

UNAMIR

G3 UNIT - CEASE FIRE

14 FEB - 26 JUNE 1994

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

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agreed

Pour une meilleure concertation et afin d'accélérer les travaux pour la mise en application effective de l'accord de cessez-le-feu, je souhaiterais que l'ordre du jour soit communiqué en avance aux deux délégations et que l'ordre ne s'en écarte pas lors des débats, et que s'il y a des points à faire figurer sous la rubrique "divers", ceux-ci soient examinés en dernier lieu.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

BIZIMUNGU Augustin
Général-Major
Chef EM AR

Copie Pour Information

- Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense
K I G A L I
- Monsieur le Chef EM Gd L
K I G A L I

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U N A M I R

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: DFC

Date: 26 June 1994

Subject: PLANNING DIRECTIVE 2 (for OP PLAN 14)

1. MISSION

a. AIM: To detail the move of people and organizations to coincide with the deployment in OP PLAN 14 over the 4 to 6 weeks.

b. TASKS: Read in four columns:

SER.	EVENT	COMPLETION DATE	RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZAT.
1.	Establish UN-protected camp on Kigali Golf Course suitable for 15,000 persons	15 Jul	HAC
2.	Move displaced persons from Amahoro Stadium	Begin 15 Jul	HAC
3.	Move displaced persons from Meridien Hotel	Begin 15 Jul	HAC
4.	Move displaced persons from King Faysal Hospital	1 Aug	HAC
5.	Move displaced persons from Airport	15 Jul	HAC
6.	Establish some offices for CAO and guest accommodation at Meridien	23 Jul	CAO
7.	Establish Hotel "Chez Lando" for offices and Qtrs	15 Aug	CAO
8.	Move A COY GHANBATT from Amahoro Stadium to	15 Jul	GHANBATT

9.	SIG SQN occupy Stadium	Begin 15 Jul	CAN SIGS
10.	Establish RWANDEX as LOG Base	At cease-fire only	C LOG O
11.	Use of CENTRE D'EFFETS SCOLAIRES as LOG Base and accom for GHANIAN PL and CDN LOG PL	4 Jul	C LOG O
12.	<u>KIA</u> Presidential Hanger + old Tower + Main Terminal (C COY and B COY GHANBATT)	15 Jul	GHANBATT
13.	<u>KIA</u> LOG COY GHANBATT will use old flying club and fire hall on North side of field and area now used by displaced persons.	15 Jul	GHANBATT
14.	Establish CENTRE CHRISTOS as GHANBATT BN HQ and A COY	7 Jul	GHANBATT
15.	TUN COY (-) to move to Amohoro Stadium (Basket Ball Court)	1 Aug	TUN COY (-)


2. COORDINATION

- a. The DFC is to organize and chair a meeting between the RPA Senior Liaison Officer, or an RPA authority who can provide appropriate decisions, and the following Sections/Units:
 - 1) OPS
 - 2) HAC
 - 3) LOG
 - 4) CO GHANBATT
 - 5) A/CAO
 - 6) TUN COY (-)
- b. The meeting must take place NLT than 30 Jun 94.
- c. The meeting must cover:
 - 1) Not getting this infrastructure will call for our delay of deployment.
 - 2) We will move sub-units into Kigali City (BYUBATT Golf building) as soon as it is safe as a first priority.

- 3) We wish to move a Coy to BUGASERA and GITARAMA as soon as possible, as the concentration of GHANBATT in KIA and around Force HQ is temporary.
- 4) The KIA Presidential Hangar can be given up to RPA once we can move to Kigali centre and outlying areas.
- 5) All tasks outlined above.
- 6) Immediate access for detailed recce.
- 7) Determine all requirements dictated by the RPA for the use of all locs listed above.

3. CONCLUSION

To ensure the smooth deployment of incoming personnel and the smooth occupation of the infrastructure, a sense of URGENCY and IMMEDIATE REACTION is required.


 BGen H.A. Anyidoho
 DFC

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Action: COO, C LOG O, HAC, GHANBATT, TUN COY (-), CAO (NAIROBI), A/CAO (KIGALI), CAN SIGS

Info: FC, CMO, CMPO, EX DIR, MIL SPOKESMAN, AMA, ADC, CAMP COMD, UNHA, MSF, FSF

Copy No of

UNAMIR
Force HQ

K April 1994

UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL PLAN
OPERATION - HARBOUR LIGHTSOPERATION ORDER NO - 41. SITUATION.a. RPF/RGF Forces.

(1) After the death of President Habyarimana, the situation deteriorated very fast. Mass killing of civilian population in and around Kigali created panic and fear among the habitants of Kigali. RGF along with Gendarmerie initially started the massacre and subsequently the civilian Hutus joined them in expediting the mass killing.

(2) Initially RPF high command did not react to the activities of the RGF but soon they ran out of patience and came out of CND. By 07 Apr 94, RPF has consolidated in and around CND and fanned out upto Hotel Village in the north, Remera in the south, Amahoro Stadium in the east and Meridien round-about in the west. As on 13 Apr 94 morning, RGF and Gendarmerie position both from north and south, RPF are carrying out mopping up operations.

(3) New COS of RGF has offered unconditional cease-fire to RPF. UNAMIR is the mediator of the probable cease-fire. This cease-fire deal is being sent to RPF authorities. However, it has become very difficult for UNAMIR to function under the present circumstances more specially since both sides (RPF and RGF) seem never to honour their word.

b. UNAMIR Forces.

(1) All troops of DMZ Sector have started withdrawing from DMZ area and the move will be completed by 191800 April 1994. DMZ Sector will take over the entire responsibilities of Kigali Sector. Handing/taking over process has already began.

(2) Most of the national forces, which came in assistance to evacuate ex-patriates have returned to their respective countries.

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(3) KIBAT and UNAMIR staff (Belgic) are preparing to withdraw from RWANDA. Sector HQ Kigali and KIBAT are now located at KIA. They are providing security at KIA.

2. **Mission.** To withdraw UNAMIR forces from RWANDA on order.

3. **Execution.**

a. **Concept of Operation.** The entire forces to concentrate in KIGALI. Bulk of personnel and light sensitive/priority equipments will be flown out of the country through KIA. Only essential vehicles and heavy equipments will move by road to TANZANIA (DAR-ES-SALAM) or KENYA (NAIROBI/MOMBASSA). The operation will be conducted in four phases. The size of the road move is to be kept to a minimum size.

(1) **Phase 1.**

(a) Concentration of the entire force at KIGALI.

(b) Preparation of move by road and by air.

(2) **Phase 2.** Evacuation of personnel and light sensitive/priority equipments by air through KIA.

(3) **Phase 3.** Road move of vehicles and heavy equipments from KIGALI to Tanzanian border or to Ugandan border and to KENYA.

(3) **Phase 4.** Continue move of forces to either DAR-ES-SALAM, TANZANIA or NAIROBI/MOMBASSA, KENYA.

b. **Kigali Sector.**

(1) **Grouping.**

(a) KIBAT.

(b) RUTBAT.

(c) TUN Coy (-).

(d) Troops of Sector HQ.

(e) FAD, Ft Med Pl.

(2) **Tasks.**

(a) **Phase 1.**

i. Concentrate all assets at respective Battalion/Company areas.

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ii. Secure KIA and routes KIA-KIGALI where UNAMIR troops are located.

iii. Defend KIA.

(b) Phase 2.

i. Continue to defend KIA.

ii. Move of personnel and light sensitive/priority equipments to KIA.

iii. Evacuation of personnel and light sensitive/priority equipments by air.

(c) Phase 3. Road move of vehicles from KIGALI to TANZANIA/UGANDA/KENYA.

(d) Phase 4. Continue move.

c. DMZ Sector.

(1) Grouping.

(a) BYUBAT

(b) Force troops.

(c) Troops of Sector HQ.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Phase 1.

i. Concentrate all personnel and equipments at KIGALI.

ii. Recover all possible equipments from BYUMBA.

(b) Phase 2.

i. Move of personnel and light equipments to KIA.

iii. Evacuation of personnel and light equipments by air.

(c) Phase 3. Road move of vehicles from KIGALI.

(d) Phase 4. Continue move.

d. MILOB Gp.(1) Grouping. Integral.(2) Tasks.(a) Phase 1.

i. All UNMOs located at different places to concentrate at KIGALI.

ii. Provide escorts and LO as and when required on order from Force HQ only.

(b) Phase 2. Withdraw maximum of UNMOs through KIA.(c) Phase 3 and 4. Provide escort and liaison during road move.e. Force Engr Coy.(1) Grouping. Integral.(2) Tasks.

(a) Be prepared to perform road clearance tasks on order.

(b) Withdraw on orders as per the plan of DMZ Sector.

f. Force Logistic Coy.(1) Grouping. Integral.(2) Tasks.(a) Phase 1. Concentrate all assets at company area.(b) Phase 2.

i. Provide transportation to withdrawing force as per Logistics plan.

ii. Evacuate of personnel and non-essential light equipments by air.

(c) Phase 3. Road move of vehicles from KIGALI.(d) Phase 4. Continue move.

g. Medical Platoon.(1) Grouping.

- (a) One First Aid Det (FAD).
- (b) Med Platoon (-).

(2) Tasks.

- (a) Med Platoon (-), on order withdraw through KIA.
- (b) FAD to deploy at Amahoro Stadium and provide medical support during all the phases. On order, withdraw by road.

h. Move Control Platoon.(1) Grouping.

- (a) KIA Control Det.
- (b) Destination Airport Control Det.
- (c) Road Move Control Det.

(2) Tasks.

- (a) **KIA Control Det** to control the air move at KIA throughout.
- (b) **Destination Airport Control Det** to withdraw fast and control the incoming traffic at the destination airport.
- (3) **Road Move Control Det** to lead the road move with MP Det and establish Move Control office at the destination.

j. MP Section.(1) Grouping. Integral.(2) Tasks.

- (a) Control all move from Force HQ location to KIA and handle vehicular traffic at KIA parking during Phase 1 and Phase 2.
- (b) Deploy 1 det to lead the convoy with Road Move Control during Phase 3 and Phase 4.
- (c) Provide traffic control at important road

junctions and at congestions due to break down of any vehicle.

(d) Help in clearing vehicle casualties out of the way.

c. Coord Instructions.

(1) Timings.

- (a) Phase 1. W.
- (b) Phase 2. W + 1 to W + 2.
- (c) Phase 3. W + 3.
- (d) Phase 4. W + 4 to W + 14.

(2) Rules of Engagement. As published for Expatriates Convoy Duties on 11 April 1994, attached as annexed 'A'.

4. Service Support.

a. Minimum cargo will be planned for air lifting and also essential equipments to move by road. Units to assess and work out the priorities.

b. Items like defence stores, additional ration, un-serviceable equipments, vehicles beyond local repair and old vehicles which are likely to break down enroute, will be left behind.

c. All equipments, vehicles and stores which can not be taken, to be dumped unit-wise at AMAHORO Stadium.

d. In consultation with the Sector HQs, battalions/coys, CMPO will workout the mode of move of personnel. Priority of movement of personnel by unit is as follows:

- (1) Sick personnel.
- (2) Non-combatant.
- (3) Administrative personnel.
- (4) Combatants not immediately required for operations.
- (5) Combatants.
- (6) Unit/Coy HQ personnel.

e. Minimum persons to move by road. Each vehicle should have two persons.

f. Food and Water

- (1) By Road. Each individual to carry three days food and water.
- (2) By Air. Each individual should carry one day food and water.
- (3) Unit/Coy HQ to cater for two days reserve ration (for road movements).

g. Medical

- (1) FAD to be located at Amahoro Stadium by W - 1 to provide medical support till the completion of withdrawal.
- (2) Force Medical Officer to work out the requirement of hygiene chemicals for all UN installations and ensure that they are used properly.
- (3) UNAMIR Force Hospital to close down on W - 2.


h. Detail logistic orders to be issued by C Log O.

5. Command and Signalsa. Location

- (1) Force HQ continues to function from present location until W + 1, 1800 hours.
- (2) Alternative HQ. Terminal building, KIA. It will open on W + 1, 1800 hours. Force HQ command elements will withdraw last by air.

b. Radio Net

- (1) Close all low priority radio assets.
- (2) Withdraw all radio sets from all, other than key personnel.
- (3) Signal Instruction. Anx 'B' (being issued separately)


R A DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

Distribution :

External :

Action :

Kigali Sector HQ
DMZ Sector HQ
MILOB Gp HQ
Force Engr Coy
Force Log Coy
Force Med Pl

Information :

RUTBAT
BYUBAT G

Internal :

SRSG
DFC
COO
C Log O
Office Copy

UNAMIR INSTALLATIONS - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

1. UNAMIR Installations are

- a. Whether compounds surrounded by fences or walls, containing UN personnel or UN equipment.
- b. Vital grounds defended by UN troops, i. e. grounds to which UN troops will not allow any access unless to persons presenting themselves at the normal access(es) and after identity controls.

