UNAMIR

G3 OPERATIONS / PLANS

8 AUG - 21 NOV 1994

LOGISTICS INSTRUCTIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-1062
BOX 123
FILE 6
ACC. 1998/0283

OPS

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 30 Sep 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ (PLANS & TRG)

Ref: PLANS 25/94

INFO : DCMO
SOO
SMPO
SLOGO
S Ln O

SUBJECT : ORGANIZATION OF MILOB GP

1. Attached are copies of the Organization of MILOB GP HQ and all Sectors including Pers Strength and vehicle requirement for your guidance and implementation.

2. Accept for action.

for

M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

UN RESTRICTED

ORGANIZATION OF MILOB GROUP



SECT 1	SECT 2	SECT 3	SECT 4A	SECT 4B	SECT 4C	SECT 5	SECT 6
HQ S/COMD OPS O SDO DO X 2 ADM/LOG BYUMBA TEAMS 6 NY'TARE C/CELL2 TEAMS 6	HQ S/COMD OPS O SDO DO X 2 ADM/LOG KIB'GO TEAMS 7 BU'SERA C/CELL2 TEAMS 6	HQ S/COMD OPS O SDO DO X 2 ADM/LOG GI'RAMA TEAMS 6 BUTARE C/CELL2 TEAMS 6	HQ S/COMD OPS O SDO DO ADM/LOG GI'GORO TEAMS 7	HQ S/COMD OPS O SDO DO ADM/LOG KIBUYE TEAMS 7	HQ S/COMD OPS O SDO DO ADM/LOG CY'GUGU TEAMS 7	HQ S/COMD OPS O SDO DO X 2 ADM/LOG GISENYI TEAMS 7 RU'GERI C/CELL2 TEAMS 6	HQ S/COMD OPS O SDO DO X 2 ADM/LOG KIGALI TEAMS 8

SECTORS STRENGTH AND VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS

SECTOR 1.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 44 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 3

TEAMS - 12

TOTAL - 15

SECTOR 2.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 47 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 3

TEAMS - 13

TOTAL - 16

SECTOR 3.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 44 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 3

TEAMS - 12

TOTAL - 15

SECTOR 4A.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 26 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 2

TEAMS - 7

TOTAL - 9

SECTOR 4B.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 26 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 2

TEAMS - 7

TOTAL - 9

SECTOR 4C.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 26 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 2

TEAMS - 7

TOTAL - 9

SECTOR 5.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 47 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 3

TEAMS - 13

TOTAL - 16-1 15

SECTOR 6.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 29 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 2

TEAMS - 8

TOTAL - 10-1 9

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

OPS

TO : SEE DISTRIBUTION

Date : 19 Dec 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : 6464.0/OPS

SUBJECT : **MINUTES OF MILOBS OPS CONFERENCE HELD AT MILOB GP HQ (KIGALI) ON 3RD DECEMBER 1994**

1. Attached please find copy of mentioned Minutes.

2. Please acknowledge receipt.

/KC BLEBOO
ap
ecretary

Distribution:
External:
Action:
ALL SECTORS

Info:
SRSG
FC
DFC/CMO
FHQ
HAC
CIVPOL
FILE
SPARE

MINUTES OF MILOBS OPS CONFERENCE HELD AT MILOB GP HQ (KIGALI) ON 3RD DECEMBER 1993

PRESENT:	BRIG	H K	ANYIDOHO	-	DFC/CMO - CHAIRMAN
	COL	U	MOEEN	-	DCMO
	COL	C B	YAACHE	-	CHAO
	COL	S O	DIARRA	-	CIVPOL
	LT	P K	NYAAKU	-	SLOGO ✓
	LT COL	K	OPONG-KYEKYEKU	-	SMPO
	LT COL	S	ILIYA	-	SOO
	LT COL	M J	MASANGANISE	-	S PLANS & TRG O
	LT COL	A	ANOCHKINE	-	SDO 1
	LT COL	W	PURTSCHER	-	COMD SECT 1
	LT COL	R	GORG	-	COMD SECT 2
	LT COL	B K	GBORGLAH	-	COMD SECT 3
	LT SOL	S A	HASNAIN	-	INCOMING COMD SECT 3
	LT COL	S	DOUNKOV	-	COMD SECT 4A
	LT COL	E C	QUIST	-	COMD SECT 4B
	LT COL	A M	AUSTDAL	-	COMD SECT 5
	LT COL	R	MUSTAFIZ	-	SOMD SECT 6
	MAJ	E	KONE	-	A/COMD SECT 4C
	MAJ	H	OUESLATI	-	SECT 1
	CAPT	T	ACHEAMPONG	-	SIG OFFR
	CAPT	W	BLEBOO	-	SECRETARY

GENERAL

ACTION BY

1. The DCMO gave a short welcome address and said the DFC/CMO would join the Conference after an appointment at the FHQ.

2. The Conference began at 0830hrs.

ITEM 1 - REVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS MINUTES | **ACTION BY**

3. **MSA**. The DCMO said he went to NAIROBI to with the necessary documents to solve the problem. He said everything went well and the problem with accommodation was resolved. He gave the assurance that every MILOB would get refund of MSA deducted.

4. **CTO/LEAVE**. The DCMO said monies deducted for CTO/Leave had also been adjusted and refunds would be effected with effect from November.

5. **REPATRIATION**. On Travel Claims for Repatriation, the DCMO said according to finance procedures, these claims were normally paid after the journey had been made. He said after a long discussion, it was agreed that travel allowances would be paid before departure of MILOBs being repatriated. He added that MILOBs who were repatriated were paid their travel allowances.

6. **SECT HQs**. As decided during the previous Conference, all Sector HQs would be collocated with formed troops HQs. The DCMO said that Sectors 2 and 3 would maintain their HQs.

7. **FORMED TROOPS**. It was reemphasized that Formed Troops were not under the command of MILOBs but under operational control only.

8. **ESCORT BY FORMED TROOPS**. After a long deliberation, it was agreed that formed troops would undertake tasks of escorting Brown and Roots convoys. The DCMO said the final decision as to who should escort Brown and Roots convoy would be taken by the Sect Comd on the ground.

9. **CHAIN OF COMD**. The CMO expressed dissatisfaction about the manner in which Sectors were corresponding directly to FHQ. He said this was an indication that there was no need for MILOB GP HQ. He pointed out that the idea of integrating MILOB GP HQ was drawn out of the this acts of direct correspondence between some Sectors and FHQ. He warned that if this was not ceased a confused situation could be created. He directed that mails going to FHQ must necessarily pass through MILOB GP HQ.

ACTION BY

10. **JACKS FOR VEHS**. All Sect Comds were to collect jacks for their vehs from the workshop. This was done except Sect 5 which said that the CTO insisted that a could only be issued with jack when it was sent for maintenance. The CMO said the workshop had no jacks and anytime the jacks arrived they would be issued.

11. **HELICOPTER RECCE/ OPs**. The DCMO said it was agreed that hel would be made available for Recce and Observation Post duties with effect from next week. The CMO added that the hels were for operations purposes. He pointed out that if they were not requested for, it would be assumed that they were not needed. He urged Sect Comds to put the request for hel through MILOB GP HQ for follow-up action.

ITEM 2 - SECT BRIEFS

11. SECT 1

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd said the situation in the Sector was calm and the borders were opened to all traffic. He added that the RPA troops in the Sector were cooperating very well with MILOBs.

b. RPA. The Sect Comd said the RPA cooperated well with MILOBs within the period. Their deployment had not changed in the Sector and the GAIBIRO GUEST HOUSE continued to be used as a Military Training Camp for new recruits. | ACTION BY

c. Own Activities. The Sect Comd said MILOBs carried out short and long distance patrols throughout the Sector. He said observations made during the patrols include low activities in schools due to shortage of book, furniture and other equipment. He said UNESCO carried out a survey and promised to supply the required items. He mentioned that farming activities have were going on and families were rehabilitating their homes. He patrols observed that the Tea Factory at KINIHIRA was being renovated and local workers hinted that the factory would open soon.

d. Mines and Unexploded Devices. The Sect Comd said presence of unexploded ordinance devices remained a serious hazard in some parts of the Sector. He said children and farmers were vulnerable and many mines accidents occurred in the Sector some in the past month. He added that those which were identified were removed.

e. Bridges. The Sector Comd said the main bridges in the Sector were in good condition. He said the wooden bridge at GATUNA was replaced with a Bailey bridge by the BRITCON ENGRS.

f. Humanitarian Activities. The Sect Comd said there were no refugees camps in the Sector.

However, there were transit camps for returnees created by NGOs at TABAGWE, RUKOMO, MUVUMBA and GATUZA. He said UNHCR was operating a reception centre at NYAGATARE and TABAGWE for returnees who were later handed over to local authorities.

ACTION BY

g. Logistics. The Sect Comd said there was urgent need for vehicles in order to sustain the momentum of operations in the Sector. He said two vehs were under repairs and maintenance.

12. **DCMO's Response**. The DCMO tasked the Sect Comd to make the necessary contacts for the deployment of MILOBs at NYAGATARE. On movement of returnees from the borders into the country, the CHAO said if NICOY could continue conveying them without problem they should go ahead. However if they needed assistance, HAC was ready to take up the task. CHO said UNHCR had the responsibility to move returnees but their mode of operation was rather sluggish. He advised that UNHCR could be contacted to provide a number of buses from their fleet.

COMD
SECT 1
NICOY
HAC
COMD
SECT 1
HAC

13. **SECT 2**

a. Gen Sit. The situation in the Sector was reported calm and relationship with locals also improved during the period.

b. RPA. The Sect Comd said RPA had one coy deployed at NYARUBUYE. He said 12 persons were reported killed North of KIBUNGO. Investigation conducted by Sector MILOBs revealed that RPA assisted civilians to kill people they suspected to be former INTERAHAMWE.

ACTION BY

c. Humanitarian Activities. The Sect Comd said he had requested for DIESEL for the local authorities to pump water to the towns but his request was not met. He said this had adversely affected the confidence of local authorities in UNAMIR. On the movement of refugees, he said there was a marked increase in the influx of returnees into the Sector. He said thousands of returnees from refugees camps in Tanzania crossed the Akagera River at 5 crossing points North-east of RUSUMO into Rwanda in the past two weeks. He said the reason was for this mass movement was the deteriorating conditions in refugee camps in Tanzania.

d. Own Activities. Sector MILOBs carried out patrols, border monitoring, investigation and recce missions during the period. The Sect Comd said due to repatriation, MILOBs strength had reduced. He asked for additional MILOBs to augment present strength. SMPO

e. Logistics. The Sect Comd said there were still problems of accommodation and office furniture. He requested for assistance to acquire office accommodation and furniture. SLOGO

13. CMO's Response. On request for diesel for the local authority to pump water to the communes, the CMO said UNAMIR had been requested to see which of its resources could be used to assist the locals. He pointed out that UNAMIR resources were not enough to go round but Sect Comds should use their initiative and offer some level of assistance to the locals in the Sectors

where possible. On replacement of MILOBs being repatriated, the DCMO said more MILOBs were leaving the AO than the replacements. He said MILOBs strength problem would remain for some time. | ACTION BY

14. SECT 3

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd said the situation had changed from tense to very calm. He attributed the change to the visits paid to the Sector by the President and the Vice President. He added that the expanded deployment of MALICOY and MALAWICOY also contributed to the calm situation. He said by by expanding their deployment, MALICOY and MALAWI COY were showing UNAMIR presence in the communes.

b. RPA. The Sect Comd said RPA deployment had not changed during the period. He said the RPA, being aware that some locals had taken refuge in UNAMIR camps and that MILOBs were aware of their acts, had toned down on their activities.

c. Humanitarian Affairs. The Sect Comd said electricity and water has now reached most parts of the Prefecture. He said efforts were being made to re-open the Post Office at GITARAMA. He added that payment of salaries to teachers and civil servants were also going on smoothly.

d. Logistics. The Sect Comd said 3 of the Sector's 9 vehicles were at the workshop. He requested for additional vehicles to enhance effective patrolling. On accommodation, he said the owner of the house which was being used as MILOBs Office at BUTARE wanted the house back. He said 3 build-

ing were being used by MILOBs, CIVPOL and formed troops at RUHANGO. He mentioned that the contracts for the 3 buildings had not yet been finalized.

ACTION BY

15. **CMO's Response**. The CMO said accommodation was still a problem and UNAMIR used taking a long time to sign contracts. He said if the building could be acquired for office accommodation, the civilian admin could be made to act quickly on finalizing the contracts. On maintenance of vehicles, the CMO said MILOBs did not keep to servicing schedules. He advised that servicing schedules should be maintained to keep the vehicles in better conditions.

SECT COMDS SLOGO

SECT COMDS

16. **SECT 4A**

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd said although the evacuation of displaced persons had increased, more displaced persons had now arrived in Camps in the Sector. He said this was due to the deteriorating security situation in adjacent prefectures. He pointed out that presence of former INTERAHAMWE in camps was a serious treat to security in the camps. He said he was glad FHQ had initiated action to deal with the problem.

FHQ

b. RPA. RPA rotation was completed and MILOBs maintained good relationship through liaison with them. The Sect Comd said the indiscipline of RPA troops was the main factor for the insecurity in the Sector.

c. Own Activities. Sector MILOBs carried out patrols, route recce, escort tasks, border monitoring, investigations and assistance and evacuat-

ion of displaced persons during the period. The Sect Comd said the Sector launched OP RUBY at RUNYOMBYI to cover the Borders and the Southern parts of the with extensive patrolling. He said co-ordination of escort tasks between the Sectors went on well.

ACTION BY

SECT 4A

d. Logistics. The Sect Comd said the Sector took delivery of a rack and file cabinet. He said request for spare tyres had not yet been met. He lamented that 4 of the Sector vehs that required replacement of parts were still at the workshop. He requested for additional vehicles, office equipment, spare tyres and tools kit for the vehicles.

SLOGO

SLOGO

17. **SECT 4B**

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd said the past three had been quite calm but a shoot out ensued in the RPA Camp at KIBUYE on 27 Nov 94. He said the shooting lasted for about one hour.This adversely affected the morale the troops in the camp and created tension in their ranks.

b. RPA. The treat in the Sector remained unchanged. RPA troops continued their foot and mobile patrols during the period. The Sect Comd said RPA recruit training in KIBUYE continued and there were about 300 recruit in the camp. He continued that several arrest were made during the period. The Sect Comd elaborated on the shooting incident in RPA Camp at KIBUYE and said it was almost a mutiny. He said a group of RPA Hutu soldiers attacked the residence of the Bn 2IC to kill him. He said one of the attackers was killed and

4 others arrested. He added that the whereabouts of the 4 was not known since RPA refused to give information on the incident.

ACTION BY

c. Political. The Sect Comd said a new Prefect had assumed office on 8 Nov 94 and organized a two-week seminar for all the Bourgemestres and Sous Prefects in the Prefecture. He said the new Prefect had also toured the Prefecture. The Sect Comd said UNAMIR Political Adviser also visited the Sector and held discussions with the Prefect.

d. Local Population. The Sect Comd said the local population was apprehensive of RPA due to the latter's activities. He the locals refused to talk to MILOB patrols at KIBUYE and GISOVU for fear of possible reprisal action by the RPA.

e. Operations. The Sect Comd said MILOBs carried out patrols, escorts and conducted investigations during the period. He said heavy rains rendered most roads in the Sector unmotorable and added that one helicopter patrol was conducted. He requested that hel be made available on call.

f. Armed Troops Activities. The Sect Comd said armed troops patrolled their AOR. He mentioned that RPA denied them access to NYAMINAGA and KIVUMU. FRAFBATT handed over a quantity of weapons to the new Prefect and local Bn 21C on 16 Nov 94.

g. Humanitarian Matters. The Sect Comd said there were about 4,000 displaced persons in the KIBUYE Prefecture. He said 2,500 were in

NYAMISHABA Camp near KIBUYE. He said UNHCR was co-ordinating their evacuation to KIGALI. He said 40 orphans were also evacuated to GITARAMA.

ACTION BY

h. NGOs Activities. The new Prefect met reps of all NGO in the Sect and appealed to for assistance to furnish and reactivate the office of the local administration. He said distribution of food and other aid items continued in the Sector during the period.

i. Problems. The Sect Comd said the 20km road from GITARAMA to KIBUYE needed immediate attention. He said the Sector was without office accommodaton because the RPA was not co-operating in the acquisition of accommodation. He elaborated on veh problems the Sector faced and said if nothing was done about this it would be impossible to withdraw MILOBs from the Sector at short notice.

18. CMO's Response. The CMO said the issue of the road was noted. He said there were hopes that the Indian contingent would bring engineer equipment to undertake road rehabilitation. He urged the Sect Comd to be monitoring the situation with the RPA closely and feed the HQ with necessary information when required.

INDIAN CONT COMD SECT 4B

19. SECT 4C

a. Gen Sit. The Sector was reported calm. He said the influx of about 5,000 refugees who fled the disturbances in the CIBITOKE Province in Burundi could adversely affect the security situation in the Sector.

b. Threats in the Sector. The Sect Comd said the successful closure of MURURU Camp by RPA sparked off movement of DPs into Zaire. He said the indiscriminate shooting by Zairian troops at their side of the border into Rwanda resulted in the killing of 13 persons.

ACTION BY

c. Political. The Sect Comd said political activities had been stepped up by the inauguration of political cadres in all Communes and the re-opening of most primary schools. He added that the visits of Ministers and officials was an encouragement to the locals.

d. Own Activities. MILOBs and formed troops patrolled the Sector. The Sect Comd said the poor nature of roads made some areas inaccessible. He mentioned that a massive landslide blocked the road linking BUTARE to CYANGUGU on 28 Nov 94 for some time.

e. Humanitarian. With the return of Burundese refugees home, the Sector had no refugee problem. The Sect Comd said the number of DPs continue to swell with the daily average of 200 DPs entering the Sector. He said the emergency phase of NGOs operation in the Sector was over and the emphasis was now on rehabilitation. He said efforts were being made to get the Prefect of CYANGUGU to identify areas where these rehabilitation would be needed most.

f. Logistics. The Sect Comd said an office accommodation had now been acquired and the con-

	ACTION BY
Bn Comd were both involved in the Military Tribunals. He said this makes them always moving to and from KIGALI. As a result they were most of the time not available in the Prefecture.	
e. Logistics. The Sect Comd said vehicles continue to deteriorate fast due to the bad roads in the Sector. He said the Sector now had 2 interpreters to be deployed at GISENYI and RUHENGERI. He said the contracts for office accommodation for GISENYI and RUHENGERI were still yet to be finalised. He said communication with the sub-sector was not good and requested that the mast be raised a bit higher than it was.	SI OFFR
21. CMO's Response. The CMO said it was necessary to get the letter for the Barge operation to be streamlined. He said this would pave the way for better barge operation and foster better working relationship between MILOBs and the RPA in the Sector. The DCMO talked about the communication problem between GISENYI and RUHENGERI and advised that the mast could be mounted on top of a tree.	
22. SECT 6	
a. Gen Sit. The Sector was calm and there was serious threat during the period.	
b. RPA. The Sect Comd said the RPA carried out morning training, patrolled and the city and mounted snap road blocks on principal streets. He said the level of discipline among the troops was not good enough.	

c. Local Population. People outside KIGALI complained of lack of NGO activities in the communes. He said the city now accommodate too many people and the people complained of accommodation and food. He said although all the NGOs operating Rwanda had their Headquarters in the capital, their activities did not cover the capital.

ACTION BY

d. MILOBs Ops. The Sect Comd said MILOBs escorted displaced persons to destinations outside KIGALI. He said 23 missions were carried out and a total of 43,000 DPs were evacuated. He mentioned that MILOBs had the problem of not meeting officials responsible for the DPs at the dispersal point during week-ends.

23. CMO's Response. The CMO said NGOs had their own schedule of work and it appeared they did not work on week-ends. He said this problem would be sorted out in due course. The CHAO highlighted on the problems of NGOs and said IOM and UNHCR reps were to be at the centres. He said the reps were to be responsible for the displaced persons and direct where they should be dropped. The CMO said some of the DPs did not know where they were going so the escorts wait for the reps of UNHCR before starting their journey. MILOBS

ITEM 2 - STAFF BRIEFS

24. SOO. The A/SOO pointed out certain problems with submission of SITREP. He highlighted on References to previous SITREPs and advised that details of the references should be quoted clearly. He touched on channel of communication and said all mails from the

	ACTION BY
Sector should be addressed to MILOB GP HQ. On Consolidated Reports on MILOBs activities in the Sectors, he said the reports should be submitted in three parts because of time limitation. The A/SOO elaborated on Helicopter recce and procedure for requests. He said the requests should be directed to MILOB GP HQ for co-ordination and follow-up action.	SECT COMDS
25. SIGS OFFICER. The Signals Officer said all Sector Radios were working well except Sector 2 which had the problem of darkness and rainy weather because of the use of Solar powered batteries. He mentioned that the were problems of voice procedure with the CIVPOL who also operate on MILOB channel. He said Canadian Sigs were still at post and could still be of help in transmitting long messages. He said satellite dishes were mounted at GITARAMA, GIKONGORO, CYANGUGU, KIBUYE and BYUMBA. He talked about welfare telephone facility and said if Sect Comds could take the responsibility, this could be made available for MILOBs.	SECT COMDS
He said a number of photocopiers were received but all were not yet serviceable. He said when repairs on them were completed, they would be distributed.	SIG OFFR
26. SLOGO. The SLOGO said out of 80 vehicles on charge to the HQ, 68 were serviceable. 8 were involved in accidents and 4 lacked spare parts. He entreated all to take good care of the vehicles and be extra careful when driving. He said vehicle maintenance schedules should be adhered to because if this was not done, vehicles would be delayed at the workshop. On equipment to be returned to the HQ, the SLOGO said these should be tended in on 07 Dec instead of 15 Dec. He said a number tablet chairs had been issued to the	

HQ and asked Sect Comds to make arrangements to collect them. On stationery, the SLOGO said as soon as some were received, sectors would be informed to collect their share.

ACTION BY

27. SMPO. The SMPO said the Finance Office had warned that individual explanation on MSA discrepancies was no longer acceptable to them though such shortfalls might exist. Affected persons were therefore to send their queries to MILOB HQ in time for necessary action to be taken. He said a total of 107 MILOBS would be repatriated by end of Dec but not the same number were due in to replace those going. He said postings have to be effected immediately for certain appointments to be filled. Some people may be called from the sectors to take up certain appointments. SMPO

On CTO/Leave, the SMPO said problems still existed. He said the Admin Instrs Feb 94 (Guidelines for Contributing Countries) stated that leave must be earned. Leave at home cannot be taken at UN expense. The regulation stated that the UN cannot pay travel expenses and not that MSA would be forfeited. CTO could also not be accumulated and must be earned. He said the implications were not that MILOBS should take CTO after staying in the mission area for 30 days. They must have worked continuously for 30 days to earn it. The SMPO said a letter had already been sent on Repatriation Procedures. He said 6 days permitted MILOBS before repatriation was an administrative measure to enable proper clearance to be carried out. If MILOB had no leave balance, he should not be granted CTO for the last 36 days. On traffic offences, the SMPO asked all to keep within regulations to avoid getting embarrassed

28. S PLANS/TRG OFFR. The S PLANS/TRG Officer said some Duty Officers' could not work well in the sectors. He advised Sect Comds to put appropriate officers in position to keep the work going. He said there was the need to review the current rotation system. On dissemination of information, he said Sect Comds should make use of facilities at their disposal to pass on information to MILOBs. He elaborated on the security alarm system and said this should be read in conjunction with MILOBs instructions. The S Plans O highlighted the importance of MILOB Sector Consolidated Report for the SRSG. He said due to time factor, the report should be broken down into three part. He said the first part should be ready by Tue, the second part on Tue the following and the last parts later.

ACTION BY

29. HAC. The Chief Humanitarian Assistance Officer (CHAO) said humanitarian activities now required local initiative. He pointed out that NGOs were difficult to work with and would never want to co-operate with MILOBs. He urged Sect Comds to make use of resources and facilities in Sectors and get the work going on at the local level.

