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NOTES FOR THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

17 January 1980

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NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

A new initiative for progress in the Cyprus negotiations

1. The object of this paper is to analyze the progress of our efforts to arrange for the resumption of the intercommunal talks early in 1980. These efforts have followed the broad lines of the Secretary-General's "approach" as outlined in paragraphs 48-50 of his latest report to the Security Council (attached); this in turn is based on the "ideas" that were explored in August 1979 with the two sides, were rejected by both, and were later accepted by Turkey (and, reluctantly, by Denktash) during the Assembly session. The Turkish side has informed us that their acceptance of the Secretary-General's approach still stands.
2. The basic idea of the Secretary-General's approach would be to dispose of "bi-zonality" and "security of the Turkish Cypriot community" in a statement to be made by the representative of the Secretary-General at the opening meeting of the resumed talks. This statement would refer to the fact that these two terms had been used by both sides to describe their initial (1977-78) proposals; thus, the additional meanings - unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots - that were attached to these terms by the Turks later in 1978 and in 1979 would be ignored. The representative of the Secretary-General would then say that these concepts would be dealt with in the context of discussions on the concrete items outlined in the 10-point accord of 19 May 1979, and he would provide an agenda of four topics based on that accord which the parties would be invited to discuss concurrently (at successive meetings). Committees could be set up in due course by agreement between the interlocutors.
3. The adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 34/30 of 20 November 1979 has affected the context of our consultations, since the resolution has entrusted the Secretary-General with the responsibility of reporting to the Assembly by 31 March 1980 whether progress has been achieved at the talks. Failure to achieve progress would lead to the setting up of a "Committee on Cyprus," a prospect which has motivated the Turkish side to push for the speedy resumption of the talks, and to accuse the Greek Cypriots of procrastination. However, this particular motivation may cease to influence the Turkish side after 31 March. It may be added that recent developments in the broader area have tended to strengthen the Turkish position in relation to the western powers, and may have caused the Turks to approach negotiations on Cyprus with greater confidence than they did in the past.
4. A recent flurry of statements by Denktash on reopening the hotels in Varosha appeared, at first sight, to dim the prospects of resuming meaningful negotiations. We therefore conveyed

warnings to the Turkish side that any ill-considered changes in the status quo at Varosha would adversely affect the prospects of resuming the talks. We also instructed the Special Representative in Nicosia to initiate inquiries with the new Turkish Ambassador there, Mr. Batu. The latter readily confirmed that the Turkish position concerning Varosha was unchanged, and he even referred in this connexion to Denktash's offer of 20 July 1978. He intimated that if the talks were resumed, "nobody would think of opening those hotels." The Ambassador also adopted a relatively conciliatory position about the resumption of talks: the problems of bi-zonality and security should be disposed of, preferably on the basis of the 23 August "ideas," but these would not have to be followed literally and could if necessary be reworded. The Turkish Cypriot side, he said, would accept dealing with the four substantive items in rotation and might not insist on the early establishment of committees.

5. The Greek Cypriot position is somewhat more complicated, having been affected by discord between the parties comprising President Kyprianou's coalition. For example, the Lyssarides socialists have been generally opposed to the intercommunal talks and prefer to pursue "internationalization." The Communists have strongly favoured resumption of the talks and meaningful negotiations, perhaps because they are apprehensive that a continuing deadlock would lead to eventual partition of Cyprus and its "NATO-ization" under the control of Greece and Turkey. The Greek Cypriots have at times seemed intent on delaying the resumption of the talks, so as to bring about the establishment of the Assembly's Committee on Cyprus. They seem to fear that, without this committee, Turkish interest in future progress would wane after 31 March. More recently, however, the Greek Cypriots have been much affected by the Turkish threat to reactivate the Varosha hotels. The situation is viewed so seriously that Mr. Clerides has agreed to re-join the National Council. The Greek Cypriots now profess to be genuinely eager to resume the talks. On 15 January, the Cyprus Government announced its readiness to improve relations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities by offering to resume payment of Social Security benefits, and to permit Turkish Cypriots to seek employment or attend certain schools in the Government-controlled area. (On 15 January Denktash issued a statement reacting favourably to some of these overtures and proposing talks under United Nations auspices to implement them).

6. On 8 January 1980, Foreign Minister Rolandis confirmed to Galindo-Pohl that his side rejected the "ideas" of 23 August 1979; instead he put forward certain points the language of which was not too far removed from the revised "approach" as outlined in the Secretary-General's report. According to Galindo-Pohl, the Greek Cypriots "might be open to concessions that were unthinkable a few months ago" and would eventually be prepared to accept a statement along the lines of the Secretary-General's "approach."

7. It is understood that the Greek Government has been quietly urging the Cyprus Government to be more forthcoming about the resumption of the talks. On 12 January, Prime Minister Karamanlis publicly urged the Greek Cypriots to avoid a repetition of the "missed opportunities" of the past. This remark caused dismay in Nicosia.

8. As of now, we are endeavouring to reach agreement, here and in Nicosia, on the main outlines of the proposed "opening statement," with the object of overcoming the hurdles that brought the talks to a halt in June 1979. The draft of such a statement is attached. We do not plan to hand it to the parties at this stage, but rather to discuss it with them orally.

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9. We have consistently taken the position that the mere resumption of the talks by 31 March will not be sufficient to justify a report by the Secretary-General that "progress" has been achieved. Before resuming the talks, the Secretary-General would wish to receive assurances (a) that the parties are prepared for concrete and substantive negotiations, (b) that there will be some forward movement on at least some of the items of the 4-point agenda prior to 31 March, and (c) that serious negotiations will continue after 31 March.

10. In this connexion, it again seems evident that the best chances of progress are in relation to concrete measures on the ground, namely, the resettlement of Varosha and "practical measures to promote a return to normal conditions" (points 5 and 6 of the 19 May accord). We are therefore planning to go to the talks with a tentative package of simultaneous initial steps, along the following lines:

(a) Resettlement of Sector A of Varosha (the hotel strip along the beach) under United Nations auspices, as part of the UNFICYP-controlled buffer zone, but without prejudice to subsequent agreement on including additional sectors of the town in the resettlement scheme;

(b) Derestriction in the economic/administrative fields by measures such as the following:

(i) payment of Social Security benefits to Turkish Cypriots (already proposed by the Cyprus Government and accepted by Denktash);

(ii) arrangements for issuing travel documents to Turkish Cypriots;

(iii) arrangements for movement of tourists and others across the cease-fire lines;

(iv) arrangements for using the Turkish Cypriot airfield at Ercan, perhaps initially by non-IATA affiliated airlines.

11. It is conceivable that in order to obtain the assurances mentioned in paragraph 9 above and commitments for movement on the substantive items listed in paragraph 10, it would be advisable for Mr. Perez de Cuellar to undertake visits to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia prior to the commencement of the talks.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 January 1980

ANNEX I

PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION

1. The objective of the current initiative of the Secretary-General would be:

- (a) to arrange for the resumption of the intercommunal talks by disposing of the obstacles which brought the talks to a halt last June ("bi-zonality" and "Turkish Cypriot security");
- (b) to secure assurances from the parties that there will be concrete movement on Varosha and on economic "derestrictions" if possible before 31 March, and that substantive negotiations will continue after 31 March 1980;
- (c) to report to the General Assembly by 31 March on the progress achieved.

2. 21 - 31 January 1980

- (a) Mr. Galindo-Pohl in Cyprus and Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar in New York will inform the parties of the Secretary-General's intention to call for the resumption of the intercommunal talks for the second part of February;
- (b) Mr. Galindo-Pohl will present orally to both sides the draft statement (see annex II) to be made at the opening meeting of the talks by the representative of the Secretary-General. The text will not be handed at this stage to the parties and it will be made clear that though their comments will be taken into account to the extent possible, the text is not for negotiation. It will also be made clear that the interlocutors would be expected simply to note the statement of the representative of the Secretary-General. This stage of the preparations should last no more than two weeks.

(c) The views of the sides will be sought on the procedure of the discussions. It will be suggested that following the opening statement, the two negotiators will address themselves substantively to the four agenda items. There will be four meetings a week (one a day), one for each item under consideration. The talks will then be adjourned for a short period, viz. 10 to 15 days, during which time informal consultations will be carried out on Varosha and "initial practical measures to promote a return to normal conditions". A new session of four meetings will then take place. If the talks start by mid-February, there will be time enough for three formal sessions before the end of March. This procedure will allow also, at a later stage, longer recesses between the formal meetings to allow for committees and expert consultations without interrupting the negotiating process.

3. 4 - 16 February 1980

- (a) A visit by Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar to the area will be considered in order to obtain from the parties the necessary assurances as to their readiness to proceed with concrete negotiations on points 5 and 6 of the 19 May agreement. We will be prepared to provide a package of specific suggestions in this regard.
- (b) In Nicosia Mr. Galindo-Pohl will continue consultations with the parties on the procedural arrangements.

4. 19-20, 21, 22 February 1980

The intercommunal talks will resume in Nicosia under the auspices of the Secretary-General or his representatives. The interlocutors will be asked not to make public statements following the meetings. A statement will be issued by the United Nations spokesman at the conclusion of each meeting or of the four-meeting session.

Draft opening statement by the representative of the Secretary-General

I note that the recess in the intercommunal talks which I announced, in consultation with the parties, on 22 June 1978, has at long last come to an end, and that the talks are now resuming in order to continue the search for a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. It is the Secretary-General's intention to pursue the negotiating process in the framework of the good offices mission entrusted to him by the Security Council, and on the basis of the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979. According to that agreement, the talks are to be carried out "in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay." This can only be achieved with the co-operation of the parties, and I wish to convey to you the Secretary-General's appeal for your co-operation to this end.

In his last report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that he continued to hold to the view that the intercommunal talks held under his auspices, if properly used, represent the best available method for negotiating a political settlement based on the legitimate rights of the two communities. The Secretary-General added the following cautionary note, which I consider it important to recall at this time:

"However, we must face the fact that after nearly five years of intermittent talks, the credibility of this negotiating method hangs in the balance. It may be further impaired if the parties fail yet again to get down to concrete negotiations, or worse yet, if they reach agreements only to have those agreements unravel when the time comes to implement them. The intentions of the parties in this regard will be tested when, as I hope, the talks are resumed."

With this in mind, the Secretary-General and his representatives have over the past several months engaged in intensive consultations with all

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concerned with a view to overcoming the difficulties that had brought the negotiating process to a halt last June. I should like to outline the Secretary-General's understanding of the common ground that was worked out in the course of those consultations, making it possible to resume the talks at this time:

- (a) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979.
- (b) It is on record that both parties in the past submitted proposals which they described as providing a "bizonal" territorial arrangement in respect of the bicommunal federal system that is referred to in the Markarios/Denktaş guidelines. Both parties have indicated that the matter of the security of the Turkish Cypriot community as well as the security of Cyprus as a whole and of all its citizens, will be duly taken into account by the interlocutors during the negotiations. The practical application of both these concepts will be dealt with in the context of the substantive consideration of the constitutional and territorial aspects and will be reflected in the substantive positions and proposals of the parties concerning the various items of the agenda.

Concerning the matters to be discussed, the Secretary-General understands, on the basis of the 19 May agreement, that these will include the following subjects:

- (a) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;
- (b) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance

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with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;

(c) Constitutional aspects;

(d) Territorial aspects.

