

Cable File  
New York Code Cables  
Incoming and Outgoing

01/11/1960 - 30/11/1960

3/3

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SERIES S-0736

BOX 6

FILE 2

ACC. DAG 13/1.6.1.2.1

DECLASSIFIED

OUTGOING CODE

To: SECGEN, NEW YORK  
From: RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date: 14 November 1960  
No.: B- 1419

*Issue  
given*

The following note signed by Kayadi, Commissioner-General of National Defence, given me by UAR Ambassador:

quote

(text attached )

unquote

We have no evidence of any significant developments along lines indicated.



COPIE

Synthèse Entretien avec S.E.  
le Président de la République  
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Etant donné l'évolution de la situation, la crise n'ayant pas été résolue à cause de certaines circonstances malheureuses, notamment l'hésitation manifestée à prendre des mesures draconiennes au moment où les pro-communistes MNC - PSA se sont manifestés, le Commissariat Général à la Défense Nationale a pris la décision de prendre les responsabilités pour remettre définitivement de l'ordre au pays, et permettre la réalisation de la table ronde politique.

- 1- L'état d'exception sera décrété pour l'ensemble du Territoire de la République (l'Intérieur et la Sûreté passeront sous le contrôle de la Défense Nationale).
- 2- Un bataillon de troupes aérotransportées dénommé "Libération" sera formé dans vingt et un jours et relèvera directement de la Présidence. Il aura pour but, en partant de certains axes stratégiques, d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre et la justice. Les troupes régulières, très indisciplinées, seront en majeure partie démobilisées.
- 3- A côté de ce bataillon, "l'Intelligence Service" qui sera créé s'occupera à liquider le terrorisme, surveiller les frontières et détruire toutes les cellules communistes.
- 4- En vue de la réorganisation de l'Armée Nationale, un contingent de 203 candidats officiers et sous-officiers se rendront à l'étranger avant le 1er décembre prochain.

Léopoldville le 31 octobre.

F. Kayadi

OUTGOING CODE

*Being Issued  
In CD*

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 13 November 1960  
No: B- 1418

Ahmed's comments on our B-1393 follow.

Quote                    'A'                    Unquote.



FM ONUC KAMINA 122200Z

TO ONUC LEO

S E C R E T

KALE018 FOR RIKHYE FROM AHMED [REUR KA57 CONFIRM CONTENTS YOUR REPLY TO  
SECGEN. ON BELGIAN PERSONNEL WE GAVE VAN LIERDE ON 27 OCTOBER LIST OF  
97 OFFICIALS TO BE RETAINED AFTER 15 NOVEMBER UNTIL REPLACED BY UNATIONS  
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL ON 11 NOVEMBER WE ADVISED VAN LIERDE THAT 3 OUT OF  
97 OFFICIALS SINCE REPLACED BY UNATIONS PERSONNEL. AS REPLACEMENTS TAKE  
OVER ONE MONTH EVACUATION NOTICE WILL APPLY TO BELGIAN COUNTERPART.  
ON MOVEABLE EQUIPMENT STOCKS AND STORES INVENTORY OF ITEMS RECOMMENDED  
FOR PURCHASE BY WHEELER MISSION NOW IN PROGRESS AND EXPECT COMPLETION  
30 NOVEMBER. BELGIANS HERE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT WHEELER MISSION ONLY AGREED  
TO RECOMMEND PURCHASE BUT THEY CONSIDER THAT IF UNATIONS SHOULD DECIDE  
NOT TO PURCHASE SOME ITEMS OR FEWER QUANTITIES OTHERS A REAPPRAISAL OF  
POSITION AND PRICES MAY BE NECESSITATED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FIRST USE  
ALREADY BEING MADE BY UNATIONS OF ITEMS SUCH AS VEHICLES SECOND SOME  
PREPARING DONE ON BULK BASIS BASED ON AVERAGE CONDITION OF ARTICLES  
THIRD BELGIANS HAVE TAKEN ACTION TO PROCURE IN EUROPE SOME ITEMS FOR  
RUANDA URUNDI WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN SHIPPED FROM KAMINA. FOR  
THESE REASONS WE REQUEST URGENT DECISION ON WHEELER MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS  
AND SUGGEST IF POSSIBLE THIS DECISION BE NOT DELAYED UNTIL 30 NOVEMBER  
SINCE TYPE AND QUANTITY OF ITEMS RECOMMENDED FOR PURCHASE ALREADY KNOWN  
AND DETERMINED BY UNATIONS LOGISTICS REPRESENTED ON WHEELER MISSION AND  
WE WISH TO AVOID POSSIBLE RETURN MON COMMISSION KAMINA ON GROUNDS OF  
REASSESSMENT WHOLE POSITION OF PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT AND STORES BY UNATIONS.  
NO DISCUSSIONS YET HELD AT KAMINA ON POSITION OF IMMOVABLE AND REAL  
PROPERTY AT BASE BUT CONSIDER SOME ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE DEFINING  
UNATIONS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH PROPERTY ]

2094/JB/131030Z NOV 60



OUTGOING CODE

sent  
4.8.

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 13 November 1960  
No: B- 1417

R

Mobutu telephoned at 8 A.M. that he had sent Kamitatu back to his residence late last night. He said that some local politicians were opposed to his release. Equally, some of his officers considered this gesture as a sign of weakness on his part. As he had given his solemn promise to me, in spite of the opposition he let Kamitatu off.

2. After recuperating his energies, in the afternoon, Kamitatu went round the African Quarter to show himself to his followers and to rally support. At 6 P.M. he returned to his residence followed by a motor cavalcade and a bus load of admirers and of course the inevitable press. After a few minutes, the crowd dispersed peacefully. Kamitatu is calling on me tomorrow morning.

3. Presumably connected with Kamitatu's activity this afternoon, Mobutu took precautions by increasing his guard at the Parliament and by surrounding Mpolo's residence which has a Moroccan guard of one NCO and three men.

4. Thomas Kanza telephoned to say that his father was in danger of being arrested. The Congolese police guard at his house has been disarmed under orders of Mobutu. I informed him that we had already taken the necessary precautions but I could not possibly spare troops to provide a guard at his house. Kanza is seeing me tomorrow.

5. The Commissaires General have decided to celebrate Armistice Day, 11th November, and have declared it as a national holiday. Due to the events of 11th November it had to be postponed. Mobutu has informed us that



he is holding an Armistice Day parade on 17th November. He is bringing some detachments from Thysville and Matadi. The parade will end up at the War Memorial where a brief ceremony will be held. Invitations are being sent to the UN as well. He has asked for our cooperation and does not wish us to misunderstand the movement of troops in this connection. I believe it will be a good gesture if we not only cooperate but also offer to provide a UN detachment at the War Memorial to join in on the ceremony -- this detachment should serve a dual purpose. Will appreciate your advice.

6. A Ghana patrol in the town of Bakwanga when going past a Kalonji camp was beaten up including its officer. They were later released on the intervention of a Belgian Kalonji officer and the following day, the self-styled Vice Premier of Etat Miniere offered his apologies on behalf of his government. They gave assurances of taking disciplinary action against their personnel. The Commanding Officer of the Ghana Regiment has warned the Kalonji troops that any further incident would be dealt with severely. I am however not satisfied with this action of the Ghana Commanding Officer and I am having instructions sent to him that our troops must act more vigorously in such incidents.

7. North Katanga is fairly quiet. The Irish have given up the search for one missing body. Since the Tshombe Government has not permitted the evacuation of refugees by rail from Kolwezi, we are going ahead with our own transport and hitherto over 300 have been evacuated. I have arranged with Linner for a team ~~of ours~~ to proceed to visit the disturbed areas at Tshikapa, Mwene-Ditu and Bukama to advise us as to the urgent measures necessary for aid to the refugees.



OUTGOING CODE

*Int. P. 1*  
*Issue*  
*Im 2*

To : SEC GEN, NEWYORK  
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 13 November 1960  
No : B-1416

1. Lack of spares for aircraft seriously affecting whole operations. Normally maximum twenty to twenty-five per cent of aircraft should be out of service for periodic maintenance, our percentages are as follows. C119 seventy-three per cent, DC3/C47 sixty per cent, Beaver and Otters each fifty per cent. Difference ours and normal is lack of spares. Less than one sixth of our requests have to date been filled. Everything possible has been done this end, by Field Service, Pisa, and Chateauroux to rectify deficiencies. We still have serious skilled personnel deficiencies and requests for additional aircraft and personnel which are urgently required have yet not been filled.
2. Regarding Kamina, as indicated my 2451, Belgians still claim not to have been approached nor do they recognize our requisitioning authority as stated by you previously. They are planning removing spares and tools which will practically immobilize our operations. Please advise.



OUTGOING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

To: Cordier, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 13 November 1960  
No: B-1415

Reur 3393. Lumumba letter dated 11 November.



OUTGOING CODE

*Sent  
Tma*

IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 13 November 1960  
No: B-14/4

*[Handwritten signature]*

Mobutu has kept his word and released Kamitatu  
late last night.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 12 November 1960  
No: B-1412-13

Leo was comparatively quiet today after yesterday's excitement. Kamitatu is still Mobutu's unwilling guest. This morning, four Gendarmes brought Rom forcibly to Mobutu's residence where I understand he was made to sign a warrant of arrest for Kamitatu on charges for stealing State documents. There are a number of documents still missing and they are either with Thomas Kanza or at the Ghana Embassy. Had these also been delivered yesterday afternoon, Mobutu would have had to find another excuse to break his word of honour to me.

2. Thomas Kanza's continued residence in the Royal is a definite embarrassment to us. Surete documents were first brought to his apartment in the Royal where I believe he still has kept some. I therefore have no other choice but to arrange for him to leave the Royal.

3. Rahman and Ghaleb saw me this morning urging Kamitatu's release and that we prevent further arrests of important political leaders. They urged that we must pressurise Mobutu to prevent further political arrests. They feel that Mobutu under the influence of his Belgian and other Western advisers is attempting a definite stifling of free political activity and to have the field to themselves. This will jeopardise the task of the Conciliation Commission who would find it difficult to get in touch with the political leaders who oppose Kasavubu, Mobutu, Bomboko group.

