



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL


9 March 2012

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to transmit the attached letter dated 6 March 2012, from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, His Excellency Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, forwarding a report on the International Security Assistance Force operations in Afghanistan, covering the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012.

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its attachment to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.


BAN Ki-moon

His Excellency
Sir Mark Lyall Grant
President of the Security Council
New York

12-02258

PKG / 041004





To: Mr. Nambiar,

Please find attached for your approval and SG's signature, a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the quarterly progress report on ISAF operations in Afghanistan, covering the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Nicholas Haysom', followed by a horizontal line.

Nicholas Haysom
8 March 2012


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Routine

Note to Mr. Nambiar



Quarterly report to the Security Council on ISAF operations

1. Please find attached the quarterly report by NATO on ISAF operations in Afghanistan, covering the period from November 2011 to January 2012. As is the usual practice, NATO has requested that the Secretary-General make the report available to the Security Council.
2. We have also attached a draft letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council conveying the report. I would be grateful if you could bring the draft letter to the attention of the Secretary-General for approval.

Hervé Ladsous
7 March 2012

Related
Corelog
12-02188

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SECRETARY GENERAL
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
Anders Fogh Rasmussen

SG(2012)0076

6 March 2012

Dear Secretary-General,

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1386 and 1943, I attach a report on ISAF operations covering the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012. I would appreciate if you could make this report available to the UN Security Council.

Yours sincerely,

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Encl.

His Excellency
Mr Ban Ki-moon
Secretary-General
United Nations Headquarters
United Nations Plaza 2
New York 10017
U.S.A.

NATO's 32nd QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) OPERATIONS

Introduction

1. This report, pursuant to the request under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 and 1943, informs the United Nations on the progress of the ISAF mission, covering the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012. As of 9 January 2012, total ISAF strength stood at 130,236 personnel provided by all 28 NATO nations and 22 non-NATO nations. Bahrain became the 50th ISAF Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) and operational partner to ISAF in December 2011. NATO and ISAF reiterate their invitation to additional UN member nations to support this UN-mandated mission by providing advisors ~~and trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as well as increasing their support for the civilian sectors of governance and development.~~

2. Throughout the reporting period, ISAF continued to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. From 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012, ISAF suffered 1,432 casualties including 76 Killed in Action, 876 Wounded in Action and 11 Non-Battle-Related Deaths.

3. During this reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks continued to trend downwards and the nationwide year over year change was 9 percent lower in 2011 when compared to 2010. However, in the eastern part of the country, the enemy-initiated attacks increased, primarily due to ISAF and ANSF deliberate operations to push the insurgency further beyond the population centers. The operational effectiveness of the ANSF improved from the previous quarter and is advancing at a pace acceptable to sustain Transition. The number of partnered and Afghan-led operations continued to increase with the ANSF becoming more capable of conducting security operations across the country. According to the recent Asia Foundation survey, the Afghan public is becoming increasingly confident in the ability of its forces to provide for their security. The security incidents this quarter were marked by the suicide attacks in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif on 6 December 2011, which caused a large number of civilian casualties when targeting Shia Muslims commemorating the holiday of Ashura.

4. Additional noteworthy events for this reporting period:


- a. On 16-19 November, the consultative Loya Jirga was conducted in Kabul. The ANSF successfully managed the security arrangements with minimal support from ISAF. In the opening speech, President Karzai underlined the necessity of continued International military and economic support beyond 2014, while also asserting Afghan sovereignty.
- b. On 26 November 2011, while conducting clearance of a suspected insurgent training camp close to the Pakistan border, ISAF and ANSF units came under fire from the overlooking ridgeline in Pakistan. Due to a series of miscommunications, Pakistan Military positions were mistakenly engaged by ISAF Close Air Support. The incident resulted in 2 border posts destroyed and 26 Pakistani soldier Killed in Action. As a result of the close border incident, a series of prevention and mitigation measures have been put in

place to prevent a similar incident from occurring. Pakistan authorities have subsequently closed the border crossing points for ISAF logistical transports.

- c. On 27 November 2011, the second tranche of areas to enter Transition was announced by President Karzai. The second tranche comprises a further 18 areas. Implementation of the second tranche began in Parwan province on 1 December 2011 and is now underway in all Tranche 2 areas, except for Sar-e Pul Province (RC N), which has been postponed.
- d. On 5 January, President Karzai ordered the Constitutional Oversight Commission to complete the transfer of the US-run Detention facility in Parwan to Afghan authorities within a month. The President's decision came after the Commission reported violations of the Afghan Constitution, which provides that no foreign countries can maintain and run prisons in Afghanistan, as well as of the Afghan Criminal Code. In February 2012, President Karzai extended the timeline to 9 March 2012.
- e. On 20 January, soldiers from a French Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in RC (E), Kapisa province, were engaged by a Afghan National Army soldier resulting in four ISAF soldiers Killed in Action and 14 Wounded in Action (all casualties French). ISAF Troop Contributing Nations have expressed strong concerns about the loss of life and consequences of the incidents that have involved ANSF personnel attacking ISAF troops, and have asked the Afghan authorities to improve their screening and vetting of recruits.