Concerning procedure, it is understood that the four items listed above should be dealt in rotation at consecutive meetings. At an appropriate early stage, committees or working groups may be set up by the interlocutors.

ANNEX III

48. Having examined the above documents, I noted that both parties had reaffirmed the 19 May agreement, which in its point 2 sets forth the basis for the talks as being the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question. Both parties had, in the past, submitted proposals which they had described as providing a "bi-zonal" territorial arrangement for a bi-communal federal system, and both had indicated that the matter of security could be dealt with in the intercommunal talks. It therefore appeared to me that there might be sufficient common ground to leave the substance of these points to be negotiated by the interlocutors in the context of the concrete aspects of a settlement based on the 19 May accord. Finally, I noted that both parties had appealed to me for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.

49. Turning to an examination of the 19 May agreement, I arrived at the conclusion that this document plainly indicated the matters-with which the talks were to deal, namely:

- (a) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;
- (b) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;
- (c) Constitutional aspects;
- (d) Territorial aspects.

50. Concerning procedure, I considered that the two sides might reasonably agree that the four items listed above should be dealt with concurrently, subject to

the priorities mentioned in the 19 May accord. At an appropriate early stage committees or working groups could be set up by the interlocutors.

Copy to [unclear]

27 September 1979

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NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. Following the recess of the intercommunal talks, consultations took place in Nicosia and New York in an effort to resolve the problems of bi-zonality and security. The Greek Cypriots stated that they would accept bi-zonality in the sense that the proposed Cyprus Federation would consist of two constituent parts (but not in the sense of accepting in advance the Turkish idea of separation). The Greek Cypriots also conceded that security could be discussed during the talks. This position was not satisfactory to the Turkish Cypriot side. However, Mr. Denktash would not explain what "bi-zonality" meant in his view.
2. On 30 July, Mr. Denktash put forward a proposal for the resumption of the talks in which he asked the Greek Cypriots to reaffirm Mr. Christofides' statement on bi-zonality of 1977 and to accept the establishment of committees. On 2 August Mr. Denktash reaffirmed the validity of the 19 May accord, and stated that his proposal was in the framework of that accord. On 2 August Mr. Ioannides put forward an aide memoire reaffirming the position of his side, including the acceptance of "bi-zonality" in the sense of having a federation of two parts. Both sides called for the resumption of the talks.
3. We thereupon prepared a paper proposing to resume the talks with an agenda of four items, which would be dealt with concurrently. However, it was not possible to reach agreement on this matter. The artificial differences on "bi-zonality" were maintained, and Mr. Kyprianou now refused to acknowledge that the paragraph 3 of the 1977 guidelines referred to the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriot community. He also refused to have "initial practical measures by both sides to promote...the return to normal conditions" negotiated in the framework of the talks.
4. During the summer, the Greek Cypriots, began to mount a broad-gauged political offensive in international fora. In this connexion, the Turks pointed out that the Greek Cypriot campaign was already launched in Colombo, shortly after the May high-level meeting, and before difficulties arose in the intercommunal talks.
5. Through July and August the representatives of the Secretary-General urged the Turkish side to facilitate the resumption of the talks, on the grounds that this was the only way to de-fuse the gathering Greek Cypriot campaign in international fora. This argument did not prove effective. At the same time, repeated appeals were made to the Greek Cypriots for restraint in their political offensive. These appeals were not heeded, and strong pro-Greek Cypriot resolutions were adopted in Lusaka and Havana. The same is bound to happen at the General Assembly unless progress is made with regard to

the intercommunal talks. The Turkish side complains that the Greek Cypriots are violating point 6 of the 19 May accord, ("It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks..."). The Greek Cypriots say that the Turkish Cypriots refused to implement the accord, with particular reference to point 5 (priority for Varosha). Thus the parties are caught in a vicious circle, which can only be broken if the talks are resumed.

6. The idea of having the interlocutors come to New York for consultations was designed to provide an opportunity to the parties to overcome the obstacles that have made it impossible to proceed with the talks on the basis of the 19 May accord (no invitation has so far been extended; the Secretary-General is merely exploring the willingness of the parties to come). The Greek Cypriots have accepted the suggestion, although they expressed serious concern that the idea was simply designed to frustrate their efforts to obtain a strong resolution in the General Assembly.

Never Again

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONVERSATION
WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU (HAVANA, SEPTEMBER 1979)

1. Both sides have in the past accepted the concept of a solution of the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bi-zonal federation. It is not helpful for the Cyprus Government to go back on this commitment. Nor does it make sense to argue that the acceptance of a bi-zonal solution would be tantamount to accepting the Turkish interpretation of that term. The Greek Cypriot side can safely accept the term "bi-zonal" while specifying that its full meaning remains to be negotiated during the talks.
2. The Secretary-General and his colleagues distinctly remember that paragraph 3 of the 1977 guidelines (which refers to "certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community") referred to the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots. This was clearly understood by both Makarios and Denktash; President Kyprianou, who was not present, is in no position to question that fact.
3. The passage of point 6 of the 19 May 1979 accord referring to "initial practical measures by both sides to promote...the return to normal conditions" is clearly meant to be negotiated within the framework of the intercommunal talks. It is not helpful for the Greek Cypriot side to attempt to exclude that subject from the agenda of the talks. Indeed, carefully negotiated arrangements under this point are the only available quid pro quo for obtaining Turkish consent to the resettlement of Varosha.

2.

4. The "draft memorandum" is a fair and balanced basis for the resumption of the talks, and it is in the interest of the Greek Cypriots to let the negotiating process go forward as soon as possible. It is therefore most important to exercise restraint in international fora, and to avoid any actions likely to complicate the Secretary-General's task under his mission of good offices.

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The recess in the Cyprus intercommunal talks
and the problem of resuming the negotiations

PART III

1. The current impasse over the resumption of the intercommunal talks in Cyprus has not yet been resolved. The Greek Cypriot side started its broad-gauged offensive in international fora on the occasion of the Commonwealth meeting. The resolution adopted in Lusaka has been considered a "success" for Mr. Kyprianou's administration. A strongly pro-Greek Cypriot draft resolution has been tabled at the non-aligned conference in Havana. President Kyprianou has indicated publicly and privately his side's determination to take its case before the General Assembly and also to the Security Council. For its part, the Turkish Cypriot side is accusing the Greek Cypriots of having violated point 6 of the May accord, but Mr. Denktash and his colleagues, as well as Ankara, have not done much to counteract the Greek Cypriot position in Lusaka or at the Havana Conference, and view with equanimity the adoption of anti-Turkish resolutions.
2. Following the presentation of the Turkish Cypriot proposals for the resumption of the intercommunal talks on 30 July as well as Mr. Denktash's statement of 2 August, and the presentation of the Greek Cypriot aide-mémoire to Mr. Galindo-Pohl on 2 August, we have endeavoured to look for a common denominator between the two sides on the basis of which the Secretary-General could call for a reconvening of the intercommunal talks. The latest version of the draft memorandum, on which the parties are being sounded out in Nicosia, is attached to this paper.

3. The first difficulty stems from the fact that Mr. Denktash, having insisted on the use of the word "bizonality" ever since the June round of the intercommunal talks, has subsequently expanded on the meaning of it and therefore raised the level of inflexibility. In his proposal of 30 July, Denktash ascribes to it only a geographical meaning, as done by the then Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Christophides, in 1977. Now, however, Mr. Denktash refers also to the constitutional implications of the term; in effect this would require the Greek Cypriots to accept in advance a term whose meaning is subject to indefinite expansion.

4. Mr. Kyprianou, on his side, seems unable to accept that the text of the third guideline of 12 February 1977, i.e. "certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community", refers in fact to the problem of security. As shown by our records, the late Archbishop Makarios specifically agreed that guideline 3 referred to Turkish Cypriot security.

5. In order to protect the role of the Secretary-General in his attempts to resume the intercommunal talks, which were recessed by his Representative on 22 June, all the members of the Security Council have been briefed and have expressed support for the new efforts. The démarches made in Ankara by Governments who strongly support the initiative of the Secretary-General, have created some uneasiness on the Turkish side, but have produced no concrete results. Indeed, it appears that the Turkish Government has not informed Mr.

Denktash or Ambassador Onhon about these approaches.

6. The Greek Cypriot determination to proceed with their militant attitude in international fora was reaffirmed by Ambassador Mavrommatis on 22 August. It appears that the Greek Cypriot side does not see the possibility of fruitful negotiations within the next four months. On the other hand, the posture of the Turkish side over the last few weeks has not been very encouraging. Turkish diplomacy has been passive in New York, and has made no particular efforts at counteracting the activities of the Greek Cypriot side. Mr. Egevit's party's uncertain prospects in the forthcoming partial elections in mid-October may have a bearing on the overall Turkish attitude vis-à-vis attempts to resume the negotiating process.

7. We are now going to suggest to the parties that they could either a) specify the meaning of the concepts of bizonality and security, or, b) accept the term "bizonal" without prejudice to the meaning ascribed to it by either side pending negotiation of the constitutional and territorial issues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26 July 1979

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NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The recess in the Cyprus talks and the problem
of resuming the negotiations

Part II

1. Unless the current impasse over the resumption of the intercommunal talks in Cyprus is resolved, there is a serious prospect that the Greek Cypriots will mount a broad-gauged offensive in international fora, accusing the Turkish side of reneging on the 19 May accord. The Greek Cypriot press has been urging the Government to bring the matter to the Security Council, either before or after the non-aligned summit meeting in Havana. The Turks are likely to respond by accusing the Greek Cypriots of having violated point 6 of the May accord, and this may precipitate a further deterioration of the situation or even a breakdown of the negotiating process. Significantly, Mr. Denktash has again started making public references to a unilateral declaration of independence.

2. The present situation comprises two sets of difficulties. One concerns the ostensible negotiating positions of the parties, their political problems and possible approaches to overcoming the differences and resuming serious talks. The other, which may be even more important, concerns the question whether the parties are, in fact, in a position to continue the search for a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem and prepared to assume binding commitments, through the intercommunal talks or otherwise.

Approach to a resumption of talks

3. In examining the negotiating positions, it is evident that the key difficulty relates to the resettlement of Varosha, precisely because the 19 May accord assigned priority to reaching agreement on it. The Turkish side

seems to consider that once this process is embarked upon, it could easily become irreversible, exposing Ecevit to the criticism that he was prepared to give up Varosha while getting nothing in return from the Greek Cypriots. It appears that Ecevit and Professor Soysal had this in mind when they decided to insist on a lengthy discussion - "if need be forever" - of point 2 in order to circumvent the inconvenient requirements of point 5.

4. There is however another and more constructive way of dealing with Mr. Ecevit's problem - namely, to offer the Turkish side a visible quid pro quo for Varosha. This is readily available in point 6 of the 19 May accord, which provides that "special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions." Mr. Galindo-Pohl has been asked to explore whether the Turkish side, which accepted this approach in March, would still agree to it now. This might present the advantage of placing the Secretary-General in a more balanced position vis-à-vis the two sides while at the same time adhering to the letter and spirit of the 19 May agreement.

