

[8 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S1002

BOX 125

FILE 6

ACC. 1998/0283

To - À	Date
Legal O Ausmed	15.4.95
	Time - Heure

From - De

DCOS Ops

Language spoken - Langue utilisée	Telephone No. - N° de téléphone	Extension Poste
<input type="checkbox"/> English Anglais <input type="checkbox"/> French Français		
<input type="checkbox"/> Please call Prière d'appeler <input type="checkbox"/> Returned your call Vous a rappelé <input type="checkbox"/> Will call again Vous rapellera <input type="checkbox"/> Wants to see you Desire vous voir		
<input type="checkbox"/> Action Donner suite <input type="checkbox"/> Approval Approbation <input type="checkbox"/> Note and return Noter et retourner	<input type="checkbox"/> Comments Commentaires <input type="checkbox"/> Draft reply Projet de réponse <input type="checkbox"/> Note and forward Noter et faire suivre	<input type="checkbox"/> As requested Comme demandé <input type="checkbox"/> Signature <input type="checkbox"/> Note and file Noter et classer
File No. - N° de dossier	Message taken by - Message reçu par	

1. Pls coord para 4 with civilian legal O in SRSG's office and determine all pertinent details.
2. In consultation with G3 Plone draft an SRSG/FC policy dir.

KGMF 2539

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

95 APR 13 22 59Z

02 1514672

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

13 APRIL 1995

TO: TOUSIGNANT UNAMIR, KIGALI	FROM: BARIL FOR ANNAN UNATIONS, NEW YORK
Fax No:	Fax. No: 212-963-4879
SUBJECT: ARMING OF UNMOS	
ATTN: COS, G3 PLANS	DRAFTED BY: LT COL M MARTIN ROOM NO: 3650 EXT: 3721
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2	

1. REFERENCE YOUR FAXES MIR 2284 OF 3 NOVEMBER 1994 AND 2329 OF DATE. WE HAVE CONSULTED THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS AT THIS HEADQUARTERS AND THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS EXPLAIN THE STATUS OF MILITARY OBSERVERS BASED UPON THEIR ADVICE.

2. A COPY OF THE FIRST PAGE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT A/45/594 OF 9 OCTOBER 1994 IS ATTACHED. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE MODEL STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT IS BASED "UPON ESTABLISHED PRACTICE AND DRAWING EXTENSIVELY UPON EARLIER AND CURRENT AGREEMENTS". THE QUESTION "WHY" MILITARY OBSERVERS ARE UNARMED IS ANSWERED IN THIS CONTEXT.

3. THE SPECIFIC STATUS OF MILITARY OBSERVERS AS "EXPERTS ON MISSION" IS ESTABLISHED BY MEANS OF PARAGRAPH 26 OF THE STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT AND EQUATES THEM WITH CIVILIANS. PARAGRAPH 37 OF THE SAME AGREEMENT REFERS TO PERSONNEL WHO MAY CARRY ARMS. MILITARY OBSERVERS, NOT HAVING THE STATUS OF **MILITARY MEMBERS** OF THE MISSION (AS EXPLAINED BY THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS), CANNOT CARRY ARMS.

4. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN ADVISED INFORMALLY BY THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS (MISS BENKIRANE) THAT ANY CHANGES TO THIS POSITION INVOLVE COMPLEX LEGAL MATTERS AND THAT FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS IN THE MATTER WOULD BEST BE ADDRESSED BETWEEN THE LEGAL ADVISER IN UNAMIR AND THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS AT THIS HEADQUARTERS.

5. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR INITIATING CONSULTATIONS ON THE LINES INDICATED ABOVE AND KEEPING US INFORMED OF ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

BEST REGARDS.

Hand to Legal
offr. Assm'd
15.4

FCC (COS) G3 plans E/dix

UNAMIR - RECORD	COS
	14 APR 1995
	- Action completed - Acknowledge
	Initial

SRSG OI-1(B)

UNITED
NATIONS

UN RESTRICTED

Annex B to:
Part 4 of SOPs and UN PKOs

A



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/45/594
9 October 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-fifth session
Agenda item 76

COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations

Report of the Secretary-General

1. In paragraph 11 of its resolution 44/49 of 8 December 1989, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a model status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and host countries and to make that model available to Member States. Basing itself upon established practice and drawing extensively upon earlier and current agreements, the Secretariat has prepared the model status-of-forces agreement annexed to the present report. The model is intended to serve as a basis for the drafting of individual agreements to be concluded between the United Nations and countries on whose territory peace-keeping operations are deployed. As such it is subject to modifications that may be agreed upon between the parties in each case.
2. The attached model, mutatis mutandis, will also serve as the basis for an agreement with a host country in operations where no United Nations military personnel are deployed.

4 - B - 1

UN RESTRICTED

90-25455 1871f (E)

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

FROM: MILOB SECTOR 4C CYANGUGU

DATE: 7 APR 95

TO: MILOB GP HQ KIGALI

INFO: UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//G2/G3//

*Scanned
Revised to
DCOS OPS*SUBJ: SITREP ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND RPA INCIDENTS*Noted
12.4*

1. OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN INCIDENTS OF MURDER/ASSASSINATION, BANDITRY, AND NOW MINELAYING. COMPOUNDING THIS ARE SOME INCIDENTS WHICH ARE SUSPECTED TO BE RPA RESPONSIBLE. THE USE OF WORDS LIKE INSURGENCY, SUBVERSIVE OPS, ETC ARE MORE COMMONLY USED, AND ITS NOT INTENDED IN THIS REPORT TO SUBSTANTIATE ANY THEORY ON VARIOUS TERMS AND DEFINITIONS; HOWEVER, THE POINT IS THAT MANY INCIDENTS INDEED APPEAR TO BE ORGANIZED, PLANNED AND EXECUTED WITH RELATIVE SUCCESS. IT IS USUALLY IN GROUPS RANGING FROM TWO TO THIRTY, THEY ARE ARMED WITH WEAPONS, GRENADES AND SOMETIMES MINES. THE AIM IS CERTAINLY AS A MINIMUM TO DESTABILIZE THE LOCAL SITUATION MORE AND PERHAPS USE THE EXPERIENCE AS A PRACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AND FOR TRAINING. COMPLIMENTING THESE CRIMES ARE CONTINUED QUESTIONABLE ACTS BY RPA.

THIS WEEKS SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS

2. ASSASSINATION OF BURGOMASTER OF GISHOMA. MR BERNARD NYNYAMBIBI ASSUMED ROLE OF BURGOMASTER AFTER THE ARREST OF HIS PREDECESSOR A FEW WEEKS AGO. THE FORMER BURGOMASTER IS THE BROTHER OF THE PREFECT OF CYANGUGU. MYNYAMBIBI WAS A FORMER CONSEILLER OF

UN RESTRICTED

219

NTENYI (GRID 8311). HIS DAUGHTER AND HER HUSBAND, MR LAMBERT, WERE KILLED NIGHT 30/31 MAR. THERE IS SOME CONFUSION OVER HIS TRIBAL AFFILIATION - MILOBS REPORTED 3 APRIL THAT HIS TRIBE WAS UNDERSTOOD AS HUTU, WHILE THE UNAMIR INFOSUM DATED 2 APRIL INDICATE THAT THE BURGOMASTER AND HIS WIFE WERE KILLED, AND THAT HE WAS ETHNIC TUTSI. FOR CLARIFICATION, MILOBS BELIEVE THAT THIS LATTER REPORT IS ACTUALLY OF THE BURGOMASTER'S DAUGHTER AND HER HUSBAND. THERE HAS BEEN SUPPOSITION THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE COULD BE EITHER RPA OR FRGF, WITH MORE WEIGHT AGAINST THE FRGF. IN THE CASE OF RPA, THE ARRESTS OF SEVERAL CONSEILLERS AND BURGOMASTERS LATELY IS ONE FACTOR. ANOTHER IS THE INCIDENT OF A FAMILY WHICH WAS KILLED IN GISHOMA COMMUNE AT RUKOKKO GR 8302 ON 13 MARCH. THE BURGOMASTER VOCALIZED HIS DISAPPROVAL AND DISSATISFACTION OF THE WAY THE RPA HANDLED THE CASE, AND PRIVATELY ADMITTED (NAME WITHHELD) THAT HE BELIEVED RPA MAY HAVE BEEN PERHAPS RESPONSIBLE. IT CAN BE ASSUMED HE MAY HAVE TOLD OTHERS THE SAME. ALTHOUGH RPA ARE BASED VERY CLOSE TO THE INCIDENT SITE OF THE FAMILY, THEY NEITHER DEPLOYED NOR CLAIM TO HAVE HEARD OR SEEN ANYTHING. WHEN RPA DID ARRIVE TO INVESTIGATE, IT WAS A UNIT FROM BUGARAMA, NOT THE UNIT BASED NEARBY. INITIAL MILOB INVESTIGATION WAS INCONCLUSIVE WHETHER RPA OR FRGF WERE RESPONSIBLE. IT WAS REPORTED 6 APRIL BY RPA THAT RPA HAVE ARRESTED TWO OF THE FOUR PERS THEY BELIEVE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE GISHOMA BURGOMASTER. THE EXACT DATE AND TIME OF THEIR CAPTURE IS NOT YET DETERMINED, BUT THEY WERE EVIDENTLY CAPTURED WHEN FOUR MEN MET UP WITH AN RPA PATROL. WHEN THE FOUR DISPERSED, THE PATROL DEPLOYED TO ENCIRCLE THEM. TWO ESCAPED. ONLY ONE WEAPON WAS RECOVERED. THE TWO PRISONERS APPARENTLY ADMIT TO THE KILLING AND HAVE GIVEN THEIR POLITICAL REASONS. THEY CLAIM ONLY THE ONE WEAPON WAS USED, AND HAD BEEN STASHED IN A HIDING SPOT (PRESUMED AT A HOME). ONE IS IDENT AS INTERAHAMWE, THE OTHER IS FORMER RGF. IT IS KNOWN THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOUR WAS IN A UNIFORM. IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT AT LEAST TWO OF THE FOUR WERE RESIDING IN THE AREA OF GISHOMA AND CYMBOGO COMMUNES, AND THAT THEY BELONG TO A MUCH LARGER GROUP OPERATING HERE. COMMENT: IT MUST BE REITERATED THAT THIS INFO