Security Situation

5. Enemy-initiated attacks (EIA)¹ have declined when compared to the same quarter last year. Insurgent efforts to maintain operations into the winter with high profile attacks and assassinations have been largely ineffective. The insurgency failed to achieve this objective due to a combination of persistent Afghan and ISAF Conventional and Special Forces operations, ongoing clear, hold, and build operations, reintegration efforts, and the expansion of local defense initiatives.




¹ EIA comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, to include executed attacks only (improvised explosive device (IED) explosions / mine strikes).

6. Insurgents continue to rely on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as the principal means to execute their campaign. During the reporting period, the insurgency was accountable for 84 percent of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) of which 60 percent were caused by their indiscriminate use of IEDs. More than half of IEDs and mines were found and cleared rather than detonated.

7. Regionally, the security situation is as follows²:

a. Regional Command Southwest (RC SW)


In RC (SW), EIA in 2011 were 29 percent lower compared to 2010. Deliberate combined team (CT) operations maintained pressure on insurgents during the beginning of the winter season, which helped to reduce insurgent capacity. Improved governance from



Provincial Governor Mangal and CT force efforts have strengthened and expanded the security bubble centred on Lashkar Gah. Operations continue in northern and southern Helmand to disrupt insurgent strongholds. The small ISAF force reductions during the final quarter of 2011 have not impacted operations, but future significant reductions may well test the capabilities of the ANSF who to date have performed well.

b. Regional Command South (RC S)

The improving capability of the ANSF and success of combined team operations maintained pressure on insurgents and limited their ability to operate. A small increase in security incidents during the reporting period and recent resurgence in suicide attacks in the Kandahar area reiterates the importance of the South to the insurgency. Insurgents increasingly targeted ANSF and GIRoA officials in an effort to regain influence over the population.




c. Regional Command East (RC E)

² Graphics are available on the ISAF Webpage, link: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/monthly-trends.html>


The security incidents in RC (E) has followed a general winter decline, but persisted at higher levels than previously seen and are spread across the RC due to a geographically diverse enemy. Supplies and fighters originating in Pakistan and moving across the border have

enabled the insurgents in the region to maintain its operational capability and tempo. Increased pressure from ISAF and ANSF, coupled with Afghan local security initiatives, are working to disrupt these supply routes and therefore hamper insurgent operations. Strained relations during the reporting period between ISAF/GIRoA and Pakistan underline the importance of cooperation for security and stability in the border region.




d. Regional Command North (RC N)

Insurgent networks in the north still represent a threat to CT forces and GIRoA, but to a smaller degree than the other RCs. Actual numbers of security incidents decreased during the last quarter demonstrating insurgent's inability to transform their rhetoric into actions. Though a positive attitude towards security forces has been reported among the populace, corruption within those representing the government remains of great concern.




e. Regional Command West (RC W)

The success of CT operations and improved popular support towards both GIRoA and ISAF has resulted in an overall decrease in security incidents. These contributing factors have resulted in the degradation of both the morale and capabilities of the insurgent's in RC W. Enemy initiated attacks have remained largely uncoordinated, ineffective and will likely decrease throughout the winter until the 2012 fighting season begins.



f. Regional Command Capital (RC C)

Improved ANSF capabilities, significant cache finds, the expansion of the Kabul Security Zone and Coalition Forces operations in RC E have limited the effectiveness of insurgent activities in the capital, culminating in a virtual lack of insurgent kinetic activity in January 2012. Although security incidents are most likely to remain stable in the next quarter, insurgents will intermittently attempt to challenge the perception of security in Kabul Province as a kinetic incident in the Capital will likely garner significant media attention.



Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

8. ANSF development is on track in terms of both size and quality. ANSF is on glide path to meet October 2012 strength goals while command and control capacities continue to be built up and improved. One of ISAF's main efforts is towards further professionalization of the forces. Substantial progress in reliability and sustainability of the ANA and the ANP has been achieved.

9. In 2011, ANSF added 57,000 soldiers and police to their numbers. And now, almost 40 percent of conventional and Special Forces operations are led by Afghan Forces, and approximately 90 percent of the operations are partnered with ISAF.

10. Strong recruitment has allowed ANSF to remain on track towards the next strength target of 352,000 by October 2012. In addition to growing combat forces, the Afghan Security Ministries made substantial progress increasing the quality of their forces. With the support and advice of the Coalition, the ANSF units are becoming more capable and improved their ability to conduct autonomous operations in the field. Efforts are being made to establish proficient headquarters at national and regional levels and to improve

planning and coordination capacity. In addition, the ANSF is progressively assuming more responsibility for self-training the ANSF.

11. The establishment of training institutions is close to completion and fosters the progressive professionalization of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANSF development continues to focus in five key areas: training Afghan trainers and instructors; accelerating leader development; building literacy and vocational skills; inculcating an ethos of stewardship, and developing enduring institutions, systems, and enablers. Additional trainers and advisers from the IC are still required to accelerate ANSF professionalization further and to help create an effective and sustainable ANSF. Furthermore, ISAF and GIROA are now reinforcing ANSF vetting process to improve safety for ISAF embedded personnel and avoid a deterioration of confidence between international trainers and advisors and their respective Afghan counterparts.