2. UNAMIR troops will adhere to following specific guidelines whilst guarding or defending the installations:

- a. Hostile Intent. It is an action which appears to be preparatory to an aggressive action against :

- (1) The UN - installation or
- (2) The UN personnel guarding/defending it or
- (3) Any person who has access to it or
- (4) Equipment contained in it.

- b. Hostile Act. Any aggressive action against as under paragraph 2,a. above.

- c. Authority. The commander of the guard/defence unit is authorized to use all available weapons or means needed to respond to the threat to which the installation, the own troops, the persons authorized to accede or the stored equipments are exposed. Still, the principles of Minimum Force and collateral damage to be avoided (ref 7. e. and f) will be adhered to.

- d. Threats.

- (1) Any installation of weapon directed to the installation has to be considered as a hostile intent and will lead to preparedness to respond fire by the guarding unit.
- (2) Any firing at the defending/guarding troops, authorized persons or stored equipments has to be considered as a hostile act and will lead to immediate reaction by fire and even to offensive actions in order to dislodge the threat.

(3) Hostile attitude by persons will only be reacted at, if those persons proceed towards the installation, although warning by voice have been given. Warning shots will precede fire for effect. If the installation is surrounded by fence or wall, there will be no firing for effect unless the persons actually attempt to cross or to force the barrier.

3. Rules of Engagement:

<u>Rule No</u>	<u>State</u>
1	B
2	B
3	D
4	A
5	B
6	B

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UNAMIR
Force HQ
Kigali

20 June, 1994

PLANNING DIRECTIVE (for OPERATION HARBOR LIGHTS)

1. MISSION

a. Aim. To withdraw UNAMIR forces from Rwanda.

b. Tasks. All Sections and Units.

- 1) accurate identification of all personnel in Rwanda;
- 2) identification of all non-essential personnel;
- 3) identification of all essential personnel;
- 4) identification of current vehicle holdings;
- 5) identification of all essential equipment and vehicles;
- 6) identification of all non-essential equipment and vehicles;
- 7) does your section or unit have enough internal lift to move all equip and pers. If not what else is required; and
- 8) number of qualified drivers. Types of vehs that they can drive.

c. Specific Tasks.

- 1) C Log O.
 - a) identification of a holding/ warehousing

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facilities for non-essential vehicles and equipment in Kabale;

b) identification and agreement to use accommodation and office space for UNAMIR in Kampala\Entebbe;

c) stockpile of 14 days water, ration and fuel at Kampala\Entebbe;

d) immediate issue of three days ration and water to all Force personnel to be used only in the case of withdrawal; and

e) fuel estimate and issue for all UNAMIR vehicles.

f) plan for backloading of non-essential vehicles and equipment on the vehicles that are currently bringing in APC's, rations etc.

2) HAC.

a) preparation of letters to RPF and RGF handing over responsibility of displaced persons camps currently under UNAMIR control. These letters should have attached to them all current lists of personnel held in these locations.

3) COO.

a) be prepared to conduct required liaison for withdrawal of UNAMIR through RPF lines by air and road to Uganda and Kenya.

4) CAO.

a) procure appropriate agreements from Kenya and Uganda for the redeployment of UNAMIR troops to those countries.

5) C Plans.

a) Prepare updated OPLAN for withdrawal; and

b) Prepare Air and Road move orders.

2. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

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a. This planning directive is intended to allow UNAMIR to effectively plan for a withdrawal of our forces from Rwanda. It is in no way intended to indicate that such a operation will be conducted. Contingency plans such as this allow us to be prepared for all eventualities and will permit the Force to undertake such an operation in an orderly, professional manner with minimum loss of equipment and vehicles. It is imperative that the tasks listed above be actioned immediately.

b. In general terms it is intended that this operation would be carried out as follows:

1) **Consolidation Phase.** Identification of all pers, veh and equipment both essential and non-essential. The pre-positioning of equipment and vehicles as necessary.

2) **Thinning Out (Phase One).** Withdrawal of non-essential pers, vehs and equip from Rwanda.

3) **Main Body-Air (Phase Two).** Withdrawal of pers, equip by air to Nairobi and Entebbe. If movement by air is not possible then this move will be done by road as part of Phase Three.

4) **Road Move (Phase Three).** Withdrawal of all essential vehs and personnel (if Air move is not possible) from Rwanda to Kampala.

4. ASSUMPTIONS

a. French intervention in Rwanda may make UNAMIR's position in Rwanda untenable.

b. RGF and RPF will not unduly hinder our withdrawal from the country.

c. Uganda and Kenya will permit the redeployment of UNAMIR forces into their countries.

5. GUIDANCE

a. a sense of urgency is required to complete the above mentioned tasks and thereby allow the completion of detailed staffing.

b. Timings.

1) W day - Commence Thinning out.

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2) W+2 - Commence Phase 2.


3) W+4 - Commence Phase 3 (note Phase 2 will commence at W+2 if aircraft are unable to fly).

c. All pers kit, ess eqpt and vehs will be taken. All APC's and heavy weapons will be taken or rendered inoperable prior to departure.

6. COORDINATION

a. all information requested in above noted tasks will be submitted in writing without fail to C Plans not later than 1900 hrs 21 Jun 94.

b. a coordination brief will be held on order.


R.A. Dallaire
Maj Gen
Force Commander


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C PLAN	
CAMP CMDT	
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MIL SPOKESMAN (for Press)	

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REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
ARMEE RWANDAISE
ETAT-MAJOR
G2

Confidentiel

/NT. J/

KIGALI, le 19 JUIN 1994

N° 0733 /G2.2.2.2.3.1

①
②
DTC
Please see my notes and
use them to respond
to both in writing.
G
P.C.
20/6

Monsieur le Commandant de la Force
de la MINUAR

K I G A L I

O B J E T : Négociations entre les
Forces Armées Rwandaises
et l'Armée du Front Patriotique
Rwandais.

Monsieur le Commandant,

J'ai l'honneur de vous exprimer mes
sincères remerciements au nom des Forces Armées Rwandaises et
mon nom personnel pour les efforts que la MINUAR ne cesse de
déployer pour trouver une solution pacifique au conflit rwanda

Depuis le 30 Mai 94, vous avez pu réunir
autour d'une même table la délégation des Forces Armées
Rwandaises et celle de l'Armée du Front Patriotique Rwandais e
vue de conclure un cessez-le-feu entre les deux belligérants.

Le dernier Sommet de l'OUA qui s'est ten
à TUNIS a permis la signature d'un accord de cessez-le-feu ent
le Gouvernement Rwandais et le Front Patriotique Rwandais
prenant effet à partir du 15 Juin 1994 à 12 heures.

Cet accord ayant été signé par les plus
hautes autorités politiques représentant les deux parties, il
s'avère nécessaire de clarifier le lien entre cet accord et le
pourparlers qui étaient en cours entre les deux Forces Armées
portant sur le même objet.

Etant donné l'évolution de la situation,
la sécurité sur l'itinéraire menant au Quartier Général de la
MINUAR en traversant les lignes FPR devient de plus en plus
préoccupante. Ainsi voudrais-je vous demander de mieux garantir
la sécurité de la délégation des Forces Armées Rwandaises pour
les négociations.

They are not, yet,
that they want to
go some-
where else
for the meetings,
but one can
certainly read their
situation the times.
So let's look for an
alternative site in a
neutral zone where in
no man's land. .../...

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e Plans

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Copy No. 18 of 27
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FORCE HQ
Kigali

18 May 94

3000.15 (Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER NO. 11 - "OPERATION POUCHING TIGER"

1. SITUATION.

a. Fighting Factions.

(1) RPF has surrounded Kigali city from the North, East and a portion of the South and is closing in on RGF fortified positions in the city. They continue to advance, gain ground and maintain roads. A few RGF counter offensives have been conducted so far but these have met with limited or no significant success. They are however holding on to most of their defensive positions.

(2) There is however a third element or force that has significantly affected the overall situation behind the RGF lines. This force has been mixing with the general population and seems to have its base in the political militia, the youth wings and the local quarter self-defence groups with some overt support of the Military/Gendarmerie. These groups have often demonstrated fanatical and ruthless actions and quite often are under the influence of alcohol and drugs while at the barricades or while roving the streets and hillsides. They seem to have been the principal authors, as far as can be ascertained, of the terrible atrocities and destruction throughout most of the country.

(3) Each individual militia or self-defence cell seem to have a self appointed leader who does not necessarily obey or take orders from anyone in the normal chain of authority. They are mostly armed with traditional weapons but several of them carry arms and grenades. They seem to have enough money, to sustain their actions. Even if a cease fire were brought into effect, it may be difficult to control these groups as

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they tend to either incite and/or coerce the locals to join them. At the moment a cease-fire implementation is at the initial stages and may take days, but hopefully not weeks.

b. UNAMIR Forces.

(1) During the thick of the battle, it was decided to thin out UNAMIR forces to a residual strength under the modified mandate of 21 Apr 94. The total strength of UNAMIR is presently at about 450 personnel. Present formed troops strength is in the order of two and half companies.

(2) Current force structure is based on a very limited self defence capability of UN installations, including the airfield, monitoring displaced persons camps in Kigali, liaison with all factions and humanitarian monitoring/assistance tasks.

(3) The Security Council has decided to increase the force structure with an expanded mandate. The increased strength will have two mechanized bns, three motorized bns of which one coy mech, 320 UNMOs, 90 UNCIVPOLs, Force Support Bn and a re-organized Force HQ and Signal Sqn. Detailed structure is at Annex A.

2. MISSION. Pursue a cease fire implementation and assist in the security of the humanitarian efforts in Rwanda in coordination with local authorities.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. Five Infantry bns will be deployed to monitor the cease-fire and to also assist in humanitarian and security tasks. These units will concurrently be employed to monitor the cease fire. The bns will be structured in four line coys each, a combat support coy which is to include a mortar platoon, assault pioneer platoon and a recce platoon with snipers. The bns will be deployed in five geo/administrative sectors. Bns in turn will deploy in coy locations through out their respective sectors and be prepared for peripheral security tasks. The deployment will be conducted in three phases:

(1) Phase 1 (D-Day + 14). The Ghana Bn would be brought to its full strength of 800 personnel and equipped with APCs. This unit will ensure the protection of Kigali International airport, the Amahoro complex where 4,000 displaced persons are presently housed and will also provide one mech coy as

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the Force Reserve at normal status of 4hrs NTM.

(2) Phase 2 (Not before D-Day + 14). Deployment of two battalions (one mechanized and one motorized), some advance elements of the support battalion including engineer company all of the Force HQ and Force Signal Squadron. BYUBAT will re-adjust its deployment as per AOR given at Annex B.

(3) Phase 3 (Not before D-Day + 31). Induction of the remaining two motorized battalions and the rest of the force support battalion.

b. BYUBAT (BUGESERA SECTOR).

(1) Grouping. Full strength of 800 personnel.

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1.

i. Ensure security of KIA as UN Neutral Territory as first priority.

ii. Receive rest of the strength and reconstitute the bn.

iii. Provide one pl for the protection of force HQ.

iv. Protect refugees at Amahoro Stadium with one coy (-).

v. Provide up to 4 armed escorts on requirement.

vi. Earmark one company to be the Force Reserve. The coy to be at four hours NTM to be employed for extraction operations using the maximum of APCs (all sorts).

vii. Be prepared to monitor the cease-fire according to separate instructions.

(b) Phase 2

i. Continue to ensure security of KIA as UN Neutral Territory with minimum with one coy.

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ii. Re-deploy the bn as per AOR given at Annex B.

iii. Establish Bn HQ at Bugesera.

iv. One coy each to be deployed at Ngenda and Gashora.

v. Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps.

vi. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.

vii. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.

viii. Participate in security operations with local authorities.

ix. Undertake, control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.

x. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal groups.

xi. Implement the Sector Operations Guidance.

xii. Earmark one coy to be the force Reserve. The coy to be at four hours NTM to be employed for extraction operations using the maximum of APCs (all sorts).

xiii. Be prepared to monitor the cease fire according to separate instructions.

