 148.000 Km² et compte 769.276 habitants d'après les données de 1993. Les Azande, les Babua et apparentés, les Babuiza, les Babende, les Abarambo et les Ngbandi constituent les principales ethnies. La Sous-région est couverte par une forêt humide avec une végétation exubérante ; elle est essentiellement agricole malgré l'exploitation artisanale du diamant à Aketi et à Bondo. Sa pluviosité varie entre 1.450 et 1.900 mm/an. Les principales cultures vivrières sont le paddy, l'arachide, le maïs, la banane, le manioc et d'autres petites spécialités. Le palmier à huile, le café et le coton constituent les cultures industrielles ; priorité pour les paysans. L'évacuation de ces cultures pose problème à cause du mauvais état des routes.

Subdivision administrative

La Sous-région du Bas-Uélé compte 6 zones administratives, 50 collectivités dont 42 chefferies, 2 cités et 323 localités. Les autorités coutumières sont très influentes dans la Sous-région surtout chez les Azande tandis qu'ailleurs les coutumes restent vivaces.

Abordant la question relative au drame rwandais, le Commissaire Sous-Régional a souligné que compte tenu de la situation actuelle que traversent les réfugiés à savoir : exposition à des intempéries et maladies, à la famine et à plusieurs autres maux et ce, sans espoir du lendemain, il est un devoir humanitaire auquel on ne peut se dérober. La Sous-région est donc disposée à accueillir les réfugiés et partager avec eux cette peine. "Les discussions pourront porter sur l'évaluation des sites" a déclaré le Commissaire Sous-Régional en examinant les avantages et inconvénients de cette implantation.

Pour le comité de sécurité de la Sous-région du Bas-Uélé, Buta n'a pas l'infrastructure voulue pour l'hébergement des réfugiés. Le comité a trouvé malveillant que les forces installées à Buta soient déplacées pour un autre milieu. Ainsi, il a proposé à la communauté internationale et au gouvernement du Zaïre trois autres sites pour l'hébergement des réfugiés à savoir :

- 1/ **Le site de Barisi**, ancienne mission catholique située à 110 Kms de Buta sur la route de Dingila et Liguga. Cette mission abandonnée depuis plusieurs années, peut être réaménagée et mise à la disposition des réfugiés. Sa capacité d'accueil est de 200 à 250 personnes. On y trouve une école primaire et un ancien hôpital désaffecté.
- 2/ **Le site de Ganga** est situé dans la zone de Bambara. Construit sur le premier plan décennal, c'est un ancien hôpital abandonné depuis 1964 et n'a jamais été récupéré. Hormis les blocs opératoires et d'autres annexes, il a une capacité de 450 lits. Ce site peut donc être aménagé et mis à la disposition des réfugiés militaires rwandais.
- 3/ **Le site de Yeme**, situé sur la route de Kisangani à 180 Kms de Buta. Il est dépourvu d'infrastructures disponibles et ne peut être retenu qu'en cas de force majeure et lorsque les deux premières possibilités ne sont pas retenues. D'un côté du site, se trouve la savane et de l'autre, la forêt. La base de Dingila qui a une piste d'atterrissage, peut servir de point de ravitaillement du site de Yeme. Sur la carte géographique, Dingila porte le nom de Bambila.

Les deux premiers sites proposés ont l'infrastructure disponible et offrent d'énormes possibilités d'agriculture. Quelques précisions ont été fournies concernant l'état des routes, dans la Sous-région. En effet, entre Buta et Barisi, la route est praticable mais, il existe un pont qui doit être réfectionné. Entre Buta et Ganga, il existe cinq bourbiers qui causent d'énormes difficultés au trafic routier au point de mettre 4 jours pour couvrir une distance de 180 Kms par véhicule. Les travaux d'aménagement de ce tronçon peuvent durer trois mois au plus d'après l'expert de l'Office des Routes rencontré sur place. L'Office des Routes dispose de 2 Benches en panne et sans pneus et d'une niveleuse. Pour réaliser ce travail, il faudra au moins 10.000 m³ de carburant, 2.000 m³ d'huile et 16 pneus. Ce carburant peut être acheminé par avion ou par bateau à partir de Bumba ou d'Aketi. Les croquis des sites proposés par le comité de sécurité de la Sous-Région du Bas-Uélé sont joints en annexe du présent procès-verbal.

Après l'intervention du Commissaire Sous-Régional, le Colonel Magistrat MBIDI, Chef de la délégation, a remercié les autorités locales pour l'accueil et l'hospitalité dont elles ont fait montre depuis Kisangani jusqu'à Buta. Il a ensuite procédé à la présentation des membres de la délégation et a enfin exposé l'objet de la mission. En effet, le but de la mission conjointe ONU/gouvernement du Zaïre est de visiter d'abord les sites où seront logés les réfugiés et ensuite évaluer le nombre de personnes à déplacer et le coût relatif à leur déplacement. "Il ne s'agit pas de déplacer toute la population rwandaise", a déclaré le Colonel MBIDI, mais "certaines catégories notamment les militaires qui constituent une force pour les réfugiés et les hommes politiques. Quatre sites ont été choisis par le Gouvernement

pour leur hébergement à savoir Kongolo, Lokandu, Buta et Irebu. Ces réfugiés militaires viendront sans armes et en tenue civile, leur protection et sécurité seront assurées par les Casques Bleus de l'ONU.

Ce déplacement devient impérieux compte tenu des conséquences enregistrées sur les plans écologique, économique et social dans le Nord et le Sud-Kivu. Goma, Chef-lieu du Nord-Kivu, ville conçue pour abriter 200.000 personnes en a reçu plus de 2.000.000. Les arbres sont détruits ; les prix sont montés et les conditions sanitaires se sont détériorées. Toute l'armée rwandaise, constituée de +/- 30.000 hommes est au Zaïre.

Aucune décision n'a été prise jusque là, c'est à l'issue du rapport que la commission aura élaboré que les décisions seront prises.

Le gouvernement du Zaïre a insisté sur le fait que ce déplacement des réfugiés vers les sites ne puisse pas porter préjudice à la population hôte. C'est ainsi que cette installation des réfugiés doit prendre en compte les intérêts socio-économiques des populations hôtes. En effet, les écoles, les foyers sociaux et les dispensaires qui seront réhabilités doivent servir à tous, réfugiés comme autochtones.

C'est par une visite des infrastructure en place par véhicule que cette séance de travail s'est terminée.

Commencée à 9H20', la séance de travail a pris fin à 11H00'.

Ont pris part à la séance de travail, les personnalités dont les noms suivent :

- | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------|---|--|
| 1. | Mr UKELO | : | Vice-Gouverneur du Haut-Zaïre |
| 2. | Général NGWALA | : | Commandant de la 3 ^e Région Militaire |
| 3. | Le REDOC/Haut-Zaïre | | |
| 4. | Mr KESIRU DAMBO | : | Commissaire Sous-Régional du Bas-Uélé |
| 5. | Colonel Magistrat MBIDI | : | Conseiller Principal au Ministère de la Défense Nationale et Chef de la délégation |
| 6. | Mr STANISLAS NKWAIN | : | Représentant Résident Adjoint du PNUD à Kinshasa |
| 7. | Mr DAO SIDIQUE | : | Chargé de l'Assistance Humanitaire/MINUAR |
| 8. | Mr ASARE COLLINS | : | Chargé du Programme Principal au HCR/Addis-Abeba |
| 9. | Lt Colonel PIERRE DESNOYERS | : | Chef Logistique/MINUAR |

- | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------|---|---|
| 10. | Mr GILLES BRIERE | : | Assistant Logistique/MINUAR |
| 11. | Major PHIL LANCASTER | : | MINUAR |
| 12. | Mr YENYI VICTOR | : | Avocat Général de la République et représentant du Ministère de la Justice |
| 13. | Mr RUMASHANA BAJOJE | : | Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint et représentant du Ministère de l'EPSP |
| 14. | Lt Colonel LEPELE | : | Médecin régional du Sud-Kivu et représentant du Corps médical/FAZ |
| 15. | Lt Colonel KAYUMBI | : | du corps Logistique FAZ |
| 16. | Capitaine KABAMBA | : | du corps de Génie FAZ |
| 17. | Mr MUTOKE MUPOMPA | : | Conseiller aux Affaires Sociales et représentant de ce Ministère |
| 18. | Pharmacien KABWIKA MBAYO | : | Conseiller pharmaceutique et représenant du Ministère de la Santé Publique. |

Fait à Kinshasa, le 12 octobre 1994

Le Rapporteur,

Pharmacien KABWIKA MBAYO,
Conseiller

to: UN Human Rights Commission HQ Kigali
att: Mr. Omran
pages: 1

Dear Sir,

This is to draw your attention to a case of eventual human rights violation.
The case was reported to Caritas by Mrs. Julienne Mukamutara yesterday. Mrs. Mukamutara is an employee of Caritas Austria and for this we are very concerned about the incident.

Mrs Mukamutara's husband, Mr. Théoneste Nzabandora went to his former residence in Butare three weeks ago. He wanted to have a look at his flat and prepare it for the family to return back home soon. As he had arrived at his home in Quartier Buye, address UNR 80, he found out that foreigners had moved in to it. Only a few hours later, Mr. Nzabandora was arrested by RPF and put in prison. His wife has had now news about him since then. She was told by a person, that her husband is held as a prisoner at the factory of matches (Usine d'allumettes) in Butare. She also was told that most of people held there are executed very soon.


Caritas Austria is the Austrian section of Caritas, an international caritative network of NGOs all over the world. Austrian donors have contributed important amounts for relief programmes in Rwanda. Caritas Austria is working in over 11 camps in Gikongoro with over 250.000 displaced.

I may politely draw your attention on the fact, that this incident shocked us very much and that we are deeply concerned about it since it shows us that there are big human rights and security problems for returnees.
We are very afraid that we can therefore not recommend to displaced people in our camps to go back home.

May I kindly ask you to intervene in this particular case as quickly as possible. I was informed that Mr. Nzabandora is not guilty of any participation in the massacres but that he obviously had been threatened by the people living now in his flat.

Thank you for calling back as soon as possible. Our satellite phone is switched connected each day from 19.00 to 22.00 h. You also might fax directly to UN HQ Gikongoro. UN observer Major Franz Walch is informed about the incident and could get in touch with us.

Kind regards


Susanne J. Brezina
Caritas Austria, Gikongoro

cc/
UN HQ Gikongoro, Major Franz Walch
UNHCR Gikongoro
NGO assembly Gikongoro
Caritas Austria HQ Vienna

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Ms Foster
Pl. pass on as in -
discussed. The HR monitors
are at UNDP Hq. 11.9.

- If Tbilisi is proposed on the basis of the expectation that the project would be located in the UN Office, please be advised that we have absolutely no space available here.

3. Regarding funding, I am anxious that the project (in particular mapping, marking and mine awareness) begins as soon as possible and would be happy to have Mr. Hansen send out the letter appealing for funds. In this connection you should be aware that Pat Banks at my request met with representatives of the Norwegian Refugee Council today and was advised that some funds for demining and mine awareness in Abkhazia may be available from the Norwegian Government. I suggest that this be discussed directly between your office and the Government of Norway. It was also suggested that the NGO, Norwegian People's Aid, which has experience of demining and mine awareness in Mozambique, may be interested in undertaking the project. Since NPA has no office in Georgia, I would propose that this be explored directly by New York. The contact for NPA is a Mr. Kjell Modsen, Head, Operations Division in Oslo. UNDP has also reconfirmed its interest in being involved in this activity and we would appreciate additional information on how you see the UNDP involvement working.

4. As regards approaching the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities to get their approval of the project, I will be happy to make these approaches once we can agree where the project is based. I would like to repeat my earlier conviction that I see little point in establishing this project outside the area of operations.

Best regards.

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/
13 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forth-ninth session
Agenda item 37 (b)

STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION
OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER
RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Emergency assistance for the socio-economic
rehabilitation of Rwanda

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the General Assembly resolution 48/211 of 21 December 1993 on emergency assistance for the socio-economic rehabilitation of Rwanda. The resolution notes with satisfaction the signing, on 4 August 1993 at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front which put an end to the armed conflict. Among other things, it calls on all parties to do their utmost to achieve the full and effective implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and national reconciliation goals; urges all States, United Nations organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to intensify, in favour of Rwanda, economic, financial, material and technical assistance in order to encourage the process of rehabilitation and sustained development; and invites all States, United Nations organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to provide to Rwanda adequate assistance for the settlement of displaced persons and the repatriation of refugees, the demobilization of soldiers and reintegration of demobilized soldiers in civil life, the clearance of mines and the completion of the democratic process. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to report at its forty-ninth session on the implementation of the resolution.

2. Unfortunately, the full and effective implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement was delayed as a result of internal political disagreements. After the 1994 airplane crash in which the President of Rwanda was killed, the

country plunged into chaos and massive ethnic violence. Fighting between the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) intensified. It is estimated that in the ensuing months, out of a total population of approximately 8 million, more than 500,000 have been killed, ^{up to} two million people have been internally displaced and over two million have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. In light of these changed circumstances, this report will focus primarily on the response of the international community to the tragedy which has taken place in Rwanda.

II. EMERGENCY IN 1993

3. Rwanda has had a history of internal tensions, with major clashes occurring between its two main ethnic groups. In the recent past, fighting between the RGF and the RPF broke out in October 1990 and continued for almost two years until a cease-fire was negotiated in July 1992. However, fighting resumed in February 1993, resulting in the displacement of approximately 900,000 civilians. The situation was exacerbated by Rwanda's already precarious economic condition, overpopulation and rapidly declining agricultural production. In response to a request from the President of Rwanda for humanitarian assistance, the United Nations launched on 15 April 1993 an inter-agency appeal amounting to \$78,517,679 to meet the emergency needs of the displaced persons. The appeal, which covered the period upto end of December 1993, provided for emergency relief projects focusing on food, shelter, health and education.

for a Roundtable on Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction to solicit donor support and mobilize funds. A preparatory donors meeting was held on 24 January 1994 in New York. The delay in the implementation of the Arusha agreement and, in particular, the formation of the broad based transitional government impeded progress in the political field and prevented the Roundtable from being held.

III. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AFTER APRIL 1994

A. Summary of events

7. On 6 April 1994, the airplane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed near the Kigali airport, resulting in the death of both Presidents. This incident was immediately followed by a horrific bloodbath that began in Kigali and quickly spread throughout the country. In the ensuing weeks, the genocidal killing mainly of Tutsis and moderate Hutus claimed over 500,000 lives. Also, it triggered a full scale armed conflict between the RGF and the RPF.

8. In view of the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Rwanda, the Security Council adopted resolution 918 on 17 May 1994 authorizing the expansion of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops in order to enable it to carry out its mandate.

the protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk, and the provision of security to humanitarian operations. In view of the difficulties in bringing UNAMIR up to its authorized strength, on 22 June 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 929 which authorized the establishment of a temporary operation under national command and control to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Operating under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of France announced on 2 July 1994 the establishment of a "humanitarian protected zone" - Operations Turquoise - in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south-west Rwanda to provide security to the population living in the area. Operation Turquoise concluded on 21 August 1994.

9. On 1 July 1994, having noted that massacres and killings had continued in a systematic manner throughout Rwanda and that only proper investigations could establish the facts in order to enable the determination of responsibility, the Security Council adopted resolution 935. It requested the Secretary-General to establish immediately a Commission of Experts which would, after examining and analyzing information submitted pursuant to the resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigation or the efforts of other persons or bodies, draw conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including possible acts of genocide. The Secretary-General appointed Mr. Atsu-Koffi Assaon (Cote d'Ivoire) as Chairman, Mrs. Habi Dieng (Guinea) and Mr. Salifou Fomox (Mali) as members.

Commission and requested their conclusions to be submitted to the Security Council by 30 November 1994.

10. The advance of the RFP forces led to the flight of a large number of civilians from the areas of combat. At the same time, the relentless inflammatory radio campaigns by the RGF "interim Government" instilled fear among the displaced persons and refugees and further encouraged the flight of civilians. At the end of April, such fear caused mainly Hutus living in the southeast to flee to the United Republic of Tanzania. Soon, the camps in Tanzania, were giving refuge to more than 400,000 Rwandese. Large number of corpses were observed floating in the Kagera river attesting to the grim nature of the killings taking place in Rwanda.

11. In mid-July, another refugee crisis occurred in the western part of Rwanda as more than one million refugees crossed the border into the Kivu region of Zaire. The challenge presented by this sudden and massive influx of refugees was enormous. It required the urgent organization of the logistic arrangements to supply and to distribute daily 30 million litres of clean water and 1,000 tons of food. With the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions in the refugee camps, a cholera epidemic broke out which was followed by the outbreak of dysentery. It is estimated that 50,000 people may have died from these diseases. Massive international efforts were marshalled to respond to this situation. In addition to the activities of UN organizations and other international organizations, there were important bilateral initiatives.

12. As the 21 August completion date for the Operation Turquoise approached, it was feared that there would be another exodus of the population in the protected zone to the neighbouring countries. As part of a strategy to prevent this, humanitarian agencies increased their presence and the delivery of assistance in the zone in an attempt to persuade the population to remain in place. In addition, alternate transit camps were identified within Rwanda and arrangements made to supply them. Following the withdrawal of the Operation Turquoise troops on 21 August 1994, tens of thousands of refugees did cross from Cyangugu to Bukavu, Zaire; however, preventive measures taken helped keep the situation under control and a potential refugee tragedy was averted.

If worked!

13. According to ^{ICA} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as of 19 September 1994, the estimated figures for Rwandan refugees by country of asylum are as follows:

Burundi	277,000
United Republic of Tanzania	510,000
Uganda	10,000
Zaire (Bukavu/South Kivu/Uvira)	482,200
Zaire (North Kivu)	<u>850,000</u>
Total	2,129,200

14. Although recent reports indicate that the outflow of refugees has decreased significantly and ^{that} some 360,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda, the situation still remains volatile. Security in the refugee camps has been deteriorating as former government officials, soldiers and interhamwe militia continue their intimidation tactics to dissuade refugees from repatriating, frequently resorting to violence to prevent refugees from returning to Rwanda. The Secretary-General sent his Special Representative in Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan to consult with the Zairian authorities on the issue of security in the refugee camps and to search jointly for ways to resolve this issue. In addition, UNHCR has sought the assistance of other regional governments and the Organization of African Unity. In cooperation with Reporters San Frontieres, radio programmes are being broadcast in Goma and Bukavu providing refugees with factual and unbiased information on services available in the camps.

No opportunity to discuss
(2) ...

B. Impact of the crisis and the needs of the population

15. The war and massacres have wreaked havoc on every aspect of life in Rwanda. The health system, already strained by high infant mortality, high fertility rates and AIDS epidemic, has been completely destroyed. Access to safe drinking water has decreased and sanitation levels have fallen well below pre-war standards of 65 and 48%, respectively, as traditional spring water sources were damaged and contaminated and pipe distribution systems were seriously damaged. The economy has been paralysed, with schools standing empty and no new

16. Agricultural and pastoral activities have been severely disrupted. Crops planted in February, already negatively affected by poor rainfall and a shortage of inputs, should have been harvested in July. Reports showed that most fields were abandoned. There is also a noticeable absence of livestock in the countryside. The number of animals observed in the displaced camps is insignificant compared with farmers' holdings prior to the outbreak of the war. It is likely that animals were slaughtered or stolen in the wake of food shortages. This will exacerbate the food situation in the months ahead.

17. A World Food Programme and Food and Agricultural Organization (WFP/FAO) survey has estimated that only 5 million people are still living in Rwanda as compared to a pre-war population of 7.9 million and that 2.5 million people, half of the current population of Rwanda, will require food assistance over the next several months.

18. Damage to agricultural production and infrastructure represent the most visible consequences of the crisis along with thousands of wounded Rwandese and countless amputees. It has inflicted incalculable mental and emotional suffering. It has been estimated that in large parts of the country, every individual had lost a family member and/or had their home and possessions destroyed. The psychological trauma of these events will leave debilitating scars for years to come.

19. With relative calm gradually returning to the country, the return of refugees has become a major obstacle for the Government and the international community.

mine clearance assistance plans were in place in conjunctions with the mandate of UNAMIR prior to April 1994, the resumption of hostilities halted all planning and preparation for the provision of UN demining assistance. It is believed that there are 50,000 to 60,000 uncleared land mines and two people die daily from related accidents. UN demining experts have visited Rwanda to re-assess the scope of the land mine problem. The United Nations will coordinate with all concerned to provide assistance to enable Rwanda to rid itself of land mines.

20. The United Nations Environment Programme has begun to investigate the problems of environmental impacts of the crisis. With large numbers of displaced persons and refugees, there are likely to be enormous problems of soil erosion and destruction of limited fuelwood resources. Contamination of water supplies and destruction of rare habitat are also among potential problems.

IV. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND BY INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

21. In the early stage of the crisis, intense fighting prevented substantial delivery of humanitarian assistance to victims of the crisis. As relatively safe areas were identified, humanitarian agencies brought in relief supplies often through Burundi and Uganda to

reach the needy population in the adjoining areas in Rwanda. As the war effectively ended on 18 July when, after having taken Gisenyi on 17 July, the RPF unilaterally declared a cease-fire, relief efforts were increased to reach more people in need.

22. UNAMIR has played a key role in providing protection to displaced persons and civilians at risk since the outbreak of the war. During the early stage when the conditions were most dangerous resulting in the evacuation of all humanitarian agencies except the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which continued to perform herculean tasks with support of the Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), UNAMIR, though severely handicapped by its limited capacity, saved countless lives, treated injured, protected targeted civilians and provided relief supplies.

23. On 23 April 1994, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs led a humanitarian team composed of representatives of WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, UNDP and DHA into Kigali to assess the situation and the most immediate needs. Part of this team stayed on in Kigali and assumed, to the extent possible, responsibilities for coordinating distribution of relief supplies and for liaising with the UNAMIR. The United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO), headed by a Humanitarian Coordinator, was established to ensure a coordinated response to the crisis. The Office was first located in Nairobi and then moved to Kigali in mid-July when the situation in Rwanda began to stabilize.

Refugees
refugees
refugees
spending

24. On 25 April, a United Nations Inter-Agency "Flash Appeal" calling for \$16 million was launched covering projected emergency needs up to 31 May 1994. In addition, UNHCR made a request for US\$56 million to cover the needs of refugees for its Burundi and Rwanda emergency operations from January to 15 July. WFP issued a request in April for US\$3.6 million to meet the needs related to its Regional Emergency Operation for refugees and displaced persons in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire.

25. Over the next months, the presence of the United Nations in the region was strengthened and international non-governmental organizations returned to carry out humanitarian activities.

26. The Secretary-General launched the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda on 22 July 1994. He drew the attention of the international community in May to the genocide occurring in Rwanda and stated that now it was the "genocide" of hunger, thirst and disease which had to be addressed. The Appeal called for US\$434,861,649 to cover humanitarian requirements for the period between July and December 1994.

27. From 24 to 28 July, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs led a second mission to Rwanda, with senior representatives of all principal United Nations humanitarian organizations and other organizations, to assess the situation and to ensure that the necessary field coordination arrangements were in place. These arrangements

included a clear division of responsibilities among the organizations of the United Nations system and an overall strategy to meet the extraordinary humanitarian challenge.

28. Together with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rwanda, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs discussed with the new Government in Kigali how humanitarian aid could be delivered to all parts of the country and the urgent steps required to re-establish a climate conducive to the safe return of the refugees and displaced persons. The new Government indicated its commitment to encourage Rwandese refugees to return to their country, to ensure their safety and to permit full access to all those in need throughout the country.

29. On 2 August 1994, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs chaired the Rwanda pledging conference in Geneva. It resulted in contributions amounting to US\$137 million against the US\$434.8 million July Appeal. As of 1 September the overall requirements have risen to \$552,055,246 with contributions against the Appeal amounting to \$384,061,506 covering 70% of the revised requirements.

30. On 26 August, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General presented the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan aimed at facilitating the transition from emergency to rehabilitation. The Plan highlights priority rehabilitation requirements in the area of water, sanitation, electric generation, communications and health services to quasi-normalcy in Rwanda.

31. In view of the significant spill-over of the crisis engulfing Rwanda on its neighbouring countries, the Secretary-General decided to explore a regional approach to the problems in Rwanda and its consequences for Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire. He appointed Mr. Robert Dillon as Special Humanitarian Envoy for Rwanda and Burundi to carry out the task. With the participation of the Departments of Humanitarian Affairs, Peace-keeping Operations and Political Affairs, Mr. Dillon undertook a preliminary mission to the region in early September. Following his visit, Mr. Dillon has made a number of suggestions on enhancing the ability of the United Nations to address the needs of the region in a comprehensive and complimentary manner.

A. GOVERNMENTS

32. Witnessing a massive refugee emergency in Zaire in late July 1994 and heeding the call of the Secretary-General when he launched the United Nations Consolidated Appeal on 22 July 1994, the international community reacted quickly and in solidarity to contribute cash, relief supplies and to make available teams of doctors, nurses, emergency and logistics experts. Some countries have made available military assets to carry out humanitarian activities. The Government of the United States of America carried out Operation "Support Hope" which involved 1900 US personnel with 1600 deployed in the region to perform humanitarian functions.

33. In order to present these contributions concisely, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs has prepared a Rwanda Financial Update which appears in Annex I of the present document, shows contributions made by States and intergovernmental and other organizations in response to the United Nations Consolidated Appeal for the crisis in Rwanda. As of 1 September, the requirements increased to \$552,055,246, from the \$434,861,649 announced at the time of the launching of the appeal on 22 July, and contributions to the appeal were \$384,061,506. Overall relief contributions received, as communicated to the Secretariat, amounted to \$762,350,204.

B. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO)

34. FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) intensified its monitoring of the food situation in Rwanda at the beginning of 1994 when there were clear indications of crop and supply shortfalls. An FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Rwanda was mounted in February and August 1994 to review the estimates of the 1994 first season crop, examine prospects for the second season crop and estimate 1994 food import requirements, including food aid. After an assessment of agricultural conditions made in June 1994, in early July, FAO reported to the international community that heavy losses of an otherwise excellent first season crop harvesting continued to be impeded by the presence of armed forces in the country.

farmers. Project proposals for immediate intervention were formulated to assist in the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector.

35. During the second week of August, another joint FAO/WFP Assessment Mission was launched, mounted with FAO Technical Cooperation Programme support. The findings of the mission would provide the basis for determining the immediate essential requirements of the farming sector for the September 1994 plantings of the first season crops.

36. The assessments of every mission were reported to the international community by GIEWS Special Alert, immediately on conclusion of the missions or receipt of FAO reports. It should also be noted that FAO and WFP also carried out joint missions to Burundi in February and again in July of 1994.

37. Through its Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), FAO provided US\$400,000 to the "crop food supply and agricultural rehabilitation needs" project (TCP/RWA/4451E). The objective of the project was to provide to the Government, donors and the international community an updated assessment of the crop, food supply and agricultural rehabilitation needs for the forthcoming year. The results of the assessment will serve as a basis for the formulation of appropriate interventions.

38. Furthermore, a project, prepared to be funded by the TCP for a sum of US\$400,000, is currently under consideration: "Technical assistance to the humanitarian operations related to agricultural rehabilitation". The objective of the project is to assist the Government in its effort to assist populations affected by the war and support the increase of food crop production.

C. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS (UNESCO)

39. On 25 July 1994, the Director-General of UNESCO contributed \$500,000 to help Rwandan refugees. He also invited UNESCO's National Commissions to open a Rwanda Emergency account worldwide to help alleviate the human suffering. In addition, UNESCO stands ready to send 200 teachers to Rwanda to contribute to the restoration of the educational system and the resumption of instruction.

D. WORLD BANK

40. In response to the United Nations Consolidated Appeal for the crisis in Rwanda, the World Bank has made a grant of \$20 million to UN agencies for their emergency programmes for Rwanda. It has sent a mission to Rwanda to assess the situation.

authorities and is working closely with the donor community on plans for assisting Rwanda in its economic and social recovery efforts.

E. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

41. During the initial stages of the war, the concern over the spreading of diseases because of the decomposition of dead bodies, population movements and the destruction of health facilities was at its highest. WHO supported other agencies and NGO's in carrying out the burial of corpses. WHO also assisted the Ministry of Health in Uganda in assuring water and food safety, as there was widespread perception that they were being affected by the dead bodies thrown into the rivers in Rwanda.

42. The Rwanda Task Force team in WHO headquarters for communicable diseases identified major diseases which have been of concern in the densely concentrated refugee camps. These are: cholera, dysentery, louse-borne fevers, acute respiratory infections, tuberculosis, malaria, and AIDS. WHO protocols for prevention, treatment, and diagnosis of these diseases adapted to the Rwandan crisis have been distributed to health sectors and agencies concerned.

43. Cases of shigellosis and meningitis were also recorded, and the distribution of treatment protocols as well as vaccinations started. In general, cholera seemed to be

under control and meningitis has also been fading. Dysentery is constant (and might increase with rain fall). Shigellosis remains a major public health problem. A worrying factor has been that all these diseases might break out inside Rwanda with the arrival of large numbers of returnees or in other refugee camps around Rwanda. WHO's Goma experience in this field will be utilized for prevention of outbreak and for treatment.

44. In regard to water and sanitation, a WHO engineer has assessed the situation in Kigali, as well as in the camps in Goma, Bukavu, and Cyangugu. Immediate measures were taken on the spot in Bukavu for the prevention of dysentery epidemics, including teaching and supervising individual chlorination of water for drinking.

45. Some of the other WHO experts include an AIDS expert who has been coordinating the information and the distribution of condoms (2.5 million of them have been stocked in Kigali); an essential drugs consultant who gives support to the Central Pharmacy in Kigali as well as to NGO's; a vaccination coverage expert in Goma advising and supporting NGO's on the implementation of emergency vaccinations; a malaria specialist evaluating the best means to control the anopheles mosquito in the camps; and a consultant on strengthening health services.

F. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC)

46. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has had a permanent presence in Rwanda since 1990, providing protection and assistance for victims of the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF. After the April accident, ICRC, with the support of Medecins sans Frontieres, was for a number of weeks the only humanitarian organization left continuing to treat the wounded and providing emergency assistance. Parallel to the major medical operation, it organized, in consultation with WFP, a large-scale food relief programme in the north, east and south-east of the country, then through Bukavu and Goma in the west. When the refugee emergency began in Goma, it distributed food until other relevant organizations became operational. In addition, ICRC is working to register the children in conjunction with NGO's and others in order to locate their parents. Regarding the protection of detainees ICRC has already visited 217 detainees held by the new Broad-Based Government of National Unity.

G. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM)

47. IOM provides road transport assistance to the returning Rwandese refugees and to internally displaced persons. Concurrently, IOM contributes transport and logistics management support for the distribution of relief supplies within Rwanda in coordination

with UNREO, WFP and others. In refugee camps in Goma, Zaire, IOM also provides transportation assistance to refugees and is involved in camp management activities. As of 7 September, IOM has assisted 71,483 persons, both refugees and internally displaced.

H. UNEP/HABITAT

48. To help the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda -- beginning with Kigali -- a United Nations Conference on Human Settlements(Habitat)-led reconstruction programming mission was ~~to~~ in Kigali from 7 to 14 September. Experts from Habitat and the United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP) drew up plans of action in five inter-related areas: urban infrastructure and housing; employment and the local economy; urban environment; environmental interaction between city and countryside; and urban management. The experts aim^{ed} at cooperating with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) "Women in Crisis" project, taking into account the role of women in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

I. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)

49. At the start of the crisis, UNHCR responded immediately with the deployment of staff and relief materials to provide emergency assistance and assess the possibility of rapid voluntary repatriation.

50. During the past five months, UNHCR has emphasized the need for all possible measures to be taken to prevent further flight and to permit the early return of refugees to their communities in conditions of safety and dignity. The UNHCR Special Envoy of the High Commissioner for the Rwanda/Burundi Operation is based in Kigali. With the nomination of a new Government, contacts were rapidly initiated to enable the resumption of UNHCR operations in Rwanda. Since then, the Government of Rwanda has extended assurances of its commitment to assist in creating conditions necessary for the return of all refugees.

51. Kigali airport, which was reopened by UNAMIR, has been supported by the UNHCR Geneva Air Operations Cell which schedules humanitarian flights, assigns UN call signs and coordinates aircraft landing slots with the Kigali airport air traffic control personnel.

52. UNHCR staff have been monitoring the return of refugees to ensure that repatriation takes place in conditions of safety and dignity. The guarantees given by the

Government must be applied and respected. UNHCR and UNAMIR joint activities are being coordinated on the ground: mainly on security issues, as well as on demining, convoy escorts and communications. Working relations are also being established with Human Rights Observers and Monitors who are expected to play a key role in the normalization of life in Rwanda. Links with the ICRC, NGO's and others are also essential for the protection of vulnerable groups, in particular unaccompanied minors and orphans, as well as for tracing relatives.

53. Logistics capacity was developed, with over 58 trucks and buses to be on the ground. An agreement was prepared with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the transport of returnees requiring such assistance.

54. A repatriation package is being distributed to returnee families consisting of blankets, jerrycans, sleeping mats and soap. Over the next few days, a package of seeds and tools will also be distributed to enable returnee families to progress towards self-sufficiency.

55. In response to the urgent needs of the internally displaced persons moving from the humanitarian protected zone into Cyangugu, UNHCR has been providing assistance to the most needy at the request and under the coordination of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO).

56. UNHCR's mandatory responsibility with regard to Burundian refugees in Rwanda remains to be addressed. Recent research has shown that the vast majority of the 250,000 Burundians who had found asylum in Rwanda have since either repatriated or moved on to neighbouring countries. Some may have moved to the south-west zone, but if so, such movement did not take place in groups large enough to be identifiable. UNHCR is systematically monitoring the situation in the different areas where Burundi refugees were previously resident to gain further information on this caseload.

57. The majority of the refugees from Uganda and Burundi are returning to Rwanda following an absence of many years. Specific assistance is being considered for this caseload as their lack of ownership of agricultural land may prove a major obstacle to their resettlement and rehabilitation.

58. Although voluntary repatriation to Rwanda is, and will remain, a complex and lengthy process, preparations for a large-scale return have been going on. The assistance, goodwill and guarantees of safety of the countries of asylum, as well as the country of origin, are vital to the voluntary return of refugees to Rwanda.

J. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

59. The High Commissioner for Human Rights undertook a mission to Rwanda on 11-12 May 1994 to assess human rights violations in the country. At its third special session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution S-3/1, dated 25 May 1994, by which it requested its Chairman to appoint a special rapporteur to investigate the human rights situation in Rwanda. Upon completion of his mission, the Special Rapporteur recommended, *inter alia*, to increase the team of human rights observers in the country to ease the return of refugees and prevent any re-emergence of ethnic violence. The report of the Special Rapporteur was submitted to the Economic Social Council at its substantive session of 1994. The High Commissioner for Human Rights decided that he would need a total of 147 monitors, forensic experts and legal investigators in Rwanda and, on 15 September, appealed to the international community for \$10.5 million to support these human rights experts so that they could complete the tasks as quickly as possible.

K. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)

60. UNDP supported the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) by making available officers to UNREO. As the war ended, UNDP reopened its office in Kigali on

5 August 1994. In parallel to these UNREO activities, UNDP is preparing plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction as well as institutional support to the new Government.

L. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF)

61. In the overall coordination of responsibilities outside of Rwanda, UNICEF was given the support role in water, health and other relief activities and was designated focal point for unaccompanied children activities. Inside Rwanda, UNICEF has the sectoral responsibility in the areas of unaccompanied children and psycho-social care, water, sanitation, health, education, and non-food relief. UNICEF has been working closely with several NGO's in all sectors to maximize the use of human and material resources.

62. UNICEF has increasingly strengthened its operations in the assistance to unaccompanied children especially among the refugee population in Goma. UNICEF has helped to collect these children and move them to secure shelters to cover their immediate survival and protection needs. Specialized staff have been hired to assist in addressing the particular problems of unaccompanied children and train local caretakers. UNICEF has constructed washing and sanitary facilities and supplied shelter for children. A major vaccination campaign and vitamin A programme was undertaken in all reception centers. A UNICEF anti-cholera team helped combat the disease in Goma and is continuously supporting local health centers to provide essential health care, providing

them with medical supplies and water equipment. Cholera awareness was improved through social mobilization activities. An immunization campaign which targets all children and all women of childbearing age is being extended to all camp sites. Access to water has been improved through cooperation agreements with local water departments in Goma and Bukavu in addition to UNICEF supplied water tankers, storage tanks and purification equipment.

63. In the area of household food security, UNICEF has deployed trucks to collect produce from farmers in exchange for relief and survival items. This operation intends to encourage farmers to resume farming activities. The harvest gathered will be distributed to farmers for seed.

64. More recently, the focus of UNICEF assistance for Rwanda emergency has been moving towards rehabilitation of badly affected social service sectors inside Rwanda to assist returnees and displaced people in restarting their lives.

65. In the health sector, UNICEF, jointly with WHO, has assessed the central pharmacy with the Ministry of Health. The facility will be prepared, drugs supplied and the central cold chain capacity re-established. Through assessment visits to all districts of Rwanda, a rehabilitation plan for health centers and hospitals was being established and supply and service needs defined.

66. In the water and sanitation sector, the immediate plan was to rehabilitate twelve semi-urban water treatment systems, improve the water delivery system in Kigali, to provide basic water supply and sanitation services to all hospitals and health centers and to restore piped water supply systems in nine major towns. Basic water supply and sanitation facilities will be provided along the main routes of returning refugees and at semi-permanent encampments of displaced people within Rwanda.

67. A joint educational programme has been prepared by UNICEF and UNESCO to respond to emergency needs in the education sector. Teacher Emergency Packages in local languages have been supplied and training of local teachers in their use has started. Psychosocial trauma therapy training will help teachers to assist traumatized children in classrooms. A non-emergency curriculum for longer term purposes was being established for primary education purposes. Schools will be provided with material for a country-wide cholera campaign. A mine awareness campaign will be specifically targeted for school children.

M. UNITED NATIONS VOLUNTEERS (UNV)

68. UNV is providing logistics experts, food aid monitors, medical personnel, and management specialists to the United Nations agencies in the region.

N. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP)

69. During the period of intense fighting, WFP provided food assistance to Rwanda through cross-border operations from Uganda and Burundi under a joint-agreement with ICRC. After the cessation of the war, WFP has made Kigali the hub of its operations and worked with a planning figure of 700,000 beneficiaries. A Transportation Coordination Unit was established in its Kigali Office, and WFP has assumed responsibility for the coordination of all overland transportation in the country.

70. WFP operated in Rwanda under the following overall strategies:

- a) supply existing feeding operations and formulate contingency plans to ensure the provision of assistance to those areas where influx is witnessed;
- b) encourage the return home, both of refugees in countries of asylum, and of internally displaced within Rwanda;
- c) encourage populations within Rwanda to remain in the country;
- d) use food aid to help rebuild Rwanda through rehabilitation and recovery activities.

71. Amid fears of an exodus from the humanitarian protected zone around the time of withdrawal of French troops on 21 August, WFP worked to ensure that it had substantial food stocks in its designated area of operations.

carried out distributions at selected sites in Cyangugu and Kibuye. In order to encourage the return of refugees from Zaire, WFP has been providing food to returnees way stations along the Gisenyi-Kigali road, and planned to enter into an agreement with CARE for food distribution at way stations on the Gisenyi-Ruhengeri road.

72. Putting priority on provision of agricultural inputs during the planting season which ends in early October, WFP has been taking part in a working group, formed by a number of agencies, to ensure the distribution of seeds and tools by early September. The Programme also planned to transport seeds purchased in Uganda by FAO. The coordination of the provision of agricultural inputs with relief food distributions has been a vital factor in this operation.

O. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

73. It should be noted that NGO's have been making vital contributions. In addition to their own programmes, in many instances, they are the implementing partners of the UN agency programmes. As of 14 September, there were 93 NGO's operating to assist the victims of the crisis, including 10 local organizations. In view of their significant role, the UN Consolidated Appeal of 22 July contains a summary of major NGO's activities and their financial requirements.

74. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies responded quickly to the massive influx of refugees which began to cross Rwanda's borders at the end of April by working closely with national societies in Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire. Since then, the Federation and National Societies have been concentrating activities on refugee-camp management, including provision of water, sanitation and health services, plus the purchase and distribution of basic food and non-food items. The Federation has received some SF 40 million in response to its appeal of 22 July. Since operations are expected to increase in Zaire and Burundi, the Federation will need to revise its appeal for funds to cover new responsibilities.

V. OBSERVATIONS

75. When the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/211 last December, there was a glimmer of hope that the armed conflict had come to an end and that Rwanda was ready to embark on a process of political reconciliation and economic and social development. These hopes were unfortunately not realized as the country once again plunged into a civil war which took the lives of as many as 500,000 Rwandans. This outbreak of violence further aggravated the already fragile socio-economic conditions in the country and led to massive displacement of population, requiring large scale emergency humanitarian assistance.

76. Since the outbreak of the current crisis in Rwanda, the Secretary-General has submitted a number of reports to the Security Council (S/1994/470 of 20 April 1994; S/1994/656 of 13 May 1994; S/1994/640 of 31 May 1994; S/1994/924 of 3 August 1994 and S/1994/1133 of 6 October 1994) which touch up on all aspects of the situation in Rwanda and the response of the international community including in particular its humanitarian dimension.

Sorry -
don't
agree!

77. Rwanda, once again, is at a crossroads. While the most urgent needs arising from the humanitarian emergency are being addressed by the international community, a long term effort will be required to rebuild the infrastructure and the social fabric of the country. The new Government is called upon to reestablish its authority and capacity while responding to the continuing emergency. Equally, it will have to formulate confidence-building measures to foster reconciliation as well as more long-term development strategies. As the new Government tries to gain stability and to meet its obligations, it will continue to depend upon the international community for assistance.

No
support.

78. A relatively stable environment together with Government assurances of security and respect of human rights are pre-requisites for the safe and voluntary return of more than two million refugees now living in the neighbouring countries. The early return of refugees is essential to relieving the burden imposed on host countries and to restoring normal economic activity in Rwanda. The rehabilitation and resettlement of an equal

UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda
Updated Financial Summary - By UN Organizations
(As of 1 September 1994)

Compiled by DHA on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing agencies.

UN Organizations	Requirements for the Rwanda Crisis (July - December '94)	Contributions/Pledges (US\$)	Shortfall (US\$)	% of Co
FAO	8,990,000	1,011,351	7,978,649	
UNICEF	37,000,000	27,982,146	9,017,854	
UNHCR	258,199,637	189,262,764	68,936,873	
WHO	3,000,000	900,000	2,100,000	
UNESCO	350,000	0	350,000	
UNIFEM	885,000	131,234	753,766	
UNCHR	2,100,000	1,595,039	504,961	
UNV	894,026	480,782	413,244	
IOM	7,658,726	1,355,634	6,303,092	
UNREO/DHA	2,223,000	1,577,348	645,652	
Rwanda Conflict Victims (700,000)				
WFP (Non-food)	5,711,870	10,711,713	(4,999,843)	
WFP (Food)	37,147,466	28,071,612	9,075,854	
MTs	70,842	54,142	16,700	
Burundi Conflict Victims (923,000)				
WFP (Non-food)	3,021,905	3,144,685	(122,780)	
WFP (Food)	50,637,653	49,500,970	1,136,683	
MTs	94,631	95,961	(1,330)	
Tanzania, Refugees in (500,000)				
WFP (Non-food)	7,391,400	1,371,312	6,020,088	
WFP (Food)	31,910,483	19,112,473	12,798,010	
MTs	52,797	30,492	22,305	
Zaire, Refugees in (1,350,000)				
WFP (Non-food)	11,650,742	777,293	10,873,449	
WFP (Food)	78,385,558	40,681,190	37,704,368	
MTs	130,223	62,980	67,243	
Uganda				
WFP (Non-food)	3,992,778	0	3,992,778	
Nairobi/FACIC/TICF				
WFP (Non-food)	905,000	0	905,000	
Regional Funds				
WFP (Non-food)		6,393,960	(6,393,960)	
WFP - Total Non-Food	32,673,695	22,398,963	10,274,732	
WFP - Total Food	198,081,162	137,366,245	60,714,917	
WFP - Total MTs	348,493	243,575	104,918	
Grand-Total	\$552,055,246	\$384,061,506	\$167,993,740	

- N.B. :

- UNHCR :

UNHCR is appealing for resources to fund activities on a regional level to meet the needs of Rwandan/Burundi refugees/returnees Jan - Dec '94. Funds requested, represent UNHCR's total budget (US\$ 143,034,637) for its Regional Operations, other than incl. is UNHCR's Flash Appeal (US\$ 115,165,000) for funds to cover the immediate, initial needs for 3 months (15 Jul - 15 Oct) some 1,700,000 Rwandese refugees in Zaire. UNHCR's budget for Repatriation to Rwanda (Aug - Dec '94), though not yet in this appeal is estimated at US\$ 40-50 million. Requirements do not include the cost of the service oriented packages.

- WFP :

- Caseload: Even though the total caseload in the region has not changed, as Kigali returns to being the focal point for the R operation, thereby reducing the need to undertake cross-border operations from neighbouring Uganda and Burundi, the current figures, by country, have been changed to reflect only the caseload within the boundary of the country (i.e. Burundi's caseload IDPs and Rwandese refugees within Burundi only).

- Food: To provide more clarity, all figures are now based on estimated needs through the end of 1994 (previously the emergency time frame for Zaire was due to terminate in mid-October). Therefore, the total current food requirements have increased from (US\$ 162,498,122) to 348,493 MTs (US\$ 198,081,162).

- Cash: Airlift requirements (non-food) for Zaire have been revised due to WFP's increased road capacity. Also, note that the excess funds (i.e. Rwanda and Burundi) shall be allocated on a priority basis in the forthcoming months, for those locations at shortfalls depending on additional resources received. Contributions under Regional will also be allocated to priority requirements.

- DHA :


With the stabilization of the situation in Rwanda the number of relief partners active inside the country has increased dramatically. Rwanda Emerg. Office has responded to this development by establishing a Coordination Centre in Kigali providing NGOs with a focal point for information on relief activities. Resources beyond those presented in the Appeal are required in order to staff and equip the coordination centre and the 5 UNREO field offices, positioned in key locations throughout the country.

