

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

CONFIDENTIAL [13 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 51002

BOX 107

FILE 3

ACC. 1998/023

FHQ (OPS)

UN RESTRICTED  
MILOB GP HQ

IMMEDIATE

TO : FC  
FHQ (OPS)  
COS  
FROM : MILOB GP HQ

DATE : 7 JAN 95

REF : 6464.0/OPS

SUBJECT: REPORT ON RPA ATTACK ON BUSANZE CAMP ON 7 JAN 95.

1. Attached is a report on an attack on BUSANZE Camp received from MILOB Sector 4A.
2. Please accept for information and prompt action.

*The case is being investigated  
for this  
09/11  
D/C / CMO*

*Alex Anochkine*

ALEX ANOCHKINE  
Lt Col  
for DCMO

*File please  
for  
info*

*09/11*

*G6  
10/1/95  
SB*

UN RESTRICTED

## UN RESTRICTED

FROM: MILOB SECTOR 4'A'  
UNAMIR.

TO: MILOB GP HQ  
UNAMIR, KIGALI.

DATE: 07 JAN 1995.

REPORT ON RPA ATTACK ON BUSANZE CAMP ON 07 JAN 95.

1. AT ABOUT 0700 HRS 07 JAN 95 THIS HQ RECEIVED A REPORT FROM IT'S TEAM BASED AT RUNYOMBYI ON AN ALLEGED ATTACK BY RPA ON BUSANZE (4491) DP CAMP. CONSEQUENTLY THE TEAM WAS TASKED TO INVESTIGATE AND SUBMIT A REPORT.

2. ON ARRIVAL AT THE SPOT THE TEAM RADIOED THIS HQ THAT 11 DPs WERE FOUND DEAD AND 18 INJURED, BOTH MALES AND FEMALES. THE TEAM REQUESTED FOR EVACUATION OF THE WOUNDED BY HELICOPTER WHICH HAS BEEN RELAYED TO CALLSIGN CHARLIE ZERO ACCORDINGLY. THE LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM WAS ALSO INFORMED.

3. THE SECTOR HQ GOT IN TOUCH WITH THE RPA BATTALION COMMAND IN GIKONGORO AND INFORMED THE 2IC OF THE DEVELOPMENT. HE PROMISED TO GO TO THE SPOT AND INVESTIGATE IMMEDIATELY.

4. THE REPORT OF THE TEAM TASKED TO INVESTIGATE PROVED THE FOLLOWING:

"AT ABOUT 062100Z JAN 95 GUNSHOTS WERE HEARD FROM THE DIRECTION OF BUSANZE IDP CAMP. AT 0230 HRS THE FIRST BATCH CONSISTING OF 36 DPs ARRIVED AT RUNYOMBYI CAMP TO LAUNCH A COMPLAINT THAT RPA HAD ATTACKED THE CAMP. THE COMPLAINANTS FURTHER STATED THAT BECAUSE IT WAS DARK MOST OF THE DPs MADE THEIR WAY TO THE NEARBY VILLAGES, BURUNDI BORDER AND THE NEARBY BUSHES TO PASS THE NIGHT AMIDST THE CONTINUOUS FIRING AND THROWING OF GRENADES BY RPA. ON THE MORNING OF 07 JAN 95 AT ABOUT 0730 HRS A TEAM OF MILOB STATIONED AT RUBY IN THE COMPANY OF ABOUT ONE PLATOON STRENGTH FROM GHANBATT VISITED THE CAMP. ON THE TEAM'S ARRIVAL A TOILET PIT WAS SHOWN TO THEM IN WHICH 11 DEAD BODIES HAD BEEN DUMPED. THE BODIES INCLUDED 04 FEMALES, 04 MALES AND 03 CHILDREN BELOW 03 YEARS. THE DEAD BODIES WERE LATER RETRIEVED FROM THE TOILET PIT. HOWEVER, PRIOR TO THEIR ARRIVAL, THE TEAM MET A WELL-ARMED PLATOON STRENGTH OF RPA SOLDIERS COMMANDED BY A WELL KNOWN RPA OFFR STATIONED AT

UN RESTRICTED

GIKONGORO WHO WAS IN A CIVIL DRESS. ABOUT 80 PEOPLE WERE ALSO SERIOUSLY INJURED FROM GUN SHOTS AND MACHETE WOUNDS. THE WOUNDED HAVE BEEN EVACUATED BY GHANBATT TO MERLIN CLINIC NEAR RUNYOMBYI (4892)."

5. IN CASE NEW DETAILS ARE REVEALED AND NEW INFORMATION OBTAINED THIS SECTOR WILL SUBMIT ADDITIONAL REPORT SOONEST.

*B. Namach*  
BN ACHEAMPONG  
Sqn Ldr  
for Sector Commander

*A*  
*07/11*

*cas figs at variance from own  
figs.*

UN RESTRICTED



FC

UN RESTRICTED  
MILOB GP HQ

IMMEDIATE

TO : FC  
FHQ (OPS)

DATE : 7 JAN 95

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

REF : 6464.0/OPS

0

SUBJECT: REPORT ON RPA ATTACK ON BUSANZE CAMP ON 7 JAN 95.

1. Attached is a report on an attack on BUSANZE Camp received from MILOB Sector 4A.
2. Please accept for information and prompt action.

② DFC

A. For your info.

B. Our staff responded very well to this. I was at the site myself at 1100 hrs. Everything was under control.

C. COS/UNAMIR & COS/RPA were to go to Busanze today.

ALEX ANOCHKINE  
Lt Col  
for DCMO

*[Signature]*

②

COS

a. I remember you stated that the Ministers of Justice and Interior were also variable to visit the site. Am I right? Are they conducting their own investigations?

01/9  
DFC



8 Jan 95

G6  
11/1/95  
SB

## UN RESTRICTED

FROM: MILOB SECTOR 4'A'  
UNAMIR.

TO: MILOB GP HQ  
UNAMIR, KIGALI.

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4. THE REPORT OF THE TEAM TASKED TO INVESTIGATE PROVED THE FOLLOWING:

"AT ABOUT 062300B JAN 95 GUNSHOTS WERE HEARD FROM THE DIRECTION OF BUSANZE IDP CAMP. AT 0230 HRS THE FIRST BATCH CONSISTING OF 36 DPs ARRIVED AT RUNYOMBYI CAMP TO LAUNCH A COMPLAINT THAT RPA HAD ATTACKED THE CAMP. THE COMPLAINANTS FURTHER STATED THAT BECAUSE IT WAS DARK MOST OF THE DPs MADE THEIR WAY TO THE NEARBY VILLAGES, BURUNDI BORDER AND THE NEARBY BUSHES TO PASS THE NIGHT AMIDST THE CONTINUOUS FIRING AND THROWING OF GRENADES BY RPA. ON THE MORNING OF 07 JAN 95 AT ABOUT 0730 HRS A TEAM OF MILOB STATIONED AT RUBY IN THE COMPANY OF ABOUT ONE PLATOON STRENGTH FROM GHANBATT VISITED THE CAMP. ON THE TEAM'S ARRIVAL A TOILET PIT WAS SHOWN TO THEM IN WHICH 11 DEAD BODIES HAD BEEN DUMPED. THE BODIES INCLUDED 04 FEMALES, 04 MALES AND 03 CHILDREN BELOW 03 YEARS. THE DEAD BODIES WERE LATER RETRIEVED FROM THE TOILET PIT. HOWEVER, PRIOR TO THEIR ARRIVAL, THE TEAM MET A WELL-ARMED PLATOON STRENGTH OF RPA SOLDIERS COMMANDED BY A WELL KNOWN RPA OFFR STATIONED AT

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
UN RESTRICTED

Who recovered the bodies  
from the pit and  
what happened to the  
corpses?

UN RESTRICTED

GIKONGORO WHO WAS IN A CIVIL DRESS. ABOUT 80 PEOPLE WERE ALSO SERIOUSLY INJURED FROM GUN SHOTS AND MACHETE WOUNDS. THE WOUNDED HAVE BEEN EVACUATED BY GHANBATT TO MERLIN CLINIC NEAR RUNYOMBYI (4892)."

5. IN CASE NEW DETAILS ARE REVEALED AND NEW INFORMATION OBTAINED THIS SECTOR WILL SUBMIT ADDITIONAL REPORT SOONEST.

  
BN ACHEAMPONG  
Sqn Ldr  
for Sector Commander

UN RESTRICTED

DFC for info  
23 RANS

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL

INTER OFFICE MEMO

From: DCOS OPS

To: DCOS SP  
FMO  
A/CMO  
HAC

Date: 26 Nov 94

Subject: Conduct of UNAMIR operations in DP camps.

