

story - General: Uthant

03/10/1966 - 11/12/1969

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UN ARCHIVES
SERIES 5-0884
BOX 1
FILE 2
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25 November 1966

QUESTION OF ADEN

The General Assembly,

Having considered the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Aden,^{1/} which includes, in addition to Aden, the Eastern and Western Aden Protectorates as well as the Islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and other off-shore Islands,

Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965, and the related resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 22 March 1966 and 15 June 1966,^{2/}

Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

Having taken note of the declaration of the representative of the administering Power on the readiness of his Government to co-operate with the United Nations in the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions at the earliest possible time,

Having taken note of the assurances given by the representative of the administering Power on 10 November 1966,^{3/} concerning the territorial integrity and the unity of South Arabia as a whole,

Having further taken note of the statement by the representative of the administering Power on 17 November 1966,^{4/} that his Government would allow the United Nations mission free and unimpeded contact with the representatives of all shades of opinion in the Territory,

Considering that the administering Power should allow the United Nations mission full freedom of action and unrestricted access to all parts of the Territory and that it should guarantee the free exercise of political rights and freedoms throughout the Territory,

Deeply disturbed by the reports issued by various international humanitarian organisations on the maltreatment of political detainees and prisoners and by the continuation of the military operations against the people of the Territory ~~carried out by the administering Power,~~

1/ A/6300/Add.4.

2/ Ibid., paras. 99 and 382.

3/ A/C.4/SR.1633.

4/ A/C.4/SR.1636.

Having further taken note of the declaration of the administering Power on the question of termination of all treaties by the time of independence, and in particular of its commitment not to enter into any defence arrangement with South Arabia,

Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which might threaten peace and security in the area due to the failure of the administering Power so far to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions,

1. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Aden, as well as the conclusions contained therein, and endorses the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 22 March 1966 and 15 June 1966;

2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

3. Reaffirms paragraph 8 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 15 June 1966 and urges the administering Power to implement it ~~(immediately)~~;

4. Further reaffirms that the only authority responsible to the United Nations for the full implementation of the United Nations resolutions with regard to the Territory is the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, in particular, for determining the extent of the United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the elections and making a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;

X 6. Requests the United Nations mission to recommend, inter alia, practical steps for the establishment of a central caretaker government in the Territory in order to carry out the administration of the whole Territory and ^{to} assist in the organization of the elections;

X 7. Calls upon the administering Power to take the necessary measures, in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of the present resolution, so that the United Nations mission on Aden can discharge its responsibilities on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 15 June 1966;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance and facilities for the implementation of the present resolution;

9. Decides to maintain the question of Aden on its agenda.

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead.

TO:

The Secretary-General

	APPROVAL	XX	YOUR INFORMATION
	MAY WE CONFER?		AS REQUESTED
	YOUR SIGNATURE		FOR ACTION
	NOTE AND FILE		REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE
	NOTE AND RETURN		PREPARE DRAFT
	YOUR COMMENTS		ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

The attached draft resolution on Aden was adopted by the Fourth Committee yesterday by roll-call vote of 100 in favour (including the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR), none against, with 3 abstentions (France, Portugal and South Africa).

A copy of the declaration made by Iraq, on behalf of the co-sponsors, with reference to operative paragraph 7 of the resolution, is also attached.

DATE:
3 Dec. 1966

FROM: *Cal*
M.E. Chacko

Thats

9/11/66

1 December 1966

QUESTION OF ADEN

The representative of Iraq, in introducing the joint draft resolution on Aden (A/C.4/L.841), at the 1649th meeting of the Fourth Committee on 1 December 1966, made, on behalf of the co-sponsors, the following declaration with reference to operative paragraph 7 of that draft resolution:

"Nothing in paragraph 7 should be construed as constituting a precondition to the appointment and/or despatch of the mission to Aden. But the co-sponsors strongly urge the administering Power to lift the state of emergency when the mission is there so as to enable it to discharge its responsibilities on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 15 June 1966."



UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y.

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8/2*
8 February, 1967.

My dear Secretary General,

I am hopeful that it will now be possible to reach a conclusion on the question of the proposed United Nations special mission to South Arabia (under General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI)).

You know that since the announcement by my Government on 1 August last year that we would welcome such a special mission I have constantly emphasised the urgency, and I greatly hope that following the extensive consultations which have since taken place the special mission may now be appointed and proceed as soon as possible to its important task.

It may be helpful to you in making a final decision to have before you the following comments.

/I

His Excellency U Thant,
Secretary-General,
United Nations,
New York.

I have throughout the consultations emphasised the need for a strong team, and when I spoke on this subject in the Fourth Committee on 10 November last year I said: "All we are asking is that the Secretary-General should not be restricted in any way in the selection of the strongest team to constitute the mission ... what matters now is that the special mission should be formed and go to work as soon as possible. It has a task of great difficulty ... in selecting members of the special mission the Secretary-General should be free to find the best men available without any limitation or restriction, having regard only to the difficulties of the assignment and the qualifications which members of the mission must bring to deal with it."

I have also particularly emphasised the need for a highly qualified chairman and stressed the desirability of the Chairman and members being drawn from countries which are unconnected with and uncommitted on the problems of South Arabia, so that the mission can be seen to bring to this problem the objective and impartial judgments which it so clearly requires.

/With

With these objectives in mind you know that my delegation has been very ready to support a number of constructive proposals which have been put forward in the course of consultations.

It was suggested that there might be three members of the mission drawn from Asia, Africa and Latin America. This was acceptable to us.

Then it was proposed that the chairman of the mission might be drawn from the Sudan. This also was acceptable to us (though subsequently we understand that this proposal was withdrawn).

Then it was proposed that the Asian member might be drawn from Afghanistan and the Latin American member from one of the countries represented in the Committee of 24. This too was acceptable.

Then it was proposed that a suitably qualified Chairman might be found from Latin America with the two members drawn from Asia and Africa. This also is acceptable to us.

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It seems to me that the consultations already undertaken should now be sufficient to enable a conclusion to be rapidly reached, and I greatly hope that it will now be possible for you to proceed to give effect to the General Assembly resolution.

Yours sincerely,

Caradon

(Caradon)

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release SG/SM/666
23 February 1967

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL
ON UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN

"Under resolution 2183 (XXI), adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1966, I was requested, in consultation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the administering Power, to appoint a special mission to be sent to Aden.

"Following such consultations, I have appointed the United Nations Special Mission on Aden composed as follows:

"His Excellency Mr. Manuel Perez Guerrero (Venezuela), Chairman of the Special Mission;

"His Excellency Mr. Abdul Satar Shalizi (Afghanistan); and

"His Excellency Mr. Moussa Leo Keita (Mali).

"I trust that the Mission will proceed to its work as a matter of urgency and that all concerned will cooperate to the full in a spirit of constructive good-will to enable the Mission to succeed in its most important task.

"As I said in my statement to the Special Committee on 9 February:
'It is my confident hope that the work of the proposed mission will be of assistance to the Special Committee and the General Assembly in enabling the people of Aden to attain their independence under conditions of peace and harmony.'"

* * * * *

7 March 1967

Excellency,

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I transmit to you herewith for consideration a letter addressed to me on 6 March 1967 by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia and a copy of my reply to him.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant

His Excellency
Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero
Chairman
United Nations Special Mission on Aden

7 March 1967

Excellency,

I refer to your letter to me of 6 March 1967 informing me of the message from His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz inviting the United Nations Special Mission on Aden to visit Saudi Arabia.

Your letter is being transmitted to the Chairman of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden for consideration.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant

His Excellency
Mr. Jamil M. Baroody
Deputy Permanent Representative of
Saudi Arabia to the United Nations
633 Third Avenue, Suite 2521
New York, N.Y. 10017

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Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

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Press Release GA/COL/538
17 March 1967

SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN TO LEAVE NEW YORK FOR LONDON ON 20 MARCH

The Special Mission on Aden appointed by the Secretary-General on 23 February 1967 under resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly, today made the following declaration:

"The Special Mission on Aden has met at Headquarters from 7 to 16 March 1967 to consider its programme of work and the ways and means to carry out its preliminary phases.

"As an essential and basic principle, the Mission considers that it should be thoroughly apprised of all factors relating to the situation in the Territory and that it should be directly informed of all points of view of the people. To this end the Mission is fully prepared to visit any place and meet with any representatives of the people who might wish to address it.

"On Monday, 20 March 1967, the Special Mission will go to London where it will establish contact with the administering Power as a preliminary step to its visit to the Territory. The Mission expects also to visit Cairo and Jidda on its way to Aden, in order to meet with representatives of the people who are outside the Territory. It intends to arrive in Aden towards the end of this month.

"As it prepares to leave Headquarters, the Special Mission wishes to stress that it is proceeding on its assignment in a spirit of objectivity and with a sense of urgency and determination to do its utmost to further the objectives contained in resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly."

At today's meeting with the Secretary-General, U Thant reiterated his trust that it would proceed to its work as a matter of urgency and that all concerned would co-operate to the full in a spirit of constructive goodwill to enable the Mission to succeed in its most important task.

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The Mission is composed of Manuel Perez-Guerrero of Venezuela, Chairman; Abdussattar Shalizi of Afghanistan; and Moussa Leo Keita of Mali. It will be accompanied by M.E. Chacko, Representative of the Secretary-General and Principal Secretary; and J. Miles and H. Rifai, Assistant Secretaries and by other members of the Secretariat.

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Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

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Press Release GA/COL/550
6 April 1967

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN OF UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN

(The following was received from a United Nations Information Officer with the United Nations Special Mission on Aden.)

Following is the text of a statement by the Chairman of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden, Manuel Perez-Guerrero of Venezuela, which was issued to the Press in Aden at 2000 hours (local time):

"I am speaking on behalf of the Mission on Aden and I am expressing the thoughts of my two colleagues and myself. I have, on my right, Ambassador Abdussattar Shalizi from Afghanistan -- Asia -- and on my left, Ambassador Moussa Leo Keita from Mali -- Africa. I am from Venezuela -- Latin America. We have been appointed by the Secretary-General, U Thant, to constitute this Mission on Aden -- South Arabia -- in accordance with a resolution approved by the General Assembly last December.

"You may know that the question of the independence of Aden and the Protectorates has been on the agenda of the Special Committee of the United Nations dealing with the question of self-determination and independence of colonial territories and the General Assembly for over five years. The three countries that we represent, together with many other countries of our three continents and also of the other parts of the world, have shown their deep concern in this matter which is important not only for the people of the Territory -- who of course are the main objective of the efforts being displayed at the United Nations -- but also in terms of the peace of the region and of the world.

"I should add that the resolution of the General Assembly under the terms of which the Mission was appointed by the Secretary-General was supported by 100 Members of the United Nations, with no country voting against it. Under that resolution, the purpose of the Mission is to go to Aden and to recommend practical steps for the full implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular to determine the extent of United Nations

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participation in the preparation and supervision of free elections. Furthermore, the Mission is to consider recommending practical steps for the establishment of a central caretaker, or transitional, government to carry out the administration and to assist in the organization of the elections. The three of us are determined to do our best to perform the task assigned to us by the United Nations in complete objectivity. This cannot be done without the full co-operation of all concerned and we hope that such co-operation will be forthcoming.

"Since we were appointed at the end of last February, we have been discussing this problem in New York in close contact with the Secretary-General, U Thant, also in London with the British Government as the administering Power, as well as in Cairo and Jidda. Now, we have come to Aden, which is the goal of our Mission. We know how difficult the problem is in view of the situation that prevails at the present time but we are hopeful that through the efforts of the United Nations and the co-operation of everyone concerned, progress will be made towards reaching the objectives as set out in the resolutions of the United Nations: that is, the unity of the Territory and its achievement of a genuine independence in the shortest possible time. It is only when the people of this country will be able to decide by themselves, in complete freedom, their own destiny that the United Nations could feel assured that the principles embodied in the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly would have been fully applied to the Territories.

"In the Territory we have been in touch with the High Commissioner and his staff as the representatives of the United Kingdom which is responsible to the United Nations as administering Power. It is with them that we will deal officially in the Territory, and not with the Federal Government. We insist on having the assurance from the administering Power that we will have full opportunity of free and unimpeded contacts with representatives of all shades of opinion. It is in this manner, and only so, that the Mission will be able to discharge its responsibility. To this end, the Mission has let it be known by Press and Radio, and we repeat it here that we would like to encourage anyone who wishes to get in touch with the Mission to do so. We will spend in Aden as much time as is necessary and visit as well the other parts of the area, if we are convinced that it will serve the purposes of our Mission.