**1994 Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency
Total Summary of Overall Donor Assistance**
(As Reported to DEA - as of 6 September 1994)

Donor Country	Total Contributions as reported by Donors (US\$)	Remarks
Algeria	(In kind-no value provided)	Medical services, 6,000 blankets, 4,000 lt. chlorine + airlift
Andorra	100,000	
Argentina	(In kind-no value provided)	Water purification (2 ma envelopes/tablets), Medicines & food
Australia	25,247,656	
Austria	40,984	
Belgium	8,086,029	Does not incl. \$2.9 million to finance equipping of infantry group to reinforce UNAMIR
Botswana	100,000	
Cambodia	10,000	
Canada	23,826,536	
China	298,850	
Croatia	300,000	
Czech Republic	464,610	
Denmark	7,257,108	
Ecuador	(In kind-no value provided)	Canned food
Egypt	(In kind-no value provided)	Shipment of 1.5 million vaccines plus 5 MTs of various medicines
Finland	3,049,627	
France	4,203,332	
Gabon	55,249	
Germany	52,586,393	Need further clarification on additional \$ 6.3 million in food aid
Greece		Need further clarification from donor
Holy See	50,000	
Iceland	14,756	
India	164,231	
Indonesia	35,000	
Ireland	3,468,216	
Israel	5,000,000	
Italy	13,475,199	Does not incl. pledge of \$ 6 million to Consolidated Appeal Need further clarification
Jamaica	15,000	
Japan	47,961,486	Does not incl. \$ 3 million to UNAMIR
Korea, Republic of	100,000	
Kuwait	1,000,000	
Liechtenstein	30,346	
Luxembourg	1,492,077	
Malaysia	100,000	
Malta	280,000	
Mauritius	20,000	
Mexico	(In kind-no value provided)	Medical support force incl. equipment + 2 million packs of ORS
Monaco	30,000	
Namibia	500,000	
Netherlands	19,973,998	
New Zealand	641,587	
Norway	6,696,722	
Oman	50,000	
Pakistan	(In kind-no value provided)	Relief goods
South Africa	100,000	
Spain	1,548,128	Does not incl. 7.5 million announced at Pledging Conference
Sweden	31,637,489	
Switzerland	7,284,948	
Thailand	80,000	
Tunisia	130,000	Also make in kind contribution - medical team
United Kingdom	43,269,224	
Uruguay	(In kind-no value provided)	6,000 ltr of medical serum and medicines incl. transport
USA	162,971,560	US\$ 162.9 million only covers USG Assn. to Rwanda. Excludes UNAMIR. Does not include DOD value of service packages.
EU	210,631,503	Does not incl. article 1. ECU 15 Mln. requested for purchase of food and fuel for UNAMIR
IFAD	4,000,000	
World Bank	20,000,000	
OPEC Fund	400,000	
Total	1,751,344,000	

1994 Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency (Continued)
Total Summary of Overall Donor Assistance
(As Reported to DHA - as of 6 September 1994)

UNICEF National Committee (NC)	
NC Australia	704,412
NC Belgium	932,130
NC Canada	181,160
NC Finland	96,712
NC France	1,077,527
NC Germany	632,911
NC Hellenic	151,899
NC Hong Kong	517,464
NC Italy	1,140,208
NC Japan	1,351,010
NC Netherlands	2,300,000
NC San Marino	9,494
NC Spain	1,740,194
NC Switzerland	950,807
NC United Kingdom	1,214,729
NC USA	2,800,000
UN Organizations	
UN Unspecified	2,550,000
UNESCO	500,000
UNFPA	30,000
UNHCR	138,184
ICRC National Society (NS)	
NS Australia	36,808
NS Austria	37,594
NS Canada	18,437
NS Denmark	119,526
NS France	51,485
NS Italy	6,534
NS Japan	251,938
NS Liechtenstein	7,519
NS Luxembourg	12,181
NS Netherlands	84,361
NS New Zealand	14,120
NS Norway	116,992
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (RC)	
RC Australia	3,424
RC Austria	331,041
RC Canada	67,687
RC Cyprus	1,827
RC Denmark	383,709
RC Finland	133,094
RC Germany	761,340
RC Hungary	3,759
RC Iceland	67,427
RC Ireland	73,322
RC Italy	71,297
RC Japan	794,534
RC Liechtenstein	44,324
RC Monaco	17,420
RC Netherlands	2,134,905
RC New Zealand	18,028
RC Norway	1,550,174
RC Poland	1,015
RC Spain	13,986
RC Sri Lanka	2,105
RC Sweden	391,581
RC Switzerland	90,850
RC Turkey	5,000
RC United Kingdom	1,814,983
RC USA	76,000
NGOs and Private Donors	
	24,923,192
Grand Total	762,350,204





UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA
(UNREO)

UNREO Humanitarian Situation Report
Friday, 4 November 1994

This sitrep is produced by UNREO Kigali three times every week; Monday, Wednesday and Friday. The information is compiled from inputs by organizations working in Rwanda including UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNHCR, WHO, IOM, UNAMIR, USAID-DART, and NGOs. This document is intended to represent the best available information as of 1200 Friday, 4 November 1994.

GENERAL SUMMARY

UNHCR has expressed grave concern over the RPA's recent trend of forced removal of IDPs from camps in the south-west.

A notable number of businesses are now open in Kigali, including gas stations, stores and restaurants. In addition, regular water supply is now available to 75% of the city.

SECURITY

In sector 3, there are UNAMIR reports of local vigilante groups organizing themselves against militia and bandit attacks.

UNAMIR reports that RPA presence is particularly strong in north-west Rwanda (sector 5). They have recently increased patrol activities and have also asked locals to move 1 km inside the country from the border line. The RPA continues to conduct patrols and mount road blocks throughout the country.

An international staff member of Concern was arrested and was still being held as of 3 November for striking a plain clothes gendarme at the UNHCR way station in Kigali. A UNHCR staff person was also arrested during the altercation, but has since been released.

Two journalists who were arrested by the RPA on 27 October were released on 3 November. The journalists work for the Associated Press and were arrested for making an unauthorised documentary on the Twa and also for asking questions on RPA deployment.

A number of sources report that clashes in the Burundi province of Cibitoke have caused over 30,000 Rwandan refugees to flee from Burundi into the Zairian town of Uvira.

HUMAN RIGHTS

There is an upcoming visit of the UN Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs, Mr Hans Corell. The purpose of his visit is to explain the draft resolution on the International Tribunal.

SECTORAL INFORMATION

Rehabilitation:

At the request of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, CWA/LWF plans to assist the government and UNHCR with repatriation of refugees and with rehabilitation of communal infrastructure. CWA/LWF has opened a Project office in Kibungo to be headed by Project Coordinator Ulrich Lind.

Health:

A WHO consultant has arrived in Rwanda at the request of the Ministry of Health. The consultant will support local authorities by assessing the nutritional situation within the country, assessing the existing resources to be mobilized for a nutritional survey, revitalizing the nutritional surveillance system, and aiding the Ministry of Health to define nutritional policies.

WHO is supporting the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs to dispose of body parts surfacing in the Bicumbi area (eastern Kigali prefecture). WHO is providing the Ministry with technical guidelines for the proper disposal of human remains, as well as equipment and supplies. WHO had requested that the Ministry assess the scale of the problem nationwide and report back with their results.

Two meetings took place in Kigali and Nairobi last week in order to coordinate the on-going and future activities of WHO in Rwanda and surrounding refugee camps. A close relationship between field workers and coordinators was identified as a key factor for effective response.

The NGO Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) is engaged in assessing and determining the actual extent of the psycho-social crisis in two communes. Its community-based programmes are assisting displaced and returnee women to cope with psycho-social trauma caused by the war and to provide them with reproductive health care. The programmes are being supported by the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

Water/Sanitation:

UNICEF is presently undertaking an assessment of water systems in north-east Rwanda as the basis for further assistance to refugee resettlement activities.

At the weekly water/sanitation meeting Electrogaz reported that 75% of Kigali has regular water supply and that plans are under way to ensure adequate supply to the remaining 25%.

Agriculture:

At the weekly meeting on agricultural issues, the issue was raised as to whether or not cattle owners should make minimal contributions to cover the cost of vaccinating their livestock. FAO and a number of NGOs expressed concern that some of the cattle owners would not be able to pay. Large numbers of cattle recently entering from Uganda, Burundi and Zaire pose a significant threat of disease to livestock. FAO will be coordinating NGO activities related to the livestock situation.

Food:

WFP reports that its priority food needs and programmes for the Rwanda Emergency are being drafted and will be ready by mid-November, 1994.

REFUGEES

UNHCR and IOM report the following returnee movement for the period 31 October - 3 November:

	Total for 31 Oct. to 3 Nov.	Cumulative as from 12 August
<u>North-west</u>		
Cyangugu/Butare to Kigali	833	12,104
Gisenyi to Ruhengeri	3,857	41,591
Gisenyi to Kigali	172	6,678
Ruhengeri to Kigali	669	7,592
<u>South-east</u>		
Kibungo to Kigali	491	1,643
<u>South-west</u>		
Kibuye to Kigali	0	861
<u>Total</u>	6,022	70,469

UNAMIR reports that for the month of November to date, the recorded movement of people into Rwanda through various border crossings totals 4,221

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

An IDP task force comprising representatives from Ministry of Rehabilitation, UNAMIR, UNHCR and UNREO visited Kibungo on Wednesday, 2 November and Friday, 4 November to do needs assessments in three communes in Kibungo prefecture which had been identified as returnee test case areas. The task force seeks to prioritize needs in areas of return, solicit NGO assistance in meeting these needs, and closely work with the local authorities in the integration of returnees. The task force strategy focuses on the shift of assistance programs from the camps to the community.

UNHCR has expressed grave concern over the RPA's recent trend of forced removal of IDPs from camps in the south-west.

The UNREO Field Office in Gikongoro reports that the situation in the southern camps, especially Kibeho camp, is very tense. On 3 November, Operation Homeward was not moving people to Gitarama because of the security situation. Operation Homeward did, however, move 600 returnees from Gikongoro to the Butare area on 2 November.

UNHCR and IOM report the following movement of internally displaced persons for the period 31 October - 3 November:

	Total for 31 Oct. to 3 Nov.	Cumulative as from 12 August
Gikongoro to Kigali	1,356	5,067
Bugasera to Kigali	0	4,473
Byumba to Kigali	0	2,082
Within Kigali	1,810	12,230
Kigali to Other Destinations	2,956	12,417
Within Movements in 4 Prefectures	8,485	5,530
<u>Total</u>	14,607	51,799

Children:

ICRC reports that it has registered 25,000 unaccompanied children but that so far only 100 have been reunited with their families.

A UNICEF study reports that there is a very high percentage of children who have been exposed to war atrocities. More than half of the children interviewed witnessed family member being killed and 75% of the group witnessed others being killed.

De-mining:

Ambassador Khan recently appealed to the international community to fund a UNAMIR demining project. It is estimated that 2 to 3 children are injured each day by mines. Five British soldiers were recently wounded by a mine while repairing a bridge near Kigali. Mines also continue to hamper efforts to rehabilitate water systems in north-east Rwanda.

OTHER INFORMATION

The UNREO Field Office in Cyangugu reports that there is a new prefet in Cyangugu, Mr Theobald Rutinhunza. UNAMIR reports that the new prefet of Byumba will be Mr Koyomba.

Action Nord Sud and Handicap International have organized a festival to benefit war orphans. The festival will take place on 5 and 6 November at the Nyamirambo Regional Stadium.

As of 1 November there are 8 organizations offering flights that connect Kigali to Nairobi, Goma, Bukavu, and Brussels.

A notable number of businesses are now open in Kigali, including gas stations, stores and restaurants. At the city market food, textiles and household goods are available.



No French hand will stop them

Fleeing Rwanda, again

GIKONGORO

THE world feared it, and it is happening. After the earlier exodus farther north, tens of thousands of frightened Hutus have begun moving out of the French "safe zone" towards Bukavu in Zaire. They were spurred on by blood-curdling propaganda—from the ex-government side—that France's pull-out, due by August 22nd, would signal attack and massacre by the now triumphant Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The French, the United Nations and aid agencies appear powerless to stem the tide.

The zone set up by the French in June has till now held about 2½m people. Not all are innocents. Many—perhaps thousands—took part in the genocidal slaughter of the Tutsi minority. Now that the French are leaving, the (mainly Hutu) refugees fear that the new (mainly Tutsi) government will seek retribution.

The UN is trying to reassure the zone's frightened people by deploying Ghanaians and Ethiopians to replace the French. But Hutus say they do not trust the protection offered by UN forces. For them, the French, who backed the old government, are natural friends. The English-speaking Ghanaians and Ethiopians are the friends, they say, of their enemies now in power.

Anti-UN sentiment has been whipped up by hundreds of the ex-government's

agents in the zone. They remind Hutus that after the killing of President Juvénal Habyarimana in an air crash in April—the event that sparked off the massacres—Bangladeshi UN soldiers were unable to protect government ministers. They have even managed to convince some people that the UN was behind the killing of the president. The slow deployment of UN soldiers has made the UN's task of rescuing its image even harder. Even under French command, it took weeks before French-speaking African troops were trusted.

Hardline ex-government officials have become increasingly forceful in urging Hutus to flee. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Gikongoro, a town in the heart of zone, emissaries from the ex-government in Zaire are ferrying refugees out of the area to the border. Those who turn down the offer are branded RPF collaborators. It is a cynical exercise to depopulate the country and thus undermine the legitimacy and the authority of the new RPF-led government.

News of the fresh exodus has played straight into the hands of propagandists in the refugee camps in Goma. "What do you mean, you want to go back to Rwanda," the message goes, "don't you know that thousands more Hutus are fleeing the RPF in ter-

ror?" Acts of intimidation in the camps by thugs determined to discourage refugees from going home have grown more brutal, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The agency had to cancel the repatriation of about 150 refugees from Maginga camp, near Goma, after elders said that those signing up to go home would be considered collaborators and killed.

For the new regime, the latest outflow is a serious blow. This week President Pasteur Bizimungu promised afresh to provide security for returning refugees and sent three ministers to Kibuye, in the French zone, to tell Hutus it was safe to go home. But their appeal was met with scepticism, even outright hostility, by the refugees. The government's promise this week not to send RPF troops into the protected zone for two months after the French leave was met with disbelief; rightly, since a couple of days later Faustin Twagiramungu, the prime minister, said that his army would occupy the zone right away.

The entry are mixed up with the innocent and nobody is sure of the new government's intentions. Earlier this month Mr Twagiramungu announced that at least 30,000 people would stand trial for their suspected role in the massacre of more than 500,000 Tutsis. Although it has now agreed to hold such trials at an international tribunal, the government has not been able to dampen the talk—and the fears—of summary justice.

The difficulties are made worse by the friction between the RPF government and the French. France's prime minister, Edouard Balladur, said on French radio this week that it was up to the new government whether it wants French support or not—a hint that French soldiers might have stayed longer if the RPF had asked them to. Mr Bizimungu says he is trying to establish a "relationship of co-operation and solidarity" with the French. But his government is still furious at what it has called the French "colonisation" of the zone. Government officials complain that they need a visa to travel to the area.

So the outflow, despite weeks of warnings, is taking place. The UNHCR and aid agencies say that they are woefully ill-prepared for a large influx of refugees into Bukavu: some 320,000 are already crowded into 36 sites in or near the lake-side town. It is difficult to find new sites, thanks to the terrain and obstructive local Zairean authorities. Food is short. The airport is in bad shape. And when the rains come, trucks bound for the town will be bogged down.

Burundi

Not a twin

IT HAS a government dominated by Hutus anxious to cling to power, a Tutsi minority fearful of political exclusion, armed gangs selecting their victims on ethnic grounds. Could the political tension winding up in Burundi, which has a near-identical ethnic mix (85% Hutu, 15% Tutsi) to that of neighbouring Rwanda, presage a repeat of that country's horrors?


That fear has grown in recent weeks. A series of tit-for-tat killings has been carried out by gangs of Hutus and of Tutsis, many of them in the northern hills near Rwanda. Some carry weapons, others wield farming tools. There were riots in Bujumbura, the capital, after students and a (Tutsi) opposition leader were arrested. A crack-down by the Tutsi-controlled army has spread only fragile calm. A further strain will come as Rwandan refugees take flight from the French zone, some of them joining the

250,000 already in Burundi. The country, said its acting president, Sylvestre Ntibunganya, this week, could well be "thrown into turmoil".

Yet Burundi may be able to avert the worst. The balance of power, though perilous, is divided between the army, which is 95% Tutsi, and the new ruling party, dominated by Hutus, which won an election last year. Mindful of the army's muscle and ethnic backing, the Hutu parties have been making concessions, in current talks, to the various Tutsi opposition parties who want to be included in government. But these talks have stalled over the choice of a new president: Burundi lost a president, for the second time in six months, in the April an

crash that also killed Rwanda's president. It is true that armed Hutu gangs, some egged on by Rwandan Hutu thugs now in exile, have attacked Tutsis. But the army would not allow an organised pogrom against fellow-Tutsis. In some ways, the greater fear is the killing of Hutus.

Burundi and Rwanda have distinct political histories. In Rwanda the Hutu major-



ity overthrew their Tutsi rulers in 1959 and ruled until the rebel victory last month. In Burundi the Tutsi minority clung on to power long after the Belgians left, quelling bloodily each Hutu uprising. Until, that is, last year's multi-party election: the vote followed ethnic lines and demographics guaranteed a Hutu victory.

Some Tutsis refused to accept defeat. Last year renegade Tutsi officers staged a coup, in protest at the plans of the new Hutu president to loosen Tutsi hegemony over the army. They murdered the president and several ministers, prompting a wave of ethnic reprisals throughout the country. A huge number of people were killed, certainly more than 50,000.

Historic tempers, optimism about Burundi, fighting, and killing, erupt periodically—as in 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1993. In the 1972 Hutu uprising, when some downtrodden Hutus vowed to slice the legs off their taller Tutsi rulers, Tutsis slaughtered up to 300,000 Hutus. The next year the Tutsi government issued a White Paper on the need to achieve "parity through elimination of the Hutu surplus." The army is still vulnerable to the message of Tutsi extremists. Were a president appointed who was not to their choice, soldiers might rebel.

Hutus, in turn, fear that they may be cheated of their chance to rule. Armed Hutu gangs might revolt against their own leaders were they to make too many concessions to the Tutsi opposition. Hutus are already aggrieved at the failure to bring Tutsis to justice. Though both Hutus and Tutsis were guilty of murder last autumn, few Tutsis have been prosecuted. Hutus suspect ethnic bias: 95% of Burundi's magistrates are Tutsis. Since the rebel victory in Rwanda, some even believe that Tutsis are bent on building a new empire, reaching from Uganda—whose president belongs to an ethnic group linked to the Tutsis—down through Rwanda and into Burundi.

Tutsi v Hutu

JUST how different are Tutsis and Hutus from each other? Anthropologists and historians disagree. There are three main schools of thought.

The school of racial determinism, much favoured by the German and then Belgian colonial rulers of Burundi and Rwanda, has it that the more sophisticated Tutsi pastoralists came south in about the 15th century and conquered indigenous Hutu cultivators. The Tutsi people, goes this line, were of Nilotic stock, possibly with a dash of European blood—hence their thinner noses and longer faces. Though they adopted the Hutu language, Kinyarwanda, Tutsi sophisticates ruled over Hutu serfs, forging two pre-colonial kingdoms.

Not so, argues the politically correct school of anthropology. The idea of two distinct tribes was a fanciful—if not cynical—figment of the imperialist imagination, used to impose racist divisions on what was little more than a distinction between haves and have-nots. Decades of intermarriage have made it nearly impossible to tell Hutu from Tutsi by physical appearance. So slender was the racial distinction, argues Alex de Waal, an anthropologist who co-runs African Rights, a human-rights organisation, that, when Belgian colonists decided that identity cards should name the holder's "tribe," they had to classify people as Hutu or Tutsi on the basis of how many cows they owned.

The third school suggests that both theories are half right. In pre-colonial times, argue academics such as Johan Potter, of the London School of Economics, there were indeed two groups, but the distinction between the two was more one of caste, or status, than of tribe. Indeed, in some cases, it was possible for a poor Tutsi to be relegated to the status of Hutu, and for a prosperous Hutu who had built up a grand cattle-herd, to become a Tutsi. Under the pre-colonial monarchies, the Tutsi kings organised local land chiefs (Hutus) to rule alongside local cattle chiefs (Tutsi). It was the Belgians who later abolished this system, leaving Tutsis in charge and fortifying their rule.

Perhaps there once was some physical basis for the distinction: many Tutsis do fit the stereotype of a tall, Ethiopian-looking physique. There certainly seems to have been a cultural difference that preceded the colonists, between milk-drinking cattle herders (Tutsis) and tillers of the soil (Hutus). But the antagonism has chiefly been one of top dog (cattle owner) versus bottom dog (peasant).

Alas, however spurious the distinction, it retains a powerful grip on the imagination in Rwanda and Burundi, made all too real by a potent mix of folk myth and political manipulation. Whatever their origins, the labels are real enough, as Mr de Waal remarks, for people to kill because of them.

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UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA
(UNREO)

UNREO Humanitarian Situation Report
Wednesday, 2 November 1994

This sitrep is produced three times every week by UNREO Kigali; Monday, Wednesday and Friday. The information is compiled from inputs by organizations working in Rwanda including UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNHCR, WHO, IOM, UNAMIR, USAID-DART, and NGOs. This document is intended to represent the best available information as of Wednesday, 1200, 1 November 1994.

GENERAL SUMMARY

Several tents in Birambo IDP camp have been burnt down after the 29 October deadline for closing down this and other camps in Kibuye Prefecture.

The First National Health Needs Assessment Workshop sponsored by UNICEF from 24 - 28 October closed with a number of recommendations for health care in Rwanda.

SECURITY

UNAMIR reports that in Rutagara, near the Zaire border, three families comprising 36 people were massacred on the night of 30/31 October. Four men, six women and 26 children were killed in the attack. In Kigali, UNAMIR also reported that automatic and single shot, small fire was heard during the night of 31 October 1994.

REFUGEES

A Tripartite Agreement on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees was signed between the Government of Rwanda, the Government of Zaire and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Agreement sets up a legal framework which enables the signatories to combine their efforts in resolving the repatriation problem. Within the first 15 days of November, a sub-committee will meet in Goma to work out some modalities and practical means to achieve the goals stipulated in the Agreement.

On 25/26 October 1994, a delegation of Rwandese Ministers went to Burundi to visit refugee camps and discuss the prospects of repatriation of refugees with their Burundian counterparts.

UNHCR reports that the Prime Minister of Rwanda is expected to soon visit Tanzania to consult with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi about the Rwandese refugee issue in Tanzania.

A Swiss Aid worker was attacked by bandits and sustained minor machete wounds in Bukavu on 27 October 1994.

- UNAMIR reports the following returnee movements into Rwanda through various border crossings on 31 October 1994 and 1 November 1994

From	Number
Burundi	3,058
Zaire	1,288
Tanzania	130
Total	4,476

Total number of returnees through various border crossings in October/November: 37,181
Total number of people leaving Rwanda in October: 281

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE

IDPs in Rugabano camp, Kibuye Prefecture, were removed on 29 October. 3,000 of them returned to their homes in Kibuye Prefecture. 300 who have remained there are still waiting for transport to Kigali.

UNAMIR reports that some tents have been burnt down in Birambo camp, Kibuye Prefecture, because some people had remained in this camp which was, along with Rugabano camp officially closed on 29 October 1994. In Muko camp in Gikongoro Prefecture several tents belonging to IDPs from Kibuye were burnt down on 1 November 1994.

At the weekly IDP meeting, it was agreed that a joint delegation of UNHCR, UNAMIR and UNREO would go to Kibungo on Wednesday, 3 November 1994 to work on the IDP test case in order to assess the practical implications of the test case at the field level. In the next meeting, the test-case will be discussed with regard to preparatory arrangements, liaison requirements, Government involvement and the role of separate UN agencies and NGOs so as to arrive at a workable return strategy for IDPs in the whole country.

SECTORAL ACTIVITY

Rehabilitation:

The UNDP Resident Representatives of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Zaire met in Kigali on 29-30 October 1994 to discuss the impact of the Rwanda conflict on the subregion and explore ways of coordinating the policies of the UNDP offices in the neighbouring countries with regard to dealing with the conflict. The meeting covered the following issues:

- Impact of the Rwanda crisis
- UNDP's role in emergency preparedness
- Transition from relief to rehabilitation and development
- Operational aspects
- Development of a sub-regional coordination mechanism

The conclusion of the meeting focused on the need for closer coordination among all agencies involved in dealing with emergency and post-emergency situation and on the need for better preparedness and more effective backstopping of field offices by headquarters.

On 31 October - 1 November, UNICEF held a sub-regional conference of country representatives from Rwanda, surrounding countries and of Regional Office officials to reflect on experience and cooperation to date. In addition, the development of the new UNICEF programme proposal for the 1995 interagency appeal was discussed.

Food:

WFP has launched a Food Stamp Programme. This has been developed in reaction to a Government request for General Feeding Programmes for the population of Kigali. The Food Stamp Programme focuses on the improvement of the nutritional status of vulnerable individuals,

which include the mentally and physically handicapped, the elderly, single parent families with more than three 'under seven' malnourished children and foster families who care for one or more unaccompanied children. The programme also provides short-term food assistance to returnees in the Kigali area.

In Kibungo, WFP's short-term provision of food for prisoners is now established. It has been monitored by ICRC. The programme was established upon ICRC's request due to the serious food shortages at Kibungo prison.

Health:

During the period 24-28 October 1994, thirty participants including senior officials from the Ministry of Health, representatives from other ministries, UN agencies and NGOs attended the First National Health Needs Assessment Workshop which was sponsored by UNICEF. They discussed the health problems of the country, its priorities, policy strategies and what future intervention will be required. Recommendations were divided into two phases: Emergency and Short term phase, Middle and Long-Term phase. Within the Emergency phase, some of the recommendations were as follows:

1. Establishment of a list of needs
2. Identification of resources and their orientation based on the prioritized needs
3. Assurance of the coordination of UN agencies, NGOs, as well as agencies of bilateral cooperation
4. Reinforcement of Regional Administration .
5. Development and determination of guidelines for health activities
6. Development of a proposed salary scale for the NGOs in order to assure reliable staffing

For the Short, Middle and Long-Term phase some of the recommendations were as follows:

1. Development of a National Health Policy
2. Acceleration of the actions of UNICEF's partners to rehabilitate the health system at all levels
3. The Reinforcement of the initial and continual training of health personnel at all levels and examination, along with the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, of ways and means of integrating the paramedical training institutions within the Ministry of Health.
4. Adoption of a national pharmaceutical policy
5. Reinforcement of documentation services of the Ministry of Health.
6. Establishment of means for intersectorial co-ordination and ensuring its efficiency

The 31 October Sitrep reported that a team of 8 from IMC will soon begin work at the Kibungo Hospital. In fact, IMC has been operating in the Kibungo area since June 1994. They have had a medical team at the Kibungo hospital throughout this period and have been instrumental in reopening numerous health clinics in the area.

Transport:

In co-operation with the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Customs, WFP has arranged, through a Food for Work project, for a customs officer to be placed at the Rusumo border point, Kibungo Prefecture. This is the second border entry point to open to enable humanitarian cargo to be customs cleared at entry point rather than having to travel to Magerwa near Kigali or Butare. This service is available to all humanitarian cargo and can be arranged by contacting the WFP officer at Gatuna or Rusumo. Arrangements can also be made by contacting the Transport Coordination Unit directly.

The Transport Coordination Unit has started a service which provides information on road conditions throughout the country. This will enable convoys to have information on road conditions ahead of time and be able to arrange to detour problem areas. UN agencies and NGOs are asked to contact the TCU for any information they may be able to provide to add to the

existing collected information.

Water and Sanitation:

UNICEF has agreed with the Ministry of Public Works/Electrogaz to support the repair of the Jabana Power Station, as well as the repair of power lines in and around Kigali. In addition, UNICEF has officially notified the Ministry of Public Works (MINITRAPE) that \$2 million has been set aside for the rehabilitation of the national grid in Rwanda. In addition, \$30,000 has been made available to rehabilitate MINITRAPE offices.

Unaccompanied Minors:

ICRC opened its office in Kibungo on 1 November 1994. Their work will entail facilitating the Red Cross Messages "mail" system. Currently ICRC has some 15,000 unaccompanied children registered in their computerized "mail list." The Kibungo office will add to the list and facilitate messages to/from registered names.

Child Soldiers:

UNICEF is in the process of completing a project proposal with the Ministry of Defense for the demobilization of boy soldiers and for their subsequent education and vocational training. The project will continue into 1995.

OTHER INFORMATION

The ECHO flight coordinator, Mr Barry Atkins announced at the UN/NGO General Meeting on 1 November 1994, that Echo flights will now be available to NGOs and UN agencies free of charge four days a week. Every Wednesday, Friday and Saturday a seven-seater aircraft will be available. An Antonov aircraft will be used on Sunday. Anyone wanting to transport cargo needs to book it in Nairobi. Additional information can be obtained at the third green tent on the lawn in front of the UNDP building in Kigali.

SITUATION REPORT

In both the health centres under its care, at Tare and Kabarando, AHA launched on October 20, 1994 new community-based programmes in trauma management and reproductive health care. The programmes focus on Rwandese women and girls and are supported by the United Nations Development Fund for Women/Africa Women in Crisis umbrella programme [UNIFEM/AFWIC].

The community-based projects are in response to the findings of a July 1994 UNIFEM/AFWIC needs assessment mission to Rwanda which established, among other things, that of the total 2.5 million Rwandese population of refugees and internally-displaced, 80 % are women and their dependants.

The projects are designed to assist displaced and returnee women to cope with the intense psycho-social trauma caused them during the Rwandese civil war and to provide them with needed reproductive health care.

The expertise of a Rwandese Psychiatrist associated with the International Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims (IRCTC) based in Copenhagen, Denmark has been contracted for the work on psycho-therapy and counselling.

AHA's immediate task is to assess and determine the real extent of the psycho-social crisis. The specialist will be posted in turn at the two health centres under the management of AHA to consult people who have suffered considerably from the effects of the civil war. A pilot programme will then be drawn up to address the trauma problem in the areas in question.

Meanwhile, there have been improvements in services at both health centres which are supported by UNHCR. The Kabarondo Centre, which in fact started giving fully-fledged services to patients for the first time on October 10, has introduced out-reach community work and a 24-hour hospital service within only a week of AHA's commencing of operations in the Kibungo Prefecture. There, AHA also installed a 7,500-litre water tank, on loan from UNICEF-Rwanda, to cope with the water shortage. Earlier, the water supply for the clinic had to be transported by jerrycans from a distance of some 20 Km. UNHCR's mobile tankers can now replenish supplies on a regular basis.

On 23 October, UNHCR made available to AHA a set of radio communications equipment which will improve upon communications and enhance the effectiveness of the services of AHA's two teams in Rwanda.

IS/SA/RM/SRR6
30/10/94

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Publications

LIFE & PEACE REVIEW (LPR): a quarterly which updates issues of peace and justice (especially those studied in LPI projects), reports international and ecumenical developments related to issues of life and peace (with special attention to some countries), offers reflection and commentary, and presents an overview of LPI work.

HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN (HAB): a bimonthly compilation of news from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, and Sudan.

Research Reports: research-project results

Conference Reports and Papers: from seminars and other meetings.

Occasional and Working Papers: interim research reports.

(For a detailed list of current and forthcoming publications, contact the LPI communications section.)

Cooperation

Over the years, LPI has worked cooperatively with many national and international bodies (or individuals from them), including:

Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Uppsala University

International Peace Research Association

International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO)

Parts of the United Nations (including UNEP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOSOM, SEPHA, UNDHA, UN University)

World Alliance of YMCAs

World Conference on Religion and Peace

Christian Council of Sweden

Conference of European Churches

Middle East Council of Churches


Pacific Conference of Churches

World Council of Churches

Lutheran World Federation

Mennonite Central Committee

World Alliance of Reformed Churches





The Life & Peace Institute is an international and ecumenical center for peace research.

Proposed by the Christian World Conference on Life and Peace (Uppsala, April 1983), LPI began its work in 1985. Its governing board is appointed by the Christian Council of Sweden (Sveriges Kristna Råd).

LPI research supports work for justice, peace, and reconciliation. The main sources of LPI funds are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs, both church and secular), and government-related entities.

Though based in Sweden, LPI (in Swedish, Liv & Fred Institutet) is **international**: Its staff and board members are from more than a dozen countries. LPI research results are shared with partners and networks around the globe. And, though it works in English, its staff can also handle Swedish, French, Spanish, Dutch, German, Portuguese, and Tigrinia.

LPI is **ecumenical**: Its staff and board members come from many Christian traditions — Reformed, Eastern Orthodox, Lutheran, Quaker, Anglican, Methodist, Roman Catholic, Baptist, United. Its ecumenical partners include global, regional, and national conferences and councils of churches, as well as research institutes, study centers, and activist groups. LPI is also ecumenical in a wider sense, cooperating with people and agencies of other faiths and of secular outlook.

As a **research** institute with a special concern for peace issues, LPI is part of the broader community of academic researchers. Besides academic research in a strict sense, it produces material informed by research, but whose primary purpose is reflection and/or advocacy.

Current research

LPI develops its research proposals in consultation with the LPI board, colleagues at other institutions, and church and other NGO representatives. It thus tries to complement rather than duplicate what is done elsewhere.

LPI takes care to include a variety of regional and academic perspectives in its work. Its research is done both by staff in Uppsala and by commissioned scholars around the world.

With particular attention to South/South and South/North issues, current LPI research has four main emphases:

- (1) *the Horn of Africa;*
- (2) *human rights and economic justice;*
- (3) *religion, conflict, and peace; and*
- (4) *nonviolent conflict-resolution.*

Among LPI projects and programs recently completed, under way, or projected are:

1) **The Horn of Africa Program.** It produces the authoritative HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN, and is (at Swedish government and UN request) active in efforts to bring reconciliation among the warring clans and factions in Somalia. Its research also focuses on the failure of the 1972 peace agreement in Sudan, the impact of returning refugees on Eritrea, and alternative models of cooperation among the Horn states.

2.1) **Debt, Disarmament, and Development** (a series on aspects of relationships among those three sets of issues in countries such as Brazil, the Philippines, Canada, the United States, and Russia).

2.2) **Christians and Human Rights in Guatemala** (official and unofficial activities by groups and individuals in that country).

2.3) **Militarization, Economic Penetration, and Human Rights in the Pacific** (in partnership with the Pacific Conference of Churches, Suva).

2.4) **NGOs and Refugee Issues** (ways in which church and other NGOs conceptualize and carry out work on behalf of refugees, migrants, and internally-displaced people).

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3.1) **Fundamentalism as a Threat to Peace** (the phenomenon in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and how it tends to exacerbate and harden conflicts).

3.2) **Religion and Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia** (the role of religion in both creating/sustaining and overcoming violence there).

3.3) **The Church in the El Salvador Peace Process** (interchurch, grassroots-leadership, and church-NGO relationships).

3.4) **Church Involvement in Protest and the Transition to Democracy in the Philippines and South Africa** (in partnership with the Institute for Political Democracy, Manila, and the Institute for Theological and Interdisciplinary Research of the University of the Western Cape, Bellville).

3.5) **The Intifada and the Church** (in partnership with the Al-Liq'a Center, Jerusalem).

4.1) **Women and Nonviolence** (in partnership with the Lutheran World Federation and World Council of Churches, both Geneva; roles played by women's movements for nonviolent social change).

4.2) **Alternative Possibilities for Common Security in Europe** (the post-Cold War debate).

4.3) **UN Intervention in the Post-Cold War World** (policies, principles, politics, and problems).



Africa Humanitarian Action

Introduction

African Humanitarian Action (AHA) is a private, non-profit and non governmental humanitarian organisation based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Founded by concerned African relief and development professionals, its corporate mission is to strengthen the response capacity of African Peoples' Organisations, provide emergency relief and sustained development assistance to distressed communities affected by natural disasters and civil strife.

It is a Pan-African voluntary agency governed by its Board of Directors and an International Assembly of Trustees.

Mr Dao
Anything for me
I take action on?
See

AHA has within its ranks highly experienced professionals with requisite skills in refugee care, disaster management, conflict prevention and resolution and the management of long-term prevention and development undertakings.

These professionals have long standing and proven records of services in the demanding actions of the Great African drought-triggered famine of the 70's and 80's, and conflicts that prevailed in the Horn of Africa over the past two decades.

*Our mission is to
enhance the
humanitarian role of
Africa's People's
Organisations. We
intend to accomplish
this by self-
empowerment and
recognition of our
decisive capacities and
our socio-political
vulnerabilities.*

AHA's network of professionals from all over Africa are ready to be deployed to an area of assignment under emergencies and on short notice.

AHA is steadfastly building its logistical and operational capabilities and is supported by the United Nations system, the Organisation of African Unity and a number of bilateral and multi-lateral funding sources.

It is the guiding principle of AHA that alleviating the horrific and tragic crisis, which continues unabated in Africa, is, first and foremost, the responsibility and challenge of Africans. Not only should Africans be seen working alongside their international compatriots, but should play a leading and vanguard role in coming to the help of their fellow Africans.

'Charity begins at home' and it is incumbent upon Africans to mount diligent efforts to ameliorate the humiliating human tragedy and in the process, contribute to the creation of lasting and just peace in our continent.

It's against this background that concerned African development and relief professionals took the initiative to establish AHA as a Pan-African humanitarian agency to bring succour and hope to the distressed communities of the region and for the pursuit of development in peace.

**Towards the Establishment
of
Africa Humanitarian Action**

A Concept Paper

**Addis Ababa
February 1994**

*Towards the founding of an African
non-profit and non-governmental humanitarian organisation*

Africa Humanitarian Action

**for the delivery of relief,
the prevention of disasters and the pursuit of
peaceful development in Africa.**

1. BACKGROUND

Notwithstanding an array of declarations, communiques and action programmes, and massive interventions by numerous humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and development agencies over the last three decades; the humanitarian crisis in Africa continues unabated.

The crisis also assumes additional dimensions as rapid transformation in political structures and production relations spurred by changes in institutions and government leaderships as well as economic adjustments in Africa continue to make new demands on individuals and communities already at the brink of collapse.

Internal strife, economic crisis manifested by extreme poverty and a socio-political environment that has been re-woven over and over again to reflect only the desires of the powerful have rendered the continent one of the tragic scenes of present day human crisis.

In Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn, persistent armed conflicts over the past three decades have constrained economic development and have resulted in making the sub-region among the least developed areas of the world. Massive militarisation and endless wars including ethnic conflicts have squandered valuable and scarce resources and have caused unparalleled human disaster, rendering the region's population chronically vulnerable and dependent on international charity. The recent political economy of the region, as much of Africa, is a study in squandered resources and missed opportunities caused by disastrous economic policies and persistent political conflicts.

The Horn continues to be marred by protracted ethnic strife and communal violence. One needs to look no further than Somalia, where the breakdown of civil society has not only resulted in thousands of deaths, but has turned the entire population against each other. Over 5,000 children are reported to be dying there everyday and over 2.5 million people, half of the entire population, have become refugees. Similarly, a devastating civil war is still raging in Southern Sudan. And Djibouti, once presumed an island of stability, has recently been tested by communal violence.

Since the early sixties, an estimated five million people, the vast majority of whom are civilians, have lost their lives as a result of armed conflicts. Nearly as many people are believed to have been handicapped for life. Presently, over half of Africa's refugees, well over two million are to be found in the Horn. This is the largest density of refugees of any comparable area in the world. In addition, nearly twelve million people, of whom well over half are widows and orphans, are internally displaced as a result of civil strife, socio economic dislocations and natural calamities.

Problems of hunger and malnutrition are recurring features of life in the region. As a result of the Great African Famine, 1984-85, more than one million people are estimated to have died in Ethiopia alone. Today, an estimated 23 million people in the sub-region, the majority of whom are women and children, face starvation and death if not provided with emergency assistance.

The region has the highest infant mortality rate, the lowest per capita income and the least quality and quantity of health, education and social services in the Third World. Hunger and despair stalks the region's fast growing urban slums and refugee camps where millions crouch in squalor. In the country side, peasants and nomad pastoralists struggle against the ravages of war, the elements of natural calamities and the inefficient and inequitable economies of their shattered countries.

In short, in-terms of affliction, the Horn of Africa has few rivals in the world. It is a very troubled and impoverished corner of the earth where the arsenal of man and nature recreate human misery and despair at a prodigious rate. This landscape, as bleak as it is, is deteriorating still further.

While these crisis persist unabated the sub-region is faced with a more fundamental and far-reaching ecological problem. Environmental degradation, desertification, over-population and intermittent drought and famine have raised serious concerns regarding the ability of the sub-region to meet the challenges ahead. At the present rate of ecological decline, a FAO study estimates that a total of ten million hectares of land which constitute the farm land of about 10 million households will be gone by the year 2010.

The outpouring of sympathy and the spontaneous response of the international community have been widely acknowledged. These actions have also brought to light some serious doubts about the adequacy and ability of the interventions to reduce vulnerability and create sustainable solutions.

In addition to external interventions, the participation of Africans, (often unfairly described as inadequate) has ranged from sharing their meagre resources at community levels, contributing trained and auxiliary man-power in support roles and functions to international aid organisations and at times assuming leadership roles through local NGOs.

The intellectual capacity, experience and will on the part of Africans to be fully engaged and involved in the humanitarian tasks facing their continent and even beyond is there to be put to good use. Even though a few success stories could be cited, the prevailing awareness has resulted in the formation of a few national and regional NGOs

It is against this background that :

1. **concerned individuals, who have been actively engaged in the demanding actions of humanitarian relief, disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation, and who believe that a tested residue of expertise in disaster management, its prevention and in grassroots community development, with long-standing and proven professional experience, is available within the continent, have taken the initiative to found the Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA).**
2. **The initiators of AHA have decided that the first steps for its action will be concentrated in and around the Horn of Africa, including adjacent areas, to address humanitarian issues in the countries and communities that will require assistance.**
3. **AHA will will work both at the operational level and will assist indigenous and external groups and agencies in the relief-development nexus (the emerging paradigm of bearing relief within the development process) and preventive and mitigative diplomacy.**
4. **in stages, and based on its experiences in the Horn, the initiators of AHA intend to promote and develop its activities all over the continent.**

II. THE AFRICAN NGOs SCENE, A rationale for change

African NGOs have played modest but crucial roles in relief, disaster prevention, rehabilitation, community development and in advocacy actions as well as in the pursuit of peace in the continent with due respect to local sensitivities and consciousness.

Indigenous NGOs have the potential to secure both greater access and improved presence benefits, to use appropriate and low-cost technology and are expected to be more responsive to local needs. They have also the added potential to harness indigenous knowledge for the purpose of solving real-life problems which is of crucial importance in addressing issues of root causes of disasters. The high community orientation demanded by relief and rural development sectors (Primary Health Care, Primary Environmental care, Safety Nets) and local conflict resolutions makes NGOs indispensable partners of governments and the international aid system.

The basic social fabric of the African civil society has always been based on kinship organisational structures that constituted legitimate framework in accomplishing the role of local governance, mediation and resources allocation. Law and order, conflict resolution, equitable resource management and community coping strategies have always been based on the strength and opportunities of these institutions. Indigenous organisational structures strengthened with adoption of new management norms can therefore assist in achieving the strategic stage of self empowerment.

The collective will and desire of the African community could only be made practical through these legitimate bodies with self-earned socio-political powers. They influence decision to invest or divest – a phenomenon that rests with what the community members want to achieve as a collective goal. Such decisions need the consensus of the community since, even in the most need-driven communities, there will be a good number of minorities who would not agree to the collective goals.

The mission of an indigenous African NGO, then becomes two pronged. Firstly to increase the institutional and organisational capacities of communities to participate in the process; and secondly to mobilise the International Community as well as African societies towards more sustainable models of peaceful transformation of society. Progress in this line will also depend on preventive activities such as local conflict-resolution; capacity building towards development in peace and the evolution of a pluralistic society.

The particular line of contribution of African indigenous NGOs would be in areas where their potential strength lies – capacity building at the grassroots level: institutional development of Africa's indigenous organisational structures in a planned and systematic way designed to increase the organisational effectiveness of individuals for growth and development with community goals. The mission here is to increase the effectiveness of the people's organisations and enhance their potential to be involved in relief, preventive diplomacy and development processes.

In comparison to conventional organisational structures, African NGOs should ideally secure both greater access and improved distribution of benefits. They can use appropriate technology that is low cost and adaptable to African reality and traditions they can achieve outcomes at less cost and they should have the capacity to experiment with unconventional ideas and practices. They should harness indigenous knowledge, skills and techniques which belong naturally to people and can evolve practices conceived and generated by original inhabitants for the purpose of solving real-life problems.

African NGOs should take up a historical mission to document and disseminate this knowledge as a legitimate instrument that will harness much needed local resources.

Given the Continent's political atmosphere of the past few decades, the overall performance of African NGOs have been positive in the sense that they have been relatively effective in providing services to their target populations, including bringing about some changes in the living conditions of some of the beneficiaries. More especially NGOs actions brought about increased employment of the youth, additional income for women, vaccination of children provision of clean water, etc. However, the overall impact has been limited in scope and extent because of the fact that the benefits generated remained modest, scattered, isolated and yet too small to meet the scale of challenges posed by the continuing crises.

This African NGO sector has also its own weakness and has encountered obstacles represented, inter alia, by over-dependence on external funding and the virtual absence of a domestic resources base; lack of systematic programme focus; underdeveloped management capability; lack of effective institutional framework for advocacy and lack of reflective capacity. They also want realistic strategies for organisational survival once a given project's life-span runs out.

In terms of the current understanding of institutional development, the African NGO sector is still at its nascent stages. This has resulted in an array of problems of mismanagement, sub-professional standards and accountability, most of them inherited from the formal sector. These serious infirmities are the lack of indigenous resource base, poor management capability, lack of co-ordination, lack of reflective capacity, poor relations with Northern NGOs and donors, poor relations with the government and limited scope of replicability of indigenous NGO activities.

We believe that AHA's institutional development objectives can address these infirmities in many ways based on the following two major strategic goals.

- A. AHA will enhance the role of traditional relief organisation that are already in the 'business' of delivering services or help transform those that have the requisite institutional base into operational NGOs.**
- B. AHA will initiate preventive activities and the relief-development continuum concurrently wherever the capacity for one exists and/or by develop the capacity at the local level.**

Development here represents a wide range of issues and actions that will be predicated on grounds of identified needs. Possible actions for collaboration include:

- i. integrated area-based preventive development programmes that will need cooperation with development agencies - UN, Government, NGOs, POs, VDOs and multilateral agencies and the private sector**
- ii. the pursuit of peaceful development through preventive diplomacy engaging those that matter most: communities in the front-line.**
- iii. conflict mediation using traditional means of conflict resolution and 'settlement of scores' as a matter of developmental priority in actions that have been necessitated because of civil/ethnic or cross border strifes.**

III. Objectives of AHA

Africa Humanitarian Action shall be an independent non-governmental and non-profit humanitarian organisation based in Addis Abeba; a city that hosts almost all regional African institutions. Founded at a time when the humanitarian crisis in Africa has reached its worst point in post war/colonial Africa, its mission shall be to provide humanitarian support, relief and development assistance to distressed communities, to foster the growth of indigenous groups that represent communities and civil society in more legitimate ways, to work diligently to promote peaceful co-existence among communities.