(c) Phase 3. No change from Phase 2.

c. Mechanized Bn Two-KIBAT (KIGALI SECTOR).

(1) Grouping.

(a) As per UN Table of Organization and equipment.

(b) Det to Command Force HQ - One Coy for Phase for operations only. The coy 2 only. will be administratively

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under control of bn HQ.
During Phase 3 the Coy will
be back to the parent unit.

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 2

- i. Re-establish presence throughout Kigali Sector.
- ii. Establish Bn HQ at MUHIMA (Old BYUBAT GOLF area) which will be the staging area for the bn.
- iii. Deploy coys within area of responsibility.
- iv. Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps.
- v. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- vi. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- vii. Participate in security operations with local authorities.
- viii. Undertake control measures (rd blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
- ix. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal groups.
- x. Implement the Sector Operations Guidance.
- xi. Be prepared to monitor cease fire on order.

(b) Phase 3. No change from Phase 2. Any changes will be intimated in time.

d. Motorized Bn One-GIBAT (GITARAMA-BUTARE SECTOR).

(1) Grouping. As per UN Table of Organization and Equipment.

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 2

- i. Establish Bn HQ at BUTARE.
- ii. Deploy one coy each at GITARAMA, KIBUYE, CYANGUGU and GIKONGORO.
- iii. Establish secured safe haven areas for refugees/displaced persons.
- iv. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell and provide vehicles, escorts and liaison for this task.
- v. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- vi. Participate in security operations with local authorities.
- vii. Undertake control measures (rd blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
- viii. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal extremist groups.
- ix. Implement Sector Ops Guidance.
- x. Be prepared to monitor the cease fire according to separate instructions.

(b) Phase 3 No change from phase 2. Any changes will be intimated later.

e. Mororized Bn Two-RUHBAT (RUHENGARI SECTOR)

(1) Grouping. As per UN Table of Organization and equipment.

(2) Tasks (Phase-3).

(a) Establish Bn HQ at RUHENGARI.

UN SECRET

(b) Deploy one coy each at GISENYI, MUKINGO, NYAMUGULI and NYAKINMA.

(c) Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps.

(d) Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.

(e) Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.

(f) Participate in security operations with local authorities.

(g) Undertake control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.

(h) Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal groups.

(i) Implement the Sctor Operations Guidance.

(j) Be prepared to monitor cease fire on order.

f. Motorized Bn Three-RWAMBAT (BYUMBA-RWAMAGANA-KIBUNGO SECTOR).

(1) Grouping.

(a) As per UN Table of Organization and equipment.

(b) Under Comd in Phase 3 - Force Engineer Coy for operations only. However Engineertasks will be given driectly by Force HQ.

(2) Tasks (Phase 3)

(a) Establish Bn HQ at RWAMAGANA.

(b) Deploy one coy each at MULINDI, RUTARE, GABIRO and KIBUNGO.

(c) Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps.

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- (d) Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- (e) Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- (f) Participate in security operations with local authorities.
- (g) Undertake control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
- (h) Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal groups.
- (i) Implement the Sector Operations Guidance.
- (j) Be prepared to monitor cease fire on order.

g. Mech Coy Ex KIGALI Sector (RUHHENGERI SECTOR).

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Phase 2.

- i. Establish Coy HQ at RUHHENGERI.
- ii. Establish secure safe haven areas for refugees/displaced persons.
- iii. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell and provide vehicles, escorts and liaison for this task.
- iv. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- v. Participate in security operations with local authorities.
- vi. Undertake control measures (rd blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
- vii. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal extremist

UN SECRET

groups.

viii. Implement Sector Ops Guidance.

ix. Be prepared to monitor the cease fire according to separate instructions.

(b) Phase 3. Be prepared to return to the parent bn on orders.

h. Tunisian Pl(+)

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Phase 1.

i. Continue to provide security at Hotel Meridien, King Faisal Hospital and Mille Colines.

ii. Provide APC escorts on order.

iii. Be prepared to undertake tasks as ordered by Force HQ.

(b) Phases 2 and 3.

i. Establish HQ at Force HQ.

ii. Ensure security and protection of Force HQ.

iii. Provide APC escorts on order.

iv. Be prepared to under take any task given by Force HQ.

v. Be administratively under control of Force Communication Sqn.

i. Force Support Bn

(1) Grouping. As per Annex A.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Force Engr Coy. (Phases 2 and 3)

UN SECRET

- i. Establish Coy HQ at BYUMBA.
 - ii. Establish secure safe haven areas for refugees/displaced persons.
 - iii. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell and provide vehicles, escorts and liaison for this task.
 - iv. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
 - v. Participate in security operations with local authorities.
 - vi. Undertake control measures (rd blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
 - vii. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal extremist groups.
 - viii. Be prepared for any engineer tasks on order.
- (b) Force Log Coy. (All Phases).
- i. Establish Log Base at Rwandex (Old Log Coy) and at Kigali International Airport.
 - ii. Carry out other tasks as assigned by C Log O.
- (c) Force Med Coy. (All Phases).
- i. Establish Force Field Hospital at King Faisal Hospital.
 - ii. Carry out other tasks as assigned by C Log O.
- (d) Force Maintenance Coy.
- i. Grouping. Integral.
 - ii. Tasks (Phase-3)

UN SECRET

aa. Establish Coy HQ as per C Log O's directive .

bb. Provide repair and maintenance facilities to the Force.

cc. Carryout tasks as assigned by C Log O.

j. Force Sig Sqn

(1) Grouping. - Integral.

(2) Tasks (Phase-2 and 3).

(a) Establish Sqn HQ at Amahoro Stadium.

(b) Establish and provide following military wireless communications capability including equipment for:

i. Command Net (secure and non-secured) for Force to Cell/Sections/Units.

ii. Logistic Net.

(c) Establish a Radio Station.

(d) Assist and integrate civil communication nets in overall signals/comm concept.

(e) Provide communication support to Force HQ.

(f) Issue detail sig instructions.

k. MILOB GROUP

(1) Strength. Will be 320 UNMOs by Phase 2.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Phases 1 and 2. Deploy 47 UNMOs to Force HQ, 40 to MILOB HQ and 233 UNMOs for the following tasks:

i. Deploy MILOB Teams in RUHENGARI, BYUMBA, KIGALI, BUGESERA, BUTARE, GIKONGORO,

UN SECRET

CYANGUGU, KIBUYE and GITARAMA with MILOB Sector HQs at KIGALI, BUGESERA, BUTARE and RUHENGERI.

ii. Be prepared to monitor the observance of the cease fire agreement.

iii. Provide escorts for humanitarian aid convoys.

iv. Assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance in conjunction with Humanitarian Relief Agencies.

v. Monitor the process of the return of Rwandese refugees/displaced persons and their resettlement.

vi. Monitor the security situation on a 24 hrs basis.

vii. Investigate any case of violations in conjunction with local authorities through:

aa. Mobile Patrolling.

bb. Static Check Points.

cc. Investigation of complaints.

dd. Continuous Liaison with all parties.

viii. Investigate and report on any incidents of harassment of refugees/displaced persons by illegal gangs or individuals.

ix. Be prepared to deploy on order to GISENYI and other places for the protection of threatened isolated refugees/displaced persons.

(b) Phase 3. Deploy UNMOs in rest of Sectors for the following tasks:

i. Continue performing tasks as per Phases 1 and 2.

ii. Be prepared to deploy on order to

UN SECRET

GISENYI and other areas for the protection of threatened isolated refugees/displaced persons.

1. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

- (a) Phase 1. To be completed within D+14.
- (b) Phase 2. Not before D+14.
- (c) Phase 3. Not before D+31.
- (d) All Tac HQs to be operational 5 days after arrival of adv party.
- (e) Main HQs to be operational 3 days after the arrival of the last flight.
- (f) Bns to be operational within 7 days after the deployment of its total str.

(2) Deployment Adjustments.

- (a) Force HQ is to be notified of any adjustments/modification to Sector plan outlined in orders.
- (b) Sector final deployment details to be submitted to Force HQ 7 days on arrival of last chalk.

(3) Reinforcements. Bn is to maintain an adequate Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) capable of influencing critical unforeseen situations.

(4) OPs/CHPs. The estb of OPs and CHPs must be of high professional standards.

(5) Improvisation. Improvisation is essential in area ops due to lack of adequate logistics.

(6) Explosive Ordnance Devices (EOD). All unexploded EODs and unsafe ammo should be fwd to Force HQ for nec disposal action.

(7) Reports.

- (a) Daily SITREPS covering the past 12 hrs are

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to be submitted to Force HQ by 0630 and 1830 hrs each day.

(b) Other reports (SHOOTREPS, VIREPS, INCREPS) are to be submitted as soon as occurrence takes place.

(8) Rules of Engagement.

(a) UN Installations - Annex C.

(b) Escorts/convoys - Annex D.

(9) Inter Sector Boundaries. Annex B.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. Food/Water. 10 days min rations/water to be maintained.

b. Accommodation. Incoming units to bring own tentage.

c. Dress. As per UNAMIR dress instructions. Flak jackets will be worn at all time.

d. Weapons/Ammo. As per UNAMIR instructions.

e. Detailed Log instructions to be issued by C Log O.

f. C Log O to establish forward Log Bases between BUTARE and GITARAMA and between TARE and RUHENGIERI.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Locations of HQ

(1) Force HQ - Amahoro Hotel.

(2) BYUBAT Bn - BUGESERA.

(3) Mech Bn 2 - MUHIMA (Old BYUBAT GOLF Area)


(4) Motorised 1 - BUTARE.

(5) Motorized Bn 2 - RUHENGIERI.

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- (6) Motorized Bn 3 - RWAMAGANA.
- (7) Force Sp Bn - RWANDEX (Old Log Coy Area)

b. Radio Net. Signal instructions being issued separately.


R. A. DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:	<u>Copy No</u>
MILOB GP HQ	1
BYUBAT	2
Mechanized Bn 1	3
Mechanized Bn 2	4
Motorized Bn 1	5
Motorized Bn 2	6
Force Support Bn	7-9
Force Sig Sqn	10
Tun Coy (-)	11

Internal:


DFC	12
CAO	13
HAC	14
COO	15
CMPO	16
C Log O	17
	18
FSO	19
Camp Comdt	20
File	21
Spare	22-27

PROPOSED UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN SECURITY FORCE


MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE STR-5526

ANNEX A To oPo No 11

DATED 18 MAY 94



ANNEX-B TO OPO II



UNAMIR INSTALLATIONS - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

1. UNAMIR Installations are

- a. Whether compounds surrounded by fences or walls, containing UN personnel or UN equipment.
- b. Vital grounds defended by UN troops, i. e. grounds to which UN troops will not allow any access unless to persons presenting themselves at the normal access(es) and after identity controls.

2. UNAMIR troops will adhere to following specific guidelines whilst guarding or defending the installations:

- a. Hostile Intent. It is an action which appears to be preparatory to an aggressive action against :

- (1) The UN - installation or
- (2) The UN personnel guarding/defending it or
- (3) Any person who has access to it or
- (4) Equipment contained in it.

- b. Hostile Act. Any aggressive action against as under paragraph 2, a. above.

- c. Authority. The commander of the guard/defence unit is authorized to use all available weapons or means needed to respond to the threat to which the installation, the own troops, the persons authorized to accede or the stored equipments are exposed. Still, the principles of Minimum Force and collateral damage to be avoided (ref 7. e. and f) will be adhered to.

- d. Threats.

- (1) Any installation of weapon directed to the installation has to be considered as a hostile intent and will lead to preparedness to respond fire by the guarding unit.

- (2) Any firing at the defending/guarding troops, authorized persons or stored equipments has to be considered as a hostile act and will lead to immediate reaction by fire and even to offensive actions in order to dislodge the threat.

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(3) Hostile attitude by persons will only be reacted at, if those persons proceed towards the installation, although warning by voice have been given. Warning shots will precede fire for effect. If the installation is surrounded by fence or wall, there will be no firing for effect unless the persons actually attempt to cross or to force the barrier.

3. Rules of Engagement:

<u>Rule No</u>	<u>State</u>
1	B
2	B
3	D
4	A
5	B
6	B

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ANNEX D To OPO No 11
DATED 18 MAY 94

SPECIFIC FOR HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION ESCORT
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TO: ALL SECTORS

RULE NO 1: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS.
STATE B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS.

