

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : SECRETARY GENERAL, NY
DATE : 15-10-62
NO. : 7300

PRIORITY

I am having Bunche make a short trip to Leo to consult with you and Kebbede in order to obtain a first hand picture of where we are, our likely direction and our capability if new developments occur. I consider this to be particularly important in preparation for the Congo advisory committee follow-up meeting on 23rd because of which I am asking Bunche to return to New York on the weekend. He will be departing from here on the weekly Panam jet flight tuesday 16th and will inform you of other details.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : ~~7299~~ 15-10-62
NO. : 7299

PRIORITY

Reference G-1420. In connection with the projected ceremony and opening of the Lubilash bridge on October 17, what is being done about the laying of the rails?

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 13-10-62
NO. : 7287

PRIORITY

Advisory Committee met afternoon 12 October, attended by several foreign ministers. Meeting began with Seegen's statement (pouched text slightly amended). Supplemental information on progress of implementation of plan was provided by reading excerpts of cables regarding work of commissions and your meeting of 11 October with Tshombe.

Members of committee generally were impressed by and welcomed Seegen's statement but wanted more time to examine it. Few questions were put, and few comments made. More important points raised are summarized below:

1. India and Indonesia considered Seegen should strengthen UN force in Congo without delay. Indonesia implied that his government would be ready to provide new contingent. Mali stated that his government would examine carefully any request made by Seegen. Seegen stated in this connexion that he considered force adequate for present duties, but would have to have to be strengthened if given new responsibilities. He indicated that he would not seek to strengthen force without advice of Advisory Committee.

2. Ghana said his government was disturbed by possible effects of federal constitution on Congo. Mali stated that part of population concerned had expressed reservations on draft constitution; he wished to have a copy of draft. Same wish was expressed by Nigeria.

3. India and Malaya pointed to the risk of having revenues from Union Minière collected through Katangese provincial authorities.

4. Ghana considered that immediate steps including use of force if necessary should be taken to disband Katangese Gendarmerie and to channel Katangese revenues to Central Government.

Next meeting scheduled for afternoon 23 October.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, KEBBEDE, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 12-10-62
NO. : 7244

ROUTINE

Have received information from a reliable source that "two or three" ANC battalions are being made available for inclusion in the Congo contingent in ONUC. Please advise.-

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE
XXXXXXXXXXXX CODE CABLE

NEW YORK

12 OCT 62

LEOPOLDVILLE

Nº 7242

GARDINER FROM BUNCHE

FOLLOWING NOTE VERBALE DATED 11 OCTOBER 1962 RECEIVED FROM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM : PARA QUOTE LE REPRESENTANT PERMANENT DE LA BELGIQUE PRESENTE SES COMPLIMENTS A MONSIEUR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL ET A L'HONNEUR DE SE REFERER AU DOCUMENT S/5053/ADD 12: SUBQUOTE REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FROM THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 21 FEBRUARY AND 24 NOVEMBER 1961 UNSUBQUOTE PARA DANS LE PARAGRAPHE 33 DE CE RAPPORT, A LA PAGE 10, IL EST SIGNALE QUE, SELON UN CERTAIN NOMBRE DE RAPPORTS JUSQU'A PRESENT NON CONFIRMES, DES AVIONS ONT ETE MONTES DANS LES USINES DE L'UNION MINIERE A KOLWEZI. PARA L'UNION MINIERE DU HAUT KATANGA A ADRESSE AU GOUVERNEMENT BELGE UNE NOTE DANS LAQUELLE ELLE AFFIRME QUE CES ALLEGATIONS SONT TOTALEMENT INEXACTES. LA COMPAGNIE RAPPELLE QUE DEJA LE 20 SEPTEMBRE DERNIER ELLE AVAIT, AUPRES DU REPRESENTANT DE L'ONU A LEOPOLDVILLE, M. MATHU, DEMENTI CES ALLEGATIONS. ELLE AVAIT, EN OUTRE, SUGGERE QUE DES REPRESENTANTS DE L'ONU VISITENT SES INSTALLATIONS ET SE RENDENT COMPTE PAR EUX-MEMES DE L'INANITE DE CES ACCUSATIONS. CES REPRESENTANTS AURAIENT PU SE RENDRE COMPTE DE L'IMPOSSIBILITE TECHNIQUE QU'IL Y AVAIT A PROCEDER A UN MONTAGE DANS LES ATELIERS EN QUESTION. PARA, LE REPRESENTANT PERMANENT DE LA BELGIQUE A RECU INSTRUCTIONS DE SON GOUVERNEMENT DE PORTER CE QUI PRECEDE A LA CONNAISSANCE DU SECRETARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES. PARA LE REPRESENTANT PERMANENT DE LA BELGIQUE SAISIT CETTE OCCASION DE RENOUVELER A M. LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL L'ASSURANCE DE SA TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION. UNQUOTE. PARA.

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND ADVICE, ESPECIALLY AS TO IMPLICATIONS OF

SUGGESTED VISIT TO KOLWEZI

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 11-10-62
NO. : 7207

ROUTINE

Reference G-1314. Have approached UK mission for action suggested and they are taking up matter with London. They have information already that you have discussed this with Riches in Leo.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 11-10-62
NO. : 7204

Further to our 7140.

1. Following results of further verification of our list of mercenaries just received from Belgian mission:

"SUITE DE L'EXAMEN DE LA LISTE DES MERCENAIRES. BOURDEAUX MICHEL EST FRANÇAIS. DEMOULIN A QUITTE KATANGA 10 SEPTEMBRE 1961, EST EN AFRIQUE DU SUD. DRAPIER EST (A) GARDE TERRITORIALE AU RWANDA. HOUTERS EST RENTRE ARMEE BELGE 16 JANVIER 1961. LEPAGE FERNAND EST A BRAZZAVILLE. LECLERCQ JEAN EST BURUNDI DEPUIS 5 JANVIER 1962. PEVENAGE EST RENTRE BELGIQUE 26 MAI 1962 SON PASSEPORT LUI A ETE RETIRE PAR SURETE ET ENVOYE AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES. FEES JEAN OCCUPE FONCTION CIVILE A EVILLE AU SERVICE DU BUDGET. VAN DER VEKEN BLESSE EN SEPTEMBRE 1961 ETAIT ENCORE EN TRAITEMENT HOPITAL EVILLE MI-AOUT DERNIER. VAN RISSEGHEN A QUITTE DEFINITIVEMENT LE KATANGA."

2. As you know, all the names have been published in annex III of SECCO report, and we cannot rule out possibility of additional communications of this type from Belgians. In light of foregoing, would you agree that it would be advisable to circulate corrigendum to S/5053/ADD.12?

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

To: Gardiner, Leo.
From: Bunche, New York.
Date: 10 October, 1962.
No. 7200.

What is status of letters Adoula plans to send out? May the Secgen count on receiving at least the one addressed to him before Friday?

.....

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : GARDINER , KEBBEDE, Leopoldville.
FROM : BUNCHE, New York.
DATE : 10 October, 1962.
NO. : 7199.

Ref ONUC 6792.

Grateful any available further information on Australian pilots flying Vampires, as Australian Mission is much interested. How long have pilots been in Katanga ? How reliable is source ? Our 760 P12 refers.

Incoming Code Cable

Most Immediate

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 10 October 1962.
No. : 7172.

SECRET

A Reuters despatch of 10 October reports arrest or detention of Gbenye on his return to Congo from visit to United States. It attributes to Thomas Mukwidi, a member of parliament, statement to effect that a security agent presented Gbenye with a search warrant, went through his luggage and had him driven to Ndolo prison. Despatch also quotes Antoine Kiwewa, another opposition member of parliament, as telling a press conference that Gbenye's arrest was expected on pretext he was involved in a secessionist plot to split eastern Swahili-speaking areas from the Congo in collaboration with Tshombe. Jean Miruho, former president of Kivu province and several of his cabinet ministers are also said to have been arrested and brought to Leo on similar charges. Please advise if you have any information about Gbenye's arrest or arrest of others on political basis.

Incoming Code Cable

Priority

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : SecGen, New York.
Date : 10 October 1962.
No. : 7167.

SECRET

Your G-1385. Approve your proposed reply.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 9 OCTOBER 1962
NUMBER : 7146.

Reference G-1331, G-1377, G-1379.

1. Belladone and Mahauden not repeat not deleted from annex I of S/5053/add.12; all other names in our 7122 and 7140 were deleted.

2. Reference Taminiau and Bauwens, we doubt utility of publishing in SECCO report names of persons who are dead or have left Katanga permanently. Similarly, Demeuse deleted because we felt it inappropriate to list belgian consulate staff as mercenaries unless evidence supports the charge as valid at present.

3. Three names in G-1331 para 1 were added to annex I; 36 names in para 2 published separately as annex II.

4. Of 21 names in G-1379 para 1, all were published in annex I except Nos 6, 7, 13, 15, 19, whom we do not find on your lists.

5. We note from your pouched memo of 28 September 1962 that an addendum to list of foreign personnel is being prepared. Suggest five persons referred to in para 4 above be included in that addendum for eventual publication as add to todays SECCO report.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 9-10-62
NO. : 7140

ROUTINE

Further to our 7122.

Belgian mission further informs that following six persons are no longer in Katanga:

Fleerackers Joseph, Ministere des Finances, Bruxelles, depuis le 7 Mars 1961.

Geigerat Jacques, Armee Belge fin 1961, forces belges en Allemagne.

Huyckebaert Willy, idem.

Servais Auguste, armee Belge Decembre 1961.

Van Mechelen Paul, Burundi depuis le 28 Fevrier 1962.

Wolter Rene, armee Belge Decembre 1961.

After examining the two lists submitted by Belgian mission, we decided to delete 40 names from list of mercenaries annexed to SECCO report. A few consequential changes were also made in body of report. We are publishing the amended list but quite frankly with some anxiety because of uncertainty about its accuracy and even the authenticity of the sources on which it is based.

SECCO report (S/5053/ADD.12) now expected to be distributed 9 October.-

(no dist,)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

To : Gardiner, Leo
From : Bunche, NY
Date : 9-10-62
No. : 7139

PRIORITY

SECGEN has just received from Adoula following letter, dated 1 October, which was sent directly from Leo by post.

"Monsieur LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL, J'AI PRIS CONNAISSANCE DE LA COPIE QUE VOUS AVEZ BIEN VOULU M'ENVOYER DE LA LETTRE DE PROTESTATION DU 17 SEPTEMBRE 1962 QUI VOUS AVAIT ETE ADRESSEE PAR MONSIEUR TSHOMBE, A LA SUITE DU GRAVE INCIDENT DU 12 DU MEME MOIS, SURVENU ENTRE LES TROUPES INDIENNES DE L'ONU ET LA GENDARMERIE KATANGAISE. ~~PAR~~ LES FAITS QUI M'ONT ETE RAPPORTES INFIRMENT LA THESE SOUTENUE PAR MONSIEUR TSHOMBE ET SUR LAQUELLE IL FONDE SA PROTESTATION.