5. Even if the parties accept this approach, there will still be the problem of what to do about the position of the Turkish side concerning point 2. There are certain indications (e.g. Ambassador Esenbel's assurances given to Secretary of State Vance on 13 July) that Ankara may be prepared to drop the broader demands relating to point 2 and content itself with an understanding concerning "bi-zonality" and "security". We are therefore pursuing the idea of a "statement" to be made at the talks stipulating

that:

(a) a settlement will involve two areas, one under Greek Cypriot and the other under Turkish Cypriot control, and that the relationship between them, their size and the type of line to be drawn between them will be for the negotiators to determine within the framework of the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Federation; and

(b) the settlement will provide for the security of both communities.

This would permit the Turkish side to claim that they only agreed to proceed to points 5 and 6 because they had received satisfaction on the questions of "bi-zonality" and "security".

6. It is quite possible of course that the Turkish side will feel unable to consider any of the above suggestions for resuming effective intercommunal negotiations before the partial elections scheduled for October. To meet this problem it may be necessary to devise a mutually acceptable holding tactic to freeze the situation for the next three months, while continuing as from August the process of informal consultations and even informal meetings between the interlocutors.

Suggested Course of Action

7. The viability of the approach outlined in the above paragraphs, or of any other approach, is of course contingent on the willingness of the parties to continue to seek a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem. Any soundings in this regard will have to involve Ankara directly, in order to avoid a repetition of our experience following the high level meeting of May 1979, when Ecevit simply overruled the agreement entered into by Denktash. This experience tends to raise the problem whether binding commitments on Cyprus can be secured at this time from the Turkish side, by way of the intercommunal talks or otherwise.

8. In the light of all the circumstances, it seems evident that the fundamental issues concerning the future of the Cyprus negotiating process can only be clarified at a high level in Ankara. A visit to that capital by Mr. Perez de Cuellar would therefore seem indicated. The timing of such a visit would of course have to be considered very carefully, having in mind that the Turkish Government is unlikely to welcome any move that could be interpreted as making Ankara responsible for the present difficulties. This would make it all the more important to arrange for a visit to Athens immediately after the visit to Ankara. It will be recalled that the Greek Government displayed a certain lack of enthusiasm about such a visit when the matter was broached prior to the high level meeting of last May.

9. In addition to the suggested visits to Ankara and Athens, it will be necessary to preserve certain forms by approaching the parties in Cyprus as well. The Secretary-General may wish to consider an appeal to Kyprianou and Denktash in which he would call for a resumption of negotiations and put forward a formula along the lines mentioned in paragraph 5 above. The appeal to Denktash could be incorporated in a reply to the latter's letter of 28 June, in which the Turkish Cypriot leader commented at length on "bi-zonality", "security" and the necessity of agreeing on point 2 of the 19 May accord.

10. An appeal to President Kyprianou could also serve as a vehicle for urging the Greek Cypriots to show statesmanship and farsightedness by moderating their actions over the next few months in international fora. We shall of course have to accept the fact that the adoption of a resolution in the non-aligned meeting in Havana is almost inevitable and that Cyprus will certainly be brought up in

the General Assembly as well, especially as it is already on the agenda. It may however be possible to induce the Greek Cypriots to moderate their efforts in this regard, especially if the Turkish side proves receptive to a resumption of serious talks.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9 July 1979

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERALThe recess in the Cyprus talks and the problem
of resuming the negotiations

1. The Cyprus negotiating process that was to have been based on the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979 bogged down almost as soon as it began. With the concurrence of the parties, Mr. Perez de Cuellar declared a recess in the talks on 22 June, and efforts to bridge the gulf between the parties and restart the talks in accordance with the 19 May accord have not been successful.
2. The recess in the talks has little if anything to do with the ostensible difficulty concerning "bi-zonality" and "security", since these concepts were in effect conceded by the Greek Cypriots long ago. There was even talk of solving the issue by an agreed statement that there would be "two areas" the relationship between which would be negotiated, and that the parties recognize the importance of the security of both communities. When this possibility emerged, the Turkish side further increased its demands by insisting on an exhaustive discussion, without time limitation, with a view to reaching agreement (or "narrowing the gap") on all the principles of the Makarios-Denktash guidelines, and on the applicability or non-applicability of UN resolutions, before point 5 (Varosha) of the 19 May accord could be tackled. This is tantamount to demanding that the Cyprus problem as a whole be solved as a precondition to the interlocutors tackling the substantive items of the 19 May accord. Incidentally, Denktash has now committed himself to his position publicly, and he has made it clear that he is opposed to any restart of the talks in July.
3. In response to the developments, President Kyprianou suggested on 29 June that the Secretary-General's representative reconvene the talks, giving priority to Varosha, as provided in the 19 May agreement. Subsequently, the Greek Cypriot interlocutor made certain suggestions to resolve the "bi-zonality" and "security" issue. On 6 July Rolandis on a personal basis went even further by hinting that the Greek Cypriots might be willing to waive the priority for Varosha, provided Turkey indicated its willingness to make a reasonable offer for an overall deal on the constitutional/territorial aspects. If (as is almost inevitable) the Turkish side turns down this suggestion, the Greek Cypriots will be in a position to insist on resumption of the talks with the sole object of exposing the Turkish position publicly. It was apparently Kyprianou's intention to send a letter to the Secretary-General to this effect

on 9 July. At our urgent request, he deferred this move to give the Secretary-General an opportunity to review the situation.

4. We have been exploring the possibility of enlisting diplomatic support to persuade the Turkish Government to adopt a more flexible position. Our tentative conclusion is that the chances of such support materializing in any effective form are slim. The action of the U.S. House of Representatives in rejecting the proposed \$50 million grant to Turkey has affronted Ecevit, who retaliated by banning American U-2 flights over Turkey (important for verification of the SALT treaty) and by bringing the Cyprus talks to a halt. An indirect link has thus been established between the Cyprus negotiations and SALT ratification. Faced with this choice, there is little doubt that the U.S. will opt for SALT and avoid irritating Turkey over Cyprus. Mr. Perez de Cuellar's conversations in Washington on 5 July tended to confirm that the Americans had no specific plans for action aimed at reviving the Cyprus talks, though they reiterated their readiness to support in Ankara any formula that may be developed by the Secretary-General.

5. In these circumstances, we must face the fact that, for the time being at least, there seems to be little prospect of productive intercommunal talks on the basis established during the high-level meeting of 18-19 May. This situation is likely to continue at least until the partial elections in Turkey scheduled for October 1979, and perhaps longer.

6. The Secretary-General's options in the face of this situation are limited and may be summed up as follows:

- (a) Submit a special report to the Security Council on developments since the 19 May agreement, covering the difficulties encountered in implementing that agreement and in generating a serious negotiating process.
- (b) Attempt to reconvene the talks, giving the Greek Cypriots the opportunity they seek to expose the Turkish side publicly (however, it has been our consistent position that the talks can only be convened in consultation with both sides and with their consent).
- (c) Freeze the talks until autumn, in the hope that continued consultations in Nicosia and New York will enable us to find a basis for the resumption of serious negotiations consistent with the 19 May accord. Such consultations could lead to the conclusion that the talks could only be resumed on the basis of a substantial modification (explicit or implicit) of

the 19 May accord, which would of course be very difficult for the Greek Cypriots to accept.

(d) Concentrate on diplomatic activity focused on Ankara, since it appears that the talks were halted following a specific decision of Prime Minister Ecevit and can only be restarted in a meaningful way by another decision from Ankara. In addition, the Secretary-General might address an appeal to Denktash, in reply to the latter's letter of 29 June (received 9 July), with a formal copy to the Permanent Representative of Turkey for the attention of his Government.

7. Of these options, (a) and (b) would mean, in effect, the end of the Secretary-General's good offices mission. It may be the case that (d) combined with (c) would offer the most practical approach. It would however require the co-operation of both parties; moreover, the Greek Cypriots may find it difficult to resist the temptation to exploit the recent developments on the international scene. On the other hand, there is still the possibility that Ecevit may be induced to consider reviving the Varosha resettlement idea in exchange for Greek Cypriot concessions under point 6 (economic deregistration).

8. It is of course conceivable that the October elections will produce no change in Turkey and that the difficulties with the U.S. will not be resolved, partly on account of Congressional resentment relating to Cyprus. The result might be continued impasse over the resumption of the talks. In that case, the Secretary-General may have to consider seriously whether to pursue his good offices mission. The consequence in the island would be a further consolidation of the status quo.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
SUGGESTIONS

17 January 1980

CONFIDENTIALSUMMARY*YES*The new initiative for the resumption
of the intercommunal talks

1. To obtain the resumption of the intercommunal talks, it will be necessary to dispose of those obstacles which brought the talks to a halt last June, namely "bi-zonality" and "Turkish Cypriot security". An appropriate statement by the representative of the Secretary-General which the two sides will approve or at least acquiesce in in advance, could be suggested.
2. The Secretary-General will wish to receive assurances from the parties beforehand (a) that the parties are prepared for concrete and substantive negotiations, (b) that there will be some forward movement on at least some of the items of the four-point agenda prior to 31 March, and (c) that serious negotiations will continue after 31 March. This would make it possible for the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly that there has been "progress" in the negotiations.
3. The best chances of progress in this regard may be found in a quid pro quo between the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices and "practical measures to promote a return to normal conditions" (points 5 and 6 of the 19 May accord). We will be prepared to provide a package of specific suggestions in this regard that Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar may possibly discuss in detail with the parties concerned in the course of a trip to the area at the beginning of February.
4. If preparations along these lines are successful, the intercommunal talks could resume in Nicosia during the second part of February.

CONFIDENTIAL

GLS/GP/JH/agm
18 October 1979

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. In the light of the situation in Turkey, as well as of the firm Greek Cypriot commitment to pursue their recourse to the General Assembly, it seems evident that it will not be possible to resume the intercommunal talks before the end of the year. On the other hand, inaction on the part of the Secretary-General until the end of the General Assembly debate on Cyprus entails some risks. Leaving the evolution of the matter to the manoeuvres of the parties might

- further undermine the basis for the intercommunal talks,
- further damage relations between the United Nations and the parties, and, above all,
- affect adversely the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

In the circumstances, the primary task at this juncture may well be to limit any such damage.

2. In this connexion, the Secretary-General may envisage making a move prior to the General Assembly debate with the object of safeguarding his role, keeping alive his earlier initiatives and avoiding a further worsening of the situation. Having this in mind, the Secretary-General may wish to outline in an appropriate manner his understanding of the status of the talks, and of such contentious issues as bi-zonality and security, perhaps with reference to our minutes of the Makarios-Denktaş meeting. He would also reaffirm his readiness to reconvene the intercommunal talks at an early date on the basis of the 19 May 10-point agreement.

3. The Secretary-General's move may take the form of a communication addressed to the parties and timed to permit a reference thereto in his report to the General Assembly.

Yes, please
preferably adequate
suggestions &

unity of the country, whether it was termed weak or strong. He agreed to a federal bi-communal state, but whether it should be bi-regional or multi-regional remained to be discussed. He doubted if the gap between the two percentages could be negotiated at the moment.

Mr. Denktash then suggested instructions be given to the negotiators. The first point was concerning the independent, non-aligned bi-zonal federal republic.

Archbishop Makarios explained that, for internal reasons, he was not in a position to accept the term "bi-zonal"; he pressed for the term "bi-communal". However, he understood that, in agreeing to the use of "bi-communal" in the first guideline Mr. Denktash had in mind the concept covered by the term "bi-zonal".