UN RESTRICTED

3/9

COMES FROM AN RPA SOURCE. THE USE OF ONLY ONE WEAPON IN THE MURDER IS UNLIKELY. THERE IS ALSO AN OPPORTUNITY HERE TO ARRANGE A PRISONER INTERVIEW BY UNAMIR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE TWO PERS ARE BEING HELD AT MUSHAKA FACILITY. IF THEIR ADMITTANCE IS TRUE, THIS GIVES FURTHER PROOF OF THE COMBINED OPS OF FRGF AND INTERAHAMWE.

3. MURDER OF RWANDAISE MDM STAFF EMPLOYEE. JONATHAN KAYIJUKA (HUTU) HAD BEEN WORKING FOR MEDECINS DU MONDE FOR APPROX 2 MONTHS AS A CLERK/SECRETARY. ON 2 APRIL AT ABOUT 1920 HRS A GENDARMERIE PATROL STOPPED HIM IN THE MARKET AREA OF KAMEMBE FOR QUESTIONING AND ASKED HIM TO SHOW HIS DOCUMENTS, WHICH HE DID. FOR AN AS YET UNEXPLAINED REASON, HE WAS TOLD TO ACCOMPANY THE PATROL TO THE GENDARMERIE STATION. ACCORDING TO THE GENDARMERIE COMD, AFTER A SHORT DISTANCE ENROUTE, JONATHAN BEGAN TO RUN AWAY, RPA FIRED FOUR ROUNDS AND KILLED HIM. THE BURGOMASTER WAS TOLD OF THE INCIDENT BY THE GENDARME AT 2200 HRS, AND THE PREFECT WAS ASKED TO GET THE BODY TO THE COMMUNE AND INFORM THE FAMILY. AT 1645 HRS THE FOL DAY THE BODY WAS FINALLY HANDED OVER TO THE FAMILY (HIS SISTER IN LAW). ONE MILOB OF 4C IS A QUALIFIED MEDICAL DOCTOR AND WAS ONE OF THE MILOBS WHO EXAMINED THE BODY. THE VICTIM WAS FULLY CLOTHED EXCEPT FOR HIS SHOES. HIS HEAD AND ENTIRE CLOTHING WERE BLOODSTAINED. THERE WAS A POINTED WOUND IN THE MIDDLE OF HIS BACK OVER THE HEART AREA ABOUT 2CM IN DIAMETER. NO OTHER APPARENT WOUNDS WERE FOUND. DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF BLOOD AND CLOTTING AND NO GLOVES READILY AVAILABLE, NO FURTHER EXAMINATION COULD BE COMPLETED. FROM THIS CRUDE EXAM, THE FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBILITIES: WOUND IS AN EXIT WOUND OF BULLET; STAB WOUND OF ROUND EDGED INSTRUMENT (SOME BAYONETS); ENTRY WOUND OF BULLET AT CLOSE RANGE. AT 1730 HRS, WHEN THE MILOBS WERE LEAVING THE SCENE, THE GENDARME COMD HAD REQ THE SISTER IN LAW TO REMAIN AT THE COMMUNE BUREAU UNTIL HE COULD SPEAK WITH HER. COMMENT: THE VICTIM WAS A FORMER RWANDAISE GOVT EMPLOYEE BEFORE THE WAR. THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE WELL WITHIN THE KNOWN CURFEW OF 2100 HRS.

UN RESTRICTED

4/9

FAMILY WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY POST-MORTEM EXAM. THIS IS THE FIRST KNOWN INCIDENT OF GENDARME KILLING PERSON WHILE ALLEGEDLY ESCAPING. THE REASON OF THE GENDARMES PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT REMAINS TO BE CONFIRMED.

4. GRENAD EXPLOSION NEAR ETHIOBAT POSN. ON 30 MAR ETHIOBAT HAD FOUND A NON-DETONATED GRENADE(S?) NEAR THE BTR-60 POSITION AT THE GAS STATION ON THE EDGE OF THE MARKET AREA. POSITION IS LOC NEAR THE RED CROSS WAREHOUSE AND WORKSHOP, THE RPA GARAGE, SOME PREFECTURE OFFICES, AND IN BETWEEN TWO ROUTES LEADING FROM THE LAKE AND AIRPORT AREA TOWARD THE MARKET. THAT NIGHT THERE WAS FIRING HEARD IN THE MARKET AREA NEAR 2200 HRS AND LATER WITHIN 100 METRES OF THE ETHIOBAT POSN AT APPROX 0100 HRS. AT THIS TIME A GRENADE EXPLODED WITHIN 50 METRES OF THE BTR 60. FRAGMENT MARKS WERE EASILY APPARENT ON THE ASPHALT OF THE GAS STATION GROUNDS. RPA LOC COMD OF THIS AREA, LT EMMANUEL, WAS QUESTIONED BY MILOBS AT 0745 HRS FOR ANY POSSIBLE EXPLANATION, BUT HE HIMSELF HAD PREVIOUSLY GONE TO ETHIOBAT POSITION AT THE AIRPORT TO ALSO INQUIRE AND HAD NO COMMENT. RPA WERE LATER SEEN SEARCHING THE AREA NEAR THE ETHIOBAT POSN AT THE STATION, AND ETHIOBAT ALSO CONDUCTED A SEARCH. SOME FORM OF SPOOR WAS FOLLOWED TO LAKE AREA NEARBY, WHERE SOME ANTI PERS MINES (BELIEVED TS-50) WERE FOUND, APPARENTLY ABANDONED. IT IS REASONABLE TO PRESUME THAT FRGF/GUERILLA WANNABEES WERE RESPONSIBLE. THE FOUND GRENADE MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED AS A BOOBY TRAP OF SOME SORT, OR LEFT BEHIND FROM A RECCE. PERHAPS MOVEMENT FORM ETHIOBAT POSN JUST WHEN THE GROUP WAS PASSING TO PLANT APERS MINES SOMEWHERE (THE MARKET?) STARTLED THE GROUP WHO SUBSEQUENTLY THREW THE GRENADE AND WITHDREW IN HASTE. IT IS CONFIRMED THERE WAS NO MEETING ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN RPA AND ETHIOBAT WITH THE GROUP. IF THEY WERE TO PLANT MINES IN THE MARKET AREA, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHY ROUNDS WOULD FIRST BE FIRED IN THE MARKET AREA EARLIER IN THE NIGHT. IT MAY HAVE BEEN BAD COORDINATION OF TIMING FOR AN ATTEMPTED FEINT, OR MINES WERE TO BE PLACED BEFOREHAND TO CAUSE RPA TO DEPLOY TO THE SCENE AND TRIP THE MINES, OR PERHAPS THE TWO INCIDENTS ARE INDEED

UN RESTRICTED

519

SEPARATE AND WERE COMMITTED BY TWO DIFFERENT GROUPS, COINCIDENTALLY.

RPA VERSUS FRGF

5. THERE ARE FACTS IN THE INCIDENTS ABOVE TO INDICATE THAT FORMER ARMY OF RWANDA AND INTERAHAMWE ARE INDEED RESPONSIBLE FOR INCIDENTS OF DEATH AND BANDITRY. THERE ARE INDICATORS THAT SUGGEST RPA HAVE AT THE VERY LEAST A SHOOT FIRST - QUESTION LATER APPROACH IN SOME INCIDENTS. BOTH THESE STATEMENTS COMPLIMENT EARLIER ASSESSMENTS OF MILOB CONCURRENCE WITH RPA ACCUSATIONS OF FRGF RESPONSIBILITY, BUT ALSO OF MILOB CONCERN OF RPA LOCAL COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS AND NERVOUSNESS OF SOME DEPLOYED TROOPS. PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INCIDENTS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVING RPA CAN GENERALLY BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABOVE.

