

OUTGOING CODE

*Ad*  
*3/11*  
*Sant*  
*A.O.C*

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Dayal, Leopoldville  
Date: 3 October 1960  
No: B-1167

Reur 2326. We are most grateful for your generous response to our request for funds to relieve unemployment. The amount exceeds what we had dared to hope, and we shall now be able to take up projects in various distress areas all over the country. Apart from intrinsic importance of the immediate relief of unemployment, I am convinced that the programme will have a powerful impact on public opinion here and abroad. Of course we shall undertake it, and with all possible speed, exclusively on our own authority.

OUTGOING CODE

RP  
Sent  
3/10  
4/10

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Dayal, Leopoldville  
Date: 3 October 1960  
No: B-1165, B-1166

Your 2322 and 2323 gave us a sense of reassurance that the assembled personages and delegates have applied their minds in search of constructive solutions and are becoming conscious of our difficulties here. This was all the more welcome after your yesterday's telegram; incidentally, we hope that our report about ANC payments has finally settled the issue.

2. My preliminary reactions are as follows: (a) Good Offices Mission under GA Resolution. Having seen the fate of the good offices efforts of the African envoys here who are expected to know the local colour, the prospects of a similar mission, presumably drawn from your Advisory Committee, achieving better results would be extremely doubtful. It is axiomatic that good offices can be applied only when a unanimous request is made by the parties concerned. In the present context it is hardly likely that the three pretenders will agree to such a joint approach. Furthermore, as has been demonstrated here, some at any rate of the African envoys have their own axes to grind. If this difference in approach is reflected in the proposed Good Offices Mission, the results can well be imagined. I agree therefore that the good offices approach is not appropriate in the present context.

3. (b) Round Table Conference. While the general idea has its own appeal, the hope of achieving any constructive results is contingent on a common approach as to composition, functions etc., and a prior agreement to abide by the consensus of opinion. While there is some agreement to the principle of holding a round table conference, there is no agreement on anything else.



Kasavubu has been trying to pack it with his own adherents while Lumumba has refused to participate on this basis, and there is Kalondji's demand that it should be held in a neutral place and Tshombe's that venue should be outside the Congo. Lumumba has made a demand that the composition should be confined to all elected members of Parliament, the Presidents of the Provincial Governments and Assemblies and of course the Head of State under whose presidency the conference will be held. This approach which seems prima facie reasonable is not likely to be accepted by the others while Tshombe's participation will be doubtful if Lumumba insists on participating as Prime Minister and not as an ordinary Deputy. For these reasons, I agree that the round table conference approach seems foredoomed to failure.

4. / (c) Parliamentary approach. This seems to be the only approach possible in the circumstances subject to the considerations which you have mentioned, namely that all elements must be enabled to participate without let or hindrance. That would of course involve UN providing necessary security to representatives and persuasion of some participants.

B-1166

5. The mere assembling of Parliament however would not be sufficient and some discreet guidance along constructive lines, indications of possible solutions and exercise of influence to ensure adherence to parliamentary and democratic procedures, will be necessary. This would need very careful handling and complete identity of approach with ours on the part of African envoys whose help could be invoked. Whether such cooperation will be forthcoming will have to be ascertained and assessed.

6. As regards the Tshombe problem, I note that you



are considering the possibility of a personal approach about which we shall no doubt receive further information. I doubt however whether it is correct that Belgian support is practically fully withdrawn, for our people have the impression that Belgian civilians, and perhaps others in mufti, are there in strength. Nevertheless, our impression is that Tshombe is approachable and willing to seek advice if permitted.

7. Before the parliamentary line is developed, it is essential that I should make soundings in the first instance with some of the African envoys, notably Ghaleb. Thereafter, it will be necessary to ascertain the views of the Presidents of the two Chambers and then possibly of Lumumba and Kasavubu. A fly in the ointment is Mobutu who says that he has neutralised Parliament. But it may be possible to influence him.

8. These are my immediate reactions to your telegrams. I should like to give further consideration to the important matters raised and would follow up with more detailed views. Meanwhile, I would request your reactions to these preliminary views.