It was agreed to use the term "bi-communal" in the first guideline. The second question concerning the discussion of territory did not give rise to much discussion. The third point concerning the principles involved was discussed at great length.

Mr. Denktash wished to include a reference to security requirements, which was resisted by Archbishop Makarios. It was agreed in this context to use the phrase "taking into consideration certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community". On the fourth point concerning powers and functions of the central government, Mr. Denktash suggested a reference to the communal partnership. This was objected to by Archbishop Makarios, and it was eventually agreed to substitute "having regard to the bi-communal character of the State".

The text of the instructions was finally agreed as follows:

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.

4. The powers and functions of the central government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.

Mr. Denktash asked that the record should show that the words in point 3 "taking into consideration certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community", were a specific reference to the Turkish Cypriot preoccupation with security.

Resumption of talks

The Secretary-General said that since the negotiations would obviously take some time and he would not be able to attend during the whole process, he proposed giving his Special Representative a leading role in meetings with the two interlocutors. Under the Security Council resolution he would keep a watchful eye on developments and would be prepared to meet with Makarios and Denktash whenever necessary. The working negotiations should take place in a location to be agreed under the Special Representative, and the Secretary-General would intervene personally if necessary.

Archbishop Makarios suggested that the negotiations should take place in New York for several weeks and subsequently in Cyprus, returning to New York when a meeting under the Secretary-General's auspices was required. Mr. Denktash said he saw no reason why the Secretary-General should be involved unless there were difficulties. The negotiators should work in Cyprus and if difficulties arose a meeting with the Secretary-General and the two leaders could be held either in Cyprus or somewhere else, so that they could give further instructions to the negotiators. New York was too far away and too expensive and the Greek Cypriots had the advantage of

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1979 SEP 13 PM 4:50

TO: GALINDO-POHL, NICOSIA
FROM: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1979
NUMBER: 1092

1. In view of difficulties encountered in securing agreement on resumption of intercommunal talks, it is my intention to initiate a new effort to produce some movement in that direction, if possible prior to General Assembly debate on Cyprus. To this end, I propose to invite interlocutors to come to New York for a few days of informal consultations with Mr. Perez de Cuellar. Consultations would initially be held with parties separately, and, if developments warrant, jointly. Convenient dates would be between 8 and 19 October 1979.
2. We discussed this idea on 12 September with PermRep of Turkey, Cyprus Chargé and Atalay. Suggest you take it up soonest with both sides at appropriately high level.
3. For your confidential information, I plan to submit to parties during consultations new version of memorandum. We shall endeavour to secure their agreement to it as basis for re-starting talks.

BCW/jl/w

28 September, 1979

1- The idea put forward during the conversation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations Dr.Waldheim on 27 September 1979 was that the intercommunal talks would be started in Nicosia on the basis of the United Nations' suggestions submitted to Mr.Denktas in Nicosia on the 23rd of August by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General welcomed this idea by saying that it constituted a very good step.

2- The text of the suggestions presented to MR.Dentas on the 23rd of August is annexed to this paper.

3- It was clearly understood during the conversation between the Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Secretary-General of the United Nations that there would be no question of improving or ammending in any direction the 23rd of August text.

4- It was actually understood that initiatives would be directed to getting negotiations re-started in Nicosia on the basis of the said text and not to consultations on the wording of that text.

5- We expect, therefore , that such initiatives by the UN Secretary-General shall be taken immediately with both communities with a view to re-starting the intercommunal talks without any pre-consultation or pre-negotiation.

23 August 1979

A) Statement by Secretary General that both parties accept the validity of Denktas-Makarios and Denktas-Kipriyanu agreements.

B) Both parties have re-affirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a Bi-Zonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem.

C) Matters of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole.

D) The two sides are to deal with these matters:

1- Resettlement of Varosha under the auspices of the U.N. as laid down in point 5 of the 19th May Agreement.

2- Practical measures to be taken in accordance with point 6 of the 19th May Agreement.

3- Constitutional aspects

4- Territorial aspects.

It is understood that the matters listed above will be dealt with concurrently and at an appropriate early stage. Committees of working groups will be set up by interlocutors.

Pending the establishment of Committees or Working Groups, the Representative of the Secretary-General will normally call upon the interlocutors to discuss each of the above matters in the above order in consecutive meetings.

IMMEDIATE

27 Sept. 1979

UNFICYP 1535. PEREZ DE CUELLAR FROM GALINDO-POHL.

AAA: EXCERPTS FROM MR. DENKTASH'S STATEMENT OF 26 SEPTEMBER,
REPRODUCED IN SPECIAL NEWS BULLETIN OF 27: QUOTE:

THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS REPORTED TODAY THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT
NEGOTIATOR AT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS MR. IOANNIDES WOULD BE
GOING TO NEW YORK. ASKED BY REPORTERS THIS MORNING WHETHER THE
TURKISH CYPRIOT NEGOTIATOR WOULD ALSO GO TO NEW YORK, MR.
DENKTASH SAID: WE HAVE RECEIVED NO FORMAL REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT.
THE FACT THAT MR. KIPRIANOU ANNOUNCED AFTER HIS MEETING WITH MR.
WALDHEIM THAT HE WOULD SEND HIS NEGOTIATOR TO NEW YORK IS A
GREEK CYPRIOT TACTIC AND AIMS AT CREATING A FAIT ACCOMPLI. SINCE
THERE IS NO FORMAL REQUEST TO US IN THIS RESPECT, WE HAVE NO-
THING TO SAY ON THE MATTER. I SHALL RECEIVE MR. POHL ON FRIDAY.
I DO NOT THINK THAT HE WILL BRING US SUCH A FORMAL REQUEST. IF
HE DOES, WE SHALL CONVEY HIM OUR VIEWS. ASKED WHETHER HE SAW
ANY BENEFIT IN SENDING THE INTERLOCUTORS TO NEW YORK, HE REPLIED:

THE TASK OF THE INTERLOCUTORS IS TO CONDUCT THE TALKS IN
CYPRUS. TAKING THEM FROM CYPRUS WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE
PLACE TO NEW YORK IS MEANINGLESS. IF THERE IS ANY ISSUE WHICH
NEEDS CLARIFICATION, EXPLANATION, OR TO BE CLEARED, THIS SHOULD
BE DONE BETWEEN PEOPLE WHO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE INTERLO-
CUTORS. WE FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING THE INTER-
LOCUTORS TOGETHER IN NEW YORK. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED A FORMAL
REQUEST YET AS YOU KNOW, ONE OF THE ARTICLES (ARTICLE 10) OF THE
SUMMIT

AGREEMENT SPECIFIES THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS SHALL BE
HELD IN NICOSIA. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ARE CONTINUOUSLY AIMING AT
TAKING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM OUT OF NICOSIA. THE ISSUE MUST BE
TAKEN UP AND CONSIDERED WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK. ASKED WHETHER
THIS MEANT THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT INTERLOCUTOR WOULD NOT BE
SENT TO NEW YORK, HE SAID: THERE IS NOTHING FOR US TO ANNO-
UNCE SINCE NO FORMAL REQUEST HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO US.] UNQUOTE

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

26 September 1979

1. In accordance with the ten-point agreement of 19 May 1979, the intercommunal talks were resumed in Nicosia on 15 June 1979 under the auspices of Under-Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. At the suggestion of Mr. Perez de Cuellar and with the concurrence of the interlocutors, the talks went into recess after their fourth meeting on 22 June. It was announced that, following an assessment of the situation by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative would announce the date and time of the next meeting.
2. During the recess, the Special Representative, Mr. Galindo-Pohl, engaged in intensive consultations with the parties with a view to resolving the difficulties that had arisen in the talks.
3. On 30 July, Mr. Denktash handed to the Special Representative a proposal for resuming the intercommunal talks. On 2 August Mr. Denktash publicly reaffirmed the validity of the 19 May agreement, and stated that his proposal was within the framework of that agreement.
4. On 2 August, the Greek Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. Ioannides, handed to the Special Representative an aide-memoire setting forth the position of his side concerning the talks and appealing for their speedy resumption.
5. Having examined the above documents, the Secretary-General has noted that:
 - a) both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979, which provides in its point 2 that "the basis for the talks will be the Makarios/Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question";

- b) both parties have reaffirmed their support of a solution of the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bi-zonal federation, which is understood to mean a federation composed of two constituent parts. Both parties have in the past submitted proposals which they have described as providing for a bi-zonal solution. The modalities of a settlement of this kind will be for the interlocutors to negotiate;
 - c) both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks, in accordance with the guidelines and the 19 May agreement;
 - d) both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.
6. The Secretary-General considers that in accordance with the terms of the 19 May agreement the two sides are to deal with the following matters:
- a) reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;
 - b) initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;
 - c) constitutional aspects;
 - d) territorial aspects.
7. It is understood that the matters listed in para. 6 above will be dealt with concurrently. At an appropriate early stage committees or working groups will be set up by the interlocutors. Pending the establishment of committees or working groups, the representative of the Secretary-General will normally call upon the interlocutors to discuss each of the four matters in the above

order, and in rotation at consecutive meetings. At the end of each meeting the representative of the Secretary-General will prepare a statement summarizing the subjects discussed. The talks will be conducted in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding delays.

8. In the light of the above considerations, the Secretary-General has requested his Special Representative to invite the interlocutors to continue the intercommunal talks in Nicosia as from 1979.

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UNITED NATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
GLS/ins

1979 SEP 24 P 9:01

TO: GALINDO-PBML, NICOSIA
FROM: PEREZ DE CUELLAR
DATE: 24 SEPTEMBER 1979
NUMBER: UNFICYP 1147

- Chas
1. Your UNFICYP 1513 noted. Denktash is fully aware of legal status of Cyprus Government in UN and specialized agencies. He should also realize that UN Secretariat cannot interfere with decisions of UPU deliberative organ. If you have replied in writing to Denktash's letter of 7 September, we would appreciate receiving copy.
 2. Denktash's proposals of 1 September (UNFICYP 1333) obviously failed to meet criteria in paragraphs 3-4 of our 1031, in that Denktash was asking GkCyps to accept "bizonal federation" without specifying what "bizonal" meant. As Denktash knows, GkCyps have accepted "bizonal" provided it simply meant that federation would have two constituent parts.
 3. Denktash's complaint about GkCyp violation of point 6 of 19 May accord has considerable validity. SecGen has repeatedly appealed to both parties for restraint in their public statements and political moves. However, if SecGen were to inform UN members of violations of high level accord, he would also have to refer to positions adopted by parties concerning point 5 and related matters.

4. We have repeatedly explained to Turkish side this end that SecGen's efforts to restart talks were in great part motivated by desire to avert broad-gauged Greek Cypriot offensive in international fora. If SecGen's efforts had been supported during summer, it might have been possible to avert some of consequences at Lusaka and Havana. If TkCyps now agree to resume talks on basis of SecGen's suggestions, it might still be possible to reduce damage in GA.

5. It would be impossible for SecGen to invite interlocutors for consultations if Denktash considers that this would constitute "bad offices" and if he then made public statement "which would strain his community's relations with UN Secretariat." In any case, there is no possibility of moving talks to Nicosia since SecGen cannot leave UNHQ while Assembly is in session. However, consultations are meant to be purely informal; they would be within framework of SecGen's good offices mission, would have no relation whatever with Assembly proceedings, and would certainly not place GkCyps in "dominant position".