1. Enclosed, for your consideration, is an assessment of the removal of criminal elements from the DP camps at Kibeho and Ndago.
2. You are requested to provide comment on the concept at a FC's Senior Officers' conference which will be held on Monday, 28 Nov 94 at 1400 hrs in the FC's conference room.
3. Please note the classification of the document. You are requested to treat the information therein strictly on a need to know basis.

MRO  
JRW  
26/11  
DFC/US/CMO

6/11/94  
SB

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL



RAARZYUW UCCVVDG0095 3281719-RRRR--UCCVVDA-UCCVVDB.

ZNY RRRRR

R 241700Z NOV 94

FM SECTOR 4C CYANGUGU//MILOB HQ//

TO UCCVVDA/UN MILOB HQ KIGALI

INFO UCCVVDA/UNHQ KIGALI//G2//

UCCVVDB/UN TAC HQ BUTARE

BT

UN R E S T R I C T E D CGM-3

SUBJ:

REPORT ON RPA KILLING OF 13 CIVILIANS 20 NOV 94, KAMEMBE  
COMMUNE.

REPORT DATE: 20 NOV 94.

1. MILOB SECTOR 4C SITREP WAS FWD 22 AND 23 NOV TO MILOB HQ KIGALI WHICH GAVE GENERAL INFO ON ALLEGED KILLING OF SEVERAL VILLAGERS IN KARAMA (AF 4 OF GRID 825 329), KAMEMBE COMMUNE, CYANGUGU. INITIAL INFO WAS OF A GRENADE INCIDENT BETWEEN RPA PATROL AND GROUP OF MALE CIVILIANS. ETHIOPIAN BN WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY CONDUCTING AN INITIAL REPORT AND HAS PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE SITE AND VICTIMS. ALL DECEASED VICTIMS SHOWED SIGNS OF BULLETWOUNDS AND NO SIGN OF ANY FRAGMENT WOUNDS. THE INCIDENT IS CONFIRMED TO HAVE OCCURED AT APPROX 2000 HRS ON 20 NOV 94.
2. AN INFORMAL MEETING THE RPA LO, LT GERARD, CFM RPA KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT. IT WAS STATED

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PAGE 2 UCCVVDG0095 UN R E S T R I C T E D

*5286*  
*I think we should wait*  
*for Annan's report*  
*on this case.*  
*25/11*  
*24/11/94*

*G6*  
*SB*  
*24/11/94*

THAT THE PATROL WAS ATTACKED BY A LOCAL GROUP, INITIALLY WITH STONES, THEN GRENADES. IT'S REPORTED THAT THE FIRST GRENADE FAILED TO DETONATE AND THEY TOOK COVER. THEY BEGAN FIRING THEIR WPNS INTO THE ATTACKERS WHEN A SECOND GRENADE WAS THROWN AT THE SOLDIERS. THEY STATE THAT THE GROUP HAD WPNS; HOWEVER, THE RPA REC'D NO CASUALTIES AND SEIZED NO WPNS.

3. LOCALS AT THE SITE REPORTED TO OBSERVERS THAT AT AROUND 2000 HRS, A GROUP OF MALES WERE RETURNING HOME FROM A NEARBY ANANA BEER HUT, WHEN AT FIRST SEVERAL SHOTS WERE HEARD, AND THEN A SMALL EXPLOSION. ALL BODIES WERE FOUND CLOSE TO THE SITE OF THE INCIDENT. THEY WERE COLLECTED BY LOCALS AND BURIED TOGETHER IN SEPARATE PLOTS AT THE SITE, LOCATED IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE ROAD AT GRID 825 329. THE GRENADE CRATER WAS EXAMINED AND FROM ACCOUNTS OF TWO WITNESSES, THE CRATER IS SITUATED APPROX 30-50 METRES FROM THE 2PA8SOLDIER AT THE TIME OF DETONATION.

4. THE TEAM WAS INFORMED OF A SOLE SURVIVOR. HIS NAME AND CURRENT LOCATION WILL REMAIN UNDISCLOSED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT. HE IS IN SERIOUS, BUT STABLE CONDITION WITH FRAGMENT WOUNDS TO THE REAR OF BOTH LEGS AND A BULLET WOUND TO THE SIDE. HE STATES ALL WERE YOUNG MEN IN THE GROUP, EXCEPT FOR TWO OLD AND WERE TOGETHER IN A LOCAL CABARET.

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PAGE 3 UCCVVDG0095 UN R E S T R I C T E D  
CONSUMING BEER. AT APPROX 2000 HRS, A SINGLE WAS HEARD



OUTSIDE THE DOOR. SOLDIERS CAAME INTO THE HUT AND ORDERED EVERYONE OUTSIDE AND TO LAY DOWN ON THE DITCH ON THE SIDE OF THE ROAD. THE SHOOTING BEGAN AND A GRENAD WAS THROWN WHILE SOME MADE AN ESCAPE ATTEMPT OF THE, FRARMENTS OF WDICH STRUCK THE SURVIVING VICTIM. THE SURVIVOR WAS PRESUMED DEAD, AND WITH MANY OTHERS, WAS MOVED OFF THE ROAD AREA BY THE SOLDIERS. HE STATED THAT NO ONE HAD ANY WPNS, HAD NO PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH THE SOLDIERS, AND DID NOT KNOW ANY OF THEIR IDENTITIES. A TOTAL OF 12 OF THE DECEASED WERE KNOWN HUTU PERSONS, ONE WAS A TUTSI.

5. SUMMARY - A TOTAL OF 13 PEOPLE WERE KILLED, ALL BY SMALL ARMS FIRE. ONE GRENADE WAS DETONATED. NO ROCKS WERE SEEN WITHIN 200 METRES OF THE SITE, AND NO WPNS WERE SEIZED BY THE RPA. THE LOCATION OF THE ALLEGED BLIND GRENADE IS UNKNOWN. IT IS CFM THAT RPA WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLING AND OF THIS DATE HAVE NOT INTERVIEWED THE SURVIVOR; THEREFORE, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THEY ARE UNAWARE.

6. COMMENT - BY WITNESS ACCOUNTS AND THE TYPE AND LOCATION OF INJURIES, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE GRENADE WAS THROWN BY RPA, NOT THE GROUP. THE SUCCESSFUL KILLING OF 13 PEOPLE BY A SURPRISED PATROL AT NIGHT AND UNDER DURESS OF ATTACK IS NOT LIKELY. TO

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PAGE 4 UCCVVDG0095 UN R E S T R I C T E D

KILL 13 OF 14 PEOPLE WITH SMALL ARMS AT CLOSE RANGE OF A STATIC GROUP AT NIGHT IS VERY POSSIBLE. NO ROCKS WERE FOUND IN THE VICINITY AND IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A GROUP OF PEOPLE WOULD

ANTAGONIZE A PATROL OF ARMED SOLDIERS IN THE DARK WITH ROCKS. IF THE GROUP WAS ARMED IN ANY WAY, IT COULD BE PRESUMED THEY WOULD HAVE USED LETHAL WEAPONS IN SUCH A CASE; OR HAVE USED ANY CONCEALED WPN AS A DEFENCE ONLY. THE FACT THAT NO WPN WAS SEIZED OR FOUND IN THE AREA ONLY REAFFIRMS THAT THE VICTIMS PROBABLY HAD NONE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS INCIDENT TOOK PLACE WITHIN 1500 METERS OF ANOTHER INCIDENT ON 27 OCT, WHERE FIVE PERSONS WERE KILLED IN A HOUSE BY RPA. THIS INCIDENT IS A CONFIRMED INCIDENT OF RPA KILLING CIVILIANS OF A COMMUNE. THIS, ALONG WITH OTHER CFM INCIDENTS AND REPORTS FROM THE AREA REAFFIRM THE DECREASE IN STABILITY AMONGST THE POPULATION AND MILITARYDISCIPLINE AND LOCAL COMMAND AND CONTROL.

7. RECOMMENDATION - DUE TO THE LARGE AMOUNT OF VICTIMS INVOLVED AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF AT LEAST ONE OTHER KILLING IN THE SAME COMMUNE, A SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BY UNAMIR WITH HUMAN RIGHTS TEAMS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. THE RPA SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SURVIVOR'S NAME AND WHEREABOUTS AS SOON AS PRACTICAL. THE COMPANY OF RPA IN AREA IN QUESTION SHOULD BE EVALUATED BY RPA

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PAGE 5 UCCVVDG0095 UN R E S T R I C T E D  
AUTHORITIES UNDER UNAMIR SUPERVISION.