OUTGOING CODE

TO : Cordier  
FROM : Dayal, von Horn  
DATE : 4 October 1960  
NUMBER : B-1164

*Issue  
Jm  
4/10/60*

Appreciate if you would let us have information on the following:

1. Have Tunisia, Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to provide extra battalions ? If so, when should we expect them ? The need for additional units has not decreased and we feel that arrangements should be made to dispatch them to the Congo as early as possible. While we will have gained by the arrival of the Indonesians and shortly that of Nigeria and Malaya units, we lose the Mali battalion and we understand a full strength Ghana infantry battalion is to be rotated by a weak one.

2. A recommendation was made a few weeks ago in regard to medals for the personnel of the Force and transmitted by my letter to you dated 15 September. Shortly, the majority of members of the Force will be completing 3 months service. It is essential that their services be recognized by the grant of an ONUC medal. Speedy action is requested and designs should be sent to us for our views.

*cc: von Horn*



CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE 3 OCTOBER 1960

UNATIONS  
NEW YORK

*H. J. J. J.*

B-1162 FOR MACFARQUHAR FROM RIKHYE X YOUR 2309 X UNDERSTAND  
FROM ITALIANS THAT THEY HAVE MORE MEDICAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE X  
AUSTRIANS ALSO OFFERED AYE 400 BED HOSPITAL X SUGGEST REQUEST BE  
ADDRESSED TO EITHER FOR FRENCH SPEAKING PERSONNEL X

~~BRIGXXRKHYE~~

CLEAR

UNATIONS, NEW YORK

B-1160 FOR CORDIER FROM DAYAL X

ARE COPIES OF THE PLAZA COMMITTEE REPORT AVAILABLE WHICH YOU COULD  
SEND BY POUCH QUERY

me  
ND  
3/1

Mr. Dayal  
We might send  
this, unless you  
have had some  
news  
Jm D  
3/10/68

Wmcl-  
Reg-a  
3/1

Drafted by: J.McDiarmid

Authorized by: R.Dayal

3 October 1960



OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen

From: Dayal

Date: 2 October 1960

No: B-1159

Would Rikhye's departure tonight be useful?



OUTGOING CODE

TO : Secgen  
FROM : Dayal  
DATE : 2 October 1960  
NUMBER : B-1158

Further my B-1137. Tense situation punctuated by daily incidents continues in provinces which any untoward event in Leo could easily spark.

1. Equateur - ANC attempted arrest Ikolo, Vice-President and Minister of Finance. Unconfirmed rumour of general strike for 3 October.

2. Orientale - President Finant reported losing confidence in Lumumba, but also intimidated by ANC. Reported that if Lumumba loses his position centrally, he may never recover his grip in Orientale. Belgians continue to leave and business tapering off. Many plantations abandoned by Europeans but still being run day-to-day basis by Congolese.

3. Kivu - Nothing fresh.

4. Kasai - Port Francqui administrator withdrew expulsion or death ultimatum to Baluba after Baluba group placed under strong UN protection. Administrator arriving Luluabourg to discuss affair with Provincial President. Kalonji family released by ANC at Mobutu's request and arrived Leo. UN air-lifting assistance to refugees Mweni Ditu area.

5. Katanga - Sixty Gendarmes attempted board Luema-Kamina train but dislodged by UN guard. Near Dianda one Gendarmerie officer and one NCO killed by local population. Lusinga village near Mitwaka burned and more trouble expected. Local Commander closed airport. Unconfirmed reports that Pasonge tribesmen with ANC weapons and ANC deserters advancing from Sentery, Katangawarda, Kongelo.

.../...

Berendsen reports whole north much disturbed. Gendarmerie has occupied many towns though sideroads barricaded by armed tribesmen. Clashes occur even on main roads. Europeans have withdrawn from all isolated areas and commerce interrupted. Tribesmen tend associate UN with Gendarmerie whose clashes with them engender bitterness. UN hoping bring two groups together, but no request for good offices yet received from Government.

Rothschild willing attempt secure withdrawal European officers in Kalonji forces. Gillet states only four such officers (3 Belgian 1 English) but he and Rothschild fear undisciplined Kalonji forces will disintegrate and become public menace unless other arrangements made previously. Berendsen suggests sending a few Moroccan officers to take over. Tshombe received warm welcome from local population when visiting Kolweji.

6. Leopoldville - Party of Kabaka visited Lumumba yesterday. At Kikwit tense situation between ANC and UN due to undisciplined ANC. UN rescued two Europeans arrested by ANC. Unemployment increases and arrival food supplies sporadic.