The following major strategic objectives and actions which emanate from them are envisioned.

- 1. to provide humanitarian relief assistance and developmental preventive actions; through employment-based social safety nets.**
- 2. to foster good-will among communities to take steps for local conflict resolution, along with the initiatives of national, continental and international institutions, with a view to reducing the scope and scale of the cause of the conflicts. This includes, *inter alia*, grassroots inspired preventive diplomacy for peaceful development, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.**
- 3. to found a centre of excellence that has the unique task of providing a backstopping support to indigenous groups and serve as a resource centre for operational NGOs in the region. This entails disseminating all generations of International Human Right Conventions, the Geneva Conventions including the Additional Protocols that uphold the rights of citizens, refugees and the displaced to survival and development. This initiative includes carrying out advocacy work at all levels to ensure prompt and adequate response to the region's humanitarian needs.**
- 4. to enhance the role of traditional relief organisations that are already in the business of delivering relief help or to transform those that have the requisite institutional basis to deliver services into operational NGOs.**
- 5. to initiate preventive activities and reinforce the relief development *continuum* concurrently wherever the capacity for one exists or by developing the capacity at the local level.**

Based on lessons learned from past experience, which indicate that failure to plan for complementary activities has jeopardised the achievement of desired objectives, the initiators of AHA recognise that a comprehensive approach built on interfaces between elements of disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation.

IV. Envisaged Programme Areas

At the programme level the broad areas where interventions will be necessary for achievement of the objective of alleviating the effects of disasters are:

A) Food, Medical and shelter assistance under relief/employment-based safety nets:

Recognising the presently high dependence of populations in disaster prone areas on food relief, the intention to reduce this dependence, AHA seeks to examine and promote ways in which food relief and assistance may be utilised to support development initiatives emanating from the affected communities.

This will emphasise on the aspect of human deprivation and disruption of a community's function and its inability to subsist without outside intervention. The conceptual muddle separating the agents of disaster from development that has prevailed in the past was a rude awakening to the fact that developing nations experiencing disasters "lost momentum" in the middle of their development efforts. It is in this context that we say, that in addition to causing tragic suffering, emergencies also create development opportunities because they demonstrate, in unmistakable terms, that existing livelihood securities do not guarantee even minimal levels of survival.

B) Integrated development programmes and disaster mitigation:

A key condition for reducing the effects of natural disasters is empowering affected populations to plan for and manage their activities in ways that will enhance the community's capacity to cope with the disruptions that result from disasters. Many of the drought-prone areas have previously been neglected and also require promotion of relevant development initiatives.

The sub-programme in areas-based integrated development activities will be devoted to the formulation of programmes through local development organisations.

C) Institutional strengthening and advocacy support to macro policies, conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy:

very often conflicts go out of hand because of ill conceived pre-emptive strikes or the denial of local forces to participate in the making of a socioentity, a community or a nation. These forces are usually the ones that vet the final decision to make peace or turn a nation into a Somalia of our day.

A number of institutions with varying capacities are involved in disasters management and prevention and mitigation of conflicts.

Recent trends of decentralisation in planning and decision-making also entails decentralisation of conflict resolution and disaster management and mitigation. It is to **focus on increasing capacities of displaced people's and communities in disaster coping mechanisms and developing indigenous capabilities in disaster preparedness, relief management, recovery and prevention actions.**

This implies either the emergence of new institutions or changing roles of existing institutions. **Capacities will have to be developed at the local level to carry out newly developed tasks in a sustainable manner.**


V. Structure of AHA

AHA will be governed by a supreme body, an **Assembly of International Trustees**, composed of renowned personalities in the international humanitarian scene. The initiators of AHA believe that, although this is an indigenous African undertaking, the imperative to build up a global coalition to effectively deal with Africa's problems and establish accountability, transparency, predictability and international credibility for any action that will, most of the time, require a neutral international leadership to chart out the rationale of its engagements, interventions and priorities.

This highest leadership body, the Assembly of International Trustees, would be politically supported by a **patronage** from African leaders of emerging democracies.

The assembly will delegate its governance functions to an All-African **Board of Governors** who in turn will entrust management to a **Secretariat** selected on merit.

The functions and duties of each echelon in this proposed structure will be defined in a Memorandum of Association.



VI. INTERFACE WITH INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCONTINENTAL SYSTEMS.

The United Nations system, the European Community, USAID, SIDA, CIDA, and other international, bilateral and multilateral consortia and agencies of relief and development have been in the forefront in the continents efforts for humanitarian relief, economic recovery and development. These efforts are punctuated by a host of action programmes and strategies bearing strong relevance to NGO work. But they lack the popular institutional framework for reaching the African communities who should have the vetting role in legitimizing policies and programmes generated by these charters.

The aim of this new relationship should, therefore, be to contribute to the current efforts of African NGOs to build greater self reliance as well as an effective and sustainable institutional capacity; while utilising the immense potential we have in the international system.

In this regard, studies will be undertaken to see how an interface could be developed between AHA and the international community :

- to plan and conduct humanitarian relief work to serve the grassroots better and faster through linkages between these groups and organisations as the relevant agencies of the UN system, the OAU, the ICRC, the IFRC etc.
- to analyse and promote the positive aspects of the declarations and action programmes initiated by the UN, the OAU, the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and other similar International institutions.
- to strengthen African NGOs and local government institutions to enable them to participate in the social, economic and cultural development of the continent; as envisaged in Agenda 21 and initiate people-based resources conservation and development in evolving tenable policies in areas of agrarian reform, tenure rights and related private sector development
- to support conflict resolution exercises designed to strengthen and if necessary rebuild local and national coping mechanisms and conflict resolution capacities to handle part of the adverse of effects of war, displacement and human displacement
- to enhance the role of indigenous NGOs in legitimizing the aspiration of the African people through acknowledgement of their decisive capacities and helping them to identify their economic, socio-cultural and political vulnerabilities. This is closely associated with the build-up of local capacities to evolve codes of conduct and monitor violations of human rights of all three generations

- to create functional linkages with political, research, commerce and development institutions such as the relevant agencies of the UN system, the OAU, IGAAD, CILS, SADDG, the regional common market groupings such as the PTA, ECOWAS to embark on endogenously derived models of development and counter-poverty measures in the sense and meaning Africans understand it.

The initiators of AHA have established important connections with the following continental NGO networks such as FAVDO, ASDAG, GONGSA, MWENGO, INTER-AFRICA GROUP etc and will find a role to play by being coordinated into the activities of the continent's NGO activities and involvements in their institutional development.

Similarly the group will also strengthen its links with international networks such as INTERACTION, Partnership Africa Canada (and through PAC, CCIC), International Council of Voluntary Organisations, Australian Council of Voluntary Agencies, Asian and Latin American NGO consortia and networks, African Advocacy groups in Europe and North America, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

The work will be supplemented with local, national, regional and continental meetings and workshops to enhance the process and derive the much needed consensus/ agreement from all the actors in the African humanitarian work scene.

SITUATION REPORT

AHA's second health team, which since mid-August had been deployed alongside the first in Tare, moved into place at Kabarondo, Kibungo Prefecture on October 10. Both health teams will receive UNHCR support until November.

The team took over the facilities of the once-busy Kabarondo health centre which was ransacked and looted during the escalation of the fighting in Rwanda earlier this year. The centre had also suffered considerable neglect and AHA had to mount a massive clean-up operation before it went to work there.

The new site is situated some 97 kms south-east of Kigali, near Rwanda's border with Tanzania, and its opening comes in the wake of the inauguration of a new UNREO field office in the prefecture, of which the centre is a part.

AHA brings to Kabarondo the expertise of a doctor, a nurse, a public health assistant and a sanitarian/administrator in a move that is aimed at expanding its outreach to the afflicted in Rwanda. Like the centre at Tare, the new site targets a population of 50,000, serving approximately 150 patients daily at the initial stage. The returnee figure is growing and so too will demand.

In light of the fact that only one nurse remains out of four medical personnel previously deployed there by the Rwandese authorities, the AHA presence fills a vital gap. Quantities of medical supplies and other requirements were transported to the site on October 8 and 9. Presently at the centre, there are enough functional beds to cater to some 15 emergency cases. Further rehabilitation of the facilities will restore service to the previous level of 50 beds.

Meanwhile in the Tare center, on 5th October, a 35-year-old male patient, injured in a mine explosion near his home in Tumbo commune, received emergency treatment and was rushed by ambulance for surgical intervention at the Kigali hospital. The explosion, which occurred within AHA's area of activity, was reported promptly to UNAMIR and UNREO.

In all, 6,919 patients have been served to date at Tare since work began there on 17th August.

SA/RM/SRR5
11-10-94

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SITUATION REPORT

AHA's two health teams, working jointly at one site, have in the last five weeks assisted 3,867 beneficiaries at Tare centre. This represents service to roughly 150 patients each day.

Part of the staff was engaged simultaneously in scouting the Tare-Ruhengeri route in a bid to intercept and assist returnees. The commencement of radio communications links with UNHCR/UNAMIR will strengthen this aspect of AHA's work in the future.

The immediate deployment of the second AHA team in Kabarondo has been delayed yet again due to the earlier reported logistics constraints and the prevailing uncertain security situation in the area. However, many of the hurdles have since been overcome and preparations have now been finalised for its deployment.

The services of a third team, to provide health care to both humans and livestock in Kagitumba, is still pending awaiting decisions by the UNHCR and other supporting agencies. The consent of both the ministries of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration and Health has been obtained for this purpose.

TS/RM/SRR4
19-09-94

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SITUATION REPORT

AHA's first way-station health team in Tare, Rwanda, is now fairly well established. While awaiting placement, the second health team continues to work in the same centre, periodically attempting to scout the Tare-Ruhengeri route to serve returning refugees on the way.

A number of need assessment field surveys were conducted to identify an appropriate service site for the second health team. Three routes included:

- | | |
|--|--------------|
| - Kigali - Gitarama - Kibuye | - August 19, |
| - Kigali - Gitarama - Nyanza - Butare - Gikongoro - Cyangugu | - August 22 |
| - Kigali - Gahini | - August 23 |
| - Kigali - Butamwa | - August 29 |
| - Kigali - Kayanza - Kibungo to Tanzania border | - August 31 |

As a result of these exercises and following discussions with and the consent of the ministry of health of Rwanda and the UNHCR it is planned to deploy the second health team in Kabarondo, Kibungo prefecture, at 97 km. from Kigali close to Rwanda's border with Tanzania.

The team at Tare have been seeing over 100 patients a day during the last two weeks, the major diagnosis being intestinal parasites, diarrhoeal illnesses, malaria and scabies. The small town of Tare and the surrounding villages are slowly filling up with returnees.

As the former health centre in Tare has now been placed fully at the disposal of AHA by the Rwandese Ministry of Health, AHA's health team will as of 1 September transfer its services from its road-side tent site to better facilities a few meter uphill. With improved working conditions in a spacious out-patient care area and about 16 beds for the critically sick, AHA's services will be further strengthened and improved upon. The team vehicle when not on survey missions has been periodically put to use to scout the returnee routes up to Ruhengeri.

Despite the expressed good will and support from the UNHCR in Kigali, inadequate transport and the total lack of communications means and other logistics constraints continue to remain major drawbacks.

In the light the findings of a survey which had been carried out in the north-east earlier and further to the understandings reached among the involved parties, AHA is presently considering to submit proposals to the UNHCR to deploy a combined human health and veterinary team at Kagitumba near the border with Tanzania and Uganda.

The consent of the Ministries of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration and Health has to be obtained and an agreement entered into with the UNHCR prior to the deployment of this team.

TS/RM/SRR3
31-09-94

Secretariat:

Africa Avenue, P.O.Box 6398 Addis Abeba, Ethiopia
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SITUATION REPORT

AHA MEDICAL TEAMS COMMENCED WORK IN RWANDA ON THE 16TH OF AUGUST 1994.

As of August 16, 1994, AHA has deployed its first medical team for the provision of services to returning refugees in Tare, Rwanda along the Kigali-Goma route.

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| August 11 | - Assembly of the Medical Team members in Nairobi, Kenya. |
| August 12 | - Briefing by UNHCR, Rwanda-Burundi Unit, Nairobi. |
| August 13 | - Arrival and placement in Kigali, Rwanda. |
| August 13-15 | - Consultations with UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, other agencies and NGOs engaged in humanitarian activities in Rwanda. |
| | - Preliminary field surveys. |
| | - Presentation and registration with the Rwandese Authorities. |
| August 16 | - Deployment of AHA Medical Team One in Tare. |

On 12 August, AHA Medical Team members, on their way to Rwanda, were briefed on the Rwanda crisis and on-going UNHCR humanitarian operations by the UNHCR Rwanda-Burundi Unit in Nairobi. This Unit also facilitated the Teams' onward transport to Kigali.

Upon arrival in Kigali, the teams were received by the UNHCR and further briefings and consultations were held with the UNHCR delegation members in Kigali, Rwanda.

AHA subsequently presented itself to the Rwandese authorities for registration with the Ministry of Rehabilitation & Social Integration and the Ministry of Health. At the same time surveys were conducted on the refugee return routes from Giseyni to Kigali and along the Northern border towards Uganda to identify sites for AHA's priority action.

With the consent of the UNHCR and the Rwanda Ministry of Health, and as of the 16th of August, the first medical team has started operations in Tare, 42 Km north-west of Kigali and is engaged in screening returning refugees and the delivery of health care.

The second team will be deployed in the next few days after a needs assessment in the South-West. Meanwhile, members of the second team are assisting in the initial phase of the work of the first team.

In accordance with assessed needs, the deployment of a third team in the North, which should include veterinary doctors and assistants, as well as strengthened logistics capabilities, is under consideration.

Although AHA is accorded prompt support and cooperation by the UNHCR delegation in Rwanda, delays in the arrival of transport and ambulance vehicles and communications equipment remain a major constraint.

TS/RM/SRR2
17-08-94

Provisional Secretariat:

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SITUATION REPORT

An initial offer of services in favour of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons was made to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) on July 25th 1994 and this was immediately supported by the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim and the Regional Liaison Representative of the UNHCR for Africa, Mr Cecil Kpenou.

Dr. Dawit Zawde, founder member and Convenor of AHA was invited by the UNHCR to Geneva and following consultations and a review of the prevailing situation in the field, a revised AHA proposal was submitted on August 2, 1994, outlining the immediate deployment of two health teams at way stations along the refugees' and displaced persons' return routes from Goma, Zaire.

The revised proposal received the prompt and positive response of the UNHCR on August 3, 1994. Consequently, a Mutual Letter of Intent was signed in Geneva on the same day and other administrative formalities were concluded on August 5, 1994,

Following the return of the Convenor to Addis Abeba on August 6, 1994, the necessary technical and other steps have been taken to commence operations.

The members of the team for the mission to Rwanda have been selected and are now conducting preparations for departure to Rwanda via Nairobi on Wednesday 10th August, 1994. They have been briefed on the prevailing situation in the field and acquainted with the nature and scope of their services and AHA's code of conduct. The following persons have thus far been selected to make up the initial AHA team to Rwanda.

Dr. Dawit Zawde, President of AHA, Placement, Ethiopia
Amb. Teferra Shiawel, Field Mission Head, Ethiopia
Dr. Yonas Tegegne, Medical Coordinator, Ethiopia
Mr. Edmund Mesheck, Administrator, Malawi
Dr. Adama Bah, Field Medical Team Leader, Guinea
Sister Fasika Ayele Yemenu, Nurse, Ethiopia
Sister Mamahali A. Ramokone, Nurse, Lesotho
Mr. Cornille Dakpo, Techn. Support Staff, Benin
Mr. Asfaw W. Maskal, Techn. Support Staff, Ethiopia
Dr. Charles Sock, Field Medical Team Leader, Senegal
Sister Aynalem T. Giorgis, Nurse, Ethiopia
Mrs. Almaz Musa, Techn. Support Staff, Ethiopia
Mr. Afeworq Teferi, Techn. Support Staff, Ethiopia

Upon arrival in Nairobi, the team will avail itself of UNHCR transport to Rwanda and logistics support on site.

TS/SRR1
07-08-94

Provisional Secretariat:

**P.O.Box 6398 Addis Abeba, Ethiopia
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AHA in Rwanda

Africa Humanitarian Action is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation based in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. It was established in May 1994 by relief and development professionals from the Horn of Africa concerned by the enormous calamities that have repeatedly overwhelmed the sub-region in recent years. Created by Africans for Africans, its corporate mission is to provide humanitarian relief and development assistance to distressed communities affected by natural disasters and civil strife. One of the ways it does this is by deploying professionals from a pool of competent and dedicated African experts in areas of need. Consistent with this policy, AHA has organised and fielded professionals with vast experience in disaster relief and health care situations and dispatched them to its first operation in Rwanda.

The savage and horrific acts of genocide perpetrated in Rwanda in early 1994 were unparalleled in modern African history. Hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, perhaps as many as a million according to some accounts, became the victims of the barbaric massacres. More than two million others fled to neighbouring countries in terror in one of the most agonising mass movements in modern times. The complete breakdown of law and order within Rwanda itself led to the displacement of over forty percent of the population within the country. The crisis not only burdened the neighbouring asylum states, but presented the world with a massive refugee problem unequalled in its scope and intensity at any other time this century. Furthermore, Rwanda's already frail economy was shattered as farms and markets were abandoned and production came to a complete standstill. The lives of its people now held dependent on international relief assistance, became seriously at risk.

Neighbouring and impoverished African countries were the first to shoulder the impact with great compassion by selflessly sharing their meagre resources, inspite of the disruption the situation caused to their livelihood. Likewise, the spontaneous outpouring of sympathy and the generous response of the international community to the sufferings in Rwanda was remarkable. Despite these efforts, the scale of the tragedy remains grave just as the fate of the refugees in the neighbouring countries continues to deteriorate and remains unsettled. The worsening crisis in the central African country therefore poses one of the greatest challenges to the rest of humanity today.

AHA responded to this tragedy by mobilising experts from six African countries -- Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Rwanda and Senegal -- and dispatched them immediately to Rwanda. The move came after its supporting partners, notably the UNHCR, promptly agreed to support an offer of services which AHA had submitted in July. Accordingly, two health teams were first deployed at Tare, 42 km. north-west of Kigali, from August 17. One of the teams was later relocated to Kabarondo in Kibungo Prefecture, 97 km south-east of the Rwandan capital, in an area where more services were sorely needed. These operations were targeted to reach a population of more than 100,000. In addition to support lent to beleaguered returnees on their way home from camps, both teams were able to serve nearly ten thousand patients between August 17 and October 8. A third project, one devoted to the psycho-social counselling of individuals and communities in need and focusing particularly on women exposed to enormous psychological stress, will start at Tare in partnership with UNIFEM/AFWIC.

If resources permit, AHA is prepared to contribute far more to the alleviation of the Rwandan tragedy and to the many others ravaging the African continent today. It profoundly believes that the solutions to Africa's problems lie first and foremost in the hands of Africans themselves. We expect to grow from this modest beginning to be able to cover the entire continent as an example of African initiative.

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Kigali Mission:
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Tel: +250-7 22 39 Fax: +250-7 28 11

Draft List of PARINAC NGO Contacts - Africa

Algeria

~~Protestant Church run by an American~~
~~Catholic Church~~

Angola

Lutheran World Federation

Botswana (small refugee presence)

National Christian Council (Protestant and Catholic)
Botswana Refugee Council (joint NGO/UNHCR) - still in operation?

Burundi

Refugee organizations - OXFAM, Médecins sans Frontières, etc.
National Christian Council

Cameroon

2. ~~FEMEX (Church umbrella) - they have recently closed their refugee programme~~

Central African Republic

?

Côte d'Ivoire

Methodist Church

Djibouti

Foreign Church offspring of a French Church
Evangelical Church of Djibouti
Islamic organization ?

Egypt

Anglican and Presbyterians (joint programme for refugees from the region)

Ethiopia

Refugee Counselling Service
Ethiopian Orthodox Church (works closely with CRDA)
Christian Relief and Development Agency
Lutheran World Federation
World Vision
Consortium of Ethiopian Voluntary Organizations
Orthodox Church (UNHCR partner)

Gambia

Anglican Church

Ghana

National Christian Council

Guinea

American Church organization

Kenya (numerous foreign NGOs, one or two Islamic)

Christian Council of Kenya

Kenya Catholic SEcretariat

Jesuit Refugee Service

AREP (Africa Refugee Education Programme) Foundation (local)

ARTES (Africa Refugee Training and Educational Services)

All Africa Conference of Churches (will work with UNHCR in bringing them together)

Lesotho (refugee presence decreasing)

National Christian Council (Protestant
Catholic institution)

Liberia

National Christian Council

Malawi (large presence of foreign NGOs)

Caritas

Malawi Christian Council

World Vision

~~Morocco~~

~~Small Protestant Church (refugees and migrants)~~

Mozambique (150 NGOs)

LINK

3R (Rehabilitation, Returnees, Repatriation) Programme - joint effort by LWF, Caritas and
National Christian Council

Namibia (refugees from Angola)

National Christian Council

Nigeria

?

Rwanda

OXFAM (partner)
Cartias Rwanda (partner)
Conseil Protestant de Rwanda
and others involved with the displaced

Senegal

Small Protestant Church (dealing mainly with students

Sierra Leone

National Christian Council

Somalia

?

South Africa

South Africa Council of Churches (Protestant)
Freedom from Hunger Campaign
World University Service

Sudan

Sudan Council of Churches
Several foreigners
Islamic African Relief Agency

Swaziland

Lutheran World Federation
National Christian Council (both churches)

Tanzania

Lutheran World Federation (very active)
Christian council of Tanzania (UNHCR partner)
ANC organization (still active)

Uganda

OXFAM
Church of Uganda
Catholic Church
Lutheran World Federation

Zaire

Foreign (French)
Eglise du Christ au Zaire (partner of UNHCR)

Zambia

Zambia Refugee Service (established by UNHCR)

Zimbabwe

Christian Care (local - heavily involved in the refugee camps)
Catholic agency
IMBISA

22.11.93



Revised 21/10/94
Internal

RWANDA EMERGENCY NORMALIZATION PLAN (RENP)

A. Immediate Measures (in the coming days)

1. Grant/Soft Loan/Opening of Central Bank and Mint:

Rwanda needs liquid funds to start functioning i.e. pay salaries, essential imports, diplomatic missions etc. Unfortunately, this budgetary assistance has still not been secured. The Rwandan Government must have the ability to pay salaries to its military and civilian staff to repair infrastructure such as electricity, water and telecommunications (Electrogaz, Rwandatel, etc.).

2. Re-opening of hospitals and other priority health facilities:

Completed. Hospitals are open and functioning adequately. Urgent needs are being met. Long-term health projects which are less urgent can be pursued.

The location of hospitals and health care centres may be indicated to Colonel Yaache.

- a) The Australian medical contingent is operating the Central Hospital of Kigali in coordination with Samaritan's Purse, Italian Emergency and other NGO's. The Australian contingent is still operating their treatment section out of the Butare University Hospital which has a resuscitation and patient holding facility in support of UNAMIR troops. The Australians, in connection with Care Australia, are providing medical teams to support humanitarian relief efforts in the area of Butare. The treatment sector from Butare is also working in conjunction with 23 parachute field ambulance in conducting daily clinics in the refugee camps in Kibeho. Twice weekly clinics are also being conducted in Kibungo in conjunction with IMC and Canadian MED teams.
- b) The Canadian 2 Field Ambulance remains in Mareru, however, they will cease operations in Rwanda on 12 October 1994 in preparation for their return home. They will have departed Rwanda by 20 October 1994. The unit has donated all of its tentage and medical supplies to UNHCR for distribution to NGOs. (Médecins Sans Frontières has taken over operations at Ruhengeri Hospital.) The platoon is providing

inpatient and outpatient facilities to returnees along the Ruhengeri to Gisenyi route.

- c) The British Parachute Field Ambulance remains in Gikongoro Prefecture with a base camp in Kitabi, a field surgical team in Kigemi and a treatment facility in Kibeho. The unit is still sending mobile medical teams to displaced persons camps in the southern part of the Gikongoro Prefecture on a daily basis.
- d) Médecins Sans Frontières is operating the King Faycal Hospital in Kigali.
- e) WHO, which recently received a \$1.5 million grant from The World Bank, plans to undertake the following:
 - WHO, in coordination with the Ministry of Health, has set up a Health Information System to enhance the national epidemiological surveillance programme. WHO and the Ministry of Health have issued the third epidemiological report which highlight the most common causes for consultation in certain regions:

1. Malaria	-	57%
2. Blood diarrhea	-	41%
3. Acute respiratory infection	-	29%
4. Diarrhea without blood	-	24%
5. Skin and eye infections	-	24%
 - HIV prevention through safe blood transfusion;
 - Resumption of the activities of the Central Pharmaceutical Office (OPHAR);
 - Assessment of health facilities and of health personnel available.
- f) UNHCR, which recently received a \$4 million grant from the World Bank:
 - is financing Norwegian People's Aid to rehabilitate and provide medical facilities in the Northeast and Southwest.
 - is funding African Humanitarian Action (AHA) to provide a medical facility at Tare.
 - is operating two dispensaries in the Kibungo Prefecture at Kabarondo and Rusumo.
- g) UNICEF has launched a mortality/morbidity data collection project throughout the country in conjunction with Ministry of Health officials. In addition, Phase 2 of the Health Facility Assessment,

which consists of twenty-six teams of two persons and two teams of supervisors in the field, is in progress. Assessment of health facilities in the region assigned to UNICEF will commence 3 October.

Following extensive repairs by UNICEF, the Central Medical Store (OPHAR) will begin to receive drugs from different donors as well as from consignees. NGOs will now be directed to OPHAR to fulfil their requests for drugs or other medical equipment.

- h) The organisation of the BRITCON Field Ambulance allows for medical sections of one doctor and 7 trained medics to visit villages within sector 4 and perform minor treatments for these villages. As part of these visits to the villages, BRITCON is performing epidemiology and nutritional studies as well as assessing the general situation in sector 4.
- i) WFP is currently providing hospital feeding for the central hospital in Kigali (implemented through Emergency) and Food-for-Work in hospital in Kibungo (implemented through IMC).

Agencies/Countries responsible:	AUSTRALIA/BITAIN/ CANADA/WHO/UNHCR/UNICEF/ WFP/ICRC/MSF/MDM
UNAMIR Officer in Charge:	Col. Yaache
Lead UN Agency:	Nigel Fisher/UNICEF

3. Resumption of Rwanda's Representation in the UN Security Council:

Completed.

Rwanda's new Permanent Representative to the UN has been nominated. He presented his credentials to the Secretary-General on 26 August 1994. Rwanda has thus resumed its seat in the UN and in the UN Security Council. No further action.

B. Measures To Be Achieved In The Coming Weeks:

I - Reopening of Airport/Restoration of Commercial Air Traffic:

The re-opening of the airport has already been achieved thanks to logistic support given by USA and Canada. Commercial

air traffic has been restored on a limited basis at the rate of one commercial international aircraft per week, along with five to ten small charter aircraft per day.

WFP, through the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, is implementing an Institutional Strengthening Programme which will provide Food-for-Work rations to the Public Sector, including air traffic controllers. The first food rations, which will have an approximate value of US\$ 50.00 (based on September 1994 exchange rate and Kigali market prices), will be distributed during the third week of October 1994. The programme will be implemented during the last quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 1995.

Lloyd's of London's insurance rate for a Sabena flight from Kigali to Brussels was \$220 per passenger as of mid-September, thus \$22,000 for a DC-10 of 100 passengers. The rate has now been lowered to \$150 per passenger, however, commercial airlines from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda are waiting until this rate goes down to 0. This exorbitant rate is due to the poor safety and security rating attributed to Kigali Airport for three main reasons:

- Fire-fighting vehicles are inadequate. The airport must have one water tanker and four mobile vehicles.
- Spare parts must be acquired.
- The glass in the air traffic control tower must be replaced urgently. An air traffic controller must be able to see the aircraft while he is guiding it to landing. At the present time, the broken windows are boarded up.

In order to fully restore commercial air traffic, the following urgent needs must be met:

- i. The airport must have adequate fire-fighting equipment, trucks and personnel. Two of the Rwandese Airport Authority fire fighting vehicles are operational, but in poor repair. The third is in need of repair. These vehicles must be replaced in order to meet the minimum international safety standard for commercial air traffic.
- ii. Spare parts, especially for the air traffic control tower, and transportation for Rwandese technicians are lacking. Support in this regard must be provided immediately to Rwandese technicians if they are to successfully take over their duties.
- iii. The glass in the air traffic control tower and in the terminal building needs to be replaced urgently. The terminal building is also in need of structural repairs.

- iv. The airport must have civilian air traffic controllers in the control towers. Several former Rwandan air traffic controllers have returned to their posts. UNDP is financing 9 UN volunteers who will serve as traffic controllers and administrators. Three air traffic controllers are already on the ground, and their arrival has enabled the airport to move into 24 hour operation. Six more UNVs will arrive soon to work in accounting, administration and finance. The UN Volunteers will serve two functions: in coordination with the Rwandese Airport Authority, UNV's will assist with air traffic control and provide training as needed to their Rwandese counterparts. The immigration unit has been established by the Rwandese Airport Authority and is fully functional, and the customs service has been established, but is not fully manned.
- v. Two meteorological officers will be required.
- vi. Fuel Depot: The three major fuel tanks at the airport all sustained damage (holes) during the war. Two are operational but require repairs, and the third is unserviceable. The inability of the Kigali Airport to re-fuel aircraft is interfering with the routing and scheduling of international commercial aircraft. BRITCON is currently repairing the fuel tanks.
- vii. The UNAMIR 65 0 kva generator currently supplying power to the airport must be relocated to another site. Either the electricity needs to be permanently restored to Kigali or a replacement generator needs to be procured and installed urgently.
- viii. The Rwandese airport staff must be paid. At present, the Government does not have funding to pay these salaries nor to buy essential spare parts. Budgetary assistance must be provided, at least in the short-term, to enable the Government to pay its staff so that the Rwandese Airport Authority will be able to take over the airport as soon as possible. UNDP's financing of UNV's and local staff is a positive contribution in this regard.

Cost:

- 1. UNDP is financing the UN Volunteer staff, who are paid at a rate of \$2,200 per month. UNDP will also be providing technical assistance with immigration and customs. The UNDP plans to approximate \$245,000 to finance ten UNV's and to pay local salaries.
- 2. The cost to finance fire emergency protective services: \$400,000.

3. The cost to replace the glass in the air traffic control tower: \$30,000.

Time Frame :

1. SABENA would like to expand its current operations to two flights per week beginning 1 November. The above-listed requirements must be met by this date.

Action To Be Taken:

1. Provide fire-fighting vehicles equipment and vehicles.
2. Provide spare parts and transportation support.
3. Replace glass in airport control tower.
4. Provide the \$400,000 for equipment immediately.
5. Provide budgetary support in order to pay Rwandese local staff.
6. Repair electrical power grid or replace generator to supply electricity to airport urgently.

Countries/Agencies responsible:	UNDP/ICAO/WFP Canada - USA, Brown & Root
UNAMIR Officer in Charge follow up actions:	R. Lambo
Lead UN Agency/Officer in Charge:	Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP

II - Transport of Returnees and Displaced persons:

This includes the establishment of transit depots which contain food, water and medical components. All agencies and NGO's are requested to inform UNREO/ HAC of all transport available for returning refugees and displaced persons. This transport would then be requested to schedule return journey from specified pick-up points. All information regarding transit depots may also be conveyed to UNREO/HAC/UNAMIR.

The following transit depots have been established:

Medical Way Stations: Gisenyi to Ruhengeri Route:

Location:

Manned by:

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Gisenyi | German Doctors |
| 2. Rubavu | MSF |
| 3. Mutura (laiterie) | Canadian Field Ambulance |
| 4. Kora | Concern Worldwide |
| 5. Nkuli | AICF (Action Contre la Faim) |
| 6. Mukingo | MSF |
| 7. Ruhengeri | ICRC doctors |

UNHCR is providing biscuits and non-food items to several of the above way stations.

CARE/UNHCR Stations Gisenyi to Ruhengeri Route:

1. Gisenyi
2. Nyundo
3. Mukamura
4. Apavapi
5. Mukingo
6. Ruhengeri

CARE is manning the stations which will provide: water, high protein biscuits, corn-soy blend and non-food items (blankets). WFP is also providing 10 days of rations, and UNHCR is providing seeds and tools. UNHCR is establishing transit centres in Ruhengeri and Butare, and transporting people from waystations to their homes. They are also providing non-food items such as blankets, mats, seed kits, agricultural tools and soap. WFP has been providing food assistance to returnees in the form of general ration since April. The current project will continue until January 1995 at which point it will be reassessed.

BRITCON, the British contingent of UNAMIR, estimates the population of displaced persons in Rwanda as of 26 September to be 1,967,760, with some 900,000 located in Sector 4 in the southwestern region of the country. These estimates are in the process of being confirmed by other UN agencies, especially UNHCR, and other NGOs.

BRITCON has also provided estimates of the displaced persons/refugee population in countries outside of Rwanda to be as follows: Goma, Zaire (800,000), Bukavu, Zaire (320,000) and Uvira, Zaire (190,000); 15,000 in Uganda (UNHCR estimates there are between 60,000-70,000 refugees who fled country prior to latest conflict); Ngara, Tanzania (300,000), Karagwe, Tanzania (98,400); and Burundi (179,500). It should be underlined that these figures are, in some case, substantially different than those provided by UNHCR.

Operation Homeward, UNAMIR's initiative to transport people from Sector 4 to their places of origin was launched on 16 September. The total number transported to-date is 1,182.

The repatriation process works as follows:

UNHCR coordinates repatriation from Zaire to Rwanda (Cyangugu, Gisenyi). UNAMIR, through Operation Homeward, then coordinates transportation using International Organisation for Migration (IOM) vehicles, from these points to Kigali. En-route, returnees spend the night at the UNHCR reception centre in Butare. Returnees are transported to the UNHCR reception Centre in Kigali at which time UNAMIR coordinates transportation, using IOM vehicles, to their final destination.

According to UNAMIR, the following are average daily refugee movements from the week of 3 October: 785 into Rwanda and 30 out of Rwanda. It should be noted, however, that in the last few days the daily in-flow into Rwanda has been over 1,000. Repatriation efforts have been, unfortunately, adversely affected by allegations of extra-judicial reprisals in Rwanda, however, increased UNAMIR deployment, as well as that of Human Rights monitors throughout the country, should instil confidence and encourage repatriation.

Sector 4 Health Centres (The Former French Zone):

The two displaced persons camps which were established in the Cyangugu Prefecture before the departure of Operation Turquoise, remain in operation. Mururu has a capacity of 30,000 and is being run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). The second, at Cyimbogo, has the same capacity and is being run by Médecins du Monde (MDM).

Transit depots parallel to those established along the Gisenyi to Ruhengeri route have been set up to facilitate the return of refugees from Bukavu. These transit depots/reception centres, run by UNHCR, are located at Cyangugu, Kizi and Butare.

Agencies / Countries involved: WFP/UNHCR/IOM/UNREO/USA

UNAMIR Officer in Charge:
Lead UN Agency:

Col. Yaache,
Mr. Urasa,
UNHCR

III - Restoration of Power and Electricity:

The restoration of electricity in Rwanda remains a priority. The rehabilitation of the power grid will lead to the restoration of water, telecommunications, radio and television. Electricity is essential at the airport, in hospitals, in schools and in general to restore the quality of life. Recently, a surgeon

working for an NGO at Kigali Central Hospital, was forced to complete a surgical procedure without electricity when the generator failed.

According to Electrogaz, the line between Mukongwa and Jabana was repaired in September by Electrogaz. In addition, one of the two transmitters at the Jabana station was repaired by Electrogaz. As a result of these repairs, electricity has been restored to approximately 50% of the residences in the following sectors of Kigali:

Kiyovu, Kimihurura, Kacyiru, Le Parc Industriel, Gikondo and Kichukiro.

Also according to Electrogaz, outside Kigali, electricity has been restored to: Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kibuye, Cyangugu and Byumba.

Electrogaz, which has a contract of cooperation with the German enterprise NECKARWERKE (through GTZ), has recently received through this contract, donated equipment vital to the repair of the power grid.

In addition, UNICEF has made available \$2 million dollars to Electrogaz for the purchase of additional equipment. Electrogaz is currently considering bids on the equipment, and will place their order by 20 October 1994.

WFP is providing, through the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Food-for-Work Rations to the workers of Electrogaz (currently numbered 430). The food packages will be provided until such time as Electrogaz can resume salary payments.

The critical need in the area of electricity is funding to pay the salaries of Electrogaz employees. According to Electrogaz, both the cost of living and the average salary have risen dramatically since the war. Electrogaz estimates that they will require assistance to pay salaries for an initial period of three months.

Assessments were carried out by:

- | | | |
|----|--|-----------|
| a. | Joint Task Force (US Forces) (JTF): | 12 August |
| b. | Electrogaz (Rwanda): | 09 August |
| c. | Ad Hoc Group: UNAMIR, UNICEF, JTF and ICRC | 17 August |

From these assessments, the following should be noted:

- a. The Gikondo transformer station in Kigali is badly damaged and requires extensive repairs. The Canadian Government has committed itself to the repair of this station.

- b. One of the two transmitters at the Jabana transformer station near Kigali has been repaired by Electrogaz. The other transmitter must be repaired, as well.
- c. According to the Building Maintenance Systems (BMS)/Brown and Root assessment, the power lines from Cyangugu to Kilinda are intact and functioning.
- d. From Kigoma to Kilinda, there are several power lines down and in need of repair.
- e. From transformer station Gikondo in Kigali to the first bend on the line to Kigoma, all lines are down and in need of repair.
- f. All of the transformer stations that have been inspected are in good repair, however, at Kilinda, there are several lines disconnected and several fuses missing.

Requirements: The following represent urgent requirements:

- 1. Equipment: As a result of consultations between JTF-Bravo, a UNAMIR engineer, UNICEF and Electrogaz the following is required immediately:
 - three to five 5-ton trucks;
 - a line truck;
 - a bucket truck
 - electric cable
 - fuses
 - insulators

Cost:

In addition, Electrogaz, in their detailed assessment, proposes the following:

Permanent restoration (Repairs to the Gikondo and Jabana stations and also to high, medium and low-tension lines using local Rwandan labor). Now that Electrogaz has the required equipment, they require funding to pay salaries. Electrogaz estimates that they will need \$70,000 per month for an initial period of three months to pay employee salaries in order to restore the power grid. At the end of the initial three month period, the situation would be evaluated to determine if further funding would be required.

Action To Be Taken :

1. The repair of the power grid by Electrogaz is more cost effective and time efficient than operating with generators. If the \$70,000 per month for three months is made available immediately to repair the power grid, the purchase of 27 generators for the short-term would be unnecessary. In the time that it would take to procure and install the 27 proposed generators, the permanent repairs to the power grid could be completed.

- Agencies/Countries responsible:** Electrogaz/BRITCON/WFP
/Germany/GTZ/Canada/

IV - Repair of Water Supply:

The city water plant is operational and is producing adequate water for the city. Water is now pumped to most of the districts of Kigali, but power to the district's pumps must still be provided in order to pump the water to storage tanks for further distribution around the city. UNAMIR Communications Section, generator unit, has repaired two of the three 837 kva generators at the Gatsata power booster station to date, and they are providing power to the main city water plant at Kimisagara. The Kimisigara water plant pumps the water to the city's ten substations, which, currently with the use of generators, pump the water up to reservoirs on top of Kigali's hills. UNICEF,

UNAMIR and ICRC are currently providing the city's ten substations with generators, however, there are several drawbacks to this short-term solution:

- high consumption of expensive diesel fuel;
- problem of transport of diesel fuel; and
- the problem of maintenance and repair of generators.

Both UNICEF and BRITCON/UNAMIR are involved in the rehabilitation of water treatment plants, pipeline systems and the overall rehabilitation of the water system in Rwanda. However, if the funds being diverted for these projects would be instead diverted to the restoration of the electrical power grid, a great deal of both time and money would be saved.

Requirements:

1. As was noted in the "Restoration of Electricity" report, it would be more cost-effective and time-efficient to repair Rwanda's power grid than to continue to purchase diesel and generators.
2. There are breaks in the water lines which must be repaired.

Cost:

1. Since the restoration of electricity will restore the water, the cost of \$70,000 per month for three months to repair the power grid will also restore the water.
2. The cost of repairing the water line breaks should be minimal.

Time Frame:

As was indicated in the "Restoration of Electricity" report, if funds are made available immediately, electricity could be restored within three months. The restoration of water would immediately follow.

Action To Be Taken:

Provide the \$70,000 USD per month for three months immediately to restore electricity. The restoration of water will follow immediately.

Agencies/Countries responsible: ICRC/UNICEF/

Officers in Charge:

Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP

V - Radio:

- i. **Radio Rwanda:** Radio Rwanda has been strengthened to reach Cyangugu, Zaire and portions of Burundi. The Canadian Signals Squadron and Deutsche Welle are both working to boost the radio. Currently, Radio Rwanda's FM capability covers two-thirds of the country. There is a repeater on Mt. Jari which transmits up to the repeater in the region of Ruhengeri, down south to Butare and west to Mt. Karongi. Mt. Karongi's signal reaches Cyangugu, and the FM repeater station, Kinanira, in Cyangugu, repeats the signal into Zaire and Burundi. Currently, the Kinanira repeater station in Cyangugu is transmitting at 50 watts, one-sixth of its normal power. The Rwandese Government has requested UNAMIR, therefore, to repair the generator and to transport diesel fuel in order to restore the station to its full capability.
- ii. **Radio UNAMIR:** A low-powered radio station arrived at UNAMIR HQ, as a first phase to a nation-wide UN broadcasting network. An additional station which will broadcast to the refugee camps in Goma is due to arrive this week. The full station, comprising a mobile studio and five transmitters, is expected in the coming weeks. At this stage, UNAMIR requires the following in order to begin broadcasting officially: (1) broadcasting licence; and (2) allocation of frequency. Negotiations with the Government in this regard are being pursued as a matter of priority. Test broadcasting began on 1 October, and the equipment tested successfully. Programming for Radio MINUAR/UNAMIR is being developed, and interested parties are encouraged to submit suggestions.

Agencies/Countries responsible:	Mr. Nick Harman, Communications Consultant, UNAMIR/ Mr. Jeffrey Hayman, Consultant CANADIAN SIGNALS SQUADRON, UNAMIR, DEUTSCHE WELLE, BRITAIN, UNDP
Officer in Charge:	Mr. Nick Harman, Communications Consultant Mr. Jeffrey Heyman, Communications Consultant

VI - Telecommunications:

Local service: Service in Kigali has been restored to most of the downtown (western) area (exchange "7"), and to the eastern portion (exchange "8"). The substation at Kimihura is powered by a generator, however, it is believed that there is a cable break. The Canadian Signals Squadron has proved Rwandatel with linemen to assist with the installation of a large telecommunications cable. The linemen also helped to restore a "trencher" for Rwandatel which will be used to dig the cable route. At the present time, however, the necessary clearances from the gas, water and transportation agencies have yet to be received. Rwandatel now has billing capability, however, Rwandatel must establish a system for the assignment of telephone numbers and the compilation of a telephone directory.

International Service: According to the Canadian Signals Squadron, 28 of the 49 circuits of the satellite earth station at Nyanza's have been restored. There is, however, a need for some cable to connect the equipment to the satellite dish (cost of approximately \$2000). The GTZ group has agreed to finance the purchase of this cable. Currently, the portion of the city in exchange "7" has international calling capability. When the remaining circuits of the Nyanza station are repaired, the eastern portion (exchange "8") will have international calling capacity, as well.

WFP has been providing food assistance to Rwandatel employees since September. This programme is scheduled to continue until March 1995.

Agencies/Countries responsible:	ALCATEL-GERMANY, CANADIAN SIG SQDRN/ GERMANY GTZ//UNDP/WFP
Officer in Charge:	Thad Anglin UNAMIR/ Major Rutherford, CANSIG
Lead UN Agency:	Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP

VII - De-mining:

De-mining requires immediate attention. Mine awareness training is urgently needed for all people living in Rwanda. Currently, only four Canadian military personnel are disposing of mines and munitions in Rwanda.

Currently, King Faycal Hospital reports an average of two civilian casualties per day in Kigali. Most of these cases are a result of children stepping on anti-personnel mines while at play.

A Mine Action Headquarters has been set up in HQ UNAMIR with a mine intelligence cell, and the UN De-mining Expert has drawn up a preliminary plan in which a civilian contractor would train 150 Rwandan mine clearers and 30 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assistants over a period of one year. The mine clearance in Rwanda would then eventually be handed over to the Rwandan Government.

According to DHA, the responsibility of the humanitarian demining throughout Rwanda rests with and is coordinated by DHA. The DHA demining consultant, during his visit to Kigali, held meetings with the Government as well as with UNAMIR to determine the type of assistance that will best meet the humanitarian demining requirements in Rwanda. He consulted with the Rwandan Government to discuss demining options and sought Government cooperation before returning to New York with his findings.
Requirements:

Please refer to Brigadier (Retd) Blagden's Mine Clearance Plan of 17 August 1994.

Cost:

\$4.3 million USD total, broken down as follows:

- a. \$.2 million for the main and mine dog contracts;

- b. \$.25 million for manpower;
- c. \$.02 million for rental;
- d. \$2.03 million for equipment and running costs.

Time Frame:

During the first year, the plan envisages mine clearance by the contractor, incorporating the training of the 150 Rwandans. Once the contract has been awarded, and the trainers are on the ground, the training of the 150 Rwandans could be completed within one year.

Action To Be Taken:

1. Provide funding and award contract to civilian contractor as soon as possible.
2. Secure the approval and clearance of the Rwandan Government to proceed with the plan.

Agencies/Countries responsible: UK/Civilian Contractor/
U N d e - m i n i n g
unit/DPKO/DHA

Officer in Charge: General Blagden, DPKO
Capt. Hurlston, BRITCON

C. Measures to be achieved in the coming months

1. Judicial System:

There is an urgent need for a judicial system to begin operating not only because of the human rights violations and genocide that have taken place, but especially because there is an urgent need for a judicial procedure to deal with the critical issues of land tenure and private property.

Agencies/Countries responsible: United States,
Switzerland, Belgium

Officer in Charge: Mr. Ike Minta,
UNAMIR

2. Land Tenure and Private Property:

The issues of land tenure and private property are critical and must be addressed as a matter of priority.

There must be a procedure in place to assist returnees with resettlement. Returnees who are not able to reclaim their homes and property must be assisted with resettlement.

HABITAT has drafted a preliminary rehabilitation programme for Kigali outlining the construction criteria for public buildings, infrastructure and private homes. The project, which would require \$1 million USD, has been submitted to UNDP and other donors for funding.