6. It may be possible that Denktash will, on further reflection, be in a better position to appreciate merits of SecGen's proposal. During morning 24 September, before receiving your 1513, Atalay after telephone conversation with Denktash quoted him as saying: "After evaluating Mr. Galindo-Pohl's report on his meeting with Mr. Denktash today, if the Secretary-General deems

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it advisable to invite the representatives of the two sides, the Turkish Cypriot side would be glad to accept the invitation." This afternoon, Turkish Mission intimated that in its view, SecGen should pursue his initiative. We shall further press our approach with Turkish Foreign Minister and PermRep this end.

7. You should therefore approach Denktash once again, explaining to him that if he maintains position in your para 4, SecGen would have to conclude that initiative had lost its object as result of TkCyp response. You should add that main purpose of proposed consultations is to provide opportunity to overcome differences about bizonality and facilitate restart of talks on basis of 19 May accord. As you know, SecGen's report to GA on Cyprus question is due toward end of October, and results of efforts to restart talks will be important element of that report.

8. Please request GkCyps to withhold public comment pending outcome current efforts.

FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF POINT 6 AT LUSAKA, HAVANA, AND NOW AT FORTHCOMING GA DEBATE ON CYPRUS, AND POINT 6, AND IT WAS DUTY OF UN SECRETARIAT TO INFORM UN MEMBERS OF THESE VIOLATIONS, OTHERWISE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD ONLY FEEL ENCOURAGED TO PROCEED ON THEIR PATH, WHICH WAS DESTROYING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. PROVOCATIVE ELECTION OF CYPRUS TO ONE OF GAS VICE-PRESIDENCIES HAD ADDED INSULT TO INJURY, SO HAD GREEK CYPRIOT +INTRIGUES+ TO GET UPU CONGRESS TO ADOPT ABOVE DECISION.

4. FOR ONAN TO GO TO NEW YORK WOULD PUT HIS COMMUNITY IN DIFFICULT POSITION= CONSULTATIONS AT UN HEADQUARTERS WOULD NOT BENEFIT TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY= THEREFORE, INVITATION WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE +GOOD OFFICES+ BUT +BAD OFFICES+. HOWEVER, IF SECRETARY GENERAL INSISTED ON HAVING ONAN COME TO NEW YORK HE MIGHT HAVE TO GO, BUT HIS SIDES SERIOUS MISGIVINGS OVER IT WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC, WHICH WOULD STRAIN, HE SAID, HIS COMMUNITYS RELATIONS WITH UN SECRETARIAT. DENKTASH EMPHASISED THAT IF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS UNDER YOU WERE CONSIDERED NECESSARY, THEN THEY SHOULD BE HELD IN NICOSIA, PHYSICALLY AWAY FROM UN ARENA WHERE, HE IMPLIED, GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE IN DOMINANT POSITION TO SCORE POINTS. DENKTASH WAS IMPERVIOUS TO ALL COUNTER-ARGUMENTS, REMAINING FIRM, ALTHOUGH DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD IN FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION HE ADDED THAT IF TALKS WERE TO BE RESUMED, GREEK CYPRIOT RECOURSE TO GA WOULD HAVE TO BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY, AS BOTH WERE ENTIRELY INCOMPATIBLE.

5. ANSWERING HIS QUESTION, I ADVISED HIM THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD ACCEPTED SECRETARY GENERALS PROPOSAL FOR INTERLOCUTORS TO GO TO NEW YORK DURING SPECIFIED TIME-FRAME.

6. DENKTASH WILL LEAVE FOR LONDON END OF THIS WEEK WHERE HE WILL SPEND FEW DAYS PRIVATELY WITH HIS FAMILY. HE WILL ARRIVE NEW YORK EVENING 5 OCTOBER FOR SOLE PURPOSE, HE SAID, OF ATTENDING ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND LEAVE NEW YORK FOR CYPRUS, EVENING 8 OR 9 OCTOBER. HE REITERATED THAT HE WAS NOT GOING FOR GA.
CORRECTION: PARA 3 PLS READ WELL.... POINT 6 OF 19 MAY ACCORD..

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•NICOSIA (UNFICYP) 320 061013

UNFICYP 1409. PEREZ DE CUELLAR FROM GALINDO POHL.

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENTS MADE ON 5 SEPTEMBER BY MR. ATAKOL AND
TKCYP SPOKESMAN:

AAA: QUOTE: ASKED BY REPORTERS TO COMMENT ON GREEK CYPRIOT
PRESS ALLEGATION THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE HAD REJECTED THE
LATEST WALDHEIM PROPOSALS. DR. ATAKOL SAID:

THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL DR. KURT WALDHEIM IS NOT SUBMITTING
PROPOSALS, BUT IN LINE WITH HIS GOOD OFFICES MISSION HE IS
MAKING SOUNDINGS. WE ARE TRYING TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO
THESE SOUNDINGS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF REALITIES. MR. WALDHEIM
HAS NOT MADE NEW PROPOSALS AND THEREFORE ANY REJECTION OF THE
NEW PROPOSAL IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE
IS DOING THIS AND SPREADING IT FOR SHEER PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

UNQUOTE:

BBB: QUOTE: ASKED BY CORRESPONDENTS TO REPORT ON THE DRAFT
RESOLUTION ON CYPRUS REPORTEDLY PREPARED AT HAVANA, MR. ATAKOL
MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WHAT IS NEEDED FOR THE SOLUTION OF
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO ETHNIC
COMMUNITIES ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY. THE FRAMEWORK FOR THIS WAS
ESTABLISHED BY THE DENKTAS-MAKARIOS GUIDELINES AGREEMENT AND
FURTHER STRESSED BY THE DENKTAS-KIPRIANOU AGREEMENT. THE GREEK
CYPRIOT SIDE HAS NOT SINCERELY ADOPTED OUR EQUALITY AND OUR CO-
FOUNDER PARTNERSHIP STATUS AND A BIZONAL SYSTEM PROVIDING SAFETY
FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY, ALL CONFIRMED BY THE SUMMIT
MEETINGS, AND THIS IS WHY THEY ARE RUNNING AWAY FROM THE NEGO-
TIATING TABLE AND PREFERRING TO TOUR THE WORLD. WE ARE AWAITING
TO SEE HOW MANY COUNTRIES THEY WILL DECEIVE IN HAVANA. THE OUT-
COME OF THE HAVANA MEETING WILL BE ASSESSED. UNQUOTE:

CCC: QUOTE: ASKED TO COMMENT ON GREEK CYPRIOT EFFORTS TO
REVIVE THE ISSUE OF MISSING PERSONS, THE SPOKESMAN SAID :
THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE INTENSIFIES THIS TYPE OF PROPAGANDA
ON THE EVE OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE ALWAYS STRESSED
OUR READINESS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
THE RESOLUTION UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS. IT IS THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WHICH RUNS AWAY
FROM THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND PREFERS PROPAGANDA INSTEAD.

UNQUOTE

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NICOSIA(UNFICYP) 011207Z SEPT 79

CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR
FROM GALINDO-POHL
DATE 1 SEPTEMBER 1979
NUMBER UNFICYP 1388

FURTHER UNFICYP 1370

1. DENKTASH ADVANCED MEETING TO MORNING 1 SEPTEMBER. ALSO PRESENT WERE ATAKOL, ONAN, ERTEKUN AND DSRSG.

2. AT OUTSET DENKTASH COMPLAINED ABOUT GREEK CYPRIOT VIOLATION OF POINT 6 OF 10-POINT ACCORD SEMICOLON THEIR CAMPAIGN OF INTERNATIONALIZATION, PARTICULARLY AT LUSAKA AND NOW AT HAVANA,

WAS SUCH FLAGRANT VIOLATION AND IMPEDIMENT TO RESUMPTION OF TALKS. IT WAS GREEK CYPRIOTS WHO WERE INTRANSIGENT AND NOT TURKISH CYPRIOTS, AND THIS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN SECGEN'S NEXT REPORT. DENKTASH ALSO WONDERED WHETHER SECRETARIAT HAD DRAWN GREEK CYPRIOTS' ATTENTION TO THESE VIOLATIONS OF POINT 6.

(UNFICYP 1387, AAA REFERS).

3. DENKTASH THEN PROPOSED FOLLOWING REWORDING OF PARA 5(B) OF 11 AUGUST DRAFT PAPER, AS AMENDED BY YOUR 994. QUOTE: BOTH PARTIES HAVE REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR A FEDERAL AND BIZONAL SOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM UNQUOTE. OR QUOTE: BOTH PARTIES HAVE REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF A BIZONAL FEDERATION UNQUOTE. DENKTASH REMARKED THAT SECGEN AT PRESS CONFERENCE IN VIENNA ON 15 FEBRUARY 1977 HAD USED SIMILAR TERMS, NAMELY QUOTE BIZONAL FEDERAL CONSTITUTION UNQUOTE.

4. POINT 5(C) AS AMENDED BY YOUR 994, IS ACCEPTABLE, PROVIDED LAST PHRASE QUOTE: AS WELL AS TO THE SECURITY OF CYPRUS AS A WHOLE UNQUOTE IS DELETED.

5. DENKTASH STRESSED THAT ABOVE PROPOSALS WERE MEANT TO BE COMPROMISE FOR QUICK RESUMPTION OF TALKS AND SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS QUOTE PERMANENT OFFERS UNQUOTE, IN OTHER WORDS, PROPOSALS WOULD LAPSE IF NOT ACCEPTED PROMPTLY.

6. DENKTASH WISHED IT TO BE MADE VERY CLEAR THAT FOUR COMMITTEES WOULD BE SET UP AND NOT LESS.

7. DENKTASH ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IF ABOVE PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED, NEGOTIATIONS UNDER POINT 2 OF 10-POINT ACCORD WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY CURTAILED AND QUOTE COMMITTEES WOULD BE SET UP

8. AT THIS JUNCTURE OF MEETING EYE BROUGHT TO DENKTASH'S ATTENTION PARA 5 OF YOUR 1031. ITS PARA B WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE, AS IN HIS VIEW, IT WAS ESSENTIALLY ALONG SAME LINES AS PREVIOUS DRAFT. ~~HOWEVER~~, YOUR C, PERTAINING TO SECURITY, WOULD BE CONSIDERED, ALTHOUGH, AS FIRST REACTION, HE PREFERRED SENTENCE TO END AFTER QUOTE GUIDELINES UNQUOTE.

9. EYE THEN CONVEYED TO DENKTASH SUBSTANCE OF PARAS 3 AND 4 OF YOUR 1031. WHILE ACCEPTING THAT QUOTE BIZONALITY UNQUOTE AND QUOTE SECURITY UNQUOTE COULD BE INTERPRETED DIFFERENTLY, HE RECALLED THAT FOR THAT VERY REASON THESE TERMS OUGHT TO BE FULLY CLARIFIED UNDER POINT 2. HOWEVER, IF HIS PROPOSALS UNDER PARAS 3 AND 4 ABOVE WERE ACCEPTED, SUCH DISCUSSION COULD NOW BE SHORTENED. HE WAS OPPOSED TO ALTERNATIVE THAT TERM QUOTE BIZONALITY UNQUOTE BE USED QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNQUOTE. THIS WOULD LEAD TO DISCUSSION OF POINT 5 WITHOUT ADEQUATE FOUNDATION.