Afghan National Army (ANA)

12. The ANA currently constitutes the most robust and self sufficient organization in the ANSF. The Afghan Army has entered the last fielding phase, the goal of which is to reinforce the sustainability of a more balanced professional force able to assume security lead. To this end, Combat Support, Combat Service Support, units along with Corps and Brigade troops³ are being created and trained. Fielding of these new enabling units should be completed by the end of 2013. Furthermore, a more autonomous logistic branch continues to be developed. Finally, significant efforts are being made to finalize the establishment of a complete training institution allowing the Afghans to professionalize the force by themselves. An ANA Training Command was set up to this end and 12 army branch schools permanently work at full capacity with more than 20,000 trainees. The overall training level for the army is increasing slowly but steadily.

13. The ANA remains on track to achieve its Oct 12 growth target of 195,000. Its current strength is around 184,000 soldiers. ANA recruiting remains strong and ethnically balanced, and gender equity is permanently promoted by ISAF through NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A)⁴. The percentage of all ANA Kandaks rated “Effective with advisors” or higher increased to 44 percent this reporting period. As mentioned in the previous reports, the attrition rates are decreasing slowly but remain high and continue to generate additional recruitment and training costs. A comprehensive plan, including mid-term and long-term solutions, has been developed in partnership with Afghan leaders to address this persistent issue.

14. Regarding the fielded ANA, the issues to be solved remain leadership skills, high attrition, staff planning, tactical coordination and logistics.

Afghan Air Force (AAF)

15. AAF development is underway and in addition to personnel recruitment and professionalization highlighted in the previous reports, infrastructure build has made significant process. New facilities have been delivered in support of a self-sustaining force. Important investments are foreseen to improve AAF training sites and infrastructure, which

³ Military Police Companies, Military Intelligence Units, Engineer Battalions, Signal Battalions, Route Clearance Companies, and Mobile Strike Force Battalions

⁴ There are currently 333 women serving in the ANA, nearly all of whom are in Kabul.

are critical conditions for sound development and self-sustainability. The AAF still faces some major challenges, with an important corruption level and recruiting issues, in particular in the ability to obtain qualified recruits.

16. 15. AAF strength reached 5,172 personnel in December 2011 and the attrition rates are lower than in the ANA and ANP. A total of 82 aircraft are in service within the AAF, including 42 helicopters, with plans to reach up to 145 aircraft in total when the Air Force will be fully fielded in 2016. International support remains critical for AAF development, training, and support to autonomously led ANSF operations.

Afghan National Police (ANP)

17. Overall, the ANP is currently on track for the October 2012 target. Its current strength is just around 144,000 police officers. Both Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) patrolmen authorized manning are full; recruiting has adjusted to focus on recruiting direct entry Non Commissioned Officers (NCO's) and to balancing growth with training of NCOs and new patrolmen. The focus on training continues as the training seat capacity surpassed 15,000 and training fill rate stood at around 65 percent.

18. The personnel establishment for 2011 provides over 1,500 additional female billets. There are currently 1,244 women serving in the ANP. The recruitment of females is lagging behind for a variety of reasons, mainly commanders' reluctance to accept female officers.

19. ANP Operational Effectiveness showed remarkable progress within the force. The December 2011 report is the first one in which any ANP unit were rated "Independent with Advisors". For the AUP, 40 percent of units were rated "Effective with Advisors" or higher, while for the ABP and ANCOP this fraction was 53 percent and 57 percent respectively.

Institutional Capacity

20. The security ministries, with the assistance of NTM-A, are sustaining their continuous effort to build capability to generate and sustain the ANSF. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the General Staff are still requiring assistance to accomplish their mission. During the reporting period, the MoD confirmed an improved capability at the managerial level as demonstrated by the effective management of the initiation of transition Tranche Two.

21. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) is still requiring significant assistance and is expected to progress to requiring only some assistance by the end of 2012. Key issues remaining include shortcomings in filling civilian positions due to the lack of civil service pay and grade reform.


Private Security Companies (PSC)/Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)

22. Nine months after the signature of the Bridging Strategy (March 2011), the APPF remains largely non-existent. The strategy calls for the dissolution of PSCs conducting development and convoy protection by 20 March 2012 and those conducting protection of ISAF bases & construction by 20 March 2013. The Joint Programme Executive Office (JPEO) has been established to support the transition from PSCs and to mentor the APPF, building adequate capability to support the bridging strategy. The JPEO could thus encourage development implementing partners to take the decision to continue development and infrastructure works. In order to accelerate the development of a business capability, command & control structure, and guard training capacity, several PSCs are mutating into Risk Management Companies (RMCs) as a stopgap solution. The RMCs will assist with management, oversight, training and operational standards until the APPF are fully capable of managing security operations. Assistance from the APPF Ministerial partners (timely issuing of visas by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, work permits from the Ministry of Labour, communication licenses from the Ministry of Communication, armoured vehicle licenses from the Ministry of Interior to ensure no gap in security) is still critical to achieve President Karzai's deadline.

Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS)

23. The protection of the Afghan population remains the highest priority for ISAF and every civilian casualty is detrimental to the ISAF mission. Among several initiatives, ISAF has dedicated special attention to the understanding and prevention of events that could result in civilian casualties. New tactical directives were issued this quarter and the entire ISAF force was retrained on them. The ISAF Deputy Commander (DCOM) became Chair of a new ISAF CIVCAS Avoidance and Mitigation Board to provide constant senior staff oversight of this issue. COMISAF held a conference at HQ ISAF 17-18 January 2012, in order to gather lessons learned from NATO operations in Libya, synchronise Commanders' understanding of the COMISAF Tactical Directive (Rev 4), and evolve future air support to partnered and non partnered ANSF units from a combat aviator's perspective.

24. Reporting this quarter indicates that the insurgents are responsible for causing 84 percent of overall CIVCAS related incidents, which represents an increase of 7 percent. The total numbers of CIVCAS is down by 19 percent when compared to the previous reporting period. ISAF actions were attributed to only 6 percent of all CIVCAS related incidents, which is representative of the continued decreasing trend when compared to previous reports. December 2011 represents the lowest number of ISAF-caused CIVCAS since accurate record-keeping began back in January 2009. It remains very apparent that the insurgency can still exploit and manipulate CIVCAS events to their advantage, since ISAF is perceived accountable by the Afghan population for all incidents where casualties occur. The figures reported in the chart reflect incidents of conflict-related civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) that have been confirmed through investigation to have been caused by either ISAF or insurgents. The data reported here is consistent with ISAF policy, which directs that all credible allegations of civilian casualties be reviewed⁵.



Counter Narcotics (CN)

25. Afghanistan Security Forces, with the support of their ISAF partners, seized a record amount of narcotics and precursor chemicals in 2011, especially morphine, that remains well in excess of total seized in 2010. While disruption to the trade is significant, operations are not having long-term impact on narcotics networks, as they are able to adapt and move, returning to pre-operational levels of activities once operations are complete.

26. Initial indications show opium cultivation decreasing in areas of better security. Near record high opium prices drove farmers to plant poppy in large numbers, including in new areas where cultivation had previously been financially prohibitive. Cultivation has also migrated to more remote areas with limited security and small coalition footprints as a result of successful operations in 2011.

27. Programs to prepare Afghan security forces and improve capabilities at all levels are vital to ensure Afghanistan is able to sustain CN operations post-transition. ISAF will continue to provide support to GIRoA CN programs and operations in order to disrupt, neutralize and influence the narcotics industry and its funding of the insurgency in Afghanistan. ISAF will continue to synchronise operations to the poppy cultivation cycle, in order to maximize disruptive effects and further support this aim.

Governance

28. ISAF continues to provide support to Afghan-led governance efforts, particularly in key areas of Transition, reintegration, counter-corruption, and rule of law improvement.

⁵ Graphics are available on the ISAF Webpage, link: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/monthly-trends.html>

29. Transition; the implementation of Tranche 2 is now underway. The Afghan government continued to work jointly with NATO on the implementation of Tranche 1 and 2 areas of Transition as well as the planning for Tranche 3. With Tranche 2 now started, roughly 50% of the Afghan population is in an area where security has been shifted to Afghan-lead. ISAF continues to support the ANSF in transition areas through various levels of over watch, training, and provision of key enabler capabilities. The Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) has endorsed the security, governance & development, strategic communication, and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) evolution components of all the transition implementation plans for Tranche 2 areas. Transition ceremonies, organised and led by the Transition Coordination Commission, are now underway in all Tranche 2 areas, except for Sar-e Pul Province in RC (N), which has been postponed. Transition implementation will be held off until Afghan processes have time to resolve the issues.

30. Anti-corruption; A NATO Building Integrity (BI) Training Team visited Kabul during 2-15 December. The Team delivered a Defence Leadership in BI course to 45 students at the Afghan Police College followed by a BI Train the Trainers course for 12 students at the National Military Academy. ~~The Team then mentored Afghan Trainers as they delivered a~~ Defence Leadership in BI course to 35 students at the National Military Academy. This is the first time that Afghan Trainers have delivered BI training and is a significant milestone in the implementation of the BI program. With Task Force Shafafiyat (transparency in Dari), ISAF has been supporting GIRoA efforts to reduce corruption in the government.

31. NATO Public Affairs Conference on Afghanistan in Dubai 10 December 2011 and around 100 spokespersons and press officers from across the Alliance, UNAMA, the EU, ISAF HQ and key Afghanistan government spokespersons and media representatives attended the conference. In addition, the Afghan Government Media and Information Centre (GMIC) committed to hosting a Kabul workshop for communicators in the capital to further explore ways of increasing the Afghan voice in all communications.

32. Support to Rule of Law Development; Through the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission (NROLFSM), ISAF is providing liaison and field capabilities to assist GIRoA and International civilian experts in improving capacity. NROLFSM focuses its efforts on helping GIRoA expand rule of law outreach into key provinces and districts.

33. Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP): Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts met with mixed success over the past few months. Reintegration continued to show steady incremental progress as small groups of Taliban entered the process over the quarter, particularly more so in RC-N and RC-W. ISAF is actively supporting its Afghan partners' efforts to accelerate reintegration, in an effort to make it an increasingly attractive alternative for insurgents. As of the end of January 31, APRP had formally reintegrated a total of 3028 insurgents. This represents an increase of around 300 reintegrees over last quarter.

Development

34. As the link between security, governance and development, the PRTs in Afghanistan will gradually change focus from direct delivery of services to technical assistance and capacity building including improvement of Afghan national and sub-national governance institution linkages. PRTs will hand over their functions to either the Afghan local administrations, private sector or to other stakeholders, such as NGOs, national consulates, and aid agencies. PRT evolution will lead to an ultimate dissolution scheduled by the end of 2014. The Office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, the

lead for PRT evolution, and ISAF HQ have produced and disseminated assistance documents and guidance, a "PRT Evolution Planning Toolkit" and "Guidance to JANIB Transition plans" to help PRT Troop Contributing Nations to identify PRT evolution dependencies and how to hand off activities. As part of transition implementation plans, PRT evolution plans for Tranches 1 and 2 were approved by JANIB and their preparation for the remaining provinces is ongoing.

Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC)

35. The North Atlantic Council met on 22 February 2012 with its ISAF partners to discuss the issue of Children affected by Armed Conflict and the ongoing cooperation between NATO and UN on this issue. The UN Under-Secretary General, Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy, shared her views via VTC. The NAC agreed on a series of additional concrete and practical steps to be taken, including the development of guidelines to strategic commanders and a review of the NATO Policy on Contractor Support to Operations to ensure that NATO does not do business with contractors using child labour. Specific reporting on Children Affected by Armed Conflict will be included in future NATO Quarterly Reports to the UN on ISAF Operations. NATO also appointed high-level focal point on Children Affected by Armed Conflict to further interact with the UN on this topic.



SECRETARY GENERAL
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
Anders Fogh Rasmussen



ACTION *M. Ladsens (email)*

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M. Pascoe (email)
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SG(2012)0076

6 March 2012

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Yours sincerely,

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Encl.

His Excellency
Mr Ban Ki-moon
Secretary-General
United Nations Headquarters
United Nations Plaza 2
New York 10017
U.S.A.

PKG/04/004

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Introduction

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
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- c. On 27 November 2011, the second tranche of areas to enter Transition was announced by President Karzai. The second tranche comprises a further 18 areas. Implementation of the second tranche began in Parwan province on 1 December 2011 and is now underway in all Tranche 2 areas, except for Sar-e Pul Province (RC N), which has been postponed.
- d. On 5 January, President Karzai ordered the Constitutional Oversight Commission to complete the transfer of the US-run Detention facility in Parwan to Afghan authorities within a month. The President's decision came after the Commission reported violations of the Afghan Constitution, which provides that no foreign countries can maintain and run prisons in Afghanistan, as well as of the Afghan Criminal Code. In February 2012, President Karzai extended the timeline to 9 March 2012.
- e. On 20 January, soldiers from a French Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in RC (E), Kapisa province, were engaged by a Afghan National Army soldier resulting in four ISAF soldiers Killed in Action and 14 Wounded in Action (all casualties French). ISAF Troop Contributing Nations have expressed strong concerns about the loss of life and consequences of the incidents that have involved ANSF personnel attacking ISAF troops, and have asked the Afghan authorities to improve their screening and vetting of recruits.

Security Situation

5. Enemy-initiated attacks (EIA)¹ have declined when compared to the same quarter last year. Insurgent efforts to maintain operations into the winter with high profile attacks and assassinations have been largely ineffective. The insurgency failed to achieve this objective due to a combination of persistent Afghan and ISAF Conventional and Special Forces operations, ongoing clear, hold, and build operations, reintegration efforts, and the expansion of local defense initiatives.




¹ EIA comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, to include executed attacks only (Improvised explosive device (IED) explosions / mine strikes).

6. Insurgents continue to rely on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as the principal means to execute their campaign. During the reporting period, the insurgency was accountable for 84 percent of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) of which 60 percent were caused by their indiscriminate use of IEDs. More than half of IEDs and mines were found and cleared rather than detonated.

7. Regionally, the security situation is as follows²:

a. Regional Command Southwest (RC SW)


In RC (SW), EIA in 2011 were 29 percent lower compared to 2010. Deliberate combined team (CT) operations maintained pressure on insurgents during the beginning of the winter season, which helped to reduce insurgent capacity. Improved governance from



Provincial Governor Mangal and CT force efforts have strengthened and expanded the security bubble centred on Lashkar Gah. Operations continue in northern and southern Helmand to disrupt insurgent strongholds. The small ISAF force reductions during the final quarter of 2011 have not impacted operations, but future significant reductions may well test the capabilities of the ANSF who to date have performed well.

b. Regional Command South (RC S)

The improving capability of the ANSF and success of combined team operations maintained pressure on insurgents and limited their ability to operate. A small increase in security incidents during the reporting period and recent resurgence in suicide attacks in the Kandahar area reiterates the importance of the South to the insurgency. Insurgents increasingly targeted ANSF and GIRoA officials in an effort to regain influence over the population.