Agencies/Countries responsible:	US, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Japan, HABITAT, UNDP, FAO, UNICEF
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Officer in Charge:	Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP
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3. Harvest/Supply of Agricultural Inputs:

UNHCR is currently distributing seed kits and agricultural tools to displaced persons returning from Zaire along the Gisenyi to Ruhengeri route and also to returnees from Sector 4. Returnees are provided with ten days of food and seeds and tools at the reception centre before being transported to their final destination.

The Humanitarian Action Cell (HAC) of UNAMIR's seed and tool distribution programme targets a population of 700,000 people in Rwanda. The target date for the bean planting season was 15 October. According to FAO, the joint efforts by UNICEF, FAO, UNHCR, ICRC and many NGOs succeeded in meeting the minimum need for the bean planting season. FAO reports that 7,700 tons of beans and 1,700 tons of maize were distributed throughout Rwanda. In addition 3,000 hoes were distributed. FAO estimate that 500,000 farming families have received seeds and hoes. Based on an estimate of 5 members to a family, 2,500,000 persons have benefited directly from seeds and hoes. ICRC has been concentrating its deliveries to the Gitarama and Byumba prefectures. Every effort is being made to deliver food aid along with seeds so that the seeds are not consumed as food.

It should be noted that there are many NGOs doing excellent work, not only in the distribution of seeds but in many areas of relief and development. It is unfortunate that, in view of the purpose and length of this report, every NGO activity could not be listed.

Agencies/Countries responsible: HAC-UNAMIR
/WFP/FAO/ICRC/UNHCR/
ADRA/SWISS RELIEF
AGENCY

Officer in Charge: Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP
Mr. Gascon, FAO

4. Training of police force - gendarmerie:

UNCIVPOL has completed both the Theoretical and the Practical Phase of the training of 103 Rwandese gendarmes. The candidates are now taking their final exams which will complete the training, and the gendarmes will then be ready for duty. The Rwandese Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie has made a request to the UNAMIR CIVPOL Commissioner that UNAMIR train an additional 6,000 gendarmes. The CIVPOL Commissioner asked that the Government make a formal written request to the United Nations.

Agencies/Countries responsible: UNCIVPOL/BELGIUM/
JAPAN/EUROPEAN UNION

Officer in Charge: Col. Diarra, UNAMIR

5. Prison systems:

A prison system along with a prisons service needs to be built up for Rwanda.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BELGIUM/EU/GERMANY

Officer in Charge: Col. Diarra, UNAMIR

6. Re-opening of schools:

- i) For primary and secondary schools teachers are immediately required. They need books and scholastic equipment. A teachers training school would also need to be opened.

- ii) The University would also need to be opened with adequate staff.

During the week beginning 26 September 1994, schools in the following prefectures opened: Kigali (city and rural) on 26 September, Gikongoro on 27 September, Cyangugu on 28 September and Kibuye on 29 September.

A UNESCO consultant conducted a survey of school buildings/facilities, looking at the prefectures of Kibuye and Gisenyi. The results of this survey, which is being conducted in coordination with UNDP, will be presented as they become available.

UNICEF is providing Teacher Emergency Packages (TEPs), kits containing school supplies for one primary-level teacher and forty students, to schools throughout Rwanda.

The second phase of Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) preparation is in progress with the dispatch of a team to Byumba. Some of their findings are as follows:

- In the 17 communes of Byumba, there are 123,085 primary school pupils and 1,942 teachers, resulting in a pupil ratio of 63.4:1;
- 70.6 percent of the pupils are enrolled in grades 1-3, precisely those grades which the TEP targets;
- The majority of the teachers are underqualified or unqualified, but TEP training is going ahead and can be expected to be particularly important for these teachers. It is important to note that the teachers are not being paid; some report that they have not been paid for the past two years;
- In some schools, many teachers and pupils have come from outside Rwanda, especially from Uganda;
- Many schools have little or no school furniture; the great majority of schools have no textbooks, exercise books, pencils, etc.;
- A few schools completed the 1993-94 school year (eg., in Muvumba), with limited disruption; this is unlikely to be replicated in other prefectures, however;
- A typical pattern of school organizations is as follows: Grades 1-3 have two shifts, a morning shift from 8:30-12:00 and an afternoon shift from 1:30-4:30; pupils in Grades 4-5 attend all day;
- The language of instruction is Kinyarwanda; French lessons are offered in Grades 4-6, but some older children have more competence in English than in French;

While the director of the Printing Press in Kigali has given assurances about its capacity to meet orders for textbooks, the UNICEF/UNESCO education team is investigating the comparative costs and production capacities of other printers.

A meeting was held at the Bureau Pédagogique on 29 September with a group of curriculum specialists; work will begin shortly on reviewing and, if necessary, revising textbooks and teacher-guides for Grades 1-6 subjects in anticipation of the commencement of textbook production in a few weeks time.

A UNESCO consultant has arrived to conduct a study of the educational needs and aspirations of young persons, especially of post-primary school age.

WFP is providing Food-for-Work Rations to approximately 10,000 primary school teachers throughout the country. The first food packages, which have an approximate value of US\$ 50.00 based on September 1994 exchange rate and Kigali market prices, were delivered to teachers in Kigali during the second week of October.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BELGIUM/CANADA/UNESCO/
UNICEF/UNDP/WFP

Officer in Charge: Nigel Fisher, UNICEF

6. Training of cadres and Administrative services:

The administrative cadres have been severely depleted and would need to be filled by newly trained personnel. A training school for administrative cadres would be necessary. Equipment (Computers, typewriters, telecoms, fax machines, data bank) needs also to be acquired for use.

WHO, in coordination with the Ministry of Health, has set up a Health Information System to enhance the national epidemiological surveillance programme. Personnel from the Ministry of Health have been trained to use the software for this programme.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BELGIUM/OAU/JAPAN/EU/
UNDP/UNICEF/WHO

Officer in Charge: Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP

8. Physical repair of Ministries:

Most of the Ministries have been physically damaged by mortars, shelling etc. They need to be repaired for use. Offices must also be equipped.

UNICEF has given formal notification that it will provide a "line of credit" to seven ministries with which it closely works for basic physical rehabilitation; Health; Primary and Secondary Education; Higher Education; Public Works; Energy and Water; Family and Women's Affairs; Social Affairs; and Reconstruction and Rehabilitation.

BRITCON-UNAMIR has repaired the bomb damage to the roof of the Minister of Public Works offices.

Agencies/Countries responsible:	US/Civilian contractor (all UN agencies should help their counterparts)
Officer in Charge:	CAO UNAMIR
Lead UN Agency:	Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP

9. Support of Ministries

WHO donated a new Toyota Landcruiser to the Ministry of Health.

UNDP has provided 5 vehicles, computers, typewriters, photocopiers and generators to the central ministries with which it collaborates -- Finance, Planning, Office of the Prime Minister, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and the Interior.

Agencies/Countries responsible:	UNDP/WHO/UNICEF/WFP
Officer in Charge/Lead UN Agency:	Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP

10. Restoration of Municipal Services:

Training of cadres and also provision of equipment (fire engines, cleaning vehicles, garbage collection, sewerage cleaning) would need to be provided.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BELGIUM/JAPAN/EU/UNDP

Officer in Charge: Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP

11. Repair of roads and bridges:

BRITCON has been repairing roads throughout Rwanda. Its primary engineering task, the construction of a bridge at Gatuna, the border crossing from Rwanda to Uganda, has been completed. The current bridge is a temporary measure and a Bailey bridge should be procured if this vital supply route is to be maintained. BRITCON has also cleared the road between Byumba and Kituna, which had been littered with road blocks and landslides.

Agencies/Countries responsible: BRITCON/BRITAIN/UNDP

Officer in Charge: Ahmed Rhazaoui, UNDP

12. Transport:

Buses, taxis need to begin plying on the roads again between major towns.

Agencies/Countries responsible: JAPAN/EU/GERMANY

Officer in Charge: CAO UNAMIR

3 November 1994



U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

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Selected Chronology of Rwanda Crisis

April 5, 1994 - September 30, 1994

- April 5: UN Security Council Resolution 909 extends mandate of UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) until July 29, 1994. The resolution authorizes UNAMIR to monitor the execution of the Arusha peace accord between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Some 2,500 UNAMIR troops from 23 countries are present.
- April 6: Plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyrimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira crashes on approach to Kigali airport. Rwandan Defense Ministry states plane shot down by "unidentified elements."
- April 7: UPI reports "fierce fighting" in and around Kigali.
- Ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers, attempting to protect Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, are tortured and executed by Rwandan soldiers of the Presidential Guard. The Prime Minister is also murdered.
- UN spokesman reports that many of those killed are leaders of four political parties opposed to Habyrimana's MRND.
- UPI quotes President Clinton as saying "I am...horrified that elements of the Rwandan security forces have sought out and murdered Rwandan officials..."
- Washington Post* quotes recent radio broadcast warning Tutsis in Rwanda: "You cockroaches must know you are made of flesh! We won't let you kill! We will kill you!"
- April 8: UPI reports that Presidential Guard "was rampaging through the city [Kigali] detaining and executing anyone suspected of being a member of the Tutsi minority."
- Washington Post* cites "persistent reports, from witnesses and diplomats in Kigali, that government ministers were being rounded up by soldiers and some had been executed."
- UN Security Council President reports that an "interim government" has formed in Rwanda.
- UPI quotes President Clinton as saying, "We're doing everything we possibly can to be on top of the situation there."
- April 9: French paratroopers arrive in Kigali to oversee evacuation of French nationals. Two companies of U.S. marines are dispatched to Bujumbura, Burundi to prepare for the evacuation of some 250 Americans in Rwanda.
- UN Under Secretary General for peacekeeping expresses concern for safety of UNAMIR forces, saying, "There are worrying signs as of Saturday, because the troops of the RPF are moving toward Kigali."
- April 10: Belgian paratroopers arrive in Kigali to oversee evacuation of Belgian nationals.

USCR, a private, humanitarian agency, has been informing the public since 1958.

April 21: Security Council Resolution 912 reduces UNAMIR's authorized strength to 270 troops and changes mandate to act as intermediary between forces and assist in aid delivery, but does not authorize UNAMIR to stop killings of civilians.

AP reports two million people have fled their homes.

U.S. State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs attributes assassinations and "large-scale massacre[s]" to Presidential Guard.

April 22: National Security Advisor Lake calls on leaders of Rwandan military "to do everything in their power to end the violence immediately."

Some 1,000 UNAMIR troops prepare to leave Rwanda following adoption of Security Council Resolution 912.

UNHCR reports more than 100,000 people have fled Rwanda.

April 25: AP quotes UN spokesman in Kigali as saying, "Radio RTLM [Radio-Television des Milles Collines] is calling on militias to step up the killing of civilians."

April 27: UNHCR reports more than 130,000 people have fled Rwanda.

April 28: U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson declares "state of disaster."

April 29: UNHCR reports some 250,000 Rwandans have fled to Tanzania over the past 24 hours, the largest and fastest exodus ever witnessed by the agency.

Boutros-Ghali tells Security Council that death toll may have reached 200,000. Boutros-Ghali cites "strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians," and calls for an increase in UN presence that "would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which member states have so far proved reluctant to contemplate."

April 30: UN Security Council condemns massacres, but refuses to back Boutros-Ghali's call to increase UN presence.

President Clinton calls on the Rwandan army and the RPF "to agree to an immediate cease-fire and return to negotiations aimed at a lasting peace in their country."

May 1: UNHCR official reports "hundreds of bodies a day" floating down the Kagera River, which empties into Lake Victoria. Many of the bodies have their hands tied behind their backs.

May 2: *New York Times* reports Boutros-Ghali is requesting African heads of state to contribute troops to an all-African peacekeeping force for Rwanda.

USCR urges the United States and the UN to declare that massacres in Rwanda constitute genocide.

May 3: Boutros-Ghali repeats call for African troops that would be financed and equipped by the West, saying a foreign military presence is necessary to "defuse the conflict, to contain the genocide." Fewer than 500 UN troops remain in Rwanda.

May 4: OXFAM reports that death toll may be 500,000.

Assistant Secretary of State George Moose, speaking at House Africa Subcommittee hearing, says U.S. has declared "our intention to provide our fair share of support—logistical, financial, and other—to such a [UN/OAU peacekeeping] mission, should it be mounted."

USCR urges the United States to jam extremist radio broadcasts.

torture and massacres.

May 18: RPF denies accusations by UNHCR officials in Tanzania that it has engaged in torture and massacres.

May 19: Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings says the United States must provide logistical and material support in the deployment of African troops, saying the United States "is the one country with the resources and capability" to do so.

May 22: RPF captures Kigali airport.

May 25: In New York, Boutros-Ghali declares that he, the UN, and the international community as a whole have failed in Rwanda. "It is genocide which has been committed in Rwanda and more than 200,000 people have been killed [but] the international community is still discussing what ought to be done," he says.

UN Human Rights Commission adopts resolution condemning massacres and saying it believes "genocidal acts may have occurred." Resolution also call on Boutros-Ghali to appoint a Special Rapporteur to investigate and document human rights violations in Rwanda.

According to the *New York Times*, the United States has indicated that it may lend 50 armored personnel carriers to UNAMIR.

Reuter reports Ethiopia and Senegal, joining Ghana, have agreed in writing to send some 800 troops each.

OFDA dispatches Disaster Assessment Response Team (DART) to region.

May 27: AP reports tens of thousands of Rwandans, including soldiers of the Rwandan army, fleeing south from Kigali.

May 31: A Senegalese UNAMIR officer is killed in an RPF mortar attack, the second UNAMIR fatality attributed to RPF forces.

June 1: UNAMIR commander Dallaire appeals to the United States to send armored personnel carriers and other military equipment to help evacuate trapped civilians. Reuter reports Dallaire briefed an envoy from President Clinton in Nairobi on UNAMIR's needs and was told his request "would be taken to the highest authority."

June 2: Reuter reports aid groups caution that "a horde of Biblical proportions is swarming south to flee advancing rebels," and that if those fleeing enter Zaire or Burundi "aid workers will be barely prepared to feed or shelter them."

AP reports the United States will send 50 armored personnel carriers to UNAMIR.

June 6: UNAMIR commander Dallaire reports that large numbers of Rwandans are expected to flee the country in the near future, and says that two million is a "reasonable [planning] figure."

AP reports that African countries have so far volunteered 3,500 of the 4,000 infantry troops the UN wants to send to Rwanda, but that engineering and communications staff are in short supply.

June 8: UN Security Council Resolution 925 endorses Boutros-Ghali's proposals for deploying the remainder of UNAMIR's authorized troops, and extends UNAMIR mandate until December 9, 1994.

Government of Uganda reports that bodies are no longer entering Lake Victoria from the

Famille compound in Kigali, UNAMIR spokesman Major Jean-Guy Plante states, "We can only do what we can do. There are people in desperate situations all over Kigali, but we can only rescue people when both sides let us, and we have only so many trucks." AP reports nearly 2,000 people were left behind.

Boutros-Ghali urges Security Council to accept France's offer of intervention and says French troops should stay in Rwanda for three months, until UNAMIR reinforcements arrive. Boutros-Ghali says some 4,600 troops have been offered by nine countries.

State Department spokesman Mike McCurry tells reporters the United States "is supportive of their [French] efforts to muster international support for an early deployment of a UN force that would help put an end to the atrocities in Rwanda."

June 21: More than twenty French aid organizations speak out against the French plan to intervene militarily in Rwanda.

Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes says, "Someone must take the initiative to save what is left to save. France took the initiative and I don't know any other candidates."

June 22: The UN Security Council, in a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions, approves Resolution 929 authorizing French military intervention in Rwanda. The resolution authorizes French troops to use "all necessary means" to achieve the humanitarian objectives identified in Resolution 925, namely, contributing to the security and protection of civilians and providing security and support for the distribution of relief supplies. The French intervention is authorized for up to two months.

Given RPF opposition to the French intervention, some 42 French-speaking UN military observers from Togo, Congo, and Senegal are evacuated from Rwanda as a precautionary move.

OFDA reports that, to date, 10,700 bodies have been retrieved from Lake Victoria and buried.

June 23: The first of 47 U.S. armored personnel carriers leased to the UN arrive in Entebbe, Uganda from Germany.

First French troops cross into Rwanda on assessment missions from Zaire. Reuter reports that Radio RTLM says the French are coming to fight on the side of the interim government and are bringing in new weapons.

June 24: AP reports that relief groups allege that arms are moving through Goma, Zaire into "interim government"-held border areas of Rwanda.

June 27: To date, more than 1,300 French troops have arrived in Goma and Bukavu, Zaire. A total of 2,500 are expected. USCR calls on UN to mandate French and UN troops to detain massacre leaders.

June 28: UN Special Rapporteur issues report on Rwanda. Report characterizes massacres as "genocide."

Reuter reports that UNESCO has offered \$20,000 to help set up a humanitarian radio station in Rwanda that would counter the broadcasts of Hutu extremists.

UNAMIR spokesman reports that only five U.S. M-113 armored personnel carriers have arrived in Entebbe, Uganda.

July 1: Security Council Resolution 935 requests establishment of Commission of Experts to analyze evidence of grave violations of humanitarian law and possible acts of genocide in

Prime Minister-designate Faustin Twagiramungu returns to Kigali from exile in Belgium.

- July 15: Reuter reports that extremist radio broadcasts are encouraging Rwandan Hutus to flee into Zaire, and that truckloads of Rwandan soldiers are also entering Zaire. UN officials estimate refugees are entering Zaire at a rate of 12,000 per hour.

Thirteen weeks after large-scale massacres began in Rwanda, President Clinton orders the closure of the Rwandan embassy in Washington, D.C. and announces that U.S. no longer recognizes Rwanda's ousted government. In a statement, President Clinton says, "The United States cannot allow representatives of a regime that supports genocidal massacres to remain on our soil." President also authorizes \$19 million drawdown from Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund to assist in humanitarian operation in region.

French officials say that French forces in Rwanda will detain members of the "interim government" if they are found in the French zone.

- July 16: Tutsi refugees in Zaire who had fled the massacres in Rwanda report that grenades are thrown over the barbed wire surrounding their compound. The refugees believe Hutu extremists carried out the attack.
- July 17: Journalists report that two mortar shells fall on the Zairean side of the border near Goma, killing several people. Scores of refugees are trampled to death as they flee from Gisenyi to Goma.
- July 18: The International Committee of the Red Cross reports that up to 100,000 Rwandans have left the French zone and entered Zaire in the past 24 hours. Reuter reports that an additional 50,000 Rwandans have fled to Burundi, bringing the total there to 140,000.
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator J. Brian Atwood arrives in Goma, Zaire and says the United States is pledging an additional \$31 million in aid.
- UNHCR reports a surge of refugee arrivals in Zaire following radio broadcasts that state "[the RPF] are going to come kill you." Reportedly, refugees are moving toward Uvira, Zaire.
- July 19: French forces distribute leaflets urging people to stay in Rwanda and promising food supplies.
- UNHCR reports that radio broadcasts are continuing. A spokesman for the French aid organization AICF says the radio "has prompted general hysteria among people who believe only in their leaders, who have made devils of the Rwanda Patriotic Front. People are scared out of their wits."
- USAID Administrator Atwood says, "The Rwandan military is everywhere [in Goma, Zaire]....They are planning to invade the country."
- The first case of cholera is reported in refugee camps near Goma.
- Rwanda's Ambassador to the UN under the ousted regime relinquishes his seat in the UN Security Council.
- July 20: Rwandan soldiers and civilians loot 200 tons of food and medicine from a Swedish aid station in the town of Cyangugu near the border with Zaire.
- Washington Post* reports that Rwandan soldiers in Zaire prevent WFP from delivering 20 tons of beans to more than 30,000 refugees in Mugunga.

the inordinate time required to negotiate the offers of equipment from some countries, since the offers are subject to payment by the United Nations."

- Aug. 4: In testimony before House Defense Subcommittee, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry reiterates that "U.S. military personnel are not part of a UN peacekeeping operation."

78 British and 200 more Canadian troops have arrived in Rwanda.

MSF estimates up to 2,500 deaths per day in Goma area refugee camps, according to Reuter.

Rwandan refugees kill Zairean soldier in a Goma refugee camp.

Reuter reports that landmines have killed dozens of returnees to Rwanda.

- Aug. 5: France announces it has given the UN evidence of genocide.

UNHCR estimates that 100,000 Hutus have returned to Rwanda but 2.7 million Rwandan refugees remain outside the country. Reuter reports that UNHCR explains its cautions about repatriation: "Although the government has given very good assurances and made guarantees, it is not clear at all that the government itself is in a position to implement all of its guarantees in every far-flung corner of Rwanda."

UNHCR estimates death rate in Goma camps has fallen to about 500 per day, according to Reuter report.

Zairean soldiers kill a Rwandan refugee, the third in three days, reports Reuter. UNHCR suspends deliveries to Katale camp because of increased tension.

- Aug. 6: OFDA DART field office established in Kigali.

- Aug. 7: Since July 18, more than 48,000 bodies have been collected from refugee camps in the Goma region. Epidemiologists from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control put the total number of deaths at 55,000 to 80,000, with the most likely figure at about 60,000. At the height of the epidemics, the death rate for refugees in the Goma region was between 34 and 54 per 10,000 per day. The lower estimate is twice the death rate seen in Baldoa, Somalia in 1992. During the first two weeks of the influx, 7 percent to 9 percent of all refugees present died.

- Aug. 8: UNHCR reports Zaireans are demanding an "entrance fee" from refugees trying to enter Goma.

New Rwandan Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu says the ousted government fled with all Rwanda's foreign and domestic exchange reserves, reports Reuter. Twagiramungu asserts that any vengeance killing of returning Hutus will be punished. *The New York Times* reports that Rwanda's new government agrees to an international war crimes tribunal to judge those accused of genocide.

MSF says that death toll of up to 80,000 in Goma's refugee camps is the highest number ever recorded, Reuter reports.

AP reports that UNHCR urges French troops to stay in southwestern Rwanda.

- Aug. 10: At press briefing, Assistant Secretary of State George Moose says the "violence that has taken place in Rwanda over the last four months has greatly exacerbated an already tense political situation in Burundi." Moose calls for the arrest, detention, and prosecution of those directing violence in refugee camps in Zaire.

Aug. 21: French troops pull out of Rwanda.

Aug. 23: UN creates "Commission of Experts" to collect evidence of genocide in Rwanda.

Reuter reports that UN has not seen mass flight of refugees from southwest Rwanda, despite French withdrawal.

AP reports that last U.S. troops are to leave Goma by August 28.

Rwanda's Prime Minister warns of a possible regional war if refugees do not repatriate from Zaire, according to Reuter.

UN official says that more than one million persons may have been murdered in Rwanda.

Aug. 24: The UN charges RPF with "occasions of retribitional killings," but says such abuses are "not a general pattern," Reuter reports. The RPF detains 60 of its troops suspected of taking part.

The UN appeals to Western governments for 100 forensic experts and 100 lawyers to investigate "possible genocide," reports Reuter.

Aug. 26: U.S. BHR/OFDA states there is "still no significant outflow [of refugees] from Goma back to Rwanda, and says the pressure to remain is still strong."

Reuter reports Hutu refugees in Zaire launch a "witch hunt" for suspected RPF spies. Reuter also reports hostility in Goma refugee camps toward the West, regarded as having sided with the Tutsi-dominated RPF. UNHCR spokesman describes the refugee camps as a "virtual war zone."

UN spokesman reports that Zairean authorities are assisting former Rwandan government forces in training camp near Bukavu, according to Reuter. Zairean military strongman Mobutu Sese Seko promises to disarm RPF foes, but political analysts are not convinced.

Aug. 28: DART/Kigali field officers return from two-day assessment of northwest Rwanda and report that "the situation appears stable."

UNICEF and the new government of Rwanda estimate up to 200,000 unaccompanied minors in Rwanda, AP reports.

Five people are killed in Goma refugee camps. Refugees trying to leave camps are systematically accused of being spies and are often lynched by suspicious crowds, urged on by militiamen. UNHCR has abandoned many repatriation plans because of this hostility, Reuter reports.

More reports surface that Zaireans are helping 20,000 former Rwandan government troops regroup and train with a goal of launching counterattack on Rwanda, says Reuter.

Aug. 29: UN-sponsored talks between Zaire and Rwanda to encourage refugee repatriation to Rwanda continue. Rwanda wants Zaire to disarm former Rwandan government troops.

Five people are killed in violent incidents in Goma refugee camps, one of them a Hutu man beaten to death by a mob after he argued in favor of repatriation, reports Reuter.

Aug. 30: BHR/OFDA reports "rumors of continued *interahamwe* activity between Gikongoro and Butare" and that UNHCR has requested French military to remain in Goma past scheduled departure date of September 5.

UNHCR estimates that some 215,000 Rwandan refugees have repatriated, including

say her contract had expired. Save the Children says "The UN's human rights mission in Rwanda is a shambles whose poor organization threatens the whole process of peace, justice and political reconciliation."

Daily death rate among refugees in Goma, Zaire is 2.4 deaths per 10,000 population, according to weekly USAID report.

Japan plans to send 480 troops to Zaire and other countries bordering Rwanda, reports Reuter.

Some 4,000 UN peacekeepers are in Rwanda, 1,500 fewer than the number that were supposed to be deployed by July, Reuter reports.

- Sept. 14 Reuter reports that Rwanda's new government is in financial crisis. The World Bank grants \$20 million to the UN for Rwanda. Rwandan officials seek international loans to pay salaries of administrators and soldiers to rebuild the country. Rural Rwandan doctors and teachers are migrating to Kigali to find paying jobs, Reuter reports.

Eighty-six aid agencies are operating in Rwanda.

U.S. House of Representatives approves resolution by voice vote calling for U.S. military withdrawal from Rwanda by Oct. 7.

- Sept. 15: UNHCR estimates 450,000 Rwandan refugees have repatriated. An estimated 200,000 have returned from Zaire, 120,000 from Burundi, and 120,000 from Uganda. Returnees include persons who fled Rwanda this year, as well as Rwandan Tutsi who had lived in exile for decades.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, launches \$10.5 million appeal to fund 147 human rights monitors, investigators, prosecutors, forensic experts, and other human rights officers in Rwanda.

- Sept. 16: Some aid agencies are reportedly planning to leave Zairian camps dominated by soldiers of ousted Rwandan government. "We don't want to offer our services to people planning to go back to war," aid worker tells Reuter.

UN spokesperson suggests that perhaps UN troops could be used to disarm exiled soldiers.

Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu says up to 70 cases of revenge attacks by the RPF have been reported.

Zaire agrees to establish a joint working commission with the government, UNAMIR and UN aid agencies to study problems of repatriation, according to Reuter.

More than 2 million Rwandans are internally displaced in approximately 100 camps, according to new UNAMIR study.

\$250 million World Bank loan to Rwanda is delayed due to Rwanda's outstanding debts.

- Sept. 17: AP reports that UN plans to disarm and move Hutu extremists who are using intimidation to prevent Rwandan refugees from returning home.

- Sept. 19: UNHCR issues report estimating that some 2.1 million Rwandans are refugees, including 270,000 in Burundi, 500,000 in Tanzania, and more than 1.3 million in Zaire. Refugees in Zaire include 850,000 in the Goma area, 450,000 in the Bukavu area, and 30,000 in the Uvira area, UNHCR estimates.

Six people are killed by men in military uniform in the Gikongoro area over two days. Both

Special team of 20 UN experts is investigating UNHCR reports of reprisal killings by the RPF, Reuter reports.

Canadian troops find 500 bodies, dead for four months, in Nyrabuye, southeast Rwanda.

Sept. 30: The last American troops leave Rwanda. Some 250 French troops depart Goma, leaving only two French soldiers behind, Reuter reports.

Relief workers evacuate from Katale refugee camp, located 30 miles north of Goma, due to growing insecurity. "It has become clear that bandits within the refugees have taken control of the camp and made personal threats" against aid workers, a UNHCR official says. Some 270,000 refugees live in the camp. Among the agencies withdrawing are UNHCR, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam, German Red Cross, and others.

UNAMIR spokesman, responding to unpublished UNHCR reports of widespread RPF atrocities, charges that Rwanda's new leaders and the UN are the target of a plot to discredit them, Reuter reports.

16th March, 1993

ARUSHA Talks on a comprehensive Peace Agreement reconvened. Supported by OAU and facilitated by Tanzania.

4th August, 1993

Arusha Peace Agreement signed. The features are:

- a) A democratically-elected govt.
- b) B-Based Transitional govt. until elections
- c) Repatriation of refugees and
- d) Integration of the Armed Forces.

11th June, 1993

A Joint request to The Security Council from Arusha for The UN to send a Reconnaissance mission.

The UN Force

To assist in the maintenance of public security

To assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid

To provide security for the repatriation of the refugees and displaced persons

To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

Humanitarian Assistance up to April 1994**Inter-Agency Appeal (15th April, 1994)**

Amount is \$78 million for 900000 war-displaced living in some 30 camps where serious malnutrition and disease are prevalent.

Precarious economic condition, over-population and declining agricultural production also rife.

Department of Humanitarian Affairs fielded a mission

(18 to 25 March 1993) to present priority emergency relief projects focussing on food, nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter and household items and education.

Nov 1993, \$33 million had been made available to UN Agencies carrying out Humanitarian Assistance in Rwanda.

After the signing of the Arusha Accord, 600000 war-displaced had returned home. So, humanitarian assistance efforts shifted to the needs of the displaced returning home.

UNAMIR,s Initial Role

Humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and refugees, as well as to demobilised soldiers, would have to be coordinated with UNAMIR,s activities. Mine-clearance had also been earmarked as a priority to ease the threat to the displaced and to humanitarian agencies seeking to deliver assistance.

DEATH of the Two Presidents - April 6, 1994

Renewed fighting: Violence erupted

The Prime Minister and 10 UNAMIR Belgian soldiers were killed.

Belgium withdrew its battalion.

UNAMIR could no longer continue with its mandate. UNAMIR could only now provide humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons under its protection.

April 9

Humanitarian activities temporarily suspended. Evacuation of Humanitarian personnel recommended.

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Bernt Jonsson

Poverty versus Peace

Life & Peace & REVIEW

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Poverty versus Peace versus Poverty

When this issue goes to the printer, South Africa has a multiracial government in office, the peace process in the Middle East seems to have taken up speed at last, a clarification commission is agreed upon in Guatemala, and even in ex-Yugoslavia there are some signs of hope. At the same time, however, frightening stories are told from Rwanda, a similar pattern in Burundi cannot be excluded, the wars in Afghanistan and Sudan are dragging on, Angola, Liberia and the Philippines are still looking in vain for peaceful conditions and in Algeria the violence is escalating.

This issue reflects—with a special emphasis on Africa—this complex of positive and negative aspects of the development around the world. It is not just a sheer coincidence that armed conflicts are most common in Africa. The evil heritage of the colonial powers and the thirst for power among authoritarian African leaders adhere to the root causes.

However, if one factor is to be identified as the main cause, then its name is

poverty. Westerners often like to identify domestic mismanagement—investments in national prestige projects, monuments to the glory of the leader, large and inefficient bureaucracies, huge military expenditures—as the decisive factors behind poverty. From a Western perspective this explanation is quite advantageous as it protects their economic and political leadership from any moral responsibility for the present state of affairs in the Third World countries.

In reality, ideals, trends and patterns are set by the rich countries, and above all, they almost exclusively define the rules for world trade and financial transactions between countries. Whatever the intentions were from the start in 1944, the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—have become instruments of the powers-that-be.

The primary function of the structural adjustment programs, imposed upon debtor nations, seems to have been to safeguard the repayment of the loans to

banks and other financial institutions in the North (cf Ulrich Duchrow's and Martin Gück's convincing and critical analysis in *Economic Alternatives: Responding to the Fifty Years of the Dominant Financial Systems Established at Bretton Woods*). In many countries the result has been increased social unrest and political tensions, conditions well suited for exploitation by fundamentalist and other extremist groups (see also page 16).

If poverty is a crucial cause of conflicts and wars, the reverse causality is also true: armed conflicts and wars do not only lead to death and massacres but also to poverty and misery for the survivors—a vicious circle. Therefore, peace and reconciliation are necessary in order to achieve positive development and prosperity. This need is a challenge to both the secular and the religious community.

Bernt Jonsson

Life & Peace & INSTITUTE

is an international and ecumenical peace research centre founded in 1985 by the Swedish Ecumenical Council.

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Notes on LPI Staff & Board

After three years in Laos, Ulla Johansson has returned as assistant to the director, and Lena Sjöqvist has come back as research and fundraising assistant after one year's leave of absence. Consequently, their deputies Dorothy Berglund and Hillevi Hanis have left. Karin Normark, financial officer within the LPI Horn of Africa Program will be leaving LPI to pursue her education full-time.

Three members of the LPI board have new posts: Sibusiso Bengu is minister of education in the new South African government; Alan Geyer is resident ethicist at the Washington National Cathedral (though he remains on the faculty at Wesley seminary, also in Washington); and Oh Jae Shik is the founding director of the Korea Social Education Institute of the Korea Christian Academy.

Tom Dorris in Memoriam

The Life & Peace Institute has suffered a great loss. Our Communications Director, Tom Dorris died in a car accident in July, when he was travelling with his sister and her family. In a way his tragic death was symbolic; he died as he lived—travelling. He was a true internationalist with roots in a committed spiritual life. The world and the church were his home.

Tom Dorris was a servant of the word both as a journalist and as a deacon. As a journalist he covered wide fields: church life and church relationships, culture, history, politics, and peace issues. He was not only a skilled writer himself but he also possessed both the talent and the interest to improve upon the texts of others—an ability you will find only among genuine servants.

As a deacon he was deeply involved in the theological thinking and the practical organizing of the diaconate, which he considered to be very important for the function and the liturgy of the church. Tom Dorris was a man of the church, both as a devoted Lutheran and as a dedicated ecumenical person with most of his professional years spent in ecumenical contexts.

He was a friend, with many friends. The secret behind this may have been his humble smile, which disarmed people and made them feel safe. He had an incredibly large network of contacts, which he cultivated and systematized.

He was a co-worker in the fullest sense of the word. He was deeply involved in his individual responsibilities at the institute, but he also had strong feelings and a deep commitment to the institute as a whole. To work together was a consistent theme and a basic attitude in his understanding of professional life.

Amidst our sorrow and mourning, shared with his relatives and friends, it's a source of comfort that Tom Dorris left

behind a feeling of optimism and hope, deeply rooted in his Christian faith. He was a man of faith and hope.

And now, he is no longer with us with all his experiences and competence, with his low-key personality, with his sense of music and his firm dedication to tasks presented. He had only spent two years with the Life & Peace Institute, but his influence will be felt for a long time to come. His friendly spirit will stay with us.

Bernt Jonsson



INGOs Peace Work in Sudan



Photo: Helder Netocny
on in Sudan
Food Distri

Wars, not natural disasters, are causing the recurring human catastrophes in the Horn of Africa. Today there are almost three million displaced people in Sudan. According to Amnesty International, attacking and killing the civilian population is not an accidental byproduct of war, but the result of deliberate tactics, on the part of both the government and the armed opposition.

It has been a long time since the war in Sudan could be called a war between the north and south of the country, in which the south was fighting for equal rights for its citizens. Though the government in Khartoum is still relentless in its fight for power over the south, it is the fragmentation of the armed opposition in the south which has made the war particularly devastating. The liberation movement has split along ethnic lines; in their struggle with each other for power, leading southern Sudanese have turned on the civilians they once claimed to fight for.

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are raising the question of what role they can play in this grim war, aside from delivering relief aid. They want to know if there is a way to put pressure on the fighting parties to stop the fighting. Others are trying to influence the international community to intervene. Still others are asking how their own involvement could contribute to peace. At the same time, leaders of the church in

Sudan have asked INGOs to coordinate and cooperate to make the best use of resources.

The following conceptual framework builds on work on theories of peacemaking by John Paul Lederach, director of the International Conciliation Service of the Mennonite Central Committee.

Top-down

The traditional "western" way of making peace is seeing negotiations and peace agreements as the main tools. It uses international actors with high profiles who can intervene to bring the fighting parties to the negotiating table. Though a substantial part of the preparatory work has to be done in secret, at certain stages, this approach stresses visibility, which is seen as a way to strengthen the resolve of participants to keep commitments they make. This can be characterized as a top-down approach, with agreements negotiated at a high political level.

However, this method has some serious flaws. Rarely does it provide a forum to address and correct the root causes of the conflict, which means there is a greater risk for renewed conflict because of undealt-with problems. Moreover, with this approach, the future of a country and its people is put in the hands of the same leaders who caused havoc in their fight for power.

The "seeping down" of the agreement from the top is also problematic, as con-

tending groups are seldom clearly defined, their internal structure is often unclear, and, absent military coercion, the leaders may be unable to compel the followers to follow. As the top-down approach also does not allow for input from other levels of society, these groups may not feel bound by any agreement reached.

Bottom-up

Another peacemaking approach may be called "bottom up," though it might more correctly be called "middle way," as the key persons for it are not usually found at the most "grassroots" level (where people have their hands full simply trying to survive). It has the potential to address root causes of conflicts, and to transform society. It can also allow a representative and noncoercive leadership to emerge. Several principles are fundamental to this approach:

1. Peace is more than nonwar. It includes reconciliation of the fighting groups, and attention to the root causes of the conflict (political, economical, racial and/or religious).

Such a comprehensive approach to peace requires a process that evolves and grows, and, therefore, may seem to some to take an excessive amount of time.

2. The people of the country in conflict must be the principals in the peace process. The international community can play an important role (through UN agencies, governments, INGOs, peace insti-

tutes, etc.) such as that of promoter/facilitator/midwife.

3. Attention must be paid to questions of legitimacy and representativity. Where questions can be raised on those grounds about those who seem to be leaders, peacemakers should look for traditional and benevolent structures and groupings to strengthen (e.g., elders, chiefs, business people, teachers, health workers, women's organizations, the church).

4. All efforts by outsiders to promote peace (including this one) have political implications. Any approach will have the affect of strengthening some groups and weakening others in society. Those involved in peacemaking must accept and be aware of this.

5. This kind of peace work requires trust and long-term commitment. It requires a low-profile approach by people with the patience and commitment to keep working even when there is very little visible progress.

A Combination

Are these two approaches mutually exclusive? Not necessarily. They can and should be combined, but it is important that the international actors involved have common goals and a shared and comprehensive view of the whole process.

Nonetheless, certain difficulties are inherent if one tries to combine the approaches. Those involved in high-level diplomacy and negotiations are seldom aware of the work going on at the grassroots and middle levels, and even when they are, rarely take it into account. In many cases, this can hamper the peace process being built up from below, and in some cases it might even disrupt progress that has already been made.

An example of this can be taken from Ethiopia in May of 1991. At the time, LPI had been facilitating contacts among the fighting factions for several months. As all the fighting factions trusted the old Ethiopian institution of "shimageles" (elders), some of them undertook intensive, low-profile "talks" with all the protagonists. A meeting was called for the beginning of June. All the contending parties (including the then Ethiopian government, and the parties opposed to the current government) had agreed to send representatives.

In mid-May, however, the US government asked LPI to postpone the meeting. It then convened a meeting in London on May 27th among representatives of the then government and three main groups

fighting it. The result was good, for the war ended, but had there been cooperation and coordination between the two processes, the London talks could have benefited from the preparatory work done by the shimageles, and the friction between



Photo: Martin Adler

the current government and its opposition might not have become so strong.

Another example is Somalia. There, one finds tensions between the two kinds of peace processes, even within the UN family. Many governments—in the region and beyond—are calling for a "political solution," by which they mean negotiations involving the warlords. What they do not take into account is that most Somalis question the leadership of the warlords. This approach helps to legitimize and strengthen the warlords' status, at home and abroad.

At the same time, part of UNOSOM (the UN presence in Somalia) is engaged in political work in the regions. Its aim is to strengthen grassroots organizations and foster local leadership that truly represents the people. This work has been very successful. As a result, by the end of 1993, 55 out of 66 projected district councils, and 8 of 13 projected regional councils were operating, and their members have received training in basic administration. These councils are viewed with great enthusiasm by ordinary people, and with great suspicion by the warlords. Any gathering of warlords and other high-level "leaders" that does not honor this emerging civilian leadership and these burgeoning democratic structures would be disastrous for long-term prospects for peace in Somalia.

INGOs: Relief and Peace

Many think of providing relief aid to suffering people as a neutral and purely hu-

manitarian act, but such a view is increasingly being questioned. Indeed, there is growing recognition among INGOs, whose primary goal is to provide relief aid in conflict situations that they are involved in politics, whether they like it or not. They are beginning to realize that if they want to help change the situation, then they have to do something about the ills causing conflicts. They are starting to ask what role INGOs can play in a peace process. They are formulating joint appeals to the fighting parties and the international community. They are exploring other avenues to promote peace.

In general, INGOs working in a conflict situation are well informed. Those engaged in development work are likely to have a long-term commitment to the people and the country in question, and will have built good relationships, based on mutual trust. These facts have several implications:

1. These INGOs are important links between the suffering population of a country in conflict and the international community. The international community (in the form of governments, regional intergovernmental organisations, and UN agencies) need the information INGOs have. INGOs should recognize their own expertise and offer it to the international community—through lobby work and appeals, but also by cultivating informal relations to government officials.

2. They are witnesses and can be voices for those suffering. In a closed country like Sudan, for instance, they may be among the few, if not the only ones, who can bring information to the outside world about what is going on. Many INGO workers hesitate to do this, for fear that this might be construed as taking sides, and thus be forbidden to work in the country. Weighing the possible consequences of one's actions is, of course, not easy, but the necessity to speak for those who have no other voice should not be left out of the equation.

3. INGO staff people aware of peace issues could intentionally cultivate contacts across the lines of conflict, and listen and provide help to all sides. They could listen and pay particular attention to different perspectives (for it is often misunderstandings, unsubstantiated rumors, and different perspectives that lead to an eruption of violence), and help clarify misunderstandings before they lead to violence.

4. Good INGO work does not replace local actors, but rather reinforces, sup-

ports, and strengthens them. Such local structures, however weak, could be seeds which grow into new indigenous infrastructures in countries where conflicts have destroyed them, or where government organizations are repressive and not serving large segments of the country. Identifying and supporting local structures is long-term work. Its ultimate aim is to train people and transform societies so that people there take control of their lives.

5. INGOs engaged in peace building cannot work in isolation. Of course, individual INGO initiatives and creativity are needed and must be allowed to flourish, but not at the expense of a commitment to inform, coordinate, and cooperate with other INGOs operating in the same area. Such work requires openness and transparency in plans and actions.

6. For many INGOs, such a commitment to peace work would require that staff members receive some training in peace-promotion techniques and conflict-resolution theories.

Sudan

One place where these reflections might be applied is Sudan. There, the challenge is daunting and complicated. In spite of the peace rhetoric of the Sudanese government, very tight security allows for hardly any international involvement, be it from the United Nations, nonregional governments, or INGOs. (There seems to be some welcome for the work of regional organizations and governments, but, so far, not much has come from their efforts.)

INGO peace work in Sudan would have to focus on advocacy, putting international pressure on the fighting parties, and "bottom-up" peace promotion. Recently, some US and European INGOs have tried to take a step in this direction. Whatever comes of this, it is important that they have a comprehensive picture of the situation in Sudan. There will be a need for frequently updated information, and also for training (for INGO workers and Sudanese counterparts).

In this context, there is a continuing need for an international expert group on Sudan (modeled after a similar group LPI has convened for Somalia). It would serve as a reference group to provide assessment, evaluation, and new perspectives and ideas. It could include relevant specialists on conflict resolution, anthropology, political science, history, culture, politics, etc. Updated insights will be necessary in order for ongoing INGO advo-

cacy work to be accurate and effective with regard to the fighting parties, governments, regional organizations, and the United Nations.

It is essential to make the parties stop fighting; an international arms embargo could help force them to accept a ceasefire, especially if neighboring governments take the lead in calling for and implementing it. In late November 1993, LPI, the German church agency AGKED, and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel College (Waterloo/Ontario/Canada) set up an international resource group to consider the arms situation in the entire Horn of Africa, including attempts to identify arms suppliers and the routes they use. It was also to set up pilot projects for disarmament in Somalia. Its work will doubtless have important implications for Sudan.

In supporting grassroots structures, the church in Sudan has an obvious key role. Though church staff members are generally thought of as belonging to the middle class of society, they can be said to represent people of all class levels. However, it would be important to discover other local structures that also represent the people, and to see if and how they could be supported in efforts to promote peace. Though tribal structures today are usually viewed as a negative factor, there might be positive reconciliatory aspects of them—as is the case in the traditional system of elders in Somalia—that could be strengthened and used.

If we are serious in saying that the Sudanese are to be the main protagonists in the peace process, then the INGO community must consult actively with and listen attentively to them. Through the New Sudan Council of Churches, Sudanese concerned with peace have requested that INGOS channel their initiatives on Sudan through one point, working with NSCC, and that they help set up teams of international peace monitors—a process of "interpositioning"—who could help supervise an internationally brokered ceasefire in the south.

The primary mission of the teams would be to live in solidarity with church people in the south. After a ceasefire is agreed, they would—as the term suggests—stand between the fighting parties. The idea is that their visible, international presence would deter renewed violence and fighting. They would be supportive witnesses, and, having had some basic training in nonviolent conflict resolution,

could help defuse critical situations. They could also be resources in many situations where there are smaller, latent conflicts involving, for example, the return and resettlement of refugees. By promoting peaceful conflict resolution, they would strengthen and encourage local grassroots attempts at building peace within the communities.

NSCC staff have also indicated a need for training in different areas. Workshops and seminars could be arranged for staff in order to increase their awareness and skill in conflict transformation. The fundamental reconciliatory role of the church could thereby be further strengthened. Training in documentation and communication skills would also be useful. Other possible Sudanese structures could, in the same way be given help to work together to identify and develop their specific reconciliatory mechanisms.

And what of SPLA? Is it at all possible to work with its various parts to empower the people? How are SPLA leaders viewed by the people, and how do the leaders feel about strengthening the middle and the grassroots levels? An armed movement, SPLA is hardly democratic. However, one of its parts has asked for help to train its commanders in principles of human rights and humanitarian law. Training SPLA commanders in this way, though it could possibly mean strengthening their military structure, could help decrease violence against civilians in the south.

All INGOs somehow engaged in Sudan could seriously consider setting aside a percentage of their budget (regular or emergency) for conflict prevention and resolution. Even if they themselves do not become actively involved in this sort of work, they could support it with funds. Such an involvement, even if only as financial supporter, would mean setting out in a direction with no clear map to follow and no sure signs by which to steer. All involved would have to try to learn from earlier mistakes and be open to creative and perhaps unconventional methods. They would need to work closely together, supporting and helping each other along the difficult road to peace. Surely, there is a risk in this course, but the risk of not doing so is much greater.

Susanne Thurfjell Lundén

This article (abridged from a longer paper) was prompted by a request in autumn of 1993, from church representatives from both parts of Sudan that LPI involve itself further in issues of peace and reconciliation in their country.