PAR SURCROIT LES GRAVES ACCUSATIONS QU'IL PORTE CONTRE L'ONU APPARAISSENT TOUTES, PRECISEMENT, COMME ETANT CELLES QUE CES FAITS AUTORISENT A DIRIGER CONTRE LUI.

J'EN CONCLUS, A UNE NETTE MAUVAISE FOI DE SA PART.

SI L'ONU ESTIME QUE LA VERITE LUI PERMET D'ETRE DE CET AVIS, JE LUI DEMANDERAIT DE BIEN VOULOIR ME FAIRE CONNAITRE LA SUITE QU'ELLE ENTEND DONNER A CETTE AFFAIRE.

J'ESPERE QU'ELLE AURA ADOPTE A CET EGARD LA POSITION DE FERME QUI S'IMPOSE.

JE LUI EN EXPRIME A L'AVANCE MES CHALEUREUX REMERCEMENTS.

VEUILLEZ AGREER, MONSIEUR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL, L'ASSURANCE DE MA TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION. LE PREMIER MINISTRE C. ADOULA"

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Gardiner, Kebbede, Leo
 From : Bunche, NY
 Date : 9-10-62
 NO. : 7138

ROUTINE

SECRET

Following is a rough and unofficial translation of a message which Swedish mission has received from its foreign office. Text reads:

"At an improvised press conference arranged by the Swedish general staff at the Arlanda airport on his arrival thursday night Lundquist in answer to a question if he from the airborne plane had seen any movements on the ground replied that he at that moment had not seen any firing positions but that he later detected where they were. In reply to a question if he knew exactly from which party the fire had come he referred to the reconstruction made later and said 'yes absolutely'. Lundquist however refused to reveal which party he was referring to. Lundquist's appearance was throughout very confident and collected.

Wanted Secundo. Zwaghe Hamrin, Dagens Nyheter Rome correspondent quotes Lundquist as saying that the fact that two helicopters ready to take off at dawn to assist the crashed plane got no permission to start is no less than a scandal. Not until five hours later was this permission granted and the helicopters could take off. Half an hour later the rescue expedition arrived at the scene of the crash. This delay could have cost several lives. Lundquist said he did not know who was responsible for this unexplainable delay. 'before my departure from Leopoldville I spoke to colonel Olof Carlsson, on this matter', he said. 'Colonel Carlsson is second in command of the UN Congo airforce. He could not give an explanation'.

To cover up Tertio. In an editorial friday the Dagens Nyheter writes IA: with un-parallelled clumsiness and without the effect desired, attempts were made to cover up the shooting down and the hunt for the guilty. It is natural that no statement on the question of the guilt were made before the inquiry board had concluded their investigations, but why were there so persistent attempts to quiet, any deny that the crew after the landing had been shot at by Congolese soldiers, an incident which not necessarily had any direct connection with the actual grounding of the plane? Why were the photos of the crash and the survivals labelled secret? Why were the surviving Swedes so completely isolated sometimes under ridiculous circumstances as they were not able to judge who was responsible for the shooting

Who did
where

my point
down of the plane but could have told about the dramatic 24 hours after the crash.? Why has the explanation not been given to why a number of Swedes who did not normally belong to the crew were aboard the plane? The result of the UN policy of secrecy was a flood of rumours and misunderstandings and the result of denials of obviously correct information is a growing distrust in the UN information policy in the Congo. Already in connection with the fighting in Katanga in September and December last year serious shortcomings were revealed and UN information officials appeared a group of last amateurs compared to the cunning propagandists of the Tshombe's regime.

The assumption was that these experiences should result in a renewal of the UN information service, its resources and goals. The Swedish information service--the channel between the Swedish UN battalion and the Swedish press via the Swedish general staff has evidently become more effective, but it is telling that these efforts have indeed not been greeted with any greater satisfaction from the higher chiefs of the organisation in the Congo, but rather created frictions. A review of the whole attitude and the activities is necessary. The responsibility towards member states demands information and not censure."

Would appreciate your comments.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 8 OCTOBER 1962
NUMBER : 7125.

Reference G-1366.

Unable to find Lauwerg Victor PH. in your list. Please
clarify urgently.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY IMMEDIATE

To: Gardiner, Leo.
From: Bunche, New York.
Date: 6 October 1962.
No: 7122.

SECRET

Reference G-1363.

1. Belgian Mission, to which we passed list for verification, have advised us of results of their first check as follows:

" "Resultat d'un premier pointage de la liste des mercenaires.

Bauwens Jacques, tue le 15 aout 1962 sur route Kabongo.

Balladone, agent sanitaire Kamina.

Collier Cyrille, Ruanda depuis le 7 fevrier 1962.

Colpaert Georges, attache consulat Belge Salisbury.

Crustin Charles, rentre armee belge le 21 decembre 1961.

Dedeken Noel, rentre Belgique mi-1961 et a reintegre sizieme de likce à Anvers le 31 decembre 1961.

Demeuse Roger, adjoint consulat à Elisabethville.

De Troyer Jacques, est aux forces belges en Allemagne depuis le 19 decembre 1960.

Flara Maurice est au Burundi.

Gesnot Armand est decede le 31 janvier 1961.

Grandelet Claude rentre armee belge le 24 aout 1961.

Greindl Emmanuel rentre armee belge le 26 mars 1962.

Guerit Jean, est a Leopoldville.

Gysels Marcel, est à Uccle, 809 Chaussee d'Alseberg.

Heureux Paul rentre armee belge le 12 juin 1961.

Kuppens Hubert Jean, est en Belgique.

Laureys Robert, rentre armee belge le 28 fevrier 1962.

SECRET

Leclerc R. G. G., tue à Kabalo le 7 octobre 1960.

Lembrong Marcel, rentre armee belge le 11 decembre 1961.

Louviaux Joseph, rentre armee belge le 11 octobre 1961.

Maeck Raymond, est au Burundi depuis le 26 aout 1962.

Mahaudem Jacques, releve de fonctions à l'armee pour raisons de sante le 3 novembre 1961.

Mathy Paul, est rentre du Rwanda le 2 septembre 1962 en Belgique.

Mathys Jacques, rentre armee belge octobre 1962.

Moret Georges, rentre armee belge le 4 janvier 1962.

Peeters Louis, tue par detachement Ethiopiens à Kabalo le 8 avril 1961.

Piret Rene, rentre armee belge le 28 fevrier 1962.

Rimbaud Marcel, rentre armee belge le 1 mars 1962.

Rouchefort Rene, est à Bruxelles.

Santois Jacques, est rentre armee belge le 23 mars 1962.

Somville Marcel rentre armee belge le 1 mars 1962.

Taminiau Fernand, administrateur territorial en Belgique depuis 13 aout 1962.

Vandamme Rene, rentre armee belge le 16 decembre 1960.

Veron Jacques, rentre armee belge le 2 mars 1962.

Volont Victor, rentre armee belge le 1 novembre 1961.

Van Gremberghen Fernand, ecole des cadets Laeken depuis le 10 juin 1961."

2. This information clearly raises some serious questions about reliability of immigration card file and our other sources, and may require reappraisal of figures given in body of report to SECCO. Please advise most urgently as we are holding up publication of report on mercenaries.

.....

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 6-10-62
NO. : 7120

PRIORITY

Belgian mission has received information to effect that United Nations in Leopoldville had made offer to Adoula that services of constitutional experts might be continued and that Adoula had rejected the offer. I informed Belgian mission that we have no repeat no information about any such actions. Please advise.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE



TO : GARDINER, KEBBENE Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 5 OCTOBER 1962
NUMBER : 7115.

Your ONUG 6813.

Have informed belgian mission and also making independent
check on Schramme's activities but not through interpol.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 5 OCTOBER 1962
NUMBER : 7090.



Grateful your urgent advice on our 7015.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

To: Gardiner, Leopoldville.
From: Bunche, New York.
Date: 5 October, 1962.
No. 7086.

Information in your G-1355 most valuable. Urge that in future such information be flagged and passed promptly to Headquarters so that missions concerned may be informed. Otherwise missions make a strong case for inability to act due to lack of information.

....

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 4 OCTOBER 1962
NUMBER : 7062.

Your G-1307 and ONUC 6765.

1. Have informed South African mission who request all available details, such as name of firm in South Africa providing Harvards and possibly origin of P-51 Mustangs in South Africa.

2. Have informed Garin, portuguese permanent representative, of information concerning shipments of aircraft in crates through Angola. After consulting his foreign minister, who is in New York, he declared that all such reports are utterly without foundation, that portuguese authorities exercise the strictest control over shipments to Dilolo, and asked that a mention of this denial should be inserted in the SEC60report . Would appreciate your advice.

Please reply soonest.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL Newyork
DATE : 4 OCTOBER 1962
NUMBER : 7059.

Reference G-1346.

As usual you will, of course, reply to Mr. Tshombe's latest letter addressed to me. In giving appropriate answers to the points he tries to establish which you can readily do on the basis of facts well known to you, you might take occasion perhaps to point out delicately to Tshombe that the press is not always a source of accurate information.

Incoming Code Cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Gardiner, Ahmed, Leo.
From : SecGen, New York.
Date : 3 October 1962.
No. : 7036.

Reference ONUC 6703.

1. We see no objection from either political or legal view point to an individual representative of ministry of national defence being stationed at Kitona base while its present limited administration by ONUC continues, so long as he has no repeat no command authorities, operation responsibility or access to restricted materials.

2. It could be understood in effect that his presence would be designed to enable Congo Government to become familiar with problems of base operation and maintenance so as to facilitate smooth Congolese assumption of these tasks at early date. This would also serve as token indication that delay in our transfer of Kitona to central government is not ascribable to any unwillingness on our part to hand over to Congolese but only to the need for legal discharge from Belgium.

3. Therefore, we would agree to proposal by Secretary of state of ministry of national defence under conditions set forth in para 1 above and provided there are no major administrative considerations against proposal at your end. Of course it should be made clear that this arrangement should be no repeat no precedent for Kamina.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 2 OCT. 1962
NO. : 7015

SECRET

Reference G 1296. Assume you intend Annex A of SECO Report to contain name-list and biographical material pouched by you 25 August 1962. If so, question arises as to inclusion of identification of confidential sources of information. In particular, would appreciate your views on advisability of omitting references to : A) Lufungula, Cornaz and other individuals who passed information to ONUC; and B) Embassies and Consulates which apparently passed information to ONUC.

Awaiting your advice before we proceed with publication.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 2 OCT 1962
NO. : 7005

SECRET

Reference G 1313, 1322 and our 6934.