4. The ANC first arrested but later released Sylvian Kama, a Deputy for the Kwilu District and I am informed that Raphael Kinkie, Deputy for the Kwango district (both in Leo Province) was beaten up. The Lumumba side has reacted but rather feebly with one demonstration outside Lumumba's residence and another minor one in the city. In spite of the Mobutu offensive, their



morale appears to be somewhat higher than before which may be attributed to the expected arrival of the Conciliation Commission.

5. Daniel Kanza feared arrest. We have instructed the Malayan patrol in that area to be vigilant. Daniel Kanza informed us that if Mobutu went too far, Lumumbaists might act in desperation. Thomas Kanza has written a letter to me in which he alludes to Mobutu's political plan being executed stage by stage by the arrest of his political opponents. Kanza warns us that when he and his friends can make themselves heard by the General Assembly, they will denounce our culpable hesitations. He continues to warn us that the civilian population is determined to foil the Mobutu Kasavubu plan.

6. The President of the Leo Provincial Assembly telephoned to inform us that Mobutu intended to beat and/or arrest all political leaders who opposed him. He asked whether the UN would guarantee their safety. He was given our standard reply. However, our troops have been carrying out intensive patrolling throughout the residential areas. The ANC has stayed away but the Gendarmerie has been fairly active. Kamitatu's police has shown little desire to support its leader. I am hoping that the week-end will reduce activity according to the usual pattern and we will have some peace till Monday.

7. Under instructions from Ndolo, the Director of Leo Radio had excluded ONUC Forces programme starting yesterday evening. We checked with Mobutu and others this morning and learnt that the only change asked for by Mobutu was fifteen minutes of radio time on Fridays for the ANC. We have finally sorted this out but have still to persuade Leo Radio not to give our fifteen minutes on Fridays to the ANC.

8. The law and order situation in Leo, South Kasai and in North Katanga requires additional troops. When Von Horn returns, I propose to suggest redistribution



of our forces to enable us to have larger strengths available in disturbed areas. The lack of adequate air transport is a serious handicap and I will therefore urge that all speedy action is taken to despatch spares already asked for. In order to get some additional troops quickly into North Katanga, we have decided to send a Nigerian company there. Brigadier Ward, the senior Nigerian officer who has arrived in the advance party, states that it would be better from their point of view if the first Nigerian battalion is sent to Kivu as planned. As Nigerian battalions only consist of three rifle companies, he recommends that a company from the second Nigerian battalion be sent to North Katanga. He added that Nigeria is willing to send a second battalion to the UN. He was sure that his Government had already made this offer to the UN. I strongly recommend that we accept this offer. If however an approach by Nigeria has not yet been made, I recommend that we ask them for the second battalion. Incidentally, the additional company can be lifted within the airlift provided by USAF as four aircraft remain unused at present.

9. Albert Kalonji held a press conference this morning in his office in the African Quarter in Leo. He declared that the cease-fire was to be null and void and charged me of betraying him. He said despite my promises, Lumumbaists continue to slaughter Balubas and unless immediate action was not taken by the UN to stop this, Kalonji's forces would proceed to liberate the entire territory from the frontier of Etat Miniere up to Port Franqui. He said all Kasai Balubas are ready to join with the Etat Miniere brethren in this move. As I have already mentioned, I have been attempting to contact Kalonji but he has eluded us so far. Now that we know that he is definitely in the city, I have asked Duran to get in touch with him as I feel, if it were possible, we should meet. Failing which, we will publicly warn



him of our intentions to introduce a neutral zone and of our determination to prevent further incursions.

10. Mobutu has just sent word through our Liaison Officer that he was permitting Kamitatu to return to his residence tonight. He said that a group of politicians had arranged for a warrant of arrest to be issued duly signed by Rom but he had torn it up personally.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SEGEN, NEWYORK  
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLVILLE  
Date : 12 November 1960  
No : B-1411



1. Berendsen reports notification from Customs Collector at important rail entry point of Dilolo that Katanga Government subjects ONUC imports to same duties, regulations and import licence requirements as any other goods. ONUC goods if not declared within 15 days would be mandatorily bonded until duty paid. We have had previous intimations of such possibility and have pointed out ONUC legal status.
2. Berendsen has written Tshombe expressing view this cannot represent considered decision of Katanga Government, requesting orders to Collector to honor exemptions granted Unations by all States, and warning that otherwise ONUC would be obliged to consider appropriate steps.
3. Berendsen is nevertheless convinced this action does represent deliberate government usurpation which must be firmly resisted. Plainly it constitutes assertion against Unations of independent statehood, as no provincial government can block importation and assess duties. Alternatively, if independence is not asserted, then action violates Charter obligation under Article 105 which San Francisco Conference clearly treated as self-executing prohibition against taxing Organization. Finally, delaying, impounding or financially burdening supplies necessary for ONUC operations obstructs Security Council mandate contrary to Articles 25 and 49 which your 4 August note informed Tshombe conferred on Council authority directly applicable to subordinate territorial governments of Members.
4. Berendsen requests instructions if Katangese refuse duty-free entry. He favours envisaging direct reprisals such as closing Elisabethville airport or Dilolo railway to some or all classes of traffic. We have informed him we are referring to your judgment question of most suitable



action. Tshombe could be reminded of points made in your above-cited note (see S/4417 page 5) that resistance to Secco decision has legal consequences laid down in Charter with sanctions applicable to subordinate territorial organs and with obvious conclusion that Katanga intentions will be considered with full knowledge of their extremely serious character. Main difficulty with this threat is that if resisted it can be carried out only by transfer of action to New York, which you may not think convenient. Best alternative to Berendsen's broader reprisals might be narrower action, more related to ONUC necessities, of minimum military measure to free any goods physically impounded, and this only after fullest diplomatic warnings to Tshombe. Please advise.



OUTGOING CODE

TO: Secgen  
FROM: Rikhye  
DATE: 12 November 1960  
NUMBER: B- 1410

*Issue  
Jm*

Reur 3356.

1. We are cabling Moroccan Commander immediately advising him he should permit Belgians remove from Kitona and Banana any items not recommended for purchase in Wheeler report. Will also tell him that even within list recommended by Wheeler we have no objections Belgians removing items they want provided they give us exact and accurate list of everything taken.



Outgoing Code

TO: Secgen  
FROM: Rikhye  
DATE: 12 November 1960  
NUMBER: B- 1409

*Issue  
Jm ad*

On seeing local newspaper account that Tshombe had released to consular corps Eville certain documents including texts verbatim records secret meetings with Secgen and Bunche, we cabled Berendsen. Berendsen verified with local consuls that texts were actually distributed. Berendsen states his notes confirm discussions were to be kept secret except for joint press release and that Tshombe had never sent him copy of verbatim of 13 August meeting despite repeated insistence. Berendsen is trying get copies of material issued by Tshombe through consular channels.



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SECGEN, Unations, New York

(TEXT &amp; SIGNATURE)

insert prefix &amp; / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

B 1408

FROM RIKHYE X

RADIO REPORTS CONCILIATION COMMISSION PROBABLY COMING EARLY NEXT WEEK X  
APPRECIATE URGENTLY BEST ESTIMATE OF ARRIVAL DATE SO ACCOMMODATIONS AND  
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE

*Josue  
m w*

I. N. 5990 — 200,000 - 7/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : J. McDiarmid

Authorized : Brig. Gen. Rikhye

Date : 12 Nov. 1960



OUTGOING CODE

To: BUNCHE, NEW YORK  
From: RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date: 11 November 1960  
No: B- 1407

*Issue  
Jan 2*

1. Reur 3340. Agree continuation Congolese workers at Kitona serious question. Seegen's cable 2299 stated that employment depends on decision whether to concentrate ANC training there but that "meanwhile agree employment should continue". We have been operating so far on this basis. Constructive discussions with an effective government have not been possible and my discussions Mobutu referred to in B-1369 have not been resumed.
2. At present Congolese labour force of some 1,200 supervised by Belgian officers as follows: 600 various custodial and road and grounds maintenance tasks, 200 work in shops, balance of 400 as recommended by Wheeler and approved by Dayal are now beginning to continue construction of uncompleted houses for Congolese at Kitona and Banana on "force account" basis.
3. Monthly payroll of 1,200 workers approximately \$50,000.
4. Following earlier study, Monod believes both Kitona and Banana could be maintained on absolute minimum care-taking basis with 400 to 500, but I believe even further reduction should be possible. Work on houses could be cut down or totally stopped. Present laying off after hopes were raised will cause serious humanitarian and political problem. If contemplated should be done gradually with adequate preparation and certain repatriation facilities for those who could be returned to their original agricultural Mayombe region.
5. With no permanent solution in sight, we could seriously consider discharging all Congolese workers not essential to basic custodial and maintenance tasks. Such a decision would require new instructions to



Nachaat, replacement for Monod as administrative officer, who left for Kitona 10 November with instructions retain all Congolese labour even if work doubtful value to us. Also probably necessary give notices in next week or so to take advantage knowledge of Belgian supervisor Lambet.