30. CIVPOL. The Commissioner mentioned that the CIVPOL office had been moved from the former place to a new location near MILOB GP HQ. He said he had problems with language. He added that some CIVPOL would be deployed at CYANGUGU and KIBUYE. He urged Sect Comds to deploy them alongside the MILOBs and also for police duties and investigations.

SECT COMDS

31. Summary of Decisions

a. No MILOB would be allowed to send any vehicle

	ACTION BY
whilst on CTO/Leave. Sect Comds should leave their vehicles in the Sector when proceeding on CTO	SECT COMDS
b. Sect Comds should train new MILOBs on driving and vehicle procedure. Those who did not have the training should not be permitted to drive.	SECT COMDS
c. In-coming Sect Comds should be with MILOB Teams for at least 2 weeks before taking over command.	SECT COMDS
d. Sect Comds should inform MILOB GP HQ before leaving their Sectors for KIGALI.	SECT COMDS
e. Sect Comds should request for UNAMIR helicopter whenever they needed it with reasons clearly stated.	COMDS
f. Out-going Sect Comds should ensure handing-over was properly done before appearing on CMO's interview.	OUT-GOING SECT COMDS
g. Personal file should be kept at MILOB GP HQ for every MILOB.	SMPO
h. Sect Comds should hold routine meetings with RPA local commanders. Minutes of meetings should be forwarded to the MILOB GP HQ.	SECT

CONCLUSION

32. The CMO took the opportunity to bid out-going Sect Comds and MILOBs farewell. He commented on the efforts departing MILOBs put in as individuals and as

a group in the most trying moments of the mission and expressed his appreciation for their dedication to duty for the course of peace. He thanked all present and urged MILOBs to maintain the momentum of the work. | **ACTION BY**

33. The Conference ended at 1328hrs.

WKC BLEBOO
Capt
Secretary

MILOB LOG BT

UN SECRET

Copy No. 11 of 18

OPS File

MILOB GP HQ
KIMIHURURA
KIGALI

10 Dec 94

OPO 12/94

References:

A. Z 723 Sheet 40 BUTARE Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.
B. Z 723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.
C. WNG 0 (MILOBS) dated 7 Dec 94.

1. **SITUATION**

a. Threat Forces. Additional to Ref C, criminals elements continue to unleash acts of terror, harassment and banditry in the camps. The following have also been recorded:

(1) Criminal elements are known to spread false propaganda with the aim of preventing lawful citizens from returning to their normal life.

(2) Threats Forces have access to small arms, hand grenades, machetes etc.

(3) Recent recorded incidents inside the camps include:

(a) Three hand grenades recovered during a search in KIBEHO on 20 Nov 94.

(b) Two bandits killed at NDAGO on 28 Nov 94 and another bandit killed on ni 28/29 Nov.

(c) Grenades explosion apparently thrown within the camp including several killings (over 50).

b. Friendly Forces

(1) The FHQ intends to rid both the KIBEHO and NDAGO Camps of criminal elements in order to encourage the return of peaceful Rwandese people to their homes.

(2) The ops will involve approximately 8 UNAMIR Coys excluding support elements.

(3) The CIVPOL, NGOs, B & R and two RPA Battalions will be co-operating with UNAMIR Forces.

(4) Interpreters in support of UNAMIR Forces.

c. Atts and Dets. No change.

2. **MISSION**. MILOB GP is to conduct operations in support of formed Contingents to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO Camps.

3. **EXECUTION**

a. Gen Outline. UNAMIR will conduct Cordon and Search Ops in co-ordination with the RPA. Two RPA Bns will from the outer cordon. Seven Coys (UNAMIR) will form the inner cordon. They will perform the search with the RPA Ident and Liaison Teams. A Coy will be inserted at NDAGO as a blocking force. A preliminary Ops consisting armed tps and MILOBs already in progress to increase UN presence.

b. MILOB SECT 1

(1) Det to Ops Comd CO NICOY wef 11 Dec 94
- One MILOB Team.

(2) Det to ops comd MILOB sect 3 wef 11 Dec 94
- 2 MILOB Teams.

(3) Tasks

(a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by Comd NICOY.

(b) Monitor all security and ops situations along GREEN ROUTE.

(c) Monitor and report to Tac HQ the security situation of Detainee Cage.

(d) Report on continuous basis, progress of operations within your AOR.

(e) Report violation of human rights to MILOB Tac HQ.

(f) In conjunction with formed troops document arrested criminals.

(g) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

(h) Carry out investigation as directed by Comd or MILOB Tac HQ.

(i) Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops, with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.

j. Monitor humanitarian requirement within boundaries.

c. MILOB SECT 2

(1) Grouping

(a) Det to Ops Comd CO ZAMBATT
wef 11 Dec 94 - One MILOB Team.

(b) Det to Comd MILOB Sect 3
wef 11 Dec 94 - Two MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

(a) Perform MILOB tasks assigned by Comd ZAMBATT.

(b) Monitor all activities and security situation within your AOR.

(c) Inform MILOB Tac HQ the situation on objectives 7 and 10.

(d) Report on continuous basis the progress of ops within your AOR.

(e) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

(f) Report any violation of Human Rights.

(g) Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.

d. MILOB Sect 3

(1) Grouping

(a) Under Ops Comd

wef 111600B Dec 94 - two MILOB Teams, Sect 1 MILOBs.

(b) Under Ops comd.

wef 111600B Dec 94 - two MILOB Teams, Sect 2 MILOBs.

(c) Det to under comd MILOB Tac HQ

wef 121600B Dec 94 - three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue monitoring the security situation in the Camps.

(b) Establish MILOB Tac HQ at KIBEHO.

(c) Prepare the alternate MILOB Tac HQ at BUTARE.

(d) Monitor and report on 24hr basis the situation in the camps.

(e) Submit SITREP on 12 hourly basis to MILOB Tac HQ, KIBEHO commencing 1200hrs D Day.

(f) Report any human rights violations.

(g) Prepare to maintain post ops presence with 3 x Teams till further order.

(h) Provide liaison between UNAMIR and NGOs, civil authorities within your AOR.

e. MILOB Sect 4A - (GHANBATT)

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by formed contingent.

(b) Monitor the activities and security situation

within your AOR and report on continuous basis.

(c) Info MILOB Tac HQ - KIBEHO on the progress of ops.

(d) Report any violation of human rights.

(e) Provide liaison between formed contingent with NGOs and civil authorities.

(f) Prepare to maintain post ops presence in the camps with 3 MILOB Teams.

(g) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

f. MILOB Sect 4A (ZAMBATT)

(1) Grouping. One MILOB Team from MILOB Sect 2.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by CO ZAMBATT.

(b) Monitor activities and security situation on 24hr basis.

(c) Report violations of human rights.

(d) Provide liaison between UNAMIR forces with NGOs and civil authorities.

(e) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200 hrs D Day to MILOB Tac HQ KIBEHO.

(f) Report on continuous basis the situation on objective 7 and 10.

g. MILOB Sect 4B

(1) Det to Comd FRAFBATT wef 11 dec 94 - One MILOB Team.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue to support FRAFBATT.

(b) Monitor the activities and security situation within your AOR.

(c) Report any human rights violation.

(d) Provide liaison between FRAFBATT with NGOs and the civil authorities within your AOR.

(e) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200hrs D Day to MILOB Tac HQ.

(f) Report the security situation of objective 5 and 9 on continuous basis.

h. MILOB Sect 4C

(1) Det to Comd ETHIOBATT

wef 11 Dec 94 - Three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue to support ETHIOBATT.

(b) Monitor and report the security situation on 24 hour basis.

(c) Report on the situation or progress of ops on obj 4 and 6.

(d) Report any human rights violations within your AOR.

(e) Provide liaison between UNAMIR with NGOs and civil authorities.

(f) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200 hrs D day.

i. MILOB Sect 5

(1) Det to Comd TUNBATT wef 11 dec 94

- Three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue to support TUNBATT.

(b) Monitor the activities and security situation on 24hr basis.

(c) Provide liaison between UNAMIR with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.

(d) Report any situation on obj 1, 3 and 11 to MILOB Tac HQ.

(e) Fwd a 12 hourly SITREP on the ops commencing 1200hrs D Day.

(f) Fwd report on any human rights violation to MILOB Tac HQ.

j. MILOB Sect 6

(1) Grouping

(a) Keep three MILOB Teams on 1 hr NTM to Ops Area.

(b) Keep close liaison with MILOB HQ on op OVERTURE.

(2) Tasks

(a) Continue with your present tasks.

(b) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB Sectors on order of DCMO/MILOB Tac HQ.

k. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

(a) D - 2. (12 Dec 94) - Move to Assy Area

(b) D - 1 / D Day.Move to blocking/cordon positions /secure Force Release Point.

(c) D Day

(i) H - 3 - (0130hrs) Outer cordon and blocking force in posn at NDAGO.

(ii) H - 2 - Secure Force Release Point.

(iii) H - 1 - Occupy Force Release Point.

(iv) H hr - 0430hrs Tps commence search.

(v) H + 1 - Holding/Screening facility estb.

(d) D + 2 Ops completed.

(e) D + 3 Commence redeployment.

(2) MILOBs continue to increase presence forthwith.
(3) Search to be conducted only during daylight hours.
(4) Curfew will be imposed at night (1800 - 0500hrs).
(5) Assy Area - BUTARE.
(6) Limit of search will be edge of NDAGO Camp.
(7) Routes
(a) RED ROUTE - ROAD BUTARE - GIKONGORO - KIBEHO.
(b) GREEN ROUTE - BUTARE - KIBEHO.
(8) Dispositions - Annex A.
(9) Force Release Point
(a) Red Route. Track Junction GR 839195.
(b) Green Route. Road Junction GR 868077.
(10) Air Plan. Annex C.
(11) Detainee Handling Procedure. Annex D.
(12) Liaison Plan. Annex E.
(13) Comms. Coordinated later. Teams to continue with the present C/S. (Annex F)
(14) Public Info Plan. Annex G.

4. **ADMIN AND LOGISTICS**

a. MILOBs are to be self sufficient in food and water throughout the period of operations.
b. C Rat will be available but issued at US$8.00 per meal.
c. Dress. Helmets and Flak Jackets will be worn.
d. Med. Cas Clearing Post will be loc in AICF Building on OBJ 2.

5. **COMMAND AND SIGNALS**

a. Loc of HQs
(1) FORCE TAC HQ. KIBEHO (Double Storey Building on OBJ 2) Tac HQ opens 140200B Dec 94.
(2) MILOB TAC HQ. Same loc as above.

b. Comms.

(i) Min conversation diring OP

(ii) Ch-12 (Sect 4) will be used for the OP

(iii) Detail callsigns at ANX F

c. Press Info. Comm with the Press only on permission of Force HQ.

d. OPS SEC. Sec of Ops be enforced.

Authentication:
S ILIYA
Lt Col
S O O

MOEEN U AHMED
Col
DCMO

Annexes:

A. Sketch of Ops Plans, Bdrys, and Report Lines KIBEHO (issued later)

B. Sketch showing objectives bdrys and Report Lines in NDAGO DP Camp. (Issued later)

C. Air Plan.

D. Detainee handling Procedures.

E. Liaison Plan. — NOT AVAIL

F. Comms Plan.

G. Public Information Plan. — NOT AVAIL

H. Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes. — NOT AVAIL

Distribution:		Copy No	Incl Annex A to H
MILOB Sect	1	1	
	2	2	
	3	3	

		4A	4&5
		4B	6
		4C	7
		5	8
		6	9
MILOB	Plans	Br	10
	Log	Br	11
	Pers	Br	12
A/FC/COS/CMO			13
CIVPOL			14
FHQ			15
Spare			16 - 18

Annx A
to Op Ord
12 Dated
10 Dec 94

SKETCH SHOWING OBJS, BDYS AND REPORT LINES AT KIBEHO CAMP



SKETCH SHOWING OBSS, BDRYS AND REPOR LINES AT NDAHO CAMP

ANNEX B TO
OPO 12
DD 10 DEC 94



Annex C to
Op Order 12
Dated 10 Dec 94

1. SITUATION. As WNGO dated 05 Dec 94.

2. MISSION. To provide helicopter support for Casevac and Command and Control for Operation OVERTURE.

3. EXECUTION.

A. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements. Two Bell 212 helicopters will provide Casevac and C2 support for the operation.

B. Group.

1. Canadian Helicopters.

A. Gp.

(i) 2 Bell 212 helicopters.

(ii) Guarding provided by RPA and TAC HQ for the Forward Air Refuel Point (FARP) at BUTARE AIRSTRIP for day/night operation.

(iii) Crews to man 2 helicopters for day operations mounted from the FOB, one of which will include an on board medical team.

(iv) A standby crew on 30 mins readiness based at KIGALI, from dusk to dawn.

C. Tasks.

(1) Helicopter support is to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Grid - 49351050 corresponding to 2 deg 37.1'S and 29 deg 32.7'E. This position will be co-located with a medical coordination team.

ANNEX D TO
OPO 12
DATED 10 DEC 94

PROCEDURES FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCHING OF PERSONS AND THEIR PROPERTY BY TROOPS EMPLOYED ON OP OVERTURE

GENERAL

1. The way in which detainees are handled by the troops of UNAMIR will be of critical importance to the success of Op OVERTURE in the eyes of NGOs and of the world's media. It is essential, therefore, that:

a. Detainees are handled with the utmost dignity and propriety.

b. Detainees' processing is reliably documented.

c. The troops employed in the task of handling detainees understand that they will be dealing with persons who are suspected of having participated in a range of serious offences but who have not been convicted. The possibility that detainees will not eventually be convicted requires that they are handled with as much sensitivity and respect as possible.

d. Detainees are to be treated sufficiently firmly that no attempt is made to escape or to embarrass the UN.

e. Troops understand that any detainees are under the protection of the UN and that they must be closely guarded against any attempt at revenge or reprisal.

2. CIVPOL is to be used to monitor the process of arrest and transfer to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC) whilst MPs are to be involved in the process of handling detainees thereafter. ICRC, UNHRC and other agencies may be present at any stage in the process and will be requested to be present at the handover of individuals to the Public Prosecutor.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ARREST OF DETAINEES

3. The procedure for the handling of Rwandese and other nationals detained by UNAMIR troops during Op OVERTURE is to be as follows:

a. Having been identified, detainees are to be apprehended as swiftly as possible using the absolute minimum of physical force. Troops are to be reminded of UNAMIR Rules of Engagement (which allow for the use of deadly force for self defence including the protection of detainees but do not extend to the use of deadly force to apprehend a person who is trying to evade capture).

b. Detainees are to be searched to:

(1) Confirm that they are not armed. Any firearms that are collected are to be unloaded and magazines discharged.

(2) Collect, document and safeguard any evidence - including weapons - that may be relevant to a prosecution case.

(3) Collect and document any valuables held by detainees so that UNAMIR is protected against any suggestion that it has been party to theft or looting.

These possessions are to be placed in a plastic bag which is to be taken with the detainee to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC).

SEARCHES OF DWELLINGS AND VEHICLES

4. If a detainee can be associated with a vehicle or dwelling, it, too, is to be searched - an action that will be best conducted in the presence of the detainee if at all possible. The procedure to be adopted is as follows:

a. The condition of the vehicle or dwelling to be searched is to be recorded and a list made of the persons present on the Record of Search (ROS), an example of which is at Appendix 1.

b. Conduct the search, if possible in the presence of the detainee or a relative or other associate, causing a minimum of damage. The location of the search is to be recorded as accurately as possible, using a sketch plan if necessary, either on, or attached to, the ROS.

c. In the event that any material evidence is discovered, it should be photographed in situ. It should then be transferred to a plastic bag for carriage to the DPC.

d. At the conclusion of the search, a description of any damage that was done in its execution should be entered on the ROS and those present at the conclusion of the search should be listed.

e. Any evidence, including the ROS and all photographs that may have been taken, should be transferred to the DPC and passed to the MP officer supervising the custody of the detainee.

BODILY SEARCHES

5. Photography by the Media. Under no circumstances are the media to be allowed to photograph or film detainees in the process of being searched.

6. The Searching of Females. If it is possible, detainees are to be physically searched only by a person of the same sex. If, because a person of the same sex is not available, detainees may be

searched by a [illegible] of the opposite sex only in the presence of another person and [illegible]eferably, one of a more senior rank than the person doing the s[illegible]ning. Extreme care is to be taken to minimize the risk of an all[illegible]ion of improper behaviour in this process and to document any complaint or suggestion - by any person - that improper behaviour has occurred.

TRANSFER TO THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

7. Use of "Plasticuffs". Detainees' hands are to be bound behind their backs with "plasticuffs" (either before or after the search procedure, as thought necessary by the senior person present). Care is to be taken that the plasticuffs are not too tight and that the circulation of blood to the hands is not restricted. Subsequently, frequent checks are to be made that the hands of bound detainees are healthy and that the plasticuffs have not been over-tightened, perhaps by one of the detainees in an attempt to embarrass or hinder the UN.

8. Escorting Detainees to the DPC. If necessary, detainees are to be collected in groups (but not allowed to assemble so closely that they can touch or talk with each other) for transport to the DPC where they are to be handed to an MP officer. It is important to ensure that continuity is achieved in the handling of detainees to minimize the chances of an accusation of brutality being made against a UN soldier, his unit or UNAMIR; for this reason, and to ensure that the process is properly documented, detainees must be escorted to the DPC by the soldiers who detained them.

9. Evidence. Any bags containing any items taken from the detainee and any photographs pertaining to the detainee are to be handed to the MP officer. He is to label the items with the details of circumstances under which they were found and the name and UNAMIR ID number of the soldier giving it to him. Any ROS that has been completed is to be passed to the MP officer for retention with the DPR.

THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

10. Perimeter and Segmentation. The DPC is to be surrounded and segmented as necessary with concertina wire with the joint aims of inhibiting:

a. Any attempt by detainees to escape or to riot.

b. Unauthorized entry.

The perimeter is to be patrolled to defend against, and deter, any attempt at attack.

11. Accommodation. Detainees are to be provided with covered and secure accommodation (9' x 9' and larger tents are permissible) with adequate heating, lighting, ventilation and seating for their comfort.

12. The Conditions of Detainees. The following rules are to apply:

a. Detainees are to be segregated as much as possible and not permitted to touch or talk.

b. Males and females are to be kept separate except that small children may accompany - and be comforted by - their parents should it be necessary.

c. Plasticuffs may be removed if, in the opinion of the MP officer, the individual is not likely to cause danger to others or to attempt to escape. In the event that the MP officer decides not to release a detainee from plasticuffs or to reapply them for a protracted period, the fact and cause is to be written clearly and in full on the DPR. The conditions of the detainees hands are to be monitored, as described above.

d. Food and drink is to be available for detainees at all times.

13. Photographs. At the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee standing with the soldier who made the arrest and with the officer into whose safe custody the detainee is being passed. The photograph is to show clearly the condition of the detainee at the time of the handover and to identify the persons responsible for him or her. The UN ID numbers, ranks, names and unit of the UN personnel are to be written legibly on the reverse of the photograph together with the place, date and time of the taking of the photograph. In addition, if it is known, the name of the detainee should be written on the reverse of the photograph.

14. Medical Officer. A medical officer is to be present at the processing of all detainees. He/she is to be available to deal with any request for medical attention from a detainee.

15. Searching of Detainees. The detainee is to be searched by an MP and any items recovered in addition to those recovered earlier are to be secured in the same way as before.

16. Detainee Processing Records. A Detainee Processing Record (DPR), of which an example is at Appendix 2, is to be compiled for each detainee. It is to:

a. Record the personal details of the individual, so far as they are known, including name, place date and time of arrest, approximate height and weight, sex, differentiating features and details of any languages known to be spoken.

b. Record the personal details of the soldier who made the arrest and of the witnesses of any searches, should this be applicable.

c. Record the personal details of the MP officer into whose care the detainee passed at the DPC and the date and time of this event, together with any observations made about the condition of the detainee at this stage.

d. Record the details of any bags containing property

removed from the detainee or a vehicle or dwelling with which he was associated in some way.

e. Have stapled to it, photographs taken:

(1) At the time of handover to the MP officer on the detainee's arrival at the DPC.

(2) Show further entries, as necessary, relating to:

(a) Any handover of responsibility of MP officers perhaps resulting from a shift change occurring while the detainee is in the DPC.

(b) The date and time of departure from the DPC.

(c) The condition of the detainee at each handover of responsibility.

(d) The date and time of the detainee's handing over to the Public Prosecutor together with the latter's signature to confirm the transfer of responsibility for the safekeeping of the detainee.

17. Transport to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Detainees are to be collected into groups for transport by a shuttle of minibuses to the Public Prosecutor's Office in Gikongoro with an escort of one MP for each 4 or 5 detainees -who are to have plasticuffs reapplied for the move - and not more than 1 detainee for each 2 seats in the minibus.

18. Departure Documentation. On departing the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee together with the MP officer from whose care he or she is passing and the MP who has been detailed to escort the detainee to the Public Prosecutor. Once again, the details of these individuals are to be recorded on the rear of the photograph and it is then to be stapled to the DPR.

APPENDICES (to which additional pages may be fixed if necessary):

1. Example of a Record of Search (ROS).
2. Example of a Detainee Processing Record (DPR).

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO OPORD 12
DATED 10 DEC 94

RECORD OF SEARCH (ROS) (FIX ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY)

Date and time of start of search:	Immediate supervisor of the search:	Subject of the search (give a description):
	UNAMIR ID No:	Car/truck/house/hut /other:
Location (address or grid reference if known, or draw a sketch map/plan on the reverse of this page or on another page fixed to it):	Condition of property before the search (list features showing obvious damage):	Names and UNAMIR ID numbers of others conducting the search:
Non-UNAMIR persons present during the search:	Reason for the search including name of suspect if known:	Description of any damage done in the execution of the search:
Other comments:	Outcome of search (list any evidence found and removed):	Date and time at the end of the search:
Certified that the information on this page (and any others fixed to it) is true to the best of my knowledge and that all items collected have been dispatched to the MP DPC.	Total number of pages including this one: Signature of search commander:	Date and time of signature:

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX D TO OPORD 12
DATED 10 DEC 94

DETAINEE PROCESSING RECORD (DPR)

Date and time of arrival of the detainee at the MP DPC:	MP officer on duty:	UNAMIR soldier escorting the detainee on his arrival:
	UNAMIR ID No:	UNAMIR ID No:
Name and address of detainee (if known)	Brief description of the detainee (add another page if necessary):	Medical officer on duty and details of any observations/ treatment):
Languages known to be understood by the detainee:	Approx Height (in metres) Approx Weight (kg): Male or female? Date of birth or approximate age: Other characteristics:	Signature: UNAMIR ID No:
Subsequent checks of detainee (date & time, with initials of MP officer) incl any handover of responsibility between MP officers:	Requests made by the detainee (with date and time):	Details of UNAMIR MP escort to the Public Prosecutor's office:
		UNAMIR ID No:
Date and time at departure of detainee from the MP DPC:	ICRC and other agency representatives present at handover to the Public Prosecutor:	Public Prosecutor's signature for receipt of the detainee:
		Date & Time:

Certified that the detainee to which this form relates was handed to the Public Prosecutor together with all evidence that could be attributed to his case.	Signature of MP officer: Date & time:

ANNEX F
TO OPO 12
DATED 10 DEC 94

COMM INSTRUCTIONS

MILOB RADIO NET DIAGRAM



(Contd)

RADIO NET DIAGRAM

1. NET DIAGRAM AS FOLLOWS:



2. FREQUENCIES

A. HF - F1, F2, F3 TBA

B. VHF - F1, F2, F3 TBA

3. ALL COMMS LINKS SHOWN WILL BE MANNED BY THE FORCE SIG SQN USING INTEGRAL COMMS EQPT

4. ALL OTHER COMMS LINKS ARE A BN/COY RESPONSIBILITY

APPX 1 TO ANNEX F
TO MILVOX OPO 12
DATED 10 DEC 94

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTION

NICKNAMES

1. The following nicknames will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

Meaning	Nickname
Assy Area	Paper Tiger
Release Point Red Route	Jungle Juice
Release Point Green Route	Cow Leg
Tac HQ (Op Overture) Loc	Open Door
Casualty Collection Point	Soft Bed
Screening and Holding area	Big Brother
Report Lines	
Report Line No 1	Mango Grove
Report Line No 2	Apple Pie
Report Line No 3	High Ball
Report Line No 4	Happy Home
Report Line No 5	Iron Lady
Report Line No 6	Last Stand
Report Line No 7	Low Loader
Report Line No 8	Little Girl
Report Line No 9	Table Lamp
Report Line No 10	Good Hope
Report Line No 11	Shoe Polish

(NICKNAMES CONTIN)

Objectives

Obj 1	Hungry Bear
Obj 2	Rocking Horse
Obj 3	Active Edge
Obj 4	Snow Ball
Obj 5	Arctic Breeze
Obj 6	Flying Arrow
Obj 7	Long Shot
Obj 8	Flat Cap
Obj 9	Rummy Punch
Obj 10	Red Sox
Obj 11	Short Stop

CODEWORDS

2. The following seven Codewords will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

Codeword	Meaning	To be issued by:
Hunter	Advance (H Hour)	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Scatter	Commence Search	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Basket	Move to second Obj	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Flower	All Obj searched	Tac HQ (OP Overture)/Units
Helmet	Cordon in position	RPA
Baboon	Mov to Assy Area	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Bingo	End of OP Overture	Tac HQ (OP Overture)

SLOGO COPY NO - 8 of 16

UN SECRET

OPS

To : See distribution

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 07 Dec 94

Sub : **WARNING ORDER**

1. SITUATION. There have been increase in acts of banditry, intimidation and criminal activities especially in certain DP camps. The most affected camps are those of KIBEHO (5007) stretching to NDAHO (5201). Both the DP camps are located in sector 4A. It is imperative that firm action is taken to restore security in accordance with UNAMIR mandate. UNAMIR forces will undertake operations in cooperation with 2 RPA battalions to get rid of criminal elements from the mentioned camps/area.