6. FRGF FORMER ARMY OF RWANDA PERS AND ITS ACTIVE SUPPORTERS ARE ACTIVE IN THE PREFECTURE. RECENT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THEIR INTENT IS TO NOW COME AFTER THEIR FELLOW HUTU FOR NOT ADHERING TO THEIR DEMANDS TO LEAVE RWANDA AND COME TO ZAIRE. SOME INCIDENTS IN RECENT MONTHS ARE CONCEIVABLY COMMITTED BY FRGF TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT RPA ARE RESPONSIBLE. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH SOME ARE PROBABLE, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE RPA COMMIT ENOUGH INCIDENTS ON THEIR OWN FOR THE FRGF NOT NEEDING TO BOTHER WITH THE EFFORT. THE PROXIMITY OF THE FRGF IN ZAIRE AND BURUNDI, RPA DIFFICULTY OF OBSERVATION AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE TERRAIN, AND LACK OF OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT ARE ALL OBVIOUS FACTORS IN FRGF SUCCESS. THEIR ABILITY TO DEVOTE THEIR ENTIRE PROPAGANDA, MILITARY AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGN IN AN OFFENSIVE MANNER BY UTILIZING THE DEFENDED BORDERS OF BURUNDI AND ZAIRE IS A GIFT...FURTHER INSTABILITY AND SUBSEQUENT INSECURITY CAUSED BY ILLEGAL ARRESTS, EXTRA-JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS, HARASSMENT AND ACTS OF MURDER COMMITTED BY RPA IS THE WRAPPING. OF GREATEST CONCERN NOW IS THE INTENDED TARGETS OF THE FRGF GROUPS. SELDOM HAVE THEY BEEN AIMED AT RPA, PREFERRING THE EASY DEFENSELESS

UN RESTRICTED

619

TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY. THEIR ABILITY TO SUCCEED IN MURDER, ROBBERY, MINE PLANTING INDICATES AN INCREASE IN THEIR TRAINING, OPERATIONS AND ARMS SUPPLY. THE INCIDENTS IN BURUNDI MUST BE ASSUMED TO BE RELATED IN SOME WAY TO OPERATIONAL INTENTIONS IN RWANDA, AND ITS CERTAIN THAT FRGF HAVE MORE INFO ON RPA STATUS THAN VICE-VERSA. A FURTHER DISADVANTAGE TO UNAMIR AND RPA SECURITY FORCES IN CYANGUGU IS THE FAMILY SUPPORT OF FRGF HUSBANDS AND SONS, THEIR FAMILIARITY WITH THE GROUND AND TARGETS, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE LOCAL POPULACE.

7. RPA. ALTHOUGH THERE IS AN APPARENT NORMALCY IN THE CIVIC AFFAIRS OF THE PREFECTURE, IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE MILITARY IS THE CONTROLLING FACTOR. THE SECURITY SIT IS LESS STABLE THAN TWO MONTHS AGO AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO SMALL PARTY RAIDS OR OTHER ATTACKS IS NOW MORE OBVIOUS. INCIDENTS SUSPECTED OF BEING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RPA CAN BE PLACED UNDER A HEADING OF "COMMITTED AT LOW LEVEL", OR "DIRECTED FROM HIGHER LEVEL". REGARDLESS, THERE ARE GENERALLY THREE CATEGORIES UNDER EACH: FIRST ARE INCIDENTS WHERE RPA PUBLICLY ADMIT TO THEM AND TAKE NECESSARY ACTION; SECOND IS WHEN THEY PUBLICLY DENY WRONGDOING, BUT PRIVATELY TAKE ACTION. BOTH COULD BE SEEN AS SOMETHING POSITIVE EVEN COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN AFRICA; THIRD, AND MOST IMPORTANT, IS WHERE A CRIMINAL ACT HAS BEEN COMMITTED WHERE THERE IS DENIAL AND NO PRIVATE ACTION TAKEN. THESE APPEAR VERY INFREQUENT, AND SOME THAT BEGAN AS THIS CATEGORY LATER ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BECOME CATEGORY NUMBER TWO (EXAMPLE - CASE OF 13 HUTU BEING KILLED AT KARAMA, KAMEMBE COMMUNE 20 NOV 94). IT IS SUSPECTED THAT, UNLIKE FRGF INCIDENTS DIRECTED BY A HIGHER COMMAND, MOST RPA INCIDENTS ARE THE RESULT OF SOME LACK COMMAND AND CONTROL AT LOW AND MIDDLE-LEVEL, AND VAGUE RULES AND SOP'S ON CONDUCT IN VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS SIGNIFICANT, HOWEVER, THE GROWING NUMBER OF CIVILIAN DEATHS OCCURRING WHILE IN CUSTODY OR WHILE ALLEGEDLY TRYING TO ESCAPE. ALTHOUGH NOT SERIOUSLY COMPARABLE, THERE IS ALSO SIGNIFICANCE TO THE RPA AND GENDARME INTIMIDATION AND MUSCLE FLEXING TOWARD UNAMIR AND NGO'S. COMMENT: IT'S SOMEWHAT ASTONISHING AND, AS A MINIMUM, QUESTIONABLE

UN RESTRICTED

7/9

THAT THE RPA ALWAYS SHOOT A PERSON WHILE TRYING TO ESCAPE AND IN EVERY CASE THUS FAR, THE PERS IS KILLED, NEVER WOUNDED. THEY NEVER SEEM TO RUN AFTER AND RECAPTURE, SHOOT TO WOUND, FIRE WARNING SHOTS, ETC. REGARDING THE MEN CAPTURED IN GISHOMA, WHEN RPA ENCOUNTERED FOUR MEN, AT LEAST ONE ARMED AND IN UNIFORM, THEY DANGEROUSLY CHOSE TO ENCIRCLE THEM AND CAPTURE WITH NO SHOTS FIRED! YET IN THE CASE OF AN UNARMED PEOPLE IN CUSTODY, POSSIBLY WITHOUT SHOES AND ONLY A FEW METRES AWAY ARE NOT JUST SHOT, BUT KILLED. EVERY TIME. IT MUST NOW BE CONSIDERED THAT CERTAIN PEOPLE, WHEN ARRESTED, FACE A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. IF SO, UNDER WHO'S DIRECTION. IF NOT DIRECTED, IS IT THE PATROL GROSSLY ABUSING ITS AUTHORITY, OR TAKING OUT ITS FRUSTRATION OF THE LOCAL POPULACE (EVEN THOUGH SOME ARE ACTUAL RELATIVES) BECAUSE THE LOCALS REFUSE TO ACCEPT AND TRUST THE SOLDIERS EVEN IN THEIR HOME COMMUNES (SOURCE - RPA OFFICER). ARE SOME ARRESTS ALLEGEDLY OCCURRING BY CHANCE ENCOUNTERS ON THE ROAD (EXAMPLE - MDM STAFF MEMBER) ACTUALLY PREMEDITATED AND THE PERS KILLED UNDER A GUISE OF ESCAPE ?

CURRENT SITUATION

8. DURING THE WEEK LEADING UP TO 7 APRIL THERE HAVE BEEN MANY RUMOURS COMPOUNDING THE CURRENT LEVEL OF INSTABILITY AND THE FEELING OF INSECURITY AMONGST THE POPULATION. THE RECENT PRESENCE OF MINES AND THE RUMOURED THREAT THAT FRGF PLAN TO MINE OTHER MORE FREQUENTED AREAS HAS NOW SPREAD THE PERCEPTION OF INSECURITY TO NGO AND UN AGENCIES AS WELL. FOR THE LOCAL POPULACE, THE CURRENT SIT HAS LED TO THEM ASKING FOR UNAMIR PROTECTION IN THE FORM OF PROTECTIVE CAMPS, AND PEOPLE IN THE NORTH EAST OF THE SECTOR ARE ALREADY SLEEPING AT NIGHT IN THE VICINITY OF THE MILOBS, COMMUNE OFFICES AND SOME UNAMIR CONTINGENT SITES.

9. THERE HAVE BEEN NO KNOWN CRIMINAL INCIDENTS DIRECTED AT ANY PARTICULAR NGO OR UN PERS, OTHER THAN PERHAPS SOME RWANDAISE STAFF UNDER THEIR EMPLOY. EARLIER FRGF ACTIONS WHICH WERE INDIRECT IN

UN RESTRICTED

819

NATURE AGAINST RPA AND OFFICIALS, ARE NOW BECOMING MORE CONFRONTATIONAL AND BOLD. A NETWORK OF SUPPORT SURELY EXISTS IN VARIOUS COMMUNES FOR FRGF AND INTERAHAMWE ACTIONS. RPA COOPERATION TO UN/NGO'S APPEARS GENERALLY COURTEOUS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT IS NOT TRANSPARENT AND OFTEN HAS SOME SORT OF SECONDARY AGENDA. EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA AND INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND LACK OF A SOUND SYSTEM OF LEGAL PROCESS ARE REAL, NOT PERCEIVED, FACTORS ASSISTING IN THE PROBABLE STRATEGY OF THE FORMER GOVT AND ITS MILITARY. RUMOURS ARE NOT FACTS, BUT ONE FACT IS THAT THE POPULATION TRULY BELIEVES THEM, AND IS THEREFORE INDICATIVE OF THE LEVEL OF INSECURITY AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE. COMPLIMENTED BY SLOW JUSTICE, PROBLEMS OF INFRASTRUCTURE, LAND ISSUES AND UNCERTAINTY OF THE RPA, THE ABUNDANT MAJORITY OF THE HUTU PEASANT POPULATION OF SECTOR 4C IS VULNERABLE AND EASILY INFLUENCED. IT IS ASSESSED THAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR FORMER GOVT POLITICAL AND MILITARY AIMS MAY ACTUALLY GROW OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

SUMMARY

10. THE INCIDENTS OVER THE PAST WEEK ARE SEEN STILL AS LOW LEVEL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY FOR PURPOSES OF HARASSMENT AND WITH AN AIM FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL GAINS. FRGF AND INTERAHAMWE ARE TRAINING AND OPERATING TOGETHER IN A MILITARY MANNER, COORDINATED CERTAINLY BY HIGHER POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. IT SEEMS INCIDENTS CONTINUE AS A RESULT OF MILITARY TACTICS TOWARD POLITICAL STRATEGY. LOOSE CONDUCT BY RPA SOLDIERS AND PERHAPS POOR DIRECTION BY COMMANDERS AT VARIOUS LEVELS HAVE RESULTED IN COMPLIMENTING THE PERCEIVED GOALS OF THE FORMER GOVT.