1. Hope it will not be too disappointing to you to learn that on second thought we have decided not repeat not to publish pamphlet on mercenaries which you had submitted. It is well enough written but we feel that our first responsibility is to report to SECO on a matter of this importance. Any information that is sound enough to put out at all should be included in report to SECO. It could seem odd and might be misunderstood if, in addition to a report to SECO, we put out a pamphlet carrying material not included in report to SECO. If any material in the pamphlet is not sufficiently supportable to include in report to SECO it could not be very effective as a pamphlet released publicly. We are therefore looking carefully at the pamphlet text to determine what material from it might or should be incorporated in forthcoming report to SECO.
2. The pamphlet text is good but we do not feel that it would be helpful at this time to put it out as a sort of competing document with the SECO report. We could not put it out earlier because we had not yet reported to the Council, to which we have first responsibility.
3. I am sure that you will understand our problem.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 1 OCT. 1962
NO. : 6973

SECRET

Your G-1324.

Regret delay at this end. Prompt steps being
taken to have IMF experts designated and available soonest. Endit.

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 29-9-62
NO. : 6963

PRIORITY

A reliable source informs us of a substantial build-up of Katangese Gendarmerie in Northern Katanga. What information do you have on this?

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : SECGEN, NY
DATE : 29-9-62
NO. : 6961

IMMEDIATE

As soon as your preparation of the forthcoming report to SECCO is completed, including sections on the Martini track incidents, I suggest that you undertake preparation of another report, also to SECCO, covering developments relating to the plan. This would include its manner of submission to the parties, their acceptance of it, the presentation of the program of implementation, the meetings of the commissions and the reports concerning them, the exchange of communications, etc. In this report, I think we might annex and thus release for the first time, the full text of the plan or at least the first part on reconciliation and constitution and also the text of the program for implementation.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 28 SEPT. 1962
NO. : 6958

SECRET

Reference your Memo of 25 September covering your
note of 24 September for discussion with Air Force Commander
and Air Commodore.

We endorse the positions you set forth which seem to
us sound and practical.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 28 SEPT 1962
NO. : 6946

Ref 59/9

Ref G 1306, paras 21-23. Assume you have precise information on this points indicating scope of katangese air build up and permitting some assessment of possible intentions. As, quite a part from SECCO report, such information can be put to good use here, would appreciate, to extent to which you have information at hand, up to date tabulation of old and new airfields, dates on which reconstruction and enlargement work was undertaken, & length of runways, capacity of each in order to show type of aircraft that can operate from them, etc.

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : GARDINER
FROM : SECRETARY GENERAL
DATE : 27 SEPT 1962
No. : 6905

SECRET

Reference G 1303. This is bad information but we have seen it coming and are not surprised. It becomes ever more clear that once again Tshombe is engaging in manoeuvre and ~~and~~ duplicity with the purpose of gaining time. We shall have to proceed in such manner as to ensure that he does not gain too much time and therefore our deadline for definitive action by him on the plan must be at a very near date. I am thinking now in terms of one week or ten days more at the most.

We must think now of situation that will exist when it becomes apparent and public knowledge that Tshombe has jettisoned the plan (He will of course miss no opportunity to place the blame elsewhere). In this context, as a matter of tactic and strategy, I would think our position would be stronger if before a complete breakdown in the efforts on behalf of the plan, you would make one further trip to Elisabethville to see Tshombe and to put the responsibility squarely on his shoulders. You need not envisage any extended stay in Eville but the important objective would be to see Tshombe himself this time. In view of what is likely to be a very rapid deterioration, I would think that your journey should begin quite soon. Again, we are thinking largely in terms of the record and of the impact on certain of our friends here.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 27 SEPT 1962
NO. : 6893

PRIORITY

Reference G-1300. I note and accept your views in response to our 6867 concerning a further approach to Tshombe on question of his position on the programme for implementation. Our concern stems solely from fact that, unlike Adoula, Tshombe has given no direct response to your communication to him covering the programme of implementation. Endit.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 26-9-62
NO. : 6878

PRIORITY

Reference G-1297.

Text of letter approved with special appreciation. Bravo!

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 26-9-62
NO. : 6877

PRIORITY

Report to SECCO might usefully include sections on Eville incidents of 12 and 24 September 1962 and the ONUC plane crash, but only to extent any verified facts about it are available. Mere reference could be made to board of enquiry and report expected from it later.-

(No dist.)

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 26-9-62
NO. : 6867

PRIORITY

Reference G-1199 and G-1207.

Since apparently there has been no reaction from Tshombe to programme for implementation, suggest, for purpose of record if for no other reason, you send him formal query on it.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : AMACHREE, NY
DATE : 26-9-62
NO. : 6863

ROUTINE

Reference your confidential memorandum of 19 September on Civilian Operations. A meeting was held yesterday at which the subject of your memorandum was discussed. The consensus of opinion is that while it may later be necessary for us to adopt reorganization proposals contained in your memorandum, we should not at the present moment saddle the Chief of Civilian Operations with more responsibilities. The position is therefore that a Chief Administrative officer will be appointed and I am considering appointing two deputies to the chief Civilian operations. Gilpin, as you know, will be one of them, and the other will be someone with French mother tongue.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 26 SEPTEMBER 1962
NUMBER : 6859.

SECRET

Reference ONUC 6524 and our 6781.

Have approached Danish mission and they have undertaken to request the desired confirmation from their government soonest.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 26 SEPTEMBER 1962.
NUMBER : 6852.

SECRET

Your G-1291.

Wholeheartedly support your policy of giving press only verified information. Suggest it might be desirable for you to meet correspondents who were signatories of protest and explain need for this policy and the very sound reasons behind it.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL Newyork
DATE : 26 SEPTEMBER 1962
NUMBER : 6851.

Reference G-1293 and further to our 6820.

Suggest that in your follow-up letter to Tshombe protesting
nine incident you also refute the mis-statements in Tshombe's letter
of reply to Mathu, and that again you rebut his latest crude
attempt to differentiate between the Indian and other ONUC troops.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BONCHE Newyork
DATE : 26 SEPTEMBER 1962
NUMBER : 6850.

SECRET

Reference G-1258 and our 6698.

Has investigation team on 12 September incident been
appointed as indicated ? Grateful further information.

Incoming Code Cable

Priority

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 26 September 1962.
No. : 6846.

Your G-1280. When may report of enquiry board on air crash be expected ? Important it should be available soonest as unfavourable reaction to continued silence on cause of crash are now becoming apparent.

Incoming Code Cable

NY 26/9

Routine

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 25 Sept. 1962
No. : 6845.

SecGen has received cable signed by 12 correspondents accredited to ONUC protesting what they call policy of systematic silence of high officials of ONUC with regard to important events in congo. Presume this must refer in part at least to fully justifiable withholding of all information on air crash until report of enquiry board available and refusal to allow journalists to interview crew members involved. Would be interested to know if you think there may be any other reasons for protest.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : SECGEN, NY
DATE : 25-9-62
NO. : 6820

MOST IMMEDIATE

Reference G-1244 and 1285. Mathus letter of protest to Tshombe about the incident of the mines is timely and satisfactory. I feel, however, that this should be followed up by a stronger message to Tshombe from you. Your letter, in pointing out the gravity of this new type of Gendarmerie activity, should demand of Tshombe point blank whether the planting of these mines was an authorized act and expression of his policy, and if not what he intends to do to identify and punish those responsible. You should also point out that in any circumstances this sort of military harassment of ONUC troops will not be tolerated and that notice is served that ONUC, failing satisfactory assurances from Mr. Tshombe, intends to take all necessary measures to ensure against any repetition of such hostile acts against its personnel.

In this connection would like to know from Commander of the force what ONUC's capabilities would be with regard to quickly eliminating the Gendarmerie checkpoint on Martini track and keeping it eliminated. I wish to make it clear that this is not a suggestion of action against the post at this time but only a request for information as to what we can readily do as the time need arises.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : GARDINER
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 25 SEPT 1962
NO. : 6814

SECRET

Further my 6780. It occurs to me that it might strengthen our report to SECCO on the indications of the Katangese Military build-up if that report could include letter from you to Tshombe calling his attention to those indications, particularly as regards aerial capacity for offensive action and mercenaries. Hope would be to elicit a reply from him which would also be included in the report. Your letter to Tshombe need not go into great detail, nor should it reveal our sources of information and methods of obtaining it, but it should go far enough to make clear to Tshombe that we have learnt enough to be disturbed.

Incidentally, we are informing, without going into full detail, Missions of United States and United Kingdom and possibly some others, about the build-up.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 24 SEPT 1962
NO. : 6809

SECRET

Reference G-1282. Would appreciate receiving for our
file final French text as delivered.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE AND AMACHREE
DATE : 24 SEPT 1962
NO. : 6781

SECRET

Reference ONUC 6524.

1. We feel that in interest both of Congo and ONUC no obstacles should be placed in way of acceptance of Danish Government offer, on assumption of assurance that ONUC Military and Civilian personnel will be cared for medically as well as under present circumstances.
2. In pursuance of this view, we are acting on your suggestion to approach Danish Mission for official confirmation that medical facilities for ONUC Military and Civilian personnel in Leo will be provided by the Danes on basis equivalent to facilities now provided by ONUC Hospital.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : GARDINER, KEBBEDE
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 24 SEPT. 1962
NO. : 6780

SECRET

Reference G-1273, ONUC 6503, 6508, 6509, 6510, 6402 and your pouched Memo on collection of information on mercenaries dated 19 September.

1. Impression conveyed by reports in these various messages is alarming but it is impossible here to differentiate between the verified and unverified information.
2. In view of these reports, however, it is clearly possible that some significant build-up is taking place in Katanga and particularly with regard to aerial capacity. In these circumstances it is imperative that a report be submitted to Security Council calling its attention to the developing situation.
3. Please prepare urgently draft of a report to Security Council based on information available to you as regards aerial build-up and increase in mercenaries, latter being startling if figures given in ONUC 6402 are to be taken at face value. The report should try to separate the confirmed information from that which is mere speculation or rumour. It should be as sound and unchallengeable as possible. We can be sure, of course, that it will be promptly and vigorously denied by Mr. Tshombe which stresses the need for accuracy on our part. This report should deal exclusively with the build-up issue.
4. We are fully aware, of course, of your long-standing limitations in gathering information. The limitations, as you may know, are inherent in the very nature of the United Nations and therefore of any operation conducted by it. Matter raised in ONUC 6427 will be subject of a separate cable. Endit.

Incoming Code Cable

Immediate

SECRET

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 24 Sept. 1962.
No. : 6776.

Reference ONUC 6524.

What are reasons behind Force Commander's reluctance to accept Danish offer for covering military personnel ?
I would think military concern would be limited to demand of assurance that military personnel would be properly cared for.

Incoming Code Cable

Immediate

To : Gardiner, Leo
From : SecGen, New York.
Date : 24 September 1962.
No. : 6774.

Reference G-1279. Word "peaceful" may be dropped.
Your reasoning well understood here.

What of suggestions in our 6772 ?

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 23 SEPT. 1962
NO. : 6772

Rec'd 24/9
SECRET

Reference G-1275.