2. MISSION. The MILOB GP will conduct operations in conjunction with formed troops to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO DP camps.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search will be conducted con- currently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR coy will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

b. MILOB Sect 1

(1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO NICOY effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Detach 2 MILOB teams under ops command of MILOB Tac HQ with effect from 11 Dec 94. Teams to report to sec 3 by 111600 Dec 94.

(3) Conduct MILOB operations in conjunction with formed troops.

c. MILOB Sect 2

(1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO ZAMBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

d. MILOB Sect 3

(1) Receive two teams from sec 1 by 111600 Dec 94.

(2) Deploy two MILOB teams by 09 Dec 94 to the camps. Be prepared to deploy three additional teams by 12 Dec 94.

(3) Monitor and report on 24 hours basis the situation at the camps.

(4) Sect comd (Lt Col Hasnain) will be the assistant MILOB commander; to be co-located with MILOB Tac HQ.

e. MILOB Sect 4A

(1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO GHANBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

f. MILOB Sect 4B

(1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO FRAFBATT effective 10 Dec 94

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

g. MILOB Sect 4C

(1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO

ETHIOBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

h. MILOB Sector 5.

(1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO TUNBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

i. MILOB Sect 6.

(1) Provide one MILOB team to MILOB Tac HQ.

(2) Keep two MILOB teams on 1 hr NTM to move to operational area.

(2) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB sectors, on orders from DCMO/TAC HQ.

j. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

(a) D - 2 (12 Dec 94) Move to assembly area commence.

(b) D - 1 (13 Dec 94) Move to assembly area complete.

(c) D Day 14 Dec 94

(d) H - Hour First Light D Day

(e) H + 2 Operation complete (16 Dec 94).

(f) D + 3 Commence redeployment

(2) FCs ops orders at 090930 Dec 94 at UNAMIR HQ. All

MILOB Sector Comds to attend. DCMOs coord conference on 091400 Dec 94. All Sect Comds to attend.

(3) Assembly area -- BUTARE

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. MILOBs to be self sufficient on Water/Food throughout the operations (48 Hrs). Sleeping bags, Flak Jackets and Helmets be worn during cordon and search operation.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

(a)	Loc of MILOB Tac HQ	KIBEHO (5007) -- Time later
(b)	MILOB HQ (Rear)	Present Loc
(c)	Force Tac HQ	KIBEHO
(d)	Alternate	BUTARE
(e)	Communication	Instructions to follow.

MOEEN U AHMED
COL
For CMO

Distr :

Action :

All MILOB Sectors

SLOGO

S PLAN/TRG O

SMPO

Info :

FHQ

DFC/COS/CMO

MILOBS OP HQ LOB BRANCH		
APPT	SIG	DATE
SLOGO	[illegible]	08/12/94
SO SUP		
SO TPT		

UN RESTRICTED

SLOGO

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

OPS

TO : SEE DISTRIBUTION Date : 01 Dec 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ Ref : 6464.01/Ops

SUBJECT : **MINUTES OF MILOBS OPS CONFERENCE HELT AT SECTOR 4A HQ (GIKONGORO) ON SAT 12 NOV 94**

1. Attached please find a copy of Minutes.

2. Please ack.

WKC BLEBOO
Capt
Secretary

Distribution:

External:

Action:

ALL SECTOR COMDS

Info:

FHQ

UN RESTRICTED

HAC

CIVPOL

Internal:

Action:

CMO

DCMO

SMPO

SLOGO

S PLANS & TRG O

UN RESTRICTED

To : See Distr

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 30 Nov 94

Sub : **PROGRAMME FOR SECTOR COMDS CONFERENCE**

1. Enclosed please find a programme for sector commanders conference to be held on 03 Dec 94 at MILOB GP HQ for your information and action.

M NAIM HASSAN
Sqn Ldr
For CMO

Distr :

Action :

CMO

DCMO

All Sectors

CIVPOL

HAC

SLOGO

MILOBS GP HQ LOG BRANCH		
APPT	SIG	DATE
SLOGO		30/11/94
SO SUP		
SO TPT		1/12/94

PROGRAMME FOR
SECTOR COMMANDERS CONFERENCE
TO BE HELD ON 03 DECEMBER 94
AT MILOB GP HQ

SLNO	TIME (HRS)	EVENTS	REMARKS
1.	0800	Arrival of sec comds & staff offrs	Tea/Coffee served
2.	0815	CMO/Chairman arrives.	
	0825	All to be seated.	Seats marked
3.	0830	CMOs welcoming address.	
4.	0835	Review of the minutes of the last conference.	SOO
5.		Sector Comds & Staff Offrs Briefing	
	0900	Sector 1	Each speaker will be given max of 10 mins for his presentation.
	0910	Sector 2	
	0920	Sector 3	
	0930	Sector 4A	
	0940	Sector 4B	
	0950	Sector 4C	
6.	1000-1025	Tea / Coffee Break	Tea/Coffee served
7.	1030	Sector 5	
	1040	Sector 6	
	1050	SOO	
	1100	SLOGO	
	1110	SMPO	
	1120	SPLAN/TRG O	
	1130	Chief of HAC	
	1140	Chief of CIVPOL	
8.	1150-1205	Tea / Coffee Break	Tea/Coffee served
9.	1210	DCMOs directives / instructions	
	1245	CMO/Chairman's closing address	
10.	1300	Lunch	

File

OPS

milob
DEM 0 8/29/11
Copy to Secs.
SMPO Br 28/11

UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: DISTRIBUTION LIST

FROM: Maj J-G Plante
Force Provost Marshal

DATE: 25 Nov 94

SUBJECT: UNAMIR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY
UNAMIR SOP, SECTION 15 (ATTACHED)
UNAMIR MILITARY POLICE REGULATIONS

---

1. With the UNAMIR Military Police Company in operation, I feel that everyone should be aware of Section 15 of the UNAMIR Standing Operation Procedures. That particular Section deals with the following aspects of our work and responsibilities:

a. Functions;

b. Powers of Arrest;

c. Search and Seizure;

d. Disposal of Seized Property;

e. General Prohibition for MP Personnel;

f. Contingent MP;

g. Relations with Host Country Authorities;

h. Cooperation with other UN Missions; and

j. Types of MP Reports.

2. Please, give this Memo the widest distribution.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action	**Information**
List: A, B, C, D, and E	SRSG FC Ex Director DFC OIC Administratio

MILOBS GP HQ LOG BRANCH		
APPT	SIG	DATE
SLOGO	RI	30/4/94
SO SUP		
SO TPT	[illegible]	1/12/94

Maj Traore

Please acquaint yourself with the contents

RI 30/4

SECTION 15 - UNAMIR MILITARY POLICE REGULATIONS

15.1. UNAMIR Military Police. A composite UNAMIR Military Police Unit is established to carry out normal police duties pertaining to the force. In this connection, it is recommended that, in addition to the personnel required for its primary task, each contingent include in its organization a section of about six English and/or French speaking military policemen, including at least one sergeant and the remainder corporals, who will be detached to the Military Police Unit. The Unit will be commanded by the Force Provost Marshall. All regulations concerning the powers, authority and functions of the military police (MP) are to be approved by the LA (Legal Adviser) in writing.

15.2. Authority, Org and Comd. Under the authority of the Force Commander, for the good order and discipline of the mission, UNAMIR MPs are the only competent police element in UNAMIR, particularly concerning matters specifically listed in para 15.9 below. Unless tasked, MPs do not have the authority to act on behalf of UNAMIR and are concerned with discipline of the mil pers. Their functions are listed in para 15.9. UNAMIR MP will contact sector comd and support unit comds when entering their areas of responsibility and will seek their cooperation.

15.3. UNAMIR pers are obliged to cooperate with the MP, to identify themselves with their ID cards, to respond to interviews, to permit searches and to follow directions.

15.4. The MPs have no authority to approach non-UN persons outside UN-occupied premises, UN-controlled areas or UN vehicles. Should it become necessary to approach such persons in exceptional circumstances, the MP is obliged not to give the impression that it has such authority. Normally, all such contact will be through local authorities.

15.5. When working in teams the team will be of mixed nationality. They wear an MP arm band and carry UNAMIR MP ID card.

15.6. The MP is responsible to the Force Commander through the CMPO and COS. He is supervised by the LA and the COS in all matters concerning his powers and by the LA and CMPO in his contact with host authorities.

15.7. Military Police. In addition to personnel for the Force Military Police Unit, each battalion should include its own police component for local supervision of its own UN military elements. All regulations concerning the powers, authority and functions of the military police (MP) are to be approved by the LA (Legal Adviser) in writing.

15.8. Matters requiring disciplinary action are referred to the national contingent comds.

15.9. Functions

15.9.1. Traffic Control.

(1) Enforcement of traffic regulations on operations of UNAMIR vehicles.

(2) Info of road conditions and traffic hazards.

(3) Checking vehs, permits and trip tickets.

(4) When necessary, to assist movcon at airports and harbors, borders, checkpoints and with tasks associated with movement of pers.

(5) In necessary, searching vehs, cargo and luggage on UN flights.

15.9.2. Discipline.

(1) Patrolling areas frequented by or out of bounds to UN pers.

(2) Liaison with med staff and with air authorities on crime and vice problems.

15.9.3. Security. Internal security duties, investigations and checks as required and to the extent not covered by field service security pers.

15.9.4. Investigations.

(1) Within the mission area as directed by Force Commander DFC, COS and CMPO.

(2) Into all serious matters including death, serious injury, loss or damage to property.

(3) Into incidents involving UN pers, members of more than one contingent or likely to affect UNAMIR or its relations with local person.

(4) Into possible serious breaches of discipline or crime, including loss of weapons or ammunition, smuggling/drug and currency offenses or black-marketing.

(5) Into all traffic accidents involving UN vehs and privately owned UN vehs when requested by their UN drivers.

15.10. Powers of Arrest. The power of arrest within contingents is governed by the national law of the contingent concerned. The MP may however :

15.10.1. Arrest a mil member whenever he is found outside contingent lines who breaches discipline or conducts himself in a disorderly manner, or who has committed, is found committing or who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence. Such a member will be transferred as soon as possible into the custody of his national contingent comd for further action. The national contingent comd is obliged to take custody and he alone is responsible for any further detention. Arrest or search of an officer should, where practicable, be made by an officer of equal or superior rank.

15.10.2. Arrest an international civ staff member whenever he/she is found, only when committing an offence which endangers the safety of persons or property.

15.10.3. Arresting local staff or non-UN pers only on UN premises when necessary to stop an offence or disturbance on those premises. Such persons should be delivered to and dealt with by the appropriate host country authority. The assistance of the local authorities in dealing with local people is always desirable.

15.10.4. Not keep anyone under detention for an extended period except for the purpose of transfer to his national contingent comd or the civil authorities or for the purpose of restraint.

15.11. UNAMIR Veh Drivers and Passengers. The MP may :

15.11.1. Direct drivers of UNAMIR vehs.

15.11.2. Stop UNAMIR veh.

15.11.3. Check the ID cards, driver's permit, trip tickets and work papers of drivers and passengers.

15.11.4. Request drivers and passengers to get out of the veh.

15.11.5. Search vehs and their contents.

15.11.6. Take possession of the keys and the driver's permit, if the MP considers it dangerous or inadvisable for the driver to continue for any reason, including alcohol, drugs, fatigue or dangerous driving.

15.11.7. Request the driver to take an alcohol breath analyzer test. However, the MP has no power to enforce such a test and must rely on testimony of witnesses who have observed the offender.

15.11.8. Submit a report to the Force Commander which the Force Commander may refer to the CAO or national contingent comd for disciplinary action.

15.12. Search and Seizure. The MP may:

15.12.1. Search UN premises and property on those premises.

15.12.2. Search any UNAMIR veh, private veh entering or leaving UNAMIR premises or territory controlled by UNAMIR and any private veh owned by a member of UNAMIR when passing through Rwanda borders or border checkpoints.

15.12.3. Search the baggage of all UNAMIR pers leaving or entering Rwanda.

15.12.4. Search the person, or property of people they have arrested. Local persons may only be searched if reasonably suspected of carrying offensive weapons and only on UN premises. Any search for stolen property or other material will be conducted by the local authorities.

15.12.5. Seize or secure UNAMIR pers property in 15.12.1 to 15.12.4 above when such property is considered to be in evidence.

15.12.6. The MPs have no right to enter any private house outside UN premises unless invited by the occupant.

15.12.7. The MP may not search any civ off UNAMIR premises nor conduct any search in a private house with or without permission. Receipts are to be given for property seized.

15.13. Disposal of Seized Property. When property of any kind is seized or recovered, full evidence will be entered in a special register. Articles which have been seized for the purpose of an investigation may be returned to the rightful owner when the investigation is concluded and any required proceedings terminated. All measures will be taken to protect the seized property against damage, loss, theft, etc. All efforts will be made to locate the rightful owner of recovered property. Property for which the rightful owner cannot be located will be disposed of as follows:

15.13.1. Mil stores will be handed over to the appropriate authorities.

15.13.2. Non-mil stores will be referred to the CAO for a decision as to disposal.

15.13.3. Personal property, e.g. contraband, will be referred to LA for advice or disposal.

15.14. General Prohibition for MP Pers. Members of MP shall not:

15.14.1. Investigate matters of a purely admin nature except with the authority of the CAO.

15.14.2. Become involved in financial disputes other than those found necessary to keep the peace.

15.14.3. Be employed as perimeter guards, permanent pers access control supervisors, on sentries except as ordered by Force Commander.

15.14.4. Serve as members of boards of inquiry, summary investigations, or any form of court martial.

15.14.5. Assist in the execution of any form of punishment or sentence imposed on an individual or group.

15.14.6. Serve on duty roster other than those internal to FPM.

15.15. Contingent MP. When appointed within the support units contingent MPs perform duties within their contingents and are responsible to contingent comd for police duties within their national law, order, discipline and investigation or minor incidents:

15.15.1. Members of the mission shall be subject to the exclusive criminal codes and jurisdiction of their respective national States. However, the UN has a duty to see that justice is done. Therefore, the results of disciplinary action taken by contingent or national authorities of members of the force should be notified to HQ UNAMIR.

15.15.2. Will act without delay in accidents and other incidents requiring investigation when UNAMIR MP is not available, or preserving evidence for the UNAMIR MP when they arrive.

15.15.3. Will assist in questioning persons in their mother tongue, it being the right of members of the mission to be questioned and to give statement in their mother tongue.

15.15.4. Will arrange for any med tests by contingent or national authorities on alcohol or drugs when necessary.

15.15.5. Will assist UNAMIR authorities in maintaining security of documents, pers and goods by providing escorts, advice on practical measures and surveys of security problems when requested.

15.16. Relations with Host Country Authorities.

15.16.1. The MP will liaise with local police and other local authorities but any extensive questions and any written contract or exchange of documents will be done through the LA with his authorization.

15.16.2. Local police may conduct investigations, e.g. into veh accidents. The MP should not interfere in their procedures. UNAMIR pers should cooperate with local police, producing their ID cards, ensuring the ID card is not

left with the police, and giving their name, rank, unit and unit location. However, they should only make and sign statements to the MP, unless and until authorized to give statement to the local police.

15.16.3. UN vehs should only be searched by UN pers. However, if local authorities insist on searching, the UN pers should submit under protest and report to the MP.

15.16.4. A member of UNAMIR should only be taken into custody or arrested by local authorities when committing a serious crime and when the MP is not able to effect the arrest. He should be transferred immediately to UNAMIR MP.

15.17. Cooperation with Other Missions. The MP may take action in incidents when a member of some other UN peace-keeping operation is involved within their territory. Any other action will be taken by request of the authorities of the other missions and in close cooperation with them.

15.18. Reports.

15.18.1. Initial reports should be made in writing or verbally as soon as possible to COS/CMPO/CAO After duty hours the Ops duty officer will decide who should be informed, if the case is urgent.

15.18.2. Complete reports are to follow in writing as soon as possible.

15.18.3. MP reports are confidential docus and all necessary precautions will be taken to ensure their security. No MP reports or UN docus may be delivered to anyone outside UNAMIR.

15.18.4. Unless otherwise directed by the Force Commander, distribution will be in the format of a circular with a comment sheet on top, to FC/COS/LA/CAO/CMPO/CLAIMS. CAO and CMPO will send copies to section/unit heads concerned as required.

15.18.5. The following reports may be prepared as appropriated by the MP:

(1) Occurrence Report. An occurrence report is to record, in outline form, the facts established in the investigation of any minor incident.

(2) Offence Report. An offence report has eye-witness evidence of a witness who has observed or discovered the commission of a minor offence by UNAMIR pers.

(3) Investigation Report. An investigation Report records the result of an investigation.

(4) Med Reports and Death Certificates. UNAMIR MOs must provide MP with med reports and death certificates when they are required to document an inquiry.

SLOGO

SL040

OPS D -

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS **Date** : 21 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ **Ref** : Plans 50/94

SUBJECT : **WEEKLY SRSG RETURN ON ACTIVITIES IN SECTORS**

1. MILOBs in all Sectors are now required to work on statistics and produce the exact picture of their daily activities.

2. This document serve as a guideline for the return to be submitted weekly on Tuesdays for further transmission to the SRSG's office. Sector Comds are required to make this return a priority.

3. The return shall be outlined as follows:

a. Issues Related to Refugees and Original Inhabitants. Under this paragraph the report shall cover:

(1) The percentage of the original inhabitants who have come back into your sector.

(2) The number of the new comers who have settled in your sector.

(3) Whether there are any indications that property is being invaded. You are to produce statistics.

(4) Whether agricultural activities have resumed and outline the harvest and the new planting by percentage.

(5) The percentage of children attending school and their attendance and non attendance bracket. Outline the number of schools in your sector. Indicate whether Government or private and level of education offered.

UN RESTRICTED

(6) The means of transport the public, refugees, merchants and others are using.

(7) Which other crossing points other than Government controlled entry/exit points are being used. Distinguish who uses such crossing points, rate of crossing and strength. Consider also the time the crossing points are being used, that is whether day or night.

b. Government Activities. Government activities have direct impact on reassuring the people and assist on confidence building among them. This paragraph shall cover:

(1) The treatment of returnees by the RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA).

(2) Those who influence people in the sector whether they are individuals or groups whether it is the radio or word of mouth/direct conduct being used.

(3) What is the flow of rumours from camps in ZAIRE like? What is and who is the source for such rumours?

(4) Whether you are meeting the local authorities, teachers, priests, doctors, NGOs and commune leaders. How many times per week.

(5) The type of resources the local authorities have to assist on their daily functions. Highlight on vehicles, office equipment, employees and finance. Verify whether employees are being paid.

(6) Outline whether the situation is deteriorating or improving. Consider criminal or sabotage incidents, human rights violations, hospital occupancy, in addition report on market activity by assessing the flow of new commodities, availability of the local authorities and informal activities within the sector ie: the frequenting of restaurants, bars and shops.

(7) The public services provided by the Government. This can be first aid , nutrition, vaccination, road construction, water and sanitation etc. You are to include the number of health centres and highlight those that are functioning or not functioning.

(8) Whether there are prisons and how many they are. Establish also whether

there are clandestine prisons and their locations. If there is not any form of prisons outline where detainees are being held.

(9) The cooperation that exists between MILOBs and customs authorities. Also cooperation with other authorities you interact with.

c. Non Governmental Organizations(NGOs) and UN Agencies.

(1) Whether NGOs are assisting the Government or working counter purpose.

(2) Whether their activities are intrusive or cooperative.

(3) The level of cooperation between MILOBs and NGOs.

4. After compiling all this information you are required to state your source of information. As a guide, make maximum use of the authorities, NGOs, the public and please state whether you can verify your information.

5. This report is very important, we are all to strive hard to ensure it is compiled weekly and submitted to this HQ every Tuesday starting from the 06 Dec 94.

6. All are to action without fail.

M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

Info:
FHQ (OPS)
FHQ (Plans)
CMO
DCMO
SOO
SMPO
SLOGO

MILOBS GP HQ LOG BRANCH		
APPT	SIG	DATE
SLO GO		25/11/94
S.O SUP		
S.O TPT		28/11/94

DCMO 18/11
Action
SMPO 19/11

To: Distribution List

From: Force Commander

Date: November 1994

Subject: Contingency Plans

1. Enclosed are the HQ UNAMIR contingency plans for:

a. Security Alert - Op Plan NIKE;

b. Reinforcement - Op Plan HECTOR; and

c. Withdrawal and Evacuation - Op Plan JASON.

2. Addressees are to develop outline operation/support plans for submission to G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR, by 5 Dec 94 as follows:

a. Military, CIVPOL and MILOBS:

(1) Sector 1 - CO NICOY;

(2) Sector 2 - CO GHANBATT;

(3) Sector 3 - OCs MALAWI and MALICOY to submit plans through Sector Comd;

(4) Sector 4A - CO ZAMBATT;

(5) Sector 4B - CO FRAFBATT;

(6) Sector 4C - CO ETHIOBATT;

(7) Sector 5 - CO TUNBATT;

(8) Sector 6 - COs INDBATT, CANCON and AUSMED.

b. Staff:

(1) Personnel/Logistics Support - DCOS SP

c. Civilian:

(1) UNAMIR civilian staff;)

(2) FSA personnel;) - Special Task Officer to CAO (Mr Lombardo) to coordinate

(3) Brown and Root personnel.)

d. UN Agencies - HAC to coordinate with respective Security Officers.

e. NGOs - Sector Commanders (HAC to assist).

3. POC for enquiries is G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR.

Distribution List

CO NICOY	Copy No 1
CO GHANBATT	2
Comd Sector 3	3
OC MALAWICOY	4
OC MALICOY	5
CO ZAMBATT	6
CO FRAFBATT	7
CO ETHIOBATT	8
CO TUNBATT	9
CO INDBATT	10
CO AUSMED	11
CO CANCON	12
UNAMIR Civilian Security Officer	13
Special Task Officer to CAO	14
Security Officer UNREO	15
HAC	16
A/C Mil Obs Force	17
C UNCIVPOL	18
Brown & Root	19
FSA	20

Internal

DCOSOPS	21
DCOS SP	22
G3 OPS	23
G3 PLANS	24
FSO	25
Camp Commandant	26

For Information

SRSG	27
MA/FC	28
MA/DFC/COS	29
CSS	30

Copy 17A

5000.46 (Plans)

PART I

UNAMIR SECURITY ALERT CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN NIKE

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Security Alert Measures (SAMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan NIKE. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE are:

a. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs could be activated concurrently with Op Plan HECTOR.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III. Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be invoked if Op Plan JASON is activated.