11. SECTOR 4C ITSELF APPEARS VULNERABLE TO RAIDS AND POSSIBLE LARGER RAIDS IN THE NEAR FUTURE OF 95/96. RPA DEPLOYMENTS AT CRITICAL GROUND AREAS GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, HOWEVER THE SIZE OF THE RPA DEPLOYED ELEMENTS AND THE TIME AND DISTANCE PROBLEMS OF REINFORCEMENTS AND LOGISTICS SUGGEST AND SUPPORT OUR ASSESSMENT THAT NO LARGE SCALE INCURSION IS IMMINENTLY

UN RESTRICTED

9\9

EXPECTED. THE POPULATION IN SECTOR 4C ARE ALSO VULNERABLE, BOTH TO ATTACK AND TO INFLUENCE. THE CURRENT SITUATION OF ONGOING ACTS OF BANDITRY, MURDER, ILLEGAL ARRESTS, DEATHS IN CUSTODY AND A NON FUNCTIONAL CIVIL AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE INDEFINITELY.

UN RESTRICTED

FHQ —

Dem
A
7/4

1 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR
MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ

Date : 06 APR 95

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : DAILY SITREP COVERING 032300B APR TO 042300B APR 95

1. SITUATION

a. GENERAL. THE SITUATION WAS GENERALLY CALM DURING THE PERIOD.

b. BORDERS

(1) GATUNA BUZIBA AND KAZITUMBA BORDER POST WERE OPEN TO ALL TRAFFIC DURING THE PERIOD.

(2) RUSUMO BORDER POST (RWANDA/TANZANIA) REMAINED OPEN TO ALL TRAFFIC DURING THE PERIOD.

(3) RUSIZI BORDER POST IN SECT 4C WAS OPEN TO TRAFFIC.

(4) GISENYI BORDER POSTS WERE CLOSED TO UNAMIR PERS.

2. FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES

a. POLITICAL.

(1) SECTORE TWO MILOB REPORTED THAT VICE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA VISITED KIBUNGO TODAY.

UN RESTRICTED

0

UN RESTRICTED

(2) SECTOR THREE MILOB REPORTED THAT PREFET OF GITARAMA AND MANY BOURGEMSTRES WERE OBSERVED CONDUCTING PUBLIC MEETINGS IN AN EFFORT TO CALM PEOPLE'S FEARS.

b. MILITARY

(1) RPA.

(a) SECTOR 1 REPORTED THAT THE RPA CONTINUES TO PATROL THE AOR BOTH BY DAY AND NIGHT ON FOOT AND ON VEHs. A TENSE ALERTNESS CAN BE OBSERVED AMONGST THEM.

(b) SECTOR 3 MILOBS REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF RPA SOLDIERS OFF DUTY TODAY IN THE GITARAMA AREA. BOTH HERE AND SEVERAL CHECKPOINTS IN THE PREFECTURE THEIR MOOD SEEMED GENERALLY FRIENDLIER THAN USUAL.

(c) SECTOR 4B MILOB REPORTED THAT RPA HAS INCREASED STRENGTH IN BUTARE PREFECTURE AND THEY CONTINUE WITH FOOT, MOBILE DAY AND NIGHT PATROLS WITH CHECKPOINTS AND ROAD BLOCKS. THEY WERE OBSERVED PROVIDING SECURITY AT BUTARE MARKET.

(d) AT SECTOR 4C RPA VISIBLY STEPPING UP THEIR PATROLS ALONG BUGARAMA ROUTE, ESPECIALLY ON IMPORTANT POINTS. IN MUSHAKA IT APPEARS A PLATOON WITH MG 7.62 CAL AND A BULK OF BELTED AMMO WAS OBSERVED.

(e) IN SECTOR 5 MILKOB REPORTED THAT THERE ARE SIGNS OF INCREASING RPA'S DEPLOYMENT IN THE PREFECXTURES OF GISENYE AND RUHENGERI SUBSECTORS.

(2) FRGF. NTR.

3. OWN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

a. MILOB GP HQ. CONTINUED COORDINATION AND MONITORING OF MILOBS ACTIVITIES IN THE SECTORS.

b. SECTOR 1 - BYUMBA

(1) THE SECTOR WAS REPORTED CALM DURING THE PERIOD.
(2) MILOBS CONDUCTED ROUTINE PATROLS TO KAGITUMBA
(GR 5184), MATIMBA (GR 4874), NYAGATARE
(GR 3550) AND GAKONI (GR 4601) IN MURAMBI COMMUNE.

(3) PATROLS WERE ALSO CONDUCTED TO MUYOVE 9622 CYUNGO
9321 KISARO 0320 BUYOGA 0113 TUMBA 9412 AND GATUNA
1042. THE SITUATION IN AREAS PATROLLED WAS REPORTED
CALM.

c. SECTOR 2 - KIBUNGO

(1) THE SECTOR WAS CALM DURING THE PERIOD.
(2) MILOBS FROM RILIMA PATROLLED GASHORA (GR 2655),
RUTETE (GR 2242), NGENDA (GR 0644) AND BRIDGE
0972.

(3) PATROLS WERE ALSO CONDUCTED IN KABUGA 2581 NTUNGA
3982 RUBONA 4474 RWAMAGANA 4881 RILIMA 2561.

(4) TWO TEAMSPATROLLED AREAS SAKE 4354 MUGESERA 4764
BIRENGA 5959 RUKIRA 6658 RUSUMO 7448 AND KIGERAMA
6170.

(4) TWO TEAMS PATROLLED AREAS RUTONDE 4884 KAYONZA
5784 RUKARA 5601 AND MUHAZI 4590. IN ALL THE PLACES
SITUATION REMAINED NORMAL AND CALM.

d. SECTOR 3 - GITARAMA

(1) THE SIT IN THE SECTOR WAS GENERALLY CALM DURING
THE PERIOD. MILOBS RECEIVED SEVERAL REPORTS OF ARREST
BY RPA. HOWEVER THE RATE OF ARRESTS HAS GONE DOWN IN
THE LAST FEW DAYS.

(2) A COMBINED MILOB/CIVPOL/HR TEAM ESCORTED THE
BOURGEMESTRE OF MUSAMBIRA COMMUNE 8273 TO HOLD PUBLIC
MEETING TO TRY TO DEAL WITH THE TENSION IN HIS
COMMUNE.

(3) ANOTHER MILOB TEAM PETROLLED TO MUKINGI 7161
COMMUNE, WHERE THEY HEARD ABOUT ABUSIVE ARRESTS AND
BEATINGS BY RPA.

(4) SECTOR HQ WAS INVOLVED IN AN ATTEMPT TO
COORDINATE A LAST MINUTE EFFORT TO TRANSFER SEVERAL

UN RESTRICTED

TRCKLOADS OF PRISONERS FROM GITARAMA PRISON TO GISENYE. SUBJECT TRANSFER COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT DUE TO CLEAR INSTRUCTION. THE PROPOSED DATE OF COMMENCEMENT IS ON 10 APRIL 1995.

(5). AT KIBUYE THE TEAM PATROLLED THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. THE SITUATION REMAINS CALM.

e. SECTOR 4A - GIKONGORO

(1) THE SIT IN THE SECTOR REMAINED GENERALLY CALM DURING THE PERIOD.

(2) MILOBS PATROLLED IDP CAMPS AT KIBEHO NDAGO, NYAMIGINA 4523 BOHORU 4621 KAMANA 5196 MUNINI 4899 RWAMIKO 4914.

(3) PATROLS WERE ALSO CARRIED OUT TO RUNYOMBYI AS PART OF OP RUBY. SITUATION IN AREAS PATROLLED WAS REPORTED CALM. STRENGTH OF CAMPS ARE:

KIBEHO	15000
KAMANA	34500

(4) MR. THIERRY ZOBEL FROM UNREO, KIGALI VISITED THE CAMP ON 5 APRIL AND INFORMED THE DPS, THAT, FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN THE CAMP WILL BE STOPPED SOON AND THEN THE CAMP CLOSED. HE HOWEVER GAVE NO DATES FOR CLOSURE OF THE CAMP.

f. SECTOR 4B

(1) THE SECTOR WAS REPORTED CALM DURING THE PERIOD.

(2) ONE MILOB TEAM PATROLLED AREA NYARUHENGARI 7607. SITUATION WAS REPORTED CALM.

g. SECTOR 4C - CYANGUGU

(1) THE SITUATION IN THE SECTOR REMAINED RELATIVELY CALM. BANDITRY WAS REPORTED TO BE ON THE INCREASE.

(2) MILOBS CARRIED OUT ROUTINE PATROLS IN THEIR AOR. SITUATION IN AREAS PATROLLED WAS REPORTED CALM.

h. SECTOR 5 - GISENYI

(1) THE SECTOR WAS REPORTED CALM DURING THE PERIOD.
(2) MILOBS CARRIED OUT PATROLS IN RWERERE 2723
MUTURA 3223 RUBAVU 2313 KANAMA 2813 NYAMYUMBA 2006
KAYOVE 2812 KIDAHU 7047 BUTARO 8144 CYERU 8035
NYAMUNGALI 8622 RUHONDO 6829 CYABINGO 6625 AND
NYARUTOVU 7517. THE PATROLLED REPORTED THAT THE AREA
PATROLLED, SECURITY SITUATION WAS CALM.

j. SECTOR 6- KIGALI

(1) THE SITUATION IN KIGALI CITY AND SURROUNDING
AREAS REMAINED CALM AND QUIET.