7. General - Situation not improving but on contrary getting worse as positions of individuals, tribes, and parties crystallize and bitterness grows. Imperative central political impasse be solved or position in provinces will progressively get worse.



OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: *Cordier*

From: McDiarmid

Date: 2 October 1960

No *B-1157*

A message in four parts in cypher from the Indian Chargé d'Affaires for Prime Minister of India is being sent through our communications to ensure its delivery today. The message is officially <sup>*addressed*</sup> from Commander, Indian Contingent, ONUC, for the Permanent Representative of India to United Nations, New York.

Please warn Indian Delegation who should arrange to collect from the UN.

*Jm ad*

*sent  
AOL*

OUTGOING CODE

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2/x

Sent  
JMA

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Dayal, Leopoldville  
Date: 2 October 1960  
No: B-1155, B-1156

MOST IMMEDIATE

Reur 2311. The position in regard to such payments as have been made by UNOC to supplement governmental funds in respect of over two months arrears of pay to the ANC is that UNOC have been actuated by their responsibility in regard to the maintenance of law and order, by their responsibility to assume training and regrouping of ANC and by desire to prevent their active and violent intervention in political crisis. Warned by the ANC mutiny of July 6 and 7 which shook the peace of the entire country, we have been deeply conscious of preventing the recurrence of a similar situation of extreme gravity. The early experience of UN troops suffering violence at hands of indisciplined ANC soldiery, rendered desperate by lack of pay or food, and restive at conditions of economic collapse, governmental instability and factional strife, increased dangers of consequences which would befall if the ANC broke out and by violent means indulged in pillage and bloodshed and intervened forcibly in the political situation.

2. General Kettani appointed adviser at Prime Minister Lumumba's request for ~~the~~ training and regrouping of ANC urged immediate measures to meet as far as possible arrears of pay to prevent above consequences. Lumumba himself raised with Kettani on 9 September this pay question and received favourably latter's report on proposed arrangements.

3. On following day Mobutu confirmed to ONUC direct, ANC's strict neutrality in the political crisis and urgently requested UN on its own initiative, settle matters relating



to food and pay. At no time did he propose payment through him, as would have been requested by one seeking political advantage. We therefore decided to demonstrate ONUC's independence in this matter visibly by effecting payments under UN flag in presence of Kettani and his staff with assistance of UN Finance office. Furthermore, Mobutu addressed the pay parade emphasising both that payments were accomplished through UN good offices and that ANC must remain neutral and unpolitical. General Lundula himself and ANC Brigade Commanders participated on this occasion.

4. On 10 September<sup>2</sup> in interview with Lumumba I personally took up with him our payment of salary arrears in Camp Leopold; he asked for any outstanding balance to be placed at the disposal of his Government for the purpose. This would ~~of course~~ have represented a clear departure from <sup>UN financial procedures</sup> ~~political neutrality~~, and since then we have also had to refuse similar requests by various provincial authorities. The following day detailed payment problems were taken up by Supreme Commander with Lundula and Mobutu jointly; that evening Lumumba claimed to<sup>3</sup> press conference that his Government had in fact paid the money although ONUC made the arrangements. ~~See my B-913.~~

and from

B-1156 — 5. By 12 September Lundula had already taken open if abortive military measures on Lumumba's behalf but was still ANC Commander-in-Chief. This did not inhibit us from negotiating with him and group commanders of Stanleyville, Luluabourg and Leopoldville, and on their urgent request we provided ANC with food. As usual we urged that they keep ANC out of the political crisis and Supreme Commander elaborated priorities for distributing rations in Kasai and Kivu.

6. While Lumumba's subsequent arrest by ANC foretold army involvement in the political crisis, his prompt



release by senior officers equally suggested that some balance was still maintained. Only on 14 September did Mobutu broadcast Army's determination to intervene in solving national problems which he later elaborated by stating that he was neutralising both governments. To keep chronology clear I mention that my personal intervention to save Lumumba's life in Ghana mess took place on 15 September. Meanwhile we constantly used Kettani's restraining influence to obtain and keep foremost in Mobutu's mind his declaration that ANC control was limited to bringing about peaceful reconciliation between Kasavubu and Lumumba.