10. FINALLY, EYE INFORMED DENKTASH OF GIST OF PARAS 1 AND 2 OF YOUR 1031. HE SAID THAT HE HAD, ABOVE ALL, BEEN ANGERED BY SERIES OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS, WHICH HE FOUND INCOMPATIBLE WITH GOOD OFFICES AND QUIET SHUTTLE. REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF BIASED NATURE OF PROPS, HE REQUESTED ERTEKUN TO REVIEW PROPOSALS IN LIGHT OF DOCUMENTS OF 30 JULY AND 2 AUGUST ENDALL

COL1 1979 1388 1370 1. 2. 6 10-POINT 6. 1387, AAA 3. 5(B) 11
994. 15 1977 4. 5(C) 994, 5. 6. 7. 2 10-POINT 8. 5 1031,
B C, 9. 3 4 1031. 2. 3 4 5 10. 1 2 1031. 30 24

NNNN

READ WELL IN 2. IT WAS GREEK CYPRIOTS WHO WERE INTRANSIGENT AND NOT TURKISH CYPRIOTS, ETC..

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

28 August 1979

1. In accordance with the ten-point agreement of 19 May 1979, the intercommunal talks were resumed in Nicosia on 15 June 1979 under the auspices of Under-Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. At the suggestion of Mr. Perez de Cuellar and with the concurrence of the interlocutors, the talks went into recess after their fourth meeting on 22 June. It was announced that, following an assessment of the situation by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative would announce the date and time of the next meeting.

2. During the recess, the Special Representative, Mr. Galindo-Pohl, engaged in intensive consultations with the parties with a view to resolving the difficulties that had arisen in the talks.

3. On 30 July, Mr. Denktash handed to the Special Representative a proposal for resuming the intercommunal talks. On 2 August Mr. Denktash publicly reaffirmed the validity of the 19 May agreement, and stated that his proposal was within the framework of that agreement.

4. On 2 August, the Greek Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. Ioannides, handed to the Special Representative an aide-memoire setting forth the position of his side concerning the talks and appealing for their speedy resumption.

5. Having examined the above documents, the Secretary-General has noted that:

- a) both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979, which provides in its point 2 that "the basis for the talks will be the Makarios/Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question";
- b) both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federation as provided in the guidelines, which is to be composed of two constituent parts that have been referred to as areas or zones, leading to a bi-zonal solution of the

territorial aspect. The modalities of a settlement of this kind will be for the interlocutors to negotiate within the framework of the constitutional and territorial aspects of the federation;

c) both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks, in accordance with the guidelines and the 19 May agreement.

d) both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks."

6. The Secretary-General considers that in accordance with the terms of the 19 May agreement the two sides are to deal with the following matters:

- a) reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;
- b) initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;
- c) constitutional aspects;
- d) territorial aspects.

7. It is understood that the matters listed in para. 6 above will be dealt with concurrently. At an appropriate early stage committees or working groups will be set up by the interlocutors. Pending the establishment of committees or working groups, the representative of the Secretary-General will normally call upon the interlocutors to discuss each of the four matters in the above order, and in rotation at consecutive meetings. At the end of each meeting the representative of the Secretary-General will prepare a statement summarizing the subjects discussed. The talks will be conducted in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding delays.

8. In the light of the above considerations, the Secretary-General has requested his Special Representative to invite the interlocutors to continue the intercommunal talks in Nicosia as from 1979.

ZCZC CSY 0218

SS NYK

NICOSIA (UNFICYP) 250 231134

P
UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS

1979 AUG 23 AM 9:21

UNFICYP 1338

CODE CABLE

TO : PEREZ DE CUELLAR

FROM: GALINDO-POHL

DATED 23 AUGUST 1979

NUMBER: UNFICYP 1338.

YOUR 1001.

1. MORNING 23 AUGUST, CALLED ON DENKTASH, IN PRESENCE OF ONAN, ERTEKUN AND D/SRSG.

2. DENKTASH NOTED PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PARAS.5(B) AND 5(C) AS WELL AS TO PARAS 6 AND 7, AND ADVISED THAT HE WOULD CONSULT HIS QUOTE CABINET UNQUOTE. ON ACCOUNT OF BAYRAM, THIS COULD HOWEVER NOT BE DONE BEFORE 29 AUGUST- HE COULD THEREFORE SEE ME ONLY ON 30 AUGUST.

3. HIS REACTION AND THAT OF HIS ADVISERS WERE NOT FAVOURABLE ON PARAS. 5(B) AND 5(C). THEY TOOK, IN PARTICULAR, EXCEPTION TO QUOTE BIZONALITY UNQUOTE BEING LIMITED TO TERRITORIAL ASPECT AND ALSO CONSIDERED THAT NEW PHRASEOLOGY DEPARTED FROM GUIDELINES, WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. RE PARA.5(C) , THEIR OBJECTIONS WAS THAT QUOTE SECURITY OF CYPRUS AS A WHOLE UNQUOTE WAS RELATED TO GUARANTEE QUESTION AND COULD NOT BE LINKED TO GUIDELINE 3, AS THIS WOULD VIOLATE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF GUIDELINES. DENKTASH EMPHASIZED THAT ROLANDIS RECENT REMARKS, THAT HIS SIDE WOULD ACCEPT TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF QUOTE SECURITY UNQUOTE OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS IF LATTER ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF QUOTE UNITARY STATE UNQUOTE SHOWED AGAIN GULF SEPARATING BOTH SIDES AND WAS FRESH INDICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOTS EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE GUIDELINES.

~~LEHMANN RESUMED HIS VIEWS ON PARAS. 5 AND 7.~~ 23 August 1979

5. RE YOUR 1001, PARA 1, AND YOUR 994, BBB PARA 3. MATTER WAS
DWELT ON, ON 22 AUGUST, BUT KYPRIANOU DID NOT ACCEPT THAT QUOTE
CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, ETC. UNQUOTE, AS UNDERSTOOD BY
TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE, HAD ANY RELEVANCE TO QUOTE SECURITY UNQUOTE.
BOTH HE AND ROLANDIS ARGUED THAT THIS TERM TOGETHER WITH QUOTE
B1-ZONALITY UNQUOTE, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD BE USED BY TURKISH CYPRIOT
SIDE TO BAR REFUGEES FROM RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES.
ENDALL.

COL 23 1979 1338 1001 1. 23 2. 5(B) 5(C) 6 7 29 30 3. 5(B) 5(C)
5(C) 3 4. 6 7 5. 1001 1 994 3 22

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REFERENCES AND NOTES

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1998-01-01 1998-01-01 1998-01-01 1998-01-01

19. *Leucosia* *leucostoma* *leucostoma* *leucostoma* *leucostoma*

1. *Georgian* 2. *French* 3. *Spanish* 4. *Portuguese* 5. *Italian*

上文引自《新編中華書局影印四庫全書》卷之三

CCW 2-54

W. J. G. VAN DER

- 1 -

卷之三

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

21 August 1979

1. In accordance with the ten-point agreement of 19 May 1979, the intercommunal talks were resumed in Nicosia on 15 June 1979 under the auspices of Under-Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. At the suggestion of Mr. Perez de Cuellar and with the concurrence of the interlocutors, the talks went into recess after their fourth meeting on 22 June. It was announced that, following an assessment of the situation by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative would announce the date and time of the next meeting.
2. During the recess, the Special Representative, Mr. Galindo-Pohl, engaged in intensive consultations with the parties with a view to resolving the difficulties that had arisen in the talks.
3. On 30 July, Mr. Denktash handed to the Special Representative a proposal for resuming the intercommunal talks. On 2 August Mr. Denktash publicly reaffirmed the validity of the 19 May agreement, and stated that his proposal was within the framework of that agreement.
4. On 2 August, the Greek Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. Ioannides, handed to the Special Representative an aide-memoire setting forth the position of his side concerning the talks and appealing for their speedy resumption.
5. Having examined the above documents, the Secretary-General has noted that:
 - a) both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979, which provides in its point 2 that "the basis for the talks will be the Makarios/Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question";
 - b) both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bizonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem;

- c) both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole;
- d) both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks."

6. The Secretary-General considers that in accordance with the terms of the 19 May agreement the two sides are to deal with the following matters:

- a) reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;
- b) initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;
- c) constitutional aspects;
- d) territorial aspects.

7. It is understood that the matters listed in para. 6 above will be dealt with concurrently. At an appropriate early stage committees or working groups will be set up by the interlocutors. Pending the establishment of committees or working groups, the representative of the Secretary-General will normally call upon the interlocutors to discuss each of the four matters in the above order, and in rotation at consecutive meetings. At the end of each meeting the representative of the Secretary-General will prepare a statement summarizing the subjects discussed. The talks will be conducted in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding delays.

8. In the light of the above considerations, the Secretary-General has requested his Special Representative to invite the interlocutors to continue the intercommunal talks in Nicosia as from 20 August 1979.

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

11 August 1979

1. In accordance with the ten-point agreement of 19 May 1979, the intercommunal talks were resumed in Nicosia on 15 June 1979 under the auspices of Under-Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. At the suggestion of Mr. Perez de Cuellar and with the concurrence of the interlocutors, the talks went into recess after their fourth meeting on 22 June. It was announced that, following an assessment of the situation by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative would announce the date and time of the next meeting.
2. During the recess, the Special Representative, Mr. Galindo-Pohl, engaged in intensive consultations with the parties with a view to resolving the difficulties that had arisen in the talks.
3. On 30 July, Mr. Denktash handed to the Special Representative a proposal for resuming the intercommunal talks. On 2 August Mr. Denktash publicly reaffirmed the validity of the 19 May agreement, and stated that his proposal was within the framework of that agreement.
4. On 2 August, the Greek Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. Ioannides, handed to the Special Representative an aide memoire setting forth the position of his side concerning the talks and appealing for their speedy resumption.
5. Having examined the above documents, the Secretary-General has noted that:
 - (a) both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979, which provides in its point 2 that "the basis for the talks will be the Makarios/Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the United Nations resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question";
 - (b) both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federation as

provided in the guidelines, which is to be composed of two constituent parts that have been variously referred to as areas or zones. The modalities of a settlement of this kind will be for the interlocutors to negotiate within the framework of the constitutional and territorial aspects of the federation;

(c) both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that the settlement will provide for the security of both communities.

(d) both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.

6. The Secretary-General considers that, in accordance with the terms of the 19 May agreement, the interlocutors are to negotiate on the following matters:

(a) reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;

(b) initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;

(c) constitutional aspects;

(d) territorial aspects.

7. It is understood that the four matters listed in paragraph 6 above will be dealt with concurrently, initially by the interlocutors, and at an appropriate early stage by setting up committees or working groups. Pending the establishment of committees or working groups, the representative of the Secretary-General will normally call upon the interlocutors to discuss each of the four matters in the above order, and in rotation at consecutive meetings. At the end of each meeting the representative of the Secretary-General will prepare a statement summarizing the subjects discussed. The talks will be conducted in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding delays.

8. In the light of the above considerations, the Secretary-General has requested his Special Representative to invite the interlocutors to continue the intercommunal talks in Nicosia as from 20 August 1979.