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"We appreciate the confidence that is placed in the Mission as the representatives of the United Nations, and you may rest assured that the Mission will spare no efforts to live up to the expectations of the people knowing full well the difficulty of our task and recognizing the fact that no peaceful solution to this problem can be reached without the unified efforts of the people of the Territory as a whole. Our visit yesterday to the detainees at Al-Mansoura was another reminder of how important it is for this country to be liberated from colonial rule. Once this goal has been achieved, the energy of this young people and their brothers outside the prison walls will be available to build up their own independent country in peace and unity. It goes without saying that this aspiration could not be achieved unless all come together to work for the common goal.

"As soon as we established beyond any doubt that we can have free and unimpeded contacts with the people of the Territories, the Mission will commence its study of the situation in the Territory, in accordance with the directives given to it by the General Assembly, and gather from anyone concerned such information and ideas as would contribute to the success of its assignment.

"Thank you very much."

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Office of Public Information
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W/ Press Release GA/COL/551
6 April 1967

MEMBERS OF ADEN MISSION TO SPEAK ON SOUTH ARABIAN TELEVISION

(The following was received from an Information Officer with the Special Mission on Aden.)

Members of the Special Mission on Aden were scheduled to appear today in a television programme to be broadcast simultaneously in Aden and to all parts of the Protectorate of South Arabia, in order to explain their presence and their task to the people of the area.

The Mission members yesterday visited Al Mansura Detention Centre in Sheikh Othman, Aden State, where 112 political detainees are held under British military supervision.

After conferring with prison authorities, the group toured the compound and spoke with two detainees from two of the prison blocks.

The Mission members, with accompanying Secretariat staff, travelled to the prison in cars flying the United Nations flag, escorted by armed police. They returned to their Aden headquarters (the Seaview Hotel) by helicopter at sundown, as explosions and small arms fire could be heard nearby.

Since their arrival on 2 April, the group had conferred with High Commissioner Sir Richard Turnbull and his staff, at the Seaview Hotel and at Government House.

The Mission is composed of Manuel Perez-Guerrero of Venezuela, Chairman; Abdussattar Shalizi of Afghanistan, and Moussa Leo Keita of Mali.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
ROME.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF
HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR

7 April 1967

COPY of a letter from H.B.M. Ambassador, Sir Evelyn
Shuckburgh to His Excellency Dr Manuel Pérez-Guerrero

BRITISH EMBASSY
ROME

7 April, 1967.

I have just received urgent instructions to convey to Your Excellency and to your two distinguished colleagues members of the United Nations Mission to Aden a cordial and pressing invitation from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Right Honourable George Brown, M.P., to visit London as soon as possible for discussions on the situation in South Arabia. He would much welcome your first hand account of your visit to Aden.

If, as the Foreign Secretary hopes, you are able to accept his personal invitation, arrangements will be made to meet the Mission at London at whatever time they may arrive and for them to meet the Secretary of State at the earliest practicable time thereafter.

I am to request a very early reply to this invitation. If I can be informed at the same time of Your Excellency's onward travel plans, immediate arrangements will be put in hand in London.

Finally I am to stress to Your Excellency the capital importance which Mr Brown places upon early discussions with you and your colleagues and accordingly to express the hope that you will be able to accept this invitation.

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Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release GA/COL/555
8 April 1967

STATEMENT CONCERNING SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN

(The following was received from a United Nations Information Officer with the Special Mission on Aden.)

The Special Mission on Aden left Aden on 7 April at 0930 hours (local time) via Khartoum, and arrived in Rome at 1530 hours (local time).

The Secretary-General, U Thant, arrived at the Rome airport from Geneva 15 minutes after the Mission's arrival. The group met with U Thant briefly, and later conferred with him for about 45 minutes at the airport, until the Secretary-General departed for Colombo, Ceylon.

The following statement was read to newsmen at the Rome airport by the United Nations Information Officer accompanying the Mission:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden regrets having had to leave Aden after only a brief stay there. The decision of the Mission to leave the Territory, in the existing circumstances, was made after a number of experiences which clearly showed that the United Kingdom authorities there were unwilling to extend to it the co-operation due to it from an administering Power.

"The Mission has always made it clear to the United Kingdom authorities that its official dealings in the Territory would be with the High Commissioner as representative of the administering Power and not with the Federal Government. It has also made it well known that it must have free and unimpeded contacts with the people of the Territory.

"Yesterday an unfortunate event took place which could not have occurred if the United Kingdom authorities in Aden, who knew the position of the Mission and of its acceptance by the United Kingdom Government, had wished to co-operate with it and enable it to discharge its responsibilities. As it is well known by now, the Mission in the performance of its duty recorded a broadcast of a very

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important statement it wished to make to the people of the Territory over radio and television. This recording was arranged yesterday through the High Commissioner's office and was due to be telecast and broadcast at 8 p.m. last evening.

"However, neither the telecast nor the broadcast took place as arranged, and the High Commissioner and his officials, surprisingly, appeared to be completely unaware of what was going on. Further, the Mission learned from Aden radio and television newscasts that if the United Nations Mission wished to use the facilities of the broadcasting services in the Territory, it should address itself directly to the Federal Government. No explanations were forthcoming from the High Commissioner's office.

"This and other incidents demonstrated that the local British authorities were unwilling to co-operate with the Mission in the performance of its task. In the circumstances, the Mission concluded that no useful purpose could be served by the Mission prolonging its totally fruitless stay in the Territory. It therefore decided to leave Aden without delay and explore other venues for the practical performance of its mandate.

"It must be clearly understood that existing conditions in the Territory are not conducive to the proper performance of the functions of the Mission there. Free and unimpeded contacts with the people, essential prerequisites for its work, were not made available by the British authorities in the field.

"The Mission will now continue its work outside the Territory, and submit its report on its findings."

In answer to questions, the Information Officer told newsmen that the Mission would leave Rome at about noon today, 8 April, for Geneva where they would continue their work for a few days. He confirmed that the Mission had received a message from the British Foreign Secretary asking them to go to London to see him, but that the Mission had not yet decided whether or not it would go to London.

Asked whether dangerous conditions in Aden had influenced the Mission's departure, the Information Officer said he was quite sure this was not the case.

The Mission is composed of Manuel Perez-Guerrero of Venezuela, Chairman; --- Abdussattar Shalizi of Afghanistan, and Moussa Leo Keita of Mali.

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Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

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Press Release GA/COL/556
8 April 1967

SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN ARRIVES IN GENEVA

(The following was received from a United Nations Information Officer with the Special Mission on Aden.)

The Special Mission on Aden arrived in Geneva from Rome today at 1300 hours (local time).

The Mission, which left Aden on 7 April (see Press Release GA/COL/555, issued earlier today), is composed of Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Chairman; Abdussattar Shalizi of Afghanistan, and Moussa Leo Keita of Mali.

Questioned at the Geneva airport by correspondents, Mr. Perez-Guerrero stated that the Mission had had a long conversation with U Thant in Rome; the members of the Mission would spend a few days in Geneva; their only plans were to discuss the Mission's programme amongst themselves.

Asked why he had accused the British Government of lack of co-operation, Mr. Perez-Guerrero repeated his earlier statement that there had been "a lack of co-operation on the part of the authorities in Aden".

Mr. Shalizi, questioned about a comment he had made to a correspondent at the airport in Aden, explained that the correspondent had made a remark to the effect that "the British Government has contributed to the United Nations a bloody sight more than you three countries put together". Mr. Shalizi said he had replied that perhaps the emphasis should be on both the contribution and the bloodshed.

Questioned on whether the Mission had refused to meet the British High Commissioner in Aden, Mr. Perez-Guerrero said that the Mission had decided to leave Aden on the basis of the conditions it had met there. It had been in touch with the office of the High Commissioner, but had been cut off from contact with the people of Aden, through being refused permission to broadcast a statement.

Mr. Perez-Guerrero said the Mission was acting in a spirit of complete objectivity, and did not wish its views to be misrepresented in Britain.

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United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release CA/COL/558
11 April 1967

SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN GIVES PRESS CONFERENCE IN GENEVA

(The following was received from the United Nations Information Service in Geneva.)

Members of the Special United Nations Mission on Aden* gave a press conference at the Palais des Nations yesterday afternoon.

In an introductory statement the Mission Chairman, Manuel Perez-Guerrero of Venezuela, recalled that the members of the Mission had had useful contacts in London, Cairo and Jidda with officials of the foreign ministries of the three countries.

Having taken the decision to go to Aden, despite "discouraging remarks", and to gather as much information as possible throughout the country, the Mission, he said, discovered that the situation in Aden did not correspond "to what we felt we were entitled to expect after our preliminary conversations".

"The sad fact was that we did not find a climate of co-operation", but rather from the beginning a "pattern of non-co-operation as if the Mission had been reluctantly accepted by the local authorities, and in the end was really unwanted" he said.

Stating that the Mission had been "so protected that in fact it was isolated" Mr. Perez-Guerrero recalled that in order to inform the people of Aden of what it had come to do and how it was going to do it, the Mission had recorded a video tape "with the full co-operation of the High Commissioner's Office and the technical facilities of the British Broadcasting Corporation". Instead of the broadcast, however, all they saw was a flash announcing that before using radio and television facilities, the permission of the Information Ministry of the Federal Government had to be obtained. "This was the first we had heard of such a condition", said Mr. Perez-Guerrero. Having contacted the High Commissioner's

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* The Mission is composed of Manuel Perez-Guerrero of Venezuela, Chairman; Abdussattar Shalizi of Afghanistan, and Moussa Leo Keita of Mali.

Office and receiving no explanation or offer of investigation, the Mission decided that its visit to the Territory of South Arabia was practically ended, and that it could stay there no longer.

The Chairman emphasized that the Mission had written officially to the High Commissioner pointing out that it considered that its only official contacts in the Territory should be with the High Commissioner, and adding that it wished to have free and unimpeded contacts with the people of South Arabia. This letter had been transmitted on 4 April through the Liaison Officer, but when the Mission left on 7 April it was told that it would take at least an additional 24 hours to get a reply.

It was "completely erroneous", said Mr. Perez-Guerrero, to say that the decision to leave Aden was taken hastily or in anger. The incident was only part of a pattern which had unfolded since the beginning. Nobody had tried to prevail on them to stay, nor had the High Commissioner given any explanation or offered to investigate the incident.

The Chairman went on to say that the Mission had had an exchange of views with the Secretary-General, U Thant, in Rome and had come to Geneva without resentment to ponder what had happened and decide what to do next. The Mission was not ended, he said, though one phase had been "sadly terminated". All avenues would continue to be explored. The Mission was contemplating going to London, and would select, in consultation with the British authorities, an appropriate moment for such a step. It was still possible for the Mission to recommend to the Secretary-General a number of measures for implementation of the General Assembly resolution adopted on 2 December by 100 votes.

Asked if the restrictions on the Mission's movements were not dictated by security considerations, Mr. Perez-Guerrero said that they had tried to "de-escalate" the situation so that security regulations could be relaxed. Nevertheless, "we were isolated, and no effort was made to see how de-escalation could take place".

In reply to a question as to why they did not see the representatives of the Federal Government as "one of the varying shades of opinion", he recalled that the United Nations resolution described this Government as "unrepresentative", and added that it would, therefore, have run counter to the resolution if the Mission had had any official contacts with the Federal Government. This decision had already been made clear not only to the High Commissioner, but also to the representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

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Abdussattar Shalizi (Afghanistan) added that, though the Mission wished to explore all shades of opinion, it did not want to be placed "in the shadow of any particular group". The Mission had had discussions with the South Arabia League representatives in both Cairo and Jidda, but in Aden the position had been different, and "we did not wish to fall into the hands of a government whose formation is deplored by a United Nations resolution".

Asked whether a return to Aden was excluded, Mr. Perez-Guerrero said that the Mission was in Geneva to reassess the situation, and nothing was excluded.

In reply to a question concerning contacts with the nationalist leaders, Mr. Shalizi stated that the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) had committed themselves in advance to boycotting the Mission. However, when visiting a detention camp, the Mission had received a petition from a member of FLOSY. A reply to the letter to the High Commissioner would have enabled the Mission to lay the groundwork for its planned month's visit, to include interviews with various groups. But under the circumstances the Mission only stayed five days.

With regard to the broadcast which never took place, Moussa Leo Keita (Mali) said the Mission was convinced that this would have been one of the most effective means of reaching the people of Aden. The text of the broadcast was made available to the press.