7. Recent developments in the provinces have manifested alarming spread of ANC indiscipline, exacerbated by lack of food and pay, resulting in forcible intervention in provincial administration and terrorising of provincial officials, with dangers of loot and general violence. Again, impelled by considerations given in paragraph one, we have had to take remedial measures in Stanleyville and elsewhere to keep army from breaking loose. <sup>Ethiopian</sup> General Iyassou has supervised supplementary payment to Stanleyville ANC force, and has succeeded in winning a temporary respite. It is significant that while ANC garrison there has always been pro Lumumba, Provincial President is his political ally; yet the liberty and safety of entire Provincial Government has been gravely threatened by the ANC revolt. President Finant addressed several appeals to ONUC for measures to avert ANC threat.

8. It will be evident from the above facts that such payments as have perforce been made, have been occasioned by compelling needs of situation and have had no political purpose or consequences whatsoever, and are fully in line with ONUC's general responsibilities. The total payments made amount to dollars four hundred and fortyseven thousand.



OUTGOING CODE

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yt

TO : Secgen  
FROM : Dayal  
DATE : 2 October 1960  
NUMBER : B-1154

1. In view of unemployment situation growing daily more alarming in whole of country, and particularly in Leopoldville, final solution questions raised in Linner's cables, for instance ONUC 1024 and B-1115, needed urgently.

2. In case there is little possibility of ending present deadlock by measures proposed from here, perhaps one way of getting things started with far-reaching psychological impact and practical advantage would be to transfer temporarily say, One Hundred Thousand Dollars from funds for ANC to Public Works projects. That would enable 1,200 workers to be employed immediately on project in Leo for a three-month period. Another Six Million Five Hundred Thousand francs would keep 26,000 workers employed for three months in Orientale Province, and indirectly some 50,000. No objections foreseen at local authority end; on contrary, we are beleaguered by requests from them to make at least some initial gesture.

3. Should action requested in above not be possible, perhaps ultimate alternative might be to open gruel kitchens to meet immediate problem of hunger till longer term arrangements possible. The cost would be comparatively small - but we are aware of the risks and implications of such action, which are being more fully examined.

sent

OUTGOING CODE

TO : Secgen  
FROM : Dayal  
DATE : 2 October 1960  
NUMBER : B-1153

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your 2311. Reports regarding ANC payments and measures required immediate relief of unemployment situation following.

Would Rikhye's presence be useful? If so he could reach New York as early as possible Monday afternoon but latest 1905 NY time.

*Jmcd*



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Dayal, Leopoldville  
Date: 1 October 1960  
No: B-1152

Reur 2301. Concerned to hear of atmosphere there, and the existence of preconceived notions in unexpected places.

2. I note your intention to send general instructions regarding handling of responsibility etc., which will be most welcome.

*gmed*  
*Rg*  
*1/10*

OUTGOING CODE

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To: Secgen, New York  
From: Dayal, Leopoldville  
Date: 1 October 1960  
No: B-1151

Reur 2300. We have prepared a reply to Kasavubu regarding Ghanaian and Guinean troops in the form you suggest. Mobutu and Ileo yesterday separately referred to the date-line of 5th October for their departure, the former even objecting to their transfer to Kasai.

Wm. L.  
Reur  
1/10

2. Mobutu is believed to have stated that Kasavubu had no authority to swear-in the Commissars.

3. Timberlake tells me of a lunatic plan which apparently has Kasavubu's blessings, for a team of four led by the Deputy Commissar for Defence to go on a trip to Rome and Israel for studies on defence matters, to Brussels for negotiations regarding transfer of Kamina Base, to West Point to inspect American training methods and materials and finally to the UN to collect one billion in funds! It is understood that although air bookings have been made the trip will not materialise as visas are being refused.

4. I have learnt from the Liberian Ambassador that four African envoys except himself and Tunisia had prepared and probably issued a statement "deploring the political manoeuvrings" and the induction of the Commissars and appealing to all parties to do nothing to exacerbate the situation. In case Liberia's name has been wrongly used, the Ambassador proposes to call a press conference to deny involvement in this flagrant interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. He confirmed that the group is badly split, the four extremists including Morocco playing their own game.



5. I also learnt from the same Ambassador that Lumumba has prepared a memorandum for the UN containing wild accusations of interference by UN officials, and payment of five million dollars by UNOC to Kasavubu. Welbeck continues to make his fantastic charges of UN collusion.