RULE NO 2: STATE OF WEAPONS.
STATE B: WEAPON CARRIED WITH MAGAZINE CHARGED.

RULE NO 3: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT
WITHOUT USE OF FIRE.

STATE D: OBSERVE AND REPORT, STAY IN PLACE, WARN
AGGRESSOR OF: INTENT TO USE FORCE AND
DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS.
DEMONSTRATIVE USE OF FIRE IS AUTHORIZED.

RULE NO 4: DISARM PARAMILITARY.
STATE B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED.
USE OF MINIMUM FORCE.
EVALUATE INTENT TO USE.

RULE NO 5: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS.
STATE B: INTERVENTION BY FIRE FOR EFFECT AGAINST
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND DESIGNATED TARGETS
ONLY AFTER WARNING SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED AS
PART OF THE WARNING PROCESS.

RULE NO 6: DESIGNATED AUTHORITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE
FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED BUT WILL BE
SPECIFIED BY:

MAN - MOVE - PREPARE - FIRE

A-1
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PLAN OF DEMARCATION LINE ESTABLISHMENT.
PHASE 3.

1. GENERAL.

The results we have obtained hitherto aimed to stop military actions by both of sides, to make all humanitarian activity easier, and to protect locals from harassment and carnage tend us to present sequent option: Demarcation Line Establishment.

- **Advantages:** there are more chances to stop anarchy, to stabilize situation and to take under control areas occupied by particular parties and to put this area to rights. This route runs mostly along with first class roads which makes UNAMIR troops' supply much easier.

- **Disadvantages:** this solution is only provisional, creates many problems with migration of locals, suggests certain involvement of UNAMIR Logistics in transportation tasks and makes distinction between Hutu and Tutsi population deeper.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

- A demarcation line is to be conducted along with current front line between both of the parties and effectively secure them against tactical manoeuver.

- It would be strongly recommended to pull out all military troops least 150 m away from the established demarcation line, nevertheless 150 m distance from so called Blue Line in two perpendicular directions seems to be sufficient for protection against small fire gun.

- The Demarcation Line should be absolutely under UNAMIR control.

- Any problems are to be negotiated by Mixed Military Committees, including both of sides' and UNAMIR's representatives.

- Immediately after the Demarcation Line is established, all humanitarian aid activity should be conducted paralelly with specialized agencies. In relatively stable and calm situation Humanitarian Aid Cell should only co-ordinate and monitor activity above mentioned organizations submitting periodical reports to FC.

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PROPOSAL OF UNMO DEPLOYMENT ON RWANDESE TERRITORY
FOR CEASE-FIRE MONITORING.

I. List of the places where UNMOs are scheduled to be deployed.

1. Kigali area :

- MONTE KIGALI (Bn Cdo HUYE)
- NYAMIRAMBO (Gd Territorial Coy)
- KIGALI CAMP
- MUHIMA CAMP
- KACIYRU CAMP (Gendarmerie HQ)
- KAMI CAMP
- GIKOMERO
- KACYIRU (REMER) (Gd Territorial Coy)
- KICUKIRO (Gd Territorial Coy)
- KIMIHURA (Presidential Guard Bn)
- GIKONDO (Gd Territorial Bde)
- KANZENZE BRIDGE (2 x Inf Pl + Mar)

2. The rest of the country:

Serial No	Name of the place	Co-ordinates
1.	KINIGI	(88 40)
2.	NKUMBA	(00 39)
3.	CYANIKA	(05 51)
4.	KIRAMBO	(15 35)
5.	MYOVE	(95 21)
6.	TUMBA	(94 12)
7.	KISARO	(02 19)
8.	BYUMBA	(07 25)
9.	BWISIGE	(83 26)
10.	NGARAMA	(26 28)
11.	RUKOMO	(90 46)
12.	GITENGURE	(94 57)

13.	MIMULI	(93 40)
14.	RUHENGARI	(91 35)
15.	RUHONDO	(68 29)
16.	SHYORONGI	(95 98)
17.	KANOMBE	(18 97)

II. Assumptions:

1. Each UNMO team comprise 2 (two) officers equipped with 1 (one) portable radio Motorola or fixed in a car, they have got.
2. UNMO deployment is going to be carried out min.2 hrs before cease-fire implementation.
3. Each UNMO team is to be rotated every week.

III. Needs:

- 24 (twenty four) UNMOs in Kigali area.
- 34 (thirty four) UNMOs outside Kigali area.


TOTAL 58 UNMOs.

- 29 Motorola radio sets.
- 29 vehicles.
- 406 MREs + 812 bottles of drinkable water.
- 58 plastic jerrycans for washing water.

IV. Terms of references:


1. Each UNMO is obliged to monitor compliance with all articles contained in "THE CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT" by both sides engaged in conflict.
2. Location of UNMO should guarantee the best fulfilment of their tasks.
3. Each time be sure that radio communication to MILOB HQ is established, and be ready to send a message if necessary. Besides of this teams are to prepare sitreps and send them every day between 18.00 and 20.00 hrs.

4. Teams are self-sufficient, so each team commander is responsible for appropriate provisions and amount of fuel.
5. UNMO teams should know positions of other teams and how to contact them in an emergency situation.
6. Supervise both stop fighting and hostilities with effect from the term of cease-fire implementation and lack of movement of any troops and weapons except evacuation of sick and wounded.
7. Monitoring of all RGF and RPF mechanisms of anti tank weapons and mortar and artillery guns which should be stripped off the weapon system and kept in custody of the battalion /company/ battery commander, no positions reinforcement one should observe.
8. UNMO teams are to supervise all important military installations of both sides where access to any locations is to be free for them.
9. Monitoring of local people life's normalization and free access of all humanitarian agencies to the areas of their interest.
10. Be sensitive to any attempts of provocations and hostile propaganda against each other especially in media.

 1904/81
prepared by
Maj. J Maczka
OIC C Plans

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UNAMIR ENGINEERING CELL ORGANIZATION



3. EXECUTION.

- The demarcation line is foreseen as follows :

GISENYI (18 13), KANAMA (27 12), KABALI (31 190, GAKARARA (39 22), MAISERIE (44 22), MUKINGO (51 30), RUHENGARI (59 33), BUSHOKA (06 24), TARE (22 16), SHYORONGI (97 75), KIGALI road North MUHIMA, KIGALI Avenue de la Gendarmerie, Boulevard de l'Umuganda, RUGENDE (27 85), RWAMAGANA (48 84), CYERU (56 90), KAYONZA (58 84), KABARONDO (62 78), KIGARAMA Rd (62 70), KIZUGIRO (64 63), RUZINGA (61 49), GATORE (65 47), RUSUMO (75 48), and BUKOBA - Tanzanian border (87 37).

- Total length of the route is about 450 km.

- It is foreseen to deploy at least 6 Infantry Battalions:

- Alfa Bn - Sector 1, with HQ in RUHENGARI.
- Bravo Bn - " "
- Charlie Bn - Sector 2, with HQ in KIGALI.
- Delta Bn - " "
- Echo Bn - Sector 3, with HQ in RWAMAGANA.
- Foxtrot Bn - " "

- Strength of each Inf Bn is at least 600 pers, including 1 (one) troop of APC (four veh), and should be self-sufficient to first line level, including defence stores. However, special to unit equipment will be maintained by units.

- Bns should be responsible for maintenance of law and order in their sectors. In addition they would report of any violation of cease-fire agreement.

- Bns are to be technically prepared to carry out the following main tasks:

- manning of OPs.
- establishment and manning of Check Points and Road Blocks.
- patrolling their area of responsibility.
- monitoring of humanitarian aid activity in their sectors.

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
- be prepared to improve their facilities
eg. accommodation, feeding, roads etc. and carry out any other tasks like recce of water sources as well as for gathering information about booby traps, mine-fields, basing only on locals.
- Two RRF Coys: first one in Sector 1, and second one in Sector 2 should be deployed to protect safety of most crucial areas.
- OPS may be tasked to work out details on the deployment of troops.
- In addition to the Bns, UNMOs may be required to provide the following assistance:
 - monitoring of Peace Accord implementation by both of factions in assigned specially selected military objects (LOs).
 - investigations of incidents.
 - providing escorts on demand of various humanitarian agencies, and monitoring of their activities in Displaced Persons' Camps.

4. ASSESSMENT OF OUR NEEDS.

Serial No	Demanded Unit	Quantity	Strength	Remarks
1.	FHQ	1	85	
2.	Infantry Bn	6	762/Bn	
3.	RRF (coy)	2	152/Coy	
4.	Engr Coy	1	203	
5.	Log Coy	1	200	
6.	Field Hospital	1	36	
7.	MP SEC	2	11	
8.	MOVCON PL	1	21	
9.	MILOBS	section	250	File

TOTAL : 5693
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FIELD HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION IN PHASE 3.



UN RESTRICTED
UN RESTRICTED

MP DET
ORGANIZATION IN PHASE 3.

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3000.5(MEO)/OPS/-1/04/09

To: FC
From: OIC C PLANS
Date: 26 Apr 94
Subject: Demarcation Line Establishment.

1. Please find attached Plan of Demarcation Line Establishment in the case if cease-fire foresees such development of events.

2. Regards.

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- be prepared to improve their facilities eg. accommodation, feeding, roads etc. and carry out any other tasks like recce of water sources as well as for gathering information about booby traps, mine-fields, basing only on locals.
- Two QRF Coys: first one in Sector 2, and second one in Sectors 4, and 5 should be deployed to protect safety of most crucial areas.
- OPS may be tasked to work out details on the deployment of troops.
- In addition to the Bns, UNMOs may be required to provide the following assistance:
 - monitoring of warring factions in the various sectors.
 - investigations of incidents.
 - carry out patrols in areas not covered by UNAMIR Bns.
 - providing escorts on demand of various humanitarian agencies.
 - monitoring of activities in Displaced Persons' Camps.

4. ASSESSMENT OF OUR NEEDS.

Serial No	Demanded Unit	Quantity	Strength	Remarks
1.	FHQ	1	66	
2.	Infantry Bn	6	600/Bn	
3.	QRF (coy)	2	120/Coy	
4.	Engr Coy	1	203	
5.	Log Coy	1	200	
6.	Field Hospital	1	50	
7.	MP SEC	2	11	
8.	MOVCON PL	1	19	
9.	MILOBS	section	250	

TOTAL : 4650
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PLAN OF DEMARCATION LINE ESTABLISHMENT.

1. GENERAL.

The results we have obtained hitherto aimed to stop military actions by both of sides, to make all humanitarian activity easier, and to protect locals from harassment and carnage tend us to present sequent option: Demarcation Line Establishment.

- **Advantages:** there are more chances to stop anarchy, to stabilize situation and to take under control areas occupied by particular parties and to put this area to rights.

- **Disadvantages:** this solution is only provisional, creates many problems with migration of locals, suggests certain involvement of UNAMIR Logistics in transportation tasks and makes distinction between Hutu and Tutsi population deeper.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

- A demarcation line is to be conducted along with current front line between both of the parties and effectively secure them against tactical manoeuver.

- Only UNAMIR troops including observers can be deployed in the demarcation line.

- All military units are to pull out at least 15 km away from the established demarcation line.

- The Demarcation Line should be absolutely under UNAMIR control.

- Weapons of both sides is to be controlled by UNMOs, and no increase of armament is allowed.

- Any problems are to be negotiated by Mixed Military Committees, including both of sides' and UNAMIR's representatives.

- Immediately after the Demarcation Line is established, all humanitarian aid activities should be handed over to specialized agencies.

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3. EXECUTION.

- The demarcation line is foreseen as follows :

GISENYI (18 13), KANAMA (27 12), KABALI (31 190, GAKARARA (39 22), MAISERIE (44 22), MUKINGO (51 30), RUHENGIERI (59 33), BUSHOKA (06 24), TARE (22 16), SHYORONGI (97 75), KIGALI road North MUHIMA, KIGALI Avenue de la Gendarmerie, Boulevard de l'Umuganda, RUGENDE (27 85), RWAMAGANA (48 84), CYERU (56 90, MURAMBI (46 01), KIZIGURO (43 04), UMUNINI (42 17), GABIRO (45 30), KAGITUMBA (51 83) - Ugandan border.

- Total length of the route is about 400 km.