Mr. Perez-Guerrero described the arrival in Aden of Lord Shackleton, United Kingdom Minister without Portfolio, as "a new element" in the situation, but would not comment on its possible implications. Though unable to say how long the Mission was planning to stay in Geneva, he emphasized their "forward-looking attitude, despite the obstacles in the path".

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UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release GA/COL/560
12 April 1967

UNITED NATIONS MISSION ON ADEN ACCEPTS INVITATION TO VISIT LONDON

(The following was received from the United Nations Information Service, Geneva.)

The United Nations Special Mission on Aden, now in Geneva, confirmed today that it has accepted the invitation by George Brown, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to visit London to confer with him.

The time of the visit, which is to be arranged in consultation with the Foreign Office, has not yet been fixed, it was announced.

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13 April 1967

I thank you for your kind letter of 10 April 1967 concerning the appointment of a British Resident Minister in South Arabia. I have noted the contents with great interest and I shall get in touch with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations as soon as I get back to New York.

I am very thankful to the Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, for constantly keeping me in touch with developments in South Arabia.

U Thant

His Excellency
Mr. John Freeman
British High Commissioner



British High Commission,

New Delhi

10 April 1967

My dear Secretary General,

Appointment of British Resident Minister
In South Arabia

I believe that the Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, has been keeping in touch with you about the departure from Aden of the United Nations Mission.

I have been instructed by Mr. Brown, as a matter of courtesy, to inform you, on your arrival in India, that in the present situation it has been thought right that a British Minister should go to South Arabia and stay for a period. With the agreement of the Prime Minister, Mr. Brown is arranging for Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio, to undertake this task. Lord Shackleton will be going to Aden in a few days.

Mr. Brown considers that the affairs of the area have now assumed such proportions that the presence of a political Minister will be of great help to the High Commissioner, the Commander-in-Chief in South Arabia, and to the British Government.

Mr. Brown has asked me to emphasize that Lord Shackleton is not undertaking any mission to put to the Federal Ministers a new set of proposals for a solution of the South Arabian problem. But with the unexpected departure of the United Nations Mission Mr. Brown felt that conditions in South Arabia called for the additional authority which a member of the Government would be able to bring to the overall direction of policy regarding the preparations for independence and the withdrawal of British forces.

I have communicated the foregoing to you on Mr. Brown's behalf in writing, since I felt that it would not be appropriate or convenient for you if I attempted to take up your time in personal conversation on your arrival as the guest of the Indian Government. I shall, of course, be immediately at your disposal if you wish me to convey any message to Mr. Brown on your behalf.

Yours sincerely
John Freeman
(JOHN FREEMAN)

His Excellency U Thant,
Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Rashtrapati Bhavan,
NEW DELHI.

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UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release GA/COL/566
14 April 1967

SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN TO LEAVE SUNDAY FOR LONDON

(The following was received from a United Nations Information Officer with the Special Mission on Aden.)

The United Nations Special Mission on Aden will leave Geneva on Sunday, 16 April, at 0900 hours (local time), for London, a United Nations spokesman for the Mission announced today.

The Mission had confirmed on 12 April that it had accepted the invitation by George Brown, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to visit London to confer with him.

The spokesman added that the time for the Mission's onward journey to New York had not been set.

Asked by newsmen whether the Mission was likely to leave London following the scheduled departure of Mr. Brown for Washington, D.C. on Monday evening, the spokesman said "this is your assumption but it would seem to be a logical conclusion".

The spokesman made clear that the Mission was en route to New York and was stopping in London at the invitation of the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary.

Asked whether the Mission had completed its work or whether it planned to hold further consultations in New York, the spokesman said the Mission had not completed its work and that after it had returned to New York it would continue work on its report and take any other action it considered useful.

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UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release GA/COL/569
17 April 1967

SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN TO RETURN TO NEW YORK TOMORROW

(The following was received from the United Nations Information officer with the Special Mission on Aden.)

The members of the Special Mission on Aden will return to New York tomorrow, 18 April, on Trans World Airlines flight number 703, which leaves London at 1300 hours British Summer Time.

Their talks yesterday with the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, George Brown, were described by a spokesman as "thorough and useful".

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UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release GA/COL/573
19 April 1967

SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN RETURNS TO NEW YORK

The Special Mission on Aden arrived in New York yesterday from London, where the members had met with United Kingdom officials.

A statement by a United Nations spokesman, made at the airport, follows:

"The Aden Mission found their talks in London very thorough and useful. They sought clarifications from the United Kingdom Government and when the information requested is forthcoming, they will be in a position to determine their future course of work. They will continue to meet in the meantime and have scheduled a meeting for tomorrow (19 April) in New York."

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From the P.A. of U.K.

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26 April, 1967.

With your letter of 15 April you enclosed a Memorandum containing some preliminary observations and suggestions by the Special Mission on how all should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden and South Arabia. A number of detailed points arose from the Memorandum and also from your letter of 4 April to the High Commissioner, and in the annex to this letter I have set out the British Government's comments and observations on those detailed points.

Most of the matters dealt with in the annex to this letter concern the past, but the future is more important than the past and I wish in this letter to try to set out some of the purposes on which I believe there was broad agreement between the Mission and the British Government when we discussed these matters on 16 April, and also to describe the main objectives of the British Government's policy in South

/Arabia

His Excellency Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero
Chairman of the U.N. Special Mission on
Aden,
New York.

Arabia.

Paragraph 13 of the Mission's Memorandum describes a number of steps and objectives for the future. There is nothing in this paragraph with which the British Government do not wholeheartedly agree.

One of the main points on which there seems to be general agreement between us is that there should be established a new central caretaker government for South Arabia which would be both politically and geographically all embracing. When the new central caretaker government assumed office, it would follow that the present government would automatically cease to function.

Moreover, I have already made clear to the Mission my belief that as a first step towards the establishment of the caretaker government there should be a round table conference representing all shades of South Arabian opinion. I hope that the United Nations can play a major role in this. If the conference is to be effective it is important that those participating should include representatives of all shades of opinion in Aden and elsewhere in South Arabia including those whose leaders are now abroad and including also those whose leaders are members of the

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various South Arabian Governments.

I believe that the United Nations, through the Mission, could have a most constructive and valuable part to play in establishing the conditions in which such a conference could be held and I greatly hope that in its declared spirit of objectivity the Mission will seek to establish the widest possible contacts with all shades of opinion inside and outside South Arabia with this object in view.

Paragraph 13 of the Mission's Memorandum also refers to certain other points about the steps that should now be taken. I gave the Mission my own views on certain of these points during the discussions on 16 April and I have the following to add:-

(1) It is easier to list the conditions needed to bring about a return to normal political life in the territory than to create those conditions. Had the British Government, for their part been able to create these conditions alone, they would certainly have done so long ago. Co-operation is needed from certain other parties who are at present intent on inflaming the violence which has led to the state of

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emergency. In passing, I should like to point out that the phrase "the return of exiles" is inaccurate; there are no restrictions whatever on South Arabian citizens now living abroad returning to South Arabia. Lord Caradon has stated several times in discussions of this question at the United Nations that all South Arabians are free to return to their country and that the British Government are ready to lift the state of emergency when there is evidence that terrorism has ceased. My predecessor and I have also made this clear in the House of Commons.

(ii) The caretaker government must clearly be created first, before it can draw up provisions for the holding of general elections, but I am fully agreed that this is an essential objective.

(iii) The Mission did not explain on 16 April what kind of effective United Nations presence in the territory might, in their view, be established. This is one of the points which I shall most look forward to seeing developed in the Mission's report.

I note that it is the hope of the Mission

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that they will be able to contact all the major political forces in the territory for the purposes set out in paragraph 14 of the Mission's Memorandum. This too is a point which the Mission did not develop in the discussions on 16 April and again I shall very much look forward to hearing their ideas about how this should be accomplished.

In conclusion, let me state that we too believe that the key to success depends on establishing and maintaining a climate of confidence on all sides. To this end I think it may be helpful to the Mission if I summarise in five points the chief objectives of the British Government's policies for South Arabia. Our purposes are these:

(a) We wish to see peaceful conditions restored and the emergency ended.

(b) We intend as soon as possible to end colonial status in Aden and to withdraw from South Arabia.

(c) We intend to withdraw the British base.

(d) We wish to co-operate in achieving the purposes stated in the General Assembly
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resolutions and to work with the United Nations Mission to that end.

(e) We shall continue to work for the early and full independence of South Arabia with a stable and representative government.

(GEORGE BROWN)

MEMORANDUM

(This annex deals with certain points raised in the Mission's letters of 4 and 15 April to the extent that they are not already covered by the letter to which it forms an attachment)

The British Government entirely understand that the Special Mission to Aden were operating on the basis of Resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly. They were also aware of the Mission's difficulty over relations with the Federal Government. They believe that the Mission for their part were equally aware of the constitutional situation resulting from the British Government's treaty obligations to the local governments in South Arabia. Thus, while the British Government fully understand that the Mission is more than a fact-finding Mission in the sense that its task goes beyond fact-finding to the recommending of certain practical steps, they consider it inescapable that the steps

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could only be practical if they were directly related to all the facts. Moreover the British Government considered that the importance of the work of the Mission for the future of South Arabia and for the prestige of the U.N. was too great for it to be allowed to falter on a question of this kind. The British Government had also in mind that missions in other colonial territories had not been deterred from contacts with local governments e.g. last year in Spanish Equatorial Guinea. They therefore believed, and still believe, that with flexibility on both sides, the question of relations with the Federal Government need not be an insuperable obstacle to the Mission's objective, which the British Government entirely endorse, of consulting all groups and all shades of opinion in South Arabia.

In the third paragraph of the Mission's memorandum, five points are listed on which the Mission believed that it had reached understandings with the United Kingdom Government. These five points are set out rather briefly and of course both the British Government and the Mission have their own full records of all that was said.

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The British Government feel, however, that in order to put these five points in their context they should make certain equally brief comments on them:-

(i) In paragraph 3 (a) the Mission said that they would have official dealings only with the representatives of the U.K. in the territory. The British Government understood this and the High Commissioner was indeed fully prepared to act as a channel for this purpose. But it was also the understanding of the British Government that the Mission were ready to listen to those of all shades of opinion in South Arabia, including those represented by South Arabians holding ministerial positions in the Federal Government. There is nothing in any United Nations Resolution debarring the Mission from meeting members of the Federal Government and the question of United Nations or other international "recognition" does not in any case arise in the context of the government of a non-self-governing territory. As explained by Lord Caradon in the United Nations, and as Mr. Thomson explained to the Mission in London, the Federal Government is however validly
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established as a matter of local law and has been treated as such in the United Kingdom's own legislation.

(ii) Paragraphs 3 (B) and (C) of the Mission's letter concerned freedom of access. On the need for this there was no dispute and the British authorities in Aden wished to do their utmost to ensure that the Mission were free to go where they like and see who they liked. This included the detainees, although the latter unfortunately boycotted the Mission. The only limiting factor in this was the violence in Aden which laid on the local authorities a very heavy burden of responsibility for the safeguarding of the Mission from injury and death.

(iii) In paragraphs 3 (D) and (E) of their letter the Mission referred to the lifting of the emergency and release of detainees. In this connexion the British Foreign Secretary made clear to the Mission during their first visit to London that he would consider lifting the state of emergency and releasing detainees if the Mission were able to secure during their visit to

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Cairo a public declaration that terrorism should stop, even though he realised that he could not expect such a declaration to end terrorism entirely.

As a result of the long discussion with the Mission on 16 April, the British Government now understand more clearly the reasons why the Mission did not wish to make any early arrangements to see the petitioners who were asking to be heard by them during the four days they spent in Aden. These reasons are set out in paragraph 7 of the Mission's memorandum and the Foreign Secretary is only sorry that the basis of the Mission's thinking was not more clearly understood while they were in Aden. Had the Mission explained to the High Commissioner, during the two meetings mentioned in paragraph 8 of the memorandum, he would have understood that the Mission did not wish to prejudice any conceivable remaining chance that the political parties which had announced their boycott might after all change their minds. Since this was not clear to the High Commissioner, he was understandably puzzled that the Mission were taking no decisions to interview these people in Aden who asked to see them. It was forr

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this reason that the High Commissioner persisted in his attempts to make what he hoped would be suitable arrangements for the Mission to meet petitioners. The fact that these petitioners consisted mainly of Ministers of the Federal Government and representatives of the South Arabian League, whose views had already been heard by the Mission in Cairo and Jedda, was not of the High Commissioner's choosing: it was the inescapable consequence of the fact that other political parties had decided to boycott the Mission and, as the Mission discovered on its visit to the Mansoura Detention Centre, that the members of those parties were carrying out the boycott instructions which had been issued to them. In this connexion, the British Government noted that even in the Mission's letter to the High Commissioner of 4 April, the fact that the Mission were still hoping for a change of mind by the boycotting parties was not explained.