BT

#0095

UNITED NATIONS  
LE OPERATIONS

1994 NOV 18 P 8:00

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: GARUBA, UNAVEM II, LUANDA  
SALAM, ONUMOZ, MAPUTO  
VIVAS, ONUSAL, SAN SALVADOR  
DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
FURUHOFDE, UNIFIL, NAQOURA  
THAPA, UNIKOM, UMM QASR  
VARTIAINEN, UNFICYP, NICOSIA  
BUJOLD, UNTSO, JERUSALEM  
GALARZA, UNMOGIP, SRINAGAR  
ABOO, UNOSOM, MOGADISHU  
VAN BAELEN, MINURSO, LAAYOUNE  
TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI ✓  
OPANDE, UNOMIL, MONROVIA  
MISZTAL, UNDOF, DAMASCUS  
HVIDEGAARD, UNOMIG, SUKHUMI  
FULTON, UNMIH, PORT-AU-PRINCE

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 16 November 1994

NUMBER: 3797

SUBJECT: UNITED NATIONS MEDAL

②  
CIS  
Please  
Don't  
miss  
5/12

It has seen and asks  
for review prior to

CYU 187  
CND 214  
CYU 176  
CND 181  
CYU 877  
CND 854  
CND 137  
CND 151  
CND 152

A 19/11/94

CNW 077  
CNR 666 ✓  
CNL 168  
CYD 054  
CYG 150  
CYH 049

1. With reference to the regulations for the United Nations Medal, ST/SGB/119/Rev.1, dated 16 February 1966, a review of the Policy for the award of the United Nations Medal has been conducted at the UN Headquarters.

2. Although the existing general policy remains valid, a few points needed clarification. The attached document should clarify which personnel shall be awarded the medal and the period of service required as qualifying service.

3. Regards.

Noted  
JP 18 Nov 94



G6  
5/12/94  
SB



UNITED NATIONS  
LE OPERATIONS

P 1/3

1994 NOV 18 P 8:00

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO:	GARUBA, UNAVEM II, LUANDA	CYL 182
	SALAM, ONUMOZ, MAPUTO	CNO 224
	VIVAS, ONUSAL, SAN SALVADOR	CYU 176
	DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB	CNZ 861
	FURUHOFDE, UNIFIL, NAQOURA	CYQ 077
	THAPA, UNIKOM, UMM QASR	CYW 054
	VARTIAINEN, UNFICYP, NICOSIA	CYS 157
	BUJOLD, UNTSO, JERUSALEM	CYN 050
	GALARZA, UNMOGIP, SRINAGAR	CNX 036
	ABOO, UNOSOM, MOGADISHU	CNM 245
	VAN BAELEN, MINURSO, LAAYOUNE	CNW 077
	TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI ✓	CNR 666 ✓
	OPANDE, UNOMIL, MONROVIA	CNL 168
	MISZTAL, UNDOF, DAMASCUS	CYD 054
	HVIDEGAARD, UNOMIG, SUKHUMI	CYG 150
	FULTON, UNMIR, PORT-AU-PRINCE	CYB 049

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 16 November 1994

NUMBER: 3797

SUBJECT: UNITED NATIONS MEDAL

1. With reference to the regulations for the United Nations Medal, ST/SGB/119/Rev.1, dated 16 February 1966, a review of the Policy for the award of the United Nations Medal has been conducted at the UN Headquarters.

2. Although the existing general policy remains valid, a few points needed clarification. The attached document should clarify which personnel shall be awarded the medal and the period of service required as qualifying service.

3. Regards.



G6  
5/12/94  
SB

3 7 9 7

P 2/3

# UNITED NATIONS MEDAL

**Reference:** Regulations for the United Nations Medal.  
(ST/SGB/119/Rev.1, dated 16 February 1966).

## GENERAL

1. The Secretary-General has established the UN Medal for award, subject to the Regulations for the United Nations Medal, to military personnel who are or have been in the service of the United Nations.
2. The aim of the present document is to clarify the policy on the award of the UN Medal. It supersedes all previous documents on the same subject.
3. The policy will apply to personnel deployed in all existing missions at the date of the promulgation of the present policy and to all new missions established for that date on.

## ELIGIBILITY.

3. The UN Medal should be awarded for service in a UN Mission to military and civilian police personnel regardless of the UN's organ they belong to, as long as the tasks they are performing fall within a mandate given by the Security Council or the General Assembly.
4. The personnel must be under operational or tactical control of the United Nations.
5. The qualifying service period shall be a minimum period of 90 days consecutively in the service of the United Nations.
6. The qualifying period for numerals shall be 180 days from the date of qualification of the medal, or previous numeral. Only periods of at least 90 consecutive days can be counted towards the total qualifying period.

3 7 9 7

P 3/3

7. A period of qualifying service shall not be required for the posthumous award of the medal for personnel killed, or presumed killed, while in the service of the United Nations.

8. Exceptions for acts of bravery may be considered.

**AWARD**

9. The award of all United Nations medals shall be authorized by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

New York, 16 November 1994





UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : DFC/COS/CMO

Date: 25 Oct 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : DOPKN/O2/94

INFO : SECTOR 6  
RPA LIAISON OFFICER, MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : INCIDENT REPORT-UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO PRIVATE  
PROPERTY AND THREATS BY RPA SOLDIERS

1. We wish to bring to your notice two incidents in Kigali sector which happened on 17th and 20th October 1994. Copies of statements attached.

a. Incident No. 1. On 17 Oct 94 at about 1130hrs, an unarmed RPA soldier entered the residence of some Bangladeshi MILOBs with the intention of using the wash room. The houseboy declined to allow the soldier the use of the toilet facility on the grounds that it was not a public toilet. An argument then ensued and while the two were exchanging words, Maj Mohammed Rahman, one of the MILOBs residing in the house arrived. His attempt to mediate was not accepted by the RPA soldier who became furious and remarked "so what, if you are a Major serving with UNAMIR? Do you know my rank? Do not interfere in the problem. I am a regular soldier in the Rwandese Army. We can enter any place at anytime".

b. Incident No. 2. On 20 Oct 94 at 1700hrs, MAJ L Likwasi went to pick Maj Maligwa from his residence for duty at Kigali Sector Ops Room. Whilst the former was waiting for the main gate to be opened, an RPA soldier on a motor-cycle pulled up and asked why the officer had blocked the road. When Maj Likwasi replied that he was waiting for the gate to be opened, the RPA soldier remarked "Don't you know that I can get this vehicle?" When questioned on his statement the RPA soldier confirmed that he could do that.

2. From the two incidents narrated and the previous incident of hijacking that took place on the 15 Oct 94, It is believed that some indisciplined RPA soldiers are likely to be involved in violent clashes with UN personnel based on their perception of being above the law.

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UN RESTRICTED

2<sup>nd</sup> copy forwarded to  
Demo as  
directed 27/10

DCMO  
Thank you. Even  
without this letter  
I had already been  
to see COS RPA  
on related  
issues and  
he was aware  
he that she  
would bring  
the culprits  
to book if  
only he  
will know  
them.  
We have  
to give  
them some  
time and  
if the situa-  
tion seems  
wrt to be  
changing  
(then I  
shall put  
it into  
writing)  
and in  
addition  
go back  
to the  
COS.  
Again thank  
you.  
27/10  
27/10  
25/10

UN RESTRICTED

3. It is requested that the RPA High Command educate their troops on the rights of UN personnel serving in Rwanda and the need to be courteous when dealing with all UN personnel.



A UDDIN MOEEN  
Col  
DCMO

UN RESTRICTED

## INCIDENT REPORT

1. We, six Bangladeshi HILOBs have been residing in a rented house just near the Kigali main market in the following address:

House owner: Mr Solomon

Avenue de Commerçants

BP - 299

Kigali.


2. On 17 October 94 at about 1130 hours I entered our house in civis and found that one RPA soldier (in uniform without arms) is in quarrel with the nephew of the house owner (aged about 18 years). From their agitated conversation I made out that the RPA soldier entered the house to use the toilet without informing anybody. The young man (nephew of house owner) asked the RPA soldier that he <sup>(RPA soldier)</sup> should have taken permission to use the toilet since it was in the private premises and rented by UNAMIR and UNICEF personnels. The RPA soldier got annoyed and was threatening the young man and he was about to beat the young man. To stop further escalation of the situation I identified myself and told the RPA soldier "Friend, forget it, please use the toilet and go. This is a very simple matter, why to make unnecessary quarrel?" Listening my request to my utter disappointment, the RPA soldier got furious and remarked "so what you are a mayor from UNAMIR? Do you know my rank? Don't interfere me. I am a regular soldier of the Rwandese Army, we can enter anytime any place". Seeing his attitude I quietly withdrew and pushed the young man out to break up the heated threatening of the RPA soldier. At that time another Rwandese in civis entered the house and the soldier had few words with him. Then they went out



shouting something (in Kwaundise) either abusing or threatening (assumed).