- It is foreseen to deploy at least 6 Infantry Battalions:


- Alfa	Bn - Sector 1, with HQ in GISENYI.
- Bravo	Bn - Sector 2, " RUHENGIERI.
- Charlie	Bn - Sector 3, " RUSHASHI.
- Delta	Bn - Sector 4, " KIGALI.
- Echo	Bn - Sector 5, " KIGALI.
- Foxtrot	Bn - Sector 6, " GABIRO

- Strength of each Inf Bn is at least 600 pers, including 1 (one) troop of APC (four veh), and should be self-sufficient to first line level, including defence stores. However, special to unit equipment will be maintained by units.

- Bns should be responsible for maintenance of law and order in their sectors. In addition they would report of any violation of cease-fire agreement.

- Bns are to be technically prepared to carry out the following main tasks:


- manning of OPs.
- establishment and manning of Check Points and Road Blocks.
- patrolling their area of responsibility.
- monitoring of humanitarian aid activity in their sectors.



53° BATTILLON

⬇ : Emplacement C¹
xxx : Obstacles Mines
mm : Pieges
⊗ : PC
⊗ : Plan de lev.

Scale 1:100,000




51° BATTALION

- Emplacement C
- Obstacle Mines
- Pieges
- PC
- Plan de l'v

SECTEUR OPS. BYUMBA
34^e BATAILLON . NOV. 62

- EMPLACEMENT D'UNITÉ
↑ RME COLLECTIVE
✕ OBSTACLES (MINES, PIÈGES)
E POSITION ENNEMIE
--- PATROUILLE DE NUIT
■ PLAN DE FEU (NORTHEAST)



SECTEUR DE B'YAH'BA

17 ene Badwillon

Emplacement de Poloton


Einplacement die Section

~~Obstacles / mines - Pieces~~

Poste d'observation


♂
horica de 81 mm

PROTEIN



UN RESTRICTED

FIELD HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION.



UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR Force Headquarters
Ops Branch
KIGALI - RWANDA

3000.1(COO)

01 June, 1994

See Distribution

Subject: GENERAL SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CEASE FIRE MEETING
BETWEEN RGF AND RPF TO BE HOSTED BY UNAMIR AT
UNAMIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS

GENERAL

1. The second tripartite cease fire talks will be held at the UNAMIR Force HQ on Thursday 02 June 1994 at 1000hrs. The meeting will be chaired by the DFC UNAMIR.

AIM

2. The aim of these instructions is to outline the security arrangements and assign responsibilities for this second meeting.

PARTICIPANTS

3. The following will be attending:

a. UNAMIR officials - FC, Col Moeen, MR Dessande, Col Moeen, Lt Col Austdal and A/MA to FC.

b. RPA delegation.

c. RGF/Gendarmerie Delegation.

4. The C Plan and A/MA to the FC will take notes during the meeting.

TASKS

5. Since the venue for the conference is in RPF held territory, there will be the need to provide a MILOB team, an Armed escort and APCs for the movement of the RGF delegation from their location to the Force HQ.

6. MILOB Gp HQ. Provide four (4) UNMO Teams as follows:

a. Team 1. Senior UNMO of Lt Col rank who will be the overall commander.

12. Camp Comdt.

- a. Ensure all round protection of Force HQ from 0915 to 1700hrs on 02 June 94. One additional platoon from BYUBAT will augment the defence platoon for the security of the Force HQ.
- b. Ensure that the Force HQ Conference room is ready for use for the meeting
- c. Provide lunch for all the participants.
- d. Ensure that the lobby is devoid of noise and all unnecessary movements during the period of the conference.
- e. Ensure the general cleanliness of the HQ on 30 May 94.
- f. Only essential visitors to be allowed in the Force HQ during the period of the meeting.


13. Camp Comdt to report to COO at 011800B June 94 for necessary security briefing.

COORDINATOR

14. The COO is appointed the overall coordinator for the meeting.

CONCLUSION

15. All concerned are requested to provide the necessary assistance so that the SECOND CEASE FIRE meeting comes out successful.


MOEEN UDDIN AHMED
Colonel
for Force Commander

Distribution:
Action:

External

RGF High Command
RPA High Command
MILOB Gp HQ
Byubat HQ
Tunisian Pl HQ
RGF LO

Information:

SRSG's Office



DECLARATION D'ENGAGEMENT

1. Nous les représentants des FAR et des RPA très préoccupés par la situation qui prévaut actuellement au Rwanda et devant la nécessité de conclure un cessez-le-feu, décidons qu'un accord d'engagement préliminaire soit conclu entre les deux parties afin de démontrer notre coopération et notre bonne volonté pour sortir le pays de ce conflit.
 - a. Nous réaffirmons notre ferme engagement pour prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour continuer les transferts déjà commencés et décidons de:
 - 1) Faciliter la poursuite, inconditionnelle et indépendamment du nombre, de l'évacuation des personnes déplacées dans les deux sens; et
 - 2) Garantir leur sécurité dans leurs déplacements en cessant tout échange de tirs lors du transfert, à l'aller comme au retour des convois de la MINUAR.
 - b. Dans cette même perspective, nous nous engageons fermement:
 - 1) À mettre fin aux massacres et tueries de populations civiles à travers tout le pays et plus particulièrement dans leur secteur de contrôle respectif; et
 - 2) Dans les cas d'accusations de massacres nous nous engageons de permettre à la MINUAR de procéder à une investigation immédiate afin de mettre à jour l'authenticité des faits.
 - c. Sérieusement préoccupés par les diffusions radiophoniques:
 - 1) Nous affirmons notre engagement total à faire cesser toutes diffusions diffamatoires, ou incitatives à la violence et aux massacres; et
 - 2) Devant la nécessité d'apaiser les esprits et de favoriser un climat de paix, nous prendrons toutes les mesures nécessaires pour que les diffusions soient de caractère pacifique.



18 mai 1994

Monsieur le Major-Général Augustin
BIZIMUNGU
Chef d'état-Major des Forces Armées

Projet de document pour la mise en application
du cessez-le-feu au Rwanda.


Réf: A. Ébauche du 12 mai 1994.
B. Modificatif 2 du 16 mai 1994.

Vous trouverez ci-joint, le modificatif des procédures
opérationnelles permanentes pour la mise en application du cessez-
le-feu au Rwanda.

Votre souci concernant le contenu et la langue de la première
ébauche a été pris en considération et des modifications furent
apportées.

Afin de finaliser ce projet, j'aimerais que vous me fassiez
part si les modifications incorporées rencontrent vos attentes.
Nous demeurons, à cet effet, disponibles pour toutes autres
réunions avec le personnel de votre État-Major.

Veuillez agréer, mon Général, à l'expression de mes sentiments
les plus distingués.


Roméo A. DALLAIRE
Major-Général
Commandant de la Force
MINUAR

PROCEDURES OPERATIONNELLES PERMANENTES POUR LA MISE EN
APPLICATION DU CESSEZ-LE-FEU AU RWANDA.

Situation générale

1. Dans le cadre de la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité du..... Mai 1994, la mise en application d'un cessez-le-feu à travers tout le Rwanda s'avère nécessaire.

2. Ce cessez-le-feu a pour objectif de:

- a. Arrêter les actions militaires qui causent des effusions inutiles de sang dans des rangs des Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises et du Front Patriotique Rwandais;
- b. Faire cesser les assassinats/ tueries politiques/massacres ethniques;
- c. ^{DÉMARCHE} Utiliser la population civile armée y compris les groupes auto-défense pour assurer la sécurité des agences humanitaires;
- d. Permettre l'adoucissement des opérations humanitaires de secours pour les réfugiés et les personnes déplacées; Ces actions pouvant être menées simultanément avec les conditions ci-dessus dès déclaration effective du cessez-le-feu;
- e. Créer les conditions de sécurité pour les personnes qui cherchent à se protéger des tirs perdus, des bombardements et des massacres et ainsi prévenir une migration massive de la population comme celle actuellement en cours;
- f. Créer une atmosphère de bonne volonté pour initier les activités préparatoires avant les pourparlers de paix; et
- g. Créer des conditions propices au retour de la loi et de l'ordre.

Cet objectif sera programmé (voir annexe A ci-après) dans le temps et dans l'espace dès l'entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu, condition indispensable pour mener à bien les autres activités.

3. Le cessez-le-feu n'entrera en vigueur que lorsque les deux parties belligérantes décideront de le mettre en application en signant un accord adéquat.

Responsabilité

4. Les dirigeants politiques et les commandants des deux parties en présence soient les Forces Gouvernementales et le Front Patriotique prendront leurs responsabilités politiques et militaires pour se conformer à l'accord du cessez-le-feu.

5. La MINUAR-II sera responsable de la surveillance de l'accord de cessez-le-feu en déployant les forces et les Observateurs Militaires de l'ONU.

Rôle des Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises et du Front Patriotique Rwandais dans le maintien du cessez-le-feu.

- a. Garder la MINUAR-II informée des violations du cessez-le-feu par la partie opposée et de l'évolution du désarmement de la population civile par préfecture, sous-préfecture et secteur dans les zones contrôlées par les deux forces et sous leur responsabilité et celle de la Gendarmerie. La MINUAR-II pourrait être requise dans cet effort de désarmement dans des conditions à définir;
- b. Rapporter les atrocités commises par la partie opposée;
- c. Se restreindre de prendre des actions unilatérales;
- d. Remettre tous les barrages tenus par les Forces armées de chaque partie et des groupes civils d'auto-défense;
- e. Utiliser la négociation comme moyen primaire pour résoudre les litiges avec la partie opposée;
- f. Déployer un Officier de Liaison de chaque partie au Quartier Général de la MINUAR-II et dans les Quartiers Généraux de secteur; et
- g. Garder un contact étroit avec les QG de la Force et des secteurs.

Endroit où le cessez-le-feu pourrait être imposé

6. Il y a deux options en vue de faire respecter le cessez-le-feu:
 - a. A travers tout le pays; et

- b. Dans des endroits spécialement sélectionnés telles que les préfectures, les villages, les villes, les régions, et les routes à grande circulation etc(Quand spécifié l'utilisation de termes rwandais)dans le cas où l'option A est impossible.

Les définitions relatives à l'établissement du cessez-le-feu

7. Arme: tout objet qui peut être employé pour infliger une blessure corporelle à un individu est considéré comme une arme. Ceci comprend les armes à feu, les machettes, les arcs, les couteaux, les épées, les baïonnettes, les lances, les bâtons, les massues etc...

8. Les Postes d'observation: Points spécialement choisis sur le terrain permettant la meilleure visibilité sur toute la région environnante occupée par l'une ou l'autre des parties et employés pour la surveillance des mouvements de troupes, du renforcement des positions et de violations du cessez-le-feu. La distance entre les postes d'observations ne devrait pas aller au delà de 10 kms. Les postes d'observations seront en opération 24 heures/jour et 7 jours par semaine. Les postes d'observations devront être équipés de jumelles, d'appareil de vision nocturne, de cartes, de boussoles, de radio et de ligne de communication avec le QG de l'unité.

- a. Genres de postes d'observation: Il pourrait y avoir les genres suivants de postes d'observations dépendant des conditions de terrain et de l'intensité des opérations:

- (1) Permanent;
- (2) Temporaire; et
- (3) Non-occupé.

9. La zone de sécurité: Zone où l'accès par l'une des factions opposées est contrôlé et réglementé par la MINUAR- I I , comme les camps des réfugiés. La sécurité du personnel militaire et civil de la MINUAR-II est aussi exigée dans cette zone.

10. Les installations de l'ONU. Tout cantonnement et équipement, militaire ou civil, appartenant à la MINUAR-II et, déployé sur le territoire Rwandais, requis pour l'accomplissement de la mission et du mandat.

11. La garde des camps de réfugiés: En vue d'assurer la protection des camps des réfugiés contre les actes illégaux spécialement des nettoyages ethniques. Les unités de la MINUAR-II seront

responsables des modalités relatives à la sécurité.

12. Les points de contrôle: installations servant comme moyen de contrôle des mouvements, de vérification des véhicules et des piétons en vue de faire respecter les mesures de contrôle, les ordres, et les règlements en rapport avec l'accord du cessez-le-feu. Ceux-ci peuvent être mobiles ou statiques.