The tight security arrangements referred to in paragraph 9 of the Mission's memorandum were unfortunately necessitated by the conditions

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of violence prevailing in Aden at the time of the Mission's visit. It would have been inconceivable that the security authorities should have taken any risk of death or injury of the distinguished members of the Mission. Had the Mission succeeded, while in Cairo, in bringing about a reduction in this violence, the security precautions could have been correspondingly diminished, but unfortunately the Mission were not able to achieve this result. Nevertheless, there is a strong possibility, which the Mission did not put to the test, that if the Mission had begun to hear the petitioners who wish to be heard, numerous other petitioners would have begun to come forward and the Mission might have acquired valuable knowledge about various important shades of opinion in the territory.

In the last sentence of paragraph 9 of the Mission's memorandum, mention is made of the fact that no reply to the Mission's letter to the High Commissioner of 4 April had been received by the Mission up to the time of their departure from Aden on the morning of 7 April. As was explained to the Mission on 16 April, this was

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because the High Commissioner, recognising the importance of the Mission's letter, had rightly felt it necessary to report it at once to the British Foreign Secretary. The letter was considered in London with the urgency and thoroughness which its importance merited. The discussions in London on 16 April will, it is hoped, be evidence that the reply would have sought constructively to meet the Mission's preoccupations and requirements. It had not crossed the Foreign Secretary's mind that there was any possibility of such a sudden departure from South Arabia, and in fact he sent instructions for a reply during the night the Mission decided to leave. It would have been with the Mission on the day on which they left.

The Mission were also able to discuss with the Foreign Secretary at some length on 16 April the circumstances relating to the Mission's attempt to make a radio and television broadcast to the people of the territory. As the Mission will recall, the Foreign Secretary explained on 16 April that broadcasting services were under the direct authority of the Federal Authority. Here

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again, if the Mission had stayed a further twenty-four hours in Aden, he is convinced that it would have been possible to overcome the difficulties with the broadcasting authorities to which one or two of the remarks in the text of the broadcast had unfortunately given rise. The Mission did of course receive a message from the Foreign Secretary to this effect before leaving Aden and he is sorry that the Mission did not feel able to reconsider their decision to depart. He is particularly sorry that in the statement made by a spokesman for the Mission at Rome Airport on 7 April the Mission should have put forward a rather one-sided account of this particular episode. For instance, the statement that "No explanations were forthcoming from the High Commissioner" makes no mention of the fact that the High Commissioner personally made three attempts to telephone to the Mission on the night of 6 April and the Mission did not accept any of the calls.

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MEMORANDUM BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MISSION ON ADEN. -

The reply of Mr. Brown, Foreign Secretary, to our letter of April 1967, was received on 26th April 1967. It contained a number of positive points which, however, have been blurred to some extent by some negative points which are to be found particularly in the memorandum attached to the letter.

1. - These negative points refer largely to the past events. There are some obvious mis-representations of the facts as they actually happened and some of the comments seem to be intended to cast doubts on the wisdom of some of the Mission's decisions, in particular that concerning its departure from Aden on 7th April. For example, it is stated that the Mission would have received the reply to its letter to the High Commissioner on the date on which it left, which is at variance with the statement of Mr. Hope during the night of 6 to 7 April that it would take at least another 24 hours for the Mission to receive that reply. Another statement which seems rather strange is that "...If the Mission had stayed a further twenty-four hours in Aden, he (the Foreign Secretary) is convinced that it would have been possible to overcome the difficulties of the broadcasting authorities to which one or two of the remarks of the text of the broadcast had unfortunately given rise". The memorandum states that "the Mission

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of course, received a message from the Foreign Secretary to this effect before leaving Aden". It is not true that the Mission received a message to this effect, except that Mr. Hope, who was holding a teletype sheet in his hand, told the Chairman that a message was being received from the Foreign Secretary which would be ready for delivery to the Mission in an hour or so, at the time when the baggage of the Mission members was being taken down. As a matter of fact, the Mission had never been told, during the day, that there were a couple of "objectionable" remarks in the text, and Mr. Hope had told the Mission, when the Mission called him during the night, that the High Commissioner was still investigating the reasons for not telecasting the Mission's programme.

There are other facts which do not correspond to reality, as for instance, the statement "that the High Commissioner personally made three attempts to telephone to the Mission on the night of 6th April and that the Mission did not accept any of the calls". In fact, there was just one such attempt, at a time when the Mission was in session, and it is obvious from the statement that was made later on behalf of the High Commissioner by Mr. Hope that what he could have told us was that he was investigating the matter.

2. - The positive points refer to the future, i.e. to

to the steps that should be required to lead the territory to full genuine independence. However, a number of aspects should be further clarified for the Mission to be on a sufficiently firm ground in deciding its future course of action.

In Mr. Brown's letter it is said that "...in paragraph 13 of the Mission's memorandum which describes its steps and objectives for the future there is nothing with which the British Government do not wholeheartedly agree".

a) The letter refers to "a new central caretaker government for South Arabia which would be both politically and geographically all embracing". In the context of our discussions in London the qualification of "new" reflects the Mission's insistence that the central caretaker government should not be an outgrowth of the present Federal Government, i.e. that it should be organized on an entirely new basis, with as broad a representation as possible. This will have to be again made crystal clear, in order to avoid any future misunderstandings.

On the other hand, the British Government now agrees that the caretaker government should cover the whole territory ("geographically all embracing"). This is all the more interesting since during the discussions in London the Foreign Secretary

suggested that it may not be possible to reach that goal and that one should be prepared, in that case, to proceed with the formation of a caretaker government which would not include the Eastern states. He was then reminded that such a course of action would be totally contrary to the resolution 2183 (XXI) and had, therefore, to be discarded.

b) It is also stated in the letter that "...when the new central caretaker government assumed office, it would follow that the present government would automatically cease to function". This statement was obtained upon the insistence of the Mission that the Federal Government has to be dissolved and that the British position ought to be clarified on this point. There is room for improvement of the language used in the letter, although the intention seems to be clear.

c) Reference is made in the letter to a round table conference representing all shades of South Arabian opinion. The convening of such a meeting was raised by the Mission during the first series of discussions in London as a substitute for a constitutional conference conducted by the British on the basis of the classical decolonization pattern used by them. It appears to the Mission that it is entirely unrealistic to follow that pattern in the situation

prevailing in Aden and the protectorates. The possibility of the round table conference which would be convened under the auspices of the United Nations was mentioned at both sets of discussions in London. The letter refers to the idea that "...the United Nations can play a major role in this". It is said there that the conference would include both the leaders that are now abroad and also "...those members of various South Arabian Governments". The latter phrase raises questions which will have to be dealt with by the Mission and the groups of parties directly concerned with the future of South Arabia. There are obvious difficulties involved in the proposition.

d) As far as the lifting of the state of emergency is concerned, the position assumed in the letter is practically the same as that which was conveyed to the Mission during its first visit to London by Mr. Brown himself, and which did not assist the Mission as it had hoped in its further dealings, owing to the unfavorable circumstances it was faced with.

e) The need for United Nations participation or collaboration in carrying out the steps mentioned above is recognized in Mr. Brown's letter. Such recognition is implicit in various paragraphs of the letter as is the case of the holding of general elections. In this respect, "...the meaning of the effective

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United Nations presence in the territory" is clear in the resolution and has been referred to, along broad lines, in the course of the discussions. Mr. Brown looks forward to seeing this aspect of the Mission's assignment further developed in the Mission's report. The scope of the United Nations presence is not well defined in the resolution, and Mr. Brown may have in his mind some controversial proposals which have been advanced by some segments of the British public opinion.

3. - The question of the Federal Government still presents potential danger in the Mission's activities for future action and it is not definitely clarified. It was largely because of the efforts of British Authorities in Aden aiming at involving the Mission in dealings with the Federal Government that the Mission was prevented from carrying out what it had set out to do in the Territory, in the face of serious difficulties arising from the state of emergency. The Mission's position had been clearly stated as from the moment that it undertook its assignment, i. e. that the Mission would deal officially with the British Government alone (or its representatives in Aden), as the administrative Power and not with the Federal Government, the creation of which had been deplored by the Special Committee as unrepresentative. In the memorandum attached to Mr.

Brown's letter, the British Government shows understanding to this position but, at the same time, still resorts to a pervasive insistence that the Mission should listen to all sides of opinions in South Arabia "including those representing by South Arabians holding ministerial positions in the Federal Government". The Mission has not ruled out that possibility, although it has felt that any hearing to this effect would impair the efforts directed at a positive change of attitude of FLOSY towards it. This question deserves further consideration by the Mission from the point of view of the principle which it is determined to uphold and of what it might be called upon to decide under circumstances which are difficult to anticipate and always provided that the position of principle will not, in any way, be trampled with.

In his letter Mr. Brown attempts to obtain a statement from the Mission on this matter. After referring to the Mission's hope that it will be able to contact all the major political forces on the territory he adds: "This too is a point that the Mission did not develop in the discussion of 16 April and, again, I shall very much look forward to hearing their ideas (the Mission's) of how this should be accomplished".

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1. These negative points refer largely to the past events. There are some obvious mis-representations of the facts as they actually happened, and several of the comments seem to be intended to cast doubts on the wisdom of some of the Mission's decisions, in particular that concerning its departure from Aden on 7th April. For example, it is stated that the Mission would have received the reply to its letter to the High Commissioner on the date on which it left, which is at variance with the statement of Mr. Hope during the night of 6 to 7 April that it would take at least another 24 hours for the Mission to receive that reply. Another statement which seems rather strange is that "...If the Mission had stayed a further twenty-four hours in Aden, he (the Foreign Secretary) is convinced that it would have been possible to overcome the difficulties of the broadcasting authorities to which one or two of the remarks of the text of the broadcast had unfortunately given rise". The memorandum states that "the Mission of course, received a message from the Foreign Secretary to this effect before leaving Aden". It is not true that the Mission received a message to this effect, except that Mr. Hope, who was holding a teletype sheet in his hand, told the Chairman that a message was being received from the Foreign Secretary which would be ready for delivery to the Mission in an hour or so, at the time when the baggage of the Mission members was being taken down. As a matter of fact, the Mission had never been told, during the day, that there were a couple of "objectionable" remarks in the text, and Mr. Hope had told the Mission, when the Mission called him during the night, that the High Commissioner was still investigating the reasons for not tele-casting the Mission's programme.

There are other facts which do not correspond to reality, as for instance, the statement "that the High Commissioner personally made three attempts to telephone to the Mission on the night of 6th April and that the Mission did not accept any of the calls". In fact, there was just one such attempt, at a time when the Mission was in session, and it is obvious from the statement that was made later on behalf of the High Commissioner by Mr. Hope that what he could have told us was that he was investigating the matter.

2. The positive points refer to the future, i.e. to the steps that should be required to lead the territory to full genuine independence. However, a number of aspects should be further clarified for the Mission to be on a sufficiently firm ground in deciding its future course of action.

In Mr. Brown's letter it is said that "...in paragraph 13 of the Mission's memorandum which describes its steps and objectives for the future there is nothing with which the British Government do not wholeheartedly agree".

(a) The letter refers to "a new central caretaker government for South Arabia which would be both politically and geographically all embracing". In the context of our discussions in London the qualification of "new" reflects the Mission's insistence that the central caretaker government should not be an outgrowth of the present Federal Government, i.e. that it should be organized on an entirely new basis, with as broad a representation as possible. This will have to be again made crystal clear, in order to avoid any future misunderstandings.

On the other hand, the British Government now agrees that the caretaker government should cover the whole territory ("geographically all embracing"). This is all the more interesting since during the discussions in London the Foreign Secretary suggested that it may not be possible to reach that goal and that one should be prepared, in that case, to proceed with the formation of a caretaker government which would not include the Eastern states. He was then reminded that such a course of action would be totally contrary to the resolution 2183 (XXI) and had, therefore, to be discarded.

(b) It is also stated in the letter that "...when the new central caretaker government assumed office, it would follow that the present government would automatically cease to function". This statement was obtained upon the insistence of the Mission that the Federal Government has to be dissolved and that the British position ought to be clarified on this point. There is room for improvement of the language used in the letter, although the intention seems to be clear.