1. Agree to proposed deletion in paragraph 2 and submission of letter to Adoula in French text.

2. Also suggest some other minor revisions in English text of our 6767 as follows :

a. In paragraph 2 of letter, third sentence, between the phrases " and wonders why " and " the experts " insert " there has been no opportunity for him or his representatives to consult " deleting " have not yet consulted him ".

b. Reword first sentence of third paragraph of letter to read as follows : "In this particular matter, however, I believe that it would be highly desirable and in the interest of your Government and Country to adopt a somewhat more accommodating attitude."

c. In second sentence of third paragraph substitute " rather " for " somewhat " before " logical ".

d. In second sentence of third paragraph between phrases " implementation of the plan " and " and at the same time " insert the words " as a whole ".

e. Revise third sentence of third paragraph to read : " if, on the other hand, you permit the experts to be in touch with Tshombe or his representatives at Leopoldville or Elisabethville, solely for presenting their views and comments and not for purpose of negotiation, the rights and prerogatives of your Government will be in no way affected and there will be much less risk of any blame attaching to you if any serious hitch develops in the implementation of the plan of national reconciliation. "

f. In fourth paragraph of letter in first sentence substitute "extensive " for " lengthy " and insert " have " between " I " and " decided ". In second sentence of same paragraph substitute " well-being " for " prosperity ".

Please comment. Endit.

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

Ref 2/19
PRIORITY.

To : Mr. R. Gardiner, LEO.
From : Secretary-General, NEW YORK.
Date : 22 September 1962.
No. : 6767.

Your G-1256.

Do you consider that a letter from me to Adoula along the following lines would serve any useful purpose at this time ?. Please comment.

" Mr. Prime Minister

Mr. Robert E. A. Gardiner has already informed you of my deep satisfaction to learn that you and your Government have accepted the plan of national reconciliation, which I submitted to you on 20 August 1962. I am convinced that the plan, if applied fairly and faithfully, will contribute decisively to ending the crisis which has plagued the Republic of the Congo for more than 2 years. For this reason, I wish to address to you a personal appeal to do everything possible to ensure the success of the plan.

I wish in particular to draw your attention to the importance of the preparation of the draft federal constitution which, in my view, constitutes the keystone on which the whole plan rests. If the draft gave rise to serious objections from interested parties, the application of the whole plan might well be jeopardized. In this connexion, I note that while the constitutional experts are about to complete their draft, Mr Moise Tshombe raises the question of preliminary consultations and wonders why the experts have not yet consulted him. I do not forget the observations you were kind enough to make on this subject when you notified me of your acceptance of the plan. You are well aware of my firm position upholding the rights and prerogatives of the Central Government of the Congo.

In this particular case, however, I believe that it would be highly desirable for you to consider adopting a somewhat more accommodating attitude on behalf of the Central Government. This particular request of Mr. Tshombe for consultation will appear somewhat logical, at least to world

Page 2.

opinion, and if it is rejected I fear that its rejection may be made the basis for his withholding cooperation on the implementation of the plan and at the same time making a plausible case before world public opinion. If, on the other hand, you permit the experts to contact Tshombe, the rights and prerogatives of your Government will be in no way affected but you will also not run the risk of a serious hitch developing in the implementation of the plan of national reconciliation.

It is only after lengthy consideration that I decided to draw your attention to this question, and I know that you will understand that I have done so only because of my anxiety not to prolong the present crisis. Such a prolongation might well have the most serious consequences for the prosperity of your country and I sincerely believe that the plan of national reconciliation affords a good chance of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

Accept, Sir, etc. "

SECRET

RLX 22/9

Incoming Code Cable

Routine

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : Urquhart, New York.
Date : 22 September 1962.
No. : 6757.

Reference G-1260.

Assuming ambassador of federal republic agreeable to publication of information passed to us by him, no objection this end to releasing story if you think it would serve useful purpose at this time. Timing left to you discretion.

Incoming Code Cable

Routine

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : SecGen, New York.
Date : 21 September 1962.
No. : 6737.

Reference G-1255, ONUC 6402.

1; Pamphlet was put aside for the moment to avoid possible confusion in official quarters and public opinion in view position taken in SecGen's comments on your last report (S/5053/add.11, para 63).

2. However, your ONUC 6402, reporting new count of mercenaries and of their influence which appears markedly out of line with previous information, may compel re-examination of our position. Your paper on subject just received and being studied.

Incoming Code Cable

Routine

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : SecGen, New York.
Date : 21 September 1962.
No. : 6736.

Reference G-1257.

1. Would appreciate full information on our protests and interventions on this subject. Has your formal strong protest to Tshombe referred to in G-1126 been sent ?

2. Your reluctance to go to Elizabethville unless Tshombe starts implementing plan understood and appreciated. This would seem to make written representation by you on supplies blockade, if not already lodged, unavoidable at this stage.

3. Agree necessity firm action which would not upset reconciliation applecart and yet impress on Tshombe that subject no joke. Grateful your views on suggestions in our 6172 para 3, and, if possible, your proposals for progressive steps along those lines.

4. How much of Katangese rail traffic do we control ? Can pressure in your opinion be effectively applied by restrictive or dilatory application of ONUC clearance procedures? Would seizures by ONUC be desirable to make up for our impounded supplies ?

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : SECGEN, NY
DATE : 21-9-62
NO. : 6722

PRIORITY

Am informed by reliable source that radio message from the Gendarmerie was intercepted requesting and receiving permission to shoot at aircraft. Presume this information, if authentic, will be made available in details to board of enquiry.-

(no dist.)

TO : GARDINER
FROM : URQUHART
DATE : 20 Sept 1962
NO. : 6714

SECRET

Following Note Verbale sent today to Permanent Observer of Federal Republic of Germany:

" The Acting Secretary General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Permanent Observer note verbale of 31 August 1962 concerning aircraft of German identity in the territory of the province of Katanga, in the Republic of the Congo.

The Officer in ~~charge~~ charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo has been informed by your countrys ambassador to Leopoldville that the representative of the Boelkow Works has reported to his firm in Munich that United Nations officials in Elisabethville had authorized the sale of three aircraft, type Boelkow 207, to persons in Katanga. Needless to say, no such authorization has ever been or indeed could be given by any UN officials.

Moreover, the Acting Secretary General has taken note of the statement in the Permanent Observers Note Verbale that " The Export Permission necessary for a sale would not be granted by the Federal Government, a fact of which the management of the Boelkow Works is aware ", and that the said management " Has promised to instruct its representative to remove the two planes from Katanga Province".

Introduction into Katanga for " Sales Demonstration " purposes of aircraft whose sale cannot legally be envisaged by Boelkow Company would seem to be wholly inappropriate, more especially in view of the methods resorted to by the Company Representative who, in addition, is reported by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic in Leopoldville to have arranged sales of other aircraft to Katanga in 1961. It should also be borne in mind that the flying of planes into the territory of the Republic of the Congo without the authorization of the Central Government is not permitted.

Accordingly the Acting Secretary General is confident that the Federal Government will take all necessary measures to prevent the attempted sale of these or other aircraft in Katanga, and that it will find effective ways to cause all the aircraft in question to be removed from that province. He would appreciate receiving such further information on this matter as the Permanent Observer may be able to secure."

SECRET

Incoming Code Cable

Routine

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From: SecGen. New York.
Date: 20 September 1962.
No. : 6703.

Your G-1244. Since Tshombes' request seems a logical one, would suggest you renew efforts to persuade Adoula to send the constitutional experts to E'ville for consultation or failing this to suggest to him that Tshombes own members of constitutional commission who presumably still in Leo might be consulted in Leo.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Priorite

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : SecGen, New York.
Date : 20 September 1962.
No. : 6696.

SECRET

Reference ONUC 6395. We are increasingly disturbed by continued blocking of ONUC supplies in Katanga. We feel that this is a subject which you might take up directly with Tshombe when you go to E'ville. What is the timing of your next visit there in your present thinking ?

Incoming Code Cable

Priorite

SECRET

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 18 September 1962.
No. : 6630.

Reference G-1240. Text is satisfactory and approved.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

To ; Gardiner, Leo
From : Bunche, Ny
Date ; 17-9-62
No. ; 6623

Routine

Document received from Frasca and is being studied. Thanks.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To: Gardiner, Leo
From: Bunche, New York
Date: 16 September 1962
No.: 6621

SECRET

Reference G-1235, G-1236.

1. Agree with Mathu that Tshombe's letter is crude attempt to create division between UN groups. Accordingly, while endorsing points made in your reply, we think it important to add to it some passages directly and fully refuting Tshombe's Accusations and insinuations relative to incident of 12 September.
2. Would therefore propose text along following lines, to be inserted possibly after your first Paragraph:

"Je ne saurais, d'autre part, laisser ~~sans~~ sans reponse votre allegation selon laquelle les troupes indiennes de l'ONUC auraient ouvert le feu sans ordre et auraient fait leur guerre a eux. Je tiens a vous faire remarquer qu'un tel ordre n'etait point necessaire, etant donne que les troupes des Nations Unies ont pour instructions permanentes de tirer pour se defendre lorsqu'elles font l'objet de coups de feu. Comme le representant de l'ONUC a Eville l'a deja fait a plusieurs reprises, je declare que l'incident du 12 Septembre 1962 s'est produit lorsque les Katangais ont tire sans provocation sur les troupes de l'ONUC, et que ces dernieres n'ont tire qu'en dernier ressort pour se defendre.

Toute perte de vies humaines, qu'elles soient Africaines ou non-Africaines, nous preoccupe vivement, et l'un des objectifs des Nations Unies au Congo est precisement ~~a~~ eviter de telles pertes. C'est la raison pour laquelle la Force des NU a fait preuve d'une grande retenue, et s'est toujours interdit de se servir de ses armes sauf en cas de necessite extreme ou sa legitime defense l'imposait.

Les allegations que vous faites a l'egard du contingent indien/..

(No. 6621, contd.)

sont entierement depourvues de fondement, et je repudie categoriquement toute insinuation selon laquelle les troupes indiennes auraient ouvert le feu sans ordre ou auraient viole l'autorite a laquelle elles doivent obeissance. Nous avons le plus haut respect pour les troupes indiennes, dont la discipline et le courage ne laissent rien a desirer. Comme vous le savez fort bien, ces troupes ont exerce une retenue et une moderation remarquables en face de nombreuses provocations dont elles ont fait l'objet au cours de leur sejour au Katanga.

D'autre part, votre reference a une patrouille "Irreguliere" est parfaitement denuee de fondement, etant donne que les patrouilles de l'ONUC a Eville ont emprunte regulierement depuis le mois de Mars 1962 la route que l'une d'elles suivait le 12 Septembre lorsqu'elle a subi l'attaque katangaise. Il s'en suit que la patrouille en question n'etait ni "Irreguliere" ni "Injustifiee".

Etant donne votre insistance sur ce sujet, j'estime devoir vous dire qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'etablir une distinction quelque quelle soit entre africains, indiens ou autres en ce qui concerne la maniere dont ils representent l'Organisation des Nations Unies, et pour ce qui est de leur diligence dans l'accomplissement des taches et des responsabilites qui leur incombent aux termes des mandats de l'Organisation.

Je tiens, par ailleurs, a repondre a votre lettre en me permettant d'indiquer. . . etc unquote.