6. Before any final decision I should have one further discussion with Mobutu in order he not consider any shift in our position a breach of faith.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
12 November 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

*Imad*

B-1406    SEC GEN FROM RIKHYE    FOLLOWING LETTER OF WHICH WE WILL POUCH  
ORIGINAL MONDAY RECEIVED FROM LUMUMBA ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY CLN QUOTE                      (text attached)                      UNQUOTE



2610/CAB/PM.-

Monsieur le Président de l'Assemblée  
Générale des Nations Unies

à NEW YORK

Aux bons soins de Monsieur le  
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général  
à LEOPOLDVILLE

Monsieur le Président,

La crise politique, provoquée le 5 septembre 1960 par Monsieur le Chef de l'Etat, Monsieur KASA-VUBU et qui ne fait que se prolonger, risque gravement de provoquer bientôt l'éclatement du Congo.-

Un régime d'anarchie et de dictature s'est substitué au régime démocratique que le peuple congolais s'est donné le 30 juin 1960.-

Une minorité insignifiante, conseillée et soutenue financièrement par certaines puissances étrangères, se livre chaque jour et chaque nuit, à des activités subversives.-

La capitale de la République est devenue une ville de désordre où une poignée de militaires achetés trouble continuellement l'ordre et la tranquillité publics. Les citoyens de Léopoldville vivent actuellement dans un régime de terreur. Des arrestations arbitraires, suivies de déportations, sont opérées jour et nuit. Beaucoup de personnes sont portées manquantes.-

Des assassinats, des vols avec effraction, des viols de femmes mariées et de filles mineures sont commis presque chaque jour par des individus dépourvus de toute morale et de toute conscience patriotique et qui prétendent être au service de l'Armée Nationale et de Monsieur Kasa-Vubu.-

Les Présidents des gouvernements provinciaux de Stanleyville et de Léopoldville, Messieurs Finant et Kamitatu, élus du peuple et dirigeants incontestés administrant à eux tous deux plus de six millions d'habitants à la satisfaction générale, subissent en ce moment des sévices et des tortures de tous genres. Enlevés par surprise par les brigands de Mobutu, respectivement le 13 octobre à Stanleyville et le 10 novembre 1960 à Léopoldville - alors qu'ils se sacrifient avec un dévouement exceptionnel à promouvoir le bien-être de leurs citoyens, les deux Présidents provinciaux sont enfermés aujourd'hui dans des camps de concentration créés à Léopoldville par Messieurs Kasa-Vubu et Mobutu. Aucun fait n'est à reprocher à ces dignes représentants du peuple si ce n'est leur loyauté à servir leur Pays, et leur désapprobation à l'égard des actes illégaux de Monsieur Kasa-Vubu et de ses partisans de Léopoldville, actes qui conduisent le Pays tout droit à son effondrement.-

Le Président du Sénat, Monsieur Joseph OKITO, deuxième personnage de l'Etat, a déjà subi le même sort : plusieurs fois arrêté arbitrairement, battu, et relâché.-

.../...



Les Parlementaires du bloc majoritaire et les membres du gouvernement légal subissent chaque jour les mêmes méfaits. Il leur est même formellement interdit de quitter Léopoldville, de rentrer dans leurs provinces pour prendre contact avec leurs électeurs et leurs familles, de circuler librement dans la ville de Léopoldville, qui appartient pourtant à la Nation toute entière. Seuls les partisans de Monsieur Kasa-Vubu jouissent en ce moment de la liberté de circulation, d'action, de travail, d'opinion, de presse, etc. A Léopoldville il est interdit aux partis formant la majorité du Parlement de publier des journaux.-

Tous les militaires et fonctionnaires loyaux, qui refusent à s'associer aux activités illégales et à la politique de démolition nationale du Chef de l'Etat et de ses quelques partisans de Léopoldville, sont révoqués, maltraités et jetés sur le pavé. Plusieurs centaines de soldats loyaux, qui s'opposent à Mobutu, sont renvoyés chaque jour dans leurs villages, d'autres sont actuellement enfermés au camp de concentration de Binza.-

Les soldats sont sélectionnés en leur raison de leur appartenance ethnique au Chef de l'Etat et à ses partisans minoritaires, ceci dans le but de terroriser tous ceux qui ne partagent pas les opinions et les vues de ces derniers. Un véritable carnage est organisé aujourd'hui à l'égard de tous ceux qui défendent la cause du peuple dans l'honnêteté et la loyauté.-

Les seules institutions provisoires prévues dans la Loi Fondamentale élaborée par l'ancienne puissance coloniale, sont sapées et foulées aux pieds par le Chef de l'Etat. Le Parlement, parce qu'il n'est pas d'accord avec lui, est brutalement fermé, et cela, en violation des articles 21 et 70 de la Loi Fondamentale.-

Monsieur Kasa-Vubu confond le régime parlementaire, qui est actuellement le nôtre, avec le régime présidentiel. C'est ainsi qu'il s'attribue les pouvoirs du Premier Ministre, prévus à l'article 36 de la Loi Fondamentale. C'est au Premier Ministre et à son gouvernement légitime qu'il appartient d'envoyer une délégation aux Nations Unies comme je l'ai fait à trois reprises, et non au Chef de l'Etat.-

Le Parlement, la plus haute institution du Pays, a voté de pleins pouvoirs à mon gouvernement le 13 septembre 1960. La confiance que la Nation toute entière fait à mon gouvernement ne fait qu'augmenter.

L'O.N.U. n'a pas à choisir une autre voie que celle que le Parlement a tracée.-

Au lieu de se conformer aux décisions prises souverainement par le Parlement congolais, certains pays, membres des Nations Unies, méconnaissent ces décisions et ne veulent soutenir que la minorité qui travaille contre la volonté de la majorité.

Au lieu d'aider les dirigeants congolais à résoudre pacifiquement le conflit provoqué par Monsieur Kasa-Vubu, certaines puissances font tout pour élargir le fossé entre nous. Leur plan est de provoquer indirectement l'éclatement du Congo.-

C'est ainsi que le peuple congolais, dans son ensemble, déplore l'attitude du gouvernement américain qui, au lieu de soutenir l'action des Nations Unies, s'est attaqué d'une façon curieuse, au récent rapport rédigé par le Secrétaire Général et qui est conforme à la vérité. Ce rapport stigmatise avec impartialité et objectivité l'ingérence manifeste de la Belgique dans les affaires intérieures du Congo et son obstruction systématique contre l'action de l'O.N.U.



C'est avec beaucoup de regret que je signale également à l'intention de l'Assemblée Générale, que les 30 millions de francs, qui ont été saisis récemment à Stanleyville des mains d'un groupe de personnes qui voulaient s'accaparer du pouvoir par un coup d'Etat, proviennent des milieux américains. Les documents saisis en témoignent éloquemment.-

En considération de tout ce qui précède, et vu l'impossibilité devant laquelle s'est trouvée l'O.N.U. à trouver une solution rapide conformément à la volonté exprimée, je propose, avec l'assentiment des millions d'habitants que je représente valablement, à ce que la solution dans le problème congolais soit trouvée que par le peuple congolais lui-même. De cette façon, l'O.N.U. ne sera pas accusée de partialité dans la décision qu'elle pourrait éventuellement prendre, ou d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures du Congo.-

Pour ce faire, je préconise l'organisation immédiate d'un Référendum populaire auquel participeront tous les citoyens de la République. Ce référendum sera organisé sous la direction des assemblées et des gouvernements provinciaux mais sous le contrôle d'une commission d'observateur de l'O.N.U. Cette commission prendra toutes les dispositions pour assurer la liberté de vote de tous les électeurs. Des dispositions seront également prises pour éviter tout truquage.-

Ce référendum consiste à l'adoption du régime présidentiel, suivie de l'élection du Président de la République par suffrage direct.

Ce référendum permettra au peuple de se choisir librement et directement les dirigeants de son choix et de mettre ainsi fin à la crise actuelle et à toutes les manœuvres de coulisse.-

Voilà la seule et l'unique voie qui rétablira la paix immédiatement et l'ordre au Congo et ce dans l'intérêt même de la mission entreprise par l'O.N.U. dans notre Pays.-

Le peuple congolais attend impatiemment que l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies se prononce sans retard sur cette proposition réaliste et objective et que la Commission de Conciliation, qui arrivera bientôt au Congo, soit une commission d'observateurs chargés du contrôle du référendum.-

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma haute considération.-

P.E. LUMUMBA  
Premier Ministre de la République  
du Congo.-

Copie pour information à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général  
de l'O.N.U. à New-York.



B-1404 (B-1399 unbreakable)



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 11 November 1960  
No: B- 1402-03

Sent  
cc  
11/11/60  
Roy's

Kamitatu's family was released about midnight and she took shelter at Welbeck's residence. We had numerous telephone calls and personal requests from Kamitatu's supporters to arrange his release.

2. Early in the morning, a crowd of about 200 Kamitatu supporters came to the Royal and requested that the UN should intervene. The demonstrators said that if he was not released by 10 A.M., a larger crowd would go to Mobutu's residence and make their demands known. Shortly thereafter, a platoon of ANC arrived but we were able to persuade them to leave. The demonstrators appeared to be divided and a fight ensued amongst them. The Malayan guards on duty at the Royal fired in the air contrary to orders but which proved effective.

3. Mobutu telephoned to say that he had been informed that the State documents stolen by Kamitatu had been delivered to a UN Secretary at the Royal at 3 A.M. He demanded that they should be handed over to him immediately. On checking, I found that no documents had been received by any one at our headquarters.

4. My first visitor this morning was the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires who strongly urged that we must act and if necessary even neutralise Mobutu. He has had bad personal experience and he informed me that the Liberian Ambassador was made to suffer indignities yesterday at the hands of the ANC as they thought him to be a communist. This was followed by a telephone call from Welbeck who confirmed that he was taking care of the Kamitatu family. He informed that all the African Ambassadors were at his residence and had asked him to speak to me on their behalf



that UN should intervene. He said that Kanza had brought the documents from Kamitatu's house which were being studied by his staff and will be brought to the Royal for return to Mobutu on condition that Kamitatu is released. I told Welbeck that I would have nothing to do with these documents and they should not be sent to our headquarters. He however called a few minutes later to say that Kanza had already returned to his apartment in the Royal. Shortly thereafter, Kanza appeared with a suitcase full of documents. I refused to take them over and asked him to retain them in his own custody.

5. / My next caller was Ghaleb, very disturbed about the situation and urged me to take firm action with Mobutu. Meanwhile, reports had come in from different parts of the city that generally all was quiet except for the demonstrators outside our offices.