- a. Les points de contrôle statiques: Les troupes ou les observateurs militaires sont positionnés en permanence à des points fixes. Ce sera normalement sur des croisements d'importantes routes, à l'entrée/sortie d'une zone contrôlée etc... La permanence y sera assurée 24 heures/jour et 7 jours/semaine. Il devra être en communication radio ainsi que par ligne avec le QG de l'unité; et
- b. Les points de contrôle mobiles: Les points de contrôle statiques peuvent ne pas être suffisants pour couvrir une zone d'opération. Dans de telles circonstances, les points de contrôle mobiles sont nécessaires. Un point de contrôle mobile aura un minimum d'effectif d'une section (10 hommes) et deux véhicules UN. Ces postes seront établis à des heures variées et des places différentes basées sur une programmation irrégulière. Il devra être en communication radio avec le QG de l'unité.

13. Barrages routiers: Un point de contrôle mobile ou statique qui ferme la route au mouvement des véhicules s'appelle un barrage routier. Un barrage routier doit être identifié par une pancarte sur lequel on peut lire "Road Block" en anglais et en kinyarwanda. Cette pancarte doit être clairement visible à un véhicule qui l'approche à distance.

14. La fouille: La fouille est nécessaire pour éviter les infiltrations. Puisque cela peut être la cause de harcèlement ou d'inconvénient pour la population, cette opération doit par conséquent être brève, méthodique et adéquate, et implique un comportement correct des militaires qui effectuent la fouille. Une fouille devrait être conduite en coordination avec les autorités locales. Les principes suivant devraient servir de guide pendant la fouille:

- a. Une attention particulière sera portée afin de ne pas endommager les véhicules ou les biens fouillés;
- b. Les cortèges funèbres transportants des cercueils ne devraient pas être fouillés;
- c. Toutes les armes non-autorisées, munitions et explosifs trouvés seront confisqués et un reçu sera remis aux personnes impliquées;

- d. La fouille des véhicules: Chaque fois qu'un véhicule est fouillé, la partie qui effectue la fouille doit systématiquement fouiller le coffre, compartiment moteur, l'habitacle du chauffeur/passagers, le châssis etc... Les véhicules suspects doivent être méticuleusement fouillés;
- e. La fouille personnelle: Le commandant d'unité peut autoriser une fouille personnelle qui devra cependant être conduite d'une manière digne en prenant soins de ne pas provoquer un quelconque embarras public à l'individu. Les femmes seront seulement fouillées à l'aide des détecteurs de métaux ferromagnétiques et ne seront pas fouillées physiquement. Si toutefois une fouille s'impose elle sera effectuée par une femme; et
- f. La fouille d'une zone: La fouille d'une zone permet la localisation des stocks non-officiels d'armes et de munitions etc... Une telle action sera conjointement effectuée avec une opération de cordon. Pendant la fouille d'une zone, les habitants devraient être séparés. Une maison ou un magasin seront fouillés en présence du Propriétaire.

15. Le cordon: la MINUAR-II peut être obligée d'effectuer une opération de cordon en vue de rechercher des armes, des munitions ou des explosifs. Préalablement, il faudra la permission du QG de la MINUAR-II avant d'effectuer une opération de cordon et de fouille. Un cordon devra être fait avec suffisamment de troupes et une réserve adéquate.

16. La patrouille: La patrouille constituera une part essentielle dans l'exécution du cessez-le-feu. Ceci sera conjointement assuré par les éléments de la MINUAR-II, les Observateurs Militaires de l'ONU et les autorités locales.

- a. Types de patrouilles Il pourrait y avoir différents types de patrouilles selon le terrain et la complexité des opérations:
 - (1) Les patrouilles à pieds;
 - (2) Les patrouilles à l'aide de véhicules normaux ou blindés;
 - (3) Les patrouilles aériennes; et
 - (4) Les patrouilles fluviales.
- b. Le but des patrouilles:
 - (1) Confirmer/vérifier/superviser un incident, un

accord ou la violation du cessez-le-feu;

- (2) Obtenir une information concernant le terrain, la topographie etc;
- (3) Localiser et confisquer des armes, des munitions, des explosifs etc;
- (4) Faire sentir la présence de l'ONU;
- (5) Assurer la protection des ONGs ou de la population, spécialement pour les personnes déplacées; et
- (6) Empêcher l'infiltration des éléments indésirables dans des zones choisies et contrôlées.

c. Effectif: En aucune circonstance, une patrouille à pieds ne sera composée de moins d'une section (10 hommes), celle en véhicules ou en bateaux sera composée d'au moins deux éléments.

d. La sécurité: La sécurité des Patrouilles de l'ONU dépend de leur connaissance de la zone d'opération. Cependant il faut considérer les aspects suivants:

- (1) Les routes de patrouille ne doivent pas être minées. Seulement les routes absolument sans mines pourront être patrouillées. Il NE faut PAS entreprendre de patrouilles dans des endroits à haut risque de mines; et
- (2) S'assurer que les insignes/marques distinctives de l'ONU c'est-à-dire le drapeau de l'ONU, et les couvre-chefs de l'ONU sont clairement visibles lors des patrouilles.

17. L'escorte: Deux sortes d'escorte seront utilisées par les éléments de la MINUAR-II.

- a. L'escorte des Observateurs de l'ONU: Ce genre d'escorte n'aura pas d'armes et sera composée d'observateurs militaires. En cas de doute d'un danger, l'escorte sera renforcé par une escorte armée d'une unité de la MINUAR-II. Les escortes sans armes seront normalement accordées aux Grandes Personnalités, aux ONGs, et aux autres personnes en visites, pourvu qu'il n'y ait pas de menace;
- b. L'escorte armée: Les escortes armées seront composées des soldats d'unités de la MINUAR-II. Elles seront accordées aux convois des opérations de secours humanitaires, aux convois du l'ONU ou aux Grandes Personnalités des deux

factions; et

- c. L'autorité chargée de l'affectation des escortes: Le QG des Forces sera la seule autorité d'affectation des escortes.

18. Les convois de l'ONU: Les convois de l'ONU seront conduits pour le déploiement des troupes de la MINUAR-II et sont nécessaires à la réalisation du mandat dans les zones d'opérations désignées.

19. Les équipes d'investigation: composées d'observateurs de l'ONU et de policiers civils de l'ONU, les équipes d'investigation seront désignées pour clarifier tous les cas de violation du cessez-le-feu, en fournissant des rapports appropriés au QG de la Force.

20. Les comités pour les questions civiques: comités qui comportent spécialement des groupes choisis du personnel de l'administration au sein des composantes de la MINUAR-II, désignés pour l'assistance humanitaire, principalement envoyée aux habitants des villes et qui donnent solution aux problèmes civiques.

21. Les équipes de reconnaissance humanitaires: personnel de la MINUAR-II qui sera chargé de collecter toutes les données concernant les concentrations des personnes déplacées ainsi que les camps des réfugiés et les infrastructures de routes à utiliser pour le transport de la nourriture.

Les données nécessaires pour l'accord de cessez-le-feu.

- a. Les FGR et les FFPR doivent donner au QG de la MINUAR les données sur leurs effectifs, leurs armes (artillerie, mortiers, systèmes de défense aérienne), leur dispositions/localisation de toutes leurs formations au moment où le cessez-le-feu entrera en vigueur;
- b. Les deux parties sont appelées à poser toutes les questions concernant la terminologie employée afin d'en assurer la clarté; et
- c. Une zone tampon et une ligne de cessez-le-feu seront créées entre les forces opposées. Cette zone sera occupée par la MINUAR-II.

Concept de l'opération:

22. Les composantes militaires de la MINUAR-II et des Observateurs militaires de l'ONU devront en tout moment s'assurer que les préconditions posées dans les paragraphes précédents sont mises en application et respectées.

23. Pour créer les conditions nécessaires pour la surveillance de l'application de l'accord du cessez-le-feu, les composantes militaires de la MINUAR-II et les observateurs militaires de l'ONU devront effectuer les opérations suivantes:

- a. L'établissement des postes d'observation: Les postes d'observations devraient être situés sur les points les plus élevés du terrain pour s'assurer de la visibilité même dans des conditions climatiques difficiles et pendant la nuit. Les postes d'observations devraient donner le maximum d'informations concernant les mouvements des troupes, s'il y en a, et d'autres preuves tangibles de violations du cessez-le-feu;
- b. La garde des camps de réfugié: Cette protection s'impose et devrait être instaurée dans tous les camps de réfugiés parce que les risques de menaces pour les personnes qui y vivent sont très élevés;
- c. L'établissement des Points de contrôle: Les Postes de contrôle statiques ainsi que mobiles devraient être établis sur tous les croisements majeurs et aux points d'entrée et de sortie d'une zone. Les postes de contrôle statiques doivent être placés au point d'entrée/sortie des positions des troupes;
- d. Les barrages routiers: Conjointement avec les points de contrôle, des barrages routiers seront établis et ce, spécialement pendant la nuit;
- e. La fouille: Les fouilles devraient être effectuées sur tous les postes de contrôle mobiles et statiques. Elles devraient être faites à intervalle irrégulier;
- f. La patrouille: La programmation des patrouilles, élaborée pour les unités de la MINUAR-II ainsi que celles des observateurs militaires de l'ONU, couvriront toutes les routes importantes et les pistes des secteurs d'importance opérationnelle. Les observateurs militaires de l'ONU seront toujours accompagnés par les escortes armées quand ils patrouilleront la nuit;
- g. Le cordon: Ceci sera effectué sur la base d'information spécifique obtenu en rapport avec la découverte de stock non officiel d'armes, de munitions ou d'explosifs. Les opérations de cordon sont à éviter pendant la nuit. Les dites opérations devraient être conduites en coordination avec les autorités locales;
- h. Les équipes d'investigation: groupes spéciaux composés d'observateurs militaires de l'ONU et de policiers civils désignés pour enquêter, clarifier, et rapporter tous les

cas de violation de cessez-le-feu;

- i. Les comités pour les questions civiques: structure organisationnelle pour résoudre toutes les questions importantes des citoyens en rapport avec les activités humanitaires dans les localités; et
- j. Les équipes de reconnaissance humanitaires: Ces groupes seront chargés de la collecte des données concernant les camps des réfugiés, de leur localisation et de la recherche de la meilleure option pour la livraison de l'assistance humanitaire par voie routière.

Les Règles d'engagement:

24. Instructions concernant l'ouverture du feu au Rwanda pour tous les membres de la composante militaire de la MINUAR-II autorisés à porter des armes.

- (1) Le commandant immédiat ordonnera tout changement concernant le degré de préparation des armes. Le commandant devrait normalement donner l'ordre d'ouvrir le feu, toutefois tu as le droit d'utiliser la force appropriée pour te protéger et protéger ceux qui sont sous ta protection. Dans la mesure du possible un coup de semonce doit être tiré.
- (2) Tu dois utiliser seulement le FORCE MINIMALE nécessaire. La FORCE MINIMALE implique les actions chronologiques suivantes:
 - a. Montrer les armes de façon visible;
 - b. Avertissement verbal;
 - c. Interdire l'accès du point à protéger;
 - d. Interdire physiquement l'accès;
 - e. Pointer les armes; et
 - f. tirer.
- (3) Si tu dois faire feu, tu dois rendre compte de tous les coups tirés dans un rapport soumis à ton commandant immédiat.
- (4) Tu dois éviter l'emploi de la force, si c'est possible de le faire, et ta conduite doit être le moins possible sujette à créer de l'inquiétude, de la crainte pour la population locale.

Avertissements:

- (5) **AVERTISSEMENT AVANT DE FAIRE FEU.** Tant qu'il est possible, un avertissement devrait être donné avant de faire feu. L'avertissement devrait être fait à haute et claire voix en Anglais, en Kinyarwanda ou en Français:

STOP-HANDS UP/ HAGARARA - AMABOKO HEJURU/ ARRETE-
LES MAINS EN L'AIR. (pause)

STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/HAGARARA CYANGWA
NKURASE/ARRETE OU JE TIRE.

- (6) **FAIRE FEU APRES AVERTISSEMENT.** Après avertissement tu peux faire feu sur la personne seulement si:

- a. Tu crois que la personne est prête à t'attaquer ou à attaquer la personne que tu dois protéger;
- b. Que la personne porte une arme dangereuse (par exemple arme à feu, un mécanisme de tir improvisé ou une machette);
- c. Que la personne refuse de s'arrêter quand il lui a été demandé; et
- d. Que tu crois qu'il n'y a pas d'autre façon d'arrêter la personne.