3. The arrogant behaviour of the RPA soldier to me when my approach was most friendly and reasonable is quite disheartening. This attitude of the RPA soldier may lead to interpret many things including their changing ~~attitude~~ attitude towards MILOBs of ~~unwilling~~ UNHCR and disregard to public rights.

4. Submitted ~~for~~ as felt necessary please.

  
19-10-94  
Hani Mohammad Hussein Lahmar  
MILOB  
ID NO H 1603

TO SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

KM 3  
SECTOR 6  
KICALI

20 October 1994

INCIDENT REPORT: AT MAJOR MALIGWA'S HOME

1. I went to pick the above officer to bring to Sector HQ for duties at 1700 hrs. I parked the vehicle outside waiting for somebody to open the Gate when an RPA soldier on a motor bike came from behind and asked me why I always block the road. I told him that I don't usually block the road, as he put it and that I was just waiting for somebody to open the gate for me. At this point he said, "Don't you know that I can get this vehicle." I asked him whether he could really do that, then he confirmed and said yes. After I picked the Duty Officer, the chap also turned and rode away.
2. I feel there is more to it than just mere display of indiscipline. If positive action is not to be taken we may lose these vehicles we use or scuffles with MLCBS will start.
3. Finally I would conclude by amplifying how insecure we are in front of such uncontrolled individuals.

G. L. LIKWASI  
Majors  
KM-3  
UNID-M 2176

Original in French/file: PISTOL.DV4/DV

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA  
(UNAMIR)

Kigali, 29 March 1994

Report by Lieutenant Colonel Gana Seck, Commander of the Senegalese Contingent, on two Senegalese Observer Officers' Borrowing of Pistols

A. Brigadier General, Acting Commander, UNAMIR, Kigali

The Senegalese observer officers involved in the borrowing of pistols from the Presidential Guard have stated they did so for the sole purpose of ensuring their security exclusively within their own homes.

Following the brutal aggression against two Senegalese officers on the night of 31 December 1993 to 1 November 1993, some officers feared repeated aggression at home by bandits looking for money or for other unavowed motives.

The explanation given by the officers has its logic since, as they say, they have never carried on their persons the borrowed pistols during or even outside duty hours. This behavior is in perfect agreement with sub-paragraph 20 of the Guidelines sent to governments contributing military personnel to UNAMIR.

Sub-paragraph 20 of the Guidelines stipulates that "Observers are not permitted to carry arms and therefore are not to bring them into the mission area. Observers are not authorized to carry their own personal cameras while on duty".

This sub-paragraph is quite clear concerning the fact that observers must not carry weapons and are not authorized to bring them to the mission. Likewise, they are not allowed to carry cameras while on duty.

Given the rise in crime and the unresolved question of how to ensure the security of observers at home, these officers have taken measures they say are to be a deterrent. The question that normally arises is what should an observer do when faced with bandits in his home who are determined to do him harm. The answer is to let them have their way or try to save one's life.

It seems to me, consequently, that there is a gap in sub-paragraph 20 that should be filled by the addition of new provisions clearly forbidding the holding of arms by UN observers at home.

A/MA  
Draft a reply to this report for me and simply state that as BOI has been set up to go into the case and the results will determine the next course of action.  
21/3  
DSC/LOS  
\* I shall however not accept as suggested course of action from him.



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May I draw your attention to the fact that on 24 March 1994 at 8 a.m. you stated to us your intention to repatriate the officers involved. This course of action is expeditious in my view and is not in keeping with the provisions of the SOP on conduct and discipline of UNAMIR personnel (Reference force Routine Order No. 1 - Conduct and Discipline - UNAMIR Personnel). It is stated in sub-paragraph 2 that "Discipline is a national responsibility and will be handled by contingent commanders once a matter is brought to them by responsible UNAMIR authority." Once the affair had been brought to my attention by Lt Col Dounkov, Commander of the Russian contingent, I reported it immediately to the CMO who decided to open an investigation to determine the exact nature of the problem.

As you explained to us, the daily complaints coming from both sides justify your decision. You believe that the two officers' conduct is liable to compromise UNAMIR's neutrality. Yet, it is well known that the media and newspapers convey a message blaming, rightly or wrongly, UNAMIR of being favorable to the RPF.

UNAMIR is RPF for some, government for others. Doesn't that mean it is really neutral?

It would be appropriate to deal with this matter by giving due consideration to the circumstances aggravated by security problems even within houses and the expressed intention of the concerned officers to simply provide a deterrent through their action. I certainly do not believe that their neutrality can be questioned simply because the Presidential Guard helped them. The fact that no problem has been detected in their work and that this incident changed in no way the relations between UNAMIR and the parties upholds this conviction.

On the basis of an analysis of the situation, I find that the decision you announced with all authority is, to my mind, excessive. I would ask that the decision, hopefully not definitive, be reduced to a written warning. This, in my view, would be sufficient and would avoid the kind of attention-drawing initiative that might be construed as UNAMIR's effort to exonerate itself.

Lt Col Gana Seck  
Senegalese Contingent Commander in Rwanda

UN RESTRICTED

MISSION NATIONS UNIES D'ASSISTANCE POUR RWANDA  
( MINUAR )

KIGALI, Le 29 Mar 1994

RAPPORT DU LIEUTENANT COLONEL GANA SECK  
COMMANDANT LE CONTINGENT SENEGALAIS SUR  
L'EMPRUNT PAR DEUX OFFICIERS OBSERVATEURS  
SENEGALAIS DE PISTOLETS

A. Monsieur le Général de Brigade Commandant par Intérim la  
MINUAR - KIGALI

Les officiers observateurs senegalais impliqués dans l'emprunt de pistolets auprès de la Garde Présidentielle ont déclaré l'avoir fait pour leur seule sécurité a l'intérieur de leur domicile exclusivement.

En effet, suite a l'agression sauvage dont deux officiers sénégalais ont été victimes dans la nuit du 31 Décembre 1993 au 1st Novembre 1994, certains officiers craignaient d'être agressés a nouveau chez eux-mêmes par des bandits en quête d'argent ou pour des motifs inavoués.

La thèse développée par les officiers peut paraître logique dans le mesure ou, comme ils le déclarent, ils n'ont jamais porté sur eux les pistolets empruntés pendant le service et même en dehors. Par cette attitude, ils sont en parfait accord avec le sous paragraphe 20 du Guidelines adressés aux Gouvernements qui contribuent aux personnels militaires de la MINUAR.

En effet le sous paragraphe 20 du Guidelines stipule!  
" Observers are not permitted to carry arms and therefore are not to bring them into the mission area. Observers are not authorised to carry their own personal cameras while on duty".

Le sous paragraphe en question est très clair sur le fait que les observateurs ne doivent pas porter sur eux d'armes et ne sont autorisés a les amener en mission. Comme d'ailleurs, ils ne sont pas autorisés a porter sur eux des appareils de photographie pendant qu'ils sont de service.

Devant le recrudescence du banditisme et la question restée sans réponse sur la maniere d'assurer la sécurité des observateurs dans leur maison, ces officiers ont pris ces dispositions dont ils affirment vouloir persuasives. Et la question qui revient normalement c'est de demander ce que doit faire un observateur surpris dans la maison par des bandits armés qui manifestent la ferme volonté de faire du mal; la réponse est ou se laisser faire ou alors chercher a sauver sa vie.

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Compte tenu de tout cela, il me semble qu'il ya une lacune dans le sous paragraphe 20 qu'il convient de combler en le complétant par de nouvelles dispositions interdisant de façon claire la détention d'armes par les observateurs de l'ONU dans leur domicile.

J'appelle votre attention sur le fait que, le 24 Mars 1994 à 8H 00, vous nous avez fait comprendre votre intention de faire rapatrier les officiers impliqués. Cette manière de procéder, expéditive à mon avis, ne répond pas aux dispositions prévues par le SOP sur la conduite et la discipline des personnels de l'UNAMIR (Reference Force Routine Order No. 1 - Conduct and Discipline -UNAMIR Personnel) En effet il y est dit au sous paragraphe 2 "Discipline is a national responsibility and will be handled by contingent commanders once a matter is brought to them by responsible UNAMIR authority." Aussi, dès que l'affaire a été portée à ma connaissance par le Lt Col Dounkov, commandant le contingent russe, j'ai aussitôt rendu compte au CMO qui a pris la décision de faire ouvrir une investigation afin de pouvoir cerner les contours exacts du problème.