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c. Regional Command East (RCE)

² Graphics are available on the ISAF Webpage, link: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/monthly-trends.html>



The security incidents in RC (E) has followed a general winter decline, but persisted at higher levels than previously seen and are spread across the RC due to a geographically diverse enemy. Supplies and fighters originating in Pakistan and moving across the border have

enabled the insurgents in the region to maintain its operational capability and tempo. Increased pressure from ISAF and ANSF, coupled with Afghan local security initiatives, are working to disrupt these supply routes and therefore hamper insurgent operations. Strained relations during the reporting period between ISAF/GIRoA and Pakistan underline the importance of cooperation for security and stability in the border region.

d. Regional Command North (RC N)

Insurgent networks in the north still represent a threat to CT forces and GIRoA, but to a smaller degree than the other RCs. Actual numbers of security incidents decreased during the last quarter demonstrating insurgent's inability to transform their rhetoric into actions. Though a


positive attitude towards security forces has been reported among the populace, corruption within those representing the government remains of great concern.



e. Regional Command West (RC W)

The success of CT operations and improved popular support towards both GIRoA and ISAF has resulted in an overall decrease in security incidents. These contributing factors have resulted in the degradation of both the morale and capabilities of the insurgent's in RC W.


Enemy initiated attacks have remained largely uncoordinated, ineffective and will likely decrease throughout the winter until the 2012 fighting season begins.



f. Regional Command Capital (RC C)

Improved ANSF capabilities, significant cache finds, the expansion of the Kabul Security Zone and Coalition Forces operations in RC E have limited the effectiveness of insurgent activities in the capital, culminating in a virtual lack of insurgent kinetic activity

in January 2012. Although security incidents are most likely to remain stable in the next quarter, insurgents will intermittently attempt to challenge the perception of security in Kabul Province as a kinetic incident in the Capital will likely garner significant media attention.



Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

8. ANSF development is on track in terms of both size and quality. ANSF is on glide path to meet October 2012 strength goals while command and control capacities continue to be built up and improved. One of ISAF's main efforts is towards further professionalization of the forces. Substantial progress in reliability and sustainability of the ANA and the ANP has been achieved.

9. In 2011, ANSF added 57,000 soldiers and police to their numbers. And now, almost 40 percent of conventional and Special Forces operations are led by Afghan Forces, and approximately 90 percent of the operations are partnered with ISAF.

10. Strong recruitment has allowed ANSF to remain on track towards the next strength target of 352,000 by October 2012. In addition to growing combat forces, the Afghan Security Ministries made substantial progress increasing the quality of their forces. With the support and advice of the Coalition, the ANSF units are becoming more capable and improved their ability to conduct autonomous operations in the field. Efforts are being made to establish proficient headquarters at national and regional levels and to improve

planning and coordination capacity. In addition, the ANSF is progressively assuming more responsibility for self-training the ANSF.

11. The establishment of training institutions is close to completion and fosters the progressive professionalization of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANSF development continues to focus in five key areas: training Afghan trainers and instructors; accelerating leader development; building literacy and vocational skills; inculcating an ethos of stewardship, and developing enduring institutions, systems, and enablers. Additional trainers and advisers from the IC are still required to accelerate ANSF professionalization further and to help create an effective and sustainable ANSF. Furthermore, ISAF and GIROA are now reinforcing ANSF vetting process to improve safety for ISAF embedded personnel and avoid a deterioration of confidence between international trainers and advisors and their respective Afghan counterparts.

Afghan National Army (ANA)

12. The ANA currently constitutes the most robust and self sufficient organization in the ANSF. The Afghan Army has entered the last fielding phase, the goal of which is to reinforce the sustainability of a more balanced professional force able to assume security lead. To this end, Combat Support, Combat Service Support, units along with Corps and Brigade troops³ are being created and trained. Fielding of these new enabling units should be completed by the end of 2013. Furthermore, a more autonomous logistic branch continues to be developed. Finally, significant efforts are being made to finalize the establishment of a complete training institution allowing the Afghans to professionalize the force by themselves. An ANA Training Command was set up to this end and 12 army branch schools permanently work at full capacity with more than 20,000 trainees. The overall training level for the army is increasing slowly but steadily.

13. The ANA remains on track to achieve its Oct 12 growth target of 195,000. Its current strength is around 184,000 soldiers. ANA recruiting remains strong and ethnically balanced, and gender equity is permanently promoted by ISAF through NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A)⁴. The percentage of all ANA Kandaks rated “Effective with advisors” or higher increased to 44 percent this reporting period. As mentioned in the previous reports, the attrition rates are decreasing slowly but remain high and continue to generate additional recruitment and training costs. A comprehensive plan, including mid-term and long-term solutions, has been developed in partnership with Afghan leaders to address this persistent issue.

14. Regarding the fielded ANA, the issues to be solved remain leadership skills, high attrition, staff planning, tactical coordination and logistics.