3. The foregoing is suggestive only, of course, but I feel that the record must show a rejoinder to Tshombe's attacks, especially on indians.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

PRIORITY

To : Gardiner, Leo
From : Bunche, New York
Date : 16 September 1962
No. : 6620

Reference G-1233 and G-1234.

1. With regard to query in first paragraph your G-1233, I would advise great caution. The quite likely result of exposing the draft in this way would be a host of suggestions for change advocated by the governments through their ambassadors. That, I imagine, would create no little awkwardness for you.
2. Final text of reply to Tshombe is satisfactory.
3. Wish you much luck in your continued effort as indicated Paragraph 4 G-1233.

TSU

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 15 SEPTEMBER 1962
NUMBER : 6619.

Reference G-1230 and G-1231.

1. Agree fully on delicate nature of request. It is awkward to deal with. Moreover, it is, as you know, in principle at least, regarded sympathetically by Belgium and United Kingdom.

2. I note that Tshombe's letter is addressed to Mathu. In this instance it might be advisable to have the reply go in Mathu's name. You could follow up with a later communication, if necessary.

3. If central government will not agree that constitutional experts go to Eville, could they be persuaded to permit specified and limited number of representatives from provinces, including Katanga, to come to Leo solely to convey orally to experts their views on constitutional questions? This would seem reasonable, on surface at least, and would be very helpful if only in depriving Tshombe of an alibi and a propaganda weapon.

4. Reply might recall that UN provided experts at specific request of central government, just as UN acted similarly in providing Stavropoulos in response to Tshombe's request for a constitutional expert. As regards these experts, therefore, Tshombe's request could more properly have been addressed to the central government. However, he (Mathu) will report Mr. Tshombe's wish to you in Leo, indicating that you may undertake to convey it to Mr. Adoula. It could be added that thus far, at any rate, the experts have not gone out of Leo. Would it be feasible to go one step further and say that it would go without saying that any written comments on constitutional questions submitted by Katanga would come to the attention of the experts and be taken into account by them, as envisaged in the plan?

5. Would appreciate your reactions.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 15 SEPT. 1962
NO. : 6617

SECRET

Reference G-1229. Text approved.

SECRET

Incoming Code Cable

Routine

To : Gardiner, Kebbede, Leo.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 14 September 1962.
No. : 6576.

1. Reference ONUC 6287. Reference paragraph 3 Katanga provinces. Was it a regular practice by ONUC to send patrols in vehicles along the route and to the distance indicated, and was this done daily, or how often; also for how long a period has this patrol been going on? Had this patrol experienced any other trouble at any time in the past ?

2. What is to be done with the material taken by ONUC when the Gendarmerie fled ? Perhaps it should not be returned as quickly and readily as in the past.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 13-9-62
NO. : 6560

IMMEDIATE

Reference G-1217 and G-1218.

1. We would hope that if ONUC has observers present at autopsy to be performed, as indicated by Mathu, a competent medical man would be included in the group.

2. I am less than happy about Mathu's sentence reading "we intend to come to an arrangement with Katangese authorities concerning sites of roadblocks and patrol areas". I seriously question advisability of any formal acceptance on ONUC's part of Gendarmerie roadblocks anywhere in the Eville area. I also strongly feel that we should not seek to clear locality of ONUC positions and areas of ONUC patrols with the Katangese.

Would appreciate your comments.-

(No dist.)

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Gardiner, Leo
From : Sec Gen, New York
Date : 12 September 1962
No. : 6536

Reference ONUC 6140. We have no objection to the hand-over if it is on the basis of either of the two understandings set forth your message.

TSU

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 11 SEPTEMBER 1962
NUMBER : 6523.

SECRET

ref 12/9

Reference my 6085.

U.K. mission informs that David Tshombe has requested british travel papers to enable him to go to England to visit his children who are there. The british intend to stand by the policy reported in the above mentioned message. On the other hand, they would hope that Mr. Tshombe could be provided with proper travel papers by the Central Government in view of the completely non-political nature of his trip. It was added that the U.K. ambassador had approached you on the matter and also Adoula. It would seem entirely unreasonable to require a katangese to come all the way to Leopoldville to obtain a passport. Can you do anything helpful ?

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : SECGEN, NY
DATE : 10-9-62
NO. : 6482

PRIORITY

Your G-1183. Following is reply to Adoula's letter number 3902/62 of 3 September:

"Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

I wish to thank you for your letter of 3 September in which you request that the mission of Mr. Mahmoud Khiary in the Congo be extended, and I am grateful to you for your appreciation of the services that Mr. Khiary has rendered to your country and to the United Nations.

As you may know, Mr. Khiary's assignment in the Congo had terminated on 30 June last, and it was only at my express request that he kindly consented to extend his stay in the Congo for a further period of 3 months; that is, until the end of the current month. In the circumstances, I do not feel that I can ask Mr. Khiary to prolong his stay beyond 30 September. Indeed, I had already designated, although not announced, Mr. Khiary's successor some time before I received your letter, and much as I would have liked to oblige you in this particular matter, I find that it is not possible to do so.

I assure you that Mr. Khiary's successor will work with you and your government in that same spirit of friendship and close collaboration which characterized Mr. Khiary's service.

Please accept, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, the assurances of my highest consideration".-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

Ref 11/9

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork
DATE : 10 SEPTEMBER 1962
NUMBER : 6475.

SECRET

Reference G-1196, 1197, 1199 and 1200.

1. Revised program of implementation approved with one change:
in I (B)_{de} (2), " de ces revenus " should be replaced by " des revenus
provenant tous les droits ou taxes sur les exportations et importations
du Katanga et de toutes les redevances des concessions minieres au
Katanga "
2. Reference IV (B) (5), we note your comment in G-1197 on
" un corps national de forces armées et de gendarmerie ", but we
also note that this is exact working employed in plan.
3. Text identical letters to Adoula/Tshombe approved.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO
FROM : BUNCHE, NY
DATE : 10-9-62
NO. : 6472

ROUTINE

Reference G-1196 and G-1197. Studying revised text and comments and will advise you shortly. In meantime please do not repeat not deliver the second letter and programme for implementation until Secretary General gives signal.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

To : GARDINER
From : BUNCHE
Date : 9 SEPT 62
N° : 6471

REFERENCE OUR 6466. FOLLOWING FRENCH TRANSLATION OF PROGRAM OF IMPLEMENTATION : QUOTE PROGRAMME D'APPLICATION DU PLAN.

I. DISPOSITIONS CONSTITUTIONNELLES

1. LE GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL DONNERA IMMEDIATEMENT AUX EXPERTS DES NATIONS UNIES EN MATIERE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL LES DIRECTIVES NECESSAIRES POUR QU'ILS ACHIEVENT LEURS TRAVAUX SUR LE PROJET DE CONSTITUTION FEDERALE AVANT LA FIN SEPTEMBRE ET POUR QU'ILS TIENNENT COMPTE ^{ap cours} DE CES TRAVAUX, DES DISPOSITIONS PERTINENTES DU PLAN ET EN PARTICULIER DE LA SECTION ONE RELATIVE AUX DISPOSITIONS CONSTITUTIONNELLES.

(REMARQUE : DANS SA NOTE D'ACCEPTATION, TSHOMBE PARLE DE "JURISTES DESIGNES AVEC LE CONSENTEMENT DES PARTIES INTERESSEES" (G.1177, deuxieme PARAGRAPHE), ~~8881X88~~ CECI EST MANIFESTEMENT INACCEPTABLE).

2. CONFORMEMENT AU PLAN, LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA ATTIRERA L'ATTENTION SUR SON COMMUNIQUE DU 29 JUILLET ET INVITERA DE NOUVEAU LE GOUVERNEMENT DES ETATS ET TOUS LES GROUPES POLITIQUES INTERESSES A LUI FAIRE PARVENIR LEURS VUES SUR LES DISPOSITIONS QUI DEVRONT ETRE INCLOSES DANS CETTE CONSTITUTION.

3. EN REPONSE A CETTE INVITATION, H. TSHOMBE PRESENTERA SANS DELAI LES VUES DU KATANGA SUR LA CONSTITUTION.

4. LORSQUE LE PROJET DE CONSTITUTION FEDERALE SERA ACHEVE, LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA LE PRESENTERA ET LE DEFENDRA AU PARLEMENT, COMME IL EST PREVU DANS LE PLAN.

5. AU CAS OU L'UNE OU L'AUTRE DES PARTIES CONTESTERAIT LE PROJET DE CONSTITUTION, LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL S'ENGAGE A DONNER UN AVIS AUTORISE RONDE SUR L'INTENTION MANIFESTE DE LA DISPOSITION PERTINENTE DU PLAN.

(REMARQUE :

/4 CETTE DISPOSITION DOIT APAISER LES APPREHENSIONS EXPRIMEES DANS G.1174, DEUXIEME PARAGRAPHE, ET G.117. IL NE SEMBLE PAS QUE LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL PUISSE ALLER PLUS LOIN.).

II. REVENUS ET DEVISES.

A. LOI FINANCIERE.

1. LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL METTRA IMMEDIATEMENT UNE EQUIPE D'EXPERTS A LA DISPOSITION DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL POUR L'AIDER A PREPARER UN PROJET DE LOI FINANCIERE QUI DETERMINERA LES MODALITES DE REPARTITION DES REVENUS ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL ET LES GOUVERNEMENTS DES ETATS AINSI QUE LES REGLEMENTS ET PROCEDURES POUR L'UTILISATION DES DEVISES.

(REMARQUE: (DANS G.1174, TROISIEME PARAGRAPHE, VOUS INDIQUEZ QUE LA PREPARATION DE LA LOI FINANCIERE ENTRE DANS LES ATTRIBUTIONS DES EXPERTS CONSTITUTIONNELS. IL FAUT RECONNAITRE QUE LE PLAN N'EST PAS CLAIR SUR CE POINT. NOUS CRAIGNONS QUE CELA N'ENTRAINE DES CONFUSIONS. NE SERAIT-IL PAS PREFERABLE DE DISTINGUER LES DEUX OPERATIONS EN DESIGNANT, POUR S'OCCUPER DE LA LOI FINANCIERE, DES EXPERTS FINANCIERS ? LES EXPERTS FINANCIERS POURRAIENT, BIEN ENTENDU, CONSULTER LES EXPERTS CONSTITUTIONNELS CHAQUE FOIS QUE CELA SERAIT NECESSAIRE. LE PEU DE TEMPS DISPONIBLE NE JUSTIFIERAIT -IL PAS EGALEMENT LA CREATION DE DEUX CATEGORIES D'EXPERTS ?)

2. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADJULA TRANSMETTRA IMMEDIATEMENT LA SECTION 2 DU PLAN AUX EXPERTS FINANCIERS, EN LEUR RECOMMANDANT DE L'UTILISER COMME BASE DE LEURS TRAVAUX.

(REMARQUE: CECI N'EST PAS PREVU DANS LE PLAN, MAIS SEMBLE LOGIQUE ET NECESSAIRE.)

3. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADJULA S'ENGAGERA A INVITER SANS DELAI TOUTS LES GOUVERNEMENTS PROVINCIAUX ET TOUTS LES GROUPES POLITIQUES INTERESSES A PRESENTER AU GOUVERNEMENT LEURS VUES SUR LE PROJET DE LOI FINANCIERE.

4. EN REPONSE A CETTE INVITATION, TSHOMBE PRESENTERA SANS DELAI LES VUES DU KATANGA SUR LE PROJET DE LOI FINANCIERE.

5. LORSQUE LE PROJET DE LOI FINANCIERE SERA AACHEVE, LE PREMIER MINISTRE LE PRESENTERA ET LE DEFENDRA AU PARLEMENT, COMME IL EST PREVU DANS LE PLAN.

6. MESURES PROVISOIRES.

(REMARQUE: LE PLAN NE CONTIENT AUCUNE DISPOSITIONS CONCERNANT LES PERSONNES OU LES ORGANES QUI SERAIENT CHARGES DE L'APPLICATION DES MESURES PROVISOIRES. VOUS AVEZ SUGGERE DEUX COMMISSIONS MIXTES AIDEES PAR DES EXPERTS DES NATIONS UNIES. ON POURRAIT EGALEMENT FAIRE APPEL AU FMI.).

1. UNE COMMISSION PROVISOIRE POUR LA REPARTITION DES REVENUS, COMPOSEE DE DEUX REPRESENTANTS DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL ET DE DEUX REPRESENTANTS DU KATANGA, SERA NOMMEE IMMEDIATEMENT. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA ET LE PRESIDENT DE LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA, M. TSHOMBE, DESIGNERONT IMMEDIATEMENT LEURS REPRESENTANTS. LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL PRETERA LE CONCOURS D'UNE EQUIPE D'EXPERTS POUR AIDER LA COMMISSION DANS SES TRAVAUX.

(REMARQUE: VOUS AVEZ PROPOSE LA COMPOSITION SUIVANTE POUR L'EQUIPE D'EXPERTS DES NATIONS UNIES : DADRE (CHEF); SCHARF (FISCALITE); NICOLLE (CONTROLE DU BUDGET ET DOCUMENTS); TURNIER (OUVRIER); SAID (QUESTIONS JURIDIQUES) ET HELLE SIMON (SECRETAIRE). NOUS PRENONS NOTE DE VOTRE PROPOSITION ET L'APPROUVONS.).

2. LA COMMISSION AURAIT LE MANDAT SUIVANT :

A) PARTAGER LES REVENUS PROVENANT DES DROITS SUR LES IMPORTATIONS ET LES EXPORTATIONS DU KATANGA AINSI QUE DES REDEVANCES DES CONCESSIONS MINIERES AU KATANGA;

B) PROPOSER DES METHODES ADMINISTRATIVES VISANT A LA REPARTITION, A PARTS EGALES, DE CES REVENUS ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL ET LE KATANGA (G.1174, TROISIEME PARAGRAPHE, G.1180, G.118 VOIR B ET G 1186 B NON B, NON PREVU DANS LE PLAN).

3. UNE COMMISSION POUR LES RECETTES EN DEVISES, COMPOSEE DE DEUX REPRESENTANTS DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL ET DE DEUX REPRESENTANTS DE LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA, SERA MISEE IMMEDIATEMENT. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADJULA ET LE PRESIDENT DE LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA, H. TINDJE, DESIGNERONT IMMEDIATEMENT LEURS REPRESENTANTS. LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL PRETERA LE CONCOURS D'UNE EQUIPE D'EXPERTS POUR AIDER LA COMMISSION DANS SES TRAVAUX.

(REMARQUE: VOUS AVEZ PROPOSE LA COMPOSITION SUIVANTE POUR L'EQUIPE D'EXPERTS DES NATIONS UNIES: FRASCA (CHEF); DEUX MEMBRES DE L'ONUC QUI S'OCCUPENT DES TRAVAUX DU CONSEIL MONETAIRE OU SONT AU COURANT DE SON ACTIVITE. NOUS PRENONS NOTE DE VOTRE PROPOSITION ET L'APPROUVONS.).

4. LA COMMISSION AURAIT LE MANDAT SUIVANT:

A) RASSEMBLER DES RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR L'IMPORTANCE DES DEVISES ENTREES PAR LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA, ET SUR LA REGLEMENTATION REGISSANT EN PARTICULIER TOUTES LES TRANSACTIONS EN MONNAIES ETRANGERES QU'AUTORISE LA BANQUE NATIONALE DU KATANGA;

B) PROPOSER DES MESURES CONCERNANT L'ALLOCATION DE DEVISES, LA STANDARDISATION DES PROCEDURES ET L'UNIFICATION DES RESERVES DE DEVISES (G.1174, TROISIEME PARAGRAPHE, G.1181, G.1184 C ET G.1186 C).

5. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADJULA CHARGERA LE CONSEIL MONETAIRE, OU UNE INSTITUTION QUE CELUI-CI DESIGNERA ET QUI SERA ACCEPTEE PAR LES PARTIES, DE RECEVOIR LA PART DE 50 P 100 DES REVENUES DU KATANGA ET DE SE CONSTITUER EN DEPOSITAIRE DES DEVISES. (CECI EST EFFECTIVEMENT PREVU DANS LE PLAN).

6. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADJULA ENGAGERA IMMEDIATEMENT DES NEGOCIATIONS AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT BELGE DE FACON QUE CELUI-CI L'AIDE A ELABORER UNEPROCEDURE POUR LA PERCEPTION EN BELGIE DES DROITS SUR TOUTES LES MARCHANDISES EXPORTEES DE BELGIE AU CONGO (G.1186 F).

(REMARQUE: CETTE DISPOSITION N'EST PAS PREVUE DANS LE PLAN, MAIS ELLE EST

MANIFESTEMENT UTILE.).

7. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA DEMANDERA EN OUTRE AUX ETATS VOISINS DE L'AIDER A CREER UN MECANISME POUR LE CONTROLE DES ARMES ET LA SUPPRESSION DE LA CONTREBANDE (G.1185 G).

(REMARQUE: CETTE DISPOSITION N'EST PAS PREVUE DANS LE PLAN, MAIS ELLE EST MANIFESTEMENT UTILE.).

(REMARQUE: LA SOLUTION SUIVANTE POURRAIT ETRE ADOPTEE A LA PLACE DE CELLE QUE VOUS PROPOSEZ CI-DESSUS. VEUILLEZ NOUS DIRE CE QUE VOUS EN PENSEZ ?

LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA PRIERA LES NATIONS UNIES D'OBTENIR L'ASSISTANCE D'EXPERTS DU FMI POUR METTRE AU POINT D'URGENCE LES DETAILS TECHNIQUES CONCERNANT LA REPARTITION DES REVENUS ET DES DEVISES PENDANT LA PERIODE INTERMEDIAIRE INTERIMAIRE.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA POURRAIT EN OUTRE FAIRE CONNAITRE ET EN TOUT CAS SIGNALER A L'ATTENTION LES DECRETS EXISTANTS AUX TERMES DESQUELS TOUTES LES AUTORITES DOIVENT DEPOSER LEURS DEVISES AUPRES DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL.

TENONDE DEVRAIT COMMENCER AU PLUS TOT A VERSER LA PART DE 90 P 100 DES REVENUS DU KATANGA AU CONSEIL MONETAIRE OU A L'INSTITUTION QUE CELUI-CI DESIGNERA.)

III. MONNAIE.

1. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA INVITERA IMMEDIATEMENT LES NATIONS UNIES A DEMANDER AU FMI DE CHARGER SES EXPERTS D'ETABLIR UN PLAN PORTANT SUR L'UNIFICATION PROGRESSIVE DE LA MONNAIE.

(REMARQUE: CECI EST PREVU DANS LE PLAN. DANS G.1174, QUATRIEME PARAGRAPHE, VOUS PROPOSEZ QU'UNE COMMISSION COMPOSEE DE DEUX REPRESENTANTS DE CHACUNE DES PARTIES ET BENEFICIAIRE DE L'AIDE D'EXPERTS DE L'ONU (ET NON DU FMI) SOIT CHARGEE DE PREPARER UN PLAN PORTANT SUR L'UNIFICATION PROGRESSIVE DE LA MONNAIE. TOUTEFOIS, DANS G 1184 ET G 1186, VOUS SEMBLEZ ETRE REVENU A LA FORMULE FMI. VEUILLEZ NOUS DONNER DES ECLAIRCISSEMENTS.).

2. L'UNIFICATION MONETAIRE DANS L'ENSEMBLE DU CONGO DOIT SE FAIRE DANS LES SIX JOURS QUI SUIVront L'APPROBATION DU PROGRAMME PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT.

IV. DISPOSITIONS MILITAIRES.

A. SERMENT D'ALLEGANCE AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE.

1. UNE DECISION SERA PRISE IMMEDIATEMENT SUR LA FORME DU SERMENT D'ALLEGANCE.

2. DES DISPOSITIONS SERONT PRISES, AVEC L'ASSISTANCE DES NATIONS UNIES, POUR QUE TOUT LE PERSONNEL MILITAIRE ET PARAMILITAIRE ET LE PERSONNEL DE LA GENDARMERIE, A PARTIR DU GRADE DE LIEUTENANT - COLONEL, SE RENDENT IMMEDIATEMENT A LEOPOLOVILLE POUR PRETER SERMENT D'ALLEGANCE AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE, SOIT DEVANT LE PRESIDENT LUI-MEME SOIT DEVANT TOUTE PERSONNE NOMMEE PAR LUI POUR RECEVOIR LE SERMENT.

3. A LEUR RETOUR, LES OFFICIERS EN QUESTION FERONT PRETER SERMENT AUX AUTRES OFFICIERS DE LEURS UNITES ET A TOUTS LES HOMMES DE TROUPE, EN PRESENCE D'UN REPRESENTANT DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL.

5^e

(REMARQUE: LA FORMULE CI-DESSUS EST CELLE QUE VOUS AVEZ PROPOSEE. ELLE/ECARTE DU PLAN SUR DEUX POINTS. LE PLAN VISE LES COMMANDANTS D'UNITES SANS PRECISER LEUR GRADE; IL NE PREVOIT DE SERMENT D'ALLEGANCE POUR D'AUTRES QUE LES COMMANDANTS D'UNITE ET NE STIPULE PAS QUE LES OFFICIERS DEVROnt SE RENDRE A LEOPOLOVILLE POUR PRETER SERMENT. ON POURRAIT REMPLACER CE TEXTE PAR LE SUIVANT : "LES COMMANDANTS DE TOUTES LES UNITES MILITAIRES, PARAMILITAIRES OU DE LA GENDARMERIE, QUI NE L'ONT PAS DEJA FAIT, PRETERONT LE SERMENT USUEL D'ALLEGANCE AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE SANS DELAI. L'ONU AIDERA LE GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL ET LES AUTORITES KATANGAISES A METTRE AU POINT D'URGENCE UNE PROCEDURE DETAILLEE A CET EFFET.")