Comme vous nous l'aviez expliqué, les plaintes quotidiennes des deux partis justifient votre décision car vous pensez que le comportement des officiers est de nature à compromettre la neutralité de la MINUAR. Et pourtant nul n'ignore les sentiments véhiculés par les médias et les journaux de la Place qui reprochent, à tort d'ailleurs, à la MINUAR d'avoir des sentiments plutôt favorables au FPR.

La MINUAR est FPR pour certains, la MINUAR pourrait être Gouvernementale pour d'autres, cela ne traduit pas réellement que la MINUAR est neutre?

Il ya lieu de conduire la présente affaire en tenant compte des circonstances aggravées par les problèmes de sécurité à l'intérieur même des maisons et de l'intention exprimée par les officiers concernés à vouloir chercher, par leur geste, uniquement un effet persuasif. Et je suis loin de croire que leur neutralité puisse être mise en doute par le seul fait que la Garde Présidentielle les a assités. La preuve qu'aucune anomalie n'a jusqu'à là été relevée dans leur travail et que cet incident n'a pas provoqué une modification quelconque des rapports de la MINUAR avec les partis, justifient ma conviction.

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En me fondant sur l'analyse de la situation, j'estime que le décision que vous avez annoncée en toute autorité me paraît excessive. Je demande que cette décision, que je souhaite ne pas être définitive, soit ramenée à des avertissements écrits qui, à mon avis, seraient suffisants et permettraient d'éviter une action d'éclat qui pourrait être interprétée comme une façon de la MINUAR de se disculper.



Lt Col Gana Seck  
Commandant le Contingent  
Senegalais au Rwanda

COPIE:

Internal: CMO

External: CEMGA



UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR

To : FC

Info: DFC  
COO

From: DMZ SECTOR HQ

Subject: REPORT ON SHOOTING INCIDENT  
IN BUSHOGA ON 17 MAR 94

References:

- A. 7186/DMZ/Ops dated 17 Feb 94. (Copy Attached)  
B. 7189/DMZ/Ops dated 03 Mar 94. (Copy Attached)

1. In the course of a routine patrol being carried out by DMZ MILOB Team F on 17 Mar 94, the team came across a shooting incident that had earlier occurred at BUSHOGA (B 333492) in the RGF area. The Team submitted an INCREP to the Sector HQ and proceeded to investigate the incident. The report of the team is duly attached.

2. From the content of the report it is felt that the incident was a case of an infiltration attack or a raid. The identity of the attackers could however not be established.

3. The attack could have been carried out by any one of the following:-

- a. Armed bandits operating in the area.
- b. RPF troops deployed along the DMZ boundary.
- c. Factional RGF troops.


4. The positive evidence of the type of weapon used in the attack was not very helpful in the identification of the attacking force since the AK 47 rifle is a common user weapon in Rwanda.

5. As intimated in previous reports from this HQ, the most volatile area of the DMZ is the Northern fringes where incidents of this nature are becoming frequent much to the detriment of security.

6. It is therefore suggested that the recommendations made in Refs A and B be considered for implementation as soon as possible.

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7. Meanwhile the refusal of the RPF troops to cooperate with the Investigation Team is considered a violation of the existing agreement and this will be conveyed to the appropriate RPF command.



CB YAACHE  
Col  
Sector Comd

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To : HQ DMZ

From: Team F

INVESTIGATION REPORT ON SHOOTING INCIDENT  
AT BUSHOGA (B 333492) on ni 16/17 MAR 94

1. In the course of a routine patrol carried out on 17 Mar 94. Team F arrived at an RGF post located at BUSHOGA (B 333492). An ambulance car was loaded there with corpses of 2 RGF soldiers and a third one being slightly wounded on the right hand.

2. On inquiry the RGF commander present (2IC of 3rd Coy Bn 81) gave an account of the incident which occurred at 0035 hrs on 17 Mar. According to him some people, of platoon strength (Approx 30), unidentified, attacked the position from western direction with allegedly fire support from machine guns. He pointed to the position he perceived the machine guns were fired from (western direction, area of RURENGE B 3052) and confirmed that the firing was not particularly directed at them but random in some directions. Attackers used small arms.

3. Particulars of the RGF losses are as follows:

- a. Mr NGIZWENAYO Serv No. 38351
- b. Mr RUGORIYWABABYEYI Serv No. 40134.

One soldier injured Mr SEKABJGA Serv No. 40430. The RGF section (strength on the night of attack) also lost 5 assault rifles and various personal items.

4. On inspection of the general area where the attack occurred some spent shells (calibre 7.62 type AK 47) were recovered. In one of the huts occupied by the soldiers an object resembling a dismantled torch with a thin wire wound around was discovered. The MILOB Team was not allowed to remove this item for fear of detonating. Later on the soldiers removed it without any incident. Grasses and bushes on the western side from where the attackers allegedly approached and retreated were depressed. An RGF uniform shirt was also found in the area, it was explained that the attackers might have dropped it on their way back.

5. Team continued to drive to MUVUMBA (B 2697) and met RGF soldiers at the communal office. Team was briefed of RPF presence across a valley (Northern Direction). All efforts by the Team to get the RPF commander at the location proved unsuccessful. RPF soldiers did not cooperate, not even to give any location of the commander. Later on Team met Lt PACIFIC CO of Bn 94 RGF. He brought Team to a hill bordering the area of attack and his area of responsibility (to the South).

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6. Lt PACIFIC alleged that refugees that settled in the area in 1986, including BUSHOGA, are partly sympathizers to the RPF. He furthermore alleged that whenever incursions like this happen in the area RPF are invited to support these. Lt PACIFIC claimed that probably civilians could have been the perpetrators, also the RGF thinks that hidden arms are in the area.

CONCLUSIONS

7. 2 RGF soldiers were killed in an attack by unidentified persons, one slightly injured. In the area of attack spent shells (AK 47) were recovered. RGF troops in the area are equipped with assault rifles with a calibre of 5.56mm.

8. The trampled grass and depressed bushes confirm that direction of the attack and retreat were from western direction. No evidence could be found that machine gun fire support was provided.

9. The RGF commander on the spot could not identify the attackers but alleged that covering fire was provided from RGF positions at RURENGE.

10. Team's effort to get through the RPF position and communicate with the commander was abortive. There were no physically restrictions of movements to the area but none of the soldiers would identify their commander for a dialogue.

11. Team cannot confirm involvement of any group of or RPF so far. Efforts will be continued to get the RPF comd to comment on the allegations.

18 Mar 94

(SGD)  
MEISSNER  
Maj  
Team Leader

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UNAMIR

7186/DMZ/OPS

17<sup>th</sup> February 1994

FC

REPORT ON CEASEFIRE VIOLATION AT  
NYAMIREMBE ON 11 FEB 94

1. The report by the DMZ Sector MILOB Team which investigated the incident of ceasefire violation at Nyamirembe (B 2448) on 11 Feb 94 is forwarded for your study and necessary action please.

2. After studying the report and debriefing the investigation team, it has not been possible to establish with certainty the cause(s) of the incident and which party first violated the ceasefire. It is therefore difficult to apportion blame for the incident.

3. It is however evident from the report that the opposing troops are too close in the place of the incident as it is in other areas along the Northern boundary of the DMZ. The possibility of a recurrence of the incident therefore exists.

4. The following recommendations are therefore made to avoid any future recurrence of a similar incident:


*Until  
BBIG 7*  
a. Both sides should be persuaded to pull back from their present positions to at least 2000 metres between each other.

*They are  
now OK*  
b. The necessary logistics should be provided to enable the immediate deployment of a MILOB Team in the area with the task of patrolling the No Man's Land between the forces.

c. These measures should be considered temporary pending a final demarcation of the new DMZ.

d. The implications of the incident should be made very clear to both parties.

5. Meanwhile immediate action has been taken to produce the details of the exact location of troops of both forces in the immediate area of the incident.

  
CB YAACHE  
Col  
Sector Comd

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UNAMIR

7189/DMZ/OPS

03 March 1994

To : FC

Info: COO

From: DMZ SECTOR COMD

Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON ALLEGED  
AMBUSH OF RGF SOLDIERS AT MUTURA  
(B 3152) ON 26 FEB 94


1. A MILOB Team from the DMZ was tasked to investigate an alleged ambush of RGF soldiers at MUTURA on 26 Feb 94. The report of the Team is duly forwarded please.

2. The cause(s) of the incident could not be established. However from the content of the report it is felt that it was a case of exchange of fire by the two parties rather than a deliberate ambush as alleged.