6. I consulted Cox and Knecht on the position of the documents. The Loi Fondamentale clearly places surete under the Central Government and police under the Provincial government. Therefore, /Kamitatu's removal of provincial documents pertaining to surete from the appropriate offices did tantamount to a criminal act. We therefore agreed that these documents should be returned to the correct authority which for practical purposes was through Mobutu to the Commissaire of the Interior, Kondolo. However, I proposed to use the return of documents to the advantage of Kamitatu by asking for his release.

B-1403 / 7. I saw Mobutu for three hours this afternoon at his new grand residence overlooking the rapids and paid by his Belgian hosts. He received me <sup>well</sup> ~~with politeness~~ and immediately agreed to release Kamitatu if the documents were returned. He gave me his word of honour and at which I sent for the documents and handed them over to Mobutu and Kondolo in the presence of Kamitatu. At this stage, a number of Mobutu's officers came into the hall and there was a lengthy discussion in Lingala between them. I thereafter had to



suffer through about two hours of harangue about Kamitatu's doings, allegations against the UN assisting Lumumbaists and criticism of Mobutu and his ANC in the report. I realised that Mobutu was playing to his audience and therefore I kept a polite but firm note in my answers. When I finally asked Mobutu when Kamitatu would be released, he said since it was a Congolese affair it should be settled by the Congolese. I realised that Mobutu did not want it known that the UN had intervened. He wanted the laurels for himself. So I asked to see him in private where I asked him for a categorical answer whether he was going to keep his word of honour and release Kamitatu. I told him that I was not going to make any public comment about my intervention to release Kamitatu and that I would prefer if he made the announcement. Furthermore, I suggested that he should send an officer to talk to the demonstrators outside the Royal to inform them that Mobutu was going to release Kamitatu. This pleased Mobutu to no end and I left him with confirmation of his assurances. Kamitatu has not yet left Mobutu's residence.

8. From Tshikapa comes news of arrest of three Baluba chiefs who were released when our troops intervened. A Ghana detachment on its way to relieve Tunisians at Bakwanga was held up near Lake Mukamba by Kalonjists but later were guided through by a <sup>Kalonji</sup> Belgian officer ~~in command~~.

9. The Irish have suffered yet another tragedy in that two of their men got accidentally shot while searching for their lost comrades. Although the operation was completed, one soldier died and the other <sup>dangerously</sup> wounded was evacuated to Albertville. The final casualty figure of the Irish patrol now stands at two men alive, eight dead and one missing.

10. I have just received reports that elements of the ANC and Gendarmerie have returned to the African Quarter where they have made some arrests. There is also a report of shooting between a party of ANC and police in the town which ~~has~~ not yet been confirmed. The situation in the city remains tense.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen  
From: Rikhye  
Date: 11 November 1960  
Number: B-1401

A handwritten signature, possibly "Jm", written in dark ink. It consists of a stylized, cursive letter 'J' followed by a lowercase 'm', with a horizontal line extending from the bottom of the 'm'.

Reference my B-1379. Scott has received word from the Foreign Office that they are willing to repatriate Roberts to the UK and keep him in the country for the duration of the Congo crisis. Roberts is willing to return without raising any difficulties. It seems to me the best solution under the circumstances. Please advise.



INDICATE  
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insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

B-1400

BUNCHE FROM RIKHYE VON HORN X REUR 3303 X CANADIANS HAVE  
ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL ON OUR REQUEST FOR INCREASED  
COMMITMENTS X ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL ASKED FOR ARE RECOMMENDED X

*1. J. L. L. L. L.*

I. N. 5990 — 200,000 - 7/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : Rikhye, Brig.

Authorized :

Date : 11/XI/60



B-1405

TOP SECRET (repeat 1399)



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen  
From: Rikhye  
Date: 11. November 1960  
Number: B-1398

Please consider our ONUC 2442 confidential.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 10 November 1960  
No: B-1396-97

Last evening, the ANC interfered with the relief of the Ghana guard on the radio station by Malayan troops. I decided to postpone the relief to this morning so that Mobutu could be warned. This morning the relief was carried out without any incident. In the city, search for weapons by ANC continues but they are conducting themselves properly. They however surrounded a number of houses for purposes of arresting anti Mobutu minor leaders but I understand no arrests were made. Our mixed police patrols are being carried out satisfactorily and relations between the Ghana and the Congolese police are excellent.

2. ANC troops rounded up the ring leaders of the strike in Otraco wharf and nine were arrested. Mobutu has warned the strikers to return to work and that he will use force if necessary.

3. We have received further details of the Irish patrol which consisted of one officer, ten other ranks and two vehicles. They left Niemba at 1330 hours 8 November to patrol the road south and they were due to return to base by last light. When they reached a damaged bridge a few kilometers south at 1500 hours, the patrol dismounted and were immediately showered with arrows from both sides of the road. Lieutenant Gleeson and some others were hit and wounded. The patrol commander ordered his men to take cover and open fire but some members of the patrol were caught by the hostiles in the bush. One Baluba dead has been buried near the scene of the ambush. Ten Baluba wounded have reported to Manono hospital this morning. They admit having killed four Irish soldiers and that ten Balubas were killed and ten wounded in the action. I have issued orders



that the Baluba wounded will be kept under custody in the hospital. Meanwhile, search continues for the remainder missing.

4. Berendsen reports that he was obliged to release available details of the above incident as the Katanga Government Information Service had put out the exaggerated report received by them from their Gendarmerie in E'ville.

5. Byrne has issued orders to his command that strength of all patrols and train guards will be increased and firmer and more vigilant attitude should be adopted in the face of armed tribesmen.

6. I have received disturbing reports about the food and health situation in the area Tshikapa and Mwene-Ditu. At Tshikapa there are 150,000 Baluba refugees who are short of food and medicines. There is abundant food in the area but the ANC have requisitioned the trucks and therefore Forminiere and other private companies are unable to distribute it. I am instructing our troops in the area to contact the ANC and obtain release of these vehicles. I am asking them to provide the necessary guards to ensure smooth distribution of food. Linner is also going into this problem and between us we will do all that is possible to alleviate conditions.

B-1397 / 7. The administration in Tshikapa being Lulua dominated are trying to move the Baluba refugees out of the area. As this would create a tremendous problem, our troops have so far succeeded in persuading them from taking this step.

8. Alexander is back from his visit to the Ghana Brigade in Kasai and he visited Mwene-Ditu during his tour. He confirms my views with regard to the situation in that sector that additional troops are required and early action is necessary to arrange a cease-fire between Kaniokas and Balubas. Michel and Veillet-Lavallee are already working in that direction and have arranged a meeting of the Kanioka Chiefs for 15 November. Meanwhile, both of them are going to Bakwanga to see the Baluba authorities. A neutral zone

TRQE  
CJDM  
KVS



including Mwene-Dity and Laputa is being considered. When Von Horn returns, I will discuss reinforcing South Kasai with the Malayan contingent.

9. Joseph M'buyi and André Tshibangu, ex-Lumumba ministers, did not leave last night for Beirut but made an attempt this morning which was thwarted by the ANC. At 1 PM one officer and four men of the ANC arrived at the UAR Embassy and said that they wanted to search the building as they were looking for M'byui and Tshibangu. Murad gave them some beer and succeeded in talking them out of searching the Embassy. On hearing of this incident, Welbeck has asked for protection since he feels he is in imminent personal danger from Mobutu who he thinks is attempting to kill him. Since he already has Ghana police guarding his residence and the Embassy, he has little to fear.

10. This evening Mobutu has surrounded Kamitatu's house with about a platoon of ANC. On our enquiry, he said that Kamitatu has repeatedly attacked him in his paper Solidarite Africane and today Ginza, a provincial minister, has removed many documents from Surete Nationale and taken them to Kamitatu's residence. Mobutu has therefore decided to neutralise Kamitatu but assured us that he was not going to arrest him. I have sent an officer to Kamitatu's house to get me a first hand report of the ANC action.

11. It is quite obvious that Mobutu is gaining in stature and each day lost to the continued failure of bringing the leaders together will give him added strength. A situation may well arise where he is so entrenched that it may be difficult to lever him out. I am fully aware of Dayal's concern about Mobutu and his ANC which I am sure is equally shared by you. However, I cannot help saying again that we must soon decide on measures which will reduce the ability of Mobutu and his ANC to continue with their illegal and violent actions.

12. From Stanleyville we have reports that Gendarmerie is patrolling the streets in strength. They have been




checking on ANC personnel. They have arrested the Acting Provincial President Bajoko. We have instructed our representative to use his good offices in obtaining his release.



OUTGOING CODE

TO: <sup>and Vaughan</sup>  
Bunche, Unations, New York  
FROM: Rikhye  
DATE: 10 November 1960  
NUMBER: B- 1395



1. Last of Belgian personnel are withdrawing from Kitona and this process scheduled for completion by 1 December. We <sup>have</sup> ~~have~~ given as much thought to future of this base as possible, although the events at Kamina have naturally overshadowed it. Have held several discussions with Mobutu about possibility using Kitona as ANC training base, and he very interested but apparently not prepared to take immediate definitive action. In any case appears we must plan continual care-taking functions there for some time, and we must also continue to meet payroll of 1,200 Congolese workers.

Olver and I have recently  
2. ~~Apple~~ visited Kitona briefly and have examined staff requirements with Monod who has served as Administrative Officer there for more than one month. We have brought Monod back to Leo and replaced him with Nachaat in view of certain jurisdictional difficulties with the military command. Monod has been advising us last few days on staffing, and following represents the absolute minimum requirements under various headings:

- A. For general administration, four posts which we can fill from our resources.
- B. For housing and grounds, two posts, one from UN military and one through extension Belgian N.C.O.
- C. For base hospital, two medical officers, one capable of handling gynaecological cases and having some experience in surgical work, one pharmacist and one laboratory technician, all to come from military resources outside the Congo. We request your urgent action to secure preferably from Austria or Italy. Personnel should be English and French speaking.