2. Op Plan NIKE provides for the increase of UNAMIR security in the event of a deteriorating situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement (ROE) levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE.

THREAT

4. It is assessed that RGF has a developing capability to establish an insurgency threat against the BBGNU. The scale of this potential will increase with time. Current assessment is that the threat is likely to be manifest as follows:

a. Initially in Sector 4/5.

b. Concurrently in more than one border area.

c. In Kigali.

d. In the interior but not until the re-establishment of the population base in rural areas.

5. The threat to UNAMIR is likely to be:

a. A collateral threat caused by attacks on the BBGNU and RPA. Soft targets would be particularly vulnerable under these conditions.

b. Direct attack on UNAMIR in order to achieve political ends.

PROTECTION

6. In either case, the protection of UNAMIR personnel must be paramount. Under the current mandate UNAMIR also has a duty to protect the following:

a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.

b. NGO Personnel.

c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.

d. Any other person under UN protection.

7. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan NIKE gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

SECURITY ALERT MEASURES

8. Command. The responsibility for adherence to Security Alert Measures (SAMs) devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of HQ UNAMIR.

9. SAMs. UNAMIR SAMs under Op Plan NIKE will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each SAM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

a. **GREEN**. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See **Annex A**.

b. **YELLOW** Medium level threat. Increased security activities. - See **Annex B**. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:

(1). **ALFA**. Withdrawal to platoon positions.

(2). **BRAVO**. Withdrawal to company localities.

(3). **CHARLIE**. Withdrawal to battalion defended areas.

c. **RED**. High Level threat. Maximum security activity. Civil evacuation if required. UNAMIR evacuation plans in readiness for immediate execution. See **Annex C**.

10. Activation. The activation of Op Plan NIKE will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

a. The codeword - Op Plan NIKE.

b. The unit/Sector to which the SAM applies.

c. The SAM to be adopted.

d. The time by which the SAM is to be activated.

e. The ROE readiness/alert status

f. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan NIKE activation.

g. Confirmation details.

11. Example. An example Op Plan NIKE activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

4C THIS IS ZERO.
A. OP PLAN NIKE.
B. ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C.
C. YELLOW ALFA.
D. BY 241200B OCT 94.
E. ROE YELLOW
F. SIGHTINGS OF ARMED INSURGENTS IN GISAKURA AREA.
G. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.

12. Reaction. On receipt of the Op Plan NIKE SAM message, the receiving unit is to:

a. Follow the action outlined in the relevant Annex to this Instruction.

b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units.

c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next SAM level.

13. Delegation. The authority to raise a SAM level is delegated to Sector Commanders, if they consider that this is warranted by the threat. They do not have the authority to lower a SAM level. In the event that a Sector Commander judges that a SAM level is to be raised, he must:

a. Inform HQ UNAMIR by the fastest possible means, giving reasons for the increase in level.

b. Liaise with neighbouring Sector Commanders.

c. Provide regular advice to HQ UNAMIR on his perception of the threat.

14. Reporting. Under NIKE YELLOW and RED, units and sub-units are to make reports as follows:

a. Any unusual activity related to the threat to be reported immediately.

b. Specific reference to Op Plan NIKE activity is to be made as part of the SITREPs at 0600 and 1800 hrs.

c. A weekly summary of Op Plan NIKE activities.

15. Status of MILOBs. MILOBs have special status under the UN Convention, wherein they are defined as "experts". Because they are unarmed, early consideration for their security should be given by Sector Commanders. MILOBs are to be controlled as described in Annexes A-C.

16. Status of UNCIVPOL. UNCIVPOL authority can offer some advantages over military authority, in certain circumstances. Sector Commanders are to consider requesting UNCIVPOL support to enhance their security arrangements, particularly for the following:

a. Crowd control.

b. Personal search.

c. Law and order enforcement.

d. Guarding of Key Points.

e. Liaison with Gendarmerie.

FURTHER ACTION

17. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector commanders are to develop formal RRF contingency plans, which match Op Plan NIKE escalation as follows:

a. NIKE GREEN. One section per company at 30 mins NTM.

b. NIKE YELLOW. One section per company at 10 mins NTM.

c. NIKE RED. One platoon per company at 10 mins NTM.

18. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan NIKE are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan NIKE sub-plans to HQ UNAMIR **by 5 Dec 94**.

19. Protected Personnel. Sector Commanders are to submit initial estimates of the numbers and deployment of Protected Personnel to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

20. Warning and Reporting Procedures. G3 Ops is to develop Op Plan NIKE Warning and Reporting Procedures by 5 Dec 94.

21. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan NIKE measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.

22. Administration and Logistics. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan NIKE by 5 Dec 94.

23. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan NIKE, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

PART I ANNEXES

A. Op Plan NIKE GREEN - Normal Activities.
B. Op Plan NIKE YELLOW - Medium Level Threat.
C. Op Plan NIKE RED - High Level Threat.

MILOBS GP HQ LOG BRANCH		
APPT	SIG	DATE
SLO GNO	R/	24/11/94
S.O. SUP		
S.O. TPT		

ANNEX A TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.

2. Reconnaissance. Carry out reconnaissance of the following:

   a. All locations identified for use under NIKE YELLOW and RED.

   b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.

3. Protected Personnel. Establish the identity, numbers and locations of Protected Personnel within AOR, and brief them on the procedure to be followed under NIKE YELLOW and RED. This must be done discreetly in a manner which avoids alarmism.

4. MILOBs. Ensure that all MILOB personnel within the Sector are briefed on Op Plan NIKE contingencies.

5. UNCIVPOL. Consider how UNCIVPOL deployment could be utilised to enhance military security arrangements.

ANNEX B TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.

2. Normal Operations. Units and sub-units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.

3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:

a. All locations identified for use under NIKE RED.

b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.

4. Protected Personnel.

(1). Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR.

(2). Maintain a register of these details.

(3) Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.

(4). Develop plans to marshall those personnel into UNAMIR Safe Areas.

(5). Inform those personnel of the action to be taken to withdraw them to UN Safe Areas.

5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. Under Op Plan NIKE, withdrawal to Safe Areas will be ordered as required. Safe Areas are designed to provide increased protection of Protected Personnel, not to defend an area from direct attack, although they must be capable of doing so. The occupation of Safe Areas will be ordered as follows:

a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Section outposts to withdraw to platoon positions. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of section level.

b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO. Platoons to withdraw to company localities. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level.

c. NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE. Companies to withdraw to battalion defended areas. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.

6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During execution of NIKE YELLOW or RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. UNAMIR personnel are not in a position to enforce withdrawal. Advice which can be given as a professional recommendation only. Withdrawal of these personnel should occur under the following conditions:

a. At the request of the personnel concerned.

b. On the advice of the Sector Commander.

c. On orders from HQ UNAMIR.

7. Reception. Platoon, company and battalion locations must have provision for the inclusion of Protected Personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

8. Fixed Installations. Sector Commanders are to increase the security of fixed installations, which include communications repeater sites, under NIKE YELLOW. In practice, it may practical to co-locate platoon, company and battalion positions with fixed installation. In other cases, this may not be possible and the following minimum security is to be provided:

a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Minimum of one section to augment security at fixed installations.

b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO AND CHARLIE. Minimum of one platoon to augment security at fixed installations.

9. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE YELLOW, provided that the following criteria are fulfilled:

a. They are not sent to the site of a known or suspected threat.

b. They travel as a minimum party of six in two vehicles.

c. They have guaranteed communications.

10. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:

a. Minimum convoy is four vehicles.

b. Minimum protection is one section per convoy or packet.

c. Movement off MSRs is minimized.

d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.

e. Movement at night is minimized.

11. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:

a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.

b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to stockpiled at unit level.

c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plans HECTOR and JASON.

d. Leave. Leave is restricted to compassionate cases only.

e. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE YELLOW or RED.

ANNEX C TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.

2. Operations. Where possible, units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.

3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:

a. All locations identified for use under Op Plans HECTOR AND JASON.

b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.

4. Protected Personnel.

a. Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR, if this has not been done under NIKE YELLOW.

b. Maintain a register of these details.

c. Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.

d. Advise those personnel of the need to move into Safe Areas immediately.

e. If ordered by HQ UNAMIR, plan to escort those personnel to Kigali or a neighbouring country.

5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. If withdrawal to battalion defended Safe Areas has not been ordered under NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE, an increase in SAM to RED automatically orders this withdrawal. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.

6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During NIKE RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. Sector Commanders are to give those personnel strong advice to withdraw to Safe Areas immediately.

7. Reception. Safe Areas must have provision for the inclusion of the UN and NGO personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

8. Further Withdrawal. UN and NGO personnel may be further withdrawn, on a voluntary basis, as ordered by HQ UNAMIR. They may be escorted to Kigali or a neighbouring country.

9. Fixed Installations. Under NIKE RED, the minimum force required to augment security at fixed installations is one platoon. Sector Commanders are to recommend whether or not fixed installations should continue to operate in this security environment.

10. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel in Safe Areas are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may not be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE RED, without the specific authority of the Force Commander.

11. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:

a. Minimum convoy is eight vehicles.

b. Minimum protection is two sections per convoy or packet.

c. No movement off MSRs.

d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.

e. No movement at night.

12. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:

a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.

b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to be stockpiled at unit level.

c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plan HECTOR and JASON.

d. Leave. No leave is to be granted.

e. Dress. All personnel are to wear ballistic protective equipment and headgear where issued.

f. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE RED.

Copy 17B

5000. 46 (Plans)

PART II

UNAMIR REINFORCEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN HECTOR

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Reinforcement Measures (RMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan HECTOR. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR are:

a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be linked to Op Plan HECTOR RMs.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III.

2. Op Plan HECTOR provides for the reinforcement of UNAMIR units and locations in the event of a deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the ROE levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR.

4. Scenario. It is not possible to anticipate specific scenarios. Op Plan HECTOR seeks to generate additional formed bodies of troops to enhance the security cover provided in certain Sectors. It is expected that such reinforcement would be in a scenario in which an additional presence would improve the security situation, or provide better protection for UNAMIR personnel or those who UNAMIR has a duty to protect. In other scenarios, reinforcement would not be the appropriate response.

REINFORCEMENT MEASURES

5. Command Responsibility. The responsibility for implementation of RMs devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of Main HQ. The two key players are:

a. Reinforcing Sector Commander (RSC). The Sector Commander from whose Sector formed bodies of troops will be deployed to reinforce another Sector.

b. Gaining Sector Commander (GSC). The Sector Commander receiving reinforcing formed bodies of troops.

6. Command Relationship. The delegation of command to the GSC will be coordinated by HQ UNAMIR. In principle, the GSC will assume TACON of reinforcing troops, subject to national command restrictions.

7. Requirement for Reinforcement. HQ UNAMIR will determine whether a Sector is to be reinforced on the basis of the following:

a. At the request of the GSC.

b. On evidence of a deteriorating security situation in the Sector(s) concerned.

c. To preempt a threat which is expected to materialize.

d. In response to a changing political situation.

8. Level of Reinforcement. Under Op Plan HECTOR, reinforcement up to multiple company level, by **formed platoons and companies**, can be ordered as required. Reinforcement by a complete battalion is unlikely, but can be ordered by HQ UNAMIR if required. Reinforcement of Kigali at battalion level is to be coordinated under the Force Evacuation Plan, Op Plan JASON.

9. RMs. UNAMIR RMs under Op Plan HECTOR will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each RM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

a. **GREEN**. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See **Annex A**.

b. **YELLOW**. Medium level threat. - See **Annex B**. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:

(1). **ALFA**. Reconnaissance. Main Body at 24 hrs NTM.

(2). **BRAVO**. Deployment of Advance Party. Main Body at 12 hrs NTM.

(3). **CHARLIE**. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.

c. **RED**. High Level threat. Deployment of Main Body. See **Annex C**.

10. Activation. The activation of a RM will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

a. The codeword - Op Plan HECTOR

b. The Reinforcing Sector(s).

c. The Gaining Sector(s).

d. The level of reinforcement.

e. The RM to be adopted.

f. RV location for YELLOW ALFA.

g. The time at which the NTM is to be achieved.

h. The ROE readiness/alert status.

i. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan HECTOR activation.

j. Confirmation details.

11. Example. An example Op Plan HECTOR activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

1,2 AND 5 THIS IS ZERO.
A. OP PLAN HECTOR.
B. SECTORS 1 AND 2 TO REINFORCE SECTOR 5.
C. SECTOR 1 TWO PLATOONS.
D. SECTOR 2 ONE COMPANY.
E. YELLOW ALFA.
F. RV SECTOR 5 HQ AT 240800B OCT 94.
G. RM TO BE ACHIEVED BY 241200B OCT 94.
H. ROE GREEN
I. AUGMENT SECURITY IN RUHRENGERI AND NDIZA AREAS.
J. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.

12. Reaction. On receipt of an Op Plan HECTOR message, addressees are to:

a. Carry out the action described in the relevant Annex.

b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units when RMs are in place.

c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next RM level.

13. Safe Area Contingency Positions. Sector Commanders are to carry out reconnaissance of contingency positions for deployment of reinforcing units. In principle, it is to be expected that reinforcing units would be withdrawn under NIKE RED. If the tactical situation prevents this, they will need to remain in the Gaining Sector. As a precaution, contingency reconnaissance should be carried out as follows:

a. Within each company Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one platoon position.

b. Within each battalion Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one company position.

14. Summary of NTM Timings. Op Plan HECTOR.

RM	RECCE PARTY	ADVANCE PARTY	MAIN BODY
GREEN	6 hrs	12 hrs	48 hrs
YELLOW ALFA	Move	6 hrs	24 hrs
YELLOW BRAVO	-	Move	12 hrs
YELLOW CHARLIE	-	-	6 hrs
RED	-	-	Move

15. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector Commanders are to maintain RRF readiness as described under Op Plan NIKE.

FURTHER ACTION

16. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan HECTOR are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan HECTOR plans to HQ UNAMIR **by 5 Dec 94**.

17. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan HECTOR measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.

18. Communications. FSO is to highlight communications issues concerned with Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94. Consideration should be given to:

a. CNR compatibility.

b. Frequency harmonisation.

c. CEOI planning.

19. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94.

20. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan HECTOR, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

Part II Annexes:

A. Op Plan HECTOR GREEN - Normal Activities
B. Op Plan HECTOR YELLOW - Medium Level Threat
C. Op Plan HECTOR RED - High Level Threat

ANNEX A TO
TO PART II TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.

2. Reconnaissance. Identify:

a. Possible locations for use under HECTOR YELLOW and RED, at platoon and company level.

b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.

3. Administration of Reinforcing Troops. Make contingency plans to administer one three platoon company consisting of the following:

a. 120 personnel.

(1). Recce Party - 5.

(2). Advance Party - 10.

(3). Main Body - 105.

b. 10 vehicles.

4. Preparation of Own Troops. Prepare to deploy formed bodies of troops to another sector. Battalion Sectors should initially plan on preparing one company; Company Sectors should initially plan on preparing one platoon, as follows:

a. Notice to Move(NTM).

(1). Recce Party at 6 hrs NTM.

(2). Advance Party at 12 hrs NTM.

(3). Main Body at 48 hrs NTM.

b. Equipment. Fully equipped and scaled for 7 days operations.

c. Combat Supplies. Self contained for 3 days.

ANNEX B TO
PART II TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.

2. Reconnaissance. If reinforcement is being planned, carry out detailed reconnaissance of locations earmarked for reinforcement under HECTOR RED, including routes.

3. Preparation for Reinforcement. If ordered to prepare to reinforce another Sector, reduce NTM to:

a. HECTOR YELLOW ALFA.

(1). Recce Party - Move immediately.

(2). Advance Party - 6 hrs.

(3). Main Body - 24 hrs.

b. HECTOR YELLOW BRAVO.

(1). Advance Party - Move immediately.

(2). Main Body - 12 hrs.

c. HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE. . Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.

4. Reception Arrangements. If reinforcement of the Sector is planned:

a. Issue verbal orders on arrival of the Recce Party.

b. Appoint an LO to coordinate reception arrangements.

c. Provide guides, movement control and signing as required.

d. Coordinate C2 including communications electronic instructions.

e. Prepare accommodation, if available, taking into account the tactical situation.

f. Coordinate administrative support.

ANNEX C TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
PART II TO
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.

2. Deployment on Reinforcement. If ordered to reinforce another Sector, deploy the Main Body immediately.

3. Reception Arrangements. If receiving reinforcements:

a. Issue confirmatory orders.

b. Coordinate C2 arrangements.

c. Arrange administrative support as required.

Copy 17C

5000. 46 (Plans)

PART III

UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN JASON

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan (WECP) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan JASON. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan JASON are:

a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. Raising of Op Plan NIKE SAMs will inevitably precede implementation of Op Plan JASON.

b. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II.

2. Op Plan JASON provides for the withdrawal and evacuation of UNAMIR and associated personnel in the event of a seriously deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied on a national basis.

PROTECTION

3. Under the current mandate, UNAMIR has a duty to protect the following:

a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.

b. NGO Personnel.

c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.

d. Any other person under UN protection.

4. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan JASON gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

PRINCIPLES OF EVACUATION

5. An Evacuation will be the Last Resort. Before it is ordered, UNAMIR will seek to continue the mission, whilst retaining security by:

a. Increasing Security Alert Measures (SAMs). Op Plan NIKE.

b. Reinforcing threatened Sector(s). Op Plan HECTOR.

c. Withdrawing to Kigali, from where evacuated Sectors can be re-occupied, if there is a decrease in the threat.

d. Evacuating Kigali at the end of the withdrawal process.

6. UNAMIR will Present Strong and Coherent Resolve. An evacuation will only be ordered where there is no alternative. Even when non-essential personnel have been withdrawn or evacuated, a high security core of troops will provide a presence until evacuated.

7. Protected Civilians will be Evacuated First. They will be offered early withdrawal to Safe Areas, escorted to Kigali and advised to leave when the security situation makes their presence no longer tenable.

8. Equipment will not be Abandoned. Where possible, only equipment of low value will be left in Rwanda.

9. Kigali International Airport will be the Primary Means of Evacuation.

10. Final Evacuation Phase will be Conducted by Road.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11. A possible sequence of events for the implementation of Op Plan JASON is given below:

SER	EVENT	RESPONSE
1	Insurgent threat increases in Sector(s).	Security Alert Measures increased under Op Plan NIKE.
2	Greater presence required to ensure security in Sector(s).	Op Plan HECTOR invoked to threatened Sector(s).
3	Situation worsens in threatened Sector(s).	Protected Personnel withdrawn to Kigali.
4	Increase in threat in other Sectors.	Non-essential personnel withdrawn to Kigali. Op Plan HECTOR invoked if troops available.

5	Threat increases in all Sectors.	Op Plan HECTOR concentrated on Kigali Sector.
6	Kigali comes under direct threat.	**Op Plan JASON activated.** Protected Personnel advised to leave.
7	Insurgency in Kigali worsens.	Non-essential personnel evacuated.
8	Situation deteriorates.	Destruction plans prepared Some operational personnel evacuated.
9	Government loses control.	Bulk of operational personnel evacuated by air/road. Destruction plans invoked.
10	Order to evacuate given.	Remainder of available personnel leave by air. Security Force leaves by road.

12. Alternative Scenarios. A number of other scenarios could invoke Op Plan JASON. In the main, however, a progressive deterioration, leading to a total collapse of security would be required before the full plan would be implemented.

13. Degree of Evacuation. Op Plan JASON may be only partially executed. A stabilisation of the security situation would limit the degree of evacuation. Similarly, the process of evacuation could be reversed if the situation were to improve.

STAGES OF EVACUATION

14. JASON GREEN. During JASON GREEN, normal operations will continue. Preparation for further stages will be carried out. Major changes to the security,environment will include:

a. Op Plan NIKE SAMs may be raised.

b. Op Plan HECTOR RMs may be activated to increase presence in threatened Sector(s).

c. For full details, see **Annex A**.

15. JASON **YELLOW**. Under JASON **YELLOW**, the WECP will be stage, as described in **Annex B**, as follows:

a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Orders for withdrawal to Kigali.

b. JASON YELLOW **BRAVO**. Protected and Non-Essential personnel evacuated.

c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Bulk of personnel evacuated by air/road.

16. JASON RED. Kigali/Rwanda evacuated by air. Security Force leaves by road. See Annex C.

RESPONSIBILITIES

17. Overall Responsibility for WECP. Chief Security and Area Security Coordinator for Rwanda is responsible for the coordination of the UNAMIR WECP.

18. Military Aspects of WECP. G3 Plans is responsible for the planning of military aspects of Op Plan JASON within HQ UNAMIR. Within UNAMIR, military responsibility for the WECP devolves to:

a. Sector Commanders to coordinate withdrawal of their Sectors to Kigali.

b. Sector Commander Sector 6 (Kigali) for the reception of units withdrawn to Kigali prior to evacuation.

c. G3 Ops for the coordination of deployment of units.

c. DFC/COS for the coordination of evacuation of Kigali, devolved as follows:

(1). Security and Protection - DCOS Ops.

(2). Transport, Movement, Sustainment and Destruction - DCOS Sp.

d. Contingent/unit/sub-unit Commanders for the coordination of contingent plans to conform with UNAMIR plans and national requirements.

19. Protected Personnel. Those organisations representing personnel protected by UNAMIR are responsible for briefing their personnel on the HQ UNAMIR WECP and for ensuring that their own instructions conform to the overall plan. These include:

a. UN agencies.

b. UN Aid agencies.

c. NGOs.

d. Contractors.

20. Destruction Plans. UNAMIR equipment will not be permitted to fall into the hands of an aggressor, unless there is no way to prevent this. **Sector Commanders and HQ Staff branches are to prepare lists of equipment which meet the criteria below.** In principle, all usable UNAMIR stores and equipment will be evacuated. The following categories of stores and equipment are to be used:

a. Essential. Those stores and equipment without which the Force cannot evacuate in good order. This category includes all weapons, vehicles, fighting equipment scales and combat supplies for 7 days. It may also include critical information which will enable the Force to resume operations in Rwanda with minimum loss of efficiency.

b. Important. Those stores and equipment which are high value, and whose loss would involve difficulty in fulfilling the mission, or considerable expense to the UN. These include alternative communications equipment, computers, medical stores, support equipment scales and remaining combat supplies.

c. Non-Essential. Those stores and equipment which are difficult to evacuate and whose loss does not incur considerable expense to the UN. These include defence stores, office and accommodation stores, and land line already in place.

FURTHER ACTION

21. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). G3 Ops is to develop a RRF plan for Op Plan HECTOR, taking into account RRF procedures adopted under Op Plan NIKE and the RRF to be provided by Comd Sector 6 during JASON YELLOW. See Annex B para 5.

22. Reception Plan. Commander Sector 6 is to develop a reception plan, in line with deployment under JASON YELLOW, as detailed by G3 Plans.

23. Protected Personnel. Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are to develop their own evacuation plans, using Op Plan JASON as the template. These should be submitted ASP. UNREO is to ensure that the Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are briefed on the security requirements of UNAMIR and that they submit, **by 5 Dec 94**:

a. Lists of all personnel in country.

b. Lists of vehicles, with stores and passenger capacity.

c. Location of assets.

d. Priority for evacuation.

e. Any call on evacuation resources which might be of use to UNAMIR.

24. Military Evacuation. Sector Commanders, Contingent Commanders and HQ UNAMIR staff branches are to submit outline lists of personnel and equipment to be evacuated by 5 Dec 94, to include:

a. Non-Essential Personnel.

b. Essential and Important Stores by tonnage and category.

c. Integral lift capability for personnel and stores.

25. Communications. FSO is to develop an outline Force Communications Plan to support Op Plan JASON by 5 Dec 94.

26. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan JASON when initial civilian and military evacuation lists have been submitted.

27. Review. G3 plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan JASON, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

ANNEX A TO
PART III TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN JASON GREEN

GENERAL

1. When JASON **GREEN** is in force, normal operations may continue, where the threat permits. This state is the opportunity for all preparatory action to be carried out, in the event that a higher Op Plan JASON state is ordered. Time utilised efficiently in planning Op Plan JASON activation during this period will pay dividends.