3. The undefined nature of the northern fringes of the DMZ is a recipe for incidents of this nature. It is therefore recommended that a Joint Military Team be established to re-demarcate that area of the DMZ. The recommended team is as follows:

- a. RPF Representatives.
- b. RGF Representatives.
- c. DMZ Sector HQ (Sector Comd)
- d. MILOB Sector HQ (CMO)
- e. Force HQ (Plans)

4. Submitted for your attention please.

  
CB YAACHE  
Col  
Sector Comd

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# SKETCH OF RGF POSN BUSHEGO

DIRECTION OF ATTACK ———

DMZ/LINE 3.5 km

NGARARA 8km

RGF POSN

CENRE VETERINAIRE BUSHEGO

B333492

3km to COT3 POSN

de mu, lai  
(messae, hej)

50 m


## LEGEND

/// GRASSLAND

□ FIGHTING POSN

□ CENRE VETERINAIRE (RUIN)

== ROAD



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UNAMIR

7189/DMZ/OPS

19 March 1994

To : FC

Info : DFC ✓  
COO

From : DMZ SECTOR HQ


Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON AMBUSH OF  
VEHICLE NO A 8579 ON 15 MAR 94

1. Following the unfortunate death of five civilians in an ambush in the DMZ on 15 Mar 94, a MILOB Team was tasked to carry out an immediate investigation into the incident. The report of the Team is duly forwarded please.
2. The Sector Comd visited the site of the incident on the day of its occurrence. He also interviewed a cross section of the workers of the Tea plantation and some locals living within the immediate vicinity of the ambush site.
3. It was clear from the oral evidence gathered and from the report of the investigation that the ambush was planned, organised and executed in a professional manner. Although the attackers were in civilian clothes, their knowledge of military operation especially in the techniques of ambushes was beyond that of ordinary bandits.
4. Information from the locals indicated that there was plain clothes recce of the ambush area a few days before the operation. However due to apparent ignorance of the implications of this activity, the locals failed to report this to the nearest UNAMIR unit.
5. There are several possible causes of the incident. No positive cause was however identified through the investigation. The opinion of the Investigation Team as expressed in para 16b of the report is considered to be one of the several possible causes.
6. The recommended search on the premises of Mr MUKWIYE could be prejudicial to the work of the planned Board of Inquiry to be instituted by Force HQ. It is therefore suggested that any such operation should be carried out only in close co-ordination with the work of the Board. The operation should also be carried out by Rwandese Security Forces with UNAMIR (DMZ troops) providing the required security.

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7. Meanwhile appropriate measures have been taken to intensify security in the area of the incident in particular and the DMZ in general. As part of the sector public relations plan, efforts are being made to educate the local population on the Mission of UNAMIR in the DMZ and the contribution required from the people towards the accomplishment of this mission.

8. Submitted for your further action please.



CB YAACHE  
Col  
Sector Comd

UN RESTRICTED

To: DMZ SECTOR HQ

2031/TMC/OPS

From: TEAM C

19 March 1994

Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON AN AMBUSH OF VEHICLE No. A85.79  
RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF FIVE PERSONS AT THE OUTSKIRTS  
OF KINIHIRA (GISEKURU B 9565) ON TUESDAY, 15 MARCH 1994

GENERAL.

1. At about 1745 hrs on Tuesday, 15 March 1994, personnel of A Coy HQ (BYUBAT) heard a loud explosion. A patrol of 1 offr and 5 men was despatched to locate the incident spot. Locals directed the patrol to the spot where a Mazda 323 saloon car (Reg No. A85.79) with dead bodies was located. Victims were later identified as workers of L'OCIR-THE' PFUNDA).

2. The following day, 16 March 1994, Team C, in whose sector the incident occurred, went to the scene to investigate. The Team was later joined by the Ops Offr BYUBAT, the OC A Coy BYUBAT and the BYUBAT EOD team.

METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.

3. Team C left Tumba at 0600 hrs and arrived at GISEKURU (B9565), the incident spot on the outskirts of KINIHIRA at 0700 hrs. The investigation team faced a great deal of problems because witnesses were reluctant to divulge information for fear of a possible victimisation. The investigation was conducted in the following manner:

a. Visits. The Team visited the incident spot to identify and examine the ambush site. The following were found at the scene:

- (1) A Mazda 323 Saloon car ( Reg No. A85.79) with bullet holes.
- (2) Five dead bodies in the car (4 male and 1 female).
- (3) 13 spent cases of AK 47 rifle ammo.
- (4) Grenade safety pins qty 2 and a booby trap cord.
- (5) Documents of the ambushed car.
- (6) Bank book bearing the name of Madam Anysie and other ID cards of the same person.
- (7) ID card bearing the name of BUKEYE JUSTIN.

b. Interviews. The Team interviewed the following persons:

- (1) OC A Coy BYUBAT at KINIHIRA.
- (2) MR MUJIGITI INNOCENT - Admin and political counsellor of the KINIHIRA District.
- (3) MR BUKUNOINKA CASSIN - Accountant of the Tea



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Company at KINIHIRA.

- (4) MR NKERABIGNI - local dweller near the scene.
- (5) MR MWIZEYE - local dweller near the scene.
- (6) MR LUSAWGAMOA Celestin - local farmer.

c. Sketch. A sketch of the incident area is attached as an annex to this report.

STATEMENT FROM OC A COY BYUBAT - KINIHIRA.

4. The OC narrated that his company heard a loud explosion at about 1745 hrs. He accordingly despatched a patrol of 1 and 5 to locate the incident spot. Directed by locals in the area, the patrol discovered a Mazda Saloon car with registration number A85.79 with dead bodies mutilated in it. That his patrol searched around but could not see anybody. That the patrol returned at about 1900 hrs to report.

5. When the OC was asked of his opinion on the likely cause(s) of the incident, he said he could not think of any.

STATEMENT FROM CIVILIANS

MR MUJIGITI INNOCENT

MR BUKUNOINKA CASSIN

6. The Team on arriving at the scene of the incident met a crowd of civilians amongst whom were the above-named witnesses. They approached the Team claiming to know the victims.

7. Mr MUJIGITI Innocent is the Political and Administrative Counsellor of the KINIHIRA District, whilst Mr BUKUNOINKA Cassin is the chief accountant of the L'OCIR-THE PFUNDA tea plantation. Both witnesses identified the victims and gave their identities as follows:

- a. NYILIKWAYA NATHANIEL - Director of the Tea plantation (L'OCIR-THE PFUNDA).
- b. BUKEYE JUSTIN - Chief Engr of the plantation.
- c. SAFALI EMILE - clerk at the plantation.
- d. DEFFLOO BONAVENTURE - worker of the plantation.
- e. MADAM NYILINKWYA ANYSIE - wife of MR NYILIKWAYA.

8. The two witnesses voluntarily explained that the deceased NYILIKWAYA came to KINIHIRA to pay the plantation workers. That he brought an amount of twenty million Rwandese Francs (approx one million US dollars). That payment could not take place on 15 March 1994 because he arrived at KINIHIRA quite late (at about 1400 hrs). The said amount was left in a safe known to the named accountant after which the deceased decided to return to Kigali hoping to return the next day, 16 March 1994. However, he fell into the ambush of the armed elements. They further alleged that such monies are usually conveyed back to Kigali when payment is not effected or completed.

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9. When the two witnesses were asked of their opinion on the likely cause(s) of the incident, both expressed that Mr MUKWIYE, a local tea plantation owner in the area, could be a likely suspect. They both explained that the said Mr MUKWIYE was once a worker of the Tea Plantation. That he resigned some years ago to establish his own farm after which he grew very prosperous with large plantations and with a great following. They further conjectured that his motive for taking up such act could be both economic and political.

10. MR MUKWIYE is alleged to be at logger-heads with two of the victims - Mr NYILIKWAYA, the director of the tea plantation, and Mr DEFFLOO. That a court case is still pending between him and the director. Mr MUKWIYE is further alleged to have tried to dictate his own price for the product but met resistance from the deceased director. Further to that, he tried to politicise the workers of the tea plantation. He is alleged to be an RPF partisan, a staunch financier who normally harbours RPF personnel in his home. Both witnesses further claimed the alleged suspect was seen in a bar in KINIHIRA heavily drunk (quite unusual of him) and later seen loitering and nosing around the factory premises when the deceased was around with the salary.

11. Mr MUKWIYE is alleged to have threatened the management of the plantation of a possible catastrophe. No evidence was however adduced in support of this allegation. Mr MUJIGITI Innocent claims he is equally not safe because the alleged suspect equally warned and threatened him.