(2) MILOBS CARRIED OUT ROUTINE PATROLS IN GIKOMERO,
RIBBING AND KANOMBI COMMUNES. ALL THE AREAS GENERALLY
REMAINED CALM AND QUIET.

k. AIR OPS.

(1) UNAM9IR OPERATED NINE FLIGHTS WITH TWO SCHEDULED
FLIGHTS FROM NAIROBI AND SEVEN HELICOPTER FLIGHTS.

4. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES.

a. SECTOR 1 MILOBS REPORTED THAT THE GOAL HAS COMPLETED
A NEW HEALTH CENTRE AT MULINDI WHICH WILL OPERATE FROM MAY
95. UNICEF HAS DONATED 140 PLASTIC SHEETS TO BE USED AS
TEMPORARY ROOFS FOR THE PRIMARY SCHOOLS AT KIYOMBE COMMUNE.

b. MILOBS IN SECTOR 4B REPORTED THAT ABOUT 102 IDPS,
WERE MOVED FROM KIBEHO TO BUTARE.

5. CIVILIAN AFFAIRS.

(1) SECTOR 1 MILOB REPORTED THAT 50 PERSONS WHO CAME FROM
KIGALI ON 5 APR TO SEEK REFUGE HAVE BEEN HOUSED IN THE
SCHOOL BUILDING.

(2) SECTOR 4B MILOB REPORTED THAT BUTARE MARKET SHOWED BIG
MOVEMENT OF LOCALS SHOPING.

6. LOGISTICS. NTR.7. MISC NTR.a. DETAILS OF BORDER CROSSING


(1)	<u>AREAS</u>	<u>INFLOW</u>	<u>OUTFLOW</u>
(a)	<u>SECTOR 1</u>		
	UGANDA	15 (GATUNA)	NIL
		1636 (KAGITUMBA)	NIL
(b)	<u>SECTOR 2</u>		
	TANZANIA	NIL	NIL
	BURUNDI	NIL	NIL
(c)	<u>SECTOR 3</u>		
	BURUNDI	NIL	NIL
	ZAIRE	NIL	NIL
(d)	<u>SECTOR 4A</u>		
	REMER	NIL	NIL
	AKABUGA	NIL	NIL
(e)	<u>SECTOR 4C</u>		
	ZAIRE	NIL	NIL

6

UN RESTRICTED

(f) SECTOR 5

UGANDA	03	NIL
ZAIRE	55	NIL


 for J McCOMBER
 MAJOR
 SOO

6

UN RESTRICTED

UN CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM

TO: FHQ/DFC/COS/ /G2
MILOBS HQ/SSO OPS
SECTOR 3A/COL HASNAIN ← IMMEDIATE

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT AT GITARAMA PRISON 3 APR 95

DATE: 5 APR 95

1. THE DELAY IN SUBMITTING THIS REPORT IS REGRETTEED BUT WAS UNAVOIDABLE DUE TO THE MASS OF OBSCURING RUMOUR THAT HAD TO BE WADED THROUGH BEFORE A CONGENT REPORT COULD BE WRITTEN. A JOINT MILOB/CIVPOL/HR INVESTIGATION OF THE GITARAMA PRISON INCIDENT WAS CONDUCTED WITH THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY RESULTS:

A. AT ABOUT 2100 HRS ON 2 APR 95, AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PRISONERS ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE FROM GITARAMA PRISON. SHOTS WRE FIRED AND THE ATTEMPT WAS FOILED. IT WAS CONFIRMED BY ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES THAT AT MOST ONE PRISONER WAS KILLED BY RIFLE FIRE AND THAT THIS PERSON WAS KILLED WHILE TRYING TO SCALE DOWN A ROPE BLANKET FROM THE PRISON ROOF. THERE IS SOME DESCREPCANCY OVER THE EXACT TIME THAT THIS HAPPENED WITH SOME SOURCES CLAIMING THAT IT HAPPENED AT MIDNIGHT IN A SEPARATE ATTEMPT AND OTHERS CLAIMING THAT IT HAPPENED LATER,

B. IT WAS CONFIRMED BY VISUAL OBSERVATION AND INTERVIEW OF PRISON MEDICAL AUTHORITIES THAT AT LEAST FOUR PERSONS SUFFERED GUNSHOT WOUNDS WHILE TRYING TO SCALE THE WALLS ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE PRISON. SIX OTHERS SUSTAINED NON-GUNSHOT INJURIES. THIS SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN 0525 AND 0545 3 APR. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE DEATH MENTIONNED ABOVE OCCURRED AT THIS TIME; AND,

C. IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT THE MANY SHOTS FIRED WERE PRIMARILY WARNING SHOTS TO DISCOURAGE ANY MORE ESCAPEES.

2. WHAT CANNOT BE CONFIRMED IS THE SPECIFIC REASON FOR THE INCIDENT. THE PRISONERS CLAIMED THAT THE GUARDS FIRED SEVERAL BURST OF AUTOMATIC FIRE AT AROUND 2000HRS ON 2 APR WITHOUT APPARENT CAUSE. THIS FUELED THEIR FEAR THAT THEY WOULD BE MASSACRED BY THEIR GUARDS AND MADE MANY OF THEM DESPERATE TO ESCAPE. THEY CLAIM THAT THEY TRIED TO ESCAPE ONLY AFTER HEARING SHOTS, WHICH THEY CLAIM WERE FIRED DELIBERATELY TO PANIC THEM.

3. THE RPA VERSION CORRESPONDS TO THE PRISONERS VERSION EXCEPT FOR THE TIMES AT WHICH SHOTS WERE FIRED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PRISON IS GUARDED BY RPA GUARDS AND THAT THE LOCAL BDE CDR HAS AN ITIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE PRISON AUTHORITIES. HE IS ALSO ON RECORD AS STATING THAT ALL PRISONERS ARE GUILTY OF GENOCIDE AND DESERVE NO PITY. THE RPA MAINTAIN THAT NO SHOTS WERE FIRED UNTIL THE ESCAPE ATTEMPT BEGAN. THE RPA CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATING A MASS ESCAPE ATTEMPT EVER SINCE

cc
Pre fwd to DCS OPS
5/4
5/4
06/4


06/4

NOTICING THAT THE PRISONERS HAD REMOVED THE MORTAR FROM MOST OF THE WALLS. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE PRISONERS COULD JUST PUSH THE WALLS DOWN AND STAMPEDE OUT. THEY ADMIT TO FIRING A NUMBER OF ROUNDS AT 2100HRS 2 APR AND TO FIRING NEARLY 100 RDS BETWEEN 0500 AND 0545 ON 3 APR. THEY CLAIM THAT THE DEATH OCCURRED AT MIDNIGHT AND THAT NO ONE WAS INJURED IN THE EARLY MORNING SHOOTING.

4. AS IS USUAL IN THESE INCIDENTS, THE TRUTH IS PROBABLY SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN THE TWO VERSIONS. ON THE ONE HAND, THE RPA MADE EXCELLENT USE OF THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PSYCHE OF THEIR OPPONENTS DURING THE LAST WAR AND IT WOULD BE QUITE IN CHARACTER FOR THEM TO PLAY ON THE FEARS OF THE PRISONERS IN A CALCULATED WAY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE MANY ROUNDS FIRED AND RELATIVELY FEW PEOPLE HIT. HAD THE RPA DELIBERATELY ATTEMPTED TO PANIC THEIR PRISONERS INTO A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE, IT IS LIKELY THAT THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN MANY MORE DEAD AND WOUNDED THAN THERE ACTUALLY WERE.

5. WHATEVER THE TRUTH OF THE EVENTS, IT IS EVIDENT THAT A DYNAMIC OF FEAR HAS BEGUN TO REINFORCE THE ALREADY EXISTING FEARS OF BOTH PARTIES. EACH ACTION BY ONE SIDE REINFORCES THE FEARS OF THE OTHER. THE PROVERB THAT WHEN THE WOLF SMILES, THE SHEEP SEE HIS TEETH DESCRIBES WHAT APPEARS TO BE HAPPENING. IN THIS CASE, THE CONDITIONS INSIDE THE WALLS ARE SO BAD THAT LEAST DISTURBANCE MAY HAVE AN EXAGGERATED EFFECT. THE NORMAL DEATH RATE HAS RECENTLY INCREASED MARKEDLY AND THIS MAY BE ADDING TO THE DESPERATION OF THE PRISONERS. LACKING A SYSTEM OF JUSTICE THAT OFFERS THEM SOME HOPE OF FAIR TREATMENT, THEY FACE EITHER LINGERING DEATH AS A RESULT OF THE LIVING CONDITIONS OR IMMEDIATE DEATH AT THE HANDS OF THEIR GUARDS. LACKING HOPE, THEY HAVE LITTLE TO GAIN FROM COOPERATION.