2. Op Plan NIKE. Op Plan NIKE may operate independently of Op Plan JASON. It provides for the raising of Security Alert Measures (SAMs), on a Sector or national basis as required. It is unlikely that Op Plan JASON would be activated unless the security situation had already warranted a SAM increase to NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE or NIKE RED. The withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas can be expected before Op Plan JASON states are increased. Their evacuation from threatened Sector(s) under Op Plan JASON would follow naturally from this situation.

3. Op Plan HECTOR. Op Plan HECTOR may also operate independently of Op Plan JASON. As the UN intends to present a robust resolve in the face of an increased threat, it is likely that Op Plan HECTOR escalation to HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE or HECTOR RED would be invoked before Op Plan JASON activation. The reinforcement of Kigali is a process which follows naturally from the reinforcement of other threatened Sector(s).

OUTLYING SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Preparation. Sector Commanders of outlying Sectors (ie not Kigali, Sector 6), have specific command responsibilities under Op Plan JASON. These include:

a. Preparation of Sector units and sub-units for Op Plan JASON activation.

b. Briefing of all personnel.

c. Contingency planning.

d. Subsidiary Plans:

(1). Communications Plan.

(2). Logistic Plan.

(3). Movement Plan.

(4). Destruction Plan.

5. Military Information. Sector Commanders are responsible for the provision of up to date military information, where the tactical situation allows the deployment of troops, specifically in the following key areas:

a. Insurgent activity.

b. Developing threat.

c. Route information, between locations and to/from Kigali.

6. Protected Personnel. UN, NGO and other Protected Personnel are to be considered when planning Op Plan JASON contingencies. Sector Commanders **are to plan** to:

a. Ensure that OP Plan NIKE SAMs are promulgated to all Protected Personnel and that they are:

(1). Listed and registered.

(2). Briefed on the developing threat situation.

(3). Encouraged to withdraw to Safe Areas, as the threat evolves.

(4). Administered within Safe Areas if necessary.

b. Provide up to date information to Main HQ on Protected Personnel, if deployed to Safe Areas, to include:

(1). Names & Parent Organisation.

(2). Locations.

(3). Medical Condition.

(4). Available transport.

(5). Stores and Equipment.

(6). Capability for self-sufficiency.

(7). Intentions.

c. Brief Protected Personnel on the means by which their parent organisation is planning to evacuate them. If Motorola communications are intact, this may not be required.

d. Escort Protected Personnel to Kigali for further evacuation to another country, if ordered to do so.

KIGALI SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Sector Command. Sector Commander Sector 6 Kigali, has specific responsibilities for the development of OP Plan JASON plans. He is responsible for coordinating the reception as ordered by HQ UNAMIR, within Sector 6 of the following:

a. Those units, sub-units and contingents currently deployed in Sector 6.

b. Those units and sub-units redeployed to reinforce Sector 6 under Op Plan HECTOR.

c. Those units and sub-units redeployed to Sector 6 under Op Plan JASON.

d. Protected Personnel occupying Safe Areas under Op Plan NIKE.

e. Protected Personnel still occupying work locations in Kigali City.

8. Kigali International Airport (KIA). KIA is central to the UNAMIR WECP. The retention of security in the area of KIA is critical to the continued maintenance of the Force and of the evacuation of UNAMIR personnel, equipment and stores. G3 Plans is to plan to deploy elements of the Force under Op Plan JASON, to guard KIA as follows:

a. Airport buildings including Control Tower.

b. Marshalling apron work areas.

c. Perimeter.

d. Flight paths which could be threatened by low-level air defence systems.

9. Key Points (KPs). The protection of KPs will be essential to the implementation of Op Plan JASON. A full list of KPs, to be guarded by elements of the Force is to be evolved by G3 Plans, in discussion with other UN and NGO representatives. The number of KPs will be the minimum consistent with the threat and the maintenance of the Force. It is likely to include:

a. Amahoro Hotel.

b. Amahoro Stadium Complex including 500 Man Camp.

c. Third Line Supply Compound.

d. Wksps.

e. Kigali City Hospital (AUSMED).

e. UNDP Building.

10. Contingency Planning. G3 Plans is to plan the deployment of all Force units within Sector 6 under JASON YELLOW ALFA. These plans are to include:

a. Deployment areas for all units and sub-units, recced to platoon level.

b. Requirement for defence stores.

c. Development of RRF plans.

d. Accommodation requirements.

e. Administrative arrangements including the delivery of water.

11. Communications. FSO is to develop a communications plan for the use of Sector 6 units deployed under JASON YELLOW and RED.

LOGISTIC PLANNING

12. General. Preliminary logistic planning by DCOS Sp for the activation of Op Plan JASON YELLOW and RED should commence immediately. Information is required to predict the sustainment requirements for the Force deployed into Sector 6. Consideration should be given to providing raw data from which operational options can be developed. Some issues are:

a. The number of personnel to be evacuated during JASON YELLOW and RED.

b. The means by which evacuation can be achieved.

c. The impact on Op Plan JASON caused by a closure of KIA.

d. Practical guidance for comparison of Force sustainment/structure requirements, when the Force is deployed to Kigali.

e. Minimum stocks required based on 14 days without resupply.

f. Accommodation options.

ANNEX B TO
PART III TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN JASON YELLOW

GENERAL

1. JASON **YELLOW** is the trigger for the UNAMIR WECP to commence. It stages the withdrawal and evacuation process between JASON GREEN, the planning phase, and JASON RED, the final evacuation of Kigali and Rwanda.

2. JASON **YELLOW** is staged as follows:

a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Outlying Sectors withdrawn to Kigali.

b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Evacuation of Protected and non-essential personnel.

c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Evacuation of bulk of UNAMIR personnel.

JASON YELLOW ALFA - WITHDRAWAL PHASE

3. Outlying Sector Command Responsibilities. On the receipt of a JASON YELLOW ALFA message, outlying Sector Commanders are to:

a. Marshall units and sub-units in Safe Areas.

b. Marshall Protected Personnel into Safe Areas.

c. Prepare orders for a road move to Kigali, utilising routes recced under JASON GREEN.

d. Be prepared to receive detailed reception coordinating instructions from HQ UNAMIR, including timings.

e. Prepare Non-Essential stores for destruction.

f. Carry out route clearance and security.

g. Before departure, destroy Non-Essential stores.

i. Move to Kigali.

4. Sector 6 Commander Responsibilities. On receipt of JASON YELLOW ALFA message, Sector 6 Commander is to prepare reception arrangements for units withdrawing to Kigali as follows:

a. Escort convoys from release points within Sector 6 to deployment areas.

b. Provide guides down to platoon level.

c. Provide security to units which are occupying their deployment areas, until local defence has been established.

d. Allocate two platoons to act as RRF at 5 mins NTM during occupation of deployment areas.

e. Escort Protected Personnel to parent organisations, if the security situation permits.

5. Deployment Coordination. G3 Ops/G3 Plans will coordinate the deployment of units within Sector 6. This will involve:

a. Identification of deployment areas.

b. Coordination between units.

c. Arrival procedures.

d. Issue of defence stores.

e. Key Point isolation and guarding procedures.

f. Development of Map/Locator list for Sector 6.

g. Control of movement.

h. Security procedures and ROE.

i. RRF allocation.

j. Administrative arrangements.

6. Arrival Procedures. On arrival in Sector 6, units and sub-units will deploy to designated areas. Immediate actions on arrival are:

a. Establish perimeter defence of designated area(s).

b. Coordinate return of Protected Personnel to parent organisation with Commander Sector 6, if the security situation permits.

c. Allocate RRF for local defence and take over responsibilities from Commander Sector 6.

d. List non-essential personnel and manifest for evacuation under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.

e. Identify Important stores for evacuation.

f. Identify Non-Essential stores for destruction.

JASON YELLOW BRAVO - PRELIMINARY EVACUATION

7. General. JASON YELLOW BRAVO will be ordered if the situation deteriorates to the point that:

a. The presence of a full complement of UNAMIR personnel in Kigali places an unmanageable burden on the logistic structure necessary to sustain it.

b. A large number of personnel cannot be properly employed due to security restrictions on their tasks.

c. Protected Personnel could be placed in direct danger.

d. Further evacuation seems likely.

8. Personnel. Personnel to be evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO are:

a. The bulk of Protected Personnel, less those required as a minimum presence on the ground by their parent organisations.

b. UNAMIR civilian personnel whose work in the security environment is no longer deemed essential.

c. UNAMIR military personnel whose role cannot be carried out in the current security environment.

d. Formed UNAMIR units no longer required to enhance the security of Kigali.

9. Equipment. It is not intended to evacuate equipment under JASON YELLOW BRAVO except for:

a. High value equipment which would be particularly difficult to evacuate in an increased threat scenario.

b. Essential equipment of any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this stage.

10. Personal Baggage. Personnel evacuated during Op Plan JASON will be restricted to minimum personal baggage. Commanders should issue instructions for personnel to carry:

a. Personal Weapon.

b. Equipment up to 30 kg in weight.

c. Personal documents including passport.

11. Means of Evacuation. At this stage the primary means of evacuation will be by air. Evacuation by road will be carried out by any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this time.

12. Destruction. Destruction will not be authorised for Non-Essential stores left by any formed unit which withdraws at this time.

JASON YELLOW CHARLIE - MAIN EVACUATION

13. General. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE will be ordered if the security situation deteriorates to the extent that:

a. The Force can no longer be easily sustained.

b. The presence of a large body of troops means that the lives of UN personnel are placed at serious risk.

c. The threat can more easily be met by a more compact force structure.

d. The Force mission requires a presence at minimal deployment.

e. Final evacuation under JASON RED is a likely possibility.

14. Personnel. Under JASON YELLOW CHARLIE, force strength will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of a UN presence. The following will be evacuated:

a. All remaining Protected Personnel.

b. Those UNAMIR civilian personnel whose presence is not required for the maintenance of a Force presence.

c. Those UNAMIR military personnel not required to provide a Force presence. This will involve a large number of administrative and support personnel, as well as those formed units not detailed off as Security Force.

15. Equipment. The following equipment will be evacuated:

a. Important stores.

b. Essential stores of formed units ordered to withdraw at this stage.

c. The bulk of the vehicle fleet less those vehicles required in order to maintain a Force presence and Security Force.

16. Means of Evacuation. The means of evacuation employed will depend on available airlift, priority equipment requirements and land route security. In principle, evacuation will be achieved
by:

a. Air. Protected Personnel, UNAMIR civilian personnel and administrative and support personnel.

b. Land. Formed units and sub-units, driving fleet vehicles in convoy, less those to be evacuated by air.

17. Security Force. The composition of the Security Force required to protect the UNAMIR presence will be determined by the threat. Its primary task will be to provide security for remaining UN installations and KIA, up to the point at which the air evacuation under JASON RED is completed. It is likely to consist of:

a. HQ UNAMIR core operations personnel.

b. A battalion (-) of wheeled/tracked APC-mounted infantry.

c. Integral engineer support.

d. Remaining Air Operations Staff.

e. Second Line transport resources.

18. Destruction. When JASON YELLOW CHARLIE is ordered, the following equipment will be destroyed:

a. All Non-Essential equipment, including that left by units evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.

b. Important equipment which cannot be evacuated within remaining air/vehicle lift availability. The bulk of important equipment should have been evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.

ANNEX C TO
PART III TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN JASON RED

GENERAL

1. JASON RED is the executive order to evacuate Rwanda. It involves:

   a. The safe evacuation of the UN presence in Rwanda.

   b. The evacuation of the Security Force.

2. JASON RED will be ordered by the FC when the following criteria have been fulfilled:

   a. The UN presence in Rwanda no longer serves a military or political purpose.

   b. The safety of those remaining UN personnel is in serious doubt.

   c. The security situation in Rwanda is likely to deteriorate to a greater extent.

METHOD

3. Execution. JASON RED will be conducted as a 2 phase operation as follows:

   a. Phase 1. Evacuation of remaining UN presence via KIA.

   b. Phase 2. Evacuation by road of the Security Force.

4. Phase 1. Phase 1 will consist of the following elements:

   a. Reduction of KP responsibility by Security Force to a minimum.

   b. Centralisation of UN personnel in one location.

   c. Provision of transitional security at KIA for final evacuation flights.

   d. Route recce for land evacuation route.

   e. Escort of remaining UN personnel to KIA by Security Force.

   f. Evacuation of UN presence less Security Force.

5. Phase 2. Phase 2 will consist of the following.

a. Centralisation of Security Force.

b. Despatch of recce elements including engineer support.

c. Clearing of route if required.

d. Route security.

e. Road move to neighbouring country.

6. Command. The Force will be commanded by the FC until his departure. HQ UNAMIR core operations staff will continue to exercise command after his departure.

7. Liaison. Liaison for the execution of JASON RED will be effected with the local authorities. UNAMIR remains responsible for the safe evacuation of UN and Protected Personnel.

8. Communications. Security Force CNR will provide the main means of communication during JASON RED. FSO is to plan to provide out-of-country communications for use by Security Force during Phase 2.

9. Logistics. The Security Force is to be self-contained for 7 days.

10. Destruction Policy. Remaining Important and Non-Essential stores and equipment not destroyed or evacuated under JASON YELLOW will be destroyed by the Security Force before evacuation.

SLOGO

UN RESTRICTED

To : Sector 6 Date : 17 Nov 94

From : MILOB GP HQ Ref : Plans 45/94

Sub : **TAKING OVER OF NEW ARRIVALS SCHOOL (PROCEDURE)**

1. This memo is intended to assist you on how you are to administer the new arrivals.

2. On arrival of the new MILOBs/CIVPOL, SMPO shall receive them and advise SPLAN/TRG, SLOGO and inform Sector 6.

3. SLOGO shall take over the new arrivals to a selected hotel for accommodation. He shall make out a list to be presented to UNAMIR HQ (CAOs office) for meals arrangements at the BELGIUM VILLAGE. Meals shall be provided on loan until advance MSA is paid. Both meals and accommodation charges shall be cleared when the new arrivals receive their advance MSA.

wrong, ~~should~~ ~~be the~~ travel The CAO's office is responsible for Mess. Not SLOGO

4. On completion of these arrangements, SLOGO shall advise Sector 6 of where new arrivals are accommodated and feeding. Sector 6 shall coordinate movements from hotel to school.

5. It shall be the responsibility of Sector 6 to receive problems of the new arrivals and submit such to relevant branches at MILOB GP HQ.

6. Sector 6 shall receive a new arrivals training programme from MILOB GP HQ, Plans and Training Branch.

7. On receipt of the training programme Sector 6 shall monitor the instructions and advise MILOB GP HQ Plans and Training on grey areas with reports to the lectures submitted and failures of submissions for reprogramming.

8. On completion of the instructional period Sector 6 shall check whether the new arrivals have settled their bills and advise SMPO to enable him to process the posting instruction.

M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
For CMO

Info :

DCMO

SMPO

SLOGO

SOO

Attached : The syllabus for the new arrivals.

UN RESTRICTED

SYLLABUS FOR INCOMING MILOBS AND CIVPOLS

SL NO	SUBJECT	PERIOD	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	WELCOME AND CLOSING ADDRESS	02	FC/CMO/DCMO/COMM
2.	INTRODUCTION TO RWANDA a. Political and Historical Background b. ARUSHA Agreement. c. UNAMIR Formation and Mandates.	01 01 01	Ops MILOB HQ Ops MILOB HQ CMPO, FHQ
3.	ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS a. Introduction to UNAMIR Organization. b. Detailed Organization of FHQ. c. Detailed Organization of MILOB GP HQ.	01 01 02	CPLANS, FHQ CMPO, FHQ SPLAN/TRG, MILOB GP HQ.
4.	PROCEDURES (PERS AND ADMIN) a. Admin and Personal Conduct, Discipline, Leave/CTO and Entitlement b. BOI. c. Medical Brief	02 01 01	SMPO, MILOB GP HQ SMPO, MILOB GP HQ Force Med Officer
5.	OPERATIONAL MATTERS. a. Patrolling, Escorts, Check Points, Observation posts and Monitoring. b. Complains and Investigations. c. Rules of Engagement (ROE). d. Detailed Brief on MILOB Sectors Operations. e. Operational Reports and Returns. f. Humanitarian Operations.	02 01 02 02 01 02	Ops, MILOB GP HQ Ops, MILOB GP HQ C PLAN O, FHQ Ops, MILOB GP HQ Ops, MILOB GP HQ HAC.
6.	COMMUNICATIONS a. Introduction, Care and Maintenance of Communication Equipment. b. Voice Procedure/Comm security	01 01	Chief Comm Off. MILOB Sig Officer
7.	LOGISTIC MATTERS a. UNAMIR Logistic System and Procedure b. Care and Maintenance of Vehicle. c. Traffic Accident Procedure. d. Driving Tests.	01 01 01 04	MILOB Log Officer CTO CIVPOL CTO

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
8.	CIVPOL Operations	02	CIVPOL
9.	**TOTAL PERIODS**	**34**	**04 Days Required**

OPS

MINUTES OF MILOBS OPS CONFERENCE HELD AT SECTOR 4A HQ (GIKONGORO) ON SAT 12 NOVEMBER 1994

PRESENT :	BRIG	H A	ANYIDOHO	-	DFC/CMO (CHAIRMAN)
	COL	U	MOEEN	-	DCMO
	LT COL	A	ANOCHKINE	-	SDO1
	LT COL	K	OPONG-KYEKYEKU	-	SMPO
	LT COL	W	PURTSCHER	-	COMD SECT 1
	LT COL	S	DOUNKOV	-	COMD SECT 4A
	LT COL	A	DOUMBIA	-	COMD SECT 4C
	LT COL	AM	AUSTDAL	-	COMD SECT 5
	MAJ	D	TRAORE	-	A/LOGO
	MAJ	DJ	MACNEIL	-	HAC
	MAJ	A	RYSHKOWSKI	-	SECT 2 (OPS OFFR)
	MAJ	S	HAIDER	-	SECT 3 (OPS OFFR)
	MAJ	T	MURIRO	-	SECT 4B (OPS OFFR)
	MAJ	A	PETROUNOVSKI	-	SECT 6 (OPS OFFR)
	CAPT	WKC	BLEBOO	-	SECRETARY

GENERAL

ACTION BY

1. In his opening address, the Comd Sect 4A warmly welcomed the DFC/CMO and all present to the HQ Sect 4A GIKONGORO. He thanked the CMO for giving him the opportunity to host the conference.

2. The Conference started at 0850hrs.

ITEM 1 - CMO'S COMMENTS

3. The CMO, in his remarks, craved the indulgence of all present to allow him to comment of some pertinent issues affecting MILOBs operations and administration.

	ACTION BY
4. Minutes. He said that certain points discussed at MILOBs Conference which required the attention of UNAMIR higher authorities which were not actioned because copies of Minutes of these Conferences were not forwarded to the appropriate quarters. He directed that copies of minutes of MILOBs Conferences should be forwarded to the highest possible office for required actions to be taken.	SOO
5. MSA. On MSA, the CMO said the issue had amply been explained by Mr Medilli at the previous conference to the understanding of all. He said that he and other authorities concerned had done all that was necessary to resolve the issue. He was optimistic that the necessary actions would be taken to refund the monies deducted. He continued that he was informed that some MILOBs were communicating the MSA issue directly to their permanent mission in New York. He said this was not in anybody's interest and added that it was better to follow laid down procedure and present a united front in dealing with such problems. He said there was no way any MILOB could lose MSA but the individuals could be blamed at times. He warned that financial issues were very sensitive and therefore must be handled well.	DCMO
6. Postings. The CMO said that no MILOB had the right or would be given the chance to decide or influence where he should be posted to unless on extreme compassionate grounds. He added that MILOBs were posted to where they should be for fairness and operational efficiency of the MILOB GP as a whole.	DCMO SMPO
He said that Sect Comds should keep MILOBs informed of issues discussed at conferences so as to prevent misconception of important issues.	SECT COMDS

	ACTION BY
7. MILOBs Rotations. The CMO said that a lot of information on rotations had been circulated. He said UN HQ, New York noted that Ghana and Bangladesh observers were too many in UNAMIR that there was the need for national balance. As such other countries were to provide observers and some of whom have started arriving. He said some observers will repatriate without replacement.	DCMO
8. In his contribution, the DCMO said MILOBs postings was meticulously done and no individual's interest was considered. He said the necessary actions have been taken to solve every issue affecting the welfare of MILOBs. He said no individual's interest was paramount and urged Sect Comds to pass on all necessary information to MILOBs in their various Sectors.	SECT COMDS
9. Complaints. On complaints, the CMO said MILOBs who went about complaining about issues which could be discussed with him or the DCMO personally, had no justification for doing so. He said that any MILOB who was not clear with anything should see him for a tête à tête discussion. He added that this might not be the best means for addressing individual MILOBs problems but unnecessary complaints were not acceptable.	MILOBS
ITEM 2 - MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS CONFERENCE	
10. The main decisions taken during the previous conference were read and deliberated upon. The following points were accepted by all present:	
a. Four Samples of the Souvenir for MILOBs would be circulated and one of them selected. This would be made and sold to all MILOBs before their DDM.	S PLANS & TRG O

	ACTION BY
b. Sector 1 MILOB patrols should cover KAGITUMBA border every other day. MILOBs should also go with NICOY to convey returnees from time to time. Comd Sector 1 was to establish a post at RWAMAGANA.	COMD SECT 1
c. Sector 2 MILOB patrols were to cover RUSUMO border daily.	COMD SECT 2
d. Sectors were to submit returns on MILOBs accommodation as soon as possible for further action on the refund of the deducted MSA.	ALL SECTORS
e. Declaration of KENYA as part of the AO was to be supported with a document.	SMPO
f. All Sectors were to draw fuel from formed units.	
g. Mr Medilli was making efforts for MILOBs to repatriate with 100kg accompanied baggage.	SMPO
h. UN HQ New York would soon state whether MILOBs could accumulate CTO or not.	SMPO

11. The Minutes of the previous conference was adopted.

ITEM 3 - SECTOR BRIEFS

12. Sector 1

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd said the situation in his Sector was calm and the RPA was in control of general security of the area.

b. Borders. The Sect Comd said GATUNA border which had been closed following the BRITCON troops misbehaviour at the post, has now been re-opened

ACTION BY

to all traffic. He said MILOBs were to cross the border in civil clothes and with valid travel documents.

c. Unexploded Ordinance Devices (UXD). The Sect Comd said a lot of EOD were scattered all over the Sector and locals especially children and farmers were being killed and injured every day. He requested for Field Engineers assistance to locate and clear these devices.

d. Humanitarian Sit. The Sect Comd said there were no refugees/displaced persons camps in the Sector. He said RPA units in the Sector carried out an exercise and the displaced persons were conveyed to where they chose to go. He continued that he had arranged with NICOY which provided trucks for conveying returnees to destinations within the Sector and beyond. He said it was realized Ugandans were using this facility just to go to KIGALI for business but efforts were being made to stop that. The Sect Comd touched on the outbreak of Malaria in the Sector. He said NGOs were contacted and they were reaching the affected areas with drugs. He said the situation was under control.

e. Logistics. The Sect Comd said his logistics problems were solved. He said the Sector now operates on Channel 5 and communication with the KAGITUMBA border post was good.

13. DCMO's Response. On unexploded devices, the DCMO said that NGOs also talked about it and the SRSG was informed. He said actions were initiated to send specialists on contract to all Sectors to clear these dangers in order to make the country-side safe for

farming and other economic activities. The CMO remarked that unexploded bombs were common in the capital also. He said unless something positive was done about this, we would be failing in our duties. The DCMO said that Sector 1 has the greatest concentration and UN HQ New York was aware. He said a contract had already been awarded as a long term solution to the problem.

ACTION BY

SOO

14. On the issue of malaria and dysentery, he said the NGOs, UNAMIR medical staff and Ministry of Health and Hygiene were visiting the affected areas throughout the country.