- D. For the Congolese labour force known as MOC, we would like to retain present Belgian officer supervisor at least for several months due his familiarity local languages and customs and will try meet other requirements from our resources.
- E. Under welfare, we would like to ask the Moanda mission to provide one Belgian priest to take care of religious needs.
- F. Under technicians, we have various requirements, but are trying to fill as many as possible from local resources. At this point we would like your assistance in providing one French-speaking civil engineer with good experience in overall maintenance of buildings, grounds and related equipment typical of modern military base. We also have need for other engineers and craftsmen but are having some success in local recruitment and will advise later if your assistance required. Would like to keep one Belgian NCO technician for essential maintenance water purification system.
- G. Under security, we will cover the entire function by our military personnel.
- H. Under telecommunications, we will explore the capabilities of our military force in providing necessary cable and telephone technicians, but we may have to request your assistance in recruitment.
- I. For messes, we will try to recruit locally one mess supervisor of the type employed for Kamina.


~~J. For the airport we will attempt to find the required technicians from our own resources.~~

3. We are being strained to utmost to keep Kitona going even on modest basis in addition to Kamina, and certain essential services may fail shortly unless we can manage with your assistance to provide the necessary replacements for the retiring Belgians, all of whom must be French-speaking. Appreciate your earliest reaction to proposals contained herein.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen  
From: Rikhye  
Date: 10 November 1960  
Number: B-1394



Byrne has informed von Horn that he is required to return to Ireland to make a full report on the incident involving the Irish patrol and that he has made a provisional booking on 13 November to travel via Brussels. Von Horn is on tour of Equateur Province and is due back on Sunday.

From the operations point of view I cannot agree to Byrne's visit to Ireland. I therefore request that this be taken up with the Irish Mission. If they insist on a report from a senior officer, I could arrange for the Commanding Officer of the Irish battalion concerned, or preferably his second in command, to proceed to Ireland.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 10 November 1960  
No : B-1398

*James  
M. W.*

Your 3285. Situation regarding takeover of Belgian supplies and equipment in bases is as follows:

1. All detailed discussions were held by Wheeler Clements mission with Belgian officials at Kamina and Kitona. Wheeler reports were pouched New York in ONUC Administrative Report No. 23 of 19 October (paragraph 2). These reports accompanied by one completely detailed inventory with one copy left at each base and one copy here in Leopoldville for study.
2. Our cable B-1246 stated inter alia that Wheeler's recommendations were under study and that we were expecting to send our final requirements to you as soon as possible to enable decision regarding purchases.
3. Ahmed and Roy cabled on 29 October asking confirmation of procedures set forth in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 of Wheeler Kamina report and have told us it is imperative they continue operating on this basis as already begun. Our cable No B-1321 asked for your confirmation.
4. On basis of detailed inventories received from Wheeler's mission, Chief Logistics would not like to be obliged to make his final recommendations to you before 30 November. This delay would give him time to make a thorough analysis of the inventories and permit him to eliminate from his final requirements supplies and equipment which are not absolutely essential for the Force, with significant economies. I feel this position is justified in view of the considerable amount of money involved (\$8,600,000 for Kamina alone). Memorandum dated 2 November from Chief Logistics to McDiarmid explaining this position was taken by Dayal to New York.



(B-1390 continued)

5. This request not to take a decision before 30 November 1960 is also based on our discussions with Wheeler and Clements and seems to be along the lines of Wheeler's report, Appendix I, para 11 and Appendix II, para 4. However this interpretation of the negotiations which took place in Kamina and Kitona between the Belgians and Wheeler's mission might not be entirely shared by the Belgians. Nevertheless, what is at stake justifies attempt to have the Belgians agree with our views.

6. On their side, the Belgians have nothing to lose in such an operation. The equipment which the UN may not want (and is unused) would be disposed by them as of 30 November 1960.

7. To sum up, I would suggest:

- (a) to consult Clements to ascertain if our above understanding is correct and
- (b) to try to obtain the Belgian Delegation to agree with our point of view that our final requirements with regard to equipment and supplies will be presented to them on 30 November 1960 at the latest.

8. With regard to substitution of Belgian by UN technical personnel to serve in the bases, the detailed proposals from Ahmed with our comments were pouched to you on 7 November.

9. Am repeating this cable to Ahmed for any urgent comments he may have which will be forwarded to you immediately.



OUTGOING CODE

Sent.  
HOS

TO: Unations, New York  
FROM: Rikhye  
DATE: 10 November 1960  
NUMBER: B-1392



For Macfarquhar, Michelmores from Rikhye.

Reference Michelmores's PRU 60 of 31 October 1960.

Liaromatis categorically denies <sup>wg</sup>insertation notice in any newspaper.

He confirms that he was offered post of Chief of Katanga Police by President of Katanga Parliament during his visit to Athens. Liaromatis has not addressed any telegram to the Greek Minister of Interior asking that Greek officers should be sent to Katanga. He however states that the Greek Foreign Minister has asked the Greek Ministry of Interior for names of suitable officers for posting to the Congo.



OUTGOING CODE

TO: Secgen  
FROM: Rikhye  
DATE: 10 November 1960  
NUMBER: B- 1391

B

Reyour 3289.

1. Only 5 bodies recovered so far but not yet identified. A Beaver, *an other* and two helicopters have joined the ground search party. We have recovered a second Irish soldier alive his name is Private Thomas Kenny. The name of the first survivor is 808214 Pte Joseph Fitzpatrick.

2. Latest reports indicate that hostile tribesmen are <sup>a</sup>round Niemba where we have an Irish platoon. We have two patrols advancing on to Niemba. The first an Irish Moroccan is moving from Monono, the other an Irish Ethiopian is advancing from Nyumzou.

*a determined*  
3. I have issued orders that ~~an~~ armed search for the four missing must continue and the UN troops must dominate the area.

4. Sendwe has backed out this morning as he felt that enough ground work has not been done for this trip. He is however making a broadcast and advising his people that UN forces include European troops. I understand that the hostile elements could either be Baluba Jeunesse who are completely out of control or they may well be Kikiwats. I have asked our troops to establish contact with local chiefs.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 9 November 1960  
No: B- 1390

Reur 3274.

Previous orders are as under:

Quote. From Supreme Commander. Following instructions will be complied with in supercession of our Ops 545. (A) Under no circumstances will you permit arrest of Lumumba on his own premises. (B) Should warrant be produced for his arrest, the server of the warrant will be directed to report to Special Representative of the Secretary General at ONUC Headquarters. (C) Should Lumumba leave his premises, it will be at his own risk and he will not be provided with UN escort. (D) Since Lumumba's premises are under UN protection, any unauthorized entry or attempt to force entry will not be permitted. (E) Brigade Commander Leopoldville may use such forces and methods as he considers necessary for the defence of the premises. (F) Force may be used if necessary to implement these instructions, keeping in mind the principles of the use of minimum force necessary for the task. It is emphasized that any attempt to force through UN guard or posts will permit the personnel of such guards or posts to exercise their right of self defence. (G) Due warnings will be announced before any resort to force is made. (H) Please acknowledge receipt of this signal. (I) These instructions eill be handed over to the Tunisian Brigade on relief. Unquote.

2. Chief Operations Officer gave verbal instructions on 7 November 1960.

3. Written instructions have been issued today. They are: Quote. In continuation of this HQ signal OPS/548 of 11 October 1960. (1) In view of the political situation in Leopoldville, it is imperative that the security



arrangements at Mr. Lumumba's residence are tightened up.

(2) In the light of the above, please revise the guard orders to include the following: (a) Strength of the guard by day and night. There will be two officers with the guard by day and night so that at least one officer is available at all times. (b) A sketch showing the layout of Mr. Lumumba's house and the tactical dispositions of troops around the house. (c) Instructions regarding visitors. All visitors will be taken to the guard Commander under an armed escort. The visitor will fill in the form available in the guard Commander's office. This form will then be taken to Mr. Lumumba, who will either grant permission or decline to see the visitor. If this permission is granted, the visitor will be escorted to the house and handed over. After the visit the guard Commander will ensure that the visitor leaves the premises. If the visitor returns, even after a short time, the same procedure will be adhered to. (d) Mr. Lumumba's household staff. Free movement into and out of the premises will be afforded to Mr. Lumumba's household staff. The household staff go daily in a car for purchases. The guard will check the number of persons that leave in the car. The same number of persons will be allowed to re-enter the house. For any other person or persons, in addition, the same procedure as indicated in para (c) above will apply. (3) Paras 7, 8, 9 and 12 of ONUC Operations Directive No.6 of 28 October 1960 will also be incorporated in the guard orders. (4) A copy of the orders will be endorsed to this Headquarters. Unquote.



OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 9 November 1960  
No: B- 1389

*Issue  
Jm c9*

I have been able to arrange to despatch Sendwe with Duran tomorrow to Nynzu leaving Leo 9 A.M. If they cannot land there, they will land at Kabalo and then proceed in a light aircraft.

2. Press have failed to obtain charter aircraft to take them to the scene of incident. Since no spare aircraft is available with Sabena, they have requested that a selected group be carried on in UN aircraft proceeding to the area. Since space is available, I am permitting a group of six to accompany Duran who~~ex~~ has been made responsible for taking care of them from the information point of view and provide any assistance which is possible in the field. Berendsen and Byrne have been notified of this.



OUTGOING CODE

Restricted

To: Secgen, New York  
 From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
 Date: 9 November 1960  
 No: B- /388

After his last visit, Duran reported certain indiscretions committed by Major Gustafsson at Kabalo. We had already received reports of his racial feelings and his extreme friendliness with Belgian nationals when he was at Stanleyville and Kabalo. Major Gustafsson has also made statements unfavourable to the UN which have appeared in the British press. In view of his sympathies, the Katanga authorities have made capital out of it and have issued many communiqués favourable to him. In view of all this, it was decided that he should report to Leo to state his side of the story. I am transmitting below a note from Von Horn on the subject.