(c) Reference is made in the letter to a round-table conference representing all shades of South Arabian opinion. The convening of such a meeting was raised by the Mission during the first series of discussions in London as a substitute for a constitutional conference conducted by the British on the basis of the classical decolonization pattern used by them. It appears to the Mission that it is entirely unrealistic to follow that pattern in the situation prevailing in Aden and the protectorates. The possibility of the round-table conference which would be convened under the auspices of the United Nations was mentioned at both sets of discussions in London. The letter refers to the idea that "...the United Nations can play a major role in this". It is said there that the conference would include both the leaders that are now abroad and also "...those members of various South Arabian Governments". The latter phrase raises questions which will have to be dealt with by the Mission and the groups or parties directly concerned with the future of South Arabia. There are obvious difficulties involved in the proposition.

(d) As far as the lifting of the state of emergency is concerned, the position assumed in the letter is practically the same as that which was conveyed to the Mission during its first visit to London by Mr. Brown himself, and which did not assist the Mission as it had hoped in its further dealings, owing to the unfavourable circumstances it was faced with.

(e) The need for United Nations participation or collaboration in carrying out the steps mentioned above is recognized in Mr. Brown's letter. Such recognition is implicit in various paragraphs of the letter as is the case of the holding of general elections. In this respect, the meaning of "the effective United Nations presence in the territory" is clear in the resolution and has been referred to, along broad lines, in the course of the discussions. Mr. Brown looks forward to seeing this aspect of the Mission's assignment further developed in the Mission's report. The scope of the United Nations presence is not well defined in the resolution, and Mr. Brown may have in his mind some controversial proposals which have been advanced by some segments of the British public opinion.

3. The question of the Federal Government still presents potential danger in the Mission's future activities if it is not definitely clarified. It was largely because of the efforts of British Authorities in Aden aiming at involving the Mission in dealings with the Federal Government that the Mission was prevented from carrying out what it had set out to do in the Territory, in the face of serious difficulties arising from the state of emergency. The Mission's position had been clearly stated as from the moment it undertook its assignment, i.e. that the Mission would deal officially with the British Government alone (or its representatives in Aden), as the administering Power and not with the Federal Government, the creation of which had been deplored by the Special Committee as unrepresentative. In the memorandum attached to Mr. Brown's letter, the British Government shows understanding to this position but, at the same time, still resorts to a pervasive insistence that the Mission should listen to all sides of opinions in South Arabia "including those represented by South Arabians holding ministerial positions in the Federal Government". The Mission has not ruled out that possibility, although it has felt that any hearing to this effect would impair the efforts directed at a positive change of attitude of FLOSY towards it. This question deserves further consideration by the Mission from the point of view of the principle which it is determined to uphold and of what it might be called upon to decide under circumstances which are difficult to anticipate and always provided that the position of principle will not, in any way, be trampled with.

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New York 2 May 1967.

From the P.R. J.V.K.

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SOUTH ARABIA

1. Her Majesty's Government, believing that the United Nations has a very important role in South Arabia, confirm their support for the purposes of the resolutions of the General Assembly, and further confirm that they wish to give the United Nations Mission every assistance and full support.
2. Her Majesty's Government welcome the intention of the Mission to pursue its endeavours to sound all sections of opinion in South Arabia, and agree that in order to do so the Mission must have unimpeded access to all sections of opinion.
3. Her Majesty's Government do not expect the Mission to deal formally with the Federal Government and other local authorities. All political contacts in South Arabia will therefore be arranged through the British authorities. This should not preclude or impede the declared intention of the Mission to sound all sections of opinion, nor exclude hearing persons holding positions of local responsibility. None of this can carry with it any implication of international recognition of the Federal Government.
4. With a view to establishing a central caretaker government as required by the United Nations resolutions it seems essential to try to achieve an early round-table conference of all concerned. This may well require further endeavours to make preliminary contact with various groups representing political opinion in South Arabia. Her Majesty's Government will welcome and support United Nations initiatives to these ends.
5. Her Majesty's Government hope that such initiatives will lead on to the early independence of South Arabia under a stable and fully representative government.
6. Her Majesty's Government does not want to continue the present state of emergency and will warmly welcome all efforts towards the restoration of peaceful conditions. They are ready to lift the state of emergency when there is evidence that terrorism ceases. As the Secretary of State told the Mission in London, he would take some risks over this but any Government facing such conditions as those in South Arabia would need evidence that violence is no longer being promoted.
7. Her Majesty's Government have repeatedly promised that independence will be granted to South Arabia not later than 1968. This necessitates all necessary steps to that end being taken as a matter of urgency.

TO: *M. Narasimhan*
 As:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED	✓	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

*Excerpt from NASSER'S
 speech on 1 May
 concerning Aden*

*Thurs.
 17/5/64*

Date:

10/5

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

M. Narasimhan

The United States is operating everywhere. They gave Yemen economic aid but that did not include firing at an ammunition dump with bazookas. Police dogs followed the tracks, and the Americans were arrested. A crisis then broke out between the United States and Yemen. Yemen was threatened, but the Yemeni Government took an honourable stand. President Abdullah as-Sallal adopted a revolutionary attitude. Like the counter-revolutionaries, the revolutionary forces should also stick together. I believe that the revolutionary forces should stand together - the revolutionary forces in Egypt and in Yemen.

In South Arabia there is a revolution and revolutionaries. You have seen on television films about the struggling South Arabian people - youths, women and children - and how they fearlessly oppose British fire and grenades. I told some British Labour Members of Parliament, including the present Defence Minister, that the Conservatives' policy could never win, and that the setting up of an agent Government to enable them to remain as neo-colonialists was impossible. Britain's plan is to consolidate the Federal Government's position in the occupied South and subsequently to control it. The UN resolution said the Federal Government did not represent the people of the South. Yesterday I read that the BBC had broadcast a cable addressed to me by the Federal Government. I did not receive the cable. It only reached me through the BBC. They ask me to suspend aid to the revolutionaries in the South. I wish to tell them that the revolutionaries of the South want an independent and liberated South. They want deliverance from imperialism. What have you done? You say you want Britain lest Abd an-Nasir raids and colonises us. I proclaim before the whole world that we will not move our Army to the South. Never. The South belongs to its own sons. You do not fear what you say in these words - which I know the British dictated to you. These words are pretexts.

I am saying this to the Federal Government in the occupied South which was told by the British Government that they wanted to leave in November 1967. The Federal Government told the British not to leave, not even in 1968. Would anyone tell imperialism to stay? Would the people regard him as a man or an agent? I tell the Federal Government which sent the cable yesterday - the one I learned about from the BBC - that its behaviour is that of a traitor and an agent. You have only one way to prove to the Arab nation, South Arabia and the people of the occupied South that you still have some patriotism or honour left in you. You must demand the immediate termination of British colonialism. You must also comply with the UN resolutions, end the state of emergency, release political detainees and proclaim your penitence and resignation. You should proclaim your penitence and tender your resignation to the people and to the British Governor in Aden. Those who sent the cable to me in atonement for their evil deeds should comply with this. They should prove to the South Arabian people and the Arab nation that they still have some honour and patriotism left in them.

On our side, we will support the nationalist forces in the occupied South with all our capacity. We will meet the demands of the Liberation Front. At the same time I call on the nationalist revolutionary forces in the South to unite and not to give imperialism any opportunity. Imperialism is now seeking an opportunity. Faysal is coiling like a striking snake. Faysal openly says Britain should not withdraw from the South. Faysal also says that Britain should not leave and the people should be imprisoned and killed. Faysal is an imperialist agent. He wants everybody to be like him. Eshkol too does not want the British to leave the South. The Israeli Premier Eshkol said yesterday that he wanted Britain to remain in the South and Aden. Both he and Faysal want Britain to stay in the South and in Aden.

This is a constant battle. We support the revolutionary forces against imperialism in any Arab country and everywhere. Imperialism will never cease working against us. They will not cease plotting because we represent true resistance. We represent our nation's ability to withstand, our nation's will to live, and our nation's hope of freedom and deliverance from imperialism and its allies, the foremost of which is Zionist racialism in Israel.

19 May 1967

My dear Ambassador,

I have received your letter of 17 May informing me of the difficulties of Ambassador Abusattar Shalizi, one of the members of the Special Mission on Aden.

I have discussed this matter with my colleagues. In the circumstances explained by you I have come to the conclusion that the most satisfactory arrangement would be to treat Ambassador Shalizi as a Consultant, but without the contractual status of a Consultant. If this proposal is acceptable, I shall be prepared to authorize a compensatory payment to Ambassador Shalizi of \$1000 per month from the date of his joining the Mission until such time as the Mission's work is completed. I believe this arrangement will maintain his position of independence as a member of the Mission.

I shall be grateful if you could consult Ambassador Shalizi as well as Ambassador Keita and let me know whether this arrangement is acceptable all round.

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

His Excellency Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero
Chairman, Special Mission on Aden
Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the
United Nations
521 Park Avenue
New York 10021, N.Y.

cc - Mr. Djermakoye
Mr. Turner
Mr. Cox

M. Lemaire ✓

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

CABLE ADDRESS · UNATIONS NEWYORK · ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE

REFERENCE:

17 May 1967

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

8/17/67
C.V.

I wish to bring to your attention a matter concerning Mr. Abusattar Shalizi of Afghanistan, one of the members of the special mission on Aden, which I have already discussed with Mr. C.V. Narasimhan and Mr. I.S. Djermakoye.

As you are already aware Mr. Shalizi is not in the employment of the Government of Afghanistan, having resigned his position with his Government shortly before his designation as a member of the special mission on Aden. Having no salaried position and being unable to undertake any private business while engaged in the work of the mission, Mr. Shalizi finds himself in a situation of financial hardship. This is all the more so since the mission, which was originally expected to last about two months, is now bound to go on for a longer period.

In the circumstances, Mr. Moussa Leo Keita and myself think that, in all fairness and in the interest of the work of the mission, an appropriate financial compensation should be made to Mr. Shalizi for the duration of his work with the mission. We would therefore appreciate it if you could give your earnest consideration to this matter.

We feel confident that you will be able to find an appropriate arrangement for making such a compensatory payment to Mr. Shalizi which will maintain his position of independence as a member of the mission, the intergovernmental character of which you have stressed on more than one occasion.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Manuel Pérez Guerrero'.
Manuel Pérez Guerrero
Chairman
Special Mission on Aden

H.E. U Thant
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York N.Y.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:
A: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

The attached Note was prepared by the special mission on Aden at its meeting this afternoon. The mission has requested that the note be handed to the Secretary-General before he leaves for Cairo.

Pl. bring with us.
mis
Lucie
5/5/67

Date:
22 May 1967
CR.13 (11-64)

FROM: *Ch*
DE: M.E. Chacko

Confidential

22 May 1967

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN

The Secretary-General may wish to have in mind during his forthcoming talks with UAR officials in Cairo the following developments connected with the United Nations Special Mission on Aden, of which he has already been informed:

As a result of the Mission's efforts through the representatives of a number of Arab States to obtain the co-operation of FLOSY, a message was conveyed to it by Amb. El-Kony of the UAR on 6 May 1967 that FLOSY had decided, at a meeting in Cairo, to co-operate with the United Nations Mission and that they were prepared to meet the Mission in New York. FLOSY also conveyed their appreciation of the Mission's position in respect of the Federal Government in South Arabia. The Mission welcomed FLOSY's decision and, through the same channel, conveyed its appreciation to the UAR authorities for their assistance in this matter and its considered opinion that the meeting should be held as soon as possible.

The Mission has been told by Lord Caradon of the United Kingdom that, around the middle of June, Foreign Secretary Brown intends to make a statement on the British Government's future policy in Aden. A Bill providing for "enabling legislation" will also be introduced in the House of Commons in this connection. This adds to the urgency of the Mission's future work, of which the proposed meeting with FLOSY is the next important step. It is therefore essential that this meeting should take place at the earliest possible date. A message to this effect from the Mission to FLOSY was sent again last week through the good offices of Amb. El-Kony. The Mission understands that Mr. Mackawee and some other leaders of FLOSY are at present in Cairo.

UNITED NATIONS

Public Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release GA/COL/614
19 July 1967

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL MISSION ON ADEN HOLDS TALKS WITH FLOSY

Following is the press communique issued in New York today by the United Nations Special Mission on Aden:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden, in furtherance of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI), held a series of meetings with the delegation of FLOSY (Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South Yemen) from 11 to 19 July 1967. The exchange of views which took place has, in the opinion of the Mission, been useful. The Mission will pursue its consultations in accordance with its mandate."