12. The deceased director and wife are alleged to be members of the MRND party. Mr DEFFLOO Bonaventure is equally alleged to be a reputed organiser of the same party. However, Mr SAFALI Emile is alleged to be a deputy (member of the interim national assembly) of the PL party (Parti Liberale).

13. Other unrecorded witnesses claim the alleged MR MUKWIYE is a crown suspect who could have sought the assistance of the armed elements to eliminate his economic and political opponents. Witnesses were, however, afraid to substantiate their statements.

STATEMENT FROM WITNESSES LIVING NEAR INCIDENT SPOT.

14. Other people living near the incident spot expressed similar sentiments but short of indicated possible suspects. The following was gathered:

- a. NKERABIGWI. He narrated that about 1500 hrs, whilst returning from his farm, he saw a group of people in the nearby forest. On reaching home, he asked a neighbour, one Mr NKEZABERA, whether she had seen those people and what they wanted. His friend answered in the affirmative. He further explained that around 1700 hrs he went back to his banana farm to cut grass and there he heard some firing. He

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dashed to the ground, raised his head and noted a man lobbing a grenade into the car. He said that the suspects then fired several rounds and fled the scene.

b. MWISEYE. He narrated that he saw people without weapons loitering around the area at about 1500 hrs. He further explained that around 1700 hrs he saw a white car passing. No sooner had the car passed than he heard the sound of gun shots followed by an explosion. He further explained that he saw three people but on climbing the hill he realised they were more than ten, moving towards KABINGA with weapons.

c. LUSANGOMOA CELESTIN. Witness resides quite close to the incident scene. He voluntarily narrated that he saw a group of men in the nearby plantation around the evening but they never uttered a word to him. That after moving a distance from the group, he met another group, some of whom were seen holding hand-held radio sets. That on reaching his home he heard some gun shots which were later followed by an explosion.

FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS.

14. The investigation revealed the following:

a. The said vehicle with five occupants (4 male and 1 female) was ambushed at the outskirts of KINIHIRA (GISEKURU B9516) at about 1745 hrs on 15 March 1994.

b. The armed elements, who are yet unknown, used small arms and grenade.

c. The four male victims were all workers of the L'OCIR-THE PFUNDA tea plantation.

d. Immediately after the ambush, the bodies were tampered with and the vehicle searched. Documents of the car found outside the car and at the probable ambush position all go to confirm this.

e. The five victims were identified as:

(1) MR NYILIKWAYA Nathaniel - Director of the tea plantation.

(2) Wife of Mr Nyilikwaya (Mme Anysie).

(3) MR SAFALI Emile - clerk at the plantation.

(4) DEFFLOO Bonaventure - worker of the plantation.

(5) MR BUKEYE Justin - plantation chief engineer.

f. One Mr Fred MUKWIYE, who has an outstanding court case with two of the victims, was found nosing around the premises of the tea factory when the deceased director was around. He is believed to be a strong RPF sympathiser and functionary. The locals believe he provides lodging to RPF troops and finances them. He is also believed to reside near KIMIRYI (B971175).

g. The plantation workers were to be paid on 15/16 March 1994. However, the money amounting to 20 million RWF brought



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by the deceased director, was left behind pending payment on the 16 March 1994.

h. The ambush was conducted by a well-organised group employing excellent professional techniques, using radios and booby traps.

i. Locals are always reluctant to disclose the identity of bandits for fear of possible victimisation or reprisal actions by such armed elements. This makes investigation extremely difficult and less rewarding.

OPINIONS.

16. The Team is of the following opinion:

a. The operation was a well-planned, organised and executed and the ambush conducted in a professional manner by an unidentified armed group.

b. Though no clear proof has been established, it is suspected that one MR MUKWIYE might have sought the assistance of an armed group sympathetic to him to eliminate his alleged opponents. He could be a possible suspect.

RECOMMENDATIONS.


17. The Team recommends the following:

a. A possible cordon and search operation be mounted on the premises of Mr Mukwiye at grid B971175 for arms, ammo and explosives. The said man should also be apprehended as a suspect thereafter.

b. Mobile and foot patrols should be intensified in the sub-sector.


c. Locals should be encouraged to report any suspicious activities within the DMZ. Equally they need to be encouraged to divulge information on any incidents without fear.

18. The particulars of the vehicle and personal documents of the afore-mentioned deceased persons together with the spent cases of AK 47 rifle ammo and grenade pins are forwarded for your further action.

  
A.S. MOHAMMED  
Captain  
Team C



# UN RESTRICTED SKETCH OF INCIDENT AREA (GRB9516)



## LEGEND

- A. Dir Of Mov Of
- A', Final Stop Of
- B. Probable Amb
- C. Booby Trap S
- D. Impact Of Ro

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UNAMIR

7189/DMZ/OPS

15 March 1994

To : RGF Sector Commander

Info: FC  
DFC ✓  
COO

Subject: FIRING INCIDENTS AT NGONDORE

1. Within the month of February 1994 a number of small arms firing incidents occurred in the area of NGONDORE. These are summarised as follows:-

a. Series of explosions with smoke approximately 600m SE of NGONDORE meeting place from RGF-held area at about 1600 hrs on 19 Feb 94. The cause was attributed to bush burning in the area.

b. Burst of small arms fire (8 - 10 rounds) heard from hilltop within RPF defended locality sited NW of NGONDORE at about 1430 hrs on 24 Feb 94 which was said to be a test firing of a weapon.


c. Single shot from RPF defensive area (described by RPF as an incidental discharge) at about 1400 hrs on 24 Feb 94.

2. I am to convey to you the Force Commander's grave concern about these incidents and the security implications of the occurrences.

3. I am further to request you to take positive steps to prevent recurrence of such incidents in future.

4. Submitted for your immediate attention please.

Seen  
HJW  
15/3  
DFC

  
CB YAACHE  
Col  
Sector Comd

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FC

SRSG

CNR - 203 P1/1

UNAMIR

194 MAY -6 OUTGOING CODE CABLE  
04 281

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KAGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 5 MAY 1994  
NUMBER: 1466  
SUBJECT: UN Mission in Burundi - Move of Technical Team

1994 MAY -5 P 10 03

1. Further to your cable No. KYF 762 dated 3 May 1994 and tele contacts with UN SRSG in Burundi it has been coordinated that a low profile team should be sent to Burundi on 9 May 1994.

2. In view of the above you are required to forward the passport numbers and the itinerary (flight details) of the persons proposed as soon as possible. The persons are -

- a. Brig-Gen H. Anyidoho - Team Ldr
- b. Col I.D. Tikoca
- c. Maj Sarr M

3. Due to the incidents in Rwanda the sensitivity of related issues will be existent in Burundi. Hence the technical team members should arrive in Burundi by civil aircraft and should travel/work in civil clothes.

Regards.

P  
Huu.

②  
MA to DFC  
Please pass to them  
the option of moving  
directly from Nairobi.  
Maj Sam would be  
difficult. He may wish  
to bring his ADC.

A  
bush

UN RESTRICTED  
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA  
( U N A M I R )

MA  
for your attn  
on per pass on  
1506 and  
div to get  
29

TO : See Distribution

Date: 29 Apr 94

FROM : DFC/ LEADER OF UN TECHNICAL TEAM TO BURUNDI

SUBJECT : ADMINISTRATIVE/LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO THE UNITED  
NATIONS TECHNICAL MISSION TO BURUNDI  
(DISCUSSION PAPER)

Reference :

A. FC's DIRECTIVE dated 28 Apr 94.

1. The following personnel have been selected as members of the Technical Team to BURUNDI:

- a. Brig Gen H Anyidoho - Team Leader.
- b. Col I D Tikoca
- c. Lt Cdr G Zwonoo
- d. Capt Cheriff
- e. Capt WKC Bleboo
- f. Capt A Nsiah

2. The team is on 24 hours notice to move, so the purpose of this instruction is to coordinate all necessary administrative and logistics requirement and the preparation of these requirements, as soon as possible, to facilitate the Technical Team's departure for Burundi.



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3. The duration of this reconnaissance mission is estimated to be 07 days.

4. The CAO is requested to provide the following:

- a. DSA for Burundi for seven days ( USD )
- b. Petty Cash of USD 2000.00.
- c. Inmarsat portable.
- d. Arrange for use of 4 x UNDP 4x4 vehicles.
- e. 2 x Laptop Computers.
- f. The necessary stationery.
- g. Maps of Burundi.
- h. 2 x First Aid Boxes.
- i. Sleeping Bags.
- j. 10 x days ration packs.
- k. Water and soft drinks.
- l. 1 x 1.5 KVA Generator and accessories.
- m. POL.