2. Meanwhile I am informed that Mollersward believes that Gustafsson had shown racial discrimination and considerable lack of tact. I am asking Berendsen that he should send Mollersward's report to Von Horn, which will be forwarded to you on receipt.

3. I have already submitted my views to Dayal and I suggest that the matter be discussed with him before any decision is reached.

4. Text of Von Horn's note follows: Quote.(1) Major Gustaffsson emphatically denies having made statements to press correspondents. He confirms that his relations with the Ethiopian troops in Kabalo did become somewhat strained but he considers that this was mainly due to his having been a witness to some cases of misappropriation of private property. (2) Public reference to Major Gustaffsson could perhaps be traced to his having been the guest of a Danish citizen in Belgium employment in Elizabethville, where at a private party he may have



displayed lack of tact and discretion. (3) The case of Major Gustaffsson is only one of a series of unfortunate actions and decisions in the area concerned. While I found it necessary to remove him from SCOMEF in order to prevent further friction with the Ethiopian troops, I do not feel justified in recommending the discontinuation of his service with UN, which service will terminate on 31 December 1960. (4) There is no reasonable evidence of his having contravened ONUC standing orders. As to his prejudiced views, attitude and/or statements, Gustaffsson cannot be brought to task unless I do take similar action against certain other staff members. (5) Removing Gustaffsson before the 31 December would only result in increased adverse publicity against the UN. There are already signs in Katangese and the Danish press of their being inclined to think of Gustaffsson as having been victimized. (6) I have transferred him to this Headquarters where he fills, on a temporary basis, one of the many existing vacancies. He has been advised to observe tact and discretion more scrupulously. (7) I consider that the action I have taken is satisfactory under these circumstances and I cannot agree to any further action being taken against this officer and he alone. Unquote.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 9 November 1960  
No: B-1386-87

Sent  
by car  
9/11/60

The day has been marred by the tragic news of the Irish patrol being ambushed near Niemba. The latest news is that ten were killed and probably there is one survivor. This morning, we were unable to recover the bodies as the tribesmen were still present in strength near the scene of the incident. A stronger patrol returned at 2 P.M. and I am awaiting results.

2. According to press reports, Chevallier issued a communiqué in Elizabethville. BBC had it on the news in the morning which was repeated on Dublin radio. Irish Army Headquarters have been in touch with us asking for details. I had a telephone call from Toronto Star, Toronto, all because our Press Attaché in Elizabethville <sup>gave</sup> ~~has let~~ out the news contrary to all our rules and regulations. I have asked Berendsen to submit a full report. Meanwhile, we have obtained the details of the dead which have been communicated to Dublin.

3. We met Sendwe and he fears that most probably his people are responsible for this act for taking the Irish patrol to be Belgian members of the Katanga Gendarmerie. He has volunteered to proceed to Albertville immediately and take steps to prevent recurrence of such an incident and to investigate. We are so terribly short of planes that it is like looking for a needle in a hay stack to find one to take him to Albertville tomorrow. If it is possible, I will send him with Duran.

4. This incident proves beyond any doubt that the Katanga Gendarmerie have little control between the area of Albertville and Nynzu. I agree that if we were to



address Tshombe, he would reject our request for inclusion of Albertville into our neutral zone or even inclusion of the area just excluding Albertville. Under the present circumstances, I feel that we should at least adopt the latter course. Do you think the situation allows for me to inform Tshombe that we are doing so and issue the necessary orders to Col. Byrne?

5. I met Ghaleb yesterday evening when he told me that he had booked four seats by Sabena from Leo to Beirut to enable Lumumbaists to attend the Afro Asian Conference. Lumumba was keen to go and take advantage of this trip which will enable him to see his children in Cairo. However, as Mobutu has taken preventive measures, they have now decided to send Joseph Mbuyi and André Tshimbanga to Beirut this evening, that is if they can get off.

B-1387 6. In an interview with an Indian journalist Abraham, Assistant Editor of the Hindustan Times, Lumumba said that he was in favour of a federation allowing the provinces to be independent from the administrative point of view but not from the political angle. He wants a coalition government which includes representatives from all parties since it is better to have them inside rather than outside the government. When asked about Kasavubu's trip to New York, Lumumba said he was very proud of it. He considered it a great honour for the Congolese people that their head of State had gone to New York. However, he felt that Kasavubu should not involve himself in discussion of problems which are below the status of a head of State. If the UN approves the nomination of Kasavubu's representatives to seat as Congo delegates instead of his, there would be serious trouble in the Congo. In regard to Kasai and Katanga, he said that all States must remain united. He did not think the round table conference was a good idea when there is a Parliament. He is in favour of a new election but wanted the Parliament to decide. He concluded by saying that he was looking for peace, for work and for welfare and that he



wanted a united government with the representatives of all the parties included in it.

7. As arranged, Mobutu came to our headquarters at 10.30 A.M. When entrance was denied to his bodyguard, he got annoyed and immediately left the Royal without seeing me. He then telephoned from his house to say that he had been insulted. I explained to him that the UN precincts enjoyed immunity and under no circumstances would it be possible for me to permit his personal bodyguard to enter our compound. He suggested that we meet at a secluded bungalow near the rapids but I declined the offer because it is not possible for me to be away from our headquarters for any length of time.

8. This afternoon the first dozen of his paratroopers carried out a jump in the presence of Von Horn, Mobutu and other senior officers. It was very successful and Mobutu is delighted. This should facilitate our further contacts.



OUTGOING CODE

*Issue Jan 69*

TO : Dayal, MacFarquhar  
FROM : Linner  
DATE : 9 November 1960  
NO. : B- 1385

RECENT REPRESENTATIONS BY COMMISSAIRES MUKENDI, KALANDA AND PONGA TO ICAO MISSION INDICATE BELGIAN AVIATION PERSONNEL BEING BROUGHT BACK IN SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER stop SOME TOP LEVEL ADVISERS ALREADY INSTALLED OR ABOUT TO BE stop STRONG SUGGESTIONS COMMISSAIRES NO LONGER WILLING ACCEPT ICAO TA AND RECENT REACTION HAS BEEN DIFFICULTY WE HAVE EXPERIENCED IN ASSIGNING EXPERTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSALS ALREADY EXPLAINED AND AGREED TO BY AUTHORITIES CONCERNED stop THIS IS PARTICULARLY CASE FOR RADIO TECHNICIANS AND RADIO OPERATOR INSTRUCTORS stop IT APPEARS SENIOR BELGIAN ADVISERS EXERCISING GREAT INFLUENCE WITH COMMISSAIRES RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMUNICATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE RESULTED IN LATEST LOCAL ATTITUDE BEING MADE KNOWN TO ICAO MISSION stop PROGRAMMING BECOMING MOST DIFFICULT TO ELABORATE AND OPERATING DIFFICULTIES INCREASING stop IT IS NOW IMPLIED ICAO IMPOSING ITSELF AND CHIEF OF MISSION NOW CALLED UPON TO EXPLAIN INITIATIVES TAKEN AT A TIME WHEN THERE WAS NO AVAILABLE AUTHORITY TO CONSULT AND DECISIVE AND SPEEDY ACTION WAS REQUIRED IN THE INTEREST OF AVIATION SAFETY stop AS IS WELL KNOWN THERE HAS BEEN PRACTICALLY NO EFFORT TO CO-OPERATE ON THE PART OF BELGIAN AVIATION PERSONNEL IN THE PAST AND IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL IF NEW MOVE WILL CHANGE THIS SITUATION stop IMPRESSION EFFORT BEING MADE TO SUBSTITUTE BELGIAN PERSONNEL FOR ICAO EXPERTS stop RETURNING BELGIAN PERSONNEL WHEN EMPLOYED WILL NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE IN CERTAIN POSTS ALREADY OCCUPIED BY ICAO EXPERTS stop FEAR SOME



ICAO PERSONNEL MIGHT SOON BECOME SURPLUS stop NOW IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES INITIALLY INTENDED FOR ICAO TEAM AND USEFULNESS THIS TA MISSION MIGHT SOON BE DEBATABLE stop SINCE THIS CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER DIRECTLY CONTRARY BOMBOKOS ASSURANCES OF COOPERATION RECENTLY YOU MAY WISH CONSIDER URGE BOMBOKO TO CABLE COMMISSIONER IMMEDIATELY THAT FULL COOPERATION ICAO PROGRAMME IMPERATIVE STOP ALSO YOU MAY WISH ADVISE ICAO TO HOLD UP TEMPORARILY SENDING ADDITIONAL ADVISERS OR EXPERTS POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TRAINING ADVISER AND ATC INSTRUCTOR JOUBERT CANADIAN EXPECTED TO LEAVE SHORTLY stop



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 8 November 1960  
No: B-1383-84

Kanza called this morning together with Mpolo to ask for our assistance to proceed to New York. He applied to Timberlake for a visa and was informed that the Commissionaire of the Interior had issue instructions that Kanza and Mpolo should not be issued with any visas as their passports were being withdrawn. While Kasavubu has appointed Bomboko to head the delegation to the UN, he has not notified any one of the dismissal of Kanza from his appointment as Ambassador to the UN. However, Timberlake is determined not to allow any Lumumbaist to enter New York to ensure that Kasavubu has all the advantages. Before leaving, Kanza said that he was sending Mpolo and his passport to us with a written request for UN assistance to go to New York. Please advise.

2. I am cabling separately copy of a letter given to me by Kanza addressed to the US Ambassador by the Commissionaire of Interior.

3. Aynor, the Israel Chargé d'Affaires, called this morning to review the general situation. Israel is very interested in finding fresh markets for their produce in Africa. His views were that the eventual answer lay in a federal system. He considered that six provinces were very large groupings giving each of them great power which should be curtailed by splitting them to a total of 13 to 15 provinces. In regard to Katanga and the so-called mining State, he felt that if no solution was possible, partition along the lines of India-Pakistan could be adopted.

4. The anti UN propaganda is in full swing and even the Catholic priests have joined in. They are talking



"minerals" instead of "the message" - obviously a relic of the Belgian colonial days. However, Katanga, while criticising our objectivity and ignoring realities have said that they wish to support the UN and that they are not secessionists.