15. **Sector 2**

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Ops Offr said that the sit in the Sector could only be said to be relatively calm. He said fresh killings were being carried out. He said the locals were scared to the extent that even children scattered when they saw RPA troops.

b. Own Activities. The Ops offr said when the UN fuel tanker was hijacked, RPA denied having any knowledge of it. However, when hel search was conducted and the tanker found in one of their camps, they wrote a letter indicating they had arrested and confiscated the tanker. He said the vehicle has since been retrieved and sent to KIGALI but the RPA claimed that the tanker belonged to an enemy so it would be confiscated to the state. Commenting on hel support, the Sect Ops Offr said it was necessary to put one hel at the disposal of the Sector for patrolling inaccessible areas.

SOO

c. RPA. The Ops Offr said the RPA in the Sector could not be said to be open and co-operative with MILOBs. He added that they have attached a Liaison Officer to the Sect HQ but their co-operation was seriously lacking.

| ACTION BY

d. NGOs. The Ops offr said there was regular meeting between the NGOs in the Sector. He said the NGOs were receiving VIPs regularly and their organization of refugee camps was quite good.

16. CMO's Response

a. The CMO in his response commented on the inability of the helicopter to respond to their call on time. He said the poor reaction by the helicopter crew to the call was not good enough.

b. On the issue of RPA not co-operating with MILOBs in the Sector, the CMO said there would soon be a weekly meeting for their Principal Staff Officers at the Force HQ. He said all such issues would be discussed and resolved at these meetings.

c. The DCMO said more returnees were being evacuated to Sector 2 and this may complicate the security situation in the Sector.

| COMD SECT 2

d. On CTO/Leave, the DCMO reminded Sect Comd to ensure that only 25% of their strength went on CTO at any given time so that more MILOBs remained on the ground to continue the work. He emphasized that pers on posting to the Sectors should not be allowed to proceed on CTO/Leave until they reported for work in the Sectors. However, MILOBs with extreme humanitarian problems could be allowed to take their CTO before reporting.

| SECT COMDS

e. The CMO talked on security of MILOBs in the Sector and said that a battalion would soon be deployed in the sector to provide security to MILOBs. — ACTION BY: CMO

17. Sector 3

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Ops Officer said the sit in the Sector deteriorated over the period. He said killings, banditry and mass arrests were ~~on~~ on the increase. He mentioned that although the sit was not stable, more returnees continue to enter the Sector. He said 2,112 persons crossed the Burundi border into Rwanda in the last 2 weeks.

b. Political. The Sect Ops Officer said that the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare visited GITARAMA on 9 Nov 94, met local leaders and talked to about 15,000 locals at a durbar. He said the Minister explained Govt programme for national reconstruction and urged the people to assist the Govt to rebuild the country.

c. RPA. The Ops Officer said the RPA have been the main cause of insecurity in the Sector. He said that RPA troops have been involved in killings, arrests, robbery and molestation of civilians. He added that there were unexploded devices scattered all over the Sector killing and injuring children and farmers. He said RPA troops were making efforts to prevent infiltration by militias and armed elements from Burundi and Zaire — SOO

d. Own Activities. The Ops Offr said Sector MILOBs carried out regular patrols, escort duties, monitoring, investigation and assisted NGOs during the period.

e. Humanitarian Activities. He said NGOs have stepped up their relief efforts in the Sector and as a result more food, seeds and farm implements were reaching the people. He mentioned that the rate of land cultivation was not encouraging. He talked about displaced persons in the Sector and said there were 7 DPs Camps in the Sector. He added that the DPs were reluctant to return home due to the security situation in the area. | ACTION BY

HAC

18. CMO's Response. The CMO said that Human Rights teams seemed not to have known exactly what to do in the present human rights situation in the country. He urged all Sect Comds to monitor and report human rights violations in the Sectors. | SECT COMDS

19. **Sect 4A**

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Ops Officer said the situation in the Sector has not changed during the period. He said there was increased flow of people from adjacent Prefectures to the DPs Camps. He attributed this flow of people to the deteriorating security situation in other Prefectures. He said a lot of former INTERAHAMWE were hiding inside the Camps committing acts of banditry, looting and killing the witnesses to of their atrocities.

b. RPA. The Ops Officer said the former RPA Battalion was rotated. He said the incoming Bn Comd promised more coordination and cooperation with the Sect Comd. The local population was very sensitive to rumours ~~and~~ on RPA troops' misconduct and thus making the situation in the Sector very unstable. He said MILOBs were doing everything possible to encourage the locals to have confidence in UNAMIR.

c. Own Activities. The Ops Officer said routine patrols, route recce, escorts, monitoring and evacuation of DPs, investigations and monitoring of border crossing were the main activities of MILOBs in the Sector. There was also constant liaison with NGOs and Human Rights Teams. He said the deployment in the South had not yet been carried out due to communication problems. Constant UNAMIR presence was shown in the area by MILOBs patrols who went as far as to the borders. He mentioned that there may not be the need to deploy MILOBs in that area because of absence of population and activities.

d. OP HOMEWARD. The main concern of the Sector was the numerous DPs Camps with about 300,000 people. The Ops Offr said OPERATION HOMEWARD was not making the desired impact because the latest influx of people into the Camps exceeded the number evacuated.

e. Logistics. The Sector requested for 6 spare tyres and 4 Runners but received no response. He said the tyres were needed in order to forestall situations where patrols could get stranded because of lack of spare tyres.

20. DCMO's Response. The DCMO said the problem of spare tyres and tools for the vehicles has been taken care of and a quantity of spare tyres, jacks and tools made available. He instructed the SLOGO to submit returns on vehicles which had no spare tyres and tools. He directed that the SLOGO should organize these items for the Sectors and advised the Sect Comds to go for the items without delay.

ACTION BY

SLOGO

SECT COMDS

21. Sect 4B. ACTION BY

a. Gen Sit. The situation in the Sector was calm. The Sect Ops Officer said the locals in the Sector were apprehensive of the RPA because of the manner in which RPA troops handled issues in the area. He said there were arrests and summary executions by the RPA troops who also burnt down the DPs Camp at RUGABANO. CMO

b. Treats in the Sector. The Sect Ops Officer said infiltration across Lake KIVU by armed elements remained the main concern for the RPA in the Sector. He added that the RPA claimed there were elements of the INTERAHAMWE operating in the area.

c. Political. The Ops Officer said a new Prefect had taken office on 9 Nov 94. He said the Prefect requested the NGOs operating in the area to streamline their modus operandi and introduce FOOD FOR WORK programme. HAC

d. RPA. The Ops Officer said the RPA troops were carrying out indiscriminate arrests with the allegation that the victims were members of the INTERAHAMWE. He said it was common knowledge in KIBUYE that the RPA were carrying out summary executions at the Gendarmerie Camp (GR 276718). He said the RPA forced DPs out of the RUGABANO Camp and burnt it down on 29 Oct 94. On RPA deployment, he said there has not been any change. He said the RPA continued to train recruits at the KIBUYE Camp. CMO/HAC

e. Own Activities. The Ops Officer said that the current rains rendered most roads in the Sector unmotorable. This, he said reduced MILOBs

ACTION BY

routine operations in the Sector. He said hel patrols were conducted on 6 and 8 Nov 94. He commented on the establishment of Observation Posts (OP) in the Sector and suggested that the problem of communication be solved and a contingency plan for extricating MILOBs from the OPs be put in place before MILOBs were deployed at the OPs. SOO

f. Humanitarian Matters. The Ops Officer said there were about 1,600 DPs in NYAMISHABA Camp although the Camp had been closed down for some time. He said some of the people in the Camp claimed they had been out of the country since the 1959 crisis. He mentioned that there were about 500 orphans who were being taken care of by NGOs in 4 towns in the Sector.

g. NGO Activities. He said NGOs continued to distribute food, drugs and seeds in the Sector. WFP officials indicated that they would open an office in the Sector and start the FOOD FOR WORK programmes. He mentioned that Human Rights teams visited mass grave sites and conducted investigations into alleged killings by RPA.

22. DCMO's Response. The DCMO commented on the establishment of OPs in the Sector and said that Hel would drop MILOBs at the OPs and wait on call at KIBUYE. Whenever there was a problem, the hel would extricate the MILOBs from the OPs.

23. **Sect 4C**

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd said although there had been some killings, the situation in the Sector remained calm during the period. He said

there was a new Prefect for CYANGUGU. He mentioned that social activities were going on and schools were running normally at CYANGUGU. He said there were reports of INTERAHAMWE activities along the Burundi and Zaire borders.

ACTION BY

b. RPA. The Sect Comd said the RPA was in control of the area and holding meetings with the people within the Sector. He said through these meetings, the RPA was explaining certain actions they took and were trying to win the confidence of the local population.

c. Own Activities. The Sect Comd said routine operations were conducted during the period. He said although the local population continue to distrust UNAMIR in the Sector, efforts were being made to harness their confidence. He mentioned that co-operation by the RPA would be improved by holding weekly meetings with the leadership in the Sector.

d. Logistics. The Sect Comd said few logistics problems continued to hamper operations in the Sector. He said the Sector had no office equipment and furniture. He requested for a photocopier and asked for authority to be changing batteries at Ethiobatt location. DCMO/SLOGO

24. CMO's Response. The CMO said he would emphasize the need for cooperation between MILOBs and Ethiobatt. He said the Ethiopia Army was yet to be transformed into a well seasoned Regular Army. He added that language was another problem facing Ethiobatt. He implored MILOBs in the Sector to relate with Ethiobatt pers with tact and patience. CMO/COMD SECT 4

25. Sect 5 | ACTION BY

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd said the situation in the Sector was calm but there has been increase in robbery over the past two weeks . He said the rich, traders and locals working with NGOs were being targeted. This led to fear and feeling of insecurity among the locals.

b. Political. The Sect Comd said new Prefects were appointed for RUHENGERI and GISENYI. He said the two Prefects were former Rwandese Diplomats and were working towards reconciliation and reconstruction.

c. RPA. The Sector Comd said MILOBs' relationship with the RPA has been good. He added that the RPA has attached a liaison officer to the RUHENGERI Sub-sector.

d. Own Activities. The Sect Comd said because of problems with vehicles and to avoid duplication, MILOBs had to carry out joint patrols with Tumbatt.

e. Refugees. The Sect Comd said the rate of influx of returnees remained at about 1,000 per day. He added that "boat people" were mainly the 1959/60 Rwandese refugees who were in Zaire. He said 100 returnees came from Uganda and 100 entered the country by footpaths.

f. Logistics. The Sect Comd said vehicles continued to breakdown due to the condition of roads in the Sector. He said frequent posting of MILOBs needed to be carefully looked at | SOO

because MILOBs have been making advance payment for hired accommodation. He said too frequent changes in postings made things a bit difficult for MILOBs.

ACTION BY
SMPO
S PLANS
& TRG

g. Confidential Report. The Sect Comd said the issue of Confidential Reports should be sorted out so that MILOBs could read them before leaving the mission area.

SMPO

26. CMO's Response. The CMO said there would be the need to establish coordinating points along Sector boundaries and along the borders. On confidential reports, the DCMO said that it had now been streamlined. He said Sect Comds would write for MILOBs to read and initial. He said these should then be forwarded to the MILOB GP HQ where the MILOBs would be call on DCMO or DFC/CMO's interview.

SOO

SMPO

SMPO

27. **Sect 6**

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Ops Officer said the situation was calm during the period.

b. RPA. The Ops Officer said KIGALI should be considered as the largest training centre for the RPA. He said large number of recruits were being trained in Camps located in the capital. He added that the RPA had also increased patrol and other activities in KIGALI especially during the the night.

c. Local Population. On local population, he said KIGALI served as the largest transit centre through which thousands of displaced persons were passed to other destinations in the country-side. He said utility services had been improved,

social and economic activities were also spreading throughout the capital. He said although life in the capital has improved, other areas in the Sector lacked basic amenities like potable water, medical care and education facilities. He said people living outside KIGALI lived in poor sanitary conditions, had problems of malaria and dysentry and lacked food. | ACTION BY

HAC

d. Own Activities. He said MILOBs tasks were mainly escorts of displaced persons, UN and other convoys. MILOBs also conducted a few patrols and established contacts with authorities of the KIGALI Prefecture to facilitate coordination and co-operation between MILOBs and the authorities.

e. NGO Activities. The Sect Ops officer said about 120 NGOs operating in Rwanda had their offices in KIGALI but were not operating in the capital itself. He added that locals living outside the capital needed humanitarian aid just as those living in the country-side.

28. CMO's Response. The DCMO said MILOBs of the Sector should know all the streets within the capital so as to be able to escort anybody anytime to any part of the capital. He urged Sector MILOBs to report any unusual incident especially mine explosions and located unexploded bombs to the MILOB GP HQ. He said formed troops would share escort tasks with MILOBs. | CCMD SECT 6 SOO

ITEM 4 - STAFF BRIEFS

29. A/SOO. The A/SOO said Sectors must adhere to the SITREP format and details must be clear. He said incidents being reported should indicate " what, when, where | SECT COMDS

who and what done about it". He said all escorts tasks would be co-ordinated so that one sector was not over-tasked. He advised against misuse of the MILOBs Ops Net and said conversations on the radio should be brief. He reminded Sect Comds to keep stand-by teams for emergencies.

ACTION BY
SECT OPS OFFRS
SECT COMDS

30. SLOGO. The A/LOGO said MILOBs vehicle holding was 75 and that it was not possible to have additional vehicles before December 1994. He said maintenance was a problem and advised Sect Comds to keep to servicing schedules. He said jacks were available at the new UNAMIR workshop. On stores, he said Sectors should submit returns before 15 Dec 94. He mentioned that some stores including generators, computers and photocopiers were being expected from Somalia to augment the current stock.

SECT COMDS

31. SMPO. The SMPO commented on channel of communication and said Sectors should desist from sending certain documents directly to FHQ. He elaborated on the CTO/Leave issue and said CTO remained 6 days for 30 days of continuous duty. He said MILOBs who were due for repatriation have been catered for so they could be granted CTO even if the individual did not perform 30 days continuous duty. On repatriation, he said many MILOBs would be repatriated between November and December without replacement. He said this would reduce MILOBs total strength so CTO would be granted according to the exigencies of work.

CMO/DCMO

SECT COMDS

32. HAC. The A/CHAO commended MILOBs for excellent reporting of humanitarian issues in the Sectors. He said most UNREO staff were new in the AO and therefore needed assistance from MILOBs. He said a command post would be set up to keep track of humanitarian

	ACTION BY
events and that Hum Teams would be formed to liaise with MILOBs. He mentioned that HAC now had an Ops Officer to co-ordinate HAC ops.	HAC
33. Summary of Decisions	
a. Sector HQs will be collocated with formed troops but Sectors 2 and 3 will remain. MILOB LO from Sectors 2 and 3 will be attached to formed troops HQs in the sectors.	SECT COMDS
b. Formed troops are not under comd to MILOBs but under control. MILOBs were to co-ordinate their activities and operations.	
c. Formed units would assist in escorting Brown and Roots convoys.	SOO
d. Channel of communication should be adhered to. All MILOB Sector mails should pass through MILOB GP HQ.	SECT COMDS
e. MILOBs/CIVPOL Training School would be moved from GITARAMA to KIGALI.	S PLANS & TRG O
f. Sect Comds should pass on information to all MILOBs in the various Sectors.	SECT COMDS
g. Sector Comds should collect jacks for Sector vehicles as soon as possible.	SECT COMDS
h. Sector 4B should map out pick-up-points for helicopter to be lifting MILOBs for patrols and recce missions.	SOO COMD SECT 4B
i. Sect Comds should forward correct details on MILOBs' accommodation for action to be taken	SECT COMDS SLOGO

	ACTION BY
quickly to avoid MILOBs losing their money.	
j. The next Conference to be hosted by MILOB GP HQ in KIGALI on 03 December 1994.	SOO

CONCLUSION

34. The CMO expressed his gratitude to all present and said the conference could be started at 0800hrs so that it could be ended earlier. He re-emphasized some points raised by the DCMO and said personal records should be straightened to enable administrative issues be pursued effectively in the interest of all MILOBs.

35. The Conference ended at 1410hrs.

WKC BLEBOO
Capt
SECRETARY

SLOGO

OPS

MINUTES OF MILOBS SECTOR COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

HELD AT SECTOR 4B HQ (KIBUYE ON 29 OCTOBER 1994

PRESENT :	BRIG	H K	ANYIDOHO	-	DFC/CMO/CHAIRMAN
	COL	A	MOEEN	-	DCMO
	COL	C B	YAACHE	-	CHAC
	LT COL		DIARRA	-	CIVPOL COMMISSIONER
	LT COL	S	ILIYA	-	SOO
	LT COL	K	OPONG-KYEKYEKU	-	SMPO
	LT COL	M J	MASANGANISE	-	S PLANS & TRG O
	LT COL	P K	NYAAKU	-	SLOGO
	LT COL	W	PURTSCHER	-	COMD SECT 1
	LT COL	[illegible]	GORG	-	COMD SECT 2
	LT COL	[illegible] K	GBORGLAH	-	COMD SECT 3
	LT COL		DOUNKOV	-	COMD SECT 4A
	LT COL	[illegible] C	QUIST	-	COMD SECT 4B
	LT COL	[illegible]	AUSTDAL	-	COMD SECT 5
	LT COL		MUSTAFIZ	-	COMD SECT 6
	MAJ	[illegible]ONE	BROULAYE	-	A/COMD SECT 4C
	MAJ		LENHARDT	-	SECT 4A
	MR	MIKE	MINTA	-	LEGAL ADVISER/OSRSG
	MAJ	C F	BARI	-	SECRETARY
IN ATTENDANCE :		MR	MEDILLI	-	DD FOD (DPKO)
		MR	GOLO	-	OIC ADMIN
		AND 4 OTHERS			

GENERAL

	ACTION BY
1. The conference began at 0945hrs with a welcome address by the Sect Comd Lt Col EC Quist. He expressed his gratitude for the opportunity given to him to host the MILOB HQ Conference.	
2. In his remarks, the DCMO thanked the CMO for being present at the conference inspite of his busy schedule. He reiterated the aim of the conference which was to provide an indept analysis on the activities of the Military Observer Group on the ground. He was particu-	

larly pleased that Mr Medilli who had recently arrived from New York was to attend the conference. | ACTION BY

3. The DFC/CMO expressed his happiness for being at the conference. He also expressed his satisfaction about the good job MILOBS were doing in various Sectors. He told Sect Comds that MILOBs should work in cohesion in order to achieve results. He said he was not happy about the way MILOBs leave for home without reading their efficiency report nor coming on his interview before their departure. He warned he would not accept incompetent MILOBs and was ready to repatriate incapable ones. He urged all to work hard in order to achieve good working relation with the contingents and the RPA.

ITEM 1 - REVIEW OF PREVIOUS MINUTES

5. Souvenirs for MILOBs. At the last conference, Sect Comds were given the responsibility to submit the design for souvenirs which could be presented to MILOBs on termination of their tour of duty. It was gathered that only KIGALI Sector had responded. The DCMO proposed that 3 or 4 designs out of these be selected and circulated to all others for their comments.

6. Decision. Four designs out of those submitted by KIGALI Sector were to be circulated to the sectors for comments.

7. Comms for Sect 5. Comd Sect 5 inform the house that comms in his Sector had improved.

8. MILOBs Postings. Comd Sect 2 said he was not happy that MILOBs especially those at Force HQ had not yet joined. The DCMO said all was being done to get all released to report to their sectors.

9. Functioning of Schools in Sectors 4A & B. Comd Sect 4B said most schools though opened were not

functioning either due to lack of teachers or equipment. Comd Sect 4A said that he could not say much on this issue. The DCMO asked him to go back and work on this. The DCMO further urged Sect Comds to encourage parents through the Prefects to let their children go to school.

ACTION BY

SECT COMDS

10. MSA. The SMPO informed the house that the MSA of those MILOBs which was cut will be adjusted in the current month. He however informed all that, those who travelled outside the mission area will lose 50% of their MSA.

11. Efficiency Report. The SMPO reminded all Sect Comds about the writing of efficiency report on each MILOB when posted away or completion of tour of duty. He informed all that on completion of the tour of duty all the reports would be compiled and sent too the CMO for writing of the final report. The DCMO emphasized this point and said MILOBs would be interviewed by DCMO on arrival, and on completion of tour of duty, be interviewed by both the DCMO and CMO. He said all MILOBs would be given 12 days time off for clearance and preparation before their DDM.

12. The minutes of the previous conference was adopted.

ITEM 2 - SECTORS BRIEF

13. Sect 1

a. General. The Sect Comd said the general situation was calm in the area. Both GATUNA and KAGITUMBA border posts remained opened to all traffic during the day. Between 01 May and 15 Oct 94, about 4,000 people were registered entering Rwanda

through KAGITUMBA border post. In addition, about one million cattle entered Rwanda through the northern frontier with Uganda. | ACTION BY

b. Political. No remarkable change other than the division of BYUMBA into two administrative centres namely BYUMBA and NGARAMA.

c. Military Activities. The Sect Comd said that he expected to meet the RPA Bde Comd in the coming week at MURAMBI. He further said no clearance had been obtained from RPA to set up a sub-sector headquarters at NYAGATARE.

d. Own Activities. Besides routine patrols, MILOBs provided assistance to NGOs and continued to liaise with local civilian authorities. MILOBs patrolled the border areas on regular basis to monitor the security situation. He said that GATUNA Border crossing remained an important exit/entry point between Uganda and Rwanda. MILOBs were not allowed to remain at these check points for long periods due to the demand from Rwandese border authorities for a letter of authority from the Govt or RPA liaison officer. He said the daily monitoring of KAGITUMBA border crossing was not feasible from BYUMBA due to the distance and that it would be better done from NYAGATARE or KAGITUMBA but the problem of suitable accommodation had prevented this.

14. DCMO's Response. The DCMO said that the RPA had been approached to allow MILOBs to deploy at NYAGATARE. He instructed S Plans Offr to contact the RPA LO to get the necessary clearance. He directed that till such a time, MILOBs should go there every alternate day in order to collect the needed data that would enhance planning. He also instructed that an outpost be located at KAGITUMBA so that teams could stay on longer to

monitor the border post.

ACTION BY

15. Sector 2

a. General Sit. The Sect Comd said the area had been calm during the period. He said relations with the Prefects of KIBUNGO and BUGESERA had been good.

b. RPA. No remarkable RPA activity in the area except RPA securing the general area NASHO near Tanzania Border. Efforts were being made to get in contact with RPA Bde and Bn Comds to enhance better co-ordination/Liaison.

c. Own Activities. He said that he had deployed 3 teams at RILIMA and 4 teams at KIBUNGO and would maintain a good working relationship with the Prefect and also make contact down to commune level.

d. Hum Activities. He said there were no refugee camps in his sector. NGOs were working in KIBUNGO and BUGESERA area.

e. Problems. The problem of furniture, accommodation and office equipment existed and these needed to be supplied soonest. He also talked about lack of potable water in the area. In his response, the DCMO promised him some furniture and instructed SLOGO to issue other items whenever available. The CHAO informed the Sect Comd that a German Engineering Company was working on the water facilities. SLOGO

16. Sect 3

a. Gen Sit. The general situation in the area has been calm. There was however a state of fear among the population due to RPA activities and arbitrary arrests.

ACTION BY

b. Military Activities. The Sect Comd said he had identified 3 types of threats in the area, namely the militia, RPA and banditry. He reported a couple of grenade incidents in the area. He said MILOB teams have been conducting routine patrols in the area. He reported theft of a veh antenna and a UN flag and the removal engine and parts of an accident UN veh.

17. Sect 5

a. Operations. A total of 90 patrols tasks were carried out during the period. The Sect Comd said that the barge operations remained suspended. He said there were evidence of new mines in the area of KAREBA (4125).

b. Returnees. He stated that a lot of returnees were coming back from Zaire as the sit in GOMA continued to deteriorate and NGOs were planning to withdraw. He further said these could lead to a massive refugee traffic in the sector. The local authority he said was looking at the possibility of resettling some returnees at some identified areas. It was decided that the Sect Comd should follow the events closely. SECT COMD

c. Relationship With RPA and Other Agencies. The sector comd said this was excellent.