Third World Warns UN on Interventions



Francisco Aduchi Chong

Several Third World governments are warning the United Nations to avoid intervening in domestic conflicts unless it secures the consent of all parties concerned. "If the United Nations does not adhere to this principle, its presence in any country would be an infringement of that country's sovereignty," says Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka and other countries—including Mexico, Colombia, Cameroon, Malaysia, and India—issued their warning at a UN committee meeting on decolonisation. Razali Ismail of Malaysia said developing nations think the international community "has no basis nor business to deal or dabble with the domestic affairs of a UN member-state."

He said external intervention—"even within the context of the United Nations"—can and should only take place under specific conditions. The world body, he said, should intervene only at the request of the government of the day, or as a result of a threat to the peace and security of another state.

The committee has asked UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to prepare a detailed report on operations that have significant difficulties in implementing their mandates. It also asked him to highlight the root causes of such difficulties and suggest possible measures to address them.

Rodrigo says it is far more important for the United Nations to analyse a situation carefully than to rush into ill-conceived interventions. "This is the primary and most vital stage in UN peacekeeping. The temptation to 'do something' because there is agitation for it must be resisted," he said. (Unilateral, ill-planned UN interventions are partly blamed for the failure of several UN missions, including Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia.)

The Central American group (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador) told the committee that every UN mission must have the consent of all parties to a conflict and should be structured in conformity with the charter. Speaking on the group's behalf, Guillermo Melendez-Barahona (El Salvador) said the positive evolution of the peace process in Central America was the result of the political will of the parties concerned.

Luis Fernando Jaramillo (Colombia) challenged the argument that intervention could be justified on humanitarian grounds. He told the committee there is no "automatic link" between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. "Not all peacekeeping operations had a humanitarian component. If they had, it must be handled by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). That would ensure the neu-

tral and impartial nature of humanitarian assistance," he argued. Amal Dutta (India) said events in Somalia and elsewhere confirmed the view that the United Nations should not get into situations where all involved parties or member states do not agree to a UN presence.

Several countries also challenged the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping operations. Razali told the committee that since decisions on peacekeeping are taken by the council, Malaysia wishes to underline the need for regular and close consultations between it and the wider membership of the world body, particularly troop-contributing countries.

He also emphasised the need to "dispel perceptions that the Western-dominated council increasingly resorts to questionable decisions, the implementation of which in the main are left to other member-states, particularly from the Third World." He said such perceptions draw their basis from peacekeeping operations approved by the Council, but from which major countries gradually disassociate themselves for domestic reasons.

Based on material supplied by IPS, Rome. For a broad discussion on the principles of humanitarian intervention and the role of the United Nations, see the LPI report The Challenge to Intervene, (ed.) Ferris, B. See the back cover of this LPR for information about ordering.

Human Rights and Peace in South Africa

Human rights are standards to which every human being is entitled simply by virtue of being human. The struggle for human rights involves defending people's right to speak, assembly, petition government, health, food, shelter and clothing—to be free from torture, arbitrary arrest and detention without charges and due process. Concern for the practical realities—enough food, adequate shelter, human dignity—is both the context of Christian mission and the content of the witness we are called to make. Bearing in mind this witness we would like to share with you some of the issues confronting us with regard to human rights and the peace process in our country.

Three Generations of Rights

Most proponents of human rights, in particular a Bill of Rights in South Africa, operate within a thematically limited and historically out of date perspective. Very few get beyond what has been called the first generation of rights namely, civil and political rights and rights to due process.

The second generation of rights namely those of a social, economic and cultural nature enunciated in the United Nations Charter of Human Rights of the 1960s, get scant mention. The third generation of rights, the rights to development, peace, social identity and a clean environment, which have been clearly identified as human and people rights only in the past decade get virtually no attention at all.

The great majority of South Africans have in reality never enjoyed either first, second or third generation rights. Their franchise rights have been restricted or nonexistent, so the achievement of first generation rights is fundamental to the establishment of democracy and the overcoming of national oppression. But for the vote to have meaning, the vote must be an instrument for the achievement of second and third generation of rights. Otherwise this would place us in a position where people have the right every five years or so to emerge from their Group Area Homesteads to go to the polls, only thereafter to return to their inferior house, inferior education and inferior jobs. It would be strange indeed if these rights ignored the right to peace and development, the right to enjoy the beauty of and benefit from the natural resources of the country. If we want the complete elimination of

apartheid in all its shapes and forms, what is needed is the rapid and simultaneous achievement of all the rights as formulated in all three generations.

Affirmative Action Needed

A fundamental feature of a meaningful Bill of Rights for South Africa is that it be structured around a program of affirmative action. Individuals as well as whole communities will be looking to the Bill of Rights as a means of enlarging their freedom and improving the quality of their lives.

If a Bill of Rights is seen as a truly creative document that requires and facilitates the achievement of the rights so long denied to the great majority of people, it must have an appropriate affirmative strategy. If for instance the law were to give equal protection to a family of ten living in two-roomed shanty and a family of two in a ten-roomed mansion, it would not be enlarging the area of human freedom in South Africa. Therefore, affirmative action is needed.

The advantage of affirmative action is that clear and irreversible goals with an undeniable social and moral purpose are stated. We must remember that there is no area of South African life that apartheid has left untouched. It will be necessary to extend affirmative action to every aspect of South African society—health, education, work, leisure, etc.

A Human Rights Culture

Very few South Africans know what a Bill of Rights is. It is something outside our experience, something we associate with seemingly exotic legal and political cultures like those of the USA. The battle for human rights in our country has essentially been a struggle for the vote and not for a Bill of Rights. We are still betrothed to the idea that rights come from law-makers, not the law enshrining our rights. Yet, when people marched in the streets without asking for permission, they were asserting the fundamental right of peaceful assembly. The foundations of the constitutional idea already exists in the daily behavior of millions of people. We need to build on this foundation to establish a firm human rights culture. One of the biggest problems however is that it seems that authoritarianism is even more deeply ingrained in what is called the South African way of life than is racism. People can

hardly decide anything for themselves, do anything on their own—they always have officials over them making decisions on their behalf.

Constitutionalism creates a totally different relationship between citizens and government. Not only does it make government accountable to the people rather than people to government; it also establishes the idea of people having rights and of people being equal.

In order to firmly establish a human rights culture, a Bill of Rights must be associated with democracy not authoritarianism. The people affected by the Bill of Rights must be involved in its formulation, so that they regard it as their own, something they have struggled for and something they will defend. The content of the Bill of Rights must correspond to the deepest aspiration of the people. The people as a whole must have confidence in those who guard over the Bill of Rights.

We also need to look at human rights documents in other countries and other continents. We all participate in an international culture and share in the patrimony of human rights instruments. To the extent that we have succeeded to show that apartheid is an international issue, so are we correspondingly obliged to heed international expectations with regard to apartheid's elimination.

In the same vein, it becomes more important than ever that opponents of apartheid the world over keep their eyes fixed on the goal of genuine democracy in South Africa. To suspend pressure because apartheid managed to wear attractive new clothes or shed some of its dirty old apparel would be to betray generations of South Africans who have struggled to free their country from racial oppression and exploitation. It would also be to postpone the peace which we all sorely need, and delay the reconstruction necessary to ensure that South Africa truly becomes a country that belongs to all who live in it.

Collin Goeiman & Don Sauls

This article was abridged and adapted from an article which appeared in the December 1993 issue of WSCF Journal, published by the Inter-Regional Office of the World Student Christian Federation, 5 route des morillons, CH-1218 Grand-Saconnex/GE (Switzerland).

Africanized Democracy and Democratized Economy?



Photo: Axel-Ivar Berglund

Nowhere is the need for a new international ethos more apparent than in the governance of African societies.

External powers, many of which have judged Africans incapable of "modernity" and thus of governing their own affairs according to the "civilized" standards of the West, have recently taken up the cry of the times and begun to demand that the autocratic governments, despotic rulers, and military dictatorships they helped establish and sustain over decades must now give way to new "democracies."

During the Cold War, the West often condemned one-party rule in independent Africa, yet all the while supporting it in practice according to its own perceived strategic and economic interests. The East was somewhat more consistent in echoing the rationales brought forward by African rulers to justify one-party rule, but it was seldom less self-interested.

The 1990s has brought growing pressure on African governments and/or rulers to don the formal attire of Western democracy as a precondition for continued economic and other aid and trade.

Various criteria have been set to measure the sincerity of moves to democracy. The tests African states must ordinarily meet today to be fully recognized by external powers and granted credits through global financial institutions are three: es-

tablishment of a "stable" multi-party political system, periodic "free and fair" elections under terms of an acceptable constitution, and an unrestricted free market economic system. Some lists may include additional items, such as greater recognition of the role of "civil society" and guaranteed freedom of speech, including of free press.

But special and increasing emphasis is being placed on "free and fair" elections which, properly administered and with results certified by international monitors, have become a sine qua non for international acknowledgment of a government's "legitimacy."

There is, indeed, a voracious appetite in Africa for democracy. So, when people are invited to participate, they do, and often with great fervor. People who have never experienced an open election have made extreme sacrifices to be able to cast a ballot in recent national elections in Kenya, Angola, Congo, Togo, Burundi, Nigeria, and elsewhere. Regrettably, the results thus far have seldom matched peoples' expectations.

At a consultation of church leaders from eastern and southern Africa on "Peace, Democracy, and Violence: The Church's Mission in Africa Today," held late last year in Windhoek (Namibia), one participant said the notion that elections

alone constitute democracy is a form of modern-day political "witchcraft." People tired of misery and, especially, of violence, have time and again been led to believe that depositing ballot papers in a "magic box" will end killing, bring peace, and, with luck, perhaps even a bit of prosperity.

But in practice, the holding of elections has achieved little for the poor. The resulting deception, this church leader suggested, could do more to impede than to foster true participatory democracy in Africa.

For democracy to be real in Africa, it must be Africanized, and African economies must be democratized.

The "Africanization" of Democracy

It is not the idea of democracy, but the form of democracy being imposed from outside which is doubted by many Africans today. It is not the universality of the human rights in which true democracy is rooted which is questioned, but the restricted and selective application of these rights. That is, individual civil and political rights are emphasized, while collective social, economic, and cultural rights are played down, thus impeding democracy in Africa.

To "Africanize" democracy, according to the Windhoek consultation, is to

emphasize the holistic character of life in African society. It is to respect the value of "family" in the extended African sense; the acceptance by the whole of responsibility for each individual member. It is to respect authority, but to hold all authorities accountable to God and the extended family—past, present and future. It is to respect the land and to establish a just relationship with it in community. It is to respect the rights and dignity of individuals and of peoples in and beyond one's own "family," and at the same time to hold each accountable to the others in renewed dedication to the goal of African unity.

Nearly two decades ago, respected Africa scholar Basil Davidson put forth the provocative question: "Can Africa survive?" By now the answer must certainly be clear: It can if it is allowed to do so on its own terms, with a fair deal in an interdependent world, and if Africans are supported in their determination to rebuild just, sustainable, democratic, African societies.

Democratization of the Economy

If, as John Philpot Curran, the Irish barrister, put it in his 1790 speech on elections, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, then equally it can be said that a precondition for lasting democracy is a minimum of social and economic justice for every citizen. The formal "democratization" of the political life of a nation is insufficient either to obtain or to sustain democracy.

External pressures and "conditionalities" have led some autocratic regimes to don the cloak of Western-style democracy, but the results have seldom been more than cosmetic. True participatory democracy—government of, by, and for the people, as the Preamble to the Consti-

tution of the United States of America puts it—requires fundamental institutional change, and authentic respect for individual and collective rights and freedoms, including economic rights.

The insistence that African nations adopt unrestricted free market policies as part of democratization serves the interest of power to have free access to African markets and resources, but it does little to guarantee African countries equal participation in the global economy, or their citizens a fair distribution of the meager wealth they themselves produce.

As the Windhoek consultation made clear, there is an imperative need to democratize both international and national economies within Africa. Political and economic participation must go hand in hand.

The Changing Face of Religion

Africa has for millennia been a continent of great religious diversity. It remains so today, but with some new complexities. Some observers see in the emerging new configuration of religion in Africa a source of destruction of the social fabric of communities, of tension, dissension, and even war. Others see possibilities of new forms of cooperation, new and more dynamic relationships which could highlight African values and give signs to the world of how, for example, Christians and Muslims might live in harmony within society.

The new religious reality of Africa includes a rapid growth of some streams of Islam. The fact that some of this growth is promoted by a narrow, militant form of Islamic thinking is troubling, even threatening to many Christian communities. But some new forms of Christian/Muslim dialogue and cooperation are emerging

which could open new doors of relationships.

New popular religious movements have emerged in several parts of the continent. Close to some aspects of traditional religion many take away the garb of the Christian church. Distinct from African "independent" churches, several of whom are close to or are a part of the ecumenical fellowship, these new popular religious movements are likely to be a lasting feature of the African religious landscape for some time to come.

The new "invasion" by fundamentalist, often marginal Christian sects, many of them originating in the United States, continues to exercise a divisive influence in the region. These must be studied and understood.

Challenge to the Church

The church in Africa has a key role to play in the transformation of Africa. People rely on it for leadership, training, mobilization, representation, and both spiritual and material resources. Many are standing up to the challenge, and have suffered martyrdom in the cause of justice and democracy. But others seem to have lost vision and the strength to carry on. One aim of the ecumenical movement is to accompany, give solace to, and encourage all parts of the church in their attempts to remain faithful and relevant.

It should go without saying that the church in the North has as often been a part of the colonial and neo-colonial system of thinking and acting as a counterweight to it. Attitudes and actions ascribed to "external powers" describe well some of the ways in which churches from the North have related to Africa.

On the other hand, the transformation of African societies must involve confession, repentance, and conversion on the part of many African Christians, church leaders, and church institutions as well. The avarice, appetite for power, susceptibility to corruption, and autocratic attitudes ascribed to some political leaders on the continent can be found among the churches as well. Christians' and the church's ability to see specks of dust in the eyes of government authorities or of outside powers—secular or ecclesiastical—would be greatly enhanced by the removal of the logs in their own.

Adapted from a paper presented to the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches last January in South Africa.

Structural Adjustment - No Success Story

One northern development expert describes a new World Bank study on sub-Saharan Africa as "blend of half-truths, oversimplification and institutional propaganda." That is among hard-hitting criticisms from First World activists who have reviewed a recently released World Bank study on the impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs (SAPs) on the continent.

In Africa too there are strong reservations about the bank's insistence that SAPs are working. Though there is little argument over the goal of macroeconomic stability, transparency, and getting rid of suffocating state control over the economy, there is controversy over whether the formula of devaluation, wholesale privatisation, debt repayment, and the lifting of trade protection and debt repayment is the right one.


'Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead' compares the relationship between policies and growth in 26 of the 30-plus countries which implemented IMF-approved policies between 1981 and 1991. Including figures, charts, graphs, tables, and statistical indices, it concludes that SAPs are working in Africa, and that the pace of implementation must be increased.

Kevin Watkins, senior policy adviser at British development group Oxfam, said that rather than the book the bank produced, "what was needed was an open acknowledgement of the scale of Africa's development failure—including the failure of adjustment policies to generate sustainable growth and poverty reduction." He maintains that the facts of adjustment speak for themselves, as Africa is the only region in the developing world where poverty and human welfare indicators are worsening and prospects for recovery receding, "15 years after the World Bank and the IMF emerged as the dominant force in economic policy making in sub-Saharan Africa."

Of the 26 countries included in the report, six—Ghana, Tanzania, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria (which subsequently abandoned SAP programs)—are commended for their consistency in implementing SAPs. The report says that as a result, these six had the highest per-capita growth in gross domestic product (GDP). On the other hand,

countries like Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Congo, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Zambia, which did not follow SAP guidelines, experienced contraction.

Despite extensive statistics, analysts say, the World Bank is going to have a tough time convincing people and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Africa that its policies are working—or that they will ever work. "No matter how much they bandy statistics about, we will never agree that structural adjustment policies will bring about sustainable development in the region," says Paul Spray of Christian Aid, an agency of the Council of Churches of Britain and Ireland.



Bob Haverluck:

He argues that for sustainable development to take place, SAPs which reduce trade protection, devalue currencies, cut expenditure on health and education, and promote wholesale privatisations must be reconsidered. Spray contends that even some bank officials acknowledge that.

According to analysts, in no country in the region can the bank honestly claim that its policies have worked. Even in Ghana, where the Bank says SAPs have been most successful, capital investment in the country—currently eight percent of GDP—has not gone up because of privatisations and drastic devaluations. "Capital investment in Ghana is less than a quarter of the southeast Asian average and is insufficient to replace existing stock, let alone provide the platform for sustained recovery," Watkins says.

GDP growth in Zimbabwe during the second half of the 1980s occurred not

because, but in spite of adjustment, he adds. Since it implemented a 'SAP program, both investment and export growth have plummeted, he notes. Howell, who describes the report as "simplistic," contends that its conceptual framework is totally wrong because it does not measure real improvements in people's lives and living standards, by using figures such as the UN Human Development Index. Instead, it bases its conclusion on per-capita GDP figures, which do not reveal health and education levels or the distribution of wealth.

"The report looks impartial, dressed up as it is in the jargon of objectivity, but it has its own agenda," she adds. "There is nothing in it about the suffering adjustment policies are causing, and the popular riots, like those in Senegal after the recent devaluation of the CFA franc."

Many specialists criticise the report's conclusion that the pace of "reform" should be stepped up if the region is to achieve development levels comparable to those in the successful southeast Asian economies.

They maintain that economies in places like South Korea, Indonesia, and even Vietnam developed under quite different conditions, without the need for SAPs. And some of the Asian examples implemented policies—including import restrictions, state ownership, and other interventionist instruments coupled with incentives to the private sector—are at variance with the SAP policies demanded for Africa. At the same time, these analysts say, Asia's 'tiger economies' benefited from high levels of western investment, aid, and market concessions, all at a time when the world economy was growing.

"This is very different from the situation in which Africa finds itself" now, says Carolyn Jenkins of Oxford University's Centre for the Study of African Economies. "SAPs are forcing African states to disengage from the economy when there is no viable private sector to take its place."

Both Jenkins and Howell believe that in principle adjustment is a good thing, but that both the pace and content of SAPs—"one panacea for all ills"—must be re-examined. "Programs should not be imposed on countries, especially deregulation, if they don't have the infrastructure



Photo: Church of Sweden AV Service / Johan Swedberg

NEWS

IMF Policies Said Unhelpful: According to Francis Teal of the Oxford University Centre for African Studies, policies of the International Monetary Fund "hinder industrialisation in Africa." According to him, among the offenders are IMF-imposed policies of trade liberalisation, steep currency devaluations, an end to subsidies, and a general withdrawal of the state from economic management.

Official Aid Down, Net Flows Up: According to a study by the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 21 industrialised countries which make up the OECD Development Assistance Committee disbursed 54.8 billion US dollars to developing countries in 1993, down from the 1992 level of 60.8 billion. Chief declines were registered by the United States, Switzerland, and Finland. However, the OECD figure for "net resource flows" increased from 153.2 billion in 1992 to 159.5 in 1993. Besides official aid, that figure includes other official funding (such as debt forgiveness), as well as all private investment, lending, and charitable assistance.

Politics Rather Than Need In Aid? Of the 1.4 billion US dollars in bilateral aid committed to 33 island nations in 1991-92, 47 percent went to two—Jamaica and Papua New Guinea. Miles Stoby, coordinator of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, says the poorest among the 33 "are not getting the most official development assistance." Rather, UN figures show "clearly a lot of decision-making on a political basis, rather than on the basis of actual need." An additional 14.7 percent went to three other countries—Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, and Cape Verde. The two-week conference met in Barbados in April and May. About 40 million people live in the world's 40 or so "small island developing countries." The largest single contributor of such aid is Japan, with 31 percent of the total. Then come Australia (17 percent), Canada (11), France and the United Kingdom (9 each), and the United States (8).

to provide the necessary supply response; the sequencing must be right," says Jenkins. "This report is an exercise in institutional self-congratulation and public deception which will further erode the already dwindling credibility of both the World Bank and the IMF," says Watkins.

In one of the half-dozen countries praised in the report, Joe Foroma, an economist at the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, says "the only fair comment would be to say we have had mixed results so far. Our currency is now almost convertible, we have done away with import licenses, and in many areas we have liberalised our economy." But, he adds, "at the same time we have not been able to cut government expenditure and we have not been able to get meaningful investment."

A Standard Chartered Bank report on Zimbabwe predicts "a strong rebound [in 1994] from the 1992 drought, with real per capita incomes rising for the first time since 1991." Government growth forecasts for this year are five percent, a target the World Bank believes is attainable. But in reducing government expenditure, subsidies have been removed, and prices have risen across the board, from fuel to food. The cost of the staple maize, following improved prices to farmers, is up by half, but wages have remained unchanged. Zimbabwe's unemployment rate is 40 percent. With 200,000 school leavers entering the job market each year, only 30,000 can be absorbed annually into the formal employment sector.

"The program has been a dismal failure so far, and prospects for its success are very slim," says Tapiwa Mashakada, chief economist of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. "We should shelve the program and reintroduce subsidies and social security so that human suffering is reduced." He maintains that the measure of SAP success should be living conditions, and that "ordinary people now associate the program with poverty and misery."

In Tanzania, another country that got a pat on the back from the World Bank, the consensus is that the reforms have been generally successful, on paper. Measured in terms of GDP, domestic investments, and reduction of the inflation rate, "there has been a marked improvement," says Daniel Ngowi, an economist with the US International Development Agency. Tanzania's economy grew from 0.3 percent in 1985 to an average of four percent in 1992, while population growth

averaged 3.8 percent per annum, he notes. While inflation has dropped from about 32 percent in 1985 to about 22 percent in 1993, officials say more has to be done to alleviate the effects on low-income earners, particularly those in the rural areas.

But government deficits remain a millstone, as the east African nation is heavily dependent on dwindling sources of foreign aid. And on the street, there are few signs of the triumphs reflected in the statistics.

After seven years of SAP-inspired austerity in Nigeria, the approach is not popular. Asked, civil servant Mike Osundare replied, "what have we ordinary Nigerians gained from SAP but suffering, unemployment and a high cost of living, while the pockets of people in high positions are swollen with ill-gotten foreign exchange?" Last January, in a policy change, the government reinstituted foreign-exchange regulation, and warned donors of development aid that it would only service the debt it could afford.

But economists point out that part of the problem with the Nigerian program was mismanagement and corruption. "Policies are no more than instruments of governance. For them to have the intended impact, the policy formulators and administrators must be seen to be above board," says Yakubu Shehu, managing director of Bank of the North. "SAP has failed principally, not because of the much claimed sharp practices in the money and foreign exchange markets, but because of lack of commitment and sincerity of purpose on the part of government," notes Erastus Akingbola, a merchant bank chief executive.

In Zambia, free-marketeer Frederick Chiluba was elected president in 1991, but according to the Zambia Association of Manufacturers, wholesale liberalisation has done more harm than good. Scores of companies have been driven into bankruptcy over the past two years as a direct result of the reform program.

A credit squeeze aimed at controlling inflation, high interest rates (up to 140 percent for most of last year), and external competition threaten the existence of scores more. According to Farmers Union spokesman Robert Hudson, at least 210 of the country's approximately 700 large-scale farming enterprises could close in the next few months as the government buys cheaper foreign maize.

Adapted from material supplied by IPS, Rome.

Southern NGOs Want Closer Look at World Bank



Photo: Jakob Lundén

Southern nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) who argue that the World Bank's harsh policies are breaking the backs of the poor are proposing to establish a permanent secretariat in Washington to scrutinise its activities. The plan comes in the wake of a challenge to the bank by 70 NGOs from 18 countries to completely rethink some of its most basic policies in order to alleviate poverty and hunger worldwide. Their message was delivered at a bank-sponsored conference on hunger late last year.

At issue are structural adjustment policies the bank administers to debtor nations—austerity tests designed to cut government budgets, open the economy to imports and investment, and promote exports, particularly in the agricultural sector. NGOs, particularly in poor countries, say the bank measures hit the poor the hardest, causing rising unemployment and deteriorating social services.

However, NGOs were encouraged when World Bank President Lewis Preston told a press conference in November that structural adjustment is "a little bit like cancer—the chemotherapy is painful." What is important, he added, is to "recognise the social costs." He and other bank officials also highlighted the need to expand the participation of the poor in development efforts, through increased access to credit, land, and services.

Some other bank officials maintain a hard line. Shahid Husain, the bank's vice president for Latin America and the Caribbean, says: "We are proud of our record. The condition of the poor would have been

much, much worse" without the structural-adjustment measures.

But Ismail Serageldin, vice president for environmentally sustainable development, said the bank now fully recognises the importance of "grassroots action" in reducing poverty, and hopes to intensify its dialogue with NGOs.

Athenton Martin, director of the Dominica-based Development Institute, says he remains "healthily skeptical" about these and other signals, but that "there is an opening" in them. "I believe that we've finally got the bank to publicly admit that its policies are not working and have hurt poor people," he observes.

Martin said Southern groups have raised the question of their own secretariat in the past, out of both frustration with bank policies and dissatisfaction with Northern NGOs. "The bank itself was obviously not committed to [the idea]—and we still have to see if there is a commitment." And, "with few exceptions, we have not been able to depend upon the Northern NGOs to follow up aggressively our agenda here in Washington." Martin says the Southern secretariat would work closely with only those counterparts in the North which represent similar interests. He says independent funding for the secretariat is being sought so "there will be no possible conflict of interest, no possible compromising of the strength with which we need to represent our interests."

Yvette Collymore

Adapted from material provided by IPS, Rome.

NEWS

US Ups Latin American Aid: The United States is proposing to spend 828.5 million US dollars on aid to Latin America in the 1995 budget year, up 100 million from the current amount, but down from the 1.9 billion allocated in 1990.

More For Asian Social Projects: The Asian Development Bank has decided to put more money into social infrastructure projects related to health, education, and population. According to Linda Tsao Yang, the bank's executive director, its goal is that 50 percent of the total number of its loans go for such projects. (The current rate is about 25 percent.) According to bank figures, it approved 5.3 billion US dollars in new loans and investments in 1993, up 3.2 percent from 1992. The top borrowers were Indonesia (1.3 billion) and China (1.0).

New Positions

The worldwide Anglican Communion has a new UN observer, **James Otley**, Anglican bishop of Panama. He succeeds **Paul Reeves**, former Anglican archbishop and later governor-general (representative of the monarch) in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Roger Williamson, LPI's first director, is the new international affairs officer of the [Anglican] Church of England. In mid-July, he succeeded the retiring **Pamela Gruber** as assistant secretary (international affairs) in the Church of England's Board for Social Responsibility.

Besides information from LPI staff and primary documents, sources of news in LPR include:

EPS (Ecumenical Press Service)
BP 2100, CH-1211 Genève 2


IPS (Inter Press Service)
via Panisperna 207, I-00184 Roma

Peace Media Service
Kanisstraat 5, NL-1811-GJ Alkmaar

Conference of European Churches
BP 2100, CH-1211 Genève 2

Middle East Council of Churches
Box 4259, Limassol (Cyprus)

Lutheran World Federation
BP 2100, CH-1211 Genève 2



Amerasian children/ Photo: Church of Sweden AV Service

The Philippines: Aftermath of US Withdrawal

The United States left its Subic naval base in the Philippines late last year with great fanfare, two turnover ceremonies, and the dramatic departure of a US aircraft carrier in port for the final two weeks of US control. (The carrier went on to Okinawa.) Simultaneously, however, another agreement was being speedily worked out to give US military forces continued access not only to Subic but also to 22 other ports throughout the country—including commercial repair and maintenance work, R&R visits by US forces, and joint US-Philippine military exercises. In response to opposition to the terms, the terminology was revised. Rather than a “new agreement” it was said to be a “cooperative arrangement” for commercial access based on the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. (It has no termination date; it provides for mutual defense, but says nothing specific about military access.) Most importantly, as a “cooperative arrangement” it requires the approval of neither the Philippine nor the US Senate.

During the era of US bases, joint military exercises were conducted in the area of some of them. With the continued access agreement, these war games could potentially be held anywhere in the country, which could enable greater direct US involvement in operations against anti-government forces.

Conversion: For Whom?

While the US military is certainly not leaving the Philippines, its pullout from

the major bases such as Subic and Clark is changing the surrounding areas. In both cases, conversion to a nonmilitary economy has been slow to almost nonexistent. The combination of base pullout and the Pinatubo volcanic eruption peeled off the onion skin-thick façade of good times and economic well-being that had covered Olongapo City and Angeles City. Mount Pinatubo changed everything quite suddenly in Angeles, spewing ash all over and sending the US military running. Displaced people continue to live in tent cities in and around Angeles. Construction on the major bridge that collapsed during the eruption has only recently been completed. Ash in the air and on the ground and volcanic mudslides during rainy season are a perpetual problem.

There is widespread speculation that Philippine President Fidel Ramos delayed implementation of the conversion law at Clark because he was entertaining a proposal made by the Philippine air force to use Clark as a military base. The air force wanted the entire area (on grounds that, for security reasons, the base cannot be split for both military and civilian use).

Ramos says the eruption caused the delay in implementation. And indeed, there are major problems due to Pinatubo which make Clark unattractive to foreign investors. The field will be unusable for an estimated five years. This is because ash destroys engines and the runway has been extensively damaged by volcanic mudflows which threaten the air field every typhoon season. The local govern-

ment, however, is opposed to the military plan; it supports a plan for a special economic zone.

The view from the people on what to do with the base areas is quite different. Two nongovernmental organisations addressing the problems of marginalised groups—CLASP and UGNAN—advocate the immediate use of Clark as a resettlement area and productivity centre for Pinatubo victims. They want the land to be used for small-scale agriculture and micro-industries. They advocate using idle reverted lands for agriculture and reforestation.

Unlike the Clark Development Authority, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) has been activated, with appointments and finances. Ramos appointed Olongapo City Mayor Richard Gordon to chair SBMA (even though it is unconstitutional for an elected official to also hold an appointed post). Signs and billboards appeared all over the city boosting the SBMA plan for a special economic and free-port zone: “Tough times are coming. Tough times don’t last, but tough people do,” read one. “We are tough people and we will prevail. Fight on Olongapo. Fight for a free port.” It was signed, “Dick and Kate Gordon.” The mayor regularly asserts that there is a multitude of foreign investors interested in the free port, especially Taiwanese (who reportedly want to set up garment factories in Olongapo). The first foreign investor to sign an agreement was an Australian/Filipino company. The only other specific

commitment was for two restaurants—Chinese and Western. Pending more investors, Gordon did his best to keep the people of Olongapo anticipating jobs in factories, but also in his debt and under his control (as they are the primary source of cheap labor for the zone). Gordon has installed a volunteer system whereby people, primarily from poor areas of the city, volunteer to guard the buildings inside the base area with no pay, but with the promise of first priority in hiring when factories are set up.

People from Pag-asa, the urban poor area where the Subic base garbage dump used to be, volunteered, even though they don’t really believe the promises of jobs. They did so for two reasons—the outside chance the promise would be fulfilled and, the possibility that Gordon might harass or even demolish their community if they didn’t. The main fear of Pag-asa people is that if tourism is pushed in Olongapo, as is also planned, there will be more demolition attempts, because Pag-

asa is considered an eyesore. Consequently, the residents have been spending time trying to improve their community by building canals, planting flowers and making sure that no one dumps garbage in the creek. Pinatubo also helped them improve the appearance of their community, by dumping enough sand to hide the remnants of the old garbage dump. The people hope to defend their community on the basis of national legislation that says squatters and tenants cannot be forced to leave if they have improved the appearance of and otherwise developed their living area.

Loss of jobs for the estimated 40,000 base workers was often cited as the major area of concern as the bases pulled out. There are about 22,000 ex-Subic and about 18,000 ex-Clark base workers. Forty million Philippine pesos were set aside by the government as financial assistance for them. They were given severance pay by the US military, and promised priority in hiring when conversion is im-

plemented. However, the government money may or may not reach them.

The loss of jobs for the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 prostitutes in Olongapo and Angeles is generally mentioned only in passing, with little concern about or attention to what may happen to them. They have not received severance pay or government financial assistance. They have no voice in the conversion plans. Women from the base areas are moving, not only to clubs elsewhere in the Philippines, but also to clubs in Japan. Others have become domestic helpers in the Philippines or overseas (for example, in Hong Kong, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait).

This item is adapted from material from Pacific News Bulletin (Box 489, Petersham NSW 2049, Australia). In LPI Research Report #12, Closing US Military Bases in the Philippines, by Ed Garcia explores some of the issues related to the base closures. See the back cover of this LPR for information about ordering.

Four Myths on Development Communication

The use in the United States of documentaries and feature films from developing countries can move US public opinion and decision makers towards greater support for Third World countries. Effective use of such material is based on the same principles which hold for effective development communication in the Third World—a flexible approach targeting specific groups which takes the audience’s interests and needs into account without sacrificing overall objectives.

Third World Television Exchange is managed by a small board of directors with ties to strategic US institutions such as the US government, public broadcasting, foundations, and independent productions. An international advisory council consisting primarily of area experts from developing countries provides policy recommendations.

Principal objectives of TWTE are to: (1) secure access to expanding US media markets for Third World productions, (2) influence the learning process of select target audiences, and (3) provide relevant information to people in the decision-making process.

To do this, TWTE: (1) identifies through research, issue-related interests of specific, narrow audience groups, (2) arranges for screenings for buyers and programmers from US public and cable

television, and nontheatrical film and home video makers,

(3) holds screenings for decision makers and/or staff of groups such as the World Bank, Carnegie Council on International Relations, and the staff association of the US Congress, (4) packages issue-oriented productions from developing countries for educational publishers such as Macmillan, and (5) ensures that each screening is combined with relevant interpersonal communication about the issue (through workshops, etc.).

Research on this approach towards development communication in the United States, and seven years of experience shows that the following myths have little if any validity:

1) The myth that there are no high quality television, video and film productions from developing countries. The contrary is correct, as evidenced by the growing number of prizes received by film and video makers from developing countries and the dramatic improvement in the quality of Third World television, made possible by the new technologies and better training.

2) The myth that there is no audience for such productions in the United States. The movement towards a multicultural society, the cosmopolitan orientation of city-based, upper-middle-class groups,

and the recognition that we live in an interdependent world has created a small but significant (and growing) audience for such productions.

3) The myth that there is no interest by programmers and buyers in these productions. Over the last years, representatives from most education-oriented public and cable television channels and the home video and nontheatrical markets have participated in TWTE screenings, and acquired productions. But access to these productions has to be facilitated, as most programmers and buyers have no time, and, sometimes, no funds to search for productions in developing countries. The programs have to be brought to them.

4) The myth that productions sponsored by international organizations such as the European Union, UNICEF, UNDP, UNTV, etc. are irrelevant and/or devoid of interest. Documentary productions from these agencies submitted for the 1993 TWTE screening Days proved to be as good, and sometimes superior to, those submitted by independent film makers.

Claus Mueller

Claus Mueller heads nonprofit Third World Television Exchange. This is excerpted from material he prepared for a conference last November at the Free University of Berlin.

Fundamentalism in the Middle East & Africa

The February massacre of dozens of worshippers at a mosque in Hebron, in Israeli-occupied territory, turned the spotlight on a Jewish form of religious fundamentalism. The mass murderer, Baruch Goldstein, was a US-born member of the Kach movement, a xenophobic, anti-Arab party banned from the Israeli parliament. Kach advocates the expulsion of all Palestinians in the occupied territories, as well as Arabs with Israeli citizenship who live within the pre-1967 Israeli borders.

Goldstein was eventually overpowered and beaten to death by survivors in the mosque. At his funeral, he was eulogised by Rabbi Yaacov Perrin as "a holy man, a hero, and a righteous man." The rabbi said "one million Arabs are not worth a Jewish fingernail."

After the massacre, the Israeli government took some action against extremist settlers, but representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation said they were insufficient.

In other parts of the Middle East and Africa recently, there have been other, less publicised, developments on the fundamentalist front.

Fundamentalist Politics

In Turkey, an estimated 30,000 people—mostly students and government employees—rallied in Istanbul in February to denounce Islamic fundamentalism and support the principles of Kemal Ataturk, the father of the secular Turkish republic which succeeded the Ottoman empire after World War I.

The rally was televised, and most of the print media joined in denunciations of Islamic fundamentalists and Kurdish nationalists as "enemies of the republic." Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and Deputy Prime Minister Murat Karayalcin addressed the crowd, urging it to support Ataturk's vision.

Turkish opinion polls indicate that the Islamic Welfare party is attracting the support of about a quarter of the electorate. It advocates a "just order" in Turkey based on Islamic law.

In Egypt, a more intense observance of Ramadan this year, the monthlong Islamic fast which began this year in mid-February, is one sign of growing fundamentalist influence there. Observes Mohammed Sid Ahmed, a founder of the Cairo-based Al Ahram Centre for Political



Photo: Church of Sweden AV Service

and Strategic Studies, "Islam is a frame of reference that is taking over society. A barometer for this is the increased use of the veil for women, and attendance at mosques."

One group actively campaigning for a theocratic Islamic state is called Al Gamaa al Islamiya. Last year, it warned Western tourists to leave the country, or risk being killed. In March, a German tourist was killed in one of several attacks in recent months on Nile cruises and tourist trains in the Assiut region of southern Egypt. (After people from the United Kingdom, the largest group of tourists to Egypt come from Germany.) Many cruise companies have stopped sailing the 17-day route between Cairo and Aswan that passes through Assiut.

Egyptian tourism officials say the number of tourists in Egypt last year was 2.5 million, down 22 percent from the 3.2 million in 1992. They estimate 1993 tourism revenue at 1.3 billion US dollars, 0.8 billion less than the previous year.

The Egyptian information ministry has increased tv and radio airtime for religious programs with a moderate approach. However, some observers think this will only make matters worse. Says Hussein Ahmed Amin, a prominent Egyptian writer on Islamic affairs, "This was a mistake. Once you lay this base for religion, with the economic conditions we have, it is a very easy step from moderation to extremism." He calls instead for a concerted government effort to tackle deep economic, social, and political problems. The Egyptian government is also determined to maintain the constitutional ban on political parties based on religion.

Among other things, this makes the Muslim Brotherhood party illegal.

In Algeria, the new president, Liamine Zeroual, says he is committed to a scrupulous respect for the law. The country has been in political turmoil since early 1992, after the theocratic Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won an overwhelming majority in the first round of voting in the country's first multi-party elections. The second round was then cancelled, FIS banned, and its leaders arrested.

Since then, about 3000 people have been killed in violence related to the crackdown, including many civilians, about 30 foreigners, and about 10 journalists. At one time during the state of emergency that was declared, 12,000 people were detained in connection with it. That number had dropped by early this year to about 500.

In Senegal, following major street battles in Dakar in February, President Abdou Diouf banned a vocal Islamic fundamentalist movement, Moustarchidia Wal Moustarchidati. Young Senegalese, frustrated by poverty and unemployment, are reportedly turning to a radical version of Islam. The government is backed by more conventional Muslim groups.

LPI publications which touch on fundamentalism include reports and papers written or edited by Roger Williamson: Images of the End & Christian Theology; Noah's Ark & the Nuclear Inferno; The End in Sight? Images of the End & Threat to Human Survival; Religious Fundamentalism as a Threat to Peace: Two Studies. See the back cover of this LPR for information about ordering.

Churches Search for a New Order of Peace

The changes in the world after 1989 have profound implications for our articulation of peace and our praxis of peace-building. The sequence of events need not be reviewed in detail, but some elements should be underlined. Over against a eurocentric view of the fundamental changes which have taken place, it must be kept in mind very clearly that the year 1989-90 seems to constitute one of those epochal years with world-wide implications.

The significant events, therefore, do not only constitute the collapse of the systems of state socialism in Eastern Europe, but also the beginning of the end of apartheid in South Africa, which has meanwhile been sealed, the new constellation in Central America, but equally the suppression of the democracy movement in the People's Republic of China.

The changes in Europe have found their significant expression in the "Charter for a New Europe" which was adopted at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris in November 1990. This was accompanied by the initiation by the first-ever process of genuine disarmament which went far beyond the traditional agreements about arms control.

In many other parts of the world, these changes found expression in determined moves towards democratization, and globally the changed role of the United Nations is the visible fruit of the initiation of a new phase of international relations.

The end of the Cold War meant an end of the situation of bipolar confrontation which had characterized not only the European and North Atlantic political scene for several decades, but which had been the framework for international politics as a whole. The question of an international order of peace is no longer the object only of theoretical discussion, but has moved into the centre of international politics.

However, the Gulf War, following only shortly after the epochal changes, revealed clearly that the move from confrontation to cooperation is neither automatic nor without ambiguity. The debate about the Gulf War declaration at the Seventh Assembly of the WCC in Canberra demonstrated that the churches are not yet in a position to give a coherent answer to the question of how international conflicts can and should be resolved in ways which

promote peace with justice. This dilemma has been exacerbated by the most recent violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in several African countries. The resurgence of nationalism, the experience of genocidal violence and of ethnic cleansing and the inability of the United Nations to live up to its role of a peacekeeping instrument, have created a situation of

...the churches are not yet in a position to give a coherent answer to the question of how international conflicts can and should be resolved in ways which promote peace with justice.

uncertainty and confusion. There is no clarity either politically or ethically about the definition of the problems and consequently about appropriate solutions.

What is most disconcerting is the fact that in many of these conflicts national identity, ethnicity and religious loyalty have begun to form an explosive mix which seems to make the problems almost insoluble. While it is true that only few of the post-Cold War conflicts are being fought principally for religious reasons, it is equally true that religious loyalties have been instrumentalized and manipulated for political ends and the respective religious communities, whether Christian, Muslim or otherwise, have largely been unable to defend themselves against this perversion of their true integrity. This fact certainly underlines that religious communities, the Christian churches included, are as much part of the problem as they might be able to contribute to its solution.

The rapid change of the international climate in the years following 1989 reminds one of a similar change sixty years ago. The high expectation of the late 1920s symbolized by the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the corresponding ecumenical Eisenach-Avignon Declaration, were disillusioned with the emergence of fascism,

Stalinism and national socialism. The world economic crisis of 1929ff. initiated the change of events which finally led to the Second World War. While historical analogies should be treated with caution, the fragility of the international order at the present moment calls for an even more determined Christian witness in the service of peace with justice.

Ecumenically, the years 1989-90 saw the culmination of the process for Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation. While the subsequent events have largely overshadowed the insights and convictions formulated in the course of this process, the ecumenical movement cannot go back behind the broad consensus reached during these years with the full participation of the Roman Catholic Church. Four basic convictions can be highlighted which should continue to serve as guidelines for our present reflection.

1. War is no longer a legitimate means of inter-state politics. Modern wars which are conducted with weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction have to be rejected and outlawed as a crime against humanity, using the ethical criteria of the just war doctrine.

2. Justice and peace are inseparably related. Peace is not only the absence of war and the security of people is constantly threatened by conditions of structural injustice. Maintaining and building peace is a process which needs to be supported by the constant effort to broaden the reign of justice and the respect of human rights. The classical doctrine of the just war which aimed at the prevention or limitation of war has to be replaced today by the concept of a just peace. War can no longer be an act of justice.

3. Security is not only a military problem referring to the maintenance of order and the integrity of the state. What is at stake is the possibility of human life in security. Such security can only be maintained in cooperative ways as common security. Cooperative systems of security on a regional basis must, therefore, be considered as a decisive element in a new international order of peace.

4. The long-term witness of the historic peace churches for nonviolence receives new relevance in the present situation. It formulates the most basic challenge to the prevailing culture of violence and is, therefore, no longer a

spectable but idealistic and apolitical position, but points towards the need to develop a new form of political reason which we have to learn if humanity is to survive.

These convictions which appeared to be supported by a broad consensus only four or five years ago, suddenly seemed to be out of place in a situation where increasingly war is again accepted as a normal and legitimate means of politics. Aggression, it is argued, can only be stopped by force and the churches are again expected to support the use of military force for the defence of the international order and basic humanitarian principles, or should at least refrain from open criticism. The doctrine of the just war is again being used to offer legitimation for "humanitarian intervention," and old enemy images which seemed to be overcome reappear in a new disguise. The decisive question is whether we respond to the uncertainties and turbulences of the present situation on the basis of the patterns of reaction formed during decades of confrontation, or whether we can understand the present situation as a phase of transition and reorientation. For the first time in sixty years, the establishment of a new international order of peace supported by new visions and a new praxis has become possible, but at the same time has become an urgent necessity.

The Churches' Role in Peace-Building

Christians and the churches live by the promise of a new heaven and a new earth in which justice prevails. The Old Testament concept of shalom embraces the dimensions of peace, justice and of the integrity of creation. The biblical injunction to the followers of Christ to be peacemakers and agents of reconciliation acquires new urgency in a situation of the breaking down of communities and the spread of a culture of violence. The World Convocation on JPIC in Seoul 1990 called for the development of a culture of active nonviolence which is life-producing and is not a withdrawal from situations of violence or oppression, but is a way to work for justice and liberation. The convocation also made a commitment "to practice nonviolence in all our personal relationships, to work for the banning of war as a legally recognized means of resolving conflict, to press governments for the establishment of an international legal order of peacemaking." As a background paper on "Overcoming the Spirit, Logic and Practice of War" presented at the Cen-



Mass in Sudan / Photo: Heldur Jann Netocny

tral Committee of the WCC in Johannesburg, January 1994, said: "Clearly, there is a need to confront and overcome the 'spirit, logic and practice of war' and to develop new theological approaches, consonant with the teachings of Christ, which start not with war and move to peace, but with the need for justice. This may indeed be a time when the churches, together, should face the challenge to give up any theological or moral justification for the use of military power, whether in war or as a part of security systems based on the notion of military deterrence, and to become a koinonia dedicated to the pursuit of a just peace."

Many of the conflicts in today's world arise from situations of injustice, e.g. the ever-growing gap between rich and poor (both within and between states), the struggle for power, resurgent racism and xenophobia, violence against women and children, the careless use of the world's resources, the proliferation of the arms trade, while millions are dying of malnutrition and disease. Many conflicts also spring from old disputes which had been repressed during the period of global confrontation, i.e. tensions between ethnic, national, religious, linguistic and racial groups. In many of these situations, the attempt to resolve the conflict by the resort to violence is an indication that even the most basic form of communication and listening to one another has broken down. Many of the present conflicts would not have taken the outrageously violent forms had it not been for the abundant availability of increasingly sophisticated and expensive weaponry and the indoctrination of the military by the ideology of national security.

Obviously, peacemaking is a complex task and the contribution of Christians and churches should be approached with modest claims. Compared to the situation sixty years ago, the churches worldwide have

only limited power in influencing political decision-making. The historic churches, in particular of Protestant and Orthodox traditions, find themselves caught in the dilemma of divided loyalty to their people and country and to the worldwide body of Christ. I would like to point to three forms in which the churches can contribute to the task of peace-building: supporting a fundamental change of consciousness, building networks of relationships and encouraging specific initiatives in the service of peace and nonviolent resolution of conflict.