5. I had arranged a meeting with Mobutu in the morning for further discussions on Kitona and Banana. Although he had rung up to say that he was coming, I learnt after about an hour's wait that he had ordered a press conference for mid-day where he stated that he had foiled a plot of the UN in disarming the ANC. He said that two NCOs belonging to Kamitatu's group succeeded in taking most of the guard which is about a platoon strength from the radio station to the Parliament where on arrival they informed Mobutu's ANC company that they had come there to relieve them. Kamitatu's NCOs had also managed to draw some arms from the ANC arsenal. Mobutu's men however said that they had not received any instructions to be relieved nor did they require any additional troops. On being informed, Mobutu ordered the arrest of the rebels but Kamitatu's NCOs escaped. The UN had hoped to provoke a fight between Kamitatu's platoon and his loyal troops at the Parliament which would have provided the UN with an excuse to intervene and disarm the ANC in Leo. Mobutu said that since Kamitatu is a UN man, he held the UN responsible for this attempt at a revolt in his army.

6. There has been a slight increase in the activity of the ANC in Leo. However, our arrangements are satisfactory and as yet I am not unduly concerned.

7. From Stanleyville news comes of the proclamation of a new province to be called Lualaba. This announcement was mailed from Stanleyville to a few press correspondents in Leo. The envelope bore imprints of "Republic of Congo, Province of Lualaba". It contained an act of proclamation signed by Mwamba-Ilunga Prosper, Yamba Jean Claude,



Kitombolwe-Maloba Floribert and countersigned by Gizenga. The act was dated October 20 but received here today. It said that the new province would consist of three districts: Lomani with chef-lieu in Kamina; Tanganika with chef-lieu in Albertville and Lualaba with chef-lieu at Kolwezi. Those districts are to be subdivided into 14 territories. The composition of the provincial government was said to be: President Mwamba-Ilunga, Vice President Muhunga-Georges, Minister of Interior and of Gendarmerie Yumba Jean Claude, of Economy Tschite Wilson, of Justice Mwamba-Bert, of Finance Shabani Andre, of Information Kabulo-Roger, of Health Soloka Stanislas, of Education Kapinda Luc, of Agriculture Kitenge Elias, of Public Works Banza Mathieu, of Social Affairs, Planning and Coordination Muganga Rayon.

8. The ethnic composition to include following tribes: Baluba, Tschokwe, Balemba, Bahemba, Basogo, Bazela, Balubasanga, Balomotwa.

9. The press was asked to disseminate this information.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
8 November 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

*Jane*  
*Jm ad*

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1382      SEC GEN FROM RIKHYE      LETTER FROM LUMUMBA OF 7 NOVEMBER WITH

ATTACHED COPY OF HIS LETTER TO STANLEYVILLE FOLLOW CLN

QUOTE

(see "A" )

UNQUOTE

QUOTE

(see "B" )

UNQUOTE



2608/CAB/PM.

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial  
du Secrétaire Général de l' O.N.U.  
LEOPOLDVILLE.

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

J'ai l'honneur de vous remettre deux enveloppes destinées à Monsieur A. GIZENGA, Vice-Premier Ministre du Gouvernement Central et aux Membres du Gouvernement provincial de Stanleyville, que je vous prie de bien vouloir faire acheminer aux destinataires.

Ces deux enveloppes contiennent une lettre dont copie en annexe et relative à la situation de Monsieur Alphonse SONGOLQ et des autres détenus.

Cette copie vous est destinée car je désire vous mettre au courant de cette affaire.

x x x

Je me permets de vous rappeler le cas de Monsieur Jean-Pierre FINANT, Député et Président du Gouvernement de la Province Orientale, qui est détenu arbitrairement par MOBUTU.

Monsieur FINANT jouit de l'immunité parlementaire. En plus, l'article 177 de la Loi Fondamentale stipule: " Les cours d'appel connaissent directement et sans appel des infractions commises par les membres du gouvernement provincial. Ceux-ci sont mis en accusation par le procureur général qui charge de l'instruction un magistrat de son parquet".

Interrogé par moi-même, le procureur général du parquet de Léopoldville, Monsieur ROM, m'a déclaré tout ignorer de l'arrestation du Président FINANT; il a ajouté qu'il n'a pas du tout mis ce dernier en accusation.

En réalité, le Président du Gouvernement de Stanleyville n'a commis aucune infraction. Son arrestation est le résultat d'une action menée par des adversaires politiques anarchistes dans le seul but de faire disparaître tous les hommes de mon Parti (M.N.C.) et tous ceux qui soutiennent mon gouvernement.

Me référant à la lettre que m'a adressée Monsieur DAYAL en date du 26 octobre 1960 et selon laquelle "les forces de l'ONU, dans le cadre de leur mission d'aide au maintien de l'ordre public, déploient de grands efforts pour mettre les citoyens à l'abri d'arrestations arbitraires ou de sévices et pour empêcher qu'il soit porté atteinte à l'immunité parlementaire", me référant donc à cette lettre, je vous serais reconnaissant si vous voulez intervenir pour que le Président FINANT soit mis en liberté.



- 2 -

Avec mes remerciements anticipés, je vous prie d'agréer,  
Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'assurance de ma considération  
très distinguée.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE,  
P.LUMUMBA.-



7 novembre 1960.

2.606/CAB/PM.

URGENT

OBJET:

Arrestation Sengolo et cts.

NOTE AUX MEMBRES DU GOUVERNEMENT PROVINCIAL  
DE STANLEYVILLE.

Copie pour information à Monsieur A. GIZENGA,  
Vice-Premier Ministre.

Monsieur Alphonse SENGOLLO et d'autres personnes ont été  
arrêtées par les Autorités de Stanleyville du chef d'atteinte à la  
sécurité intérieure de l'Etat.

Selon les rapports qui me sont parvenus, les inculpés ont  
été trouvés en possession d'une somme de plusieurs millions de francs  
et d'un plan relatif au renversement du gouvernement de Stanleyville.  
L'exécution de ce plan devait se réaliser avec le concours de certains  
Officiers de l'Armée, lesquels ont aussi été arrêtés.

J'ai demandé que les autorités judiciaires de Stanleyville  
s'occupent activement de l'affaire et qu'un jugement soit rendu dans  
les formes légales.

J'insiste particulièrement pour que Monsieur Sengolo et  
tous les autres détenus soient traités humainement. Des instructions  
précises doivent être données à tous les gardiens de prisons de la  
Province pour que partout les prisonniers soient nourris et logés  
dans de bonnes conditions.

Votre mission est de veiller attentivement à la protection  
des personnes et des biens, de même qu'au maintien de l'ordre et au  
respect de la légalité. Tout en restant vigilants, les représentants  
de l'autorité ne procéderont à aucune arrestation arbitraire, car  
nous ne devons pas imiter les anarchistes de Léopoldville ou d'ail-  
leurs.

Tout fauteur de troubles devra être mis hors d'état de  
nuire. Les citoyens de la République et les étrangers qui ont élu  
domicile chez-nous doivent vivre dans la sécurité.

Pour toute difficulté qui surviendrait, vous demanderez  
immédiatement le concours des Représentants de l'O.N.U. qui sont là  
pour vous aider. Il s'agit spécialement du maintien de l'ordre dans  
la Province.

Il ressort, des documents saisis des mains des inculpés,  
que les grosses sommes d'argent qu'avaient Sengolo et ses complices  
pour organiser la subversion et la corruption, proviennent des milieux  
des milieux américains.

./...



CABINET  
DU PREMIER MINISTRE

Le Magistrat instructeur de l'affaire établira avec précision la provenance de cet argent; il obtiendra cette précision d'après l'interrogatoire qu'il fera subir les inculpés.

Sans pour autant dévoiler le secret de l'enquête judiciaire, je vous prie de demander de contacter Monsieur le Procureur s'il ne serait pas en mesure de vous fournir ce renseignement.

J'attends votre réponse.

Ne ménagez aucun effort pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité dans l'ensemble de la Province.

Je multiplie des démarches auprès du Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'O.N.U. pour que le Président FINANT, arrêté arbitrairement, soit mis en liberté.

Ne perdez pas courage et restez toujours dans la voie que je vous ai tracée. C'est dans le calme et la dignité que nous ferons triompher notre cause.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE,  
P. LUMUMBA.-



OUTGOING CODE

To: Bunche  
From: Rikhye, von Horn  
Date: 8 November 1960  
Number: B-1381



Reference 3231.

1. Your aircraft listing is correct.
2. We have requested a total of six additional DC3s: four from you and two recommended for purchase from the Belgians at Kamina. In addition, you requested Italians to build up their C119 Squadron to a total of ten aircraft.
3. As mentioned previously, DC3s secured from USAF were in such a bad state of repair that extensive rebuilding and overhaul was necessary. Final rebuilds are in maintenance at Kamina and have caused costly and extensive delays to our whole maintenance programme.
4. Contrary to your information, Cessnas are in use in USAF for "Liaison and Pilot Proficiency Training" and have designation U-3.
5. Air Commander Carr is familiar with Gruman Gulf <sup>Streams</sup> ~~Streams~~ and confirms these aircraft do not require long take-off and landing strips. In any case, majority of runways in Congo are over 6,000 feet long.
6. Agree wholeheartedly with your assessment of undesirability of obtaining too many different types of aircraft. Unfortunately, there was no control over what was accepted originally. Gruman



Gulf Stream was suggested as special mission aircraft in view of its high performance and low operating costs. A special mission flight is required for transportation of senior UN officials and such visiting dignitaries as are approved by UN. Because of configuration, time and distance factors, DC3/C47 is not a suitable substitute. Aero-Commander might be. Agree DC3 suitable substitute for Cessna if UN is prepared to accept extra operating costs and inefficient utilization payload which would result from type of work envisaged for Cessnas.