Afghan Air Force (AAF)

15. AAF development is underway and in addition to personnel recruitment and professionalization highlighted in the previous reports, infrastructure build has made significant process. New facilities have been delivered in support of a self-sustaining force. Important investments are foreseen to improve AAF training sites and infrastructure, which

³ Military Police Companies, Military Intelligence Units, Engineer Battalions, Signal Battalions, Route Clearance Companies, and Mobile Strike Force Battalions

⁴ There are currently 333 women serving in the ANA, nearly all of whom are in Kabul.

are critical conditions for sound development and self-sustainability. The AAF still faces some major challenges, with an important corruption level and recruiting issues, in particular in the ability to obtain qualified recruits.

16. 15. AAF strength reached 5,172 personnel in December 2011 and the attrition rates are lower than in the ANA and ANP. A total of 82 aircraft are in service within the AAF, including 42 helicopters, with plans to reach up to 145 aircraft in total when the Air Force will be fully fielded in 2016. International support remains critical for AAF development, training, and support to autonomously led ANSF operations.

Afghan National Police (ANP)

17. Overall, the ANP is currently on track for the October 2012 target. Its current strength is just around 144,000 police officers. Both Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) patrolmen authorized manning are full; recruiting has adjusted to focus on recruiting direct entry Non Commissioned Officers (NCO's) and to balancing growth with training of NCOs and new patrolmen. The focus on training continues as the training seat capacity surpassed 15,000 and training fill rate stood at around 65 percent.

18. The personnel establishment for 2011 provides over 1,500 additional female billets. There are currently 1,244 women serving in the ANP. The recruitment of females is lagging behind for a variety of reasons, mainly commanders' reluctance to accept female officers.

19. ANP Operational Effectiveness showed remarkable progress within the force. The December 2011 report is the first one in which any ANP unit were rated "Independent with Advisors". For the AUP, 40 percent of units were rated "Effective with Advisors" or higher, while for the ABP and ANCOP this fraction was 53 percent and 57 percent respectively.

Institutional Capacity

20. The security ministries, with the assistance of NTM-A, are sustaining their continuous effort to build capability to generate and sustain the ANSF. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the General Staff are still requiring assistance to accomplish their mission. During the reporting period, the MoD confirmed an improved capability at the managerial level as demonstrated by the effective management of the initiation of transition Tranche Two.

21. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) is still requiring significant assistance and is expected to progress to requiring only some assistance by the end of 2012. Key issues remaining include shortcomings in filling civilian positions due to the lack of civil service pay and grade reform.


Private Security Companies (PSC)/Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)

22. Nine months after the signature of the Bridging Strategy (March 2011), the APPF remains largely non-existent. The strategy calls for the dissolution of PSCs conducting development and convoy protection by 20 March 2012 and those conducting protection of ISAF bases & construction by 20 March 2013. The Joint Programme Executive Office (JPEO) has been established to support the transition from PSCs and to mentor the APPF, building adequate capability to support the bridging strategy. The JPEO could thus encourage development implementing partners to take the decision to continue development and infrastructure works. In order to accelerate the development of a business capability, command & control structure, and guard training capacity, several PSCs are mutating into Risk Management Companies (RMCs) as a stopgap solution. The RMCs will assist with management, oversight, training and operational standards until the APPF are fully capable of managing security operations. Assistance from the APPF Ministerial partners (timely issuing of visas by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, work permits from the Ministry of Labour, communication licenses from the Ministry of Communication, armoured vehicle licenses from the Ministry of Interior to ensure no gap in security) is still critical to achieve President Karzai's deadline.

Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS)

23. The protection of the Afghan population remains the highest priority for ISAF and every civilian casualty is detrimental to the ISAF mission. Among several initiatives, ISAF has dedicated special attention to the understanding and prevention of events that could result in civilian casualties. New tactical directives were issued this quarter and the entire ISAF force was retrained on them. The ISAF Deputy Commander (DCOM) became Chair of a new ISAF CIVCAS Avoidance and Mitigation Board to provide constant senior staff oversight of this issue. COMISAF held a conference at HQ ISAF 17-18 January 2012, in order to gather lessons learned from NATO operations in Libya, synchronise Commanders' understanding of the COMISAF Tactical Directive (Rev 4), and evolve future air support to partnered and non partnered ANSF units from a combat aviator's perspective.

24. Reporting this quarter indicates that the insurgents are responsible for causing 84 percent of overall CIVCAS related incidents, which represents an increase of 7 percent. The total numbers of CIVCAS is down by 19 percent when compared to the previous reporting period. ISAF actions were attributed to only 6 percent of all CIVCAS related incidents, which is representative of the continued decreasing trend when compared to previous reports. December 2011 represents the lowest number of ISAF-caused CIVCAS since accurate record-keeping began back in January 2009. It remains very apparent that the insurgency can still exploit and manipulate CIVCAS events to their advantage, since ISAF is perceived accountable by the Afghan population for all incidents where casualties occur. The figures reported in the chart reflect incidents of conflict-related civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) that have been confirmed through investigation to have been caused by either ISAF or insurgents. The data reported here is consistent with ISAF policy, which directs that all credible allegations of civilian casualties be reviewed⁵.



Counter Narcotics (CN)

25. Afghanistan Security Forces, with the support of their ISAF partners, seized a record amount of narcotics and precursor chemicals in 2011, especially morphine, that remains well in excess of total seized in 2010. While disruption to the trade is significant, operations are not having long-term impact on narcotics networks, as they are able to adapt and move, returning to pre-operational levels of activities once operations are complete.