* * * * *

INCOMING
INFO COPY

FILE NO.

ACTION **PARASIMHAN**
TO

WU CD007 LDC122 57/56 PD INTL

CD ADEN VIA WUI 3 1130

LT MR UTHANT GENERAL SECRETARY

UNITED NATIONS NYK

WE THANK YOU AND ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR TELEGRAM DATED 31/7 STOP

WE DECLARED GENERAL STRIKE ON THE DAY OF MISSIONS

ARRIVAL AT GENEVA IN PROTEST OF THE MISSION READINESS TO MEET SULTANS

AND BRITISH STOOGES OF NON-NATIONALIST PARTIES STOP

REVOULTIONISTS ARE THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE

NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

UNITED NATIONS
17 AUG -4 PM 7:15
TELEGRAPH UNIT

655A

31 July 1967 H. Rifai

3316
2608

TRN

X

2/8

NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

ADEN

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR CABLE OF 25 JULY WE INFORM YOU THAT THE UN SPECIAL
MISSION ON ADEN WILL START MEETINGS WITH THE ELEMENTS CONCERNED IN GENEVA
FROM 11 AUGUST 1967

DJERMAKOYE
UNDER-SECRETARY FOR TRUSTESHIP
AND NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

COMMUNICATION NO. 1474

ADEN, 25 JULY 1967

U THANT
SECRETARY GENERAL
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER TURN TO UNITED NATIONS MISSION ON ADEN
IN FACE OF POWERFUL REVOLUTION, STRIKES AND INTENSIFIED POPULAR AND ARMED
RESISTANCE STOP NLF VANGUARD OF POPULAR ARMED REVOLUTION SINCE
14 OCTOBER 1963 STRESSES ITS REFUSAL NON ACCEPTANCE AND RESISTANCE TO ANY
SETTLEMENT OR SOLUTIONS REACHED WITH BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER OR ANY
OTHER END WITHOUT FIRSTLY SEEKING NLF OPINION AND APPROVAL

NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

TO: Mr. Lucien Lemieux
A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

The attached is for your file.

This cable was sent yesterday as discussed by the Secretary-General with Mr. Djermakoye.

Date:
22 Aug. 1967
CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:
DE: T. Tanaka T.T.

21 Aug.1967

3327

TRN

2821

SON EXCELLENCE
MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
REPUBLIQUE DU MALI
BAMAKO (MALI)

J'APPRENDS PAR M. L'AMBASSADEUR KEITA, REPRESENTANT PERMANENT DU MALI AUPRES DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES, QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT MALIEN COMPTE PROPOSER M. DIAKITE, COMME MEMBRE DE LA MISSION SPECIALE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR ADEN POUR LUI SUCCEDER. COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, J'AVAIS NOMME LES MEMBRES DE LA MISSION SPECIALE POUR ADEN EN CONSULTATION AVEC LE COMITE SPECIAL DES VINGT-QUATRE ET AVEC LA PUISSANCE ADMINISTRANTE, EN EXECUTION DU PARAGRAPHE 5 DE LA RESOLUTION 2183 (XXI) DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE. POUR ARRIVER A UN ACCORD DEFINITIF SUR LA COMPOSITION DE LA MISSION, IL A ETE DUMENT TENU COMPTE DES TITRES ET QUALIFICATIONS PERSONNELS DES CANDIDATS, COMME IL EST D'USAGE POUR LES NOMINATIONS DE CE GENRE.

LA MISSION SPECIALE, QUI SIEGE ACTUELLEMENT A GENEVE, EN EST A LA PHASE CRUCIALE DE SES TRAVAUX. EN RAISON DE CE FAIT ET DE LA COMPLEXITE DES PROBLEMES DONT ELLE S'OCCUPE, J'ESTIME QU'IL SERAIT HAUTEMENT SOUHAITABLE, A CE STADE, D'ASSURER A LA MISSION LA CONTINUITE DE SA COMPOSITION ACTUELLE. DANS CES CIRCONSTANCES, JE SERAIS TRES HEUREUX QUE DES MESURES PUISSENT ETRE PRISES POUR QUE L'AMBASSADEUR KEITA PUISSE DEMEURER MEMBRE DE LA MISSION SPECIALE JUSQU'A LA CONCLUSION DE SES TRAVAUX.

TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION.

U THANT
SECRETAIRE GENERAL
NATIONS UNIES

English translation

I have been informed by Ambassador Keita, Permanent Representative of Mali Mission to the United Nations, that it is the intention of the Government of Mali to propose Mr. Diakite as member of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden to succeed him. As you are aware, members of the Special Mission on Aden were appointed by me in consultation with the Special Committee of Twenty-four and the administering Power in pursuance of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI). In reaching the final agreement on the Mission's composition, due consideration was given to personal qualifications of candidates as it is customary in such appointments.

The Special Mission which is currently meeting in Geneva is at the most crucial phase of its task. Bearing this in mind and in view of the complexity of the problems facing the Mission, I feel that it would be most desirable at this stage to maintain continuity in the present membership. In these circumstances, I would be most grateful if an arrangement could be made to enable Ambassador Keita to serve the Special Mission until conclusion of its work.

Highest consideration.

FOLLOWING OUT OF SEQUENCE

222422/56 S NEWYORK 262/233 21 1705EDST PUNTNS CTD UNGOVT P1/56/50

ETATPRIORITE

SON EXCELLENCE

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

REPUBLIQUE DU MALI

BAMAKO (MALI)

J'APPRENDS PAR M. L'AMBASSADEUR KEITA, REPRESENTANT PERMANENT
DU MALI AUPRES DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES, QUE LE
GOUVERNEMENT MALIEN COMPTE PROPOSER. ^m DIAKITE, COMME MEMBRE
DE LA MISSION SPECIALE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR ADEN

P2/56/50

POUR LUI SUCCEDER. COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, J'AVAIS NOMME LES
MEMBRES DE LA MISSION SPECIALE POUR ADEN EN CONSULTATION AVEC
LE COMITE SPECIAL DES VINGT-QUATRE ET AVEC LA PUISSANCE
ADMINISTRANTE, EN EXECUTION DU PARAGRAPHE 5 DE LA RESOLUTION
2183 (XXI) DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE. POUR ARRIVER

P3/52/50

A UN ACCORD DEFINITIF SUR LA COMPOSITION DE LA MISSION, IL A
ETE DUMENT TENU COMPTE DES TITRES ET QUALIFICATIONS PERSONNELS
DES CANDIDATS, COMME IL EST D'USAGE POUR LES NOMINATIONS DE CE
GENRE. LA MISSION SPECIALE, QUI SIEGE ACTUELLEMENT A GENEVE, EN
EST A LA

P4/56/50

PHASE CRUCIALE DE SES TRAVAUX. EN RAISON DE CE FAIT ET DE
LA COMPLEXITE DES PROBLEMES DONT ELLE S'OCCUPE, J'ESTIME QU'IL
SERAIT HAUTEMENT SOUHAITABLE, A CE STADE, D'ASSURER A LA MISSION
LA CONTINUITE DE SA COMPOSITON ACTUELLE. DANS CES CIRCONSTANCES,
JE SERAIS TRES HEUREUX

P5/37/33

QUE DES MESURES PUISSENT ETRE PRISES POUR QUE L'AMBASSADEUR
KEITA PUISSE DEMEURER MEMBRE DE LA MISSION SPECIALE JUSQU'A
LA CONCLUSION DE SES TRAVAUX. TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION

U THANT SECRETAIRE GENERAL NATIONS UNIES

COL 5 2183

UNITED NATIONS
EST 205 21 PM 5:35
TELETYPE UNIT

Rec'd by Head 1300h. 1.12.67

orig. J. Gagerian for action

② Pl. copy. 19/8/67

31st August, 1967

Excellency,

With reference to Your Excellency's note (document A/AC.109/260 dated August 24th, 1967) transmitting the text of a communication addressed to the Secretary-General by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, we the Representatives of the Arab States have the honour to state the followings:

1. The Islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and other off-shore islands came under British control as a result of colonial occupation.

It must be conceded, however, that neither colonial occupation nor the convenience of colonial administration justifies the establishment of a separate identity for the Island of Perim and other off-shore islands.

These islands are an integral part of the Arab homeland, inhabited by Arab people whose culture, history and aspirations have been inseparable from those of the Arab people of Southern Arabia.

2. General Assembly resolutions 2023(XX) and 2183(XXI) specifically affirmed that the off-shore islands, including the Islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, and Kamaran form an integral part of the territory of Aden.

31st August, 1967

It is further re-affirmed in these two resolutions that the people of the Territory, as a whole, are to achieve their independence in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration of Independence for Colonial Countries and Peoples, resolution 1514(XV) of the General Assembly, where it is stated that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

Moreover, resolution 2183(XXI) takes special note of the assurance given by the Representative of the United Kingdom on 10th November 1966 concerning the territorial integrity and unity of South Arabia as a whole.

The suggestion put forward by the United Kingdom, which will result in disruption of the territorial integrity of South Arabia, is therefore clearly in contravention to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) and resolutions 2023(XX) and 2183(XXI).

Now, the United Kingdom while acknowledging that Perim would adhere to South Arabia when the latter became independent, reference is made in the letter dated 11th August by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General to the fact that the United Kingdom Government informed the United Nations when resolution 2023(XX) was under discussion in 1965 "that Perim was not part of Aden State and that it would consult the people about their future when the time came." The letter of the Deputy Permanent

31st August, 1967

Representative does not mention, however that no such reservation about the status of Perim was expressed when resolution 2183(XXI) was under discussion in 1966. This latter resolution which specifically includes in the Territory the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and the other off-shore islands, was in fact endorsed by the United Kingdom, whose affirmative vote nullified the reservation made in the previous years.

The Representatives of the Arab States categorically reject this British proposal which aims at the dismemberment of the territory.

We further wish to state that the United Nations should not be called upon to act in contravention of its Charter, and solemn resolutions in order to further the political ends of one Member State. The scope of United Nations responsibility as it was most clearly defined in the resolutions of the General Assembly was to assist in the attainment of full independence.

The Special Mission on Aden cannot therefore be called upon to consider this proposal as it does not only exceed the mission's terms of reference but is also contrary to the basic purposes and objectives of resolution 2183(XXI).

It is our considered opinion that if the Government of the United Kingdom has "no undeclared interest of its own with regard to Perim" it would be well advised to abandon this proposal and affirm its adherence to the principles of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as stated in the resolution of the General Assembly 1514(XV) and its commitments to carrying out the provisions of resolution 2183(XXI).

31st August, 1967


Assuring Your Excellency of our highest consideration, we should be very grateful if you would kindly arrange to have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Special Committee of 24 .



Representative of Algeria




Representative of Iraq




Representative of Jordan




Representative of Kuwait




Representative of Lebanon




Representative of Libya




Representative of Morocco




Representative of Saudi Arabia



Representative of Sudan



Representative of Syria



Representative of Tunisia



Representative of United Arab Republic



Representative of Yemen

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL

Pl. Keep 31/10/67

SOUTH ARABIA: DECISIONS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT

The naval and air deterrent forces offered to the Federal Government in June are cancelled, since changes in the Yemen and South Arabia now make them inappropriate. Naval forces already assembled in South Arabian waters will cover the period of final British withdrawal and the transition to independence.

2. Independence and final British withdrawal, previously fixed at 9 January, 1968, will be during "the second half of November". This flexibility of dates is because we do not know when or even whether a new Government will emerge to start negotiation of outstanding issues.

3. Decisions on the post-independence military and economic support offered to the Federal Government must be taken later. This includes the proposed military advising and training mission which will be at fourteen days notice to proceed but will not do so without further decision.

4. We shall continue ready to negotiate with "Nationalist" representatives if they come forward for negotiation, but independence will be brought about by the end of November whether this proves possible or not.

*To be announced in 4 of C Press 2 Nov 10 30 AM
Devon's only press taken
Can't do any more*

*Read at 4.45 p.m.
in Times, 31 October 1967
31/10*

CONFIDENTIAL



Minister of State

I submit the attached notes for talking to the Secretary General on Aden.