Important as such initiatives aiming at the minimization or the resolution of conflicts at an early stage are, in the majority of cases the churches and Christian communities find themselves caught in the dynamics of violent conflicts. The experiences of recent years point to one important form of the Christian ministry of reconciliation, i.e. the service to people who are emotionally and psychologically traumatized by war, violence and torture. The centres assisting women in the former Yugoslavia who have been victims of rape, the Trauma Centre in Cape Town, and similar initiatives for children who have been exposed to atrocities often in their immediate family, show the urgent need of spiritual, pastoral and psychological support for the victims of war and violence. These wounds often take far longer to heal than the physical wounds, but it is in these efforts of healing that the seeds of future reconciliation are being laid.

To promote reconciliation remains the ongoing task even after the hostilities in conflict situations have ceased. Reconciliation presupposes the readiness to move from open and often violent confrontation to dialogue. This transition is the most critical phase in the process of peacemaking. Many examples of recent years have shown that the churches can make a sig-

nificant contribution in preparing the way for a constructive communication between the parties in conflict.

In the transition phase in Central and Eastern Europe, the model of the "round table" has developed in order to bring all political and civic groups together to consider the future of the society. In many instances, church representatives have been called upon to moderate such round tables. In several African countries, efforts at reconciliation have revived traditional forms of consensus formation and the role of the elders in extended families or tribes for the resolution of conflict.

These examples stand for the effort to transform the confrontational resolution of conflict in terms of victory and defeat in the direction of cooperative processes which guarantee equal participation for all actual and potential parties in the conflict. The churches have the old tradition of conciliar resolution of conflict which provides a wealth of experience which

should be applied in the social and political arena.

Any active and authentic contribution by churches to the tasks of building peace, justice and reconciliation pre-suppose their readiness to admit their own failure, responsibility and guilt in order to break out of the vicious circle of enmity and prejudice. This is all the more important in view of the tendency to fall back into the old patterns of matching up historical injustice and to misuse the churches for the legitimization of ethnic and national power claims. Fortunately, there are examples where the churches have played a leading role in moving towards a culture of peace, especially in South Africa, but often enough the churches, especially where they are closely linked to and identified with nations' aspirations, have been part of the problem. How best can we continually affirm that our first allegiance is to Jesus Christ and to all God's people, refusing the nationalism which so fre-

quently breeds xenophobia, racism and discrimination of many kinds? Those who have been victims can themselves become oppressors.

The call to be reconciled is a call to all of us. Here in Northern Ireland, as in so many parts of the world represented at this gathering, we know that it is an immensely difficult task. Jesus' words still challenge us, but with the challenge is the promise: "Peace I leave with you; my peace I give to you. I do not give to you as the world gives. Do not let your hearts be troubled, and do not let them be afraid" (John 14:27).

This paper was presented by Konrad Raiser, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, at the WWW consultation in June at Corrymeela, Northern Ireland on building a culture of peace. He has also contributed to the LPI publication Justice & Peace: Strategies & Stumbling Blocks. See the back cover of LPR for information about ordering.

Church Mediation Efforts in Russian Coup

The Russian Orthodox Church is the main body of believers in Russia. Texts related to the role of its leadership during the failed Russian coup of October 1993 are now available (in German and French) from the Conference of European Churches in Geneva. (Earlier, ROC itself published the texts in the Russian original.) Here is a reflection, by a veteran observer of Russian Orthodoxy, on the attempts of those church leaders to play a mediating and conciliating role during that crisis.



Patriarch Alexei II / Photo: Peter Williams/WCC

In responses from correspondents in Moscow about the official position taken by the Russian Orthodox Church during the bloody events of the coup, one could read the view: 'The church is keeping its hands clean.' Such a media judgment is more a reflection of prejudice than of fact, and it contains at least a double contradiction. First, it is inconsistent with the untrue (and above all Western) accusations previously directed against Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alexei II that he was with Russian President Boris Yeltsin attempting to reconstruct an unholy alliance between throne and altar. And it is even less consistent with the active attempts at conciliation by the patriarch and two senior metropolitans (Juvenaly and Kyril).

Other criticisms, both in Russia and abroad, do admit the hardly disputable fact of conciliation activities, but nonetheless reproach the patriarch for taking up the cause of one side, or for being used by one side, or both, for the purpose of gaining time. The impartial observer, however, is hardly able to recognize in this criticism the specific role of the patriarch and the metropolitans, but sees rather the dilemma inherent in any attempt at conciliation in similar difficult situations. (Compare, for

example, on another plane, the strong criticisms directed at the mediators in the former Yugoslavia.)

What might, in fact, be remarkable is precisely that in his firm intention to engage in conciliation the patriarch consciously became involved in inevitable ambiguity, instead of remaining aloof in splendid isolation.

From a Western standpoint it is even easier to arrive at a misinterpretation of the conciliation role of the Russian Orthodox Church for two reasons. The West's clear preference for Yeltsin makes any attempt at conciliation (which of necessity must result in compromise) and the conciliator suspect from the outset. Moreover, observers who favor Yeltsin often have no understanding of the strength of the opposition to him in Russia as a whole. This wishful thinking about the Russian situation becomes even more removed from reality if there is a dualistic setting of a 'democratic Yeltsin' over against an undifferentiated group of alleged 'slavophiles'—former communists, monarchists, neofascists and the Russian Orthodox Church!

An approach to a more accurate, differentiated picture of the political scene which is closer to reality emerges if people, instead of engaging in wishful thinking, become open to the realization that neither of the two sides has an adequate awareness or experience of democracy and that both sides are in principle capable of moving in either direction—towards democracy or dictatorship (as are, incidentally, even the Western democracies, as, for example, has again become more apparent last year in Germany).

Here, however, the position and role of the Russian Orthodox Church and especially of the patriarch, is of particular interest, as that church and its leadership cannot be simply assigned to one side or the other (even though, on the basis of particular experiences, that is being constantly inferred of the whole church in an absolute way). It is important to note that within the Russian Orthodox Church there are to be found the most disparate groupings, from ultra-conservatives to radical reformers, from monarchists to democrats, from slavophiles to westerners, who will, after a fashion, remain together, provided that the leadership does not take up a position on one side or the other.

It is precisely in that context of internal and external conciliation that one should understand the firm step taken by the bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church not

to allow party political disputes to lead to division in parishes. Clergy are forbidden to engage in professional political activity, under pain of dismissal.

Precisely in the variety of the many groupings within it the Russian Orthodox Church displays, on the one hand, a somewhat fragile structure which is not only threatened with schism but is actually afflicted by it. But, on the other hand, Patriarch Alexy is thoughtfully and energetically attempting to use this perceived need within the church as an opportunity to contribute to conciliation within the church and beyond it in political and social life.

In all this Patriarch Alexy is regarded by most Western observers far too hastily and forgetfully as 'only' the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and his actions are judged and analyzed from that standpoint alone. Westerners, however, could remember much better than Russians that the patriarch also held office over many years until 1992 as president of the Conference of European Churches (CEC), that in that capacity he worked closely together in mutual understanding with Carlo Maria Martini, the Roman Catholic cardinal archbishop of Milan and president, until 1993, of CCEE (the Council of European conferences of Roman Catholic bishops), and that he presided over the European Ecumenical Assembly on Peace with Justice in Basel in 1989.

During his time as CEC president, he strongly supported ecumenical efforts on behalf of justice, peace, and the integrity of creation (JPIC). A particular feature of his current work is his appeal for nonviolence and tolerance, and I regard his efforts for conciliation as clearly those of a trailblazer, arising out of the situation of a new phase of 'reconciliation' in the JPIC movement. This movement for reconciliation in justice and peace is today attempting to make headway in Russia in a quite fundamental way, and often under much more difficult conditions there than in central and western Europe (4).

The understanding out of his own experience that ecumenism belongs to the innermost essence of his own church is and remains quite essential for Patriarch Alexy (85). He upholds that position precisely in face of all the nonecumenism and anticumenism that can today be detected on all sides in considerable measure. As I see it, the fierce debates over the new law on religious freedom in Russia do not go to the heart of the matter. It is not the desire of the Russian Orthodox Church to be the

dominant church once again. Rather, a large part of the dispute arises out of the bitter contemporary experience of the Russian Orthodox Church that its expression of Christianity and the church is being covertly or openly rejected by many of the native and foreign Protestant and Roman Catholic 'missionaries' and 'evangelists,' even though official voices may deny it.

Nonetheless, in the attempt at conciliation made by the Russian Orthodox Church during the October coup, clear efforts were being made, certainly not to act as the Russian state church but to involve interfaith and interconfessional elements in the highly difficult work for conciliation and peace. This should not be overlooked. Here it is highly instructive to examine in detail the progress of the conciliation negotiations and their documentation by the Russian Orthodox Church.

For example, in the conversations with representatives of the 'subjects of the Federation' the wish was expressed 'to include in the second phase of the negotiations representatives of the intelligentsia, industrialists and entrepreneurs, trade unions, landowners, Muslim leaders and representatives of other religious communities. The [Russian Orthodox] Church External Affairs Office took immediate steps to clarify how representatives of the above mentioned groups could be included in the process of negotiation.'

Unfortunately, this second stage of the negotiations was not reached. Their aim was, after the confrontation at the White House ended, to make a contribution to the further political settlement of the conflict.

Here, too, it becomes clear that in the specific Russian conditions the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church attaches great practical importance to peaceful co-existence and equality with Islam for reducing tension in the situation in Russia and beyond.

Thus, the efforts at conciliation during the October coup, which left the patriarch totally exhausted, are not to be seen as a first attempt at conciliation, which then failed, but rather as a continuation of a whole series of highly difficult attempts at conciliation of that sort. Thus, to take only one example, Patriarch Alexy had already been actively involved for a long time in the efforts at conciliation between the Muslim community in Azerbaijan and the Armenian Apostolic Church. Such efforts form the background to the situation in

which the Russian Orthodox Church is attempting to be engaged in conciliation today.

Moreover, the division existing in Russian Orthodoxy itself between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia was also reflected in the dramatic events in Moscow in October 1993. The highly renowned and revered icon of the Virgin of Vladimir, a sacred object common to all Russian Orthodox, was brought out of the Tretchykov Gallery, where Lenin had banished it from the Uspensky Church in the Kremlin, into the patriarch's Cathedral of the Epiphany for worship on Sunday 3 October 1993. In the presence of that sacred object, which is of immense historical and spiritual significance for Russian Orthodoxy as a whole, Metropolitan Juve-

naly in a short homily called on all Russian Orthodox people in schism to regard this moment of prayer before the Virgin of Vladimir as a 'moment of reconciliation with the Russian church and the most holy patriarch.'

Although after 3 October 1993 the Russian Orthodox Church's offer of conciliation was no longer of any use to the two conflicting parties, it is nonetheless worthwhile to bear in mind the appeal of the patriarch and other bishops as a leitmotif for the future of Russia: 'It is now necessary to return as quickly as possible to peaceful living, to the protection of human rights and civil freedoms, to the establishment of lawful rule in our land. All conflicts must cease and a firm foundation must be laid for the life of our fatherland.'

The conflicts in Russia have not come to an end with the failed coup of October 1993. It is possible, sad to say, that that struggle was only an opening scene, a bloody signal of what is to come for the whole vast land with its centripetal and centrifugal forces. In that case, and in any case, the Russian Orthodox Church's attempt at conciliation in the coup of October 1993 is also an essential first step and an initial highly noteworthy move by the Russian Orthodox Church into a new and essential area of activity.

Hermann Goltz

Translated from the German by Anthony Coates, and then adapted for publication here.

Serbs Attempt to Unite Orthodox States




Photo: Peter Williams / WCC

A new twist in the ties between Serbia and Russia was brought home a few months ago when Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic visited the headquarters of the Russian Orthodox Church, his first stop on arriving in Moscow. Church sources said Karadzic's unexpected stop, during which he had talks with Kyril, the metropolitan who heads the ROC foreign relations department, surprised many, including Kyril. Though he has accused the media of painting Serbs as the aggressors in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the official ROC stance is neutrality among the contending parties.

Karadzic's visit is viewed as an attempt to forge solid links between Serbia and Russia, based on their shared Orthodox Christian identity. This common re-

ligious heritage is also a factor in a loose alliance linking those two with Greece. Traditional feelings of friendship and spiritual closeness with other Orthodox Christian peoples have been strengthened in Serbia as the ex-Yugoslav crisis has deepened. In Moscow, Alexander Bulekov, a ROC press officer, described ROC contacts with its Serb counterpart as "constant" since the conflict began.

Historically, Serbia is on the geographic boundary between the eastern and western forms of Christianity in Europe, and there is continuing and deep suspicion among many Orthodox of what they perceive as Vatican attempts to ignore the historic boundaries between spheres of influence. Serbia's renewed contact with Orthodox neighbors is largely attributed

to its increasing diplomatic isolation, with many countries of the western Christian tradition siding with mostly Roman Catholic Slovenia and Croatia in their struggles with Serbia, and the Islamic world backing the Bosnian Muslims.

The first major international meeting in Serbia following the imposition of sanctions was an informal and unofficial gathering of Eastern Orthodox Christian peoples, in Belgrade in last September.

It was attended by politicians, public figures, and religious leaders from about a dozen historically Orthodox countries (including Russia, Armenia, Greece, and Romania). Besides appealing for an end to the sanctions, it drew up and called for a revival of common bonds, cultural and economic cooperation, coordinated for-

eign policies, and mechanisms to settle disputes.

Participants especially emphasised the roles of Greece and Russia. It called on the former, a member of the European Community, to promote the Orthodox tradition within Europe. It urged the latter, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, to defend the interests of historically Orthodox countries and not permit any discrimination against them.

Nonetheless, cooperation among these countries as a group is so far not so notable. "I do not want to underestimate the role of the common Orthodox background and the historical, religious, and spiritual sentiments we share with these two nations," says Ranko Petkovic, president of the Yugoslav Association for International Law. "However, like international politics in general, support is not based on sentiment, but on common interests." He says the Russians "have a clear interest in being present in the Balkans and becoming important players in any regional crisis. On the other hand, Greece and Serbia share almost identical foreign policy positions

towards other Balkan states such as Macedonia or Turkey," says Petkovic.

For their part, the bishops of the Serbian Orthodox church has officially welcomed Russia's decision to involve itself in the Bosnian crisis, referring to Russia as "the biggest guarantor of the safety of the Serbian peoples."

While Greece has publicly welcomed Russian involvement in Bosnia, sources say it is still suspicious about a lasting Russian presence in the Balkans. "Memories of the Greek civil war when Russia supported the communists are still fresh," says a Greek diplomat in Belgrade. Referring to a Balkan visit by Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zirinovsky, the diplomat says Zirinovsky 'promised' part of Greece to Bulgaria. Moreover, it was among the first states to recognise the independence of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, a move Greece opposes.

The leading Greek Orthodox hierarch, Archbishop Serapheim of Athens, declined to take up questions about Bosnia, though a priest standing nearby, said

Greek religious sentiments mean "we feel close solidarity with our Serb and Russian brothers. We are all Orthodox and in this together."

Last February, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was given a hero's welcome by the Greek media on his visit to Athens. Kozyrev spoke of Russia's "cultural, historic, and religious sympathy with all the Balkan peoples."

Over the past months, a steady stream of clothing, food, medicine, and other relief supplies has gone from Athens to Belgrade and thence to Serb forces fighting in Bosnia. In the same period, Athens has hosted benefit concerts, art exhibitions, visits by high-ranking Serbian Orthodox clergy, and university seminars, all aimed at promoting Greek/Serb solidarity.

For a broad analysis of the roles of religion in the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia, see the LPI Research Report God With US? The Roles of Religion in Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia by Gerald Shenk. See the back cover of LPR for information about ordering.

Life & Peace INSTITUTE is looking for a new Communications Director

Life & Peace Institute is an international and ecumenical centre for peace research. It is based in Uppsala with a staff of about a dozen. It specializes in action-oriented research on South/South and South/North issues.

The LPI Communications Director is responsible for the editorial work, production and distribution of Life & Peace Review and other LPI publications and for the promotion of the institute and its publications.

The ideal applicant should have extensive experience with journalism, editing and pro-

motion, as well as wide international experience and good knowledge of academic, ecumenical and peace networks. S/he should be a native English speaker or equivalent.

Application deadline: 24 September 1994
Starting date: 1 January 1995.

Curriculum vitae with letter of application should be sent to Ulla Johansson, LPI, Box 297, S-751 05 Uppsala, Sweden.

Further information is available through Nichole Wolf, managing editor and Bernt Jonsson, director, phone (46)18-16 95 00, fax (46) 18-69 30 59.

BOOKS

To review any of the following, contact the LPR managing editor: (Quotations are from their covers.)

Dark Symbols, Obscure Signs: God, Self, and Community in the Slave Mind
Riggins Earl Jr., Orbis, Maryknoll 10545 (NY/USA), 1993, 186 pages, 19.95 US dollars, ISBN 0 88344 916 1.

An illuminating, often moving, account of the sagas, spirituals, narratives, and tales told by African slaves in their struggles to resist and overcome the dehumanizing stereotypes of slave masters. What distinguishes Earl's work is his interest in assessing the persisting importance of these primal resources for the development of African-American contributions to Christian thought.

The Tibetans—School for Survival or Submission: An Investigation of Ethnicity and Education

Katrin Goldstein-Kyaga, HLS Förlag (100 26 Stockholm), 1993, 209 pages, ISBN 91 7656 314 6.

Parallels are drawn with other ethnic groups such as the Jews, the Gypsies, and the Syrian Christians. It should be read by...

all those who are engaged in the issue of ethnic conflicts and education.

Wade in the Water: The Wisdom of the Spirituals

Arthur C. Jones, Orbis, Maryknoll, 10545 (NY/USA), 1993, 140 pages, 21.95 US dollars, ISBN 0 88344 923 4.

A richly textured, remarkably insightful rendering of the spirituals, their original settings, and their possible meanings for us today.

Whose Ministry? A Ministry of Health Care for the Year 2000

Gillian Paterson, WCC, 1211 Geneva 2 (Switzerland), 1993, 120 pages, 8.95 US dollars, ISBN 2 8254 1118 3.

The book asks how voluntary institutions stay relevant to a changing world, and what it is about institutions in general that makes them so resistant to change within themselves. It looks at ministry, especially Christian ministry, and tries to establish a model that is compatible with justice,

peace, and the integrity of creation, and all it stands for.

Candles Behind the Wall: Heroes of the Peaceful Revolution That Shattered Communism

Barbara Von Der Heydt, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids 49503 (MI/USA), 257 pages, 19.99 US dollars, ISBN 0 8028 3722 0.

Weaves together the intricate pattern of individual lives of faith with the drama of world events. The reader will be inspired, humbled, and overwhelmed.

No Longer a Secret: The Church and Violence Against Women,

Aruna Gnanadason, WCC, 1211 Geneva 2 (Switzerland), 1993, 79 pages, 6.50 US dollars, ISBN 2 8254 1098 5.

Beyond the heart-rendering stories of victims and sobering analysis of root causes, this book points to signs of hope as women and men in the church and elsewhere are beginning to struggle courageously against all forms of violence against women.

LPR is an international journal distributed in dozens of countries. As such, it seeks to avoid speaking with the voice of any particular national culture or politics. It welcomes topical articles written for intelligent but nonspecialist readers. Its articles are relatively short (2000-3000 words). If you submit something longer, we assume you want us to shorten it.

Please submit manuscripts (double-spaced!) in duplicate with a copy on diskette (noting which software you have used). Include a short professional biography of yourself. In matters of spelling, abbreviation, punctuation, etc., LPR generally follows the latest edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*.

Clearly indicate a proposed short title for your article. As LPR does not run notes or bibliographies, please keep quotations to a minimum and include any citations within the text. Designate breaks in your text, giving suggested subheads.

LPR welcomes correspondence; it publishes short letters. It also wants to inform about new books and videos; please send short reviews of about 750 words.

LPI ASSOCIATES:

Though LPI receives major funding from church and state sources, additional support from individuals and institutions is vital for its work to continue. You can help LPI work for peace and justice by enrolling as an LPI associate, in one of five categories: **Supporting** (250 Swedish kronor per calendar year any part thereof), **Contributing** (500), **Sustaining** (750), **Senior** (1000), **Director's** (1500).

Without additional charge, supporting associates receive LPR and another LPI publication of their choice. They can purchase additional LPI publications at a 30 percent discount. Comparable benefits for the other categories are: Contributing (LPR, two additional publications, 35 percent), Sustaining (LPR, *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, two additional, 40 percent), and Senior (LPR, *HAB*, two additional, 50 percent; advance information about LPI semi-

nars, to which they are welcome at their own cost).

Director's associates receive the two LPI periodicals and everything else LPI publishes, invitations to all seminars and to meet with LPI senior staff, the LPI committee, and/or the LPI international board.

To enroll as an LPI associate for the rest of 1994, send your name, address, and phone/fax numbers to the LPR managing editor. Indicate your category of associateship, and choice of publication(s) from the list on the back cover of this issue. Have your bank or post office transfer a suitable amount in Swedish kronor, following the payment instructions on the back cover.

Note to librarians and others wishing to receive all LPI publications without becoming an associate: Transfer 1300 Swedish kronor and indicate "Library" in your note to the managing editor.

LPI Publications

Periodicals

Life & Peace Review is a quarterly magazine covering peace and justice issues, with an emphasis on church involvement: SEK 175/year (membership)

Horn of Africa Bulletin is a bimonthly newsletter covering Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland and Sudan: SEK 300/year (membership)

Research Reports

#15: God With Us? The Roles of Religion in Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, Shenk, 1993, SEK 80

#14: Women, War, and Peace, Ferris, 1993, SEK 80
Series on Debt, Disarmament, and Development

#13: The Military, Foreign Debt, and Transnationals in Brazil, Gonçalves, 1993, SEK 60

#12: Closing US Military Bases in the Philippines: Opening an Era of Self-reliant and Sustained Peace? Garcia, 1993, SEK 60

#11: Between Jihad and McWorld: The Canadian Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice, Reeve, 1993, SEK 60

#10: The New Pax Americana: US Interventionism in the Post-Cold War Era, Klare, 1992, SEK 60

#9: Power and Peace: Statements on Peace and the Authority of the Churches, 1992, SEK 80

Case Studies on The Churches' Role as Agents of Peace and Development

#8: Brazil, Landim and Cesar, 1992, SEK 60

#7: Zimbabwe, Nkiwane, 1992, SEK 60

#6: Argentina, Gutierrez, 1992, SEK 60

#5: Costa Rica, Ruiz-Hedström, 1991, SEK 60

#4: Noah's Ark and the Nuclear Inferno, Williamson, 1990, SEK 80

#3: Peace Policy for the 90s, 1990, SEK 80
(published with the Swedish Ecumenical Council)

#2: Christian Responses to the Militarization of Space, 1989, SEK 80

#1: Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts: NGOs in the International System, 1988, SEK 80

Conference Reports

#7: Justice and Peace: Strategies and Stumbling Blocks
1994, SEK 80

#6: Pondering Power: Christian Perspectives
1993, SEK 80

#5: The End in Sight? Images of the End and Threats to Human Survival, 1993, SEK 100

#4: Overcoming the Institution of War
1992, SEK 100

#3: The Holy Land in the Monotheistic Faiths
1992, SEK 100

#2: The Challenge to Intervene: A New Role for the United Nations? 1992, SEK 100

#1: Somalia: A Historical, Cultural, and Political Analysis, 1991, SEK 80

Papers

Alternative Defence Models for Europe: The Debate of the 1980s, de Smet, 1992, SEK 60

Churches and Culture in Palestine: An Historical Overview and Contours of Palestinian Contextualized Theology, Khoury, 1992, SEK 60

Religious Fundamentalism as a Threat to Peace: Two Studies, Williamson, 1992, SEK 60

Just War in the Gulf? Williamson, 1991, SEK 60

Images of the End and Christian Theology
1990, SEK 60

Forthcoming (Working Titles)

Military Expenditure, Economic Trends, and New Concepts of Security

Realities and Challenges for South Africa in a Changing Global Context

The Worship of the Free Market and the Death of the Poor

PAYMENT INFORMATION

DO NOT SEND CASH OR PERSONAL CHECKS! Instead, please use one of the following methods of payment:

1) Have your bank or post office transfer the amount in *Swedish kronor* to either of the following LPI accounts: #403 016 623-7 (Uppsala Sparbank) or #494 74 05-9 (Swedish Postgiro).

2) Send an *international bank check or money order in Swedish kronor* (must be drawn on a Swedish bank).

3) Send a *Eurocheck in Swedish kronor*.

Contributions are welcome to cover costs of sending publications to those who cannot pay. **Exchange arrangements** are possible in lieu of payment. **Review copies** are available free of charge. (Specify where and when you expect the review to appear.)

Box 297, S-751 05 Uppsala, Sweden Phone: 46 18/16 95 41 Fax: 46 18/69 30 59

LifePeace 1994 & OVERVIEW & USERS' GUIDE

This annual overview and user's guide is based in part on the official LPI annual report. That text is available on request. (Each annual report covers the period 1 July—30 June.) The LPI brochure, also available on request, includes more general information about LPI and its work.

Research & Program Highlights

LPI does research in four areas:

Horn of Africa.

Human rights and economic justice.

Role of religion in conflict and peace.

Nonviolent conflict-resolution.

Here is a summary of projects completed, underway, and contemplated in the period from July 1992 (with the name of the project leader in parentheses):

1.1) Alternative Models of Economic Cooperation in the Horn (Belay Gessesse): This project is in collaboration with the Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa.

1.2) Refugee Repatriation in Eritrea: Start of this project was pending selection of a leader.

2.1) Debt, Disarmament & Development (Elizabeth Ferris): This is a series of about eight studies. Four had been published by October 1993.

2.2) Litany of Pain: Christian Engagement with Human Rights in Guatemala (María Ruiz-Hedström): The research is done. Publication (in Spanish and English) was projected for 1994.

2.3) Militarization, Economic Penetration & Human Rights in the Pacific (Suliana Siwatibau): Start of this project was pending adequate funding.

2.4) Beyond Borders (Elizabeth Ferris): This project, now completed, included three papers and a book, *Beyond Borders: Refugees, Migrants & Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era*. The book was published in 1993 by the World Council of Churches.

2.5) Working Beyond Borders: The Role of the Churches and NGOs in Refugee Work (Elizabeth Ferris): This pro-

ject follows up the previous one. The research was to be completed by the end of 1993.

2.6) Concepts of Power and Human Rights (Elizabeth Ferris): Publication of *Pondering Power: Christian Perspectives* concluded this project.

2.7) Justice and Peace: Strategies and Stumbling Blocks (Bernt Jonsson): See the description on the next page.

3.1) Religious Fundamentalism as a Threat to Peace (Roger Williamson): Publication of *Religious Fundamentalism as a Threat to Peace: Two Studies* ("Religious Fundamentalism in the Middle East: A Threat to Peace?" and "Towards Armageddon: US Christian Fundamentalism, Enemy Images, and the Nuclear Threat") concluded this project. It also included a seminar on fundamentalism at the July 1992 meeting of the International Peace Research Association in Kyoto, and participation in the IPRA working group on religion and conflict.

3.2) Religion and Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavian Republics (Gerald Shenk): Publication of *God With Us? The Roles of Religion in Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia* concluded this project. Shenk conducted on-site research in ex-Yugoslavia during the first part of 1993.

3.3) The Churches as Agents of Reconciliation in El Salvador, the Philippines, and South Africa: Start of this project was pending selection of a leader and adequate funding.

3.4) The Intifada and the Churches in the Holy Land (Geries Khoury): A joint initiative with the Al-Liq'a Centre in

Bethlehem, this project was to begin in 1994.

3.5) The Role of Religion in Armed Conflicts (Roger Williamson): Publication of *The Holy Land in the Monotheistic Faiths* concluded this project.

3.6) Images of the End (Roger Williamson): Publication of *The End In Sight? Images of the End and Threats to Human Survival* concluded this project.

4.1) Women and Nonviolence (Elizabeth Ferris): A seminar in collaboration with the World Council of Churches and Lutheran World Federation was scheduled in the Philippines in November 1993. *Women, War & Peace* was published as a resource for that meeting as well as an overview and summary of issues in the debate.

4.2) Alternative Possibilities for Common Security in Europe: This project was being developed.

4.3) The Challenge to Intervene: A New Role for the United Nations? (Elizabeth Ferris): Publication of a collection of essays with the same title completed this project. It also included preparation of two papers and participation in two meetings.

4.4) UN Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Operations: NGO Perspectives: This project was on hold.

Horn of Africa Program

Besides the research described above, the LPI Horn of Africa Program includes three other major areas of activity: (a) cooperation with the United Nations in efforts to foster sustainable peace in Somalia and Somaliland, (b) support for Ergada (a group of Somali

elders in exile who have formed the Somali Peace and Consultation Committee) and the Ad Hoc Peace Committee (based in Addis Ababa), and (c) information and networking (including the bi-monthly *Horn of Africa Bulletin*).

Anniversary Seminar



Sergei of Solnechnogorsk and Eugenia Olsson

April 1993 was the 10th anniversary of the Christian World Conference on Life and Peace. One of its many recommendations led to the founding of LPI, in 1985. To mark the conference anniversary, LPI and the Swedish Ecumenical Council held a two-day seminar in Uppsala. Its presentations and discussions considered "strategies and stumbling blocks" in connection with issues of peace and justice in the years ahead. The seminar concluded in Uppsala cathedral with an ecumenical and multicultural liturgy for life and peace.

The five main presentations at the seminar were by Christopher Tremewan, a consultant on refugee and migration issues to the Christian Conference of Asia and the World Council of Churches; Sergei of Solnechnogorsk, chair of the Department for Church Charity and Social Ministry of the Russian Orthodox Church; Nirmalka Fernando, a regional coordinator for the Asia/Pacific Forum on Women, Law, and Development; Bernard Przewozny, director of the world Franciscan Centre for Environmental Studies in Rome;

and Konrad Raiser, general secretary of the World Council of Churches. (Edited excerpts from their presentations appeared *Life & Peace Review*, 2/1993.)

Death of Olle Dahlén

With Olof Sundby, then archbishop of the [Lutheran] Church of Sweden, Olle Dahlén was the key figure in establishing LPI. After a party-political career, Dahlén became the first Swedish ambassador to NGOs, in 1974. Besides his activity in the [Reformed] Mission Covenant Church in Sweden, he played an international and ecumenical role, serving as moderator of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches.

Dahlén died 1 February 1993 of cancer. He was 77. A wise counselor and firm supporter of LPI to the end, he was, in the words of LPI board president Karl-Axel Elmquist, "a key person in laying a firm foundation on which the institute can build in the years ahead."

Board, Staff, Finances

The LPI board is chosen by Sveriges Kristna Råd (the Christian Council of Sweden). The terms of its members (except that of the LPI director, member ex officio) expire after the 1994 board meeting. The members are:

Sibusiso Bengu, rector and vice chancellor, Fort Hare University, Alice (South Africa).

Alexei Buevsky, Department of External Church Relations, Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow.

Karl-Axel Elmquist, president, Diakonia, Stockholm.

Biörn Fjærstedt, bishop, Diocese of Visby, Church of Sweden.

Alan Geyer, professor of political ethics and ecumenics, Wesley Seminary, Washington.

Satoshi Hirata, director, Nippon Christian Academy, Kyoto.

Bernt Jonsson, director, Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala.

Andrew Kirk, dean of mission, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham (England).

Alice Mogwe, director, Botswana Center for Human Rights, Gabarone.

Oh Jae-Shik, ecumenical executive, Seoul.

Suliana Siwatibau, research consultant, Port-Vila (Vanuatu).

Heinz-Günther Stobbe, professor of ecumenics and peace research, Ecumenical Institute of the Catholic Theological Faculty, Münster (Germany).

Tomás Téllez, director for international relations, Polytechnic University of Nicaragua, Managua.

In 1993, the board met in Sigtuna (Sweden), 24-25 April, following a two day seminar, "Justice & Peace: Strategies and Stumbling Blocks," in Uppsala. The 1994 board meeting and seminar were scheduled for the end of May in Kyoto (Japan).

The LPI executive committee consists of the director and the board president (Karl-Axel Elmquist) and vice president (Biörn Fjærstedt.) It takes some decisions in between board meetings.

Between 1 July 1992 and 31 October 1993, it met eight times, including four joint meetings with the LPI Swedish committee (primarily a reference group in financial matters).



Oh Jae-Shik and Karl-Axel Elmquist
Photos: Jim Elfström

Uppsala Staff (as of November 1993)
The LPI office is located one flight up at Sysslomansgatan 7, not far from Uppsala cathedral. (The mailing address is at the bottom of page 14.)



Participants at the 1991 LPI board meeting in Moscow

Each staff member is listed below with her or his direct phone number. When calling from Sweden, but outside the Uppsala area, the prefix is 018; when calling from outside Sweden, that country's international access code followed by 46-18 precedes the number. (The LPI switchboard number is 16.95.00. The fax number is 16.95.40.)

Director: Bernt Jonsson	16.95.46
Administrative Assistant:	
Dorothy Berglund	16.95.45
Librarian: Erik Klang	16.95.77
Library Aide:	
Vita Sigurdson	16.95.77

Research and Communications Section

Research Director:	
Lucia Ann McSpadden	16.95.47
Communications Director:	
Tom Dorris	16.95.39
Section Assistant:	
Nichole Wolf	16.95.41
Section Assistant: (vacant)	16.95.48

Horn of Africa Program

Program Director:	
Sture Normark	16.95.42
Program Associate:	
Susanne Thurfjell Lundén	16.95.43
Program Assistant:	
Karin Normark	16.95.44
Program Assistant:	
Everett Nelson	16.95.54

(Other Horn of Africa Program staff are based in Somalia.)

Uppsala staff arrivals

(1 July 1992—1 January 1994)
Tom Dorris, 1 July 1992
Karin Normark, 1 October 1992
Nichole Wolf, 26 October 1992
Everett Nelson, 13 April 1993
Lucia Ann McSpadden, 1 January 1994

Uppsala staff departures

(1 July 1992—1 January 1994)
Roger Williamson, researcher
30 September 1992
Maria Ruiz-Hedström, researcher
28 February 1993
Kim Barcik, managing editor
31 March 1993
Elizabeth Ferris, research director
30 June 1993
Lena Sjöqvist, research assistant
31 July 1993

Summary financial statement

(FY 92-93, in millions of Swedish kronor)

Total income:	11.3
General:	3.3
Project specific:	8.0
Income by Source:	
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs:	2.5
SIDA (Swedish International Development Authority):	5.4
Swedish church:	1.4
Non-Swedish (church, foundation, NGO):	1.0
Revenue:	0.8
Other:	0.2
Expenditures:	
Somalia work:	4.8
Other Horn of Africa work:	2.5
Other Projects:	2.7
Administration and Communication (General):	1.1
Funds in Reserve:	1.2

Support LPI

Financially, individuals can support LPI work for justice, peace and reconciliation by becoming an LPI associate,

and/or by contributing to the Olle Dahlén Fund, which honors the life, work, and vision of LPI's first president, who died in February 1993. The fund is earmarked for LPI research and other work in conflict resolution, conflict transformation, and reconciliation.

There are five categories of associates: Supporting (250 Swedish kronor a year), Contributing (500), Sustaining (750), Senior (1000), and Director's (1500).

Supporting associates receive *LPR* and another LPI publication of their choice without charge. They can purchase additional LPI publications at a 30 percent discount.

Director's associates receive *LPR* and *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, everything else LPI publishes, invitations to LPI seminars (at which they are welcome at their own cost), and an invitation to meet with LPI's senior staff and/or international board.

Corresponding benefits are: Contributing (*LPR*, two additional publications, 35 percent discount), Sustaining (*LPR*, *HAB*, two additional, 40 percent), Senior (*LPR*, *HAB*, two additional, 50 percent, seminar invitation).

To enroll yourself or someone else as an LPI associate for 1994, send payment according to the instructions on the next page, along with name, address, and phone/fax numbers. Indicate the category, and choice of free publication(s). Indicate if you are making someone an LPI associate as a gift; that person will receive suitable notification.

It is also possible for libraries and others to receive all LPI publications for 1994 without being formally associated with LPI: indicate "subscriber only," and transfer 1500 Swedish kronor.

LPI Publications

Periodicals

Life & Peace Review is a quarterly magazine covering peace and justice issues, with an emphasis on church involvement: SEK 125/year

Horn of Africa Bulletin is a bimonthly newsletter covering Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somali-land and Sudan: SEK 300/year

Research Reports

New! **#15: God With Us? The Roles of Religion in Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia**, Shenk, 1993, SEK 80

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
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**REFERENCE
PAPER**

**THE
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NATIONS
AND THE SITUATION IN
ANGOLA**

MAY 1991-JUNE 1994



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UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II

BACKGROUND

The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) was originally established by the Security Council on 20 December 1988 at the request of the Governments of Angola and Cuba. Its task was to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between the two Governments. The withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991 — more than one month before the scheduled date. On 6 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it.

Meanwhile, on 17 May 1991, the Government of Angola requested the Secretary-General to ensure the participation of the United Nations in verifying the implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola ("Acordos de Paz"), initiated by the Angolan Government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) on 1 May 1991, and consequently to prolong UNAVEM's presence in Angola. In accordance with the Accords, the United Nations was to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the cease-fire and for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the cease-fire period. On 30 May, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council adopted its resolution 696 (1991), entrusting a new mandate to UNAVEM (hereafter UNAVEM II) and establishing the Mission for a period of 17 months, until the general elections were held in Angola in the fall of 1992.

VERIFICATION OF CEASE-FIRE

The United Nations verification operation began as soon as the Angolan Peace Accords were formally signed on 31 May 1991. Advance parties of observers were deployed to the field on 2 June 1991. Subsequently, UNAVEM II teams of unarmed military observers were deployed at some 46 locations ("assembly areas") where the troops of the two sides were

assembled during the cease-fire, as well as at several "critical points" (certain seaports, airports and border posts).

In essence, their task was to verify that joint monitoring groups, composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Angolan Government and of UNITA and responsible for monitoring on the spot the observance of the cease-fire, carried out their responsibilities. Working closely with these monitoring groups, UNAVEM II verification teams provided support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the cease-fire. They responded to requests for assistance and used their good offices to resolve problems within monitoring groups. In addition, UNAVEM II took the initiative in monitoring some aspects of the Accords, such as the regular counting of troops and weapons in the assembly areas, as well as monitoring of un-assembled troops, demobilized troops, and troops selected to join the new Angolan Armed Forces.

The neutrality of the Angolan police was to be verified by monitoring teams also composed of members designated by the Government of Angola and by UNITA. Their work was verified by UNAVEM II police observers. The monitoring teams and UNAVEM II observers were to visit police facilities, examine activities of the police and, if necessary, investigate alleged violations of political rights. The Angolan police monitoring teams were established in all 18 Angolan provinces only in June 1992, although UNAVEM II police observers were present in the designated areas by October 1991.

On many occasions the United Nations conveyed to the two sides suggestions to overcome difficulties related to the assembly and the demobilization of troops, proper custody of weapons and the monitoring of the police, as well as other matters relating to the peace process. At the request of the two parties, the United Nations launched an emergency food programme to relieve food shortages in the assembly areas.

ENLARGEMENT OF UNAVEM II'S MANDATE

The Peace Accords for Angola provided for "free and fair elections for a new Government" under "the supervision of international election observers". On 5 December 1991, the Secretary-General received two letters signed by the Minister for External Relations of Angola. One of the letters contained a request for United Nations technical assistance to help the Angolan Government to prepare for and conduct the forthcoming elections. The other letter contained a formal request to the Secretary-General to send United Nations observers to follow the Angolan electoral process until its completion in the fall of 1992. It was later announced that elections would be held on 29 and 30 September 1992.

An agreement on technical assistance was signed with the Angolan Government in January 1992. As regards United Nations observation of the first-ever elections in Angola, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council on 20 December 1991 that he intended to recommend that the Council authorize such a mission. On 6 February 1992, the Secretary-General informed the Council of his decision to appoint Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, a national of the United Kingdom, as his Special Representative to coordinate the current and projected activities of the United Nations in connection with the Angola Peace Accords, and as the Chief of UNAVEM II. On 3 March, following the Special Representative's visit to Angola, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his report with recommendations concerning the United Nations role in observing the forthcoming elections. On 24 March, the Security Council, by its resolution 747 (1992), decided to enlarge UNAVEM II's mandate to include election observation in Angola.

OBSERVATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESS

In March 1992, the office of the Special Representative was established in Luanda, the capital of Angola, to coordinate all United Nations activities related to the Angolan peace process. In addition to its deployed military and police observers and civilian staff, UNAVEM II was enlarged to include an Electoral Division, headed by a Chief Electoral Officer. Offices of the

Electoral Division were established in Luanda, in the six Angolan regions and in the capitals of all 18 provinces. Approximately 100 international staff and the requisite number of local staff were deployed in the regional and provincial electoral offices.

The United Nations role was to observe and verify the elections, not to organize them. The electoral process was organized and directed by the National Electoral Council (NEC), on which all legalized political parties in Angola were represented, and supported by technical assistance provided by experts and consultants from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The electoral process comprised four phases: the registration of voters from 20 May to 10 August; the electoral campaign from 29 August to 28 September; the presidential and legislative elections on 29 and 30 September; and the counting of the votes, investigation of complaints and announcement of the final results by the President of NEC on 17 October.

In his report to the Security Council dated 9 September 1992, the Secretary-General stated that the results of the registration exercise had surpassed expectations, with NEC reporting the registration of 4.86 million eligible voters, representing some 92 per cent of an estimated voting population of 5.3 million.

The electoral campaign was conducted without major violence, although there were reports of intimidation by some political parties, notably UNITA and the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), as well as difficulties of access to certain areas, particularly those controlled by UNITA. The 18 political parties which had presented candidates campaigned actively. There were complaints, especially from the smaller parties, about the continued existence of the Government and UNITA armies, the slow progress in demobilization and in forming the new Angolan Armed Forces, and lack of access to the Government-controlled radio and television, whose alleged partiality was criticized.

UNAVEM II electoral observers monitored the campaign, contributed to civic education programmes and provided information on UNAVEM II's role. In addition, UNAVEM II and UNDP organized the air support operation, consisting of 45 helicopters and 15 fixed-

wing aircraft, to overcome the logistical difficulties in reaching the more inaccessible polling stations. For the observation and verification of the voting on 29 and 30 September 1992, UNAVEM II deployed 400 electoral observers. Operating largely as two-person mobile teams, the observers covered all 18 provinces and most of the 164 municipalities, and visited about 4,000 of some 6,000 polling stations.

As regards its mandate in military matters, UNAVEM II continued to carry out its verification functions at the assembly areas up to and after the announced disbandment of the two former armies of FAPLA (Government) and FALA (UNITA) on 27 September 1992. As the elections drew near, demobilization formally accelerated. By 7 October, a total of 96,620 Government troops had been demobilized, representing 80 per cent of the projected figure. However, a much lower proportion of ex-FALA troops were demobilized.

United Nations police observers continued their verification of police neutrality, with the Angolan joint monitoring groups being almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM II for transport and communications. Little progress was made in developing a representative national police force. Soon after the elections, however, UNITA withdrew its cooperation.

SITUATION DETERIORATES

On 1 October 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement in which she noted that the great majority of the registered voters had cast their ballots in peaceful and orderly conditions, despite organizational and logistical difficulties.

However, complaints were raised on 3 October and thereafter by UNITA and some other parties of widespread, massive and systematic irregularities and fraud during the elections. The Secretary-General urged the leader of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, not to reject the results of the elections, pending investigation of UNITA's complaints, and emphasized the urgency of a meeting between him and President José Eduardo dos Santos. The complaints were investigated by NEC, with the active assistance of UNAVEM II. Investigative

commissions were sent to all 18 provinces, but found no conclusive evidence of systematic fraud.

Meanwhile, a major violation of the Peace Accords occurred on 5 October, when 11 former UNITA generals, including the commander of UNITA's army, withdrew from the new, unified Angolan Armed Forces, in protest at what they called "fraud and cheating" in the elections.

In view of these developments, the Security Council sent to Angola, from 11 to 14 October, an ad hoc Commission, composed of representatives of Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation and the United States, to support implementation of the Peace Accords. Notwithstanding all diplomatic efforts, the political and military situation in the country continued to deteriorate.

On 17 October 1992, the President of NEC announced the official election results. More than 91 per cent of those registered had voted. MPLA had won the legislative elections, with 53.74 per cent of the votes, against UNITA's 34.1 per cent. In the presidential elections, President dos Santos had received 49.57 per cent, against Mr. Savimbi's 40.07 per cent; since neither had achieved 50 per cent, the Electoral Law required a second round. The Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement on 17 October, saying "there was no conclusive evidence of major systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of magnitude to have a significant effect on the results officially announced on 17 October". She emphasized that, "with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 can be considered to have been generally free and fair".

Immediately after the election results were announced, UNITA launched a nationwide operation to occupy municipalities by force and remove the Government's local administrative structures. On 27 October, the Secretary-General conveyed to the Security Council his serious concern at the rising tension. The Council once again called upon both parties to abide by all their commitments under the Peace Accords, in particular the confinement of their troops and collection of weapons, demobilization and the formation of the unified Angolan Armed Forces. It requested UNITA to

respect the results of the elections and urged the leaders of the two parties to engage in immediate dialogue to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held.

On 30 October, the Security Council, faced with further alarming reports of resumed hostilities in many parts of the country, adopted resolution 785 (1992), extending the existing mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 November 1992, and endorsing the statement by the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the elections having been generally free and fair.

Barely 23 hours later, on 31 October, heavy fighting broke out between the Government and UNITA forces, especially in Luanda. The Secretary-General's efforts, supported by a number of Member States, resulted in a cease-fire which came officially into effect on 2 November. UNAVEM II, which kept its military, police and civilian presence intact at 67 locations throughout the country, worked to maintain the cease-fire, patrolling trouble spots and using its good offices to foster dialogue between the parties.

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

Diplomatic efforts continued after the cease-fire to arrange a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. Immediately after the cease-fire, the Government stipulated four conditions for resuming political dialogue between the two leaders: (a) commitment to uphold the cease-fire, pursue dialogue and renounce violence; (b) commitment to the principles of the Peace Accords; (c) acceptance of the results of the September 1992 legislative elections; and (d) greater United Nations involvement in the peace process and the second round of the presidential elections.

On 5 November 1992, the Secretary-General sent Mr. Marrack Goulding, then Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, to Angola to assist in implementing the cease-fire, put the peace process back on track and explore the future role of UNAVEM II. After the meetings in Angola, the Secretary-General's envoys concluded that the desire for a larger United Nations involvement constituted the main common ground between the two sides. Also, as a result

of a telephone conversation and an exchange of letters with Mr. Goulding, Mr. Savimbi confirmed, in a letter dated 12 November, that UNITA accepted the results of the legislative elections so as to permit the implementation of the peace process.