TURKISH CYPRIOT
POSITION

ZCZC CSY0193

SS NYK

NICOSIA (UNFICYP) 30 1118

UNFICYP 1201

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Recd:
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CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: PEREZ DE CUELLAR

FROM: GALINDO-POHL

DATE: 30 JULY 1979

NUMBER: UNFICYP 1201

1. MORNING 30 JULY, CALLED ON DENKTASH AT HIS REQUEST= MEETING WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY ATAKOL, ONAN AND D/SRSG.

2. DENKTASH PROPOSED FOLLOWING FOR RESUMING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS:

I. GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT:

A. RECONFIRMING CHRISTOPHIDES STATEMENT TO SECCO OF 31 AUGUST 1977 (S/PV.2026, PAGE 11), IN WHICH HE SAID INTER ALIA THE ACCEPTANCE OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM AND THE DECISION TO PRESENT A MAP AT VIENNA ON THE BASIS OF A BI-ZONAL SOLUTION OF THE TERRITORIAL ASPECT, WERE INDEED GREAT CONCESSIONS ON THE PART OF THE GREEK-CYPRIOT SIDE.

B. REAFFIRMING COMMITMENT TO 12 FEBRUARY 1977 GUIDELINES.

C. REAFFIRMING THAT CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH MAY ARISE FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN GUIDELINE 3 COVERS ALSO SECURITY.

II. ONCE ABOVE PUBLIC STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE BY GREEK CYPRIOTS, INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD FORMALLY RECONVENE FOR PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING FOUR COMMITTEES, NAMELY:

A. ON VAROSHA, WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH RESETTLEMENT UNDER TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION.

B. ON POINT 6 OF 10-POINT AGREEMENT.

C. ON CONSTITUTION.

D. ON TERRITORY.

THESE COMMITTEES WOULD MEET CONCURRENTLY AND CONTINUOUSLY.

IT WAS HINTED IN THIS CONNEXION, THAT ONAN AND IOANNIDES COULD BE MEMBERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE.

3. DENKTASH AMPLIFIED THAT ABOVE PROPOSAL WAS TO SHOW THAT HIS SIDE WAS NOT RETRACTING ON VAROSHA= IT WAS NOW UP TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT TO SHOW BY ACCEPTING ABOVE FORMULA THAT THEY WERE NOT RETRACTING ON BI-ZONALITY AND SECURITY. DENKTASH ALSO CLARIFIED THAT IF ABOVE FORMULA WERE ACCEPTABLE, INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS COULD RESTART IN AUGUST BUT AFTER 14 AS ON THAT DAY LIBERATION OF FAMAGUSTA WOULD BE CELEBRATED IN NORTH.

RATHER SOLEMN WAY HE SUBMITTED HIS PROPOSALS AND PUBLICITY.
HE SAID, HE WOULD BE GIVING TO THEM, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT
THAT ANKARA IS FULLY AWARE OF THIS INITIATIVE AND THAT LATTER
MAY BE REGARDED AS COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO UNFICYP 1191 AND RELATED
CABLES.

5. IN VIEW OF PUBLICITY BELIEVE I MUST, IN ABSENCE OF KYPRIANOU AND ROLANDIS IN LUSAKA, INFORM IOANNIDES WITHOUT DELAY OF ABOVE= I SHALL DO SO ON 31 JULY UNLESS I HEAR TO CONTRARY FROM YOU.

6. IT MAY BE DOUBTED THAT DENKTASH'S FORMULA WILL LEAD TO RESUMPTION OF TALKS IN VIEW OF KNOWN STRONG OPPOSITION OF KYPRIANOU TO ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMITTEES PRIOR TO REACHING CONSENSUS IN PLENARY. ALSO, IT HAS BEEN GREEK CYPRIOT STAND THAT CHR^ESTIC PHIDES ESPOUSAL OF TERM BI-ZONAL IN SECCO IN 1977, NEEDS CLARIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION IN VIEW OF SUBSEQUENT TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS OF APRIL 1978, WHICH GAVE TO BIZONALITY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTENT UNACCEPTABLE TO GREEK CYPRIOTS.

7. IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT DENKTASH'S PUBLICIZED INITIATIVE OF THIS MORNING HAS BEEN TIMED WITH BOTH LUSAKA AND HAVANA CONFERENCES IN MIND. ENDALL

COL CKD

WITIN

GREEK CYPRIOT
POSITION

CONFIDENTIAL

GP/dp

NOTES ON MEETING WITH MR. NICOS ROLANDIS, FOREIGN MINISTER OF CYPRUS

Held at Headquarters on 2 October 1979, at 9:45 a.m.

Present: Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Mr. George L. Sherry
Mr. Giandomenico Picco

Mr. Nicos Rolandis, Foreign
Minister of Cyprus
Mr. Alecos Shiambos, Chef de
Cabinet to the Minister

Mr. Rolandis stated that the 21 August version of the Secretary-General's memorandum was unacceptable to the Greek Cypriot side for the three following reasons:

- A. The term "bizonality", included in para. 5 (b) of the text, had recently been given by Mr. Denktash a separatist meaning which was unacceptable to the Greek Cypriot side;
- B. The correlation between the third guideline and security (para. 5c) was not a correct one. The Greek Cypriot side accepted to discuss the concept of security, but not in the context in which it was contained in the 21 August version.
- C. The procedural suggestion for setting up committees "at an appropriate early stage" differed from the Greek Cypriot view that committees would be set up by the interlocutors only on specific issues which may arise during the course of the negotiations of the main items.

The Secretary-General would now face difficulties in view of the Greek Cypriots' negative reaction to the 21 August memorandum and the positive response of the Turkish Cypriots. The ultimate goal was to avoid a useless confrontation between the two sides and especially between the Greek Cypriot side and the Secretary-General. It was, therefore, imperative to find ways to defuse the present tense situation until at least late November. In his view, the Turkish Cypriot side had no intention to negotiate substantially.

Mr. Rolandis intimated that a new initiative might be in the offing within the next few weeks. He mentioned, very confidentially, that Libya together with some other Mediterranean countries, *viz.* Algeria, Malta, Yugoslavia and possibly Syria, might suggest the setting up of a committee of representatives of those countries which would co-operate with the Secretary-General on the Cyprus question. The Libyan initiative could take the form of a conference chaired by the Secretary-General with the participation of the above-mentioned Mediterranean countries, Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities. In view of the good relations existing between Libya and Turkey, this idea might commend itself to the Turkish side.

Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar referring to the negative reaction to the 21 August memorandum, noted that the Secretary-General was now put in a very difficult position on what to do next. The Turkish side felt that the ball was now in the Greek court. He therefore suggested that it might be wiser not to inform

the Turkish side of the Greek Cypriot reaction.

As regards the Libyan initiative, he questioned whether the Turkish side would accept the involvement of four non-aligned countries unless at least some European countries, e.g. Spain or Portugal, were added to the group.

Mr. Rolandis referred to the Libyan initiative as an idea that could become the subject matter of the recourse to the General Assembly. In the light of this possibility it would be advisable to keep Mr. Denktash from making any statements which would spoil the atmosphere. If this were not possible, the Greek Cypriot side would be forced into comparing the 21 August memorandum to the 19 May agreement, thus coming into confrontation with the Secretary-General.

Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar noted that Mr. Denktash had just left for London and would be staying there for the next ten days. Mr. Denktash might refrain from making statements during that period.

Mr. Rolandis reiterated that the recent move by the Turkish side was solely aimed at undermining the Greek Cypriot recourse to the General Assembly. He stressed that the word "bizonality" had become "taboo" on the Cyprus political scene and could not be used in this context. The simplest way to overcome the present difficulties might be for the Secretary-General to call the two sides together and ask them to explain the meaning they ascribed to that word.

* * *

There followed an informal discussion with Foreign Minister Rolandis, in the course of which Mr. Perez de Cuellar and Mr. Sherry developed the following arguments:

- 1) The Turkish Cypriots will not resume the talks simply on the basis of the 19 May accord without some clarification of the points of difference that had arisen during the round of 15-22 June. Moreover, it would not be in the interest of the Greek Cypriot side to resume the talks in this way. President Kyprianou's suggestion that either side could raise any topics it wished might be used by the Turkish Cypriots to restart a lengthy discussion of bi-zonality, security, the UN resolutions, etc. This would in all probability again lead to a breakdown.
- 2) The Secretariat paper, in its paragraph 5, makes certain statements concerning such common ground as has been reached by the sides regarding bi-zonality and security; having done so, the Secretariat paper, so to speak, puts them aside. It does not include them among the four subjects to be discussed at the talks, which are listed in paragraph 6 of the paper. The 10-point accord did not contain an explicit agenda of this kind; this made it possible for Mr. Onan to demand a complete discussion of point 2 of that accord. Such tactics could not be repeated if the talks now resumed on the basis of the Secretariat paper.
- 3) The text of sub-paragraph 5(b) quotes verbatim the language used by Mr. Christophides in the General Assembly on 7 November 1977, and it fully meets the Greek Cypriot point of view. The

Greek Cypriots contend that the Turkish proposals of April 1978 revealed what the Turkish side really meant by bi-zonality - namely, not only an indication that the federation would consist of two geographic areas under the control of either community, but also an unacceptable constitutional arrangement involving almost complete separation. By accepting the Christophides text, the Turks have now excluded the constitutional aspects from the content of the term "bi-zonal". The solution of the constitutional aspects, as specified, is to be federal (not bi-zonal).

4. The Greek Cypriot side may consider issuing a statement to explain its view of the meaning of bi-zonality, so as to avoid any ambiguity. There is no reason for the Greek Cypriots to concede in effect that the Turkish Cypriot interpretation of bi-zonality is the only correct one.

5. "Bi-zonality" has indeed acquired an important political significance for the Turkish side. It would be politically impossible for the Turks to abandon the use of the term at this time. Instead, they have eliminated its objectionable aspects.

6. Sub-paragraph 5(c) fully reflects the Greek Cypriot position. For that reason, Denktash in August vigorously denounced this paragraph, especially its last clause ("as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole"). The language concerning "certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community" is quoted from the Makarios-Denktash guidelines. The first sentence of the sub-paragraph indicates that the security of both communities can be discussed.

7. The second sentence of paragraph 7 refers to the establishment of committees (working groups) but only "at an appropriate early stage". Consequently, the Greek Cypriot interlocutor would be in a position to block the setting up of committees for as long as he found that this "stage" had not been reached.

8. The penultimate sentence of paragraph 7, concerning a statement by the representative of the Secretary-General after each meeting, is a further safeguard against dilatory tactics.

9. The Turks feel that they have made significant and far-reaching concessions in accepting the Secretariat suggestions of 21-23 August. Rejection by the Greek Cypriot side may bring about a total collapse of the negotiating process, and would be interpreted by the Turkish side as indicating an unwillingness on the part of the Greek Cypriots to negotiate. The Turks would criticise the Greek Cypriots publicly for causing the Secretary-General's efforts to break down for reasons - such as distaste for the term "bi-zonality" - which many Governments would find it difficult to understand.