B. COMMISSION MILITAIRE.

1. ADDULA ET TSHUMBE NOMMERONT CHACUN IMMEDIATEMENT UN REPRESENTANT A LA COMMISSION MILITAIRE.

2. LE COMMANDANT DE LA FORCE DES NATIONS UNIES NOMMERA IMMEDIATEMENT UNE EQUIPE

D'EXPERTS MILITAIRES DES NATIONS UNIES (SPECIALISES DANS LES QUESTIONS INTERESSANT LES OPERATIONS, LE PERSONNEL, LA LOGISTIQUE ET L'AVIATION) QUI AIDERA LA COMMISSION DANS SES TRAVAUX.

3. LES AUTORITES MILITAIRES DES DEUX PARTIES FOURNIRONT A LA COMMISSION TOUS LES RENSEIGNEMENTS QUI LUI SERONT NECESSAIRES. CES RENSEIGNEMENTS POURRONT PORTER NOTAMMENT SUR LE DEPLOIEMENT, L'ORGANISATION, LES EFFECTIFS, LES EMBLEMENTS LES ARMES, LES MUNITIONS ET L'EQUIPEMENT AINSI QUE LES MOYENS DE TRANSPORT DES UNITES MILITAIRES, PARAMILITAIRES ET DE GENDARMERIE.

(REMARQUE: CETTE FORMULE EST VOLONTAIREMENT MOINS FORTE QUE CELLE QUE VOUS AVEZ EMPLOYEE DANS VOTRE COMMUNICATION DU 4 SEPTEMBRE.).

4. A TITRE DE PREMIERE MESURE EN FAVEUR DE LA PAIX, LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL PAR INTERIM DEMANDERA L'ARRET DE TOUS LES MOUVEMENTS DE TROUPES AU KATANGA. LES FORCES DE L'ONUC VERIFIERONT SI CETTE MESURE EST BIEN APPLIQUEE, ET A CET EFFET DEVRONT AVOIR ACCES A TOUS LES ENDROITS OU LES TROUPES SERONT CONCENTREES.

(REMARQUE: NOUS CONVENONS QU'ILS SERA PEUT-ETRE DIFFICILE D'AMENER ADOULA OU TSHOMBE A ACCEPTER CELA, MAIS NOTRE INSISTANCE TEMOIGNERA DE NOTRE VOLONTE D'IMPARTIALITE A L'EGARD DES DEUX CAMPS).

5. LA COMMISSION, ASSISTEE PAR LES EXPERTS FOURNIS PAR L'ONU, METTRA AU POINT, DANS UN DELAI DE 30 ~~MMRXXX~~ JOURS, UN PLAN VISANT A L'INTEGRATION ET A L'UNIFICATION RAPIDES DE TOUTES LES UNITES MILITAIRES, PARAMILITAIRES OU DE GENDARMERIE AUX FINS DE LES CONSTITUER "EN UN CORPS NATIONAL DE FORCES ARMEES ET DE GENDARMERIE".

(REMARQUE: LE TEXTE CI-DESSUS ne VA PAS AUSSI LOIN QUE VOTRE PROPOSITION DETAILLEE EN DATE DU 4 SEPTEMBRE QUI POURRAIT SE LIRE COMME SUIVANT :

"DU FAIT QU'ELLE S'OCCUPERAIT DE L'ENSEMBLE DES EFFECTIFS DES FORCES COMBINEES DISPONIBLES, C'EST LA COMMISSION QUI DEVRAIT INDiquer QU'ELLES UNITES - QU'ELLES RELEVANT

DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL DU KATANGA, QU'IL S'AGISSE D'ELEMENTS MILITAIRES OU PARAMILITAIRES OU DE LA GENDARMERIE - IL FAUT ENVOYER A CERTAINS EMPLACEMENTS IMPORTANTS POUR QUE LES FORCES KATANGAISES, EN TANT QU'UNITES AUTONOMES, PUISSENT ETRE INTEGREES DANS LA STRUCTURE DU COMMANDEMENT MILITAIRE DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL. SUR CETTE BASE, ON PREPARERA UN PLAN PREVOYANT QUE LES UNITES SERONT REPARTIES NOTAMMENT ENTRE LES ENDROITS VOULUS. PAR LA SUITE, LA COMMISSION INDICHERA DANS LE DETAIL COMMENT SON PLAN D'INTEGRATION DES FORCES DOIT ETRE MIS EN OEUVRE."

PARLE

(REMARQUE: VEUILLEZ NOTER TOUTEFOIS QUE LE PLAN D'UNE INTEGRATION NON PAS DANS UNE STRUCTURE RELEVANT DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL MAIS DANS "UN CORPS NATIONAL ...").

C. APPLICATION

1. UNE FOIS LE PLAN MILITAIRE ACHEVE, LA COMMISSION DEVRAIT VISITER, AVEC LES EXPERTS DES NATIONS UNIES, TOUTES LES BASES MILITAIRES, PARAMILITAIRES OU DE GENDARMERIE IMPORTANTES POUR EXPLIQUER AUX TROUPES COMMENT L'INTEGRATION VA SE FAIRE. TOUTES LES AUTORITES CENTRALES, DES ETATS ET LOCALES ASSURERONT A LA COMMISSION AINSI QU'AUX EXPERTS DE L'ONU QUI L'ASSISTERONT UNE COMPLETE LIBERTE DE MOUVEMENT, SUR L'ENSEMBLE DU TERRITOIRE DU CONGO.

2. LE PLAN MILITAIRE SERA EXECUTE EN SOIXANTE JOURS. LA COMMISSION SE PRONONCERA SUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DETAILLEE. UNE FOIS LE PLAN ACHEVE, LES NATIONS UNIES CONTINUERONT A FOURNIR LEUR CONCOURS, S'IL LEUR EST DEMANDE, EN VUE DE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DU PLAN.

(REMARQUE: SANS VOULOIR NECESSAIREMENT L'INCORPORER AU PROGRAMME CI-DESSUS, NOUS TROUVONS INTERESSANTE VOTRE SUGGESTION TENDANT A FAIRE UNE DEMARCHE AUPRES DE M. ADBULA POUR L'AMENER A ACCEPTER QUE L'ONU ANNONCE QUE LES MERCENAIRES LUI DEMANDANT ASILE PENDANT UNE PERIODE DONNEE SERAIENT RAPATRIES RAPIDEMENT AVEC L'AIDE DE LEUR AMBASSADE. TOUTS LES MERCENAIRES APPREHENSES APRES L'EXPIRATION DE CETTE PERIODE SERAIENT REMIS AUX TRIBUNAUX CONGOLAIS POUR ETRE JUGES CONFORMEMENT A LA LOI CONGOLAISE. NOUS COMPRENONS QUE LE BUT DE CETTE DECLARATION SERAIT D'ENCOURAGER LES DESERTIONS DANS LA

GENDARMERIE KATANGAISE ET PEUT-ETRE DE DEMORALISER LA GENDARMERIE DANS SON ENSEMBLE, MAIS NOUS NE SOMMES PAS DU TOUT CONVAINCUS QU'ELLE AURAIT CET EFFET. ICI, ELLE POURRAIT ETRE MAL COMPRISE ET CREER DES MALENTENDUS DANGEREUX).

V. AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.

1. TSHOMBE PRENDRA SANS DELAI DES MESURES POUR ABOLIR LE "MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES" D'ELISABETHVILLE ET TOUTES LES MISSIONS KATANGAISES A L'ETRANGER, COMME IL EST PREVU DANS LE PLAN.

2. LE GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL PRENDRA RAPIDEMENT TOUTES LES MESURES VOULUES POUR DELIVER DES PASSEPORTS A TOUS LES CONGOLAIS, Y COMPRIS LES KATANGAIS, QUI DESIRENT VOYAGER A L'ETRANGER ET POUR ACCORDER DES VISAS AUX NON-CONGOLAIS DESIREUX DE SE RENDRE AU CONGO (N 1186).

3. LE PRESIDENT DE LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA, M. TSHOMBE, POURRA ENGAGER IMMEDIATEMENT DES DISCUSSIONS AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL EN VUE DE L'ETABLISSEMENT A L'ETRANGER DE REPRESENTATIONS KATANGAISES N'AYANT AUCUN CARACTERE DIPLOMATIQUE OU CONSULAIRE.

VI. AMNISTIE

1. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA DECRETERA IMMEDIATEMENT, ET S'IL Y A LIEU PRESENTERA XXXX ET DEFENDRA AU PARLEMENT UNE LOI PROCLAMANT UNE AMNISTIE GENERALE.

LES NATIONS UNIES AIDERONT LE GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL DANS CETTE TACHE, SI LA DEMANDE EN EST LEUR/XX FAITE.

(REMARQUE: COMPTE TENU DE VOTRE G 1174, NOUS DEMANDONS A NOS SPECIALISTES DES QUESTIONS JURIDIQUES DE PREPARER UN PROJET DE TEXTE QUI POURRAIT COMBLER AU MOINS EN PARTIE LE FOSSE QUI SEPRE ADOULA DE TSHOMBE.).

VII. COOPERATION AVEC LES NATIONS UNIES.

L'ATTENTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA ET DU PRESIDENT DE LA PROVINCE DU KATANGA, M. TSHOMBE, SERA ATTIREE SUR LA SECTION 7 DU PLAN AUX TERMES DE LAUELLE ILS

DOIVENT COLLABORER PLEINEMENT AVEC L'ONUC A L'APPLICATION ET A L'EXECUTION DES RESOLUTIONS DE L'ONUC RELATIVES AU CONGO.

VIII. RECONSTITUTION DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE ADOULA S'ENGAGERA A REITERER PROCHAINEMENT SON OFFRE D'ATTRIBUER DES MINISTRES A DES MEMBRES DU PARTI CONAKAT ET PRECISERA DE QUELS MINISTRES IL S'AGIT.

RUC 8/9

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

To : Gardiner, Leo.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 9 September 1962.
No. : 6468.

The additional comments and suggestions mentioned in our 6466 are the following :

A. Amachree's Comments :

1. Dubious about paragraph II(b)(6) under interim measures, because of the Belgian collection angle. What degree of importance do you attach to this provision ?
2. Has doubts about para I(5) (Constitutional arrangements) and feels that if it is retained at all, it should precede the existing para 4.

B. Rolz-Bennett's Comments :

1. Where words "Immediate" and "without delay" appear, would prefer, to extent feasible, substitution of a precise date deadline. I realize, however, that probably in most instances this cannot be readily done.
2. In connection with para II(b)(5), would it be practical and helpful to envisage a sub-office of the Monetary Council in E'ville ?
3. In IV(a)(1), after word "taken" insert "by the central Government".