26. Initial indications show opium cultivation decreasing in areas of better security. Near record high opium prices drove farmers to plant poppy in large numbers, including in new areas where cultivation had previously been financially prohibitive. Cultivation has also migrated to more remote areas with limited security and small coalition footprints as a result of successful operations in 2011.

27. Programs to prepare Afghan security forces and improve capabilities at all levels are vital to ensure Afghanistan is able to sustain CN operations post-transition. ISAF will continue to provide support to GIRoA CN programs and operations in order to disrupt, neutralize and influence the narcotics industry and its funding of the insurgency in Afghanistan. ISAF will continue to synchronise operations to the poppy cultivation cycle, in order to maximize disruptive effects and further support this aim.

Governance

28. ISAF continues to provide support to Afghan-led governance efforts, particularly in key areas of Transition, reintegration, counter-corruption, and rule of law improvement.

⁵ Graphics are available on the ISAF Webpage, link: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/monthly-trends.html>

29. Transition; the implementation of Tranche 2 is now underway. The Afghan government continued to work jointly with NATO on the implementation of Tranche 1 and 2 areas of Transition as well as the planning for Tranche 3. With Tranche 2 now started, roughly 50% of the Afghan population is in an area where security has been shifted to Afghan-lead. ISAF continues to support the ANSF in transition areas through various levels of over watch, training, and provision of key enabler capabilities. The Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) has endorsed the security, governance & development, strategic communication, and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) evolution components of all the transition implementation plans for Tranche 2 areas. Transition ceremonies, organised and led by the Transition Coordination Commission, are now underway in all Tranche 2 areas, except for Sar-e Pul Province in RC (N), which has been postponed. Transition implementation will be held off until Afghan processes have time to resolve the issues.

30. Anti-corruption; A NATO Building Integrity (BI) Training Team visited Kabul during 2-15 December. The Team delivered a Defence Leadership in BI course to 45 students at the Afghan Police College followed by a BI Train the Trainers course for 12 students at the National Military Academy. The Team then mentored Afghan Trainers as they delivered a Defence Leadership in BI course to 35 students at the National Military Academy. This is the first time that Afghan Trainers have delivered BI training and is a significant milestone in the implementation of the BI program. With Task Force Shafafiyat (transparency in Dari), ISAF has been supporting GIRoA efforts to reduce corruption in the government.

31. NATO Public Affairs Conference on Afghanistan in Dubai 10 December 2011 and around 100 spokespersons and press officers from across the Alliance, UNAMA, the EU, ISAF HQ and key Afghanistan government spokespersons and media representatives attended the conference. In addition, the Afghan Government Media and Information Centre (GMIC) committed to hosting a Kabul workshop for communicators in the capital to further explore ways of increasing the Afghan voice in all communications.

32. Support to Rule of Law Development; Through the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission (NROLFSM), ISAF is providing liaison and field capabilities to assist GIRoA and International civilian experts in improving capacity. NROLFSM focuses its efforts on helping GIRoA expand rule of law outreach into key provinces and districts.

33. Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP): Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts met with mixed success over the past few months. Reintegration continued to show steady incremental progress as small groups of Taliban entered the process over the quarter, particularly more so in RC-N and RC-W. ISAF is actively supporting its Afghan partners' efforts to accelerate reintegration, in an effort to make it an increasingly attractive alternative for insurgents. As of the end of January 31, APRP had formally reintegrated a total of 3028 insurgents. This represents an increase of around 300 reintegrees over last quarter.

Development

34. As the link between security, governance and development, the PRTs in Afghanistan will gradually change focus from direct delivery of services to technical assistance and capacity building including improvement of Afghan national and sub-national governance institution linkages. PRTs will hand over their functions to either the Afghan local administrations, private sector or to other stakeholders, such as NGOs, national consulates, and aid agencies. PRT evolution will lead to an ultimate dissolution scheduled by the end of 2014. The Office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, the

lead for PRT evolution, and ISAF HQ have produced and disseminated assistance documents and guidance, a "PRT Evolution Planning Toolkit" and "Guidance to JANIB Transition plans" to help PRT Troop Contributing Nations to identify PRT evolution dependencies and how to hand off activities. As part of transition implementation plans, PRT evolution plans for Tranches 1 and 2 were approved by JANIB and their preparation for the remaining provinces is ongoing.

Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC)

35. The North Atlantic Council met on 22 February 2012 with its ISAF partners to discuss the issue of Children affected by Armed Conflict and the ongoing cooperation between NATO and UN on this issue. The UN Under-Secretary General, Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy, shared her views via VTC. The NAC agreed on a series of additional concrete and practical steps to be taken, including the development of guidelines to strategic commanders and a review of the NATO Policy on Contractor Support to Operations to ensure that NATO does not do business with contractors using child labour. Specific reporting on Children Affected by Armed Conflict will be included in future NATO Quarterly Reports to the UN on ISAF Operations. NATO also appointed high-level focal point on Children Affected by Armed Conflict to further interact with the UN on this topic.