7. Cl24 is suitable substitute for Cl30 in external airlift role. However, consider it impractical because of cost and time factors to train personnel on this aircraft. Suggest you ask Canadians to accept complete external airlift role and let them work out the method, the equipment to be used and when they can start. They likely do not have sufficient equipment immediately available to undertake complete external airlift role, but with the introduction of the Cl06 very large very long-range turbo-prop transports, they could probably do all the external airlift for the Congo. In the interim period, however, it is most likely they would require the additional Cl30s for a period of up to six or eight months.

8. In principle we agree with your last paragraph except addition of a cargo/vehicle carrier aircraft of the Cl19 or Cl23 type. In view of apparent world-wide shortage of spares for Cl19s, it appears from a long-range point of view we would be wise to think now of a replacement. On his return through New York, on approximately 22 November, Carr will bring with him a complete long-range proposal for United Nations Air Force. We are still desperately short of airlift.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 8 November 1960  
No : B-1380

Following letter addressed 7 November by Commissaire à l'Intérieur  
Damien Kandolo to US Ambassador Leopoldville:

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que je viens  
d'être informé de l'intention de Messieurs: KANZA Thomas et MPOLO Maurice  
de se rendre à New York en vue d'assister à l'Assemblée Générale des  
Nations Unies comme représentants de l'ex-gouvernement LUMUMBA.

Ces personnes auraient l'intention de demander un visa pour  
les Etats-Unis.

Je me permets d'attirer votre attention sur le fait que les  
passeports n° (illisible) et 454 dont étaient respectivement porteurs  
Messieurs KANZA Thomas et MPOLO Maurice ont fait l'objet d'une décision  
de retrait par Monsieur le Commissaire Général à l'Intérieur en date de  
ce jour.

Les intéressés sont en conséquence, démunis d'un titre de  
voyage régulier et Messieurs KANZA Thomas et MPOLO Maurice ont été priés  
de remettre les susdits documents à mon Administration.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance de  
ma très haute considération."



OUTGOING CODE

*Tem. P-4*

*Issued  
Jan 2*

TO : SecGen, Dayal  
FROM : Rikhye  
DATE : 8 November 1960  
NO. : B- 1379

Further to my B-1360, para. 2.

1. Roberts questioned in Luluabourg by Knecht. He admitted to signing contract in Eville for combat service with Kalonji army. At Eville station he took command of heavily armed company which he led into action at Luputa on 15 September. On Belgian major being killed in action that day, he admits to having assumed command from that date onward of all Kalonji troops on "southern" Kasai front, amounting to some 2,500 men. Col. Crèvecoeur heads "northern" army. In this capacity, he had command of all troops engaged in operations which took place in Mwene-Ditu - Gandajika area. This included ambush of Unations troops on 17 September as reported our B-1041 after threats made to Tunisians while he was senior officer present. Also included burning of Mulunda on 28 October, reported in our B-1325. In latter case, Roberts now takes line that he was unable to oppose action by his troops, over which he had lost control. It is established that he was on scene at time of burning. You will have noted AP story under Luluabourg 2 November dateline attributes to him as direct quotation the statement that quote on arrival at Malundu, I burned the village down unquote. Statements to Knecht also show he frequently reported in person to and dealt with Kalonji quote Government unquote at Bakwanga as the responsible commander and in this capacity received money for paying his troops.

2. Brazilian civilian Ballarati acted as interpreter for Kalonjists and denies charges of affirmative collaboration or participation in acts of violence.



Belgian business man Swaenen representing Forminière, Petrocongo and others at Mwene-Ditu admits frequent contacts with Roberts and was accessory at least to extent of lodging him. Both have been released.

3. It is obvious that Roberts has conducted actions which involved opposition by force of arms to fulfillment by ONUC of its mandate, particularly by operating in cease-fire zone. No state of civil war being recognized, Roberts is not merely a dangerous adventurer but also a common criminal. Normal procedure would be for ONUC to yield custody to central government for trial under Congolese penal law or by military tribunal. This is manifestly impractical since neither effective Congolese tribunal nor ANC means to marshal evidence exists. Moreover, as political matter current Mobutu relations with Kalonji might only mean Roberts would shortly reappear in Kasai to conduct fresh operations against ONUC. Provincial Government, already thanking ONUC for his capture, would happily incarcerate him, though we would have to oversee his humane treatment. UK Government, however, should not be insensitive to potentially unfortunate repercussions of such activities on part of British subject. Knecht reports Roberts holds British passport No. 28262 delivered in London on 1 October 1957, presently deposited in Eville. I thus wonder whether best disposition would not be for you to take up case with UK Delegation as a political matter, seeking practical rather than jurisdictional solution through their Government's undertaking to repatriate Roberts to England, with assurance that he would be dissuaded from re-entering any part of territory of Republic of Congo as long as political situation remains unsettled. Upon such an understanding, we could take up detailed arrangements for transport through their good offices with British Embassy in Leopoldville, though conversation with Scott indicates Embassy will be disinclined to offer any assistance



without express instructions. Meanwhile we have no choice but to retain Roberts in custody for his and ONUC's protection. Please advise.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Bunche  
From: Rikhye  
Date: 8 November 1960  
Number: B-1378

Reference 3235.

1. (a) Regret the delay in replying this, ~~one~~. We examined the establishment of Ghana Police Unit to enable us to make our recommendations. The Nigerian Police Company should be organized ~~in~~ two or preferably three platoon basis. Each platoon should have a minimum strength of one officer and 30 policemen. Company Headquarters should include a senior police officer and a staff for operational command of the Unit and to enable the Company to be completely self-contained for administration and logistics.

(b) The Nigerian Police will take over from the Ghana police in Leo. Their task will be to assist the Congolese police and gendarmerie in the maintenance of law and order.

(c) The three Nigerian police companies will be located in Leo. There should therefore be an overall command<sup>er</sup> with adequate Headquarters to command and administer all the three companies.

(d) The Ghana police wish to be back in Accra by 1 December. Therefore, the Nigerian police should be here by 25 November. I suggest they travel by sea if possible, otherwise an airlift ~~would~~<sup>will</sup> have to be arranged. I need not emphasize the necessity of



the time of arrival of this Unit due to the law and ~~xxxxxx~~ order situation in Leo.

2. If there are any empty US Airforce planes bringing Nigerians to the Congo and returning with the ex-Mali contingent, we would like to use them to lift elements of Ghana police from Leo back to Accra. Please advise.

cc. Gen.von Horn



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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

B-1377 SecGen from Rikhye. Déclaration du Premier Ministre, Mr. Patrice Lumumba remise à la presse le 7 novembre 1960 Quote Dans le nouveau rapport qu'il vient de rédiger sur la situation politique du Congo, le Secrétaire Général de l'O.N.U., Monsieur Dag Hammarskjöld, a déclaré entre autres que les deux seules institutions dont les fondements sont encore existants sont le Président de la République et le Parlement. Para. Le Secrétaire Général a dénoncé également le coup d'Etat du Colonel Mobutu qui, selon lui, a été une intrusion de l'armée sur la scène politique. Il a émis l'opinion que l'acte de Mobutu constituait une nouvelle menace à la paix et à la sécurité. Para. De son côté, déclare aussi le Secrétaire Général, le Collège des Commissaires composé d'étudiants sans expérience, accompagné de nombreux conseillers belges se sont opposés à la mission d'aide technique de l'O.N.U. Il n'a jamais été question, dit Monsieur Dag Hammarskjöld, de reconnaître le Collège en tant que Gouvernement légitime du Congo, car son existence ne découle aucunement de la Loi Fondamentale. Para. Le Gouvernement que je représente et le Parlement Congolais se rallient entièrement à ces déclarations du Secrétaire Général de l'O.N.U. car elles sont conformes à la vérité et à la réalité que nous avons vécues ces dernières semaines. Para.

T. O. R.

BY:

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

I.J. Rikhye  
P. Poullain  
7.11.60



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En reconnaissant l'autorité du Parlement, le Secrétaire Général reconnaît implicitement les décisions prises souverainement par ce même Parlement tant en ce qui concerne sa position sur la crise congolaise. Para. Le Secrétaire Général n'est pas sans ignorer que le Parlement réuni en trois séances successives s'est prononcé respectivement le 6, le 7 et le 13 septembre 1960 sur la crise provoquée d'une façon anti-démocratique par le Chef de l'Etat. Para. La Chambre des Représentants et le Sénat ont, par des votes séparés, renouvelé leur confiance à mon Gouvernement. Le 13 septembre, les deux Assemblées législatives, réunies en séance plénière, ont voté pleins pouvoirs à mon Gouvernement. Para. Interprétant d'autorité la Loi Fondamentale conformément aux dispositions de l'article 51, les deux Chambres législatives ont annulé l'ordonnance du Chef de l'Etat car, déclaraient-elles, la nomination et la révocation de tout Gouvernement par le Chef de l'Etat sur la base de l'article 22 ne peut intervenir qu'après le vote de confiance ou de défiance du Parlement. Para. Ces décisions souveraines et irrévocables prises par le Parlement furent communiquées à leur temps au Secrétaire Général, au Président du Conseil de Sécurité et au Président de l'Assemblée Générale de l'O.N.U. Para. Méconnaître la valeur de ces décisions, c'est méconnaître l'existence même du Parlement. L'Organisation des Nations Unies qui est le gardien de la démocratie doit respecter et se conformer aux décisions du Parlement Congolais, qui est

T. O. R.

BY:

Drafted by :

Authorized : I.J. Rikhye

T. O. D.

Date : 7.11.60



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l'expression de la volonté de la Nation Congolaise. Para. C'est là la position que le Gouvernement, le Parlement et le Peuple du Congo entendent voir adopter et par l'Assemblée générale de l'O.N.U., et par son Secrétaire général auxquels nous faisons pleinement confiance pour sauver ce pays de l'anarchie et de l'effondrement qui le menace aujourd'hui gravement Unquote

I. N. 5990 — 200,000 - 7/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

I. J. Rikhye

Authorized :

Date : 7.11.60