SECRETARY-GENERAL EVALUATES SITUATION

On 25 November 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a detailed report on the situation in Angola, and recommended extension of the mandate of UNAVEM II for a further two-month period, until 31 January 1993. In the report, the Secretary-General stated that although it was too soon to analyse the causes of the deteriorating situation in Angola, it was already clear that a "root cause" was the incomplete fulfilment of key provisions in the Peace Accords. Among those failings were the less than effective demobilization and storage of weapons; the delay in creating the unified Angolan Armed Forces, which only formally came into being two days before the elections; the failure to re-establish effective central administration in many parts of the country; and the delay in setting up a neutral police force. It had also been difficult to create in 16 months, after as many years of civil war, an atmosphere of mutual confidence, tolerance and respect.

Yet, the Secretary-General emphasized, "it is also too soon to despair of the Angolan peace process", noting the renewed commitment to the process by both parties. At the same time, he made it clear that he could not recommend an enlargement of UNAVEM II's mandate and strength unless both sides could convince him that they would be genuine in their adherence to, and fulfilment of, the Peace Accords, especially the key provisions relating to the dissolution of the existing armies and the creation of unified and non-partisan military and police forces.

On 30 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 793 (1992), extended UNAVEM II's mandate until 31 January 1993. The Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the Government of Angola and UNITA scrupulously observe the cease-fire, stop military confrontations and all offensive troop movements and create the conditions for completing the peace process in

Angola. It appealed to the two parties to engage in a dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process, and to agree on a clear timetable for the fulfilment of their commitments under the Peace Accords.

Meanwhile, the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative resulted in a meeting under UNAVEM II auspices on 26 November 1992 in the southern provincial capital of Namibe between senior delegations from the two sides, where they pledged themselves to full acceptance of the validity of the Peace Accords, to an effective cease-fire throughout the country and the immediate cessation of all offensive movements, and to the need for a larger United Nations involvement. However, almost immediately, this progress was followed by a set-back when, on 29 November, UNITA forces took the northern provincial capital of Uige and an important airbase nearby, Negage. Attempts to restore dialogue between the two sides, including the Secretary-General's personal invitation to President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to meet with him at an agreed location, failed.

THREE OPTIONS FOR UNAVEM II

On 8 January 1993, the Secretary-General reported that the situation in Angola had severely deteriorated since the beginning of the year. There were outbreaks of heavy fighting in at least 10 provincial capitals and other population centres, with each side blaming the other for initiating those hostilities. In his further report submitted to the Council on 21 January, the Secretary-General stated that "to all intents and purposes, Angola has returned to civil war, and is probably in an even worse situation than that which prevailed before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991". The conflict engulfed towns and population centres in a way unprecedented during the previous 16 years, and there were "disturbing but unconfirmed reports" that new supplies of arms might be entering the country.

In addition, the Secretary-General stated, the widespread fighting and the absence of government administration in much of the countryside had led to widespread hunger and the flight of large numbers of people from the towns involved in the conflict. "An

already serious humanitarian situation has become catastrophic in many areas", he pointed out, and the capacity of international humanitarian agencies to provide assistance had been severely disrupted.

According to the report, the crisis arising after the September 1992 elections thrust UNAVEM II into a central mediating role. However, with the outbreak of violent and widespread hostilities, and the total collapse of the joint monitoring mechanisms, "UNAVEM II's original mandate has become less and less relevant". Even its mediating role had been increasingly limited by the deteriorating security situation. At the same time, UNAVEM II teams in the field faced mounting dangers, which became so extensive that 45 of UNAVEM's 67 locations had to be evacuated.

The Secretary-General outlined three options for the future of UNAVEM II. The first option was to maintain the mission at its current strength; the second was to reduce UNAVEM II's provincial deployment to approximately six locations. The Secretary-General's preferred option was to confine UNAVEM II's deployment to the capital, Luanda, and to one or two outstations but with the capability to deploy to six provincial sites if needed, to support his Special Representative's peacemaking efforts. At the same time, the Council stressed its readiness to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

On 29 January, the Security Council, by its resolution 804 (1993), extended the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months, until 30 April 1993. It did so with the proviso that, as a provisional measure based on security considerations, the Secretary-General could concentrate UNAVEM II's deployment in Luanda and, at his discretion, in other provincial locations, with the levels of personnel and equipment he deemed appropriate to allow for the subsequent expeditious redeployment of UNAVEM II as soon as this became feasible. By other provisions of the resolution, the Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the two parties establish a cease-fire immediately, restore continued and meaningful dialogue and agree on a clear timetable for the full implementation of the Peace Accords. Subsequently, the Secretary-General

decided to temporarily decrease the strength of the Mission.

FURTHER EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE

In January 1993, fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo. After repeated efforts by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to arrange a dialogue between the two sides, the Government and UNITA agreed to hold talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss the fulfilment of various prerequisites for the effective re-launching of the peace process in Angola.

During the first round of the Addis Ababa talks, which were held from 27 to 30 January 1993 under United Nations auspices and the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Government of Angola and UNITA reached agreement on a number of questions, but some key issues remained to be resolved before a cease-fire could be arranged. The parties accordingly agreed to meet again in Addis Ababa on 10 February, in order to resolve the outstanding questions. Later, at the request of UNITA, which indicated that its delegation was encountering logistical difficulties, and with the agreement of both sides, the date for the second meeting was postponed to 26 February 1993. Subsequently, the meeting in Addis Ababa had to be cancelled, due to the failure of UNITA to send its delegation there.

In the light of the steadily worsening situation and the collapse of the Addis Ababa negotiations, the Secretary-General asked his Special Representative to come to New York from 9 to 12 March 1993 for consultations. In her briefing to the Security Council, Miss Anstee outlined several options for UNAVEM II. Following informal consultations, the Security Council, by resolution 811 (1993) of 12 March, demanded an immediate cease-fire throughout the country. The Council also, *inter alia*, called on the two parties, particularly UNITA, to produce early evidence that real progress had been made towards implementing the Peace Accords, and invited the Secretary-General to seek to organize a meeting between the Government and

UNITA at the highest possible level before 30 April 1993.

Consequently, the Secretary-General instructed Miss Anstee to consult with the Government and with UNITA on a date and venue for the resumption of direct talks under the auspices of the United Nations. As a result of these consultations, agreement was reached to meet in Abidjan on 12 April 1993 at the invitation of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire.

The Abidjan meeting began as scheduled, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and lasted six weeks. Regrettably, while very nearly reaching success, it ended, on 21 May 1993, without full agreement on the text of what became known as the Protocol of Abidjan.

In his 25 May 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General described the breakdown of the Abidjan talks as "a major and tragic setback to the peace process". Having stated that it would be unthinkable for the United Nations to abandon Angola at this critical juncture, he recommended a further interim extension of UNAVEM II, on a reduced basis, and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. Such a mission would provide good offices and mediation, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process along the lines of the Peace Accords. At the same time, the Secretary-General stressed that with the humanitarian situation deteriorating daily, it would also be important during this interim period to devote increasing resources to coordination of humanitarian relief activities throughout Angola. To this end, a United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, headed by a senior official with extensive operational experience, was set up in Luanda in late April 1993, under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

On 27 May 1993, the Secretary-General announced that he had agreed to accede to Ms. Anstee's wish to be released from her responsibilities. Subsequently, he appointed Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, as his Special Representative for Angola, effective 28 June.

On 1 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 834 (1993), decided to extend UNAVEM II's mandate for a period of forty-five days until 15 July 1993 and stressed the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative. The Council also welcomed the steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen United Nations humanitarian activities in Angola.

On 15 July 1993, the mandate of UNAVEM II was further extended by Security Council resolution 851 (1993) for a period of two months until 15 September. In recommending the extension, the Secretary-General noted that UNAVEM II had become an essential factor in a continuous United Nations effort to facilitate the resumption of negotiations, to support humanitarian activities in the country, as well as an indispensable channel for communication between the parties. By the same resolution, the Council reiterated its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the elections and abide fully by the Peace Accords.

SITUATION OF UNAVEM II

UNAVEM II continued to be deployed at five locations (Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe), with its military and police observers patrolling the areas, maintaining liaison with the respective local authorities, rendering support to humanitarian assistance operations, conducting investigations and other activities. In this connection, the Secretary-General stated in his 13 September 1993 report to the Security Council that the present number of international civil staff was inadequate to carry out effectively the various tasks required under UNAVEM II's mandate, especially that of mediation and good offices, and suggested that the number be increased to at least 59 persons.

On 15 September, the Security Council, by resolution 864 (1993), further extended the existing mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months. It reiterated its readiness to consider expanding substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

SANCTIONS AGAINST UNITA IMPOSED

By the same resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, decided that all States should prevent the sale or supply of weapons, ammunition and military equipment as well as petroleum products to Angola other than through points of entry named by the Government of Angola. The embargo was to enter into force in 10 days unless a cease-fire was established. The Council also expressed its readiness to consider the imposition of further measures, including trade measures against UNITA and restrictions on the travel of UNITA personnel, unless by 1 November 1993 the Secretary-General reported that an effective cease-fire had been established and that agreement had been reached on the full implementation of the Peace Accords and relevant resolutions of the Security Council. It also decided to establish a committee to monitor the sanctions. The oil and arms embargo came into force at midnight on 25-26 September 1993.

In the meantime, the United Nations has continued its efforts to facilitate the resumption of the peace process in consultation with the Angolan parties and interested countries, including, in particular, the observer States to the Peace Accords — Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States. Following extensive consultations, the Government of Angola and UNITA began exploratory talks in Lusaka, Zambia, on 25 October 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations. These talks were made possible by positive steps taken by both sides, including UNITA's proclamation of a unilateral cease-fire, its acceptance of the general legal framework of the Peace Accords and its agreement to withdraw from the localities it had occupied since the resumption of the hostilities.

As requested by Security Council resolution 864 (1993), the Secretary-General reported back on 27 October. He stated that not enough progress had been made towards implementing the Peace Accords and relevant Council resolutions, and therefore recommended that the Council impose additional measures against UNITA. However, the Secretary-General said the Council should postpone such action until 1 Decem-

ber in view of the fact that the Angolan Government and UNITA were holding talks.

The Secretary-General recommended that UNAVEM II's authorized strength be increased from 50 to 175 military observers, from 18 to 60 police monitors, and from 11 to 14 military paramedics. Additional international and local staff would also be needed. These personnel would be deployed in the event of a breakthrough and would enhance the mission's ability to verify major developments on the ground and to provide good offices. He appealed to the Government of Angola and UNITA to make full use of the opportunity and to consolidate the progress made so far in the search for a solution to the conflict in Angola. He also appealed to the international community for further generous support to meet the growing humanitarian needs, noting that stocks of relief supplies were inadequate.

In his statement of 1 November 1993, the President of the Security Council affirmed, on behalf of the Council, complete support for the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their efforts aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis and encouraged the Secretary-General to carry out urgent contingency planning for the possible augmentation of the strength of the Mission. The Council expressed its readiness to impose further sanctions against UNITA at any time it observed that UNITA was not cooperating in good faith to implement the cease-fire, the Peace Accords and relevant Council resolutions.

PEACE TALKS BEGIN

The exploratory talks, held from 25 to 31 October 1993 in Lusaka, resulted in the acceptance by UNITA of the validity of the 1991 Peace Accords and the validity of the results of the legislative and presidential elections of 29 and 30 September 1992. UNITA also agreed to withdraw its troops from the localities occupied since the resumption of the hostilities and to return its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional measure pending full implementation of the Peace Accords.

Following the exploratory talks, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in consultation with the representatives of the three observer States, set the date and venue for the talks. Accordingly, the Angolan peace talks began at Lusaka on 15 November 1993. By 11 December 1993, agreement was reached on the general and specific principles as well as on the modalities relating to all military issues on the agenda: the re-establishment of the cease-fire; the withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces; the disarming of all civilians; and the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces.

On 14 December 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council in which, in view of the encouraging results achieved at Lusaka under United Nations auspices, he recommended the further postponement of action to impose additional measures against UNITA. He also recommended that the mandate of UNAVEM II be extended for three months.

The Security Council, by its resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December, agreed with the Secretary-General's recommendations and called upon both parties to honour the commitments already made by them at the talks in Lusaka. It urged them to exercise the maximum restraint and to stop immediately all military actions, and to agree on the modalities for the establishment of an effective and sustainable cease-fire and to conclude a peaceful settlement as soon as possible.

POLITICAL PROCESS CONTINUES

Following the 11 December 1993 agreement on the military issues, the discussions moved to the political issues, including the questions of the police and national reconciliation. By 31 January 1994, after protracted negotiations, the parties reached an agreement on the general and specific principles and on the modalities relating to the police.

On 17 February 1994, following several rounds of proximity talks, an agreement was also reached on a document containing a revised text of the general principles concerning the question of national reconciliation.

Since then, the Lusaka peace talks have focused on efforts to find ways to bridge the gap between the positions of the parties on the specific principles relating to the question of national reconciliation, which includes the allocation of high-level government posts to UNITA.

It was expected that once agreement was reached on this issue, the remaining items on the agenda would be discussed. Those included the future mandate of the United Nations and the role of the observer States, the conclusion of the electoral process and the re-establishment of a national administration throughout the country.

FIGHTING PERSISTS

The military situation in Angola has remained volatile. Fighting in many provinces of the country continued and intermittently intensified; several major cities remained under siege by one or the other side resulting in increased hardship for the civilian population and aggravating the already disastrous humanitarian situation.

In the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 10 February 1994, the Council deplored the great loss of life and destruction of property caused by the outbreak of fighting at several locations throughout Angola and stressed that the only way to achieve an effective, verifiable and sustainable cease-fire was for the Government and UNITA to conclude and sign a comprehensive peace agreement. It called upon the parties to honour their commitments, to exercise maximum restraint, to put an immediate halt to all offensive military actions and to commit themselves to the urgent conclusion of the Lusaka talks.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

From the outset of the renewed civil conflict in Angola, the United Nations agencies and programmes have made intensive efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to all Angolans in need. The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Unit plays a major coordinating role in this process. On 21 May 1993, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched an inter-agency appeal for Angola, seeking some

\$226 million in emergency humanitarian assistance for 2 million Angolans in need.

In July-August 1993, the situation in Angola worsened further despite all efforts by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, as well as a series of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), several African leaders and the three observer States. According to the Secretary-General's 13 September 1993 report to the Security Council, some 3 million people, particularly the most vulnerable population groups — children, women and the elderly — suffered from the consequences of the conflict. It was estimated that during 1993 more than 1,000 persons died every day from the direct or indirect effects of the war.

In the coastal provinces and other areas considered secure, the relief programme initiated by the United Nations, in cooperation with national and international non-governmental organizations, brought food aid and other emergency assistance to large numbers of Angolans displaced by the war or affected by the country-wide economic decline. However, the implementation of relief operations in the interior of the country and in zones of active conflict, where the needs are particularly acute, encountered serious difficulties. It was only in October 1993, following intensive negotiations with the two parties on humanitarian access and a general decrease in the intensity of fighting country-wide, that relief flights were able to reach besieged cities such as Kuito and Huambo, whose populations had been cut off from international assistance for many months.

In many of these previously inaccessible communities, people were found to be starving to death, and the malnutrition rates in many cases were higher than 35 per cent. The United Nations started a massive programme of humanitarian assistance with the World Food Programme (WFP) spearheading the effort by providing air transport of relief supplies for other United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Donor response to the May 1993 appeal improved

considerably, and nearly 50 per cent of the \$226 million target was reached by the end of January 1994.

Although the overall humanitarian situation in Angola improved in January-February 1994, hundreds of people were still dying every day due to starvation, related disease, war injuries and land-mine explosions.

On 28 February 1994, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched the 1994 revised inter-agency appeal for Angola simultaneously in Luanda, New York and Geneva. The appeal seeks \$179 million for multi-sectoral emergency aid to be delivered by United Nations agencies and international and national non-governmental organizations between February and June 1994. It is estimated that at least 3.3 million Angolans — over a quarter of the total population — are currently in need of some kind of relief assistance, compared to 2 million identified in the original appeal of May 1993.

The largest component of the appeal is food aid requested by WFP, amounting to some \$84 million. The total cash funding required by UNICEF is \$23 million, by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) almost \$21 million, UNHCR approximately \$9 million, and the World Health Organization (WHO) \$4 million. UNDP, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Volunteers also have small components in the appeal. Multi-sectoral funding requirements of non-governmental organizations stand at over \$24 million.

UNAVEM II MANDATE FURTHER EXTENDED

In a report submitted to the Security Council on 9 March 1994, the Secretary-General reviewed the negotiating process and the military and humanitarian situation in Angola. He recommended that the Council extend UNAVEM II at its current strength for an additional three months. The Secretary-General also recommended that the Council "authorize in principle" an increase in the operation's existing strength to its previous level of 350 military observers, 126 police observers and 14 military medical staff, with an appropriate number of international and local civilian staff. The additional personnel would be deployed when an overall settle-

ment had been agreed or when the Secretary-General advised the Council that the successful conclusion of the Lusaka talks was imminent. In this connection, the Secretary-General stated that following such an agreement, it would be important for the United Nations to be able to deploy immediately military and police observers, at least in the most sensitive regions of the country. Failure to do so could jeopardize a settlement in its initial and most critical stages.

The Secretary-General also recommended that the Council continue adhering to the provisions of paragraph 14 of its resolution 890 (1993), in which it decided not to impose at present the additional measures against UNITA.

On 16 March 1994, the Security Council adopted its resolution 903 (1994), by which it decided to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II until 31 May 1994 and not to impose, at present, additional measures against UNITA. The Council also declared its readiness, in principle, to consider promptly authorizing an increase in the strength of UNAVEM II to its previous level, following a report from the Secretary-General that the parties had reached an agreement. It invited the Secretary-General to proceed with contingency planning in that regard.

Demanding the end to all offensive military actions, the Council called upon both parties to honour commitments already made; and urged them to redouble their efforts to complete the remaining points on the agenda of the Lusaka talks, attain a sustainable cease-fire and conclude a peaceful settlement without "procrastination".

In addition, it called for full cooperation of all the parties to guarantee the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance and strongly appealed to the international community to respond generously to the 1994 revised inter-agency appeal for Angola.

PEACE TALKS STALLED

Efforts continued at all levels to make further progress at the Lusaka peace talks. The discussions focused after February 1994 on the specific principles and the modalities pertaining to the question of national reconciliation. Following consultations on proposals pre-

sented by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Government and UNITA agreed on 12 of the 18 specific principles. However, one of the six remaining principles — the question of UNITA's participation in the management of State affairs, including the crucial issue of the allocation of senior government post to UNITA — caused the talks to stall.

On 31 March 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the deadlock in the negotiating process. He was convinced, however, that the remaining issues relating to national reconciliation could be resolved if approached with realism and the necessary political will. The Secretary-General urged the parties to the conflict to make every possible effort to show the flexibility needed to reach a comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary-General reiterated that it would be necessary to strengthen UNAVEM II as soon as a comprehensive peace agreement had been reached. He stressed that UNAVEM II would need adequate and timely financial resources in order to consolidate the agreement at its initial and most critical stage.

On 14 April 1994, the Security Council, in a letter from its President to the Secretary-General, expressed concern at continuing outbreaks of hostilities in Angola and reaffirmed the importance its members attached to the "prompt and successful" conclusion of the Lusaka peace talks. The Council also reaffirmed its readiness, depending on the progress achieved towards the full implementation of the Peace Accords and relevant resolutions of the Security Council, to consider further action in accordance with its previous resolutions.

CONTINUED FIGHTING

Reporting to the Council on 24 May 1994, the Secretary-General noted that agreement on the completion of the electoral process was reached between UNITA and the Government of Angola on 5 May 1994, while his Special Representative and the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America) submitted to both parties new proposals aimed at breaking the impasse concerning the six

remaining specific principles which had not yet been agreed upon.

While the intensity and scale of military activities decreased as of the second week of April, small-scale operations and guerilla-type activities, especially by UNITA, continued. On 19 April, Malange airport and the city itself were shelled while a World Food Programme aircraft was unloading cargo, the Secretary-General noted, and humanitarian flights to the city were temporarily suspended. During May, the military situation remained tense throughout the country, as both the Government and UNITA continued to conduct military operations in several provinces. As a result of the continuing hostilities, emergency relief flights to some locations had been disrupted. UNAVEM II remained at its reduced strength, but while negotiations in Lusaka continued, the Secretariat and UNAVEM II had stepped up their contingency planning in anticipation of a comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary-General also urged Member States to confirm their contributions in response to the revised humanitarian assistance appeal, and accelerate the actual transfer of funds. United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations continued to implement the emergency humanitarian assistance programme which was aimed at providing relief to all accessible locations. However, the humanitarian needs of recently accessed areas had to be urgently met, as the populations in those locations were on the verge of starvation. It was very likely that similar conditions would be found in other presently inaccessible areas.

Work had commenced on the development of a humanitarian programme for future needs which would have to be addressed once a comprehensive peace settlement was reached. The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs visited Angola from 15 to 18 April, reviewed the ongoing humanitarian operations there and discussed the expected increase in humanitarian needs in the event a peace agreement was concluded.

In its resolution 922 of 31 May 1994, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 June 1994, and stressed that its future decision

concerning Angola would take into account the extent to which the parties demonstrated their political will to achieve a lasting peace. It encouraged both parties to finalize outstanding details in the peace process without further procrastination.

The Security Council also decided not to impose additional measures against UNITA with regard to its resolution 864 (1994) in view of the direct negotiations taking place, but reiterated its readiness to consider further steps should the Secretary-General recommend additional measures or the review of those in effect.

PROGRESS IN TALKS

On 20 June 1994, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Lusaka peace talks had recorded some positive developments, with agreement reached on all but one of the specific principles pertaining to the question of national reconciliation. The major problem remained UNITA's insistence on the post of Governor of Huambo. The Secretary-General suggested that the Council might wish not to impose further measures against UNITA if it gave an unequivocally positive response to the proposals put forward by UNAVEM II and the observer States on its participation in the management of State affairs; but if UNITA persisted in its refusal to accept in their entirety the proposals which the Government of Angola had already accepted, the Council could consider their implementation.

The military situation continued to be a cause for serious concern, the Secretary-General added. Fighting had escalated in Angola since his previous report, and this had caused further loss of life and damage to infrastructures, and had hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid to many parts of the country. Both the Government and UNITA appeared to be determined to achieve their military objectives. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council, in addition to urging an immediate suspension of hostilities, press the Government and UNITA to grant immediately security clearances and guarantees for relief deliveries to all locations.

In its resolution 932 of 30 June 1994, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 September 1994. The Council also declared its readiness to impose additional measures against UNITA if by 31 July 1994 UNITA had not formally accepted the complete set of proposals on national reconciliation put forward by the Special Representative and the three observer States. It strongly deplored the intensification of offensive military actions throughout Angola, condemned acts that imperiled humanitarian relief efforts and urged both parties to grant immediate security clearances and guarantees for relief deliveries to all locations.

COMPOSITION OF UNAVEM II

The current authorized strength of UNAVEM II is 50 military observers, 18 police observers, 11 military paramedics, 49 international civilian staff and some 75 local staff deployed at Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe.

Originally, UNAVEM II's authorized strength was 350 military observers and 90 police observers. There were also a civilian air unit and a medical unit, as well as some 87 international and 155 local civilian staff. In May 1992, the Secretary-General recommended, and the Security Council agreed, to increase the police strength of the Mission to 126 officers. Military and police observers were provided by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, former Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe. In addition, during the polling, the Electoral Division fielded a total of 400 electoral observers. They were of some 90 nationalities and included staff members from the United Nations system and observers contributed by Member States. UNAVEM II's military and police observers also participated in the observation of the electoral process.

As of 30 June 1994, military and police personnel were contributed by the following countries:

COUNTRY	POLICE	TROOPS	OBSERVERS
Argentina	3		2
Brazil	3	11	7
Congo			2
Guinea Bissau			2
Hungary			4
India			3
Jordan			2
Malaysia	3		1
Morocco	2		
Netherlands	2		2
New Zealand			3
Nigeria			5
Norway			4
Slovak Republic			5
Sweden			3
Zimbabwe	2		5
TOTAL	15	11	50

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The annual cost to the United Nations of UNAVEM II is approximately \$25 million. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 April 1994, total contributions outstanding to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II) amounted to approximately \$31 million.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND STATEMENTS BY ITS PRESIDENT

(30 May 1991 - 30 June 1994)

SECURITY COUNCIL

Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. All United Nations Member States have agreed to accept and carry out the Council's decisions in accordance with the Charter. The Council is composed of 15 members. Five are permanent: China, France, the Russian Federation,* the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The 10 non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly to serve two-year terms. Since 1991, the year in which UNAVEM II was established, non-permanent members of the Security Council were as follows:

1991 — Austria, Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Romania, Yemen, Zaire and Zimbabwe.

1992 — Austria, Belgium, Cape Verde, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Japan, Morocco, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

1993 — Brazil, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain and Venezuela.

1994 — Argentina, Brazil, Czech Republic, Djibouti, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda and Spain.

Each member of the Security Council has one vote. Decisions on substantive matters require nine affirmative votes including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. The permanent members may abstain or not participate at all in the voting, and still satisfy the stipulation of their concurrence in the affirmative vote. A negative vote by any permanent member means the rejection of the draft resolution or proposal.

* * * * *

Between 30 May 1991 and 30 June 1994, the Council adopted 14 resolutions directly relating to the situation in Angola. In addition, the President of the Security Council issued 15 statements in this connection. A short summary and the full text of those resolutions and statements are reproduced on the following pages.

* The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 24 December 1991, the President of the Russian Federation informed the Secretary-General that the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United Nations, including the Security Council and all the organs and organizations of the United Nations system, was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS: SUMMARY

RESOLUTION 696 (1991)

30 May 1991

The Council welcomes the decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to conclude the "Acordos de Paz para Angola", and decides to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission and to establish UNAVEM II for a period of 17 months.

RESOLUTION 747 (1992)

24 March 1992

The Council welcomes the Secretary-General's appointment of a Special Representative for Angola, and approves the Secretary-General's recommendations concerning the operational plan for United Nations observation of the elections and the enlargement of UNAVEM II.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

7 July 1992 (S/24249)

The Council voices concern over constraints holding back the peace process, and over the political and security situation in Angola. It calls for agreement on a Code of Electoral Conduct and cooperation with the Special Representative and all United Nations specialized agencies working in the electoral process.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

18 September 1992 (S/24573)

The Council calls on the Angolan parties to take urgent and determined steps to complete measures including the demobilization of remaining troops, the collection and centralized storage of weapons and a rapid completion of the formation of the National Angolan Armed Forces.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

6 October 1992 (S/24623)

The Council expresses concern at reports that one of the parties is contesting the validity of the election, and announces that it has decided to send to Angola as quickly as possible an ad hoc commission, composed of members of the Council, to support the implementation of the peace agreements.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

8 October 1992 (S/24639)

The Council notes that members of the ad hoc Commission are Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation and the United States.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

19 October 1992 (S/24683)

The Council welcomes the contribution of the ad hoc Commission to reducing the tension in Angola, and notes the announcement by the Special Representative that the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 can be considered to have been generally free and fair.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

27 October 1992 (S/24720)

The Council expresses serious concern at the deterioration of the political situation and rising tension in Angola, calls upon the parties to the Peace Accords to respect their commitments and the results of the elections.

RESOLUTION 785**30 October 1992**

The Council supports the statement by the Special Representative certifying that the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 were generally free and fair, urges the leaders of the two parties to engage in a dialogue so as to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held promptly and reiterates its readiness to consider all appropriate measures under the Charter to secure implementation of the "Acordos de Paz".

RESOLUTION 793**30 November 1992**

The Council demands that the two parties immediately stop all military confrontations and strongly appeals to the two parties to engage in a continuous and meaningful dialogue. It reaffirms it will hold responsible any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT**2 December 1992 (S/24884)**

The Council expresses deep concern and outrage about the increasing number of attacks against United Nations personnel serving in various peace-keeping operations, including an incident in which a police observer with UNAVEM II was killed.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT**22 December 1992 (S/25002)**

The Council reiterates its strong appeal to the two parties to engage in a continuous and meaningful dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and to agree on a clear timetable and programme of action to complete the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz".

RESOLUTION 804**29 January 1993**

The Council strongly condemns the persistent violations of the main provisions of the "Acordos de Paz", in particular the initial rejection by UNITA of the election results, its withdrawal from the new Angolan armed forces, its seizure by force of provincial capitals and municipalities and the resumption of hostilities, and demands that the two parties cease fire immediately. It also provisionally authorizes the Secretary-General to concentrate UNAVEM II deployment in Luanda because of security considerations.

RESOLUTION 811**12 March 1993**

The Council, gravely disturbed by the outbreak of heavy fighting, the large number of casualties and massive loss of human life, demands that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992. It also demands that the two parties, particularly UNITA, produce early evidence of progress towards the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and strongly condemns verbal and physical attacks against the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAVEM II personnel in Angola.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT**27 April 1993 (SC/5601)**

The Council condemns the shooting down of a plane on a humanitarian mission in Angola.

RESOLUTION 823 (1993)**30 April 1993**

The Council requests the Secretary-General to submit his recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and stresses its readiness to take action promptly to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT**14 May 1993 (SC/5617)**

The Council expresses deep concern about persistent tension in Angola and hopes that negotiations in Abidjan will produce a successful result in the nearest future.

RESOLUTION 834 (1993)**1 June 1993**

The Council condemns UNITA for its actions and armed attacks, which resulted in increased hostilities and endangered the peace process, and demands that it withdraw its troops from locations which it occupied since the resumption of hostilities. In addition, the Council holds UNITA responsible for the breakdown of talks between the Government of Angola and UNITA held in Abidjan under the auspices of the United Nations, and urges States to refrain from providing military assistance to UNITA inconsistent with the peace process. The Council also welcomes steps by the Secretary-General to strengthen humanitarian activities in Angola.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT**8 June 1993 (S/25899)**

The Council condemns UNITA's attack against a train carrying civilians as a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and of international humanitarian law.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT**30 June 1993 (SC/5662)**

The Security Council expresses concern that as a result of UNITA's failure to cooperate with the full implementation of the United Nations emergency programme, it has not been possible to continue the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and urges UNITA to extend its cooperation.

RESOLUTION 851 (1993)**15 July 1993**

The Council condemns UNITA for continuing military actions and expresses its readiness to consider the imposition of a mandatory embargo on the sale or supply to UNITA of arms and related *matériel* and other military assistance unless a cease-fire is established by 15 September 1993. It also welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement the emergency humanitarian assistance plan.

RESOLUTION 864 (1993)**15 September 1993**

Determining that, as a result of UNITA's military actions, the situation in Angola constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the Council decides to impose an embargo of arms and petroleum and petroleum products on UNITA within 10 days unless a cease-fire and other agreements are reached.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

24 September 1993 (SC/5706/Rev. 1)

The Council insists that UNITA fully respect and abide by the Bicesse Accords, urges the parties to make every effort to restart negotiations, and notes that mandatory sanctions will be imposed if provisions of resolution 864 are not satisfied.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

1 November 1993 (S/26677)

The Council notes the exploratory talks in Lusaka, Zambia, under the auspices of the United Nations, as well as recent actions taken by both parties, including the lessening of hostilities. It expresses its concern that not enough progress has yet been made towards the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Council, and it expresses its readiness to consider the immediate imposition of further measures at any time it observes that UNITA is not cooperating in good faith. The Council also encourages the Secretary-General to carry out urgent contingency planning for the possible augmentation of the existing strength of UNAVEM II in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

RESOLUTION 890 (1993)

15 December 1993

The Council reaffirms the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and UNAVEM II. Welcoming the resumption of direct negotiations in Lusaka under the auspices of the United Nations, the Council decides not to impose at present the additional measures against UNITA but reiterates its readiness either to impose such additional measures or to review those in effect.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

10 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/7)

The Council notes progress made in talks in Lusaka, and welcomes the improvement in the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance, while acknowledging that the overall situation remains serious.

RESOLUTION 903 (1994)

16 March 1994

The Council calls upon both parties to honour the commitments made by them at the talks in Lusaka. The Council also declares its readiness to consider authorizing the increase of the strength of UNAVEM II to its previous level.

RESOLUTION 922 (1994)

31 May 1994

The Council deplores the resurgence of military actions in Angola along with the deterioration in the humanitarian situation. It stresses that its future decision concerning Angola will take into account the extent to which the parties demonstrate their political will to achieve a lasting peace.

RESOLUTION 932 (1994)

30 June 1994

The Council welcomes the formal acceptance by the Government of the Republic of Angola of the proposals on national reconciliation and strongly urges UNITA to do likewise, and declares its readiness to impose additional measures against UNITA if by 31 July 1994 UNITA has not formally accepted the complete set of proposals on national reconciliation. It also reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the embargo provisions of resolution 864 (1993).

RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS: FULL TEXT

RESOLUTION 696 (1991)

30 May 1991

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Welcoming the decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to conclude the "Acordos de Paz para Angola",

Stressing the importance it attaches to the signing of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola" and to the fulfilment by the parties in good faith of the obligations contained therein,

Stressing further the importance of all States refraining from taking any actions which could undermine the agreements mentioned above and contributing to their implementation as well as respecting fully the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola,

Noting with satisfaction the decision taken by the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba to complete the withdrawal, ahead of schedule, of all Cuban troops from Angola by 25 May 1991 (S/22644),

Considering the request submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the People's Republic of Angola in its letter dated 8 May 1991 (S/22609),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 May 1991 (S/22627) and the addendum dated 29 May 1991 (S/22627/Add.1),

Taking into account that the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) established by Security Council resolution 626 (1988) of 20 December 1988 expires on 22 July 1991,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 May 1991 (S/22627) and the addendum dated 29 May 1991 (S/22627/Add.1) and the recommendations therein;

2. Decides accordingly to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) (henceforth UNAVEM II) as proposed by the Secretary-

General in line with the "Acordos de Paz para Angola" and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect;

3. Further decides to establish UNAVEM II for a period of 17 months from the date of adoption of this resolution in order to accomplish the objectives stated in the report of the Secretary-General (S/22627);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council immediately after the signature of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola" and to keep the Council fully informed of further developments.

RESOLUTION 747 (1992)

24 March 1992

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 which decided to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) as proposed by the Secretary-General in line with the "Acordos de Paz para Angola",

Welcoming the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General to implement fully the mandate entrusted to UNAVEM II,

Noting with satisfaction the efforts made so far by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to maintain the cease-fire and **expressing concern** over the delays and gaps in the completion of some major tasks arising from the "Acordos de Paz",

Stressing again the importance it attaches to the fulfilment by the parties in good faith of all obligations contained in the "Acordos de Paz",

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary-General of a Special Representative for Angola who will be in charge of all current and projected activities of the United Nations in connection with the "Acordos de Paz" and will also be the Chief of UNAVEM II,

Taking into account the further report of the Secretary-General dated 31 October 1991 (S/23191),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 3 March 1992 (S/23671) and the addendum dated 20 March 1992 (S/23671/Add.1),

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General dated 3 March 1992 (S/23671) and the recommendations contained therein concerning the operational plan for United Nations observation of the elections and the enlargement of UNAVEM II;

2. Calls upon the Angolan parties to cooperate fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with UNAVEM II, including in the discharge of its expanded mandate;

3. Underlines the necessity recalled in paragraph 18 of the report of the Secretary-General that the United Nations electoral mission will have the explicit agreement of the two parties to the "Acordos de Paz";

4. Decides to enlarge the mandate of UNAVEM II to include the mission provided for in paragraph 22 of the report of the Secretary-General for the remainder of its existing mandate period;

5. Urges the Angolan parties to comply scrupulously with the provisions of the "Acordos de Paz" and with the agreed deadlines; and to this end, to proceed without delay with the demobilization of their troops, formation of a unified national armed force, effective operation of joint police monitoring units, extension of the central administration and other major tasks;

6. Calls upon the Angolan authorities and parties to finalize political, legal, organizational and budgetary preparations for free and fair multi-party elections to be held in September 1992 and to make available as soon as possible all available resources for the electoral process;

7. Encourages all States to contribute voluntarily and requests the United Nations programmes and specialized agencies to provide the assistance and support necessary to prepare for free and fair multi-party elections in Angola;

8. Urges the parties to establish as soon as possible a precise timetable for the electoral process in Angola so that elections can take place at the date fixed and

requests the Secretary-General to extend his cooperation to this end;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of developments and to submit a further report to the Council within three months of the adoption of this resolution.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 7 July 1992

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3092nd meeting, on 7 July 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Further report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)":

The Security Council has considered carefully the report of the Secretary-General (S/24145 and Corr. 1) on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), and notes the efforts of the Angolan parties to implement commitments agreed to in the "Acordos de Paz para Angola". It commends the efforts of the Angolans to move their country towards free and fair multiparty elections on 29 and 30 September 1992 in accordance with the established timetable. There is no viable alternative to this. The Security Council calls on all interested parties to cooperate fully with the electoral process to ensure that elections are free and fair.

The Council re-emphasizes the observation of the Secretary-General in his report, that Angola being a sovereign and independent country, the organization and supervision of all tasks under the Peace Accords is the responsibility of the Angolan parties themselves. Nevertheless, the Council, which has mandated United Nations observation and verification of the peace process, at the request of the Angolan parties, remains seriously concerned at some constraints holding back the process at the moment.

The maintenance of peace since May 1991, and the commitment by all parties to the electoral process, are encouraging. Nevertheless, the Council reaffirms the importance it attaches to the fulfilment by the parties in good faith of all obligations contained in the "Acordos de Paz para Angola". In this connection, it strongly

appeals to the Government and UNITA to overcome rapidly the delays and inadequacies described in the report, and increase the momentum of progress on the issues of confinement of troops and weapons, demobilization and the formation of the new armed forces and police.

The Council also expresses its concern at the political and security situation in Angola, which requires the greatest restraint. Violent incidents, mutual accusations and hostile propaganda should be terminated and give way to tolerance, cooperation, and reconciliation. It is imperative to agree, without delay, on a brief and clear Code of Electoral Conduct and to ensure that everybody is allowed freedom of movement and speech and the ability to register to vote without fear in all areas of the country. The Council calls on the Government and all parties to work closely with the Special Representative and all United Nations specialized agencies engaged in the electoral process to ensure that voter registration is conducted in accordance with established procedures and completed in a timely manner.

The Security Council calls on both parties to devote all available resources to preparations for the elections in order that their commitment to elections on 29 and 30 September 1992 may be met and welcomes with appreciation commitments by donor countries to provide all support for all vital tasks relating to the final three months of the peace process. Since the logistical difficulties are major constraints on the process, the Council strongly appeals to the Member States concerned to provide the promised assistance expeditiously and urges Member States as well as the United Nations agencies to display flexibility and pragmatism in this cooperation to ensure that a successful conclusion of the Angolan operation leads to stability and prosperity in Angola.

The Security Council calls on all parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of UNAVEM staff and property.

The Security Council will continue to keep the situation in Angola under close review and looks forward to a further report by the Secretary-General at the beginning of the electoral campaign.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 18 September 1992

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council at its 3115th meeting, on 18 September 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Further report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) (S/24556)":

The Security Council has noted with appreciation the further report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) (S/24556), which it has studied carefully.

It reaffirms the importance it attaches to the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola", culminating in free and fair multi-party elections on 29 and 30 September 1992. It congratulates the Angolans on their success in maintaining the cease-fire and in registering the great majority of the population to vote in the elections. It is convinced of the irreversibility of this process.

At the same time, the Council calls on the Angolan parties to take urgent and determined steps to complete certain essential measures. These include the demobilization of the remaining Government and UNITA troops, the collection and centralized storage of weapons, and the rapid completion of the formation of the new National Angolan Armed Forces. It is also essential that the police should operate as a neutral, national force.

The Council is also concerned at the recent deterioration of the political and security situation in Angola. It endorses the Secretary-General's appeal to President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi to exercise leadership at this critical juncture and to ensure that their followers act with restraint and tolerance. The Council is encouraged by the reports of positive decisions reached by the two leaders at their meeting on 7 September 1992 and urges them to implement these without delay. Of particular importance is their reported agreement in principle to the formation of a government of national reconciliation after the elections.

The Council calls upon the Angolan electoral authorities to ensure that all registered persons are given the

opportunity to exercise their vote and to extend polling hours on the second day, if this should prove necessary. The Council also underlines the importance of adequate logistical planning and support and urges the donor community to move speedily to provide the remaining requirements identified in the Secretary-General's report.

The Council is concerned that doubts have recently been expressed in Angola about UNAVEM's effectiveness and impartiality and welcomes the decision of the Secretary-General as expressed in paragraph 9 of his report to investigate thoroughly all matters raised in this regard. It expresses strong support for the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and commends UNAVEM II personnel who are tackling their challenging tasks with courage, impartiality and dedication. It urges the Angolan parties to continue to cooperate closely with the United Nations and to take all necessary steps to ensure the security of United Nations personnel and property.

The Council takes note of a reported agreement between the Government and UNITA that the United Nations should be asked to extend UNAVEM's presence in Angola during the period of transition after the elections. It will be prepared to consider such a request if it is based on wide support in Angola and if it proposes for UNAVEM a mandate which is clearly defined in scope and time.

The Security Council will continue to keep the situation in Angola under close review and looks forward to a further report by the Secretary-General after the elections.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 6 October 1992

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3120th meeting, on 6 October 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Oral report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)":

The Security Council has followed closely the electoral process which took place in Angola on 29 and 30

September 1992 in accordance with resolution 696 (1991), which it adopted on 30 May 1991 following the peace agreements. The Council is gratified that the presidential and parliamentary elections were held throughout the country in a calm atmosphere and with the participation of a large number of voters. It also wishes to express once again its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and its gratitude for the outstanding efforts that she has made, together with all the personnel of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), to ensure the implementation of that resolution and in particular the smooth conduct of the electoral process.

The Council expresses its concern at the reports it has received, according to which one of the parties to the peace agreements is contesting the validity of the elections. It is also concerned that certain Generals belonging to the same party have announced their intention of withdrawing from the new Angolan Armed Forces.

The Council calls upon all the parties to respect the obligations they have assumed within the framework of the peace agreements, and in particular the obligation to respect the final election results. Any challenge must be settled through the mechanisms established for that purpose.

The Security Council has decided to send to Angola as quickly as possible an ad hoc commission, composed of members of the Council, to support the implementation of the peace agreements, in close cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The membership of this Commission will be established in the near future following consultations among the members of the Council.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 8 October 1992

1. The President of the Security Council has the honour to refer to the statement which he made at the 3120th meeting of the Council, on 6 October 1992, in connection with the situation in Angola (S/24623).

2. In this statement mention was made, in particular, of the decision by the Security Council to send to Angola

as quickly as possible an ad hoc Commission, composed of members of the Council, to support the implementation of the peace agreements, in close cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The statement also indicated that the membership of that Commission would be established in the near future following consultations among the members of the Council.

3. In accordance with this decision, the President has held consultations with the members of the Council. Following these consultations, the members have agreed that the ad hoc Commission should comprise the following four members of the Council: Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT (To the press) 19 October 1992

After consultations held on 19 October 1992, the President of the Security Council issued the following statement to the media on behalf of the members of the Council:

The members of the Security Council heard on 19 October an oral report of the members of the ad hoc Commission of the Council which was dispatched to Angola from 11 to 14 October 1992.

They expressed gratitude to the members of this Commission and welcomed its contribution to reducing the tension in Angola and to finding a solution to the difficulties that arose after the elections of 29 and 30 September 1992.

The members of the Security Council once again called upon the parties to abide by all the commitments entered into within the framework of the peace agreements and to refrain from any action that could increase the tension.

The members of the Security Council noted with satisfaction that in her public announcement of 17 October 1992 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Angola certified that, with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 can be considered to have been generally free and fair.

They also noted with satisfaction that the leaders of the two parties to the peace agreements agreed to start a dialogue with a view to the completion of the presidential elections.

The members of the Security Council look forward to the recommendations of the Secretary-General on the contribution of the United Nations to ensuring the completion of the presidential elections. They are ready to act without delay on the basis of these recommendations.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 27 October 1992

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3126th meeting, held on 27 October 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Letter dated 27 October 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council":

The Security Council has taken note of the letter dated 27 October 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council concerning the situation in Angola. It expresses its serious concern at the deterioration of the political situation and the rising tension in that country.

It once again calls on the parties to the Peace Accords to respect all the commitments undertaken in accordance with these accords, in particular with regard to the confinement of their troops and weapons, demobilization, and formation of the unified national Armed Force. It also calls on the parties to refrain from any act that might heighten tension, impair the conduct of the electoral process and threaten the territorial integrity of Angola.

The Security Council calls on UNITA and the other parties in the electoral process in Angola to respect the results of the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992, which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General certified as being generally free and fair. It urges the leaders of the two parties to the Peace Accords to engage in a dialogue without delay so as to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held. The Security Council will hold responsible

any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue, thereby jeopardizing the entire process.

The Security Council strongly condemns the attacks and baseless accusations made by Vorgan radio of UNITA against the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II). It calls for the immediate cessation of these attacks and accusations, and reiterates its full support for the Special Representative and for UNAVEM II.

The Security Council reiterates its readiness to act without delay on the basis of recommendations that the Secretary-General might make concerning the contribution of the United Nations to the completion of the electoral process.