- (7) **FAIRE FEU SANS AVERTISSEMENT.** Tu peux faire feu sans avertissement sur une personne:

- a. Qui a employé ou emploie une arme à feu ou une autre arme offensive contre toi, ton unité ou une personne que tu dois protéger; OU
- b. Qui porte ce que tu penses être une arme dangereuse ET qui est visiblement prête à l'employer ET que tu crois qu'il n'y a pas d'autre façon de te protéger ou de protéger la personne que tu dois protéger; et
- c. La vengeance est interdite, et tous les blessés devraient bénéficier de premiers soins.

Les Installations de l'ONU et les camps des réfugiés:

- a. Un gardien des Installations de l'ONU est autorisé à employer la force armée contre des personnes armées dans les cas décrits dans l'instruction précédemment pour ouvrir le feu et aussi:

- (1) En cas d'auto-défense;
- (2) Contre une tentative de désarmer du personnel de la MINUAR-II;
- (3) Quand une autre personne de l'ONU ou d'autres vies sont en danger de mort;
- (4) Quand il y a tentative d'infiltration ou de destruction des installation de la MINUAR-II;
- (5) Pour la défense d'installation de la MINUAR-II sous attaque;
- (6) Lorsqu'une tentative armée de pénétrer dans une installation de la MINUAR-II prend place ou que les troupes de l'ONU risquent d'être isolées; et
- (7) Lorsqu'il y a une tentative armée de forcer le personnel de la MINUAR-II à quitter une position qui leur a été ordonnée d'occuper.

Escortes et Patrouilles

a. Une escorte ou une patrouille est autorisée à utiliser leurs armes contre le personnes armées dans les cas mentionnés précédemment d'ouverture du feu et également:

- (1) En cas d'autodéfense;
- (2) Contre une tentative de désarmer du personnel de la MINUAR;
- (3) Lorsqu'une personne de l' ONU ou d'autres vies sont en danger de mort;
- (4) Pour la défense de convois de la MINUAR-II ou autres, ainsi que pour la protection des véhicules de patrouilles avec du personnel à bord en cas d'attaque armée;
- (5) Lorsqu'une tentative est faite par la force d'empêcher le personnel de la MINUAR-II d'exécuter la mission qui lui est assignée par son supérieur; et
- (6) Lorsqu'une tentative est faite pour abuser ou arrêter des civils ou militaires de l'ONU en utilisant la force.

Points de contrôle et barrages routiers

a. Le personnel des points de contrôle et barrages routier est autorisé à utiliser leurs armes dans les cas décrits précédemment d'ouverture du feu et également:

- (1) en cas d'auto-défense;
- (2) pour la défense de propriété ou de véhicules de la MINUAR-II sous attaque; et
- (3) Lorsqu'une tentative est faite par la force d'empêcher le personnel de la MINUAR-II d'accomplir la mission assignée par son supérieur.

25. Les observateurs militaires de l'ONU surveilleront, observeront, enquêteront et soumettront des rapports constamment sur:

- a. Les mouvements des troupes, s'il y en a;
- b. Tous les genres d'engagement, indépendamment du type de calibre employé;
- c. Le mouvement des convois de secours humanitaires; et
- d. Le harcèlement sur les civils, les rencontres des parties politiques, les propagandes hostiles ainsi que les actes de provocation, par radio ou directement à l'égard de l'opinion publique, s'il y en a.

Conclusion:

26. La mise en application du cessez-le-feu est d'une importance significative pour le développement du processus de paix au Rwanda. De plus, une brève période d'attente pour la mise en application du cessez-le-feu décidera si la plupart des victimes de la guerre actuellement vivantes survivront, mais d'un autre côté, l'attitude de toutes les personnes engagées dans cette action n'est pas sans importance.

ANNEXE A

Programmation des objectifs après déclaration effective du cessez-le-feu-Date
de mise en application Jour C.

Objectifs	début- opérations	Fin- opérations
a. - Déploiement des éléments de la MINUAR-II	Jour C - 1	
b. - Arrêt des tirs et des actions militaires sur toute l'étendue du Rwanda.	jour C	Jour C
c. - Arrêt des assassinats/tueries politiques/massacres ethniques	Jour C	Jour C
d. - ^{DEJAZA F.2} Utiliser la population civile y compris les groupes auto-défense sur toute l'étendue du pays et de remettre tous les barrages à MINUAR-II	Jour C + 1	C + 15 jours
e. - Redéploiement des unités et des sous unités d-MINUAR-II pour des raisons de sécurité entre les deux factions	Jour C + 3	Jour C + 7
f. - Permettre action opérations humanitaires pour réfugiés et les personnes déplacées	Jour C + 3	Fin opérations en fonction de la situation.
g. - Créer conditions de sécurité sécuritaires pour les personnes qui cherchent à se protéger des tirs perdus, bombardements et massacres.	Jour C + 3	Fin opérations en fonction de la situation
h. - Créer une atmosphère de bonne volonté pour initier les activités préparatoires avant les pourparlers de paix.	Jour C + 2	C + 15 jours
i. - Echange de prisonniers	Jour C + 10 .	Jour C + 30
j. - Créer conditions propices au retour de loi et de l'ordre.	Jour C + 15	Fin opérations après mise en place satisfaisante

N.B. Le jour C est considéré comme date de cessez-le-feu.

COPY : CMPO
Coo
CLOGO
CAO

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1/4

*File
Demobilization*

*For comment by 19/2
to Chief Plans*

DRAFT
with comment of EC

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KIGALI, 14 February 94

OPS PLAN ON ASSEMBLY POINTS ESTABLISHMENT

References : A. Arusha Peace Agreement
B. Rwanda Map 1:250,000

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan : Bravo

1. **SITUATION**

- a. On RGF side, there is up to 10,000 beds available in the barracks. An unknown number of them can be used to establish assembly points but in D+150 (D=BBTG establishment) the National Army will need 4,400 beds, in D+180 the National Guard will need 2,000 beds and in D+225 the National Army will need again 4,400 beds.

Additionally, a lot of buildings of different shapes and in various technical conditions are available on RGF controlled territory. The exact data will be available when the reconnaissance conducted by the Chief of Plans is completed. It will be undertaken once an agreement on the location of the assembly points is reached in the Joint Military Commission.

On RGF side there is no problem with water. The roads only require minor repairs.

- b. On RPF side, existing infrastructure is very poor. In the proposed locations there is a very limited number of buildings suitable to establish assembly points.

In some places, there may be problems with water. All proposed places and roads will have to be checked by deminers. Roads usually require major repairs.

The exact data will be available when the reconnaissance conducted by the Chief of Plans is completed. It will be undertaken when an agreement on the location of the assembly points is reached in the Joint Military Commission.

- c. According to reference A UNAMIR is responsible for establishing Assembly Points, Joint Training Centers and

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*(2) C PLANS
FC has made some
comments. Could you
please answer these
questions?
16/2
DSC/CO*

Cantonment Points. Assembly Points are to be ready when the disengagement process starts, i.e. 90 days after the establishment of the BBTG (D day). The bed requirements in Assembly Points are :

FROM	TO	NUMBER OF BEDS	NUMBER OF TYPICAL ASSEMBLY POINTS
		<i>57000</i>	
D + 90	D + 120	55,652 <i>57000 / 22 = 2536 per</i>	22
D + 120	D + 180	49,252	20
D + 180	D + 195	44,012	18
D + 195	D + 210	39,612	16
D + 210	D + 225	24,412	10
D + 225	D + 240	22,412	9
D + 240	D + 270	21,212	9
D + 270	D + 300	13,212	6
D + 300	D + 330	12,012	5
D + 330	D + 360	8,812	4
D + 360	D + 450	3,512	2

For details : Annex A "Bedding Chart"
Annex B "Typical Assembly Point Description"

According to reference A it shall be possible to use some of the 10,000 beds in existing infrastructure.

why not?
UNAMIR Engineer Coy and Logistics Coy are not suitable to conduct this task. So it shall be done by General Services and Building Management Services in close cooperation with the Plans Cell and the Chief of Logistics.

what about integrated centre?
MISSION

UNAMIR shall establish assembly points for *57000* ~~55,652~~ Rwandan soldiers.

try to contact nearest family
EXECUTION

Concept of Operations

All Assembly Points shall be built with the greatest possible engagement of local resources and local infrastructure.

Only when there is no infrastructure will completely new assembly points be built. The average size of an assembly point shall be 2,500 beds, however, the size of assembly points may range from 1,000 to 3,000 beds. The size and shape of assembly points shall be determined according to terrain, existing available infrastructure, and by tactical and political requirements of the Disengagement, Demobilization

and Integration process.

To avoid problems when closing down assembly points, the standard of living in assembly points shall be a little lower than the average in Rwanda (Spartan camp) but high enough to create an environment suitable for conducting military training (separate training) of Rwanda troops, to resolve all administrative problems (see Annex C), to allow supervision of the training and surveillance of the weapons and ammunition in depot in the assembly points, and to avoid mass illnesses among soldiers.

b. Task Organization

By 20 February 1994, the Chief of Plans is to negotiate through the Working Group on Logistics of the Joint Military Commission the exact location of all assembly points to be established. *operations first*

The Chief of Plans, in close cooperation with the Chiefs of Logistics, Engineering, General Services, and Building Management Services, is to conduct a reconnaissance of the proposed assembly points. Consolidated data shall be provided to the Force Commander as soon as possible to allow for the location of all 22 assembly points to be determined. A recommendation shall also be submitted on the locations which shall be phased out after 1, 4, 8, 10 and 12 months respectively.

By 20 February 1994, the Chief of Plans, in cooperation with the Chiefs of General Services and Building Management Services, is to prepare costs estimates for the construction of a typical assembly point (see Annex B) on a flat area without pre-existing infrastructure either using : (1) 10 men tents; or (2) 10 men local huts.

By 10 March 1994, the Chief of Plans, in cooperation with the Chiefs of General Services and Building Management Services, is to prepare costs estimates for the establishment of each individual assembly point, i.e. the costs of the construction of a typical assembly point minus the value of existing infrastructure plus the costs of necessary repairs to the existing infrastructure.

As of D day and until D+90, The Chief of Logistics, in cooperation with the Chiefs of General Services and Building Management Services, is to supervise the establishment of the Assembly Points.

The Chief Engineer Officer is to ensure that all necessary

mine clearances have been carried out before works start in each assembly point.

By D+30, The Chief Engineer Officer is to ensure that all roads and bridges from Kigali to the assembly points are suitable for heavy trucks of up to 16 tons.

The UNMO Commander is to post a 6 men strong UN Observer Team in each assembly point from the beginning of the works.

c. Coordinating Instructions

The Chief of Plans is to coordinate all the activities relating to the establishment of assembly points.


In this regard, he will maintain daily contact with the Members of the Army High Command Council and with the Council itself, with the Joint Military Commission and its Working Group on Logistics, with the Chiefs of Logistics, Engineering, General Services and Building Management Services. In case of disagreement, the Chief of Plans may take a decision or may refer the case to the Force Commander for guidance and/or decision.

Brig. Gen. Romeo A. Dallaire
UNAMIR Force Commander

Annexes : A. Bedding Chart
 B. Typical Assembly Point Description
 C. Administrative Problems

Distribution : CAO
 DFC
 SAO
 Chief of Plans
 Chief of Logistics
 Chief of Engineering
 Chief of General Services
 Chief of Building Management Services
 UNMOS Commander

SERVICEMEN STRENGTH IN ASSEMBLY POINTS
(Bedding)



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TYPICAL ASSEMBLY POINT DESCRIPTION
OPS PLAN ON ASSEMBLY POINTS ESTABLISHMENT

References : A. Arusha Peace Agreement
B. Rwanda Map 1:250,000

1. SITUATION

a) It is essential for the success of the Demobilization and Integration processes to conduct properly the first month of separate training of Rwandan troops in assembly points (roughly 90 hours of basic infantry training plus 90 hours of **political training of a great importance**). This requires proper organization of the military life in the assembly points. The time table of a typical day in assembly points is to be determined by the Army High Command Council and the Camp Commander. In any case, the timetable will be close to the sample given below.