6. THE PRISON AUTHORITIES AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM ARE COOPERATING IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE TENSION BY ADDRESSING THE PRISONERS AND EXPLAINING THAT THERE IS LITTLE TO BE GAINED FROM TRYING TO ESCAPE. IN FACT, MILOBS HAVE OBSERVED A PLATOON SIZED AMBUSH SET UP OUTSIDE OF THE PRISON WALLS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE CONSEQUENCE OF A MASS ESCAPE ATTEMPT WOULD BE LARGE NUMBERS OF DEATHS AT THE HANDS OF THIS PLATOON.

for 
S.A. HASNAIN
COL
SECTOR CDR

UN CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM

TO: FHQ/CMO/COS/~~OPS~~ OPS
INFO: MILOBS GP HQ/DCMO

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PREFET OF BUTARE

DATE: 5 MAR 95

1. THIS IS A FOLLOW UP OF THE INCREP PERTAINING TO SUBJECT EVENT SUBMITTED BY THIS HQ ON 4 MAR 95.

2. ON THE NIGHT OF 4 MAR, AT APPROX 2100 HRS, A CAR CARRYING THE PREFET OF BUTARE, A DRIVER, A UNIFORMED BODY GUARD AND ONE OTHER PASSENGER WAS WAVED TO A HALT APPROX 5 KM NORTH OF BUTARE ON THE MAIN ROAD TO GITARAMA. THE PREFET REPORTEDLY LOWERED HIS WINDOW TO ENQUIRE INTO THE REASON FOR THE STOP AND WAS SHOT THROUGH THE HEAD IMMEDIATELY AT CLOSE RANGE. ACCORDING TO THE SOLE SURVIVOR, APPROX FOUR OTHER GUNS OPENED UP AT VERY CLOSE RANGE FROM THE WEST SIDE OF THE ROAD (RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE VEHICLE) AND KILLED THE DRIVER AND THE OTHER PASSENGER. THE GUARD WAS SITTING IN THE BACK LEFT HAND SEAT AND WAS UNTOUCHED IN THE INITIAL VOLLEY. HE MANAGED TO GET OUT OF THE BACK DOOR AND TO FIRE A FEW ROUNDS BEFORE TURNING TO RUN TO THE EAST SIDE OF THE ROAD. THE ATTACKERS FIRED AS HE RAN HITTING HIM IN THE SHOULDER AND LOWER LEG. HE LATER REPORTED THAT HIS ASSAILANTS WERE DRESSED IN SHORT PANTS, LONG COATS AND HOODS. SHORTLY AFTER THE SOLDIER WENT DOWN, A BROWN AND ROOT VEHICLE, DRIVEN BY MR BEAVER, CAME UPON THE SCENE, SAW THE VEHICLE AND THE BULLET HOLES, AN IMMEDIATELY WENT TO TAC HQ TO REPORT.

3. SECTOR 3A MILOBS OPSO, MAJ NUNDWE, WAS CALLED TO INVESTIGATE, IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED THE RPA LO AND MALAWICOY, AND PROCEEDED TO THE SCENE. HE WAS OBLIGED TO WAIT FOR MALAWICOY FOR SAFETY AND TRANSPORT REASONS AND SO ARRIVED SEVERAL MINUTES AFTER THE RPA LO. THE LO HAD, BY THIS TIME, TAKEN THE WOUNDED SOLDIER INTO HIS VEHICLE AND DEPARTED FOR THE HOSPITAL. MAJ NUNDWE MADE AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE SIGHT WITHOUT HINDRANCE FROM THE RPA ELEMENTS WHO HAD BY THIS TIME DEPLOYED, AND THEN SUBMITTED AN INCREP. THE SIGHT WAS THEN SEALED OFF BY THE RPA AND TRAFFIC HALTED. IT REMAINED SEALED UNTIL APPROX 0845H 05 MAR, AT WHICH TIME THE BODIES WERE REMOVED AND THE CAR TOWED AWAY.

ASSESSMENT

4. THERE ARE SEVERAL INTERESTING ASPECTS OF THIS EVENT THAT NEED CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THE PREFET, A M. PIERRE....., BELONGED TO THE PARTI SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIQUE, AND WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A MODERATE FORCE. HE WAS NOT VERY POPULAR WITH THE LOCAL RPA AND HAD NOT BEEN

UN CONFIDENTIAL

GIVEN A SEAT AT THE WEDDING FEAST OF THE LOCAL BDE CDR SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. SECOND, THE PREFET HAD ENEMIES WITHIN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ONE OF WHOM HAD RECENTLY ACCUSED HIM OF FRAUDULENT USE OF PUBLIC MONEY. THIRD, THE SHOOTING TOOK PLACE A SHORT DISTANCE FROM MBAZI COMMUNE (7218) A COMMUNE FROM WHICH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN FLEEING RECENTLY. FOURTH, THE RPA, CONTRARY TO WHAT ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED FROM A FORCE AS COMPETENT AS THEY IN NIGHT OPS, TOOK NO IMMEDIATE ACTION. FIFTH, THOUGH THE ATTACKERS WERE REPORTEDLY IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, THEY EXECUTED THEIR AMBUSH WITH A PRECISION USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH PROFESSIONAL MILITARY UNITS. IT IS EASY TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF SHORT PANTS BY PULLING LONG PANTS UP UNDERNEATH A LONG COAT. SIXTH, THE ATTACKERS MUST HAVE HAD SOME MEANS OF IDENTIFYING THE CAR AND POSITIONING THEMSELVES AT THE RIGHT TIME TO CARRY OUT THEIR ATTACK. THE PREFET HAD SPENT THE DAY WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT MEMBERS IN KIGALI AND HAD MADE A BRIEF STOP WITH THE BOURGMESTRE OF RUSATIRA ON HIS WAY TO BUTARE. FINALLY, THIS ACTION PROVIDES THE PERFECT EXCUSE FOR TIGHTENING UP SECURITY INCLUDING FORCED CLOSURE OF THE IDP CAMPS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS LONG HELD TO BE THE SOURCE OF ALL SUCH ATTACKS.

5. THE TWO MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITIES ARE THAT HARDLINER ELEMENTS WITHIN THE RPA STAGED THE ATTACK INTENDING TO BLAME IT ON FORMER MILITIA OR THAT SOME FORMER MILITIA ELEMENT STAGED THE ATTACK IN THE HOPE OF INDUCING THE GOVERNMENT TO OVER REACT. EITHER POSSIBILITY COULD BE PLAUSIBLY ARGUED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE MAJORITY POPULATION IN THIS SECTOR IS ALREADY DISAFFECTED BY FEAR AND THUS THERE WOULD BE LITTLE TO GAIN FOR FORMER RGF OR MILITIA ELEMENTS FROM AN ATTACK SUCH AS THIS AT THIS TIME. MOREOVER, IF THE CAMPS ARE CLOSED AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK, THE FORMER GOVERNMENT FACTION STANDS TO LOSE A VALUABLE BASE OF OPERATIONS INSIDE RWANDA. THE HARDLINERS IN THE RPA, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD LITTLE TO LOSE AND MUCH TO GAIN FROM THIS ACTION. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, IT IS JUST TOO GOOD AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER REPRESSIVE MEASURES.

6. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS EVENT OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED VERY SERIOUSLY. IN THE COMING WEEKS, UNAMIR SHOULD MONITOR ACTIONS OF ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT CAREFULLY TO OBSERVE WHICH WAY THEY DECIDE TO MOVE. IT IS VERY POSSIBLY THE FIRST STEP IN A POWER GRAB BY HARDLINERS. IT IS ALSO OMINOUS THAT THE PREFET SHOULD BELONG TO THE SAME PARTY AND COME FROM THE SAME AREA AS M. GATABAZI, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED LAST YEAR AT ABOUT THIS TIME.

for *PC Hurns, Mo*
S.A. HASNAIN
COL
SECT CDR

File (or)UN CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM

TO: FHQ/CMO/COS/DCOS OPS
 INFO: MILOBS GP HQ/DCMO

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PREFET OF BUTARE

DATE: 5 MAR 95

② G3 ops

1. For files

2. Cfm copies
 have been fwd
 to Mr Schiess
 (SU - UNHRCF).

mtt
24/3

DCOS OPS

Copies were
 fwd to Mr Schiess.

DCOS OPS

18.3

1. THIS IS A FOLLOW UP OF THE INCREP PERTAINING TO SUBJECT EVENT
 SUBMITTED BY THIS HQ ON 4 MAR 95.

2. ON THE NIGHT OF 4 MAR, AT APPROX 2100 HRS, A CAR CARRYING THE
 PREFET OF BUTARE, A DRIVER, A UNIFORMED BODY GUARD AND ONE OTHER
 PASSENGER WAS WAVED TO A HALT APPROX 5 KM NORTH OF BUTARE ON THE
 MAIN ROAD TO GITARAMA. THE PREFET REPORTEDLY LOWERED HIS WINDOW TO
 ENQUIRE INTO THE REASON FOR THE STOP AND WAS SHOT THROUGH THE HEAD
 IMMEDIATELY AT CLOSE RANGE. ACCORDING TO THE SOLE SURVIVOR, APPROX
 FOUR OTHER GUNS OPENED UP AT VERY CLOSE RANGE FROM THE WEST SIDE OF
 THE ROAD (RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE VEHICLE) AND KILLED THE DRIVER AND
 THE OTHER PASSENGER. THE GUARD WAS SITTING IN THE BACK LEFT HAND
 SEAT AND WAS UNTOUCHED IN THE INITIAL VOLLEY. HE MANAGED TO GET
 OUT OF THE BACK DOOR AND TO FIRE A FEW ROUNDS BEFORE TURNING TO RUN
 TO THE EAST SIDE OF THE ROAD. THE ATTACKERS FIRED AS HE RAN
 HITTING HIM IN THE SHOULDER AND LOWER LEG. HE LATER REPORTED THAT
 HIS ASSAILANTS WERE DRESSED IN SHORT PANTS, LONG COATS AND HOODS.
 SHORTLY AFTER THE SOLDIER WENT DOWN, A BROWN AND ROOT VEHICLE,
 DRIVEN BY MR BEAVER, CAME UPON THE SCENE, SAW THE VEHICLE AND THE
 BULLET HOLES, AN IMMEDIATELY WENT TO TAC HQ TO REPORT.