RESOLUTION 785 (1992) **30 October 1992**

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992,

Recalling also the statement made on its behalf by the President of the Security Council on 27 October 1992 (S/24720),

Taking note of the letter of the Secretary-General dated 29 October 1992 (S/24736), in which he recommends an extension of the existing mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for an interim period,

Deeply concerned at the deterioration of the political situation and the rising tension in Angola,

Deeply concerned also at the reports of the recent resumption of hostilities by UNITA in Luanda and Huambo,

Affirming that any party which fails to abide by all the commitments entered into under the "Acordos de Paz para Angola" will be rejected by the international community, and that the results of use of force will not be accepted,

1. Approves the recommendation of the Secretary-General to extend the existing mandate of UNAVEM II for an interim period, until 30 November 1992;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it by that date a detailed report on the situation in Angola together with long-term recommendations, accompanied by the financial implications thereof, on the mandate and strength of UNAVEM II;

3. Strongly condemns any such resumption of hostilities and **urgently demands** that such acts cease forthwith;

4. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which directly or indirectly could jeopardize the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and increase the tension in the country;

5. Reiterates its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAVEM II, and its strong condemnation of the attacks and baseless accusations made by UNITA's radio station, Vorgan, against the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAVEM II;

6. Supports the statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General certifying that the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 were generally free and fair and **calls upon** UNITA and the other parties to the electoral process in Angola to respect the results of the elections;

7. Calls upon the parties to the "Acordos de Paz" to abide by all the commitments entered into under the Accords, in particular with regard to the confinement of their troops and collection of their weapons, demobilization and the formation of the unified national armed force, and to refrain from any act that might heighten tension, jeopardize the continued conduct of the electoral process and threaten the territorial integrity of Angola;

8. Urges the leaders of the two parties to engage in a dialogue without delay so as to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held promptly;

9. Reaffirms that it will hold responsible any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue, thereby jeopardizing the entire process, and **reiterates** its readiness to consider all appropriate measures under the Charter

of the United Nations to secure implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

10. Decides to remain seized of the question.

RESOLUTION 793 (1992) **30 November 1992**

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992 and 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992,

Taking note of the further report of the Secretary-General of 25 November 1992 (S/24858 and Add.1),

Deeply concerned by deterioration in the political and military situation in Angola and especially by the troop movements which have taken place and by the hostilities which occurred on 31 October and 1 November 1992,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at resolving the present crisis,

Disturbed by the continuing non-implementation of major aspects of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola",

Reiterating its support for the statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General that the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 were generally free and fair and **taking note** of the acceptance by UNITA of the results of the elections,

Noting the intention of the Secretary-General to continue, in this as in other peace-keeping operations, to monitor expenditures carefully during this period of increasing demands on peace-keeping resources,

1. Approves the recommendation of the Secretary-General to extend the existing mandate of UNAVEM II for a further period of two months until 31 January 1993;

2. Appeals to the troop and police contributing States to lend cooperation to UNAVEM II in order to restore as soon as possible its mandated strength;

3. Welcomes the joint declaration of the Government of Angola and UNITA made in Namibe on 26 November

1992 and **urges** them to take immediate and effective actions in accordance with the declaration;

4. Demands that the two parties scrupulously observe the cease-fire, immediately stop all military confrontations, and in particular offensive troop movements, and create all the conditions necessary for the completion of the peace process;

5. Urges the two parties to demonstrate their adherence to, and fulfilment without exception of, the "Acordos de Paz" in particular with regard to the confinement of their troops and collection of their weapons, demobilization and the formation of the unified national armed force and to refrain from any action which might heighten tension or jeopardize the return to normalcy;

6. Strongly appeals to the two parties to engage in a continuous and meaningful dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process and to agree on a clear timetable for the fulfilment of their commitments in accordance with the "Acordos de Paz";

7. Reaffirms that it will hold responsible any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue, thereby jeopardizing the entire process, and **reiterates** its readiness to consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to secure implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

8. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which directly or indirectly could jeopardize the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and increase the tension in the country;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it by 31 January 1993 a further report on the situation in Angola together with his longer-term recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process, which should be clearly defined in scope and time and based on a wide degree of support in Angola;

10. Decides to remain seized of the question.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

(To the press)

2 December 1992

After consultations held on 2 December 1992, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the media on behalf of the members of the Council:

The members of the Security Council wish to express their deep concern and outrage about the increasing number of attacks against United Nations personnel serving in various peace-keeping operations.

A number of serious incidents affecting military and civilian personnel serving with UNAVEM II, UNTAC and UNPROFOR have occurred during the last few days.

On 29 November in Uige, northern Angola, a Brazilian police observer with UNAVEM II was killed as a result of an outbreak of hostilities between UNITA and government forces, during which the UNAVEM camp was caught in the crossfire. The members of the Council convey their deep sympathy and condolences to the Government of Brazil and to the bereaved family,

The situation in UNPROFOR, which has already suffered over 300 casualties, 20 of them fatal, remains deeply troubling. On 30 November, two Spanish UNPROFOR soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina were seriously injured in a mine attack and a Danish UNPROFOR soldier was abducted by armed men today.

"On 1 December, two British UNTAC military observers and four naval observers, two from the Philippines, one from New Zealand and one from the United Kingdom, on patrol in Kompong Thom province were illegally detained by forces belonging to the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). An UNTAC helicopter, sent to assist in the discussions for their release, was fired upon, and a French military observer on board was injured. Moreover, today, six UNTAC civilian police monitors, three Indonesians, two Tunisians and one Nepalese, were injured in two land mine incidents in Siem Reap province.

The members of the Council condemn these attacks on the safety and security of UN personnel and demand that all parties concerned take all necessary measures to prevent their recurrence. The members of the Council consider the abduction and detention of United Nations

peace-keeping personnel as totally unacceptable and demand the immediate and unconditional release of the UNTAC and UNPROFOR personnel concerned.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

22 December 1992

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3152nd meeting, held on 22 December 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Letter dated 18 December 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council":

The Security Council has taken note of the letter dated 18 December 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council (S/24996) concerning the situation in Angola. It expresses serious concern at the lack of progress in implementing the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola' and at the continuation of the dangerous political and security situation in the country.

The Security Council reiterates its strong appeal to the two parties to engage in a continuous and meaningful dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process, and to agree on a clear timetable and programme of action to complete the implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz'. The Security Council urges that the military forces of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) be immediately withdrawn from Uige and Negage and that the Government administration be fully restored there and that the two parties resume the direct talks started in Namibe on 26 November 1992. It again urges both parties to demonstrate their commitment to the 'Acordos de Paz', in particular with regard to confinement of their troops and collection of their weapons, demobilization, formation of the national armed forces and restoration of the central administration throughout the country.

The Security Council also considers it essential that both parties agree without delay on security and other arrangements which would allow all ministers and other high-ranking officials to occupy the posts which have

been offered by the Government and for all deputies to assume their functions in the National Assembly.

The Security Council also considers it imperative that both parties agree on a realistic plan of action for full implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz', and to facilitate a continuing United Nations presence in Angola. It underlines the need for the two sides to produce early evidence of their willingness and ability to work together to implement the 'Acordos de Paz', so that the international community would feel encouraged to continue to commit its scarce resources to the continuation of the United Nations operation in Angola on its present scale.

The Security Council fully supports the action of the Secretary-General aimed at resolving the present crisis and appeals to President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi to accept the Secretary-General's invitation to attend, under his auspices, a joint meeting at an agreed location, to confirm that real progress has been made in the reactivation of the Bicesse Accords with a view to their full implementation and that agreement has been reached on a continuing United Nations presence in Angola.

RESOLUTION 804 (1993)

29 January 1993

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992 and 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992,

Having considered the further report of the Secretary-General dated 21 January 1993 (S/25140 and Add.1),

Having considered also the request submitted to the Secretary-General by the Government of Angola in its letter dated 21 January 1993 (S/25155),

Gravely disturbed by the recent outbreak of heavy fighting in many parts of Angola and the further deteri-

oration of the already dangerous political and military situation in that country,

Gravely concerned at the continuing non-implementation of the major provisions of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola",

Concerned at the recent absence of dialogue between the Government of Angola and UNITA, and welcoming the meeting between them under United Nations auspices in Addis Ababa to discuss the cease-fire and political matters,

Also concerned at the outrageous harassment and physical abuse to which UNAVEM II personnel have been subjected, and the looting and destruction of United Nations property, as described in the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General,

Further concerned at reports of foreign support for and involvement in military actions in Angola,

Regretting that the deteriorating situation has made it increasingly difficult for UNAVEM II to carry out its mandate,

Recalling that democratic elections were held on 29 and 30 September 1992, which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General certified as being generally free and fair, and that steps have been taken to set up a Government of National Unity which would reflect the results of the legislative elections, and **deeply regretting** the failure of UNITA to take part in the political institutions thus established,

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Recognizing that the Angolans themselves bear ultimate responsibility for the restoration of peace and national reconciliation of their country,

Reiterating its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at resolving the present crisis and resuming the political process, in particular through the completion of the electoral process,

1. Notes with appreciation the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General;

2. Strongly condemns the persistent violations of the main provisions of the "Acordos de Paz", in particular the initial rejection by UNITA of the election results, its

withdrawal from the new Angolan armed forces, its seizure by force of provincial capitals and municipalities and the resumption of hostilities;

3. Demands that the two parties cease fire immediately, restore at their meeting in Addis Ababa continued and meaningful dialogue, and agree on a clear timetable for the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", in particular with regard to confinement of their troops and collection of their weapons, demobilization and formation of the unified national armed forces, effective restoration of the Government administration throughout the country, the completion of the electoral process and the free circulation of people and goods;

4. Supports fully the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their continuing efforts to restore the peace process and to carry out the mandate of UN-AVEM II under extremely difficult conditions;

5. Urges once again the two parties, and in particular UNITA, to produce early evidence of their adherence to, and fulfilment without exception of, the "Acordos de Paz";

6. Appeals strongly to the Government of Angola and UNITA to confirm as soon as possible to the Secretary-General that real progress has been made towards implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

7. Appeals to all Member States to render economic and technical assistance to the Government of Angola for reconstruction and development of the country;

8. Calls upon all Member States to support all those concerned in their efforts for the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

9. Urges all Member States to take all necessary steps to stop immediately and effectively any direct or indirect military or paramilitary interference from their territories and to respect scrupulously the provisions of the "Acordos de Paz" concerning the cessation of supply of lethal material to any Angolan party;

10. Strongly condemns violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the attacks against the civilian population, including the extensive killings carried out by armed civilians, and **calls upon** both parties to abide by their obligations thereunder and the appropriate provisions of the "Acordos de Paz";

11. Demands that UNITA immediately release foreign nationals taken hostage;

12. Strongly condemns attacks against UNAVEM II personnel in Angola, and **demands** that the Government and UNITA take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security;

13. Expresses its condolences to the family of the UNAVEM II police observer who lost his life;

14. Approves the recommendation of the Secretary-General to maintain a Special Representative for Angola based in Luanda, with the necessary civilian, military and police staff with the mandate as described in paragraph 29 of the report of the Secretary-General;

15. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months until 30 April 1993, with the proviso that, as a provisional measure based on security considerations, the Secretary-General is authorized to concentrate UNAVEM II deployment in Luanda, and at his discretion in other provincial locations, with the levels of equipment and personnel he deems appropriate to be retained in order to allow the subsequent expeditious redeployment of UNAVEM II as soon as this becomes feasible, with a view to the resumption of its functions in accordance with the "Acordos de Paz" and previous resolutions on this matter;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 30 April 1993, a report on the situation in Angola together with his recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process, and in the meantime to keep the Council regularly informed;

17. Stresses its readiness to take action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process;

18. Reiterates its readiness to consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to secure implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

19. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 811 (1993)

12 March 1993

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992 and 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993,

Gravely disturbed by the recent outbreak of heavy fighting in many parts of Angola, the large number of casualties and massive loss of human life which have ensued and the further deterioration of the already dangerous political and military situation, bringing the country to the verge of the resumption of civil war,

Gravely concerned at the persistent violations by UNITA of the major provisions of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola",

Further concerned at reports that military support and equipment continue to flow in contravention of the "Acordos de Paz",

Noting with particular concern that a humanitarian tragedy of grave proportions is developing in Angola and the need, therefore, for increased international humanitarian assistance,

Deeply regretting that the second meeting between the delegations of the Government of Angola and UNITA, which had been scheduled to be held on 26 February 1993 in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the United Nations, did not take place because of the failure by UNITA to fulfil its commitment to send a delegation to Addis Ababa,

Noting with satisfaction the readiness displayed by the Government of Angola to participate in the Addis Ababa meeting,

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at resolving the present crisis through negotiations,

1. Strongly condemns the persistent violations by UNITA of the major provisions of the "Acordos de Paz", in

particular the continued rejection by UNITA of the results of the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General determined as generally free and fair, its failure to take part in the political institutions established on the basis of those elections, its failure to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Government of Angola, its withdrawal from the new Angolan armed forces, its seizure by force of provincial capitals and municipalities and the resumption of hostilities;

2. Demands that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the "Acordos de Paz", and **further demands** that the two parties, particularly UNITA, produce early evidence, not later than 30 March 1993, that real progress has been made towards the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

3. Strongly demands an immediate cease-fire throughout the country, and **further demands** the resumption without delay and without preconditions of a continued and meaningful dialogue under United Nations auspices so that a clear time-table for the completion of the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" may be established;

4. Reaffirms that it will hold responsible any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue, thereby jeopardizing the entire process, and will consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to advance the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

5. Strongly condemns verbal and physical attacks against the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAVEM II personnel in Angola, and **demands** that these attacks cease forthwith and that the Government of Angola and UNITA take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security;

6. Condemns the kidnapping of a UNAVEM II military observer in Cabinda on 23 February 1993 and **demands** that he be released unharmed and unconditionally and without further delay;

7. Supports fully the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their continuing efforts to restore the peace process and to carry out the mandate of UN-AVEM II under extremely difficult conditions;

8. Invites the Secretary-General to seek to organize a meeting between the Government of Angola and UNITA at the highest possible level with a view to securing the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", this meeting to take place in good time before 30 April 1993 and to consider also the future role of the United Nations in Angola, and **encourages** the parties to respond positively;

9. Requests the Secretary-General, pending the submission of the report referred to in paragraph 16 of resolution 804 (1993), to present as soon as possible a progress report on the efforts for the resumption of the talks between the two parties in Angola at all appropriate levels;

10. Calls on all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to accord or increase humanitarian relief assistance to Angola and encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, with the resources at her disposal, to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need;

11. Strongly appeals to both parties strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need;

12. Appeals once again to all Member States to render economic, material and technical assistance to the Government of Angola for the reconstruction and development of the country;

13. Looks forward to the report of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 16 of resolution 804 (1993) on the situation in Angola together with his recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process;

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

(To the press)

27 April 1993

Following consultations held this afternoon, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the press:

The members of the Security Council are deeply concerned by the report on the shooting down in Angola by National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces of the 'Antonov-12' plane on a humanitarian mission in the framework for the World Food Programme (WFP), resulting in the severe injuries of the two Russian members of the crew.

The members of the Council strongly condemn this outrageous hostile act against the civilian airplane, which undermines the efforts of the international community to provide humanitarian relief to the suffering population in Angola.

The members of the Council demand that UNITA takes all necessary measures to prevent recurrence of such acts of violence against international humanitarian agencies and their personnel and reiterate that persons who commit or order the commission of such acts should be held personally responsible.

The members of the Council pay tribute to the courage and commitment of these dedicated people who accept considerable personal risk in order to provide humanitarian relief assistance to the Angolan population.

RESOLUTION 823 (1993) 30 April 1993

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993 and 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993,

Recalling its resolution 804 (1993), in particular its paragraph 15, by which it decided to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months until 30 April 1993,

Extending its support to the current and ongoing peace talks in Abidjan between the Government of Angola and UNITA under United Nations auspices and chairmanship and expressing the hope that those talks will

result in an immediate cease-fire and in the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Gravely concerned at the continuing attacks against international humanitarian flights operating in Angola, in particular the recent shooting down of a World Food Programme airplane,

Taking into account the letter dated 29 April 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,

1. Decides to extend the existing mandate of UNAVEM II until 31 May 1993;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 31 May 1993, a report on the situation in Angola with his recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and in the meantime to keep the Council regularly informed;

3. Stresses its readiness to take action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process;

4. Condemns the attacks against international humanitarian flights operating in Angola and demands that these attacks cease forthwith and that both parties, in particular UNITA, take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of these flights as well as the security of UNAVEM II personnel;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

(To the press)

14 May 1993

Following consultations held this afternoon, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the press:

Members of the Security Council are deeply concerned about persistent tension in Angola.

In that connection, they support talks in Abidjan and express the hope that those negotiations will produce a successful result in the nearest future.

Members of the Security Council believe that the Council should remain seized with the situation in Angola and take further appropriate steps to support the peace process.

RESOLUTION 834 (1993) 1 June 1993

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993 and 823 (1993) of 30 April 1993,

Having considered the further report (S/25840 and Add. 1) of the Secretary-General dated 25 May 1993,

Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the political and military situation, and **noting** with consternation the further deterioration of an already grave humanitarian situation,

Gravely concerned at the failure of the talks between the Government of Angola and UNITA held in Abidjan under the auspices of the United Nations and the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with participation of the representatives of the three observer States to the Angolan peace process – Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America – and in particular at the failure to establish a cease-fire,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations,

Emphasizing the importance of a continued and effective United Nations presence in Angola, with a view to fostering the peace process and advancing the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

1. Decides to extend the existing mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for a period of forty-five days until 15 July 1993 in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Secretary-General's report (S/25840 and Add.1);

2. Stresses the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process for the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

3. Reiterates its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the "Acordos de Paz";

4. Condemns UNITA for its actions and armed attacks, which have resulted in increased hostilities and which endanger the peace process, and **demand**s that it immediately cease such actions and armed attacks;

5. Welcomes the disposition of the Government of Angola to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict in conformity with the "Acordos de Paz" and pertinent Security Council resolutions, **deeply regrets** UNITA's refusal at the talks to agree to the withdrawal of its troops from the locations which it has occupied since the resumption of the hostilities, and **demand**s that it do so;

6. Affirms that such occupation is a grave violation of the "Acordos de Paz";

7. Strongly appeals to the two parties, and in particular to UNITA, to re-initiate as soon as possible the interrupted peace talks under United Nations auspices with a view to the earliest establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", further undertakings between the two parties, and relevant resolutions of the Security Council, due account being taken of what was achieved during the discussion of the Abidjan draft protocol;

8. Holds UNITA responsible for the breakdown of the talks and for thereby jeopardizing the peace process, and reaffirms that it will consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to advance the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

9. Supports fully the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at restoring the peace process and at carrying out the mandate of UNAVEM II under extremely difficult conditions;

10. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which directly or indirectly could jeopardize the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", and **urges** all States to refrain from providing any form of direct or indirect military assistance or other support to UNITA inconsistent with the peace process;

11. Welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen the humanitarian activities being undertaken by the United Nations system in Angola under the overall coordination of the Special Representative, including the preparation of the United Nations humanitarian assistance plan for Angola, and **strongly appeals** to the Government of Angola and to UNITA to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General's efforts in this field;

12. Calls on all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to respond swiftly and generously to the Secretary-General's appeal in implementation of the above-mentioned plan and to accord or increase humanitarian relief assistance to Angola, and **encourages** the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to continue to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

13. Reiterates its appeal to both parties strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including to guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need, and **commends** in particular the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to establish agreed humanitarian relief corridors;

14. Reiterates its appeal to both parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and the safety of the personnel involved in humanitarian relief operations;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 15 July 1993, a report on the situation in Angola with his recommendation for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep the Council regularly informed of developments;

16. Reiterates its readiness to take action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process;

17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 8 June 1993

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3232nd meeting, on 8 June 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Angola":

The Security Council received with grave concern and shock the report of the Secretary-General on the attack by UNITA forces, on 27 May 1993, between Quipungo and Matala, against a train carrying civilians, which resulted in the death of 225 persons, including women and children, and several hundred wounded.

The Security Council strongly condemns this action by UNITA, which is a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and of international humanitarian law, and it reiterates its demand that UNITA immediately cease its armed attacks. The Security Council expresses its condemnation of such criminal attacks and it stresses that those responsible must be held accountable. The Security Council urges UNITA leaders to make sure that its forces abide by the rules of international humanitarian law.

The Security Council emphasizes once again the imperative need for an immediate cease-fire throughout the country and it reiterates its appeal to the two parties, in particular UNITA, to re-initiate the interrupted peace talks with a view to the full implementation of the Acordos de Paz.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT (To the press) 30 June 1993

The following is the text of the statement read out this afternoon by the President of the Security Council following consultations of the Council:

Members of the Security Council today expressed concern that as a result of the failure of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to cooperate with the full implementation of the United Nations emergency programme, it has not been possible to continue the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected population areas in Angola, which began on 21 June.

They urged that UNITA extend its cooperation to facilitate the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance and emphasized that the Security Council would take a serious view of this matter, in the event of the failure of UNITA to extend the necessary cooperation.

Members of the Security Council have requested that their position on the implementation of the United Nations emergency programme in Angola, as reflected above, should be conveyed to UNITA in Angola.

RESOLUTION 851 (1993) 15 July 1993

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 823 (1993) of 30 April 1993 and 834 (1993) of 1 June 1993,

Having considered the further report (S/26060 and Add.2) of the Secretary-General dated 12 July 1993,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 8 June 1993 (S/25899),

Welcoming the Declaration on the Situation in Angola adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

at its Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session (S/26076), and the Resolution on the Situation in Angola adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OAU at its Fifty-eighth Ordinary Session (S/26081),

Welcoming also the joint statement issued in Moscow on 8 July 1993 by the representatives of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the three observer States to the Angolan peace process (S/26064),

Noting the Special Declaration on Angola adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna,

Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the political and military situation, and **noting** with consternation the further deterioration of an already grave humanitarian situation,

Deeply concerned that the peace talks remain suspended and that a cease-fire has not been established,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations,

Emphasizing the importance of a continued and effective United Nations presence in Angola with a view to fostering the peace process and advancing the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

1. Welcomes the further report of the Secretary-General dated 12 July 1993 and **decides** to extend the existing mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for a period of two months until 15 September 1993;

2. Reiterates its readiness to consider taking action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process;

3. Stresses the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process for the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

4. Reiterates its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the "Acordos de Paz";

5. Condemns UNITA for continuing military actions, which are resulting in increased suffering to the civilian population of Angola and damage to the Angolan economy and **again demands** that UNITA immediately cease such actions;

6. Also condemns UNITA's repeated attempts to seize additional territory and its failure to withdraw its troops from the locations which it has occupied since the resumption of the hostilities, and **demands once again** that it immediately do so and agree without delay to return its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional measure pending full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

7. Reaffirms that such occupation is a grave violation of the "Acordos de Paz" and is incompatible with the goal of peace through agreements and reconciliation;

8. Stresses the fundamental need to re-initiate without delay the peace talks under United Nations auspices with a view to the immediate establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

9. Takes note of statements by UNITA that it is prepared to resume peace negotiations and **demands** that UNITA act accordingly;

10. Welcomes the continued disposition of the Government of Angola to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict in conformity with the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

11. Urges all States to refrain from any action which directly or indirectly could jeopardize the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", especially from providing any form of direct or indirect military assistance to UNITA, or any other support to UNITA inconsistent with the peace process;

12. Expresses its readiness to consider the imposition of measures under the Charter of the United Nations, including a mandatory embargo on the sale or supply to UNITA of arms and related *matériel* and other military assistance, to prevent UNITA from pursuing its military

actions, unless by 15 September 1993 the Secretary-General has reported that an effective cease-fire has been established and that agreement has been reached on the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

13. Recognizes the legitimate rights of the Government of Angola and in this regard **welcomes** the provision of assistance to the Government of Angola in support of the democratic process;

14. Welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement the emergency humanitarian assistance plan;

15. Takes note of statements by UNITA that it will cooperate in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Angolans and **demands** that UNITA act accordingly;

16. Calls upon all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to respond swiftly and generously to the Secretary-General's appeal in implementation of the above-mentioned plan and to accord or increase humanitarian relief assistance to Angola, and **encourages** the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to continue to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

17. Demands that UNITA continue to extend its cooperation in ensuring the immediate evacuation of foreign nationals and their family members from Huambo and other locations occupied by UNITA;

18. Reiterates its strong condemnation of the attack by UNITA forces, on 27 May 1993, against a train carrying civilians, and **reaffirms** that such criminal attacks are clear violations of international humanitarian law;

19. Reiterates also its appeal to both parties strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including to guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need, and **commends** in particular the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to establish agreed humanitarian relief corridors;

20. Reiterates its appeal to both parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of UNAVEM II personnel as well as of the personnel involved in humanitarian relief operations;

21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 15 September 1993, a report on the situation in Angola with his recommendation for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep the Council regularly informed of developments;

22. Requests also the Secretary-General to submit as soon as possible the budgetary implications of bringing UNAVEM II up to its full strength as mandated in resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991;

23. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 864 (1993)

15 September 1993

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 823 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 834 (1993) of 1 June 1993 and 851 (1993) of 15 July 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26434 and Add.1) dated 13 September 1993,

Expressing grave concern at the continuing deterioration of the political and military situation, and **noting** with consternation the further deterioration of an already grave humanitarian situation,

Deeply concerned that, despite its previous resolutions and the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, the peace talks remain suspended and a cease-fire has not been established,

Welcoming the joint statement issued in Lisbon on 10 September 1993 by the representatives of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the three observer States to the Angolan peace process (S/26488),

Welcoming also and supporting to that end the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative

aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations, and **stressing** the importance it attaches thereto,

Welcoming further the efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of Heads of State of neighbouring countries to facilitate the resumption of the peace process in Angola,

Emphasizing the importance of a continued and effective United Nations presence in Angola with a view to fostering the peace process and advancing the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

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1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/26434) dated 13 September 1993 and **decides** to extend the existing mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for a period of three months until 15 December 1993;

2. Reiterates its readiness to consider taking action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process;

3. Reaffirms the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process for the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

4. Welcomes the continued disposition of the Government of Angola to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict in conformity with the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

5. Reaffirms its recognition of the legitimate rights of the Government of Angola and in this regard **welcomes** the provision of assistance to the Government of Angola in support of the democratic process;

6. Reiterates once again its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 30 September 1992 and abide fully by the "Acordos de Paz";

7. Condemns UNITA for continuing military actions, which are resulting in increased suffering to the civilian population of Angola and damage to the Angolan economy and **again demands** that UNITA immediately cease such actions;

8. Also condemns UNITA's repeated attempts to seize additional territory and its failure to withdraw its troops from the locations which it has occupied since the resumption of the hostilities, and **demands once again** that it immediately do so and agree without delay to return its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional measure pending full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

9. Reaffirms that such occupation is a grave violation of the "Acordos de Paz" and is incompatible with the goal of peace through agreements and reconciliation;

10. Stresses once again the fundamental need to initiate without delay the peace talks under United Nations auspices with a view to the immediate establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and resolutions of the Security Council;

11. Takes note of statements by UNITA that it is prepared to resume peace negotiations and **demands** that UNITA act accordingly;

12. Welcomes the further steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement the emergency humanitarian assistance plan;

13. Strongly condemns the repeated attacks carried out by UNITA against United Nations personnel working to provide humanitarian assistance and **reaffirms** that such attacks are clear violations of international humanitarian law;

14. Takes note of statements by UNITA that it will cooperate in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Angolans and **demands** that UNITA act accordingly;

15. Reiterates its appeal to both parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of UNAVEM II personnel as well as of the personnel involved in humanitarian relief operations, and strictly

to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law;

16. Demands that UNITA proceed immediately to the release of all foreign citizens held against their will and to abstain from any action which might cause damage to foreign property;

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Strongly condemning UNITA and holding its leadership responsible for not having taken the necessary measures to comply with the demands made by the Council in its previous resolutions,

Determined to ensure respect for its resolutions and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Urging all States to refrain from providing any form of direct or indirect assistance, support or encouragement to UNITA,

Determining that, as a result of UNITA's military actions, the situation in Angola constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

17. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 19 to 25 below shall come into force ten days after the date of adoption of the present resolution unless the Secretary-General notifies the Council that an effective cease-fire has been established and that agreement has been reached on the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

18. Decides further that if, at any time after the submission of the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General reports to the Council that UNITA has broken the cease-fire or ceased to participate constructively in the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the provisions set forth in paragraphs 19 to 25 below shall come into force immediately;

19. Decides, with a view to prohibiting all sale or supply to UNITA of arms and related *matériel* and military assistance, as well as petroleum and petroleum products, that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag

vessels or aircraft, of arms and related *matériel* of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as of petroleum and petroleum products, whether or not originating in their territory, to the territory of Angola other than through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by the Government of Angola to the Secretary-General, who shall promptly notify the Member States of the United Nations;

20. Calls upon all States, and all international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of adoption of this resolution;

21. Calls upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the measures imposed by this resolution and to impose appropriate penalties;

22. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 24 below;

(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them with a view to effectively implementing the measures imposed by paragraph 19 above;

(c) To consider information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 19 above and to recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;

(d) To make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 19 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(e) To promulgate guidelines that may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 19 above;

23. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee established by paragraph 22 above in the fulfilment of its tasks, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;

24. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 15 October 1993 on the measures they have adopted in order to meet the obligations set out in paragraph 19 above;

25. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee established by paragraph 22 above and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;

26. Expresses its readiness to consider the imposition of further measures under the Charter of the United Nations, including, *inter alia*, trade measures against UNITA and restrictions on the travel of UNITA personnel, unless by 1 November 1993 the Secretary-General has reported that an effective cease-fire has been established and that agreement has been reached on the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

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27. Expresses also its readiness to review the measures in the present resolution if the Secretary-General reports to the Council that an effective cease-fire has been established and that substantial progress has been achieved towards the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

28. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case in good time before 1 November 1993 and again before 15 December 1993, a report on the situation in Angola and the implementation of this resolution, with his recommendation for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep the Council regularly informed of developments;

29. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

(To the press)

24 September 1993

Following consultations held today, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the press:

The Security Council reviewed the situation in Angola on the basis of the latest information available to the Secretariat, taking into account the provisions of resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993. As you know, the 10-day period provided for in that resolution expires tomorrow at midnight.

Unless the Secretary-General reports that an effective cease-fire is in place and that an effective implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", as well as of all Security Council resolutions, has been undertaken by UNITA, the oil and arms embargo will come into force.

The Council has authorized me to express its position as follows:

- 1) The Security Council insists that UNITA fully respect and abide by the Bicesse Accords;
- 2) That the Parties should make every effort to restart negotiations;
- 3) That Security Council resolution 864 (1993) is very clear in its provisions and that unless such provisions are satisfied, the mandatory sanctions will start to be enforced;
- 4) Lastly, that if, by 1 November 1993, no action is forthcoming, the Council will consider further measures.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

1 November 1993

At the 3302nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 1 November 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item "The situation in Angola", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council has considered the Secretary-General's report of 27 October 1993 (S/26644) submitted in response to operative paragraph 28 of resolution 864 (1993). It notes the exploratory talks in Lusaka, Zambia, under the auspices of the United Nations, to which both the Government of Angola and

UNITA have sent delegations. It affirms its complete support for the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their efforts aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations within the framework of the 'Acordos de Paz' and Security Council resolutions. It calls upon the Angolan parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to this end.

The Security Council notes recent actions taken by both parties, including the lessening of hostilities, and considers it essential that the two parties take the necessary steps to resume direct negotiations towards a peaceful settlement and agree without delay on the modalities for an effective cease-fire in accordance with Security Council resolutions.

The Security Council notes UNITA's communiqué of 6 October referred to in paragraph 11 of the Secretary-General's report. It expresses its concern, that the Secretary-General has reported that not enough progress has yet been made towards the full implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz' and relevant resolutions of the Council. It demands that UNITA take the necessary steps to comply with its previous resolutions. It expresses its readiness to consider the immediate imposition of further measures under the Charter of the United Nations, including *inter alia* trade measures against UNITA and restrictions on the travel of UNITA personnel, at any time that it observes that UNITA is not cooperating in good faith to make the cease-fire effective and implement the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council, or upon a report from the Secretary-General to that effect.

The Security Council expresses its grave concern at the serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Angola. It is encouraged however by the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations system, working with humanitarian agencies, has now been able significantly to increase the rate of delivery of relief aid to all parts of the country. It welcomes the resumption of humanitarian relief deliveries to the cities of Cuito and Huambo. It calls upon the parties to cooperate fully in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Angolans throughout the country, to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and

safety of United Nations and other personnel involved in humanitarian relief operations, and strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law. It commends the international community for its generous provision of relief aid and calls upon the international community to make available further relief aid rapidly to meet the growing need.

The Security Council shares the Secretary-General's view that UNAVEM II should be able to respond rapidly to any progress which might be achieved in the peace process. It encourages the Secretary-General to carry out urgent contingency planning for the possible augmentation of the existing strength of the military, police and medical components of UNAVEM II for deployment in the event of significant progress in the peace process, including contacting potential troop contributors. It stands ready to take decisions in the matter at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by resolution 864 (1993).

The Security Council again expresses its strongest appeal that both sides, in particular UNITA, undertake to commit themselves to the peace process that will lead to a comprehensive settlement in Angola on the basis of the "Acordos de Paz".

The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter and will review the position again with regard to further measures at the latest on 15 December in the context of its consideration of the report that the Secretary-General is due to make by that date pursuant to its resolution 864 (1993).

RESOLUTION 890 (1993)

15 December 1993

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 823 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 834 (1993) of 1 June 1993,

851 (1993) of 15 July 1993 and 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 1 November 1993 (S/26677),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26872 and Add.1) dated 13 December 1993,

Reiterating the importance it attaches to the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Welcoming the resumption of direct negotiations in Lusaka under the auspices of the United Nations, and the ongoing efforts of the Government of Angola and UNITA to reach a negotiated settlement,

Commending the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Taking note of actions taken by both parties, including the lessening of hostilities, but **deeply concerned** that an effective cease-fire has not yet been established,

Stressing the importance it attaches to UNITA's acceptance without reservations, as requested by the Security Council, of the results of the democratic elections of 30 September 1992 held under United Nations supervision and to their abiding fully by the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Deeply concerned also about the continued grave humanitarian situation,

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/26872) dated 13 December 1993;

2. Stresses again the importance it places on a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Angola in conformity with the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and **urges** both parties to continue to demonstrate flexibility in the negotiations and a commitment to peace;

3. Decides to extend the existing mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) until 16 March 1994;

4. Reaffirms its willingness as necessary to review the existing mandate of UNAVEM II to determine whether it is able to carry out effectively its mission, taking account of any progress achieved towards the early establishment of peace in the country;

5. Reaffirms the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and UNAVEM II, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process for the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions;

6. Calls upon both parties to honour the commitments already made by them at the talks in Lusaka, **urges** them to exercise their maximum restraint and to stop immediately all military actions in order to prevent further suffering on the part of the civilian population of Angola and damage to Angola's economy, and **further urges** them to agree on the modalities for and establishment of an effective and sustainable cease-fire in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions and to conclude a peaceful settlement as soon as possible;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council as soon as an effective cease-fire is established and in any case by 1 February 1994 on progress made by the parties in the Lusaka talks, including a report on progress achieved in furthering the peace process, establishing an effective cease-fire, and implementing relevant Security Council resolutions and the "Acordos de Paz";

8. Takes note of the steps taken by the Secretary-General to initiate contingency planning for the possible augmentation of the existing components of UNAVEM II for deployment in the event of significant progress in the peace process, and requests him to inform the Council periodically in this regard;

9. Reiterates its readiness, in the event of the achievement of an effective and sustainable cease-fire, to consider promptly any recommendations by the Secretary-General on the basis of that contingency planning;

10. Reaffirms further the need for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all civilian populations in need;

11. Welcomes also the actions taken by the Secretary-General to implement the emergency humanitarian assistance plan;

12. Commends those Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations who have already contributed to the relief efforts and **strongly appeals** to all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide rapidly further assistance to Angola to meet the growing humanitarian needs;

13. Reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 864 (1993);

14. Decides in view of the direct negotiations under way between the parties not to impose at present the additional measures against UNITA contained in paragraph 26 of resolution 864 (1993), but **reiterates** its readiness to consider at any time further steps, in the light, *inter alia*, of a recommendation of the Secretary-General, either to impose such additional measures or to review those in effect;

15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 10 February 1994

At the 3335th meeting of the Security Council, held on 10 February 1994, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item "The situation in Angola", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) (S/1994/100) submitted pursuant to resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December 1993.

The Council commends the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer on their efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the talks between the Government of Angola and UNITA, currently taking place in Lusaka, with a view to reaching an effective and sustainable settlement of the conflict, within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The Council

also commends the efforts of the three observer States to the Angolan peace process and those of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of neighbouring States in support of the Lusaka talks, and encourages them to continue these efforts.

The Council notes the progress made to date in the Lusaka talks, in particular the adoption of the general and specific principles, as well as the modalities, relating to all the military and police issues on the agenda. The Council calls upon the parties to renew their commitment to a peaceful settlement. It demands that they redouble their efforts in the Lusaka talks, with the aim of urgently attaining an effective and sustainable cease-fire and completing work on the remaining points on the agenda and concluding a peaceful settlement without procrastination.

The Council is deeply concerned at the intensification of hostilities and, in particular, at the recent outbreak of serious military activity at several locations in Angola, particularly at Kuito-Bie. It deplores the great loss of life and destruction of property.

The Council stresses that the only way to achieve an effective, verifiable and sustainable cease-fire is for the parties to conclude and sign a comprehensive peace agreement. It calls upon them to honour the commitments they have already voluntarily agreed to in Lusaka, to exercise maximum restraint, to stop immediately all offensive military actions, and to commit themselves to the urgent conclusion of the Lusaka talks.

The Council welcomes the improvement in the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance to the affected population in Angola, while acknowledging that the overall situation remains serious. It urges the parties to continue to cooperate with the United Nations agencies and the non-governmental organizations in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and the necessary security for its efficient distribution. It calls upon the international community to contribute generously to humanitarian aid efforts in Angola.

"The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to keep it informed on a timely basis of developments in the Lusaka peace talks. It reaffirms its readiness to consider promptly any recommendations from the Secretary-General once an agreement has been concluded

between the parties. It also reaffirms its readiness to consider further action in accordance with its previous resolutions.

The Council will remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 903 (1994)

16 March 1994

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 10 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/7),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/282 and Add.1) dated 9 March 1994,

Reiterating the importance it attaches to the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Reiterating also the importance in current circumstances of a continued and effective United Nations presence in Angola with a view to fostering the peace process and advancing the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Welcoming the progress, described in the Secretary-General's report, in the talks being held between the Government of Angola and UNITA in Lusaka, under the auspices of the United Nations, and **urging** the parties to complete the negotiation process expeditiously,

Commending the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Commending also the efforts of the three observer States to the Angolan peace process, of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and some neighbouring States, in particular Zambia, and **encouraging** them to continue their efforts,

Stressing the importance it attaches to UNITA's acceptance without reservation of the results of the democratic elections of 30 September 1992 held under United Nations supervision and to their abiding fully by the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Strongly urging both parties, and in particular UNITA, to exercise maximum flexibility and good faith at this crucial stage of the negotiations in Lusaka and to refrain from any acts which could delay their early and successful completion,

Stressing that its future decisions concerning Angola will take into account the continued demonstration by the parties of their political will to achieve a lasting peace,

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Noting that Angolans bear ultimate responsibility for the successful implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and any subsequent agreement,

Expressing its concern at the continuing hostilities and their effect on the civilian population in terms of loss of life and property, which underlines the need for an effective and sustainable cease-fire,

Welcoming the improvement in the overall humanitarian situation in Angola, while **noting** that the situation remains serious in certain areas of the country,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 9 March 1994;

2. Calls upon both parties to honour the commitments already made by them at the talks in Lusaka and **urges** them to redouble their efforts with the aim of urgently completing work on the remaining points on the agenda, attaining an effective and sustainable cease-fire, and concluding a peaceful settlement without procrastination;

3. Expresses its deep concern at continued offensive military actions and **demands** the cessation of all such action immediately;

4. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) until 31 May 1994;

5. Declares its readiness, in principle, to consider authorizing promptly, with a view to consolidating a

settlement in its initial and most critical stages, the increase of the strength of UNAVEM II to its previous level of 350 military observers, 126 police observers and 14 military medical staff with an appropriate number of international and local civilian staff, following a report from the Secretary-General that the parties have reached an agreement and that the conditions are right for deployment; and **invites** the Secretary-General to proceed with contingency planning to this effect;

6. Takes note of the preparations and contingency planning undertaken by the Secretary-General for an appropriate United Nations presence in Angola once a comprehensive peace settlement is reached, and **reaffirms** its readiness to consider promptly any recommendations from the Secretary-General in this regard;

7. Condemns any actions that threaten the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need in Angola and put the lives of the humanitarian assistance workers at risk and **calls for** the full cooperation of all parties;

8. Strongly appeals to the international community to respond generously to the 1994 revised inter-agency appeal for Angola and **commends** those who have already contributed to humanitarian relief efforts in Angola;

9. Reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 864 (1993);

10. Decides, in view of the direct negotiations continuing between the parties, not to impose at present the additional measures against UNITA contained in paragraph 26 of resolution 864 (1993), but **reiterates** its readiness to consider at any time further steps in the light, *inter alia*, of a recommendation by the Secretary-General, either to impose such additional measures or to review those in effect;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Council is informed regularly on the progress of the talks in Lusaka as well as on the military and humanitarian situation in Angola and to this end requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by 4 April 1994;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 922 (1994)

31 May 1994

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Recalling the letter dated 14 April 1994 (S/1994/445) from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/611) dated 24 May 1994,

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Reiterating the importance it attaches to the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Reiterating also the importance of United Nations support in fostering the peace process and advancing the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Commending the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and those of the three observer States to the Angolan Peace Process and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and some neighbouring States in particular Zambia, and **encouraging** them to continue their efforts aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Recalling its readiness, in principle, in accordance with resolution 903 (1994), to consider authorizing promptly an increase of the strength of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) to its previous level,

Noting, however, with grave concern the resurgence of military operations throughout the territory of Angola which cause continued suffering to the civilian population and hamper the effective implementation of the current mandate of UNAVEM II,

Deeply concerned at alleged violations of the measures contained in paragraph 19 of its resolution 864 (1993),

Concerned also at the protracted duration of the Lusaka Peace Talks and **reaffirming** the importance it attaches to their prompt and successful conclusion,

Emphasizing that Angolans bear ultimate responsibility for the successful implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and any subsequent agreement,

Reiterating its strong appeal to the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA to show the good faith and flexibility needed to reach an early and comprehensive settlement at the Lusaka Peace Talks,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 24 May 1994;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of the UNAVEM II until 30 June 1994;

3. Stresses that its future decision concerning Angola will take into account the extent to which the parties demonstrate their political will to achieve a lasting peace;

4. Welcomes the formal acceptance by the Government of the Republic of Angola of the proposals on national reconciliation by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the three observer States to the Angolan Peace Process, **urges** UNITA to do likewise and **encourages** both parties to finalize outstanding details without further procrastination to allow the successful conclusion of the Lusaka Peace Talks;

5. Reaffirms its readiness to consider promptly any recommendations from the Secretary-General for an expanded United Nations presence in Angola in the event a comprehensive peace settlement is reached;

6. Declares its intention to reconsider the role of the United Nations in Angola in the event a peace agreement has not been reached in Lusaka by the time of the expiration of the extended mandate of UNAVEM II;

7. Decides, in view of the direct negotiations continuing between the parties, not to impose at present the additional measures against UNITA contained in paragraph 26 of resolution 864 (1993), but reiterates its readiness to consider at any time further steps in the light, *inter alia*, of a recommendation by the Secretary-General, either to impose such additional measures or to review those in effect;

8. Reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 864 (1993);

9. Strongly deplores the resurgence of military actions throughout Angola contrary to resolution 903 (1994) and **reiterates** its demand that both parties cease immediately all offensive military operations;

10. Further deplores in this regard the worsening of the humanitarian situation and **condemns** acts that imperil humanitarian relief efforts, and all actions which would inhibit the free and unrestricted movement of humanitarian relief and humanitarian relief workers;

11. Commends those States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have already contributed to the relief efforts, and **strongly appeals** to all States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide rapidly further assistance to Angola to meet the growing humanitarian needs;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it, as soon as there is progress, and in any case by 30 June 1994, a report on the Lusaka Peace Talks and on the continued political will of the parties to achieve a lasting peace, with recommendations for the future United Nations presence in Angola;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 932 (1994) **30 June 1994**

Adopted by unanimous vote.

Prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/740 and Add.1) dated 20 June 1994,

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Reiterating the importance it attaches to the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Reiterating also the importance of United Nations support in fostering the peace process and advancing the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Stressing the importance it attaches to UNITA's acceptance without reservation of the results of the democratic elections of 30 September 1992 held under United Nations supervision and to their abiding fully by the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Stressing also that its future decisions concerning Angola will take into account the extent to which the parties demonstrate their political will to achieve a lasting peace,

Strongly urging both parties, and in particular UNITA, to exercise maximum flexibility and good faith in the negotiations in Lusaka at this crucial stage and to refrain from any acts which could delay their early and successful completion,

Commending the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and those of the three observer States to the Angolan Peace Process and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and some neighbouring States in particular Zambia, and **encouraging** them to continue their efforts aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Recalling its readiness, in principle, in accordance with resolution 922 (1994), to consider authorizing promptly an increase of the strength of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) to its previous level,

Noting, however, with grave concern the intensification of military operations throughout the territory of Angola which cause extensive suffering to the civilian population, hamper the successful conclusion of the Lusaka Peace Talks and the effective implementation of the current mandate of UNAVEM II,

Deeply concerned at alleged violations of the measures contained in paragraph 19 of its resolution 864 (1993),

Concerned also at the protracted duration of the Lusaka Peace Talks and **reaffirming** the importance it attaches to their prompt and successful conclusion,

Emphasizing that Angolans bear ultimate responsibility for the successful implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and any subsequent agreement,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 June 1994;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 September 1994;

3. Calls upon both parties to honour the commitments already made by them at the talks in Lusaka and **urges** them to redouble their efforts with the aim of urgently completing work on the remaining points on the agenda, attaining an effective and sustainable ceasefire, and concluding a peaceful settlement without procrastination;

4. Welcomes the formal acceptance by the Government of the Republic of Angola of the proposals on national reconciliation by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the three observer States to the Angolan Peace Process, and **strongly urges** UNITA to do likewise;

5. Declares its readiness to impose additional measures against UNITA as indicated in paragraph 26 of resolution 864 (1993) if by 31 July 1994 UNITA has not formally accepted the complete set of proposals on national reconciliation put forward by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the three observer States and **declares further** that in such case it will decide what further measures it will impose;

6. Welcomes the preparations and the contingency planning undertaken by the Secretary-General for an appropriate United Nations presence in Angola once a comprehensive peace settlement is reached, and **reaffirms** its readiness to consider promptly any recommendations from the Secretary-General in this regard;

7. Declares its intention to review the role of the United Nations in Angola in the event that a peace agreement has not been reached in Lusaka by the time of the expiration of the extended mandate of UNAVEM II;

8. Reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 864

(1993) and in that context **urges** the two neighbouring States which have so far failed to respond substantively to requests from the Committee established by resolution 864 (1993) for information required regarding alleged sanctions violations to do so promptly, and **requests** the Committee to provide a report to the Council, by 15 July 1994, on compliance with the sanctions regime and in particular on possible violations of the regime by those neighbouring States;

9. Strongly deplores the intensification of offensive military actions throughout Angola contrary to resolution 922 (1994) and **reiterates** its demand that both parties cease immediately all military operations;

10. Further deplores in this regard the worsening of the humanitarian situation and **strongly condemns** acts that imperil humanitarian relief efforts, and all actions which inhibit the free and unrestricted movement of humanitarian relief workers;


11. Strongly urges both parties to grant immediately security clearances and guarantees for relief deliveries

to all locations, and to refrain from any action which could jeopardize the safety of relief personnel or disrupt the distribution of humanitarian assistance to the Angolan people;

12. Commends those States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have already contributed to the relief efforts, and **appeals** to all States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide rapidly further assistance to Angola to meet the growing humanitarian needs;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Council is informed regularly on the progress of the Lusaka Peace Talks as well as on the military and humanitarian situation in Angola and to this end requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by 31 July 1994;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



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