

Country Files of the Secretary-General: U-Thant  
+ Iran (West New Guinea) - Sec. - Gen. Exchanges with Governments - General Chronological  
File (before Bunker)

26/11/1961 - 13/02/1962

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER  
CLEAR

UN ARCHIVES  
SERIES 0884  
BOX 23  
FILE 6  
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DJAKARTA VIA WUCABLES 26 1915 HC20215/27  
SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT  
UNITED NATIONS NEWYORK

THE PEOPLE OF WEST IRIAN CMA GENERAL HEADQUARTERS WEST  
IRIAN PEOPLES MOVEMENT REJECT DEFINITELY THE RESOLUTION  
OF THE DUTCH-LONS DELEGATION AND URGE AN IMMEDIATE MEETING BETWEEN  
THE TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF DEFACTO WEST IRIAN INDONESIAN  
REPUBLIC AND DUTCH HELD WEST IRIAN SILAS PAPARE CHAIRMAN PB  
GERAKAN RAKJAT IRIAN BARAT DJAKARTA.

412P EST.

UNITED NATIONS  
1951 NOV 26 PM 4:15  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

*original with Stan*

New York, 18 December 1961

Sir,

I have the honour to repeat herewith the reasons I brought forward this morning in support of the request of my Government that you should, in your capacity as Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, remind Indonesia of its obligations under the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force in its international relations, and, more specifically, warn that country against the use of force against West New Guinea.

1. On December 14, 1961, President Sukarno of Indonesia declared that he would "use armed force to liberate West Irian" and said "When I shall give my command on the struggle for regaining West Irian on December 19, I expect that the whole nation will already form one united force and will be well prepared for the liberation of West Irian".

2. The threat or use of force for the settlement of the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West New Guinea would obviously be contrary to Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

It would also be contrary to the statement made in the General Assembly on November 15, 1961 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio, who then said: "As we promised before, if this is still a dispute between the Netherlands and us we will not use force. But as soon as they proclaim their independence there is no alternative for us".

Independence of West New Guinea has not been proclaimed.

3. Apart from the fact that the threat or use of force in this case would be both legally and

To His Excellency U Thant

-morally-

Acting Secretary-General

of the United Nations

New York

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morally indefensible, there can also be no practical reason for Indonesia to resort to violence in order to resolve the dispute over West New Guinea as the Netherlands has always been willing and remains willing to settle this dispute by peaceful means.

4. From the start the Netherlands has offered to have the question of sovereignty over West New Guinea (on the political, economic, social and educational development of which the Netherlands has always submitted information in accordance with, and even beyond, its obligation under Article 73e of the Charter) decided by the International Court of Justice and to abide by whatever decision this Court would hand down.

5. During its XVth General Assembly the Netherlands submitted a draft resolution (A/L.354), in which it proposed to transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea to the people of the territory and to let the future status of the territory be determined in accordance with the wishes of the population, after an interim period during which the executive powers of administration would be exercised by an international organization or authority, established by and operating under the United Nations.

These proposals were fully and entirely in accordance with the various General Assembly resolutions on Non-Self-Governing Territories, and in particular with the directives laid down in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), for which the Netherlands delegation had voted in the fifteenth session of the General Assembly.

6. A draft resolution submitted by 13 African States (A/L.368) on November 24, 1961, would i.e. have urged "the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands to resume negotiations without delay with a view to reaching an agreement on the future of the territory of West New Guinea, without prejudice to respect for the will and self-determination of the peoples". The Netherlands delegation declared its willingness to accept this proposal and to negotiate with Indonesia on that basis.

Unfortunately this resolution, which obtained the votes of 53 delegations, was not adopted.

-7. After-



7. After the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1654 (XVI), under the terms of which a Special Committee of seventeen members was established and requested "to examine the application of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration, and to report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session", I informed the President of the General Assembly that my Government was willing to negotiate with Indonesia on the future of West New Guinea, on the basis mentioned in draft resolution A/L.368, under the aegis of this Special Committee of seventeen members, or under the aegis of one or more other countries.

8. For the abovementioned reasons President Kennedy of the United States wrote a letter to President Sukarno on December 9, 1961, in which he urged the President of Indonesia not to use force.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,



C.W.A. Schurmann  
Permanent Representative of the  
Netherlands to the United Nations

SVN18 S NY 119 19 2218EST UNGOVT

ETAIPRIORITE

HIS EXCELLENCY

DR. JAN E. DE QUAY

PRIME MINISTER OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

THE HAGUE (THE NETHERLANDS)

SIR CMA IT IS WITH DEEP CONCERN THAT I HAVE LEARNT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS SITUATION ARISING BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA STOP I THEREFORE URGENTLY APPEAL TO

P2

YOUR EXCELLENCY AND TO YOUR GOVERNMENT TO TAKE NO ACTION WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY STOP PARA IT IS MY MOST SINCERE HOPE THAT THE PARTIES CONCERNED MAY COME TOGETHER TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND I WOULD THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY URGE

P3/19

THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS TO THIS END STOP  
U THANT ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL UNITED NATIONS

READ IN P3 2ND TEXT AS 2 WOREXXX WORDS YOUR EXCELLENCY .....

END ACK PSE ''

*Press Release*  
56/1098, 19/12/61

*Press Release*  
56/1098, 19/12/61

BUN36 SSS NEWYORK 116 19 2225EST UNGOVT

19 December 1961

ETAT PRIORITE

HIS EXCELLENCY

DR. SOEKARNO

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

DJAKARTA (INDONESIA)

*Press Release*

*SG/1098, 19/12/61*

SIR CMA IT IS WITH DEEP CONCERN THAT I HAVE LEARNT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS SITUATION ARISING BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE NETHERLANDS STOP I THEREFORE URGENTLY APPEAL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND TO YOUR

P2

GOVERNMENT TO TAKE NO ACTION WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY STOP PARA IT IS MY MOST SINCERE HOPE THAT THE PARTIES CONCERNED MAY COME TOGETHER TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND I WOULD THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY URGE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR

P3/16

GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS TO THIS END STOP HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

U THANT

ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL

UNITED NATIONS

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*Press Release*

*SG/1098, 19/12/61*

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ETATPRIORITE  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS U THANT  
UNITED NATIONS NEWYORK

ACTION

DEC 23 1961

TO SEC GEN

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☒ ACTION COMPLETED

INITIALS

Info. Sec. Control Room 2874

*Press Release*  
*PM 4128*

*27/12/61*

SIR , I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 19TH IN WHICH YOU EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS SITUATION ARISING BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