FROM	TO	ACTIVITY
06.00		wake up
06.15	06.45	training
06.45	07.15	toilette
07.15	08.00	breakfast and preparation for first hour of training (06.30-07.15 breakfast for duties/ill; 08.00-08.15 breakfast for prisoners)
08.00	08.45	first hour of training
08.45	09.00	break
09.00	09.45	second hour of training
09.45	10.00	break
10.00	10.45	third hour of training
10.45	11.00	break
11.00	11.45	fourth hour of training
11.45	12.00	preparation for lunch
12.00	13.15	lunch (11.30-12.00 lunch for duties/ill; 13.15-14.00 lunch for prisoners)
13.15	13.45	siesta
13.45	14.00	preparation for fifth hour of training

FROM	TO	ACTIVITY (Cont'd)
14.00	14.45	fifth hour of training
14.45	15.00	break
15.00	15.45	sixth hour of training
15.45	16.00	break
16.00	16.45	seventh hour of training
16.45	17.00	break
17.00	17.45	eighth hour of training
17.45	18.00	preparation for dinner
18.00	19.00	dinner
19.00	21.00	time off (laundry, letter writing)
21.00	21.45	evening toilette
21.45	22.00	presence check in sub-units
22.00	06.00	sleep

The manpower in a typical assembly point will be as follows :

TOTAL	:	2,500	
breakdown	Officers :	150	6%
	NCOs :	550	22%
	Men :	1,800.	72%
ON DUTY	Officers :	4	(1 Duty Officer at the camp and 2 Assistant Duty Officers, 1 Guard Commander)
	NCOs :	up to 55	
	Men :	up to 180	
STAFF		up to 30 Officers and NCOs	

ORGANIZATION OF THE MEN POWER IN TYPICAL ASSEMBLY POINT

- Staff : up to 30
- 25 coys (groups) up to 100 men

b) The analysis of the requirements in terms of physiological needs for the purpose of establishing the timetable is :

EARLY MORNING LAVATORY

- 2,500 men minus 200 on duty equal 2,300 men
- 1 minute each makes 2,300 minutes of free access to lavatory
- time available : 10 minutes

CONCLUSION need for 230 lavatories in the camp
estimated waste : 1 ton (1,000 kg) every morning (only !)

Each latrine has to be portable, 0,6 meter wide and one meter long. The latrines should be located at least 10 meters behind the classrooms. Every month they should be moved five meters forward. Hence the original location should be 10 meters plus x months by 5 meters (x = projected number of months of camp existence).

EARLY MORNING TOILETTE

- 2,300 men
- 3 minutes each makes 6,900 minutes of free access to tap
- time available : 30 minutes

CONCLUSION need for 230 taps in the camp

PREPARATION FOR LUNCH/DINNER (HANDS WASHING)

- 2,300 men
- 10 seconds each makes 400 minutes of free access to tap
- time available : 60 minutes

CONCLUSION need for 7 taps for this purpose near the eating area

MEALS

- BREAKFAST
- 2,300 men
- 10 seconds each to collect breakfast makes 400 minutes
- time available : 30 minutes

CONCLUSION need for 13 points of distribution of breakfast

- LUNCH/DINNER
- 2,300 men
- 20 seconds each to collect lunch/dinner makes 770 minutes
- time available : 60 minutes

CONCLUSION need for 13 points of distribution of lunch/dinner

c) The analysis of the requirements for sleeping areas is :

- for each soldier : 2,5 sqm
- for each soldier : 2,5 sqm for inner routes in camp
- for each soldier : 2,5 sqm for anti-fire purposes

TOTAL FOR ONE SOLDIER : 7,5 sqm in camp
(roads for trucks, sub-units
meeting places and supply not
included)

For an example of a double tent, see sketch 1; of a ten men tent, see sketch 2; of the part of a camp allocated to two companies, see sketch 3.

- * 0,9 m and 2,05 m are the minimum distances between one tent and the next tent or the edge of the road.

CONCLUSION

Where permanent infrastructure is not available an area of 18,750 sqm is required for 2,500 men to sleep in tents or locally-built huts.

The best location for the sleeping area is between two roads as per sketch 4.

This design would allow for the lavatories for each coy on the opposite side of the roads (see sketch under point r).

d) The requirements for the weapons and ammunition storage in the assembly points are as follows.

As the weapons will be returned to the troops for training purposes it is necessary to design storage facilities in such a way as to allow this retrieval and to permit strict control of the weaponry movements by the UNMOS.

Weapons should be stored in a vertical position. Hence, each item requires 0,2 m of wall totalling 500 meters of wall (2,500 x 0,2 m) or for each coy (100 men) 20 meters.

For the design of a weaponry depot building, see sketch 5.

Remarks : Partition walls can be made of iron net.
Behind each door (one door per three coys) there should be one table for administrative purposes.

e) The requirements for the security of the weapons in storage are shown in sketch 6.

Remarks : The minimum visibility around the building should be 50 meters (NO GO area).

f) For the requirements for the storage of non-personal (additional) weapons and ammunition see sketch 7.

Remarks : This weaponry and ammunition can be stored in piles. A roof is necessary against sun and rain.
This depot has to be located at least 100 meters from any other installation.

g) The requirements for the food giving area are shown in sketch 8.

Remarks : Additional 14 points required for Officers.

h) The requirements for bathing are as follows.

- Early morning bathing
 - 2,300 soldiers
 - 2 minutes each make 4,600 minutes of free access to the tap
 - time available : 20 minutes

CONCLUSION : need for 230 taps for this purpose

- Shower
 - 2,300 soldiers
 - 5 minutes each make 11,500 minutes of free access to the shower
 - time available : 165 minutes


CONCLUSION : need for 70 showers

- Laundry

It can be done by each soldier personally during time off in toilette area (230 taps are sufficient for this purpose).

For drying purposes classrooms can be used during night time.

For each tap (shower) it is necessary to provide an area of 0,6 x 1 meter.



$230 \times 0,6 = 138$ meters of free access to taps

i) The requirements for class/lecture rooms follow :

Half of the training hours are devoted to political training (first month - separate training), hence the need for 1,150

seats under a roof. A typical classroom should accommodate a company (100 men) and will be used in shifts by two companies. An area of 0,24 sqm (0,4 x 0,6) is required for each soldier plus 8 sqm for the teacher in each classroom. Hence the size of a typical classroom should be 32 sqm (5,6 x 5,6).

j) The requirements for firewood are as follows :

- 2,500 men
- 0,5 m3 per month per soldier
- 1,250 m3 of firewood are necessary for each month, i.e. a 200 m long x 2 m high x 6,25 wide pile
- This one month supply can be located on both sides of the sports facilities.

k) The requirements for the hospital are :

In such an assembly point, it should be possible to hospitalize 1 % of the soldiers mainly for prevention, i.e. to avoid mass illnesses such as influenza. A small 25 beds hospital has to be provided. One ill soldier requires 21 sqm under a roof. Hence the hospital should be 21 x 25 = 525 sqm.

l) The requirements for the prison are :

A symbolic prison for 25 men has to be provided near the Headquarters (100 sqm).

m) The requirements for the guardroom are :

Rooms for guards (11 resting + 11 on standby + 11 on duty + 2 assistants to Guard Commander + 1 Guard Commander) :

- 1 room with 11 beds for resting
- 1 room with 2 beds for assistants to Guard Commander
- 1 room with 1 bed + 1 desk for Guard Commander
- 1 room with 11 chairs + table for those on standby

n) The requirements for UNMOs are :

Accommodation for 6 UNMOs.

o) The requirements for staff are :

Office area for 30 staff members, including one good room to accommodate one computer, two locally-recruited data entry clerks and their two beds.

p) The requirements for power are :

- UNMOs Headquarters
- staff
- weaponry storage
- hospital
- kitchen
- eating and food distribution area

q) The requirements for fencing are :

2,000 meters of fence and 3 gates.

r) For a typical camp see sketch 9.

2. MISSION

UNAMIR shall establish 22 assembly points that meet all training and administration requirements according to reference A.

3. EXECUTION

The Chief of Plans, in cooperation with the Chief of Building Management Services, is to prepare project designs for each of the 22 assembly points.


The Chief of Logistics is to supervise the realization of these assembly points.

Brig. Gen. Romeo A. Dallaire
UNAMIR Force Commander


Distribution : CAO
 DFC
 SAO
 Chief of Plans
 Chief of Logistics
 Chief of Engineering
 Chief of General Services
 Chief of Building Management Services
 UNMOs Commander


ANNEX B

Sketch No.1





Sketch No.2







ANNEX B
Sketch No.4









Sketch No.7





TYPICAL ASSEMBLY POINT



○ Additional Weapons Storage

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ANNEX C

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14.02.94

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS DESCRIPTION
ANNEX TO OPS PLAN ON ASSEMBLY POINTS ESTABLISHMENT

References: A. Articles Nos. 2,18,54.c.6,54.c.8,58,61,62, 69, 74.1,74.2, 78, 85,141,142,143,144.1,144.2, 148, 149,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160 of the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the two Parties.

1. SITUATION

Implementation of Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration of the Armed Forces of the two Parties requires a lot of administrative works which have to be done in a very short period of time. When troops arrive in assembly points and heavy weapons in cantonment points, registration process of men and weapons has to start. The aim of this registration is not just to keep records but to create possibility to check whether the implementation of Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration is done properly or not. So the records should be created in such a way to make crosschecks possible.

Main body of all crosschecks has to be done before 30th day after troops arrival in assembly points because the official beginning of the demobilization starts when the lists of servicemen to be demobilized are published. This publishing has to take place after one month of separate training.

2. MISSION

UNAMIR shall assist, supervise all administrative works regarding the disengagement, demobilization and integration process and conduct some of these works.

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ANNEX C

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation

Military EDP shall prepare software (end of February 94), recruit (March 94) and train (April 94) 50 data entry clerks. Two data entry clerks shall be posted in each assembly (cantonment) point to register personnel and weaponry. Twice a week diskettes shall be delivered to Military EDP for checking and crosschecking, and for creating central data base. The input of each diskette should be approved by camp commander and checked physically by UNMOs Team Leader. On the end of separate training, lists of those to be demobilized have to be ready. When these lists are published, only one data entry clerk is to be left in each assembly (cantonment) point, until the start of the third batch of Gendarmerie training or if before, until close down of the point.

b. Task Organization

- **Chief Personnel Officer :** In cooperation with Civil Administration, employ 50 data entry clerks for Military EDP effectively one month before start of disengagement. 25 of them for a period of two months and 25 for 6 months.
In cooperation with Civil Administration, employ 2 software gurus for Military EDP effectively from one month before start of disengagement for a three-month long period.
- **Chief Logistics Officer:** In cooperation with Civil Administration, provide Military EDP with listed below equipment: One 4x4 car, Printer-Hewlett-Packard Laser Jet 4 = 25 pieces, CPM SIREX 486 PLUS - 25 pieces, MONITOR-AOC CM-336 N - 25 pieces, UPS-Smart UPS-600 (American Power Conversion) - 25 pieces, FLOPPY DISKS-MAXELL OR 3M type MF2HD - 250 ea, Laminator - 25 pieces, Polaroid (4x4) - 25 pieces, plus paper (54000 x 4 photos = 216000).
- **Chief Military EDP :**
 - to register 54,000 servicemen
 - to crosscheck the division of posts in NA and NG (60% for RGF ; 40% for RPF).
 - to prepare the lists of servicemen to be demobilized for publication.
 - to divide those to be demobilized into categories according to articles 155, 156, 157, 158, 159 160.

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ANNEX C

- to account the bulk of money needed to pay demobilization allowance (Art. 153)
 - to be ready to prepare payrolls of demobilization allowances.
 - to register all recovered and stored in assembly points illegally possessed weapons and ammunition.
 - to be ready to prepare report for the BBTC about types, technical condition and age of stored weapons and ammunition.
 - to check the ratio between the various ranks in NA and NG (Art. 2 and 18).
 - to register administrative and support staff (Art. 58).
 - to register instructors (Art. 78, 143).
 - to register 1800 Gendarmes not trained but being on duties.
 - to be ready for issuing Demobilization Certificates (four copies) (Art. 152).
 - to register invalid and handicapped together with their children (Art. 154).
- **MILOBS Commander** : To point one Military Observer in each assembly (cantonment) point team as a man being in charge of all administrative matters. This Officer is to keep contact with Chief of Military EDP in all matters regarding administrative works.
- **Chief of Plans** : during recce of assembly and cantonment points to find proper room for two data entry clerks, their equipment and source of power.
- c. Coordinating Instructions
- In all matters regarding administration, Chief of Military EDP is to report to Chief of Plans.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Chief of Logistics has to provide Chief of Military EDP with all necessary stationary, furniture and other equipment.

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ANNEX C

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Chief of Plans is to be informed in details by Chief of Military EDP on progress in work on day to day basis. Chief of Plans is to report every week on progress to FC or if necessary immediately.

Romeo A. Dallaire
Force Commander

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