3. SECTOR 3A MILOBS OPSO, MAJ NUNDWE, WAS CALLED TO INVESTIGATE,
 IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED THE RPA LO AND MALAWICOY, AND PROCEEDED TO
 THE SCENE. HE WAS OBLIGED TO WAIT FOR MALAWICOY FOR SAFETY AND
 TRANSPORT REASONS AND SO ARRIVED SEVERAL MINUTES AFTER THE RPA LO.
 THE LO HAD, BY THIS TIME, TAKEN THE WOUNDED SOLDIER INTO HIS
 VEHICLE AND DEPARTED FOR THE HOSPITAL. MAJ NUNDWE MADE AN INITIAL
 INVESTIGATION OF THE SIGHT WITHOUT HINDRANCE FROM THE RPA ELEMENTS
 WHO HAD BY THIS TIME DEPLOYED, AND THEN SUBMITTED AN INCREP. THE
 SIGHT WAS THEN SEALED OFF BY THE RPA AND TRAFFIC HALTED. IT
 REMAINED SEALED UNTIL APPROX 0845H 05 MAR, AT WHICH TIME THE BODIES
 WERE REMOVED AND THE CAR TOWED AWAY.

ASSESSMENT

4. THERE ARE SEVERAL INTERESTING ASPECTS OF THIS EVENT THAT NEED
 CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THE PREFET, A M. PIERRE....., BELONGED TO THE
 PARTI SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIQUE, AND WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A MODERATE
 FORCE. HE WAS NOT VERY POPULAR WITH THE LOCAL RPA AND HAD NOT BEEN

UN CONFIDENTIAL

GIVEN A SEAT AT THE WEDDING FEAST OF THE LOCAL BDE CDR SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. SECOND, THE PREFET HAD ENEMIES WITHIN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ONE OF WHOM HAD RECENTLY ACCUSED HIM OF FRAUDULENT USE OF PUBLIC MONEY. THIRD, THE SHOOTING TOOK PLACE A SHORT DISTANCE FROM MBAZI COMMUNE (7218) A COMMUNE FROM WHICH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN FLEEING RECENTLY. FOURTH, THE RPA, CONTRARY TO WHAT ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED FROM A FORCE AS COMPETENT AS THEY IN NIGHT OPS, TOOK NO IMMEDIATE ACTION. FIFTH, THOUGH THE ATTACKERS WERE REPORTEDLY IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, THEY EXECUTED THEIR AMBUSH WITH A PRECISION USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH PROFESSIONAL MILITARY UNITS. IT IS EASY TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF SHORT PANTS BY PULLING LONG PANTS UP UNDERNEATH A LONG COAT. SIXTH, THE ATTACKERS MUST HAVE HAD SOME MEANS OF IDENTIFYING THE CAR AND POSITIONING THEMSELVES AT THE RIGHT TIME TO CARRY OUT THEIR ATTACK. THE PREFET HAD SPENT THE DAY WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT MEMBERS IN KIGALI AND HAD MADE A BRIEF STOP WITH THE BOURGMESTRE OF RUSATIRA ON HIS WAY TO BUTARE. FINALLY, THIS ACTION PROVIDES THE PERFECT EXCUSE FOR TIGHTENING UP SECURITY INCLUDING FORCED CLOSURE OF THE IDP CAMPS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS LONG HELD TO BE THE SOURCE OF ALL SUCH ATTACKS.

5. THE TWO MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITIES ARE THAT HARDLINER ELEMENTS WITHIN THE RPA STAGED THE ATTACK INTENDING TO BLAME IT ON FORMER MILITIA OR THAT SOME FORMER MILITIA ELEMENT STAGED THE ATTACK IN THE HOPE OF INDUCING THE GOVERNMENT TO OVER REACT. EITHER POSSIBILITY COULD BE PLAUSIBLY ARGUED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE MAJORITY POPULATION IN THIS SECTOR IS ALREADY DISAFFECTED BY FEAR AND THUS THERE WOULD BE LITTLE TO GAIN FOR FORMER RGF OR MILITIA ELEMENTS FROM AN ATTACK SUCH AS THIS AT THIS TIME. MOREOVER, IF THE CAMPS ARE CLOSED AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK, THE FORMER GOVERNMENT FACTION STANDS TO LOSE A VALUABLE BASE OF OPERATIONS INSIDE RWANDA. THE HARDLINERS IN THE RPA, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD LITTLE TO LOSE AND MUCH TO GAIN FROM THIS ACTION. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, IT IS JUST TOO GOOD AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER REPRESSIVE MEASURES.

6. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS EVENT OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED VERY SERIOUSLY. IN THE COMING WEEKS, UNAMIR SHOULD MONITOR ACTIONS OF ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT CAREFULLY TO OBSERVE WHICH WAY THEY DECIDE TO MOVE. IT IS VERY POSSIBLY THE FIRST STEP IN A POWER GRAB BY HARDLINERS. IT IS ALSO OMINOUS THAT THE PREFET SHOULD BELONG TO THE SAME PARTY AND COME FROM THE SAME AREA AS M. GATABAZI, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED LAST YEAR AT ABOUT THIS TIME.

S.A. HASNAIN
COL
SECT CDR

Tac HQ (OP)file carefully
separately

UN. CONFIDENTIAL

UNAMIR MILOBS ~~SECTOR~~ 3A, BUTARE.

Document SRL #: OPS/REP/01

Date 09 Mar 94

To: MILOBS SECTOR 3 HQ, GITARAMA.

From: MILOBS SECTOR 3A, BUTARE.

Subject: REPORT ~~ON~~ THE SUDDEN DEATH OF BUTARE PREFECT DR PIERRE CLAVER.Reference: ~~A. Incident~~ Report dated 04 MAR 95.

B. Daily Sitreps dated on 05 and 06 MAR 95.

1. The sudden death of the Butare Prefect has not been a shock to the people and foreigners in Butare since he looked very moderate Hutu and very out spoken. The information emerging suggests that his death is predetermined. Other school of thought are of the opinion that many such people were murdered or ambushed before the war broke out in June 94, through such means.

2. The Prefect had earlier in the morning of Saturday 04 left Butare for Kigali accompanied by his driver and body guard. It was said in Kigali he visited the Prime Minister and other Government Officials. He also took his son from Nyamirambo for Butare. While returning to Butare he stopped over at Rusatira to see the local Bourgmaster after sunset.

3. At about 042045 his car was stopped near Mbazi at GR 738183, by a group of about five people dressing in shorts and jackets with the face partially covered. When the vehicle ~~was~~ pulled to stop the Prefect asked the assailants their mission. After recognizing the Prefect the assailants opened fire into the car killing the Prefect, his son and the driver instantly. The armed escort who sat behind the prefect on the rear right side of the vehicle however managed to open the door and escaped into the bush. He consequently received two bullet wounds on the right arm and the right leg. He is however responding to treatment at University Hospital in Butare.

4. An informant who was driving from Butare to Save on the Gitarama-Butare road reported to the Duty Offr of Tac HQ ~~Call~~ on the night of the incident. The source reported that about 4 km north of Butare a car was seen parked on the right side of the road with the head lights on. Instantly he heard the sound of riffle shot with flashes close to the side of the vehicle. Noticing that the situation could be dangerous for his life he sped and left the scene. The informant further said shortly after by passing the scene he met a local on a motorcycle heading towards the place of the incident; he presume that the cyclist could be an RPA soldier. From various school of thought around the village in Save, they heard about six to seven shots in the night of the incident.

UN. CONFIDENTIAL

TO SITREP
BUTARE TEAM FILE
OPSO
WNY

UN CONFIDENTIAL

5. After the evacuation of the wounded RPA soldier, suggestion was made that the bodies of the victims be evacuated but this was ignored. The vehicle and bodies were kept in the place until the morning of Sunday 05 Mar 95 at about 1030 hrs when they were removed from the scene.

6. The Vice President Of Rwanda Maj Gen Paul Kagame visited Butare on Sunday 05 Mar, the day after the death of the Prefect and a large number of RPA soldiers were seen all over the streets of Butare.

7. On Monday 06 Mar 95 at about 1530 hrs the remains of the Prefect and his son were giving a tidy burial. In attendance were the President of Rwanda, some Government Officials, the SRSG to Rwanda, Diplomats, UNAMIR and UN Agencies Staff, large number of RPA soldiers and local population. Two wreaths were laid by the SRSG and Tac HQ Cmdr, on behalf of UNAMIR. The death of the Prefect took everybody by surprise, it has not hampered the security situation; the normal day to day business in Butare Prefecture is not disturb.

8. To prevent such occurrences in future it is suggested to all dignataries if possible should not travel at night and if the means are available should not travel in a convoy of less than two vehicles.