5. All members of this Technical Team are to equip themselves accordingly, with the necessary military clothing (flak jackets incl) and also some civilian clothing (coat and ties incl) and be ready to move at 24 hours notice.

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6. The CAO and DFC will discuss the necessary contractual engagements and arrangements for the aeroplane to be used for this mission.

Distribution:

Action:

DFC

CAO

CMO

MA to DFC

ADC to DFC

Capt Cheriff

Capt Bleboo

C LOGO

Info:

FC

COO

FHQ

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UNAMIR  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: FC 1000.7/(DFC)/G/7  
From: DFC  
Info: Executive Director, CAO  
Date: 25<sup>th</sup> May, 1994  
Subject: A REPORT ON UN TECHNICAL TEAM  
VISIT TO BURUNDI FROM 18 TO 20 MAY 1994

Reference:

A. Outgoing Fax No. KMF 976 of 16 May 94.

1. I am submitting the following report on the visit of the United Nations Technical Team to Burundi from 18 to 20 May 1994.

GENERAL

2. A UN Technical Team as composed below left Kigali, Rwanda on Tuesday 17 May 1994 for Bujumbura, Burundi via Nairobi vide reference A.

- |    |                      |   |                         |
|----|----------------------|---|-------------------------|
| a. | Brig Gen HK Anyidoho | - | DFC UNAMIR, Team Leader |
| b. | Col ID Tikoca        | - | CMO UNAMIR, Member      |
| c. | Maj ND Babacar       | - | MILOB, Member/Secretary |

3. Whiles in Bujumbura the team had discussions with the SRSG of Burundi, the military commander of the OAU Mission and officials (both military and civilians) of Burundi. The Team also had a rare oppotunity to participate in a seminar on Burundi organised by the SRSG and the Scandinavian African Institute. The team left Bujumbura on 20 May to Nairobi and arrived in Kigali on 23 May 1994.

AIM

4. The aim of this report is to present an overview of the visit and make recommendations.

MISSION

5. The Technical Team left for Bujumbura without a mission or clear directive but with the anticipation that guidance will be provided by the SRSG of Burundi on arrival in Bujumbura.

ARRIVAL IN NAIROBI - KENYA

6. On arrival in Nairobi - Kenya in the afternoon of 17th May 1994, the movement/protocol personnel that met the aircraft told us that they knew nothing about our arrival. Consequently they made no transportation arrangement for us. Even though we reminded them about the need for them to get a vehicle detailed for us, to convey us from the hotel to go and visit the wounded soldiers in Nairobi Hospital, they did not. We had to go to the hospital in a taxi after having vainly waited for three hours.

DEPARTURE FOR BUJUMBURA

8. As on the 17th, the Team had no vehicle to lift us from the hotel on Wednesday 18th May 94 to the Airport. We had to hire a taxi again to convey us. We therefore requested the MILOBs that saw us off to convey our verbal protest to the administration in Gigiri, UNAMIR office. This they did and the answer was that they received no information on our journey from New York even though they bought tickets for us from the same office.

ARRIVAL IN BUJUMBURA

7. We arrived in Bujumbura about 1145 hours local time on 18th May 1994. There was no one at the airport to meet us because there was no information on our visit. The only message the SRSG Mr. Ould-Abdallah received was the one we, at the airport, requested the MILOBs to send. Of course that message got to Bujumbura about the time we landed, when the SRSG was at a meeting. We spent well over two hours at the airport before a Burundese Air Force Major came to pick us. We had no visas and nothing on our passport particulars was communicated to the SRSG as he had earlier requested. It is needless to state that this poor arrangement was embarrassing to the SRSG and us. We were lucky to have been treated so well by the Burundese authorities at the airport despite the incognito visit.

A DIALOGUE ON BURUNDI

9. Upon arrival, we were invited by the SRSG to a Seminar that was organised by him and Scandinavian African Institute. It was a clever move on the part of the SRSG to expose us to the Burundese authorities to avoid suspicion. We therefore participated fully in the last debate and the closing ceremony which was performed by the Interim President of Burundi. The objectives of the seminar are as follows:

- a. Restoration of confidence, stability and democracy.



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- b. National and sub-regional concerns on security matters.
- c. Reconciliation and co-existence.
- d. Protection of human rights of minorities and national unity.

MEETING WITH MR OULD-ABDALLAH, SRSG - BURUNDI

10. On Thursday 19th May 1994, we held our first meeting with the SRSG. Despite lack of information to him on our arrival he received us very well and invited us to a lunch also. During our discussions he showed us a number of documents he sent to UN New York clearly advising against the Technical Team's visit to Burundi in view of the delicate nature of the political situation in that country. We saw among other correspondences, one which states that if at all a team should visit Burundi, at least he required 24 hours notice with the passport particulars of the individuals in order to inform the Burundese authorities. Nothing of these was done. He stated clearly that there was no need for such a team at this stage of the political crisis in Burundi. He was perfectly in charge and was using very tactful methods; diplomacy, broadcast, joint meetings with all sections of the community and transparent neutrality in handling the situation and he is succeeding. We noticed during our short stay that he is very much respected and he is in charge of his mission in Burundi. Our sudden appearance, therefore, embarrassed him and the Burundese started speculating. The Burundese really want no UN Force in their country especially one related to Rwanda since they appear to have a low rating for UNAMIR's performance. Indeed the Burundese refer to the situation in Rwanda as a lesson for them. The last organisation they want to deal with is any form of outside military force. I specifically asked the SRSG on using Bujumbura airport as a staging ground for UNAMIR II and he told us that he has been educating the authorities on the advantages they stand to get if they allow it but they told him they will only accept such UN flights if there is ceasefire in Rwanda.

OAU MISSION IN BURUNDI

11. We met the military commander of the OAU Mission in Burundi who is a Colonel from Tunisia. He briefed us thoroughly on what he and his team have been going through since December 17th 1993. The day they arrived in Burundi, they were detained at the airport under some sort of arrest/restriction for five hours before reluctantly allowing them to enter the city of Bujumbura. Since their arrival, they have been allowed to put on military uniform only twice. Their movement is very much restricted and they are miserable from all indications. Their mission ends on

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17th of June 1994 and he personally sounded like he would prefer a non-renewal if the same conditions under which they have been operating persist.

INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH BURUNDESE OFFICIALS  
(MILITARY AND CIVILIANS)

12. All the Government officials that the team had discussions with expressed their concern that the Burundi issue is a political affair that has to be solved politically and therefore

there is no need for a regional or international military presence in Burundi. Dr Mpawenayo Prosper, a professor of the University of Burundi, stated during the meeting that Burundi is not involved in a civil war but is a victim of socio-political terrorism.

DEPARTURE FROM BURUNDI

13. We left Bujumbura on Friday 20th May 1994 for Nairobi on our way back to Rwanda. This time, the UNAMIR office detailed a car to meet us and that vehicle was available for our use until we departed Nairobi with the resumed C130 flight on Monday 23rd May 1994.

OBSERVATIONS

14. The following observations were made in the capital Bujumbura during the team's visit:

- a. The city is not heavily populated in spite of the dense population of Burundi. The inhabitants are predominately Tutsis.
- b. Military personnel are visibly deployed at strategic points such as the airport, major crossroads in the town and around the President's residence.
- c. The army and gendarmes officers move about with armed guards.
- d. Social activities in the night are some how limited possibly due to insecurity.

CONCLUSION

15. The Technical Team was in Bujumbura, Burundi from 18 to 20 May 1994. On arrival it became clear that the SRSG of Burundi did not really think there was the need for such a visit. It was


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also realised that the problem in Burundi is political and the Burundese obviously resent any form of international force in solving their problem as they think such a force does not seem to be working well in Rwanda. The OAU Military Team already in Burundi is not gainfully employed and its presence is resented. The SRSG indicated that the presence of the Technical Team in Burundi raised suspicion and queries from the Government officials. The team's visit to Burundi was therefore unproductive.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. The team recommends the following:

- a. The United Nations should not send any military personnel to Burundi now unless the SRSG specifically requests for it.
- b. Any team to be sent to Burundi in the future should not be from UNAMIR.
- c. Any team in Burundi should be in constant communications with UNAMIR.
- d. All future proposals or discussions involving Burundi should be coordinated with all relevant authorities to ensure smooth movement.
- e. The military component of UNAMIR should have Movement Control personnel in Nairobi to accord military officers the necessary protocol and dignity that are age-old tradition to our profession. Two of our MILOBs in Nairobi can temporarily take up that responsibility until a MOVCON unit is deployed.



HK ANYIDOHO  
Brig Gen  
Team Leader