G. Belgian Comments :

The Acting representative of Belgium has given a "Note de travail" setting forth a number of suggestions, many of which have been anticipated in the program of implementation that

has been sent to you. The points not covered are set forth herewith :

I. Constitution.

1. "A la demande d'Adoula CMA les juristes internationaux convoquent les représentants du Gouvernement katangaïs (et des autres provinces qui seraient prêtes à le faire) pour prendre connaissance des points de vue et conceptions que le Katanga demande d'inclure dans la Constitution."

2. "L'invitation des juristes internationaux aux autorités katangaises de leur envoyer des représentants devrait être doublée d'une réponse des Nations Unies à la note remise le trois septembre par Tshombe à Mathu; cette réponse contiendrait l'acceptation par Gardiner de tenir le Gouvernement du Katanga au courant des travaux constitutionnels et approuverait aussi l'envoi de représentants qualifiés katangais pour discuter de la Constitution avec les juristes internationaux."

INTERIM MEASURES (FINANCIAL)

I "Le Gouvernement central doit immédiatement annoncer que les dispositions prévues au Paragraphe II, (a) et (b) du plan sur le partage des revenus et des devises étrangères CMA seront d'application à partir du 1er Octobre".

2. "Le Gouvernement central demandera au comité Monétaire d'élaborer et de publier au cours du mois de Septembre un règlement fixant les procédures auxquelles les administrations et les sociétés (personnes physiques et morales) devront se soumettre dès le 1er Octobre de telle manière qu'à partir de cette date le conseil monétaire dispose des pouvoirs et mécanismes permettant d'assurer techniquement le déroulement des opérations et le règlement doit aussi prévoir comment le Comité monétaire exercera son contrôle à Elisabethville".

3. "Le règlement prévu ci-dessous permettra au Conseil monétaire à la fois le contrôle :

(Para. A) des rentrées extérieures de devises (produit des exportations et transferts);

(Para.B) des devises recoltées par le paiement des taxes et droits sur les importations CMA, CMA exportations CMA redevances minières CMA constituant les revenus dont le plan prévoit le partage entre le Gouvernement central et le Katanga. Il appartiendra au Conseil monétaire d'établir les conditions suivant lesquelles pourront être retrocedés les devises qu'il juge nécessaire pour le budget katangais et l'activité des sociétés au Katanga.

4. "Le Comité monétaire enverra le plus tôt possible à Elisabethville des experts financiers CMA répondant à l'invitation deux fois lancées (2 et 3 août et 3 septembre) par Tshombe de voir des spécialistes examiner les comptes du Katanga et les informations recueillies par les experts fourniront au Comité monétaire une partie des éléments requis pour l'établissement du montant total des revenus à partager, (c'est au cours de cette phase que les autorités de l'Union Minière devraient être consultées et associées à l'élaboration des règlements. (Para6666) militaires.

"D'accord entre les Nations Unies et le Gouvernement central CMA la date de la première réunion de la commission militaire sera annoncée".

Your opinions on the foregoing will be appreciated.

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Gardiner, Leo.
From: Secretary General, New York.
Date: 8 September 1962.
No.: 6466.

1. For your review and comment herewith is text of second letter to be sent to Adoula and Tshombe presenting the program for implementation of the plan. Our draft letter is short, as you may wish to suggest additions. We have no objection if you would wish to send non-identical texts to the two parties. The program for implementations is extensive and calls for your comments here and there, especially where there are alternatives.

2. Text of letter reads :

" Mr. Prime Minister,

Pursuant to my letter of 7 September 1962, I am now directed by the Acting Secretary General to transmit to you, as an enclosure to this letter, a detailed programme for the immediate implementation of the plan.

I am sure that you will agree with me that this programme is in full conformity with the letter and the spirit of the plan, which you have fully accepted, and provides for the faithful and fair application of all of its provisions. As you will note, ~~that~~ it includes a number of measures which should be taken immediately, and I am sure that you will take the necessary actions without delay.

The Acting Secretary-General wishes to take this opportunity to reassure you of his full support and assistance in the expeditious implementation of the plan, which is of possibly decisive importance to the future of your country and the well-being of its people. "

SECRET

3. Text of original English version of program of implementation reads (French is being done here) :

" Program for implementation of the plan (operator heading just mentioned centred and underlined.)

Romans 3. Constitutional arrangements (last 2 words underlined.)

1. Instruction will be given immediately by the central Government to the constitutional experts provided by the United Nations to complete their work on the draft Federal Constitution before the end of September, taking into accounts, in so doing, the relevant provisions of the plan, and particularly Section 1 on constitutional arrangements.

(Comment: Tshombe in his note of acceptance spoke of " Juristes designes avec consentement des parties Interesseees " (G-1177 2nd Paragraph). This obviously is not acceptable.)

2. Prime Minister Adoula, in pursuance of the plan, will draw attention to his communique of 29 July and will renew his invitation to Governments of States and all interested political groups to submit their views on the provisions to be included in the Constitution.
3. In response to this invitation, Mr. Tshombe will promptly submit Katange's views on the Constitution.
4. When the draft Federal Constitution is completed, Prime Minister Adoula will submit and support it before Parliament as envisaged in the plan.
5. In the event of challenges to the draft Constitution by either party, the Secretary-General undertakes to afford authoritative advice on the basis of the clear intent of the applicable provision of the plan.

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(Comment: This is to delay the apprehensions expressed in G-1174 Paragraph 2 and G-1177. It seems to be as far as the Secretary-General is entitled to go.)

Romans 2. Revenue and Foreign Exchange (Last four words underlined)

A. Financial Law (Last two words underlined)

1. The Secretary-General will immediately place at the disposal of the Central Government a team of experts to assist the Government in preparing a draft financial law which will determine arrangements for the division of revenues between the Central and State Governments and regulations and procedures for the utilisation of foreign exchange.

(Comment: In G-1174, Paragraph 3, you indicate that the preparation of the financial law is part of the work of the constitutional experts. The plan admittedly is not clear on this point. Our concern is that this might lead to some confusion. Might it not be better to separate the 2 operations and designate financial experts for the financial law ? The financial experts, of course, could consult the constitutional experts whenever necessary. Is not the short time factor also another reason in support of 2 sets of experts ?)

2. Prime Minister Adoula will immediately transmit Section 2 of the plan to the financial experts, with a recommendation that they should use it as a basis for their work.

(Comment: The plan does not call for this but it would seem logical and necessary.)

3. Prime Minister Adoula will undertake to issue promptly to all provincial governments and to all interested political groups to submit to the Government their views on the draft financial law.

4. In response to this invitation, Mr. Tshombe will submit without delay Katanga's view on the draft financial law.

5. When the draft financial law is completed, the Prime Minister will present and support it in Parliament as envisaged in the plan.

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B. Interim Measures (Last two words underlined)

(Comment: The plan does not make provision for the persons or bodies to be entrusted with the implementation of the interim measures. You have suggested 2 joint commissions assisted by UN experts. Another suggestion could be the IMF.)

1. An interim revenue division commission composed of 2 representatives from the Central Government and 2 from Katanga will be appointed immediately. Prime Minister Adoula and Provincial President Tshombe will immediately designate their representatives in this commission. The Secretary-General will provide the commission with a team of experts to assist in its work.

(Comment: We note and approve your proposal that the UN team be composed of - Badre (Chief); Scharff (Taxation); Nicolle (Budget Control and Documents); Turner (Customs); Said (Legal Matters) and Miss Simeon (Secretary).)

2. The terms of reference of the commission are (A) to assess the revenues deriving from the duties imposed on imports into, and export from Katanga, and the duties from the mining concessions in Katanga; and (B) to propose administrative methods for effecting the equal division of these revenues between the Central Government and Katanga. (G-1174, Paragraph 3, G-1180, G-1184 B and G-1186 B,)

3. A foreign exchange earnings commission composed of ~~two~~ 2 representatives from the Central Government and 2 from Katanga province will be appointed immediately. Prime Minister Adoula and Provincial President Tshombe will designate immediately their representatives on the commission. The Secretary-General will provide the commission with a team of experts to assist in its work.

(Comments: We note and approve your proposal that the UN team be composed of Frasca, Chief, and 2 ONUC members assigned to or familiar with the work of the Monetary Council.)

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4. The terms of reference of the commission are (A) to collect information concerning the extent of foreign exchange earned by the Province of Katanga; and the rules and regulations governing in particular all transactions in foreign currencies, as authorized by the Banque Nationale du Katanga; and (B) to propose measures for the allocation of foreign exchange earnings; the standardization of procedures, and the unification of foreign exchange reserves. (G-1174, Para 3, G-1181, G-1184 C and G-1186 C)

5. Prime Minister Adoula will designate the monetary council, or an institution appointed by it which is acceptable to the parties concerned, to receive the 50 per cent share of Katanga revenue and to act as depository for foreign exchange. (This is actually in the plan)

6. Prime Minister Adoula will immediately initiate negotiations with the Belgian Government with a view to obtaining its help in drawing up a procedure for the levy in Belgium of the duties on all goods exported from Belgium to the Congo (G-1186, F)

(Comment: Not covered by plan but is clearly useful.)

7. Prime Minister Adoula will also solicit the assistance of neighbouring states in the setting up of machinery for the control of arms and the suppression of smuggling, (G-1186, GO.

(Comment: Not covered by plan but is clearly useful.)

Comment: An alternative to the foregoing, which you have suggested, might be the following. Would appreciate your views.

alternative
Prime Minister Adoula will call upon the UN to obtain the assistance of IMF experts to work out urgently the technical details of revenue and foreign exchange division during interim period.

Prime Minister Adoula might also publicize and otherwise call attention to existing decrees which provide for all authorities to deposit foreign exchange with the Central Government.

Tshombe should start paying soonest the 50 per cent share

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of Katanga revenue to the Monetary Council or the institution designated by it.

Romans 3. Currency (Last word underlined)

1. Prime Minister Adoula will immediately invite UN to request IMF to instruct its experts to work out a phased programme for currency unification.

(Comment: As envisaged in the plan. In G-1174, Paragraph 4, you suggest "A commission composed of two representatives from each side, assisted by UN (not IMF) experts, to draw up a phased programme for currency unification. However, in G-1184 and G-1186 you seem to have reversed to the IMF formula. Please advise.)

2. Currency unification throughout the Congo is to take effect within ~~30~~ 10 days after the Government has approved the program.

Romans 4. Military Arrangements (Last 2 words underlined)

- A. Swearing of the ^{oath} ~~other~~ of allegiance to the President (Last 9 words underlined)

1. A decision will immediately be taken on the form of the oaths of allegiance.
2. Arrangements will be made, with United Nations Assistance, for all military, para-military ANC gendarmerie officers of the ranks of LT Colonel and above to come immediately to Leopoldville to swear the oaths of allegiance to the President of the Republic in front of either the President or any person nominated by him for this purpose.
3. ~~Spd~~ In return the officers so named will swear in other officers of their respective units, as also all enlisted men, in the presence of a representative from the Central Government.

(Comment: The foregoing is your suggested approach. In 2 instances it does not square with the plan. The plan applies to commanders of units without specified ranks, makes no provision for swearing of other than unit commanders, and does not call for the officers