9. Investigations still in progress and complete report will follow.

10. Gratefull submitted for your attention and perusal.

Antwi-Boas
Sqn Ldr
Sector 3A Ops Offr.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

CC
Copy COS & DCOSUN CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUMThunt
06/3
weeted
06.3

TO: FHQ/CMO/COS/DCOS OPS
INFO: MILOBS GP HQ/DCMO

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PREFET OF BUTARE

DATE: 5 MAR 95

1. THIS IS A FOLLOW UP OF THE INCREP PERTAINING TO SUBJECT EVENT SUBMITTED BY THIS HQ ON 4 MAR 95.

2. ON THE NIGHT OF 4 MAR, AT APPROX 2100 HRS, A CAR CARRYING THE PREFET OF BUTARE, A DRIVER, A UNIFORMED BODY GUARD AND ONE OTHER PASSENGER WAS WAVED TO A HALT APPROX 5 KM NORTH OF BUTARE ON THE MAIN ROAD TO GITARAMA. THE PREFET REPORTEDLY LOWERED HIS WINDOW TO ENQUIRE INTO THE REASON FOR THE STOP AND WAS SHOT THROUGH THE HEAD IMMEDIATELY AT CLOSE RANGE. ACCORDING TO THE SOLE SURVIVOR, APPROX FOUR OTHER GUNS OPENED UP AT VERY CLOSE RANGE FROM THE WEST SIDE OF THE ROAD (RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE VEHICLE) AND KILLED THE DRIVER AND THE OTHER PASSENGER. THE GUARD WAS SITTING IN THE BACK LEFT HAND SEAT AND WAS UNTOUCHED IN THE INITIAL VOLLEY. HE MANAGED TO GET OUT OF THE BACK DOOR AND TO FIRE A FEW ROUNDS BEFORE TURNING TO RUN TO THE EAST SIDE OF THE ROAD. THE ATTACKERS FIRED AS HE RAN HITTING HIM IN THE SHOULDER AND LOWER LEG. HE LATER REPORTED THAT HIS ASSAILANTS WERE DRESSED IN SHORT PANTS, LONG COATS AND HOODS. SHORTLY AFTER THE SOLDIER WENT DOWN, A BROWN AND ROOT VEHICLE, DRIVEN BY MR BEAVER, CAME UPON THE SCENE, SAW THE VEHICLE AND THE BULLET HOLES, AND IMMEDIATELY WENT TO TAC HQ TO REPORT.

3. SECTOR 3A MILOBS OPSO, MAJ NUNDWE, WAS CALLED TO INVESTIGATE, IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED THE RPA LO AND MALAWICOY, AND PROCEEDED TO THE SCENE. HE WAS OBLIGED TO WAIT FOR MALAWICOY FOR SAFETY AND TRANSPORT REASONS AND SO ARRIVED SEVERAL MINUTES AFTER THE RPA LO. THE LO HAD, BY THIS TIME, TAKEN THE WOUNDED SOLDIER INTO HIS VEHICLE AND DEPARTED FOR THE HOSPITAL. MAJ NUNDWE MADE AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE SIGHT WITHOUT HINDRANCE FROM THE RPA ELEMENTS WHO HAD BY THIS TIME DEPLOYED, AND THEN SUBMITTED AN INCREP. THE SIGHT WAS THEN SEALED OFF BY THE RPA AND TRAFFIC HALTED. IT REMAINED SEALED UNTIL APPROX 0845H 05 MAR, AT WHICH TIME THE BODIES WERE REMOVED AND THE CAR TOWED AWAY.

ASSESSMENT

4. THERE ARE SEVERAL INTERESTING ASPECTS OF THIS EVENT THAT NEED CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THE PREFET, A M. PIERRE...., BELONGED TO THE PARTI SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIQUE, AND WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A MODERATE FORCE. HE WAS NOT VERY POPULAR WITH THE LOCAL RPA AND HAD NOT BEEN

UN CONFIDENTIAL

GIVEN A SEAT AT THE WEDDING FEAST OF THE LOCAL BDE CDR SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. SECOND, THE PREFET HAD ENEMIES WITHIN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ONE OF WHOM HAD RECENTLY ACCUSED HIM OF FRAUDULENT USE OF PUBLIC MONEY. THIRD, THE SHOOTING TOOK PLACE A SHORT DISTANCE FROM MBAZI COMMUNE (7218) A COMMUNE FROM WHICH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN FLEEING RECENTLY. FOURTH, THE RPA, CONTRARY TO WHAT ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED FROM A FORCE AS COMPETENT AS THEY IN NIGHT OPS, TOOK NO IMMEDIATE ACTION. FIFTH, THOUGH THE ATTACKERS WERE REPORTEDLY IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, THEY EXECUTED THEIR AMBUSH WITH A PRECISION USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH PROFESSIONAL MILITARY UNITS. IT IS EASY TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF SHORT PANTS BY PULLING LONG PANTS UP UNDERNEATH A LONG COAT. SIXTH, THE ATTACKERS MUST HAVE HAD SOME MEANS OF IDENTIFYING THE CAR AND POSITIONING THEMSELVES AT THE RIGHT TIME TO CARRY OUT THEIR ATTACK. THE PREFET HAD SPENT THE DAY WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT MEMBERS IN KIGALI AND HAD MADE A BRIEF STOP WITH THE BOURGMESTRE OF RUSATIRA ON HIS WAY TO BUTARE. FINALLY, THIS ACTION PROVIDES THE PERFECT EXCUSE FOR TIGHTENING UP SECURITY INCLUDING FORCED CLOSURE OF THE IDP CAMPS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS LONG HELD TO BE THE SOURCE OF ALL SUCH ATTACKS.

5. THE TWO MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITIES ARE THAT HARDLINER ELEMENTS WITHIN THE RPA STAGED THE ATTACK INTENDING TO BLAME IT ON FORMER MILITIA OR THAT SOME FORMER MILITIA ELEMENT STAGED THE ATTACK IN THE HOPE OF INDUCING THE GOVERNMENT TO OVER REACT. EITHER POSSIBILITY COULD BE PLAUSIBLY ARGUED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE MAJORITY POPULATION IN THIS SECTOR IS ALREADY DISAFFECTED BY FEAR AND THUS THERE WOULD BE LITTLE TO GAIN FOR FORMER RGF OR MILITIA ELEMENTS FROM AN ATTACK SUCH AS THIS AT THIS TIME. MOREOVER, IF THE CAMPS ARE CLOSED AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK, THE FORMER GOVERNMENT FACTION STANDS TO LOSE A VALUABLE BASE OF OPERATIONS INSIDE RWANDA. THE HARDLINERS IN THE RPA, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD LITTLE TO LOSE AND MUCH TO GAIN FROM THIS ACTION. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, IT IS JUST TOO GOOD AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER REPRESSIVE MEASURES.

6. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS EVENT OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED VERY SERIOUSLY. IN THE COMING WEEKS, UNAMIR SHOULD MONITOR ACTIONS OF ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT CAREFULLY TO OBSERVE WHICH WAY THEY DECIDE TO MOVE. IT IS VERY POSSIBLY THE FIRST STEP IN A POWER GRAB BY HARDLINERS. IT IS ALSO OMINOUS THAT THE PREFET SHOULD BELONG TO THE SAME PARTY AND COME FROM THE SAME AREA AS M. GATABAZI, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED LAST YEAR AT ABOUT THIS TIME.

for *PC Hussain, May*
S.A. HASNAIN
COL
SECT CDR

FEB 26 1995

UN RESTRICTEDUNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

TO : TEAM LEADERS OF SEC 6

DATE 25 FEB 1995

INFO : FORCE HQ (OPS BR), MILOB GP HQ (OPS BR)

FROM : KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HQ

SUBJECT : WEEKLY TASK TABLE FOR THE TEAMS OF KIGALI MILOB SECTOR
PERIOD : 27 FEB - 5 MAR 1995

	MON 27 FEB	TUE 28 FEB	WED 1 MAR	THU 2 MAR	FRI 3 MAR	SAT 4 MAR	SUN 5 MAR
KM 1			D AREA		D AREA		
KM 2		E AREA		B AREA		E AREA	
KM 3	A AREA		G AREA		A AREA	G AREA	
KM 4	C AREA		C AREA	C AREA		C AREA	
KM 5		F AREA		F AREA	F AREA		QRT

1. LETTERS ARE TO SHOW THE FOLLOWING COMMUNES :

- A - NYARUGENGE, - B - KACYIRU, - C - KICUKIRO, - D - GIKOMERO,
- E - RUBUNGO, - F - KANOMBE, - G - BUTAMWA.

2. - VEH No 1121 (KM-1) IS ON "C" MAINTENANCE SINCE 22 FEB 95.

3. KM 2 WILL PATROL BY VEH No 800 ON 28 FEB, BY VEH No 1121 ON 2 AND ON 4 MAR 95.

- KM 5 WILL PATROL BY VEH No 1031 ON 28 FEB, BY VEH No 1121 ON 2 AND ON 3 MAR 95.

- KM 5 IS TO BE QRT BY VEH No 800 ON 5 MAR 95.

4. TLDRS ARE TO SUBMIT REPORTS ON PATROL USING THE FORM ISSUED BY FHQ.

802 OPS 1

03/3

 PETROUNOVSKI A.
 MAJOR
 OPS OFFR
UN RESTRICTED

27/2

 27/2
 8020PS1