18. The DCMO in his response asked the Sect Comd whether he was aware of a planned Hutu meeting at GOMA. The DCMO then asked the Sect Comd to monitor and confirm this information. On when a new sub sector HQ would be established at RUHENGERI, the Sect Comd said this would be done by Mon 31 Oct 94. COMD SECT 5

18. Sector 6

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd said the situation i

KIGALI city and the whole area of responsibility remained calm during the period. | ACTION BY

b. Military. AOR remained under the firm contro of the RPA, Gendarmerie and local admin. In the remote areas of the country however, banditry and other crimes are prevalent due to the absence of RPA and local police.

c. RPA Activities. RPA was recruiting new soldiers from different places of Rwanda. Large numbers of recruits were brought to KIGALI Military Camps for training and the reinforcement of units deployed in the city.

d. State of Local Population. There was no refugee camp in the sect. One orphanage with 250 children was located in RUBANGO. The population in KIGALI was increasing. Life in the city was improving as more shops were opening and many foreign businessmen had returned to the country. Schools and hospitals in the city were functioning

e. MILOB Activities. Emphasis were laid on patrolling and getting acquainted with the area of responsibility. Priority was also given to assistance to UNHCR to convey displaced persons to their homes.

f. Admin. The Sect Comd stated that the morale of MILOBs has been affected to the arbitrary deductions in MSA by the finance section. MILOBs felt the deductions were unjustifiable.

19. Sector 4A

a. Gen. The general situation remained calm with acts of banditry in certain areas. The RPA continued to conduct searches for arms and ammo and also manned road blocks.

b. Operations. Besides routine patrols and route recce, they had monitored and provided assistance to DPs in camps. The Sect Comd said there were total of 35 Camps with about 300,000 DPs in his area. One or two teams were detailed for OP HOMEWARD every day. So far 3,460 DPs had been evacuated. He said some refugees were not interested in leaving the camps. The 4 crossing points to Burundi in the area of responsibility were manned by RPA. It had been observed that not than 20 to 30 pers crossed the border every day.

c. RPA Activities. There were 5 RPA Coys deployed in the area. Contacts with RPA were not maintained regularly due to unco-operative attitudes of the RPA Comds. The situation with the Prefect was no different. He said the RPA believed there were quite a number of Interahamwes in the camps being shielded by UNAMIR and NGOs from prosecutions and punishment. It was for this reason they wanted the DPs Camps closed.

d. Problems. The Sect Comd said there was problem of water in GIKONGORO. The generator for pumping water needed 200 litres of fuel every day. The issue of who should provide fuel remained unresolved. He also needed 4 more vehicles and 2 base stations and requested for a forward repair team at BUTARE.

20. DCMO's Response. The DCMO directed the Sect Comd to establish a sub-station in the Southern part of his Sector. He asked the SLOGO to give the Sector one more Four Runner so that the office could opened by Wed 02 Nov 94. On the issue of fuel for pumping water, Col Yaache said Ghanbatt should continue to supply the fuel for the time being. Sect Comd should follow this up.

ACTION BY

SLOGO

COMD SECT 4A

ACTION BY

21. Mr Medilli and his team from New York arrived at this point and were received by the DCMO.

22. Sector 4B

a. Gen Sit. The Sect Comd stated that the situation in the Sector had deteriorated in the past 3 weeks. A number of incidents were reported including the driving away of DPs from NDABA Camp. He reported that tension had risen between the RPA and locals GISOVU and KARONGI.

b. RPA Activities. The Sect Comd reported that a 22 year-old lady was killed by the RPA at BIRAMBO on 15 Oct 94. On 18 Oct, RPA cordoned off NDABA Camp and fired indiscriminately wounding 4 persons, expelled DPs from the camp and set fire to the huts. On the night of 18/19 Oct, RPA soldiers and shot wounded a man for refusing to answer questions about the whereabouts of his brother. In another incident at GISOVU on 19 Oct, an RPA soldier was killed and another wounded in an incident where they went to demand money from the villagers. In an apparent retaliation, on 25 Oct, the RPA was reported to have killed 19 people in RUSHISHI and GISOVU. The RPA was also alleged to have shot a 15 year old boy at KARONGI on 25 Oct 9.

c. Formed Troops Activities. The Sect Comd said during the period, the RPA Bde Comd wrote a letter to FRAFFBATT HQ asking them to withdraw from GISOVU and BIRAMBO. FRAFFBATT has since withdrawn from the area and the situation was deteriorating.

d. MILOBs Activities. Routine patrols were conducted during the period. Investigations were also conducted into reports received as mentioned. MILOBs also escorted DPs as well as Brown and Root trucks to KIGALI.

ACTION BY

23. DCMOs Response. The DCMO wanted to know whether the Sect Comd required more MILOBs due to the general situation in the area. The Sect Comd said he did not since he maintained close contact with Fraff-batt and the local RPA Comd.

24. Sector 4C

a. Gen Sit. The Acting Sect Comd said that the area of responsibility was calm, but a state of fear still existed among the population. He said that the local population were being harassed by some uniformed people in the area. He said before the French troops left, the locals were assured that security would be provided by UNAMIR but this had not been the case.

b. RPA. The Sect Comd said RPA troops were causing insecurity in the area and this was making people to go back to the camps. He also said the relationship between RPA and Ethiobatt had not been very cordial.

c. Logistics. The Sect Comd requested the use of the INMARSAT phone of CAN SIGS by MILOBs. He also raised the point of MSA deduction from MILOBs in the name of house rent.

25. DCMO's Response. The DCMO informed the house that the CAN SIGS officer has been approached to work out the modalities of using these phones.

ITEM 3 - STAFF RESPONSE

26. SOO. In view of inadequate time only the SOO was allowed the chance to make remarks. He raised the issue of conducting night patrols. He conceded that there were some equipment and vehicles constraints these should not prevent the conduct of night patrols. The subject was debated at length. The problems of identi-

fication and night vision devices were highlighted. It was suggested that night patrols could start in the urban areas before going down to the communes. The DFC agreed that these patrols could serve as deterrent to would be criminals.

ACTION BY

ITEM 4 - DISCUSSION WITH FOD (DPKO) STAFF

28. The DCMO after welcoming the Deputy Director,FOD, Mr Medilli and his team, highlighted on a few points of worry to MILOBs. These were as follows:

a. Inadequate vehicles for the performance of duties.

b. Inadequate equipment.

c. The need for having Forward Repair Teams in all the Sectors to avoid driving all vehicles to KIGALI for repairs and maintenance.

d. The hiring of local guards to provide security at MILOB Sector HQ buildings.

e. The issue of MILOBs being repatriated without replacements.

29. He asked the SMPO to present to the team, the administrative and welfare problems that were lowering the morale of MILOBs. The SMPO highlighted on the following:

a. Loss of Personal Effects. On the loss of personal effects the SMPO told the team that necessary procedures for claims by MILOBs who lost their personal effects during the war had been forwarded. He requested that these claims should be processed in New York on time since most of these MILOBs would be ending their tour of duty soon.

b. Reduced Baggage Allowance. The SMPO said the new regulation by UN HQ for returning MILOBs to have their 100kg baggage sent to them unaccompanied poses a lot of problems to MILOBs. These

include problems of clearance when these items arrived, the long time some airlines take to forward these items which sometimes results in possible loses and the fact that most MILOBs would be sending their military kit unaccompanied might create problem for them on their return home.

ACTION BY

c. He suggested two options:

(1) To go with 50kgs accompanied or

(2) Opt for 100kgs unaccompanied.

d. Leave/CTO. The SMPO requested that the policy on leave being earned should be reviewed so that MILOBs could take leave in advance. He recommended that the CMO should be granted powers to grant a minimum of 6 days leave advance to MILOBs

e. Compensatory Time Off (CTO). The SMPO said the new policy on CTO which states that CTO could not accumulated by MILOBs is reducing the operational efficiency of MILOBs. He therefore suggested that a maximum of 12 days be accumulated and this could be carried forward from one month to the other to allow for flexibility in the planning of CTO for MILOBs to ensure efficiency.

f. MSA. The SMPO then talked about the thorny issue of deductions in MILOBs MSA. He said the Finance Section was deducting $27 per diem across the board from MILOBs MSA for having stayed in UN hired accommodation. He stressed that not all MILOBs lived in UN accommodation during the period 21 Sep - 31 Oct 94 and so it would be unfair to treat all like that. He also requested that MILOBs HQ be notified in advance of any deductions and justifications before deductions are effected.

MR MEDILLI FINANCE SECTION

g. Deputy Director FOD/CAO Response. Mr Medilli praised MILOBs for the good job they did and are

still doing to bring stability to Rwanda. He said everything was being done to equip UNAMIR with the the required number of vehicles and and this would materialize soon. On the inadequate communication equipment, he said he was not aware of the inadequacy, and asked that this be submitted to UN HQ soonest.

ACTION BY

SLOGO

h. He agreed with the suggestion on having Forward Repair teams in all Sectors and asked that the CTO be instructed to open these as soon as feasible. On the hiring of local guards, he said the possibility of locating MILOB HQs with the formed troops should be exploited. He asked that the issue be studied and a paper submitted on it.

CTO

SECT COMDS

i. He promised to take up the issue of MILOBs being repatriated and not being replaced with Maj Gen Baril at UN HQ.

MR MEDILLI

j. Mr Medilli agreed with the problems returning MILOBs are likely to encounter with their unaccompanied baggage and promised to take up the issue.

k. On accumulation of CTO for a period of 12 days, he said that was not a problem and could be arranged.

l. Mr Medilli then handed over to Mr Keypulton to dilate on the issue of MSA. Mr Keypulton first spoke on the issue of the definition of "MISSION AREA". He said that a Mission Area could be defined based on the administrative or operational reasons. He said NY had the problem of which countries could be considered as the Mission Area, particularly in the case of UNAMIR. He asked for recommendations on this issue and added that KENYA for now has been made part of the Mission Area purely due to administrative reasons.

CMO

	ACTION BY
m. On the issue of MSA, Mr Keypulton explained the circumstances under which deductions could be made from ones MSA. These he said were: (1) When an observer is accommodated by UN. (2) When an observer is fed by the UN. (3) When both accommodation and feeding are provided.	
n. He said that it was wrong for across the board deductions to be made and asked that information be provided by all MILOBs on who occupied UN buildings during the period for this anomaly to be corrected.	ALL FINANCE SECTION
o. Mr Medilli summarized by directing the CAO that before cuts in MSA or major administrative changes are made, these should be coordinated with the CMO before they are effected.	CAO, CMO FINANCE
p. The DFC/CMO said at this point that the whole exercise looked punitive and was happy that the issue had been well explained by Mr Keypulton.	
30. <u>Summary of decisions</u> a. Samples of 3 or 4 Souvenirs out of the ones submitted by Kigali Sector be circulated to all Sectors for comments.	SMPO
b. MILOBs to cover the border of KAGITUMBA every other day until the outpost is located. The outpost be reconnoitred by the Sect Comd.	COMD SECT 1
c. Sector 2 had deployed in both KIBUNGO and RELIMA but lacked essential items and furniture. The SLOGO was to look the furniture.	SLOGO
d. NGOs in GOMA threatening to withdraw due to deteriorating security. Local authority looking	

	ACTION BY
into ways of resettling refugees in some areas of Sector 5. Sect MILOBs to monitor the situation.	SECT 5
e. The alleged planned HUTU meeting at GOMA be monitored.	COMD SECT 5
f. MILOBs to liase and monitor the supply of Diesel by GHANBATT.	COMD SECT 4A
g. The CTO to set up Forward Repair Teams as soon as possible.	CAO
h. Decision would be taken on the accumulation of CTO up to maximum of 12 days by MILOBs.	CAO
i. Returns on MILOBs residential accommodation should be forwarded to CAO for action.	CAO SLOGO
j. Kenya accepted as part of the Mission Area.	CAO
k. Major administrative changes or cut in MSA be coordinated by both admin section and CMO before they are effected.	CAO CMO

CONCLUSION

31. The DCMO thanked the DD (FOD) for coming and urge all to keep up the good work inspite of the logistics inadequacies. He also thanked the Comd Sect 4B for the efforts put into hosting the conference.

32. The conference ended at 1545hrs,

BF CHOWDHURY
Maj
Secretary

SL040

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS Date : 01 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB G HQ Ref : Plans 38/94

SUBJECT : SITUATION IN RWANDA

REVIEW OF THE SITUATION

1. The situation is deteriorating throughout RWANDA. Violations are a daily event. Control of MILOB movements by RPA is still witnessed. Co-ordination between RPA and MILOBS to establish total peace and stability remains a problem in every sector. Isolated cases of MILOBS private accommodation searches by RPA have been reported. UNAMIR vehicles have been targeted by armed robbers, one is still missing. Relations between RPA and MILOBS are not improving. It must be noted that heroic actions are always jealously guarded, hence cannot be shared.

2. Banditry related incidents are now on the increase. Mass murders feature in almost every Sitrep. Looting has been witnessed throughout the country. Extortions are becoming a subject of the day. In some sectors mine warfare has been reported.

3. The RPA has not been paid and this situation might continue

for an unpredictable time to come. While banditry activities are realized, it is difficulty to rule out RPA involvement especially with the above in mind. Infact robberies, looting, killings, assaults and extortions are related to poverty hence the likelihood of certain elements within the RPA being involved cannot be exempted.

IMPACT ON MILOBS

4. Paragraphs 1 to 3 clearly show that MILOBS can be at risk since they are vulnerable. Their vulnerability extends from security at home, in offices and during patrols. Emphasis is not only on bodily harm but extends to MILOBS property (UN sponsored), MILOBS private property and money. It must be noted that money is an attractive and essential commodity especially in this situation, hence might attract the perpetrators to take risks.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

5. It is difficult to outline a solution on the predicament of the MILOB. Suggested preventive measures might assist as outlined below :

a. MILOBS are all officers. It is believed that every country devotes all efforts to produce an efficient Officers Corps. The way one portrays himself to the public must leave no doubt that his image deserves respect. Even the way one presents arguments to the public must not cause friction. We must know our limits, understand which places to frequent, people to communicate to and subjects to discuss.

b. In the event of situation deterioration through military action, a withdrawal plan was already issued to you. Action as appropriate (PLANS 13/94 dated 21 Sep 94 refers).

c. Routine patterns during movement or patrols must be avoided. It is advised that MILOBS must always be in twos. Night movements if possible should be confined to duties only. It must be noted that UNAMIR is not mandated to patrol during the night, however it is understood that MILOBS are an essential tool on the provision of information to the Mission.

d. Since vehicles are also targeted, it is necessary to exercise caution when parking at public places and at home. A MILOB is an observer, his main task is to observe. The MILOB has an extra duty now and that is to observe his vehicle. Windows and doors must always be closed and locked no matter how much time to the minimum, one intends to spend outside the vehicle. It is also important to check your surroundings before you approach your vehicle and identify something unusual. On approaching your home during hours of darkness, do not make it a trend to just jump out of the car and open the gate.

e. Security at your residence is also essential. Try to satisfy your guests to avoid friction. Do not just employ, check for credentials. Pay them enough and create understanding and friendship. A secured home plays a

protective function. It must be walled and have a locking gate. Always keep the gate locked. A knock is not an emergency, take your time to allow for identification before you react.

f. Offices are facilitated with very valuable equipment. These equipments need protection. Duty Officers if co-located to the office blocks can be essential security tools. For those sectors co-located with UN armed troops, the advantage through local arrangement is at their disposal, this could be exploited.

Sector Commanders are required to ensure that MILOBS are made aware of these essential security requirements. You are also to assess threats in your respective areas and make additionals where necessary.

MJ MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

Info :
DCMO
SOO
SMPO
SLOGO

MILOBS HQ NOB BRANCH		
APPT	SIG	DATE
SMO MO		7/11/94
CO SUP		7/11/94
CO TPT		7/11/94

10

20

UN SECRET

Copy No 1 of 30

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
Kigali

30 July 1994

4000.1 (Log)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **LOGISTICS INSTRUCTION TO OPS ORDER 16**

Reference: Operation Order 16 dated 25 July 94

SITUATION

1. a. **General**. As per Operation Order 16.

b. **Attachment**. In support of UNAMIR - USA deployed forces in Rwanda.

MISSION

2. To support UNAMIR forces in the ceasefire monitoring, the replacement of the French-led Coalition Force (FCF) in the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) by 22 August, and the assistance in the security and support of humanitarian efforts with a view to bring lasting peace in Rwanda.

EXECUTION

3. **General Outline.**

a. Support will be provided by the Force Support Elements (FSE). These elements will include:

(1) Transport - UK sub-unit (NE of Amahoro Stadium)

(2) Supply - CA sub unit (Log Base)
GH sub unit (Log Base)

(3) Maintenance - UK sub unit (Log Base/Iveco Complex)

(4) Medical - AS Field Hospital (King Faysal Hospital or Kigali Hospital)

(5) Gen Log Svcs - Brown and Root Services Corporation (Brown & Root)

(6) Coordination - Logistics Coordination Centre (LCC) in UNAMIR HQ. This is a combined military and civilian staff Log Ops

b. Support to the Force will be done in cooperation between the military elements and the civilian contractor at all levels. Work in the areas for which Brown & Root provides services and which are outside the capabilities of the FSE to deal with should be addressed as directed in Logistic Directive 1.

c. **Deployment**. As per Operation Order 16.

(1) Phase I. Deployment of MILOBs.

(2) Phase II. Relief in place operation in sector 4. GHANBATT to deploy with 14 days of combat supplies at Coy level and support its own move. Refuelling will be in situ on completion of the move. Details for other battalion deployments will follow.

(3) Phase III. Relief in Sector 4 completed, all UNAMIR forces become fully operational.

(4) Phase IV. Handing over of responsibilities in Sector 4 to Rwadan government under general security assistance by UNAMIR.

d. **Supported UNAMIR Forces**. The following forces should constitute UNAMIR at endstate:

(1) GHANBATT - Sector 4A (HQ in GIKONGORO),

(2) Mechanized Battalion Two - Sector 4B (HQ in KIBUYE),

(3) Motorized Battalion - Sector 4C (HQ in CYANGUGU),

(4) Independant Motorized Company One - Sector 2 (HQ in

Kigali),

(5) Independant Motorized Company Two - Sector 3 (HQ in GITARAMA),

(6) Independant Motorized Company Three - Sector 5 (HQ in RUHENGERI),

(7) Force Engineer Company - Sector 1 (HQ in BYUMBA),

(8) Force Signal Squadron - AMAHORO Stadium,

(9) MILOB Group - 320 personnel located throughout the country,

(10) CIVPOL - 130 personnel generally located in the vicinity of the MILOBs,

(11) Force Composite Helicopter and Fixed Wing Squadron - KIGALI AIRPORT,

(12) Field Ambulance - Sector 5A (HQ in RUHENGERI), and

(13) FSE - as mentionned in paragraph 3a.

MATERIAL AND SERVICES.

4. a. **Supply.**

(1) General.

(a) Due to the lack of historical data, consumption rates for all commodities can only be estimated. Adjustment to stock level will be made to reflect new Bn strength in sector.

(b) Local procurement can only be done through the CAO, and his authorized delegates, or by Brown & Root when applicable. All Force units/independant sub-unit that are located outside the KIGALI area will have a CAO representative in their HQ location. The CAO representative with GHANBATT will join the unit shortly after its deployment to Sector 4. No UNAMIR reimbursement will be approved unless this procedure is followed.

(2) Sup Class I.

(a) Compo Rations. 14 days brought into Rwanda as part of the unit initial stock. Then 3 days maintained as safety stock held at unit level.

(b) Fresh Rations. Fresh rations will be delivered, by a contractor, directly to the unit HQ locations mentionned in paragraph 3d 14 days after the arrival of the main body. Units are to confirm the exact location the rations are to be delivered before delivery will commence. Unit to hold fresh dry, and canned goods, at sub Unit level. Fresh meat will be provided as soon as refrigeration containers have been made available. Initially two refrigeration units per Coy will be allocated.

(c) Drinking Water (Bottled). 14 days brought into Rwanda as part of the unit initial stock. Then 3 days are maintained as safety stock held at unit level.

(3) Sup Class II.

(a) General and Technical Stores. As per unit SOP.

(b) Clothing, Personal Issue Items. UN accoutrements to be worn at all times. Shortfalls to be identified to C Log O immediately.

(4) Sup Class III.

(a) POL. Initially POL will on the pull system. It is estimated that bulk fuel will be sent to unit, sub unit locations every two days. A POL farm (barrels) should be established in unit HQ location. All vehicles are to top-up before any major move. Quantities held in location outside the KIGALI area to be determined.

(5) Sup Class IV.

(a) Construction Materials. Units to submit consolidated demands to FSU. If items not in

stores it will be forwarded to CBMS for appropriate action.

(b) Defensive Stores. COO is the releasing authority. Demands must be submitted to COO office for approval.

(6) Sup Class V. Ammunition quantities held at unit level are as per national directives. Expenditures to be recorded IAW form "Ammunition Expended For Operational Reason". The criteria, and form for reimbursement of ammunition is attached at annex a.

(7) Sup Class VI. FSE (Supply) to coordinate personnel demand items, distribute and account. Acquisition to be coordinated by CAO staff.

(8) Sup Class VII. Major Ends Items are to be held by FSE (Supply), and Brown & Roots once established.

(9) Sup Class VIII. Medical Supplies are to be held at unit level as per national standard.

(10) Sup Class IX. Limited first line repair parts held at unit level. Second line parts held by FSE (Supply), and Brown & Root once established.

(11) Water. One water trailer per Sub Unit will be allocated. Unit Recce party to identify local water point for resupply.

(12) Garbage. To be burned to the extent possible. Use of local dump site to be coordinated by unit. No payment is authorized to local authority unless coordinated with CAO or his staff.

(13) Laundry. Unit responsibility. Local contract will be established by CAO staff.

b. **TRANSPORTATION.**

(1) Unit to be self sufficient. Demands for additional support to be coordinated by FSE (Transport).

(2) R and R Tpt outside theater to be coordinated by Welfare Officer and Mov Con.

(3) All traffic accidents to be reported to the closest

CIVPOL organisation.

c. **MAINTENANCE.**

(1) Repairs. Priority of repairs to be determined by COO/C Log O.

(a) First Line. Limited capability exist within GHANBATT to proceed with first line repair on tracked vehicle. Units are to undertake only repairs on UN vehicles for which they have been trained for. First line repairs not done by the unit must be reported to FSE (Maint) for coordination with REME Coy or Brown & Root.

(b) Second and Third Line Repairs. They will only be undertaken by FSE (Maint) or Brown & Root once in theater. Repairs to be conducted as far forward as possible, in order to minimize backloading.

(c) Recovery.

i. Backloading Point (BLP). BLP to be determined in conjunction with FSE (Maint) and Brown & Root.

ii. Main Recovery Location. IVECO complex.

iii. Recovery Vehicle. One per unit. GHANBATT to have one M578.

5. **MEDICAL AND EVACUATION.**

a. **Policy**. Medical and Evacuation plan will be through the FCF initially and then through the UNAMIR medical units when they are operational. ~~are operational~~. Unit resources to be utilized to maximum extent possible. Unit will be deploying with the unit MO and an ambulance. Local NGO medical facilities or expertise to be utilized in case of emergency. A UNAMIR helicopter will be on standby thoughout the deployment. Air Evac to be coordinated and authorized by COO.

b. **Hygiene and Sanitation**. As per unit SOP. Portable toilet to be deployed when available.

6. **PERSONNEL.**

a. **Amenities**. Force Welfare Officer to coordinate resupply of amenities with FSU.

b. **Messes and Institutes**. As authorized by Force Commander.

c. **Out of Bound Policy**. As determined by Force Commander.

d. **Finance**. As per unit SOP. UN pay to be done in location.

e. **Postal**. Mail collection and distribution will be done by FSE (Transport) in one central point on a daily basis. Distribution of mail within unit line, is unit responsibility.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

7. a. **Location of HQ.**

(1)	Force HQ	AMAHORO HOTEL
(2)	C Log O	AMAHORO HOTEL ROOM 3021
(3)	FSE	As per paragraph 3a

b. **Communications**. CEOI to be issued separately by Force Signal Officer.