6. The assembling of the round-tablers will not be easy especially as extreme positions have been adopted by the protagonists. The question of representation is still in the air.

7. The surface calm in Leo continues while situation in the provinces, though tense in certain areas, is fortunately slightly relaxed.

OUTGOING CODE

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TO : Secgen  
FROM : Dayal  
DATE : 1 October 1960  
Number : B- 1150

In a letter to me Albert Kalonji requested food and medical supplies for the Baluba in South Kasai. We have already measures in hand to relieve the population in the area. However, I thought it was a good occasion to inform Kalonji of our efforts and to get his cooperation to improve the military situation there.

As Kalonji is now in Leo I sent Rikhye and Liu to meet him, at Kasa-Vubu's residence. Ileo was present. After informing him of the UN efforts to help the population and to maintain cease-fire in the area, Rikhye drew attention to the danger arising from Kalonji's armed undisciplined volunteers and the presence of European officers.

Kalonji who listened in cooperative mood made the following replies:

(a) He had a plan to regroup volunteers and train them as a disciplined police force. The regrouping would be achieved under direction of his representative Ngalula, in cooperation with a representative of Mobutu. Mobutu had agreed to the plan but had not yet appointed his representative.

(b) The European officers were on loan from Tshombe (quite a confession!) and he was willing to ask the latter to take them back, but he would like to keep them for two more weeks to train the volunteers as policemen.

.../...



Rikhye insisted that Kalonji should withdraw the European officers without delay. He will have another meeting with Kalonji next Monday. He will also see Mobutu concerning volunteers.

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

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PRIORITY

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SSSS

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Address(es)

*COOB*

UNATIONS  
NEW YORK

*Ad*  
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(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

ONUC B-1148 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL - VON HORN STOP REFERENCE  
PREVIOUS MESSAGES CONCERNING VISITS TO NATIONAL CONTINGENTS  
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOU STOP HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT  
TUNISIAN CHIEF OF STAFF PROCEEDING ON 2 OCT TO LULUABOURG  
TO VISIT TUNISIAN BRIGADE STOP DURATION HIS VISIT UNKNOWN  
STOP INFORMATION SECURED THROUGH TUNISIAN LIAISON OFFICER  
WHO WAS HIMSELF INFORMED BY BRIGADE COMMANDER WHO HAD  
BEEN CONTACTED DIRECT BY TUNIS STOP PLEASE CONFIRM ADVISED  
OF POLICY CONCERNING VISITS

*DELEGATIONS*

*Mmed.*  
*Aria*  
*1110*

I. N. 5990 — 200,000 - 7/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Lt Col Berthiaume  
G. von Horn  
Ambassador Dayal  
Authorized : *[Signature]*  
1 OCT 60  
Date :



OUTGOING CODE

TO : Bunche  
FROM : Dayal  
DATE : 1 October 1960  
NUMBER : B-1147

Your 2285. I have been in touch with Scott who informs  
that London has suspended the operation. He has enquired details.



OUTGOING CODE

TO: Secretary-General

FROM: Dayal, von Horn

DATE: 1 October 1960

NUMBER: 1146

IMMEDIATE

Further to our B-1079. Withdrawal of Mali Battalion from Congo not possible before Malayan Battalion available in Eastern Provinces. Sudanese and Senegalese delegations who visited battalion 29 September reported 30 September that they expect battalion Commander likely to be unable to keep his troops from reacting violently in view of behaviour of Belgian led Katanga gendarmerie in their area and requested withdrawal of battalion within 48 hours which was turned down here. Agree that clashes likely to occur if Mali Battalion remains area Kabongo-Kabalo-kongolo and are trying to relocate them either in Kindu or Kamina area where battalion could be broken up into Sudanese and Senegalese elements prior to being airlifted for shipment by sea from either Matadi or Point Noire of Mali Sudanese to Abidjan and Senegalese to Dakar. Relocation made difficult due to non-arrival as yet of Malayan and Nigerian Battalions as well as necessity to relieve other formations such as Tunisian Brigade in Kasai. Are further reinforcements from Tunisia and/or Ethiopia to be expected? Will forward proposed plan for outwards movement of Mali Battalion.

cc. Dayal & von Horn