2. Lord Shackleton has had two days of substantive talks with the N.L.F. delegation in Geneva. The principal N.L.F. spokesman is Qahtan As-Shaabi. The talks have run into some difficulty over the future disposal of the Kuria Muria Islands. Lord Shackleton decided to start the discussions by informing the N.L.F. of our decisions on the Islands following the popular consultations which have now been completed in the case not only of the Kuria Murias but of Perim and Kamaran.
3. The Kuria Murias are a small group of five islands off the coast of Muscat (and not of South Arabia) ceded to Britain by the Sultan in 1854. They have only 70 to 80 inhabitants and have always been administratively separate from Aden and latterly the Federation, although administrated from Aden. The Islanders were consulted last month and made it very clear that they wished to return to the Sultanate.
4. We have always maintained reservations on the 1965 and 1966 Resolutions about the preambular paragraphs including the Islands in the definition of South Arabia, and our preliminary thoughts about their disposal were made clear to the U.N. Special Mission by Sir H. Trevelyan in July (paragraph 201 of the Mission's Report).
5. The N.L.F. have raised the decision to hand back the Islands to the Sultanate into a major issue of principle and there is now a possibility that the talks, which have ^{been} almost entirely concerned so far with this question, could break down because of it. Lord Shackleton has returned to London today for consultations but will be going back to resume negotiations probably later today.
6. It would be tragic if the hopes of a peaceful transition to independence and the prospects of more orderly and stable conditions in S. Arabia were to be destroyed because of differences over this very minor issue of the Kuria Murias. But at present the N.L.F. leaders seem intent on inflating it into a major issue. Our own concern has been for the wishes of the people of these small islands, which, as we have consistently maintained at the U.N., have always been separate from S. Arabia. All their ethnic, historical and other links with the outside world have always been with Muscat.

J.D.B.
/ (J.D.B. Shaw)
24 November, 1967.

ADEN TAKES OVER FOREIGN CONCERNS

36 Are Nationalized, but
Compensation Is Promised

ADEN, Southern Yemen, Nov. 27 (AP)—The People's Republic of Southern Yemen nationalized 36 foreign concerns today, including four British banks, the chairman of the Presidential Council, Salem Ali Rubaya, announced.

British, French, United States, Jordanian, Pakistani, Indian and Southern Yemeni concerns involved in banking, stevedoring, foreign trade, insurance and the marketing of petroleum products were affected.

The oil and lubricant marketing organizations of British Petroleum, Shell, Mobil, Esso and Caltex were nationalized, although British and United States investments in petroleum refineries, bunkering in Aden harbor and aviation fuel operations were not affected.

British Petroleum's \$6.75-million refinery also was spared.

13 Days of Meetings

Mr. Rubaya made the announcement over the radio after 13 days of meetings by the general command of the ruling National Liberation Front.

He said shareholders and owners of the nationalized concerns would be compensated by bonds payable after 20 years at an annual interest of 2 per cent.

Mr. Rubaya said these are the only nationalizations the Government plans.

Security men immediately moved in to guard the affected companies.

Banking, shipping, stevedoring, insurance and foreign trade will now be in the public sector and no private concern will be allowed to operate in these fields, the nationalization law indicated.

Fighting In Southern Yemen

Special to The New York Times

ADEN, Southern Yemen, Nov. 27—The People's Republic of Southern Yemen charged that regular Saudi Arabian forces supported by aircraft attacked Southern Yemen positions near the frontier yesterday, 300 miles north of Aden, and that fighting was continuing today.

Abdulbari Kassim, the Information Minister, said that the Saudi forces attacked an outpost at Al Wadea, 70 miles north of Husn al'Abr in the Fourth Governorate yesterday morning. He said that the attack was repulsed and 30 Saudis were killed or wounded and 12 captured. A quantity of arms was also seized, according to a bulletin issued by the Defense Ministry.

The site of the reported clash is in the Hadhramaut region, formerly the British Eastern Aden Protectorate.

The Al Abr fortress occupies a strategic position at two major desert roads, one leading into the Hadhramaut Valley and the other into Beihan Province.

The fighting was reported to have erupted again when the Saudis sent more forces into battle supported by aircraft.

New Attack Reported

This morning another military bulletin said that Southern Yemeni forces repulsed another Saudi attack today. Thirty Saudis were reported killed, wounded or captured and more arms seized after what was described as a ferocious battle. Southern Yemen's forces suffered no losses, according to the bulletin.

Mr. Kassim said that the aircraft were flown by mercenaries because King Feisal had imprisoned the regular air force pilots, whom he suspected of plotting a coup.

This is the first time that Southern Yemen has charged that regular Saudi forces were fighting against this country since independence two years ago.

On previous occasions Southern Yemen accused Saudi Arabia and American intelligence of aiding and arming tribal mercenaries to fight for them.

This is also the first reference to Saudi Arabian aircraft in action against Southern Yemen.

The semi-official press reported here this week that Southern Yemen was being threatened with attacks at three places on the frontiers—against the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Governorates, including the Beihan, Hadhramaut and Mahra regions.

Last year tribesmen made similar attacks across the frontier between Southern Yemen and royalist-controlled areas in Yemen, but they were quickly repulsed by Southern Yemen's armed forces.

Foreign Minister Ali Salem al-Beedh told ambassadors in Aden that American intelligence services were backing the Saudis against his country.

Denouncing the reported attacks, Mr. Kassim said that his Government had complained to the Arab League. A complaint was also made to the United Nations.

Sunday, 30 November 1969

Saudi-Southern Yemeni Clashes Are Result of an Old Conflict

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Nov. 29—The clashes this week between Saudi Arabian and Southern Yemeni forces over the frontier post of Al Wadea have for the first time brought about a serious confrontation between the principal traditional and revolutionary forces in the Arabian Peninsula.

Those forces have long been in indirect conflict, most conspicuously in the war begun in 1962 between Saudi-supported royalists and Egyptian-supported republicans in Yemen.

The various newspaper and diplomatic sources of information here indicate that in the new military development, adding one more element to the mosaic of conflicts along Saudi Arabia's southern frontier, the Southern Yemenis have tried to break up a concentration of tribal forces hostile to the Aden Government and supported by the Saudis.

Old Maps Cited

That appears to have been the point of a Southern Yemeni operation Wednesday to overpower the frontier post. The Saudis say that they sent reinforcements to recapture the post later that day. A broadcast by the Jidda radio today indicated, however, that Al Wadea was still in the hands of the Southern Yemenis. It asserted that Saudi Arabia was "determined to get its territory back" and added that the fate of 26 Saudi guards in the post was "still unknown."

The Saudis insist that they have held the area for generations, adding that the tribesmen there pay taxes to Saudi Arabia. But the Southern

Yemenis point to old British maps of the area, which show the frontier post in the former South Arabian Federation, which is now the People's Republic of Southern Yemen.

Nearby is Thamud, where the Pan-American Oil Corporation ended its search for oil in 1966. The American company decided that oil prospects were poor and departed. This casts some doubt on the Southern Yemeni allegation that the Saudis are seeking their oil fields.

The Saudis speak frequently of confrontations with "Communists" in the Middle East and single out the anti-monarchist, socialistic regime in Aden. The Southern Yemenis nationalized the country's banks and insurance companies about the same time they entered into military conflict with the Saudis, and they are supported by the Soviet Union.

In the opinion of students of the area, the new direct conflict between Saudis and Southern Yemenis may open a new area of confrontation in the Hadramauth, known in the days of British rule as the Eastern Aden Protectorate. The revolutionary Southern Yemeni regime is at a disadvantage there.

Logistical problems preclude sending troops overland from Aden, although Southern Yemen has a battalion or two, stationed on the coast of Mukalla.

Aden's control of the Hadramauth has been little more than nominal since British withdrawal in 1967 and the idea that the region might become independent has frequently been voiced in Saudi Arabia.

CLASHES CONTINUE ON YEMENI BORDER

Rubaya Says Saudi Arabia
Bombs Near Al Wadea

Special to The New York Times

ADEN, Southern Yemen, Nov. 30—Southern Yemen's Head of State, Salem Rubaya Ali, said here today that fighting between the regular armies of Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen continued across their common frontiers with Saudi Arabian aircraft bombing Southern Yemen's forces.

Mr. Rubaya, who is chairman of the five-man Presidential Council, told crowds here shortly after midnight that the two armies were engaged in fierce fighting over the frontier post of Al Wadea, which lies on the border of the two countries.

Chairman Rubaya said that Al Wadea belonged to Southern Yemen and that Saudi Arabia had annexed it, together with the Al Sharoorah region, with the consent of the British Government in Aden just before independence.

Saudi Arabia charged Southern Yemen with attacking and occupying Al Wadea and pledged to recapture it.

Aden radio said today that Saudi Arabian forces, supported by a squadron of aircraft, attacked Al Wadea yesterday afternoon, but had been repulsed with heavy casualties and loss of equipment.

Both armies are believed to have dispatched reinforcements to the front. The Southern Yemeni Army had been airlifting troops and equipment to the desolate desert fortress of Husn Alabr, which controls the major desert roads leading into the Hadramauth — known in the days of British rule as the Eastern Aden Protectorate — and Beihan — Western Aden Protectorate — regions.

Addressing a rally to mark Southern Yemen's second anniversary of independence, chairman Rubaya said his country would resist Saudi Arabian aggression with all her might, backed by Socialist countries and progressive Arab states.

The country's 10,000-man army is British-trained and largely Soviet-equipped. It is considered a sound fighting force that has been taught to hate Saudi Arabia intensely. Before they go into the battlefield, each unit digs its own graves.

Chairman Rubaya said that last Thursday's sweeping nationalization decrees were only the beginning of the road to socialism and the supremacy of the workers and farmers in the nation.

AIRCRAFT CLASH AT SAUDI BORDER

Southern Yemen Says MIG's
Drove Off Enemy Planes

Special to The New York Times

ADEN, Southern Yemen, Dec. 1—Saudi Arabian and Southern Yemeni air and ground forces have been battling for the last 24 hours near the border outpost of Al Wadea, according to reports issued here and Saudi Arabian radio broadcasts.

British-made Hawker Hunter aircraft of the Saudi Arabians attacked Southern Yemeni ground forces near Al Wadea, and Southern Yemen's Soviet-made MIG's drove them off, military bulletins reported here.

Saudi Arabia said that her forces had recaptured Al Wadea, killing six of the defenders and capturing 11. A Southern Yemeni counterattack was reportedly repulsed.

Southern Yemen has reported killing, wounding or capturing 30 Saudis in the border clashes, some of whom have been shown on television in Aden. Neither side has reported either losing or downing any planes.

The fighting in the border area broke out last Wednesday. Southern Yemen said that Saudi forces had attacked the Al Wadea outpost and had been repulsed. Saudi Arabia, however, charged that Southern Yemeni forces had attacked and occupied the post.

The area of the fighting was part of British-administered South Arabia before independence was granted in November, 1967, and Southern Yemen was established.

Salem Ali Rubaya, the Southern Yemeni head of state who is chairman of the five-men Presidential Council, said that Saudi Arabia had annexed the disputed area, with the consent of Britain, before independence was granted. The British are said to have believed that the area had originally been part of Saudi Arabia when it was ruled by the Turks before World War I.

The status of the Kuria Muria islands in the Arabian Sea is also disputed by South Yemen. The islands, which had been administered from Aden, were turned over to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman by the British at the time of independence.

Southern Yemen is supporting the Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf, a guerrilla group that opposes the present rule in the islands.

The clash with Saudi Arabia comes at an inopportune time for Southern Yemen, which is striving to cut expenses to meet the requirements of a curtailed budget.

The Government last Thursday announced the nationalization of 36 foreign concerns, including banks, shipping agencies, insurance offices and oil marketing outlets. The move was believed aimed partly at creating more sources of revenue for the Government.

The British-trained army is reputed to be a well-organized fighting force. The soldiers are continually exhorted by the Government, which tells them that the Saudi monarchy is an evil that ought to be liquidated in the interest of all Arabs including the Saudis themselves.

The Saudis, in their broadcasts received here, call the leftist Southern Yemeni Government "the infidels ruling Aden."

Saudis Report Retaking Border Position From Southern Yemenis

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT
Special to The New York Times

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, Dec. 3 — Saudi Arabian military sources announced tonight that the Saudi Army had driven the Southern Yemenis back seven and a half miles and had retaken the border post of Al Wadeiah.

They said that the Southern Yemeni invaders, under heavy pressure from the Saudi Air Force and ground reinforcements, had withdrawn from a point four miles north of Al Wadeiah to new positions three miles south of this post at a hamlet called Um Salem.

The Southern Yemenis are still in the Valley of Al Wadeiah although they are no longer in the post and they are 12 miles within Saudi territory, according to a Saudi military source.

The source noted that for the last four days the Saudi Air Force had kept the Southern Yemenis under attack, while at the same time flying in enough men for the Army, the border police and the National Guard to match the force of about 1,000 men that the Southern Yemenis had concentrated in the region of Al Wadeiah-Beihan and Abr.

Internal Front Calm

Since the leftist Southern Yemeni regime cannot, in the long run, hope to equal Saudi military strength, the purpose of its border attacks, the Saudis presume, may have been to trigger some kind of internal disturbance against the Saudi monarchy of King Faisal.

But the Saudis, who suppressed a plot against their monarchist regime during the summer, now have internal affairs well under control.

It is also possible that oil is involved. There have been persistent reports here that the Southern Yemenis had offered an oil concession to Algeria, including the area of Sharurah to the east of Al Wadeiah, where Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Company, conducted extensive tests before 1967. Aramco concluded that there was no oil in this area, but a large limestone outcropping has continued to interest geologists.

While the Saudis appear to



The New York Times Dec. 4, 1969

have turned back the Southern Yemeni attack, observers here do not believe that this little war between Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen is over. Further developments seem possible in three areas in the eastern part of Southern Yemen: first around Beihan where the Sheik of Beihan has many sympathizers, second in the Hadramauth, where the South Arabian League, a political organization hostile to Southern Yemen, has some strength and third, in the region of the former Aulaqi sultanate.

If the conflict is not settled soon or if other Arab states should show sympathy for the Southern Yemeni regime, it is possible, in the opinion of foreign observers, that the Saudis will decline to attend the conference of Arab leaders due to begin Dec. 20 in Rabat, Morocco.

While no one here would deny that Saudi Arabia has willingly harbored the former rulers of the South Arabian Federation, which preceded the present Southern Yemeni regime, and many tribesmen who are hostile to the leftists in Aden are in this country, the Saudis feel that they have been the victims of premeditated aggression.

At the conference of Arab defense ministers in Cairo a few weeks ago, the southern Yemenis made much of an alleged military build-up on the Saudi side, and the day before the attack at Al Wadeiah, last week the press in Aden announced that Southern Yemeni

forces had been placed on an alert because of the alleged build-up.

More Bombings Reported

Special to The New York Times

ADEN, Southern Yemen, Dec. 3—Southern Yemeni and Saudi Arabian aircraft have reported bombing each other's forces in

the desert along their common border for the seventh consecutive day.

Southern Yemen reported yesterday that her forces had shot down two Saudi planes and had destroyed Saudi convoys and vehicles confronting them around Al Wadeiah. Saudi Arabia has denied

losing any planes and reported that her forces had attacked 14 Southern Yemeni vehicles and had killed an undisclosed number of soldiers. The Saudis admitted, however, that Southern Yemeni planes raided their Southern Yemeni vehicles and one soldier and wounding another.

ARABS SEEK TO LIMIT SAUDI-ADEN FLARE-UP

Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Dec. 5 — Officials and diplomatic couriers hastened between Arab capitals today in an urgent attempt to prevent the fighting between Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen over a border outpost from undermining agreement for a conference of Arab leaders, scheduled to convene two weeks from tomorrow. The meeting has been called to bolster unity and chart strategy against Israel.

Commentary on the clashes between royalist Saudi Arabia and the left-wing regime in Aden has been muted in Arab capitals to avoid inflaming the situation.

Mediation efforts have been undertaken by the United Arab Republic, Libya, Iraq and Morocco, which is to be the host country for the conference in Rabat.

Earlier this week the Cairo radio asserted that the United States was attempting to exploit the flare-up between Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen to torpedo the Rabat conference.

DAMASCUS, Syria, Dec. 5 (AP)—Saudi Arabia claimed victory today in the nine-day war with Southern Yemen over a border outpost.

"Saudi forces have overrun Southern Yemen's last defenses in the embattled Al Wadeiah oasis and taken up positions along the Southern Yemeni northeastern frontiers," an army communiqué broadcast by the Riyadh radio said.

SAUDIS AGAIN HELP YEMENI ROYALISTS

Deny Limited Aid Is Meant
to Destroy Sana Regime

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, Dec. 7.—Saudi Arabia acknowledged today that she had resumed aid to the Yemeni royalists in their intermittent seven-year civil war against the republican Government of Yemen, which is based in Sana.

Prince Sultan ben Abdul Aziz, the Minister of Defense, said in an interview that the aid was limited. He implied that it was intended to keep the tribes that support the deposed Imam, or ruler, Moahmad al-Badr, on a war footing but not necessarily to back them in a renewed attempt to destroy the republicans, who drove the Imam out of Sana in 1962.

According to Prince Sultan, the most authoritative figure in the Saudi Government after King Faisal, the decision to two republican aircraft on the town of Najran, near the Saudi border.

The Prince gave the date of the raid of "the first day of Ramadan," the Moslem holy month, which fell this year on Nov. 10.

Najran, the main gateway for Saudi aid to the royakists, has been raided a dozen or more times by Egyptian as well as Yemeni republican planes in the last seven years.

The civil war followed an Egyptian-backed army coup in September, 1962, that ousted the Imam. The deposed ruler escaped to the northern mountains, and with Saudi assistance rallied a tribal army to fight against the republicans and up to 70,000 men of the Egyptian Army. Estimates have placed the number of deaths in the war at 25,000 Egyptians and several hundred thousand Yemenis.

Within six months of the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, all Egyptian forces were withdrawn from Yemen as part of an agreement under which the Saudis promised to withdraw their support of the Imam's royalist forces.

Since the royalists made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Sana, early in 1968, they have gradually disintegrated militarily and politically, and it seemed during the last 12 months, that the republican regime was close to establishing control over almost the entire country.

But the murder in July of Prince Abdullah ben Hassan, who for several years had established himself as the ruling authority in Sada, the principal town of northern Yemen, reactivated the war.

Reports that Saudi Arabia was again helping the royalists began to filter out of Yemen last month.

Prince Sultan said that he had not immediately disclosed the air raid on Najran because he did not wish to "distract attention from the struggle against Israel."

One reason for disclosing it now, it is believed here, is Saudi annoyance at the support that the Yemen republic is giving neighboring Southern Yemen in her conflict with Saudi Arabia over the border checkpoint of Al Wadeiah.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO: The Secretary-General
As:

FOR ACTION	POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL	POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE	POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT	PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS	POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?	POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION	VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED	COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE	NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN	NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	POUR INFORMATION

I am forwarding herewith,
for your information, a paper
concerning The Saudi Arabia-
Southern Yemen Border Dispute.

Pl. keep. Shao
12/12/69

Date:
11.12.69
CR.13 (11-64)FROM:
DE: *L. Kutakov*
L. Kutakov

11 December 1969

THE SAUDI ARABIA-SOUTHERN YEMEN BORDER DISPUTE

The dispute which erupted a fortnight ago between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Southern Yemen on the other, is over a desert area located at the western edge of the Empty Quarter in the Arabian Peninsula about 640 kilometres north-east of Aden. It is reported that the area is rich in oil and ownership is therefore claimed by the two parties in the dispute.

Origin of the conflict

The dispute over "Al-Wadiha" is a new chapter in the frontier dispute and politics in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. It should be stated first that through centuries the frontiers between Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen (formerly Aden Protectorate) have never been delineated by international agreements. Therefore, when Great Britain, who, alone, had a military presence in the area, gave an oil concession to the Arabian-American Oil Company in 1950, Yemen protested the action and discussions with the British authorities led to the signing in London of an agreement known as "the 1951 Modus Vivendi", whereby the Arabian-American Oil Company would abstain from oil exploration until a final agreement on the frontiers had been reached.

In the subsequent years, Aramco surrendered the concession to ENI, the Italian oil firm.

Southern Yemen, which has inherited the problem from Great Britain and as a nation poor in natural resources, granted to SONATRACH the National Algerian Oil Company the right to oil exploration in the area.

This, in the opinion of experts, made the conflict with Saudi Arabia inevitable. Northern Yemen, which had a claim to the area, was too absorbed in the civil war to stake its claim anew. Southern Yemen considers the area a part of its territory which was ceded by Great Britain to Saudi Arabia shortly before it evacuated its Aden Protectorate; Saudi Arabia contends however that it had always had control of it.

The recent events

A few months ago, the Saudi military frontier post in "Al-Wadiha" reported that a geological mission had been undertaking land surveys in the area under the protection of the Southern Yemen substantial military force. As expected and predicted, this was followed by clashes between Saudi and Southern Yemen forces which resulted in the capture of the Saudi soldiers by the Southern Yemen forces.

Faced with a dilemma and eager to avoid a new "Buraimi", Saudi Arabia chose to confront the situation with force. The remoteness of the area and the lack of communications, however, made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Saudi forces to retrieve the post. According to informed sources, Saudi Arabia was likely to abandon this approach and may accept offers of mediation by some Arab countries.

Diplomatic action

On the diplomatic level, Southern Yemen submitted a note of protest to the Arab League charging that Saudi Arabia had committed an act of aggression, aiming at the implementation of an American imperialist scheme. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, had replied that a complaint to the Arab League had announced that it would submit the case to the Arab Summit Conference. Some sources indicate that Saudi Arabia may take the conflict to the United Nations Security

Council.

Implications of the conflict

Many circumstances and events surround the Saudi-Southern Yemen conflict:

1. The fate of the Arab Summit Conference scheduled for later this month may be determined by the conflict, which may have a serious effect on its outcome. While Saudi Arabia accuses Southern Yemen of provocations which, it says, aim at disrupting Arab ranks at a time when the Arabs are uniting their efforts to face Israel, Southern Yemen counter-charges, and many progressive Arab countries feel, that Saudi Arabia aimed at jeopardizing a conference that it was very reluctant to attend. It is for this reason that several Arab countries had rushed to mediate in the dispute, including the United Arab Republic, which received a Southern Yemen emissary in connection with the fight, and whose Minister of Economy^{is} now conducting talks in Djeddah, trying to find a sound basis for mediation.
2. The old rivalry between the progressive Arab countries, of which Southern Yemen is considered among the foremost, and between a conservative Saudi regime, could not but be invoked here as a stimulant in the new dispute. Indeed, the Saudia, who had enough involvement in the Northern Yemen republican regime, having supported the royalists for years until the fight lost its vigour, now look with grave concern at the new Southern regime which has recently nationalized a number of foreign firms and which not only applies a socialist ideology domestically but also strives to export socialist revolutions to other parts of the Peninsula, let alone the internal factional party fight which so far had brought to power a more radical faction headed by Rabi'h and Haitham, following the overthrowing of Qahtan Al-Shabi,

the first President of Southern Yemen, who was considered a moderate statesman.

3. According to informed circles, Saudi Arabia has a very serious stake in this fight. Its prestige as the leading power in the Peninsula is in balance, and it wishes to show the new Gulf Federation as well as other countries in the area that it is willing and able to fight for what it considers its right. It also wants to thwart the rebellion sustained and supported by Southern Yemen in Dhofar in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman; for should the rebellion succeed, Saudi Arabia will have three hostile socialist, or at least progressive, Arab neighbours to the south and south-west, namely, Yemen, Southern Yemen and a new regime in Muscat and Oman, as well as in the east by new regimes in the Persian Gulf area, should the Dhofar rebellion spread east.

The Arab countries which rushed to undertake the mediation mission may have the success of the Summit Conference on their mind, but the real danger lies in another Yemen type war with Southern Yemen, a situation which might rob the Arab countries of a most needed effort in the Arab-Israel conflict. Some indicate that Saudi Arabia might create difficulties for Southern Yemen in its Hadramout region whose past leaders live in exile in Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

The fight then is not over a desert strip or fort; it involves developments in the Arabian Peninsula and threatens the prestige of a Monarch who has, so far, been successful in staying within the Arab ranks in connection with the Palestine problem, but who might stand fast, should his personal prestige run into danger in what he considers his sphere of influence.

The Arab League has been seized of the question and, barring serious developments, the issue may well become the hottest subject in the Summit Conference, especially if it were attended by Arab Chiefs of States, including Saudi Arabia King Faisal and Southern Yemen Chairman of the Presidential Council, Salem Rabi. The Conference whose theme is the mobilization of Arab forces in the Near East conflict, might then see a concerted effort made to solve the conflict and in such event a more complicated and intricate problem will be waiting for the mediators; it is the task of working out a protocol or a modus vivendi regarding frontiers which have remained undelineated for generations, a difficult task indeed in the light of possible discovery of rich oil deposits.