R. A. DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

Annex

A. Ammo Expenditure Form and Criteria

Distribution (page 8)

Distribution:

External:

Action:	Copy No
MILOB GP HQ	1
GHANBATT	2
Mechanized Bn 2	3
Motorized Bn	4
Indep Mor Coy 1	5
Indep Mor Coy 2	6
Indep Mor Coy 3	7
Force Engr Coy	8
Force Sig Sqn	9
Force Composite Sqn	10
Force Field Amb	11
FSE (Transport)	12
FSE (Supply)	13
FSE (Maintenance)	14
FSE (Fd Hosp)	15

Information:

UNDPKO (Msn Planning Service)	16
French Coalition Force	17

Internal:

DFC	18
CAO	19
COO	20
CMO	21
C PLANS	22
HAC	23
CMPO	24
FSO	25
CSS	26
CC Log O	27
Spare	28-30

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION

UNAMIR

94 JUN 28 03:25

YKF1010

Outgoing Fax #: OPS/ADH-671	Date: 27 June 1994
To: ALL MISSIONS Attn: CAO'S/OIC'S	From: BEISSEL/ACT.DIRECTOR FOD/DPKO/UNHQ-NEWYORK
Fax #: OSGAP-I - 92-51-261-232 OSGAP-K- 92-51-851292 UNARDOL- 3-3008 DIAL 5538 UNAVEM II - 3-3011 UNDOF - 3-3005 UNFICYP - 357-2-359753 UNIFIL - 972-4-825228 UNOSGI-T- 873-150-5132 UNMOGIP-R 3-3020 UNTSO 3-3012 UNIKOM II 3-2679 ONUSAL 503-790325 MINURSO 3-1952/3/4/5 x247 UNGCI 873-1754223 UNTAC 855-23-26836 UNSCOM 973-322-695 UNPROFOR 3-2655 UNOSOM 3-3082 UNOMSA 27-11-331-5533 ONUMOZ 3-2672 MICIVUH 874-151-1543 UNOMUR 256-486-23817 UNOMIG 873-151-3370 UNOMIL 231-798 906 UNAMIR 3-2672	FAX #: (212) 963-2116
Number of transmitted pages: 3	Ref.:
Subject: **AMMUNITION**	

THE AS CRITERIA FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF AMMUNITION IS OUTLINED AS FOLLOWS:

REIMBURSEMENT OF AMMUNITION

GENERAL

(2) SO Sup
a. info. Pls return to me.
MAS
DCLO
28-6-94

Re: OIC (DCLO)

1. AS STATED IN ANNEX A, IT IS A UNIT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO OBTAIN AMMUNITION FROM THE HOME COUNTRY.

2. AMMUNITION USED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES IS A UNIT'S RESPONSIBILITY AND WILL NOT BE PAID FOR BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION FOR PERSONAL WEAPONS (WHICH IS REIMBURSED THROUGH THE USAGE FACTOR, THE USD 5.00 PER MAN PER MONTH FOR PERSONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION) WILL NOT BE PAID FOR BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

AMMUNITION REIMBUSRED BY UNITED NATIONS

4. AMMUNITION USED FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES IS TO BE REIMBURSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

A. WHEN SO INSTRUCED BY THE MISSION (OPERATIONS BRANCH WILL IN ALL CASES SUBMIT WRITTEN ORDERS TO THE UNITS CONCERNED IN ADVANCE).

B. AMMUNITION USED IN INCIDENTS INCLUDING USE OF WEAPONS, LOSS OF AMMUNITION.

C. PRYOTECHNICS, FLARES ETC. USED AS SURVEILLANCE MEANS IN ACTION OR WHEN PATROLLING.

D. SPECIAL AMMUNITION NECESSARY FOR DEMOLITION PURPOSES.

PROCEDURES

5. CLAIMS FOR AMMUNITION EXPENDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 4A D ABOVE SHOULD BE RAISED BY THE HOME COUNTRY'S AUTHORITIES AND FORWARDED TO NEW YORK.

6. ATTACHED TO THE CLAIM MUST BE AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS:

A. A WRITTEN ORDER FROM THE MISSION FOR USE OF THE SAME AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION.

B. "QUARTERLY REPORT OF AMMUNITION HOLDINGS" WHICH ARE CERTIFIED BY THE MISSION THAT THE AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION IN THE COLUMN QUANTITY EXPENDED (OPS) HAS BEEN REALLY EXPENDED FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSES.

7. THE DIFFERENT CONTINGENTS OR UNIT COS ARE RESPONSIBLE THEMSELVES FOR COLLECTING THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS AND SUBMITTING THEM TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES (SEE ANNEX C AMMUNITION REPORT).

*FOD REQUESTS COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE PROCEDURES/CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES NO LATER THAN 5 JULY 1994.

AMMUNTITION EXPENDED FOR OPERATION REASONS

(THIS FORM MUST BE FORWARDED TO UNITED NATIONS HQ FOR REIMBURSEMENT)

Contingent: _____ Date: _____

Period Covered: _____

Serial No.	Type of Ammunition	Unit Price US$	Quantity Expended (OPS)

OPS APPROVAL: _____ Date: _____
Signature

LOG APPROVAL: _____ Date: _____
Signature

CPO CERTIFICATION: _____ Certification: _____

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT:

Contingent: _____ _____ _____
Signature Date

Copy to:
REGARDS

Drafted/Cleared by: DIVERS	Authorized by: B. WALDRUM

LOG BR

Copy No. 10 of 16
MILOB GP HQ
KIGALI

18 Oct 94

OPO 9/94

Reference:
A. HQ UNAMIR OP ORD 20 dated 6 Oct 94.

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT order : BRAVO

1. **SITUATION**

a. General. The present structure of Govt continues to establish firm control over the entire country.

(1) RPA forces consisting of 5 x Bdes deployed throughout the country. Bdes HQ located at MEREMO KIBUNGO, GITARAMA, BUTARE, and RUHENGERI. Bdrys not clearly defined as redeployment still on-going.

(2) RPA remains resolute to ward off any resistance both within and coming from outside the country. Cordon and Search operations being conducted to recover arms and ammo in a bid to increase security within the country. Isolated arrests of people alleged to have been involved in the killings in the country continued to be made.

(3) Approximately 20,000 armed ex-RGF/Gendarmes occupying camps in Zaire mainly in the towns of BUKAVU and GOMA. There are unconfirmed reports stating that the troops are receiving some training. They might be capable of launching small-scale insurgency in conjunction with the INTERAHAMWE who escaped along with them.

(4) Some INTERAHAMWE activities have been reported within the Refugee Camps of BENACO in NGARA district of Tanzania. There are no confirmed reports yet on any of their activities inside Rwanda.

(5) Zairian authorities have declared that its territory would not be used as a launching pad for operations of ex-RGF into Rwanda. Reports however, continue to filter into Rwanda on proposed plans by them to launch attacks across Rwanda.

(6) The ex- RGF Govt continue to blackmail UNAMIR as having constituted the reason for their defeat.

(7) Unrully RPA personnel are grapping UNAMIR vehs whenever they are getting a chance. They have taken away one UNAMIR veh at gun point on 15 Oct 94.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) The intention of the FC is for the MILOBs to continue to conduct operations in support of the humanitarian effort in Rwanda. This is aimed at creating a conducive atmosphere for the return of refugees/displaced persons into Rwanda.

(2) The deployment of MILOBs, CIVPOL and Formed Troops have not changed. However, the build up of formed contingents; Tunisia, India, Zambia and Nigeria continues.

(3) Humanitarian ops in conjunction with OPERATION PASSAGE (Canada) and OPERATION GABRIEL (UK) on-gong.

(4) A total of 184 NGOs still conducting humanitarian operations in Rwanda.

(5) UNOMUR operations on Rwanda/Uganda border recently terminated.

c. Atts and dets. No change.

2. MISSION. MILOB GP is to conduct humanitarian operations in conjunction with friendly forces in support of Rwandese Government.

3. EXECUTION

a. General Outline

(1) Phase 1. Primary tasks for MILOBs continue to be provision of information regarding humanitarian operations and monitoring of security situation. A progressive handover of humanitarian ops to NGOs and Government by formed troops when most of the refugees would have returned.

(2) Phase 2. Rationalization of troops commences. MILOBs must be capable of operating with little or no support from formed contingents.

b. Detailed Task

(1) MILOB SECT 1

(a) Phase 1

i. Continue to perform present tasks.

ii. Continue with the present deployment plan.

iii. Participate in the security operations

with local authorities such as Communal Police and Gendarmerie (CIVPOL).

iv. Monitor insurgent activities.

v. Motivate the refugees/displaced persons to return to their homes.

vi. Monitor and report the movement of people at GATUNA and KAGITUMBA entry points daily.

v. Keep one team (3 x MILOBs in one veh with comm) standby; NTM: 15 mins.

(b) Phase 2

i. Continue to conduct Phase 1 operations as troops deployment and withdrawal are effected.

ii. Be prepared to perform any assigned task by FHQ or CMO.

iii. Be prepared to withdraw on order of FHQ/MILOB GP HQ.

(2) MILOB SECT 2.

(a) Phase 1

i. Continue to perform present tasks.

ii. Continue to execute present deployment plan.

iii. Participate in security ops with local authorities such as Communal Police and Gendarmerie (CIVPOL only)

iv. Monitor insurgent activities.

v. Keep one team (3 x MILOBs in one veh with comm) standby; NTM: 15 mins.

vi. Monitor and report the movement of refugees/displaced persons at RUSUMO border post Rwanda/Tanzania and Rwanda/ Burundi border near BUGESERA on daily basis.

vii. Motivate refugees/displaced persons to return to their homes.

(b). Phase 2

i. Continue to perform Phase 1 tasks as troops redeployment /withdrawal is effected.

ii. Be prepared to perform any task assigned by FHQ/MILOB GP HQ.

iii. Be prepared to withdraw on order of FC/MILOB GP HQ.

(3) MILOB SECT 3

(a) Phase 1

i. Continue to perform present tasks.

ii. Participate in security ops with local authorities such as Communal Police and Gendarmerie.

iii. Monitor and report insurgent activities.

iv. Monitor and report the movement of persons at the Burundi/Rwanda border within Bdrys on daily basis.

v. Keep one team (3 x MILOBs in one veh with comm) standby; NTM: 15mins.

vi. Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.

(b) Phase 2

i. Continue with Phase 1 tasks as troops redeployment/withdrawal is effected.

ii. Be prepared to support Sect 4 MILOBs.

iii. Withdraw on order of FHQ/MILOB GP HQ.

iv. Be prepared to perform any task assigned by FHQ/MILOB GP HQ.

(4) MILOB SECT 4

(a) Grouping. No change.

(b) Phase 1. Continue to support formed troops.

(c) Phase 2. Be prepared to come under command of MILOB GP HQ as troops redeployment/withdrawal is effected. Be prepared to perform tasks without support of formed troops.

(5) MILOB SECT 5

(a) Phase 1

i. Continue to perform present tasks.

ii. Participate in security ops with local authorities such as Communal Police and Gendarmerie.

iii. Monitor and report insurgent activities.

iv. Monitor and report on daily basis, the movement of refugees/displaced persons at GISENYI border and CYANIKA.

v. Keep one team (3 x MILOBs in one veh with comm) standby; NTM: 15mins.

vi. Continue to implement the current deployment plan.

vii. Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.

(b) Phase 2

i. Continue with Phase 1 tasks as troops redeployment/withdrawal is effected.

ii. Be prepared to perform any task assigned by FHQ/MILOB GP HQ.

iii. Be prepared to withdraw on order of FC/CMO.

(6) MILOB SECT 6

(a) Phase 1

i. Continue to perform present tasks.

ii. Participate in security ops with local authorities such as Communal Police and Gendarmerie.

iii. Monitor and report insurgent activities.

iv. Continue to monitor the security situation in KIGALI City.

v. Keep one team (3 x MILOBs in one veh with comm) standby; NTM : 15mins.

(b) Phase 2

i. Continue with Phase 1 tasks as troops redeployment/withdrawal is effected.

ii. Perform any task assigned by FC/CMO.

iii. Be prepare to support any of the Sector MILOBs on order of CMO.

iv. Provide 1 x MILOB team at KIA wef 01 Nov 94 (from 0600 to 1800hrs) for monitoring duties.

v. Be prepared to withdraw on orders.

c. Co-ordinating Instructions

(1) Boundaries. No change.

(2) Humanitarian Control Measures. Annex C ref A.

(3) Routes. Annex D ref A.

(4) Information Collection Requirement. Disseminate of subject previewed on weekly basis or as required.

(5) OPO 10. MILOBs to implement contents of OPO 10 of FHQ as related to their tasks. OPO already issued.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS. No change.

A U MOEEN
Col
ACMO

Authentication:
S ILIYA
Lt Col
S O O

Distribution :

	Copy No	
MILOB SECT 1	-	1 of 12
MILOB SECT 2	-	2
MILOB SECT 3	-	3
MILOB SECT 4A	-	4
MILOB SECT 4B	-	5
MILOB SECT 4C	-	6
MILOB SECT 5	-	7
MILOB SECT 6	-	8
PLANS/TRG BRANCH	-	9
LOG BRANCH	-	10
PERS/ADMIN	-	11
FHQ	-	12 - 13
FILE	-	14
SPARE	-	15 & 16

MILOBS GP NW LOG BRANCH		
APPR	SIG	DATE
SHOGO	RJ	19/10/94
SOTPT		
SOSUP		

→ SL040

(6)

TO : FORCE HQ

Date : 14 Oct 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : PLANS 30/94

SUBJECT : REINFORCEMENT PLAN (MILOBS)

OVERVIEW

1. From most information reiceved the potential threat to the RWANDA Government of National Unity comes from their opposition elements currently in ZAIRE. This threat cannot be ruled out on any part of RWANDA if infiltration tactics are adopted.

2. In view of this possibility a Low Intensity Operation campaign or a major incursion can only be sprung from a safe haven. Hence the western state can be used as a spring board for such purposes. Also the lose security in the south can be taken as an advantage and exploited. The refugee camps in TANZANIA are good hiding places for likely perpetrators of any hostile act in this country.

3. The above observation commits almost all UNAMIR MILOBS Sectors if a low intensity campaign is launched depending on its intensity. However, if a major incursion is launched, this might leave some of the sectors with breathing space.

4. History has shown that even low intensity operations need a lot of investment, both military and politicaly, before their intensity became a known security problem. Such operations require base areas, well concealed and heavily populated areas with good political support.

5. The terrain in RWANDA is ideal for low intensity operations, however of most concern are safe havens offered by forests on the west and Lake KIVU which is a potential obstacle but can be breached easily by infiltration if the RWANDA ousted Government Forces acquire resources.

6. These observations leave no doubt that in the event of any hostilities starting in RWANDA, the likely areas to be affected at the early stages of any campaign can be the West (UNAMIR Sectors 4C, 4B and 5) and the South (UNAMIR Sectors 4A, 3B and 2). The only Sectors likely not to be immediately affected are Sectors 1, 3A and 6.

REINFORCEMENT PLAN

7. MILOBs do not maintain a reserve and do not expect any reinforcements. The only possibility is to reinforce affected areas by MILOBs from safe areas without disrupting the operational efficiency of MILOBs where reduction has been effected.

8. If Sector 5 is affected, some elements from Sector 1 with transport and communication equipment can be moved in to support MILOBs in Sector 5. If Sectors 4B, 4C, 4A and 3B are affected,

MILOBs in Sector 3A can be thinned to reinforce affected areas. If Sector 2 is affected, MILOBs from Sector 6 and 1 can be thinned to support Sector 2. Equipment support shall be treated in the same manner.

9. The most important point to note is , as per appreciations made, MILOBs in anticipated threatened areas must not be moved until positive indications are established.

10. If continuous situation deterioration is experienced, there is no other option except to withdraw because of the threat poised to MILOBs.

RECOMMENDATION

11. It is requested that paragraph 8 be considered on the reinforcement plan currently under production at Force HQ.

MJ MASANGANISE

Lt Col

S PLANS/TRG O

Info:

A/CMO

SOO

SLOGO

S INFO/Ln O

MILOBR GP HQ LOG BRANCH		
APPT	SIG	DATE
SRO GO	[illegible]	17/10/94
SO TPT	[illegible]	4
SO Cap		

CMO SLOGO Pse send a copy each to Sectors
Sir, We can circulate to Sectors and MHQ and NBO
CMO 17/8
1118

File (3)

UN SECRET

Copy No 1 of 19

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
Kigali

8 August 94

4000.1 (Log)

See Distribution

SUBJECT: **AMENDMENTS TO LOGISTICS INSTRUCTION TO OPS ORDER 16**

Reference: Modification No 1 to Ops Order 16

1. The following amendments have been made to the Logistics Instruction.

a. **Supported UNAMIR Forces**. Para 3 d should read as follow:

(1) GHANBATT - Sector 4A (HQ in GIKONGORO),

(2) Mechanized Bn Two - Sector 4B (HQ KIBUYE),

(3) Mechanized Bn Three - Sector 5 (HQ RUHENGERI)

(4) Motorized Bn - Sector 4C (HQ CYANGUGU),

(5) Independent Motorized Coy 1 - Sector 2 (HQ KIGAKI)

(6) Independent Motorized Coy 2 - Sector 3 (HQ GITARAMA)

(7) Independent Motorized Coy 3 - Sector 1 (HQ BYUMBA)

b. The remainder of UNAMIR Forces remains unchanged.

2. A Chief Medical Officer (C Med O) has now been appointed. Col W.P. Ramsay from the Australian Contingent will now be the C Med O for UNAMIR II. Para 5 a of reference should be deleted and re
placed by the following:

a. prior to the arrival of the Australian Medical Support Force (AS MSF) the medical plan for UNAMIR II is has follow:

(1) **Level One**. All casualties are to be assessed and treated initially by unit medical staff. The Canadian Contingent's Medical Element will provide level one medical support to units without medical staff in Kigali area. Movement of non urgent casualties to this location will be under unit arrangements.

(2) **Level Two**. All units should hold low dependent care patients in own facilities for up to 48 hr.

(3) **level Three**. Initial wound surgery for trauma casualties will be undertaken by either the Medecin Sans Frontiere (MSF) or ICRC. surgical teams in Kigali.

(4) **Level Four**. Definitive care will be provided at the Nairobi hospital under the arrangements of the UNAMIR CMO.

b. **Casualty Evacuation**. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) will be coordinated by CMO using Aeromedical Evacuation (AME) or road transport as required. Request for CASEVAC are to be submitted through the C Med O and Chief Operation Officer (COO) at FHQ. The Canadian Medical Element will provide a Medical Assistant for AME that originates from Kigali. Request for evacuation will be ~~by~~ coordinated by C Med O.

c. **Location**. Key locations are as follows:

(1) C Med O - Force HQ;

(2) Canadian Med Element - Amahoro Stadium; and

(3) MFS - King Fisal Hospital.

(4) AME- aircraft - Kigali Airport

(5) Others loc to be advised

RA Dallaire
Maj Gen
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MILOB GP HQ	1
GHANBATT	2
Mechanized Bn 2	3
Mechanized Bn 3	4
Motorized Bn	5
Indep Motorized Coy 1	6
Indep Motorized Coy 2	7
Indep motorized Coy 3	8
Force Engr Coy	9
Force Sig Sqn	10
Force Field Hospital	11
UNCIVPOL	12

Information:

UNDPKO (Mission Planning Services)	13
French Coalition Force	14

Internal:

DFC	15
CAO	16
COO	17
HAC	18
C Plans	19
C Log O	20
CMPO	21
FSO	22
Camp Comdt	23

Information:

SRSG's Office	24
File	25
Spare	26-31

B & R

- ELTIS → GUANABARA

B & R → ?

(2)

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

MILOB GP HQ

UNAMIR, KIGALI

6464.0/OPS

22 Sep 94

See Distribution

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MILOBS AT KIBUNGO

GENERAL

1. The security situation, particularly in the South-Eastern region of sector 2 has become worrisome. Unconfirmed reports have revealed that certain atrocities in the form of clandestine killing and terror are being perpetrated either in form of reprisals by the RPA or by pockets of INTERHAMWE still operating within the region.

2. The reports, suggest that the ebbing level of security in the area has provoked the movement of people through the use of footpaths, tracks and a few people using the main road into neighboring Tanzania. On the contrary a few refugees/displaced persons trickle into Rwanda from either Burundi or Tanzania.

3. The intention of the FHQ is to increase its presence in the area in order to facilitate the continuous monitoring of the situation and therefore increased security for the refugees and those already returning and living in their homes.

MISSION

4. The MILOBS are to continue to provide humanitarian assistance in conjunction with friendly agencies in support of the Rwandese Government.

EXECUTION

5. Tasks:

a. MILOB sec 2-Kigali

(1) Deploy 4 x MILOB teams at Kibungo by 241800 hrs Sep 94.

(2) Teams to conduct the following tasks:

(a) Provide humanitarian assistance in conjunction with NGOs and friendly agencies/forces.

(b) Monitor and report the security situation on 24 hours basis.

(c) Report immediately any violation of humanitarian rights to MILOB HQ.

(d) Coordinate the evacuation of refugees / displaced persons.

(e) Report daily movement or flow of persons into and out of Rwanda at the border posts of Rwanda / Tanzania near Rusumu and Rwanda/Burundi, south of Bugasera.

(f) Monitor continuously the activities of custom / immigration and RPA officials at the entry point.

(g) Provide liaison with the civil authorities and the RPA within boundaries.

(h) Investigate any breach of security or serious incidents within sector.

(i) Conduct or perform any task you judge can enhance the performance of your mission.

(j) Provide unarmed escort on orders of MILOB HQ.

(k) Perform any other task assigned to you by MILOB HQ or FHQ.

UN RESTRICTED

ADMIN REQUIREMENT

6. As you are aware, the administrative requirement to enhance your deployment are still being coordinated with the FHQ. However, you are to deploy the teams with 04 vehicles including what you can mobilize for the meantime. Further instructions on communications will be issued later. The teams meanwhile will continue to use their present callsigns.

7. The DCMO will visit the teams in place on 26 Sep 94 at a time to be communicated to you.

I D TIKOCA
Col
CMO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MILOB SEC 2

Info:

MILOB SEC 1

" " 2

" " 3

" " 4A, B & C

" " 5

FHQ

Internal:

CMO
DCMO
Plans/Trg Br
Pers/Admin Br
Logistics Br

APPT	SIG	DATE
SLOWO		23/9/94
SO TPT		24/9/94
SO SUP		2'
SO MED		

UN RESTRICTED

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 11 Sep 94

FROM : Plans/Trg Cell

Ref : 13/94 Plans

INFO : DCMO
SOO
SLOGO
SMPO
FHQ

SUBJECT : MILOB SECURITY MEASURES IN ALL SECTORS

Reference :UNAMIR HQ Memo dated 29 Aug 94.

1. The prevailing situation currently demands MILOBs to expand their deployment. The question of resources to support such a programme is always failing our intentions.

2. There is a possibility of the situation deteriorating. From this basis, a tentative withdrawal plan as outline below shall serve as a guideline for MILOBs to implement. The plan shall be executed in three phases as follows:

a. Phase 1. Phase 1 shall cater for MILOBs deployed as independent teams or MILOB teams collocated with armed troops. The following withdrawal procedure shall be adopted:

(1) Independent MILOB Teams.

a. Withdraw to nearest armed troops.

b. If there are no armed troops, withdraw to MILOB Sector Hq.

(2) MILOB Teams Collocated with Armed Troops. Withdraw with armed troops to next higher troop Hq.

b. Phase 2. Phase 2 shall be considered if the situation continues to deteriorate. Independent MILOB Sectors shall be affected. Action to be taken is as follows:

(1) Withdraw to nearest armed troops Hq.

(2) Withdraw to MILOB GP Hq. This is only applicable to those Sector Hqs where armed troops

are not deployed.

c. Phase 3. If the situation continues to deteriorate then Phase 3 shall be adopted. Force Hq shall issue a withdrawal instructions to a selected area.

3. Attention of all MILOBs is drawn on the need to:

a. Recover all essential stores and equipment.

b. Identification of transport requirements.

c. Additional support requirements.

4. MILOBs are expected to continue executing task at each level of withdrawal as seen fit by the CMO.

M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

APPI	SIG	DATE
SIO GO		20/9/96
SO TPI		23/9/96
SO LOP		
SO ADMIN		