10. The Greek Cypriots consider that the Turkish proposal and its timing was designed to sabotage the Cyprus Government's efforts to obtain a strong resolution from the General Assembly. The Greek Cypriots also consider that the Turks are no more willing to negotiate seriously at present than they were before. These hypotheses can be easily tested. If the Greek Cypriots accepted the Turkish offer, the talks could begin without delay. If

on the other hand there should be a serious intention to negotiate,
this should be taken advantage of.

Mr. Rolandis said that this discussion had brought out some important new elements, which would now be examined by his side. For the time being, however, his Government's negative reaction remained in effect.

It was understood that the Secretariat would advise the Turkish side that the final official reaction of the Greek Cypriot side had not yet been received.

cc: Mr. J. Perez de Cuellar
Mr. B.E. Urquhart
Mr. F.T. Liu
Mr. R. Galindo-Pohl, Nicosia
Mr. G. Mautner-Markhof✓
Central (2)
File

Dictated to Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar
by President Kyprianou and Mr. Rolandis
on Saturday morning, 6 October 1979

1. Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high level Agreement of 19 May 1979 which provides in its Point 2 that "the basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the United Nations resolution relevant to the Cyprus question".
2. Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a Federal solution consisting of two constituent areas which have on occasion in the past been described as regions or zones.
3. Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks.
4. Both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.
5. The interlocutors will discuss all subjects in accordance with the priorities specified in the 19 May Agreement
6. Through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General, initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions may be considered.
7. At an appropriate stage the interlocutors may set up committees to study specific matters.

(Mr. Okçun, Foreign Minister of Turkey, was informed about this text on afternoon of 6 October 1979 and rejected it.)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 October 1979

Note to the Secretary-General

Today at 5.45 p.m. President Kyprianou informed me that he had discussed with his collaborators both here and in Nicosia, the current situation as it had emerged from the Turkish side's recent decision.

He stated that his side's acceptance of the formula now accepted by the Foreign Minister of Turkey and by Mr. Denktash, was out of the question.

In his view, the Turkish side was not prepared to negotiate; their aim was rather:

- a) to confuse the situation, and,
- b) to push the Government of Cyprus toward a confrontation with the Secretary-General; the Turkish side had in fact chosen to present as the Secretary-General's proposals, ideas which were only explored with the two sides on 23-August 1979 in Nicosia.


Javier Perez de Cuellar

IMMEDIATE CODE CABLE.

Cham

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SS NYK

NICOSIA (UNFICYP) 166 221122Z

ETATPRIORITE

UNATIONS

NEWYORK

UNFICYP 1506 IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

TO SECRETARY-GENERAL

FROM GALINDO-POHL

DATE 22 SEPTEMBER 1979

NUMBER UNFICYP 1506

FURTHER UNFICYP 1455 AND UNFICYP 1490, PARA.4.

1. NOON, 22 SEPTEMBER, CALLED ON ROLANDIS WITH D/SRSG, AT FOREIGN MINISTERS REQUEST.

2. ROLANDIS INFORMED ME THAT GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO ACCEPT YOUR PROPOSAL TO INVITE INTERLOCUTORS TO COME TO NEW YORK FOR FEW DAYS OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN 8 AND 19 OCTOBER (YOUR 1092, PARA.1). ROLANDIS EMPHASIZED THAT HIS SIDE ATTACHED GREATEST IMPORTANCE THAT ABOVE TIME-FRAME BE KEPT. IN ORDER TO AVOID THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE HELD TOO CLOSE TO GA DEBATE ON CYPRUS, GOVERNMENT WILL REQUEST THAT DEBATE TAKE PLACE SECOND PART OF NOVEMBER.

3. ROLANDIS EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO GIVE IMMEDIATE PUBLICITY TO ITS ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR PROPOSAL. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, TO GIVE ME TIME TO CONSULT YOU WHETHER SUCH PUBLICITY WAS APPROPRIATE AT THIS JUNCTURE. PLEASE ADVISE.

4. KYPRIANOU AND ROLANDIS ARE LEAVING NICOSIA AFTERNOON 23 SEPTEMBER KYPRIANOU ARRIVING NEW YORK EVENING 24, AND ROLANDIS EVENING 25.
ENDALL

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MI NEWYORK

FROM: GALINDO-POHL
TO: PEREZ DE CUELLAR NEWYORK
DATE: 22 AUGUST 1979
NUMBER: UNFICYP 1331

1. At noon 22 August, was received by Kyprianou, in presence of Rolandis and S/SRG.
2. At outset of meeting Kyprianou handed to me "talking paper", which is quoted below:

"aaa. The following wording of the assessment to be made by or on behalf of the UUUNNN Secretary-General is suggested:

 1. Both sides affirm the validity of the 19th May Agreement, which provides that the basis for the talks will be Makarios/-Denktash guidelines of 12th February 1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus Question.
 2. Both sides support a federation consisting of two constituent areas, which have on occasion in the past been described as regions or zones.
 3. The question of security of the Republic of Cyprus as a whole and of all its citizens can be pertinently raised and discussed.
 4. Both sides have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the talks.

bbb. The interlocutors will, in discussing the following subjects, accord to them the priorities specified in the 19th May Agreement:

 - (aaa) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha;
 - (bbb) Territorial aspect;
 - (ccc) Constitutional aspect.

ccc. Through the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, initial partial measures by both sides to promote good will,

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-2-

mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions may be considered.

ddd. After agreement in principle is reached on the overall solution of the Cyprus Problem, committees may be set up as and when agreement by the interlocutors during the talks at appropriate stages to study specific matters. The committees will function ad referendum and will report back to the interlocutors who may at any time participate in any committee. Long line underline it / is understood that none of the above) alters in any way the letter and spirit of the 19th May Agreement."

3. Thereafter I raised points in your 994.

aaa. Rewording of para. 5 (bbb) was rejected: not only did Kyprianou not agree to differentiation between "federal solution" and "bi-zonal solution", but was also opposed to having "bi-zonal" in any text.

bbb. Rewording of para. 5 (ccc) was also unacceptable as it introduced "security" into guideline three, which in light of Turkish Cypriot proposals of April 1978 had to be avoided.

ccc. Regarding changes in paras. 6 and 7, Kyprianou referred to relevant passage in talking paper.

4. As general comment, Kyprianou said that current exercise of "indirectly taking into account Turkish Cypriot pre-conditions" would lead into labyrinth, and was waste of time, since it was known why Turkish Cypriots had been "stone-walling" since June.

5. Kyprianou confided that he had received reports to effect had taken negative line when representations were made there, particularly European Economic Community.

6. Both Kyprianou and Rolandis felt that under circumstances SecGen should consider calling parties to table without pursuing present exercise, i.e. simply on basis of 19 May accord "as it stands". However, such resumption of talks should not take place before Havana Conference, as this

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-3-

would be most unfair towards Greek Cypriot side, bearing in mind that Turkish Cypriots had created all difficulties and delays since June. For Cyprus Government it had become a "must" to go to Havana and enlist help of non-aligned.

7. Since Denktash is known to be unavailable on account of Bayram from 24 to 27 August, both inclusive, made tentative appointment with him for 23 August at 11 a.m. however, in view of above, please advise whether I should proceed.

ΓΡΑΦΕΙΟ
ΕΛΛΗΝΟΚΥΠΡΙΟΥ
ΔΙΑΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΥΤΟΥ

Ανακοινωθεν

OFFICE OF
THE GREEK-CYPRIOT
INTERLOCUTOR

Press Release

7/79

2 August, 1979

GREEK-CYPRIOT SIDE'S AIDE-MEMOIRE
HANDED TO MR. GALINDO POHL

The attached aide-memoire was handed to the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Galindo Pohl, by the representative of the Greek Cypriot side to the intercommunal talks, Mr. G. Ioannides, at a meeting this afternoon. Present at the meeting was the Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. R. Gorge.

/X.M.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Intercommunal Talks were resumed in Nicosia on 15.6.1979 on the basis of the Ten-Point Agreement reached on 19.5.1979 between the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, and Mr. Denktash in the presence of the U.N. Secretary-General, Dr. Waldheim.

2. The Greek Cypriot side is deeply committed to the process of meaningful negotiations which is the best available means for arriving at a just solution of the Cyprus problem.

3. The Greek Cypriot side reiterates its adherence to the Ten-Point Agreement of 19.5.1979 which provides that the basis of the Talks shall be the Makarios/Denktash Guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the U.N. Resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question. Therefore its commitment to the said Guidelines and Resolutions cannot be doubted.

4. On the resumption of the Intercommunal Talks in June, 1979, the Turkish Cypriot side demanded, as a pre-condition to negotiation, that the Greek Cypriot side should accept the addition to the Guidelines of the terms "bi-zonality" and "security for the Turkish Cypriots", to which the Turkish side ascribes meanings destroying the basic notion of "federation", underlying the Guidelines. This would enable the Turkish side to promote its avowed objective to create two separate states, legalising the existing military occupation of Cyprus.

5. The U.N. Secretary-General adjourned the Talks on 22.6.1979 in order to enable him to assess the situation, and it was anticipated that the recess would be for a few days. Since then, efforts have been made, through the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, to smooth the way towards a continuation of the Talks and to this end the Greek Cypriot side has co-operated fully, while the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot side has been negative and obstructive, culminating in the pre-conditions set by Mr. Denktash in a public statement on 30.7.1979.

6. These pre-conditions must be rejected in their entirety.

Furthermore, they would divert the Talks from meaningful negotiations on the essence to endless unproductive discussion.

7. Moreover, the Turkish demand for a public statement from the Greek Cypriot side accepting the pre-conditions, inconceivably arrogant in itself, is an obvious attempt to shift onto the Greek Cypriot side the blame for the standstill in the Talks, which is a direct result of the refusal of the Turkish side to abide by the Ten-Point Agreement.

8. If any side were justified in setting pre-conditions, it would be the Greek Cypriot side, which is willing to negotiate even under the unbearable pressure of the presence of the Turkish forces, which still occupy 40% of the territory and 70% of the economic resources of the Republic, and of the continued displacement of 200,000 Greek Cypriots representing 40% of the Greek Cypriot population of Cyprus.

9. The Greek Cypriot side reaffirms its position as follows:

(a) It reiterates its commitment to the establishment of a federation, as provided in the Guidelines, which would ensure the unity of the country. This commitment was demonstrated by the Greek Cypriot side by the submission in Vienna in March/April 1977, of proposals (the validity of which has been reaffirmed at the recent Talks), including territorial proposals on a map, for a federation composed of two constituent parts. It was in the context and in explanation of these proposals that the then Foreign Minister of the Republic, Mr. J. Christophides, made his statement at the Security Council on 31.8.1977, using the term "bi-zonal" as meaning two regions or areas, in contra-distinction to more than two regions or areas. He did not and could not have used it with the meaning ascribed to the term by the Turkish proposals of April 1978.

(b) The Turkish side may raise at the negotiating table any matter, including "bi-zonality" and "security", as well as any other matter which may be pertinently discussed in the

(c) The setting up of Committees is a matter which may be raised and agreed by the Interlocutors during the negotiations at the proper stage. Committees can only function after an agreement in principle is reached on the overall solution of the Cyprus problem and there are particular matters needing further study and elaboration.

10. In conclusion, the Greek Cypriot side appeals for a speedy resumption of the Intercommunal Talks on the basis and in accordance with the Ten-Point Agreement, to "be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner; avoiding any delay".

2 August, 1979

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