AND IN WHICH YOU EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE PARTIES CONCERNED MIGHT COME TOGETHER TO SEEK PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM STOP I HAVE NOTED THAT A SIMILAR APPEAL WAS MADE TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA STOP THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR INITIATIVE STOP MY GOVERNMENT

SHARE YOUR CONCERN IN THIS MATTER , AS WELL AS YOUR HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION STOP PARAWITH THIS VERY PURPOSE IN MIND AND MINDFUL OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE POPULATION OF WESTERN NEWGUINEA , THE NETHERLANDS , WHO HAVE ALWAYS REPORTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS

UNDER ARTICLE

73E , HAVE RECENTLY BROUGHT BEFORE THE SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY FARREACHING PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY STOP THE WELL KNOWN DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE BRAZZAVILLE STATES AND TOGO WAS DEEMED BY US TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ESSENCE OF OUR PROPOSALS STOP WE THEREFORE SUPPORTED THIS RESOLUTION STOP

ALTHOUGH MORE THAN HALF OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THAT RESOLUTION , IT FAILED TO OBTAIN THE REQUIRED TWO THIRDS MAJORITY STOP PARA IN SPITE OF THIS , MY GOVERNMENT ARE ACTIVELY INVESTIGATING OTHER WAYS AND MEANS OF REACHING A SOLUTION COMPATIBLE WITH OUR

RESPONSIBILITIES AND IF POSSIBLE ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO INDONESIA STOP PARA IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS PREPAREDNESS AND INDEED FROM THE PERSISTANT POLICY OF MY GOVERNMENT FOR AN EQUITABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM , THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO REFRAIN FROM ALL ACTS WHICH MIGHT AGGREGATE THE SITUATION STOP PARA

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BE , SIR , YOUR OBEDIEN SERVANT , J DEQUAY  
PRIME - MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS

19TH 73E J

S 851 AM EST WD  
UNATION 2224537

UNITED NATIONS  
1961 DEC 23 AM 9:24  
TELEGRAPH UNIT



SECRET

3 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
From: The Secretary-General

Ambassador Charles Yost of the U.S. Mission saw me yesterday afternoon (2 January 1962) and informed me that he had received a message from Washington to the effect that both the Governments of the Netherlands and of Indonesia had agreed to negotiate on the problem of West Irian under my auspices. Ambassador Yost remarked that his Government would be very happy if I could give favorable consideration to this demarche from the two Governments. I told him that I shall send for the representatives of both countries and sound out their views, and assured him that I would give very close consideration to this request.

Minister Lapien, chargé of the Indonesian Mission here, saw me this morning and conveyed to me a message received by him from his Government yesterday. The message in effect was a re-iteration of what Ambassador Yost told me on the previous day. I informed Mr. Lapien that I would immediately contact the Netherlands Mission and that I would inform him of my reaction tomorrow (4 January ).

Mr. Polderman, chargé of the Netherlands Mission, saw me this afternoon and conveyed to me a similar message from his Government. He reaffirmed newspaper reports that his Government would not attach any prior conditions for the purpose of negotiations under my auspices.

I informed both delegates that I felt highly honoured at the trust and confidence imposed on me by their respective Governments, but without committing my active participation in this negotiation I would like to initiate exploratory talks with the two parties to enable me to formulate my own position before the actual negotiations take place. I informed them of my line of thinking which is as follows:

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a) The two Governments should not set any prior conditions for the purpose of discussions under my auspices;

b) I propose to hold exploratory talks with each party before I commence with the negotiations contemplated;

c) I will try my best to be present at the bi-lateral negotiations, but in view of the fact that I will certainly be engaged in other important activities, I would like to depute a personal representative in case my presence is not possible;

d) Before the actual exploratory talks commence I would like to request the two Governments to make a simultaneous public announcement to the effect that they would not set any prior conditions for the purpose of negotiations. If desired, I would prepare a short draft of this announcement for their approval.

This afternoon Ambassador Stevenson of the U.S. Mission rang me up from Washington, conveying his best wishes for the success of the projected negotiations, expressing his personal wish that I should consider the request of the two Governments favorably if I considered that there is a pretty good chance of achieving positive results.

4 January 1962

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE TO BE PUBLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN  
DJAKARTA, THE HAGUE AND NEW YORK \*

The President of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands have agreed to undertake negotiations on the problem of the future administration of (West Irian<sup>1/</sup>), (Netherlands New Guinea<sup>2/</sup>), (Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian)<sup>3/</sup>) under the auspices of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations. Both Governments have requested the Acting Secretary-General to make his services available in this connexion.

The negotiations will be undertaken without any prior conditions being set by either Government.

On the basis outlined above, the Acting Secretary-General has agreed to the negotiations taking place under his auspices and in his presence.

\*  
4.00 p.m. E.S.T.  
Friday, 5<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1962.

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1/ For release in Djakarta.

2/ For release in The Hague.

3/ For release in New York.

January 1962

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4.00 E.S.T.

Friday, 5<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1962

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- 1/ For release in Djakarta.
  - 2/ For release in The Hague.
  - 3/ For release in New York.

SECRET

5 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 3 January 1962.

Minister Lapan, chargé d'affaires of the Indonesian Mission here, saw me yesterday morning and I showed him the draft of the proposed statement meant to be released simultaneously in Djakarta, The Hague and New York. As already discussed with you, the projected statement contained the sentence: "The negotiations will be undertaken without any prior conditions being set by either Government".

I also suggested to him that if his Government were agreeable to it, I would like to release it at 4 pm today EST.

Mr. Lapan reacted to my suggestion negatively, and informed me that he was sure that his Government would not agree to enter into negotiations with the Netherlands representatives without any prior conditions. When I asked him if the transmission of my draft to his Government would embarrass Djakarta, he said that he was quite definite that his Government would be embarrassed. In the circumstances I told him not to take any action on this draft.

Mr. Polderman, chargé d'affaires of the Netherlands Mission, saw me on the same day and I showed him the draft. He assured me that he was definite that his Government would agree to its release at the specified time, but I informed him of the Indonesian reaction and asked him not to take any action on this draft for the moment. In the course of our conversation I brought to his attention Resolution A/L.367/Rev.1, tabled on

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27 November 1961 by India and other delegations at the plenary session of the General Assembly, and I asked him whether the operative paragraph 1) of that resolution could serve as a basis for negotiations, of course substituting me for the President of the General Assembly. He told me that he would convey this to his Government and that he would let me know the result as early as possible.

He saw me again this morning and informed me that so far he had not received any reply from The Hague, but he transmitted to me the following information:

a) If any negotiations take place on the basis of my first formulation, the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington (Amb. van Royen) will represent the Netherlands in these talks.

b) The Netherlands Government would like to convey its thanks to me for the efforts I have been making with a view to bringing together the two parties concerned, and it still considered that my first formulation is the most appropriate basis for negotiations.

c) Ambassador Schürmann, Permanent Representative to the U.N., is arriving in New York on Saturday afternoon (tomorrow), and he will no doubt have more detailed information regarding his Government's attitude towards the problem.

I told him that in the absence of any reaction from his Government towards my second formulation I need not see the Indonesian chargé d'affaires for the time being.

Ambassador Yost of the U.S. Mission again saw me today and asked me if there was any further development regarding my soundings with the two delegations. He told me that Washington was very much interested in these exploratory talks. I informed him of the developments and I promised to keep him apprised of further developments as his Government is keenly interested in bringing about negotiations between the two parties.

# Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations



5 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET  
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.  
TR 9-0600

## PRESS RELEASE

9/1/62

Wide publicity is being given to the recent Dutch decision to seek negotiations with Indonesia over West Irian (West New Guinea) without setting any pre-conditions. It appears that there are those in the Western world who have so little understanding of Dutch ambivalence that they expect Indonesia to drop all conditions and enter forthwith into such negotiations.

In this respect, it should be recalled that it was Indonesia which for many years pressed for negotiations with the Dutch to attain a peaceful settlement of the West Irian dispute. Indeed, the last resolution on this matter brought before the United Nations by Indonesia, in 1957 - that is, more than four years ago - merely contained a request for the re-opening of talks with the Netherlands. Just this and nothing else. There was then no mention at all of any pre-conditions from the Indonesian side. But this effort, as every previous effort, proved fruitless because of Dutch intransigence. The Dutch scornfully rejected any suggestion of negotiations with Indonesia.

Moreover, the International community was shown to lack a sufficient understanding of the situation in failing to bring the requisite pressure to bear upon the Netherlands. Countries that supported the Indonesian struggle were thus unable to be effective through the United Nations and to muster the necessary two-thirds majority to recommend a resumption of negotiations.

Faced with this impasse year after year - faced, too, with the mounting arrogance of the Dutch in West Irian, the mounting oppression of our people in West Irian, and the increasing extent of Dutch colonial penetration in the life of the people - Indonesia was forced to take other means to advance its national anti-colonial cause. Before doing so, however, before the last vote was taken in the United Nations on the question of West Irian, Indonesia clearly stated that she would be compelled to adopt other means should the United Nations again fail to render its assistance. This statement by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, was at that time attacked by the Dutch as constituting an attempt at "intimidation", just as the Dutch are now attacking the "Peoples' Command."

W. see p. 4



As recently as a few months ago, during the debates in the Sixteenth General Assembly session of the United Nations on the question of independence for colonial countries and peoples, the Delegation of India submitted a proposal calling for negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands without a stipulation of prior conditions. But the Netherlands and their supporters voted against this proposal on 27 November 1961.. Had this proposal been passed, Indonesia and the Netherlands would now be sitting around the Conference table. Instead, the rejection of this resolution brought its own consequences.

It was precisely because the long and patient struggle to achieve a peaceful settlement and the many attempts to obtain United Nations assistance all proved to be in vain, that Indonesia issued the "Peoples Command" on December 19, 1961. With not a single understanding of the situation from the Netherlands and its supporters, Indonesia made known the steps she will take to bring West Irian once more within the Indonesian State.

It is true that the third point of the "Peoples Command" only calls upon the Indonesian people to prepare for a general mobilization of the country, with the door still being left open to any possibility that may yet exist for a peaceful settlement. But this should not lead anyone to interpret this command as a mere bluff or, as the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. Luns, has done, as a policy of blackmail. If Indonesia is refused international assistance and cooperation in ridding her soil by peaceful means of the last remnant of colonial domination, then Indonesia is left with no option but to attain this national goal through her own strength - and, as a last resort, her military strength.

With the declaration of the "Peoples Command" on December 19, 1961, the situation in regard to negotiations has altered. For negotiations to be opened, there must first be real guarantees of success. Without that, no Indonesian leader or Government could begin negotiations and still maintain a position of leadership. It is already clear that the Indonesian people are ready to storm the Dutch in West Irian and liberate their compatriots. It is only the hand of the Indonesian leaders that prevents direct action at the moment. War would certainly eventuate if there are no prior guarantees of success in any talks with the Dutch.



The reason for this attitude - perhaps considered by some to be a hard or extreme one - is not a matter of prejudice, but the product of years of experience in negotiating with the Dutch. In not one single instance have the Dutch ever sincerely and honestly adhered to agreements concluded in negotiations between free Indonesia and the Netherlands.

After the "Linggadjati Agreement" between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands, in 1947, the Dutch waged an all-out military attack against precisely those areas of the country stated by the "Linggadjati Agreement" to be parts of the Republic. The same thing occurred after the "Renville Agreement" in 1948, even though the Dutch had pledged not to use force. In open defiance of the Security Council of the United Nations, they launched a second military action against the Republic and went so far as to arrest the top Indonesian leaders, including President Sukarno, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta and Cabinet members. Then there were the "Round Table Agreements" of 1949. Quite apart from disregarding the provisions on West Irian, the Dutch also initiated and supported subversive movements in Indonesia designed to overthrow the State they had recognized as sovereign. Indeed, the Dutch have never shown any genuine goodwill or sincerity in negotiations with Indonesia. With their record of broken promises and pledges, they certainly do not come before the international community on this matter with clean hands.

Up to a week ago, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. Luns, had always rejected negotiations with Indonesia as being useless. The Netherlands Government has declared in Parliament its intention to continue to pursue its co-called policy of self-determination - a policy that is completely unacceptable to Indonesia because it is, in reality, merely a guise for a policy of separatism; it utilizes a noble principle for another piece of Dutch trickery - a principle, moreover that Indonesia has consistently upheld and the Dutch, by force of arms and by their votes in the United Nations, have just as consistently opposed for still dependent peoples. In these circumstances, how can Indonesia believe in Dutch sincerity today?

In view of the past experiences, there must be prior guarantees of success before Indonesia can once again meet the Dutch at the negotiating table. Indonesia is still prepared to negotiate with the Dutch, but only if the latter recognize that the basis of such negotiations will be the transfer of administration over West Irian to Indonesia. This is indispensable to guarantee that negotiations will succeed in attaining a fruitful solution in line with the freedom and independence of the whole of Indonesia and the solemn proclamation of the United Nations on "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations."

January 9, 1962

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SECRET

11 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Subject: Continuation of my note of 5 January 1962

On the basis of my discussions with the representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia I discussed with Amb. C.S. Jha of India, on 8 January, and explored the possibilities of Prime Minister Nehru coming into the picture in some way or other. I asked Amb. Jha if he considered that his Prime Minister would be agreeable to offer his good offices by asking President Sukarno if the latter still maintains his position towards the Indian draft resolution, A/1.367/Rev.1), which was originally sponsored by India and supported by Indonesia, but which was not adopted by the General Assembly. I also suggested to Amb. Jha that since India was the original sponsor of that resolution and because of the fact that P.M. Nehru is held in very high esteem by President Sukarno, the idea of P.M. Nehru getting involved in the negotiations should be considered. Amb. Jha, however, maintained that his Prime Minister would be very reluctant to get involved in such a manner at this stage particularly because of the emotional climate prevailing in Indonesia and in the light of the latest statements made by President Sukarno. He, however, told me that if I want him to convey any message to his Prime Minister, he would be only too glad to comply with my wish. I informed him that it was not my intention to convey any particular request to his Prime Minister since my intention was just to get his reactions to my idea.

On the same day Mr. Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal of the British Government, saw me in connection with another matter and he seized the opportunity to touch on certain news reports regarding my discussions with both the representatives of the Netherlands and of Indonesia. I gave him a brief resume of the discussions, without of course mentioning my references to P.M. Nehru, and Mr. Heath asked me to continue with my efforts to bring the two parties together. He also mentioned his belief that the Indonesian position had definitely hardened after the rejection of the Indian draft resolution in the General Assembly.

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On 9 January Amb. Yost of the U.S. Mission informed me that he had received a message from Washington to the effect that the Netherlands Government was ready to reconsider its position on the formulation set forth in the Indian draft resolution which the Netherlands had rejected, and Amb. Yost suggested that I might seek to confirm this from the Netherlands delegation here. Amb. Yost also confided to me that the information was informally conveyed to the State Department by the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington, Mr. van Royen.

On 10 January I sent for Amb. Schürmann of the Netherlands and asked him if the information conveyed to me by Amb. Yost was true. He told me that he had to refer this to his Government and promised to see me again on the next day when he hoped he would have received specific instructions.

Today Amb. Schürmann saw me and confirmed the information I received from Amb. Yost. To avoid criticism in his own country and for other apparent reasons, Amb. Schürmann suggested that the text of the announcement should be slightly different from the actual text of the relevant paragraph of the Indian resolution. He confided to me that his Government would be agreeable to undertake negotiations with the Government of Indonesia on the basis of the following announcement:

"The Government of Indonesia and the Netherlands have agreed to undertake negotiations without delay with a view to reaching an agreement on the future status of Netherlands New Guinea/West Irian in conformity with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, under the auspices of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"Both Governments have requested the Acting Secretary-General to make his services available in these negotiations.

"The Acting Secretary-General has agreed to lend his services to these negotiations which will take place under his auspices and in his presence, or in the presence of one of his deputies."

The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands have agreed to undertake negotiations without delay with a view to reaching an agreement on the future status of Netherlands New Guinea/West Irian in conformity with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, under the auspices of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Both Governments have requested the Acting Secretary-General to make his services available in these negotiations.

The Acting Secretary-General has agreed to lend his ~~(good) services~~ <sup>and office services</sup> to these negotiations which will take place under his auspices and in his presence, ~~or~~ <sup>or</sup> in the presence of <sup>one of</sup> his deputies. ~~in~~



The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands have agreed to undertake negotiations without delay with a view to reaching an agreement on the future status of Netherlands New Guinea/West Irian in conformity with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, under the auspices of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Both Governments have requested the Acting Secretary-General to make his services available in these negotiations.

The Acting Secretary-General has agreed to lend his good services to these negotiations which will take place under his auspices and in his presence.

The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands have agreed to undertake negotiations without delay with a view to reaching an agreement on the future status of Netherlands New Guinea/West Irian in conformity with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, under the auspices of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Both Governments have requested the Acting Secretary-General to make his services available in these negotiations.

The Acting Secretary-General has agreed to lend his good services to these negotiations which will take place under his auspices and in his presence.

HP

SG will dictate more on this

gg

13/1/62  
7

The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands have agreed to undertake negotiations without delay with a view to reaching an agreement on the future status of Netherlands New Guinea/West Irian in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, under the auspices of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Both Governments have requested the Acting Secretary-General to make his services available in these negotiations.

The Acting Secretary-General has agreed to lend his services to these negotiations which will take place under his auspices and in his presence, or in the presence of one of his deputies.

MTA

56  
CONFIRMATION COPY  
OF MESSAGE DISPATCHED

SVN16 S NEWYORK 107/155 15 1542EST UNGOVT

ETATPRIORITE

HIS EXCELLENCY DR JAN E DE QUAY

PRIME MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS

THEHAGUE (NETHERLANDS)

MOST IMMEDIATE

I HAVE LEARNED FROM NEWS REPORTS THIS MORNING OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A CLASH BETWEEN DUTCH AND INDONESIAN NAVAL VESSELS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISPUTE OVER NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN) PARA I

P2/57/55

AM DEEPLY CONCERNED TO HEAR THIS NEWS AND I REITERATE MY APPEAL OF 19 DECEMBER 1961 TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM PARA I AM ADDRESSING A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

U THANT

ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

COL 19 1961

UNITED NATIONS  
1962 JAN 15 PM 3:47  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

PLS ACK

R16WUCD 348P TX

*Press Release*

*SG/1116 - 15/1/62*

*See Netherlands reply  
16/1/62*



CONFIRMATION COPY  
OF MESSAGE DISPATCHED

BUN12 S NEWYORK 104/102 15 1536EST UNGOVT

ETATPRIORITE

HIS EXCELLENCY DR SUKARNO

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

DJAKARTA (INDONESIA)

MOST IMMEDIATE

I HAVE LEARNED FROM NEWS REPORTS THIS MORNING OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A CLASH BETWEEN DUTCH AND INDONESIAN NAVAL VESSELS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISPUTE OVER WEST IRIAN (NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA) PARA I AM DEEPLY

P2/54/52

CONCERNED TO HEAR THIS NEWS AND I REITERATE MY APPEAL OF 19 DECEMBER 1961 TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM PARA I AM ADDRESSING A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS

U THANT

ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS  
1962 JAN 15 PM 3:41  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

COL 19 1961

PLS ACK •

R BUN 12 340P YK

Press Release  
SG/1116/  
15/1/62

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PRESS INQUIRIES

OX 7-5544

711 THIRD AVENUE  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.  
OX 7-5547

DUTCH REPLY TO APPEAL MADE BY

U.N. ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT

Following is the reply of the Netherlands Prime Minister, Dr. Jan E. de Quay,  
in response to the appeal made to him on January 15, 1962 by the Acting Secretary-General of the U.N., Mr. U Thant:

"January 16, 1962

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your message of January 15th concerning the incident which occurred earlier that day in Netherlands territorial waters along the south coast of Netherlands New Guinea, when our naval units thwarted an Indonesian attempt at armed infiltration in the region east of Etna Bay. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is instructing our permanent representative to inform you about the details of the incident in as far as known to date.

"The Netherlands Government share your deep concern about this recent development. I may recall that already in my message of December 23rd, 1961, in reply to your message of December 19th, I mentioned that the Netherlands Government shared the concern you then expressed, as well as your hope for a peaceful solution. I added that my government were actively investigating ways and means of reaching a solution compatible with our responsibilities and if possible also acceptable to Indonesia. I may also recall that as early as January 2nd of this year we concurred with your suggestion that Netherlands-Indonesian negotiations take place under your auspices and without any preconditions.

"On behalf of the Netherlands Government I repeat that we are still prepared to enter into such negotiations without preconditions. My government hope urgently that Your Excellency may prove successful in your endeavours. I must, however, add that if Indonesia should repeat their unprovoked attack of January 15th, our forces will again make use of their right of legitimate self-defence, in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter."

0

**ACTION**

JAN 16 1962

TO SEC GEN

FILE NO.

☒ ACTION COMPLETED

INITIALS

Return to Records Control Room 2074

VRCA POSN 69  
UNATION 2224537 RC9/CQ/ NSP325 S SGRAVENHAGE 284/281 16 1311

ETATPRIORITY

HIS EXCELLENCY  
U THANT  
ACTING SECRETARYGENERAL OF THE  
UNITEDNATIONS  
NEWYORK

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR MESSAGE OF JANUARY 15TH CONCERNING THE INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED EARLIER THAT DAY IN NETHERLANDS TERRITORIAL WATERS ALONG THE SOUTH COAST OF NETHERLANDS NEWGUINEA WHEN OUR NAVAL UNITS THWARTED AN

INDONESIAN ATTEMPT AT ARMED INFILTRATION IN THE REGION EAST OF ETNA BAY STOP THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS INSTRUCTING OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT IN AS FAR AS KNOWN TO DATE STOP THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT SHARE YOUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THIS RECENT DEVELOPMENT STOP

I MAY RECALL THAT ALREADY IN MY MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 23RD 1961 IN REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 19TH I MENTIONED THAT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT SHARED THE CONCERN YOU THEN EXPRESSED AS WELL AS YOUR HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION STOP I ADDED THAT MY GOVERNMENT WERE ACTIVELY INVESTIGATING WAYS

AND MEANS OF REACHING A SOLUTION COMPATIBLE WITH OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND IF POSSIBLE ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO INDONESIA STOP I MAY ALSO RECALL THAT AS EARLY AS JANUARY 2ND OF THIS YEAR WE CONCURRED WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT NETHERLANDS INDONESIAN NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE UNDER YOUR AUSPICES AND WITHOUT ANY PRECONDITIONS STOP ON BEHALF OF

THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT I REPEAT THAT WE ARE STILL PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS STOP MY GOVERNMENT HOPE URGENTLY THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY MAY PROVE SUCCESSFUL IN YOUR ENDEAVOURS STOP I MUST HOWEVER ADD THAT IF INDONESIA SHOULD REPEAT THEIR UNPROVOKED ATTACK OF JANUARY 15TH OUR FORCES WILL AGAIN MAKE

USE OF THEIR RIGHT OF LEGITIMATE SELFDEFENCE IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER STOP

J DEQUAY  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS

SENT RCP 817AM EST/CQ  
UNATION 2224537

UNITED NATIONS  
1962 JAN 16 PM 8:23  
TELETYPE UNIT

U. S. Spokesman (Frank Carpenter)

"The ~~USA~~<sup>SE</sup> has addressed an appeal to the President of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands urging the two parties to agree to immediate discussion with him on the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the West New Guinea problem in conformity with the UN Charter. The US welcomes this commendable initiative of the Secretary General.

"We consider that a peaceful solution is essential and strongly support his efforts to get the parties together. The ingredients for a peaceful settlement of this problem clearly exist. Therefore, we hope that U Thant's appeal will meet with a speedy and positive response."

92

W

The Secretary General has addressed an appeal to the President of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands urging the two parties to agree to immediate discussion with him on the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the West New Guinea problem in conformity with the United Nations Charter. The United States welcomes this commendable initiative of the Secretary General.

We consider that a peaceful solution is essential and strongly support his efforts to get the parties together. The ingredients for a peaceful settlement of this problem clearly exist. Therefore, we hope that U Thant's appeal will meet with a speedy and positive response.



night lead new guinea

By Peter Arnett

Jakarta, Indonesia, Jan. 17(ap)-Indonesia has placed all hopes ~~of~~ for the avoidance of war over West New Guinea on u.n. acting secretary-general u thant, sources close to president sukarno's inner cabine t said today.

The cabinet was ~~re~~ported to feel that only thant can find a formula to get indonesia and the Netherlands around the conference table. Attempts by the United States and other world powers to reach a <sup>peaceful</sup> settlement have failed.

Sukarno proposes to talk only on the basis of a transfer of the administration of west new guinea to indonesia. the Dutch want negotiationw without prior conditions.

Burmese ambassador u vum ko hau--a fellow countryman of thant-- is having frequent meetings with foreign minister subandrio. but tells ne2smen "my business is private."

the inner cabinet is united, one informant said, in the attitude that if thant fails to find a ~~formula~~ formula, an invasion is necessary.

Annals

Would you pl. pass this on to the S. C.

R. Arnett

8/2/62

17 Jan '62

ZZZZ

R 103

CONGOLESE - EYEWITNESS

LEOPOLDVILLE, CONGO REPUBLIC, JAN. 17-(REUTERS)-NINETEEN ROMAN CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES MASSACRED AT KONGOLO CALLED OUT "PRAY FOR US" BEFORE CONGOLESE TROOPS MACHINE-GUNNED THEM, AN EYEWITNESS SAID HERE TODAY.

AN AFRICAN STUDENT PRIEST, WHOSE STORY WAS REPORTED BY THE CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY DIA, ALSO CHARGED "MANY" CIVILIANS DIED IN THE DEC. 31 MASSACRE. MOST OF THE SLAIN MISSIONARIES WERE BELGIAN, HE SAID.

THE STUDENT PRIEST, WHO ESCAPED TO BUKAVU, HAS TOLD HIS STORY TO UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS. BUT A U.N. SPOKESMAN SAID IT HAD NO TROOPS WITH 150 MILES OF THE KATANGA TOWN AND FACED ALMOST INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES IN INVESTIGATING.

DIA NEWS AGENCY QUOTED THE STUDENT PRIEST AS SAYING 58 STUDENTS AND A LARGE NUMBER OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN THE MISSIQC OF THE HOLY SPIRIT WHEN THE TROOPS ENTERED THE TOWN ON NEW YEAR'S EVE.

KATANGAN GENDARMES HAD EVACUATED THE TOWN AFTER A THREE-DAY BATTLE WITH THE CONGOLESE, BELIEVED TO BE FROM THE GIZENGIST STRONGHOLD OF STANLEYVILLE.

THE STUDENT PRIEST, NOT NAMED, SAID 18 PRIESTS AND A BOY BROTHER WERE FORCED TO TAKE OFF THEIR SHOES AND EACH WAS LASHED 12 TIMES.

HALF AN HOUR LATER, THE WITNESS CONTINUED, A GROUP OF CIVILIANS WERE GUNNED DOWN. THEN THE 19 MISSIONARIES WERE TAKEN OUT TO BE SHOT AND ONLY HAD TIME TO CALL OUT "PRAY FOR US."

(MORE)

4.02P. C.W.C.

ZZZZ

R 104

FIRST ADD LEOPOLDVILLE CONGOLESE - EYEWITNESS X X X US."

THE STUDENTS WERE LED BACK INDOORS AND TOLD, "TOMORROW IT WILL BE YOUR TURN," THE STUDENT PRIEST SAID.

LATER, HE WENT ON, 20 STUDENTS WERE TAKEN TO THE CORPSES, WHICH WERE LYING ON THE GROUND AND HAD BEEN STRIPPED, "THEIR HANDS CUT OFF, EYES STABBED, OTHER UNMENTIONABLE MUTILATIONS AS WELL AS ARROWS PLANTED IN THE BODIES..."

MOST OF THE PRIESTS WHO DIED WERE BELGIANS, BUT THEY INCLUDED AT LEAST ONE GERMAN AND SOME DUTCHMEN, IT WAS SAID.

CONGOLESE PRIME MINISTER CYRILLE ADOULA HAS DESCRIBED THE CONGOLESE TROOP COMMANDER, COL. PAKASSA, AS A REBEL.

(A MISSIONARY REACHING USUMBURA, RUANDA-URUNDI, SAID AN EYEWITNESS TOLD HIM NUNS WERE AMONG THOSE ARRESTED AT KONGOLO.

(CONSULAR SOURCES SAID THERE WAS NO NEWS OF THE 27 NUNS WHO BELONGED TO THE MISSION, NOR WAS ANYTHING KNOWN OF THE FATE OF EIGHT PRIESTS AND 12 NUNS AT MISSIONS NEAR KONGOLO.

(ARCHBISHOP JULES CORNELIS OF ELISABETHVILLE TODAY CABLED BRITAIN'S QUEEN ELIZABETH II, U.N. ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT, PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND FRENCH PRESIDENT CHARES DE GAULLE, APPEALING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL INQUIRY.)

4.07P. C.W.C.

5G  
CONFIRMATION COPY  
OF MESSAGE DISPATCHED

SVNS S NEWYORK 126 17 1325EST UNGOVT

ETATPRIORITE

HIS EXCELLENCY

DR. JAN E. DE QUAY

PRIME MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS

THEHAGUE (NETHERLANDS)

THANK YOU FOR YOUR EXCELLENCYS TELEGRAM OF 16 JANUARY REPLYING TO MY MESSAGE OF 15 JANUARY.

I EARNESTLY APPEAL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION FOLLOWING THE CLASH OF P2/51

NAVAL VESSELS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON 14 JANUARY. I WOULD ALSO REQUEST THAT YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK BE INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS WITH ME THE POSSIBILITIES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE QUESTION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

P3/26

WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR VERY URGENT CONSIDERATION OF THIS APPEAL BY YOUR EXCELLENCY AND FOR AN EARLY REPLY

U THANT

ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL

OF THE UNITED NATIONS

CFM 16 15 14

Press Release  
SG/11 18, 17/1/62

See Netherlands  
Reply, 18/1/62

UNITED NATIONS  
1952 JAN 17 PM 1:34  
TELEGRAPH UNIT



56  
CONFIRMATION COPY  
OF MESSAGE DISPATCHED

BUN12 S NEWYORK 122 17 1320EST UNGOVT

ETATPRIORITE

HIS EXCELLENCY

DR. SUKARNO

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

DJAKARTA (INDONESIA)

THIS IS IN CONTINUATION OF MY TELEGRAM TO YOUR EXCELLENCY OF  
15 JANUARY. I EARNESTLY APPEAL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR  
GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION FOLLOWING  
THE CLASH OF NAVAL VESSELS WHICH TOOK PLACE

P2

ON 14 JANUARY. I WOULD ALSO REQUEST THAT YOUR PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK BE INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS WITH ME  
THE POSSIBILITIES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE QUESTION  
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR

P3/22

VERY URGENT CONSIDERATION OF THIS APPEAL BY YOUR EXCELLENCY AND  
FOR AN EARLY REPLY

U THANT

ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL

OF THE UNITED NATIONS

CFM 15 14

ACK PLS .....

RBUN12 KW 124P

*Press Release*  
*SG/1118, 17/1/62*

UNITED NATIONS  
1962 JAN 17 PM 1:23  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PRESS INQUIRIES  
OX 7-5544

711 THIRD AVENUE  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.  
OX 7-5547

NETHERLANDS PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO APPEAL  
MADE BY U.N. ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT  
ON JANUARY 17, 1962.

Following is the reply of the Netherlands Prime Minister, Dr.

Jan E. de Quay, in response to the appeal made to him on January 17, 1962

by the Acting Secretary-General of the U.N., Mr. U Thant:

"January 18, 1962

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your urgent telegram of 17th January containing an earnest appeal to myself and to the Netherlands Government to refrain from any precipitate action following the recent incident off the coast of Netherlands New Guinea and requesting my government to instruct our Permanent Representative in New York to discuss with you the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the whole question, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the U.N.

"The Netherlands Government are grateful for your renewed initiative. The Netherlands Government and the Netherlands forces in New Guinea have so far studiously refrained from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area and I am empowered to inform you that even in the face of the continued threat of violence by Indonesian leaders and of military preparations aimed against New Guinea which have been publicly announced, the Netherlands Government are determined to continue in the attitude of utmost restraint. Our instructions to the commanders of the Netherlands forces in New Guinea are in conformity with the foregoing. Furthermore, in acceding to the second part of your appeal our Permanent Representative in New York has once more been instructed to put himself at once at your disposal in order to have further discussions with you regarding the possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the whole question in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

"Finally, I would like to repeat to Your Excellency the suggestion made by the Netherlands Government to your predecessor to send one or more observers, or one or more personal representatives, to Netherlands New Guinea."



7,-589, 2224537RCA POSN 21 +  
7,-589, 2224537/RC8/BL/VL/ S S S NSP814  
S S GRAVENHAGE 301 18 1439

ETATPRIORITY  
HIS EXCELLENCY  
U THANT  
ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF  
THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR URGENT  
TELEGRAM OF 17TH JANUARY CONTAINING AN EARNEST APPEAL TO MYSELF  
AND TO THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM ANY PRECIPITATE  
ACTION FOLLOWING THE RECENT INCIDENT

OFF THE COAST OF NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA AND REQUESTING MY  
GOVERNMENT TO INSTRUCT OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK  
TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE POSSIBILITIES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT  
OF THE WHOLE QUESTION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES  
OF THE CHARTER OF THE UN STOP THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT

ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR RENEWED INITIATIVE STOP THE NETHERLANDS  
GOVERNMENT AND THE NETHERLANDS FORCES IN NEW GUINEA HAVE SO FAR  
STUDIOUSLY REFRAINED FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE THE  
SITUATION IN THE AREA AND I AM EMPOWERED TO INFORM YOU THAT  
EVEN IN FACE OF THE CONTINUED THREAT OF VIOLENCE

BY INDONESIAN LEADERS AND OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS AIMED AGAINST  
NEW GUINEA WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THE NETHERLANDS  
GOVERNMENT ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE IN THE ATTITUDE OF UTMOST  
RESTRAINT STOP OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMANDERS OF THE  
NETHERLANDS FORCES IN NEW GUINEA ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE  
FOREGOING STOP FURTHERMORE

IN ACCEDING TO THE SECOND PART OF YOUR APPEAL OUR PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK HAS ONCE MORE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PUT  
HIMSELF AT ONCE AT YOUR DISPOSAL IN ORDER TO HAVE FURTHER  
DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU REGARDING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A PEACEFUL  
SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE QUESTION IN CONFORMITY WITH

THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER STOP FINALLY I  
WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE SUGGESTION MADE BY  
THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT TO YOUR PREDECESSOR TO SEND ONE OR  
MORE OBSERVERS OR ONE OF MORE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO  
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA STOP

SIGNED J DE QUAY  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS

UNITED NATIONS  
1957 JAN 18 AM 9:29  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

SENT 924A EST  
UNATION 2224537

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services  
Office of Public Information  
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media -- not an official record)

Press Release SG/1123  
20 January 1962

TEXT OF CABLE FROM PRESIDENT SUKARNO OF INDONESIA  
TO ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT

Text of a cable dated 20 January, from President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia addressed to Acting Secretary-General U Thant:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF THE 15TH AND 17TH JANUARY. I FULLY APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE EXPLOSIVE NATURE OF THE INDONESIAN NETHERLANDS CONFLICT ABOUT WEST IRIAN.

AS YOUR EXCELLENCY IS AWARE WE HAVE IN ALL SINCERITY DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN THE PAST TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM IN A PEACEFUL WAY. IT IS TRUE THAT WE ARE PREPARING OURSELVES NOW TO FACE THE WORST IN OUR CONFLICT WITH THE NETHERLANDS BECAUSE OF THE PERSISTENT PREPARATION OF THE NETHERLANDS TO MAKE A SO-CALLED INDEPENDENT WEST IRIAN AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT FORCIBLY SEPARATED FROM INDONESIA. IN SUCH A CASE I HOPE YOUR EXCELLENCY AGREES WITH ME THAT NO DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WILL BE OF ANY AVAIL. STILL DESPITE THE PEOPLES COMMAND I PROCLAIMED ON THE 19TH DECEMBER LAST WE LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT HONORABLE FOR BOTH SIDES. YOUR EXCELLENCY CAN IMAGINE HOW DEEPLY DISTURBED I WAS WHEN IN THE EVENING OF THE 15TH - 16TH JANUARY INDONESIAN NAVAL UNITS WHILE ON PATROL 25 MILES FROM THE WEST IRIAN COAST WERE SUDDENLY ATTACKED BY AN OVERPOWERING COUNTERPART OF THE NETHERLANDS WITH THE RESULT THAT AMONG OTHERS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE NAVY LOST HIS LIFE. TO BE FRANK THE EMOTIONS OF ANGER HAVE BEEN DEEPLY AROUSED AMONG THE WHOLE NATION AND A DETERMINATION TO RETALIATE IS QUITE STRONG.

(more)

ON THE OTHER HAND I ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY I WILL DO MY BEST TO KEEP THESE EMOTIONS WITHIN BOUNDS.

FURTHER I HAVE INSTRUCTED MY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK TO KEEP CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE QUESTION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

\* \*\*\* \*



ACTION

JAN 19 1962

TO *Lee*

FILE NO.

☐ ACTION COMPLETED

INITIALS

Return to Records Control Room 2074

WU CD025 LNL1455 PUSA260 T2634 SVP336/DC1739

CD DJAKARIA VIA WUCABLES JAN 20 0145

MOSTIMMEDIATE HIS EXCELLENCY U THANT SECRETARY GENERAL  
UNITED NATIONS NYK

NR 0158/B THANK YOU VERY MUCH (.) EXCELLENCY (.)  
FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF THE 15TH AND 17TH JANUARY (.)  
I FULLY APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE EXPLOSIVE  
NATURE OF THE INDONESIAN NETHERLANDS CONFLICT ABOUT WEST  
IRIAN (.) AS YOUR EXCELLENCY IS AWARE WE HAVE IN ALL  
SINCERITY DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN THE PAST TO SOLVE  
THIS PROBLEM IN A PEACEFUL WAY (.) IT IS TRUE THAT WE  
ARE PREPARING OURSELVES NOW TO FACE THE WORST  
IN OUR CONFLICT WITH THE NETHERLANDS BECAUSE OF THE  
PERSISTANT PREPARATION OF THE NETHERLANDS TO MAKE A SOCALLED  
INDEPENDENT WEST IRIAN AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT FORCIBLY SEPARATED  
FROM INDONESIA (.) IN SUCH A CASE I HOPE YOUR EXCELLENCY  
AGREES WITH ME THAT NO DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WILL BE OF ANY  
AVAIL (.) STILL DISPUTE THE PEOPLES COMMAND I PROCLAIMED  
ON THE 19TH DECEMBER LAST WE LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR A  
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT HONORABLE FOR BOTH SIDES (.) YOUR  
EXCELLENCY CAN IMAGINE HOW DEEPLY DISTURBED I WAS WHEN IN THE  
EVENING OF THE 15TH ON 16TH JANUARY INDONESIAN NAVAL  
UNITS WHILE ON PATROL 25 MILES FROM THE WEST IRIAN COAST  
WERE SUDDENLY ATTACKED BY AN OVERPOWERING COUNTERPART OF THE  
NETHERLANDS WITH THE RESULT THAT AMONG OTHERS THE DEPUTY CHIEF  
OF STAFF OF THE NAVY LOST HIS LIFE (.) TO BE FRANK THE  
EMOTIONS OF ANGER HAVE BEEN DEEPLY AROUSED AMONG THE WHOLE  
NATION AND A DETERMINATION TO RETALIATE IS QUITE STRONG (.)  
ON THE OTHER HAND I ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY I WILL DO MY BEST  
TO KEEP THIS EMOTIONS WITHIN BOUNDS (.) FURTHER I HAVE  
INSTRUCTED MY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEWYORK TO KEEP CLOSE  
CONTACT WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF  
A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE QUESTION IN CONFORMITY  
WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS (.) HIGHEST CONSIDERATION (.) SUKARNO (.)  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (.)

*Press Release*

56/1123

20/1/62

UNITED NATIONS  
1962 JAN 19 PM 5:45  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

ON THE OTHER HAND I ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY I WILL DO MY BEST  
TO KEEP THIS EMOTIONS WITHIN BOUNDS (.) FURTHER I HAVE  
INSTRUCTED MY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEWYORK TO KEEP CLOSE  
CONTACT WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF  
A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE QUESTION IN CONFORMITY  
WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS (.) HIGHEST CONSIDERATION(.) SUKARNO (.)  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (.)

TELEGRAPH UNIT

1952 JAN 19 PM 5:45

UNITED NATIONS

DEPARLU.

544P EST..

CLR

R WUCD25 19 1744EST SVN EJ TU



SECRET

22 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 11 January 1962

On 12 January I sent for Ambassador Wirjopranoto of Indonesia and asked him if his Government would be agreeable to the new formulation. He told me that in view of the Indonesian Government's press statement released in New York on 9 January, this new formulation would not be acceptable to his Government. The latest position of the Indonesian Government towards the problem is stated in that communiqué as follows:

.....  
"In view of the past experiences, there must be prior guarantees of success before Indonesia can once again meet the Dutch at the negotiating table. Indonesia is still prepared to negotiate with the Dutch, but only if the latter recognize that the basis of such negotiations will be the transfer of administration over West Irian to Indonesia. This is indispensable to guarantee that negotiations will succeed in attaining a fruitful solution in line with the freedom and independence of the whole of Indonesia and the solemn proclamation of the United Nations on 'the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations'."

Since he felt very strongly that even the transmission of my request would embarrass Djakarta, I did not press him any farther. Ambassador Wirjopranoto assured me, however, that his Government would enter into negotiations with the Government of the Netherlands if there was some indication of the latter's sincere intention to comply with the previous agreements, particularly the agreement reached on 22 June 1949 on the holding of a round-table conference. He informed me that at that particular meeting an agreement was reached to discuss ways and means of transferring real, complete and unconditional sovereignty of West Irian to Indonesia in accordance with the principles of the Renville agreement. I asked him if a copy of that agreement could be made available to me, and he promised to send it to me.

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Ambassador Yost of the U.S. Mission saw me on 15 January and exchanged views on the latest developments regarding West Irian. On that day I sent cables to the President of the Republic of Indonesia and to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, expressing my deep concern of the news of an incident involving a clash between Dutch and Indonesian naval vessels near the West Irian coast. In the same messages I reiterated my appeal of 19 December to both Governments to seek a peaceful solution of the problem. The appeals were made on the basis of news reports which I received on that morning.

On 16 January Ambassador Stevenson of the U.S. Mission informed me that an Indonesian mass landing off West Irian was imminent according to the information received by the State Department, and he asked me if I would be agreeable to sending further appeals to both Governments to avoid precipitate action. I informed him of my messages sent on the previous day and that I was awaiting replies from both Governments. I considered that no further action on my part was called for at that stage.

On 17 January Ambassador Stevenson saw me again and conveyed to me an oral request from the Secretary of State to take very prompt action in view of the very serious psychological climate prevailing in Indonesia as the result of the sinking of two Indonesian naval boats by Dutch naval units. I told him that my information was to the effect that President Sukarno would for the time being restrict his activities to retaliatory measures only, and that he would not launch a full-scale attack on West Irian. In any case, I assured him that I would make a further appeal to the two Governments to depute their permanent representatives in New York to discuss with me the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the whole question in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. On the same day I received a reply from the ~~permanent~~ ~~representations~~ Prime Minister of the Netherlands to my appeal of 15 January, assuring me that the Netherlands Government would refrain from any precipitate action in that area. In the same message he repeated a suggestion made by the Netherlands Government to Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld to send one or more observers or personal representatives to Netherlands New Guinea.

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On 18 January Ambassador Stevenson discussed with me the advisability of my personal visits to both the Netherlands and Indonesia. I told him that for the moment it would not be necessary or advisable.

On 19 January, at my luncheon with President Kennedy and Ambassador Stevenson, the question of West Irian was also discussed along with other problems. Among the formulas likely to contribute to the success of a solution of the problem, the question of trusteeship of the territory was also mentioned. In the light of my discussions with the permanent representatives of the two countries on 17 January, I expressed my feeling that this idea should be pursued and that I would explore the possibilities of such an approach with the two delegates as soon as possible.

On the same day I sounded both delegates regarding their attitudes towards the idea of formulating an approach involving a trusteeship system for the area. The Indonesian representative, as his first reaction, indicated to me that things had gone too far for the Indonesian Government to consider a solution of the problem within the framework of a trusteeship system, even if Indonesia were asked by the General Assembly to serve as the trustee. However, after <sup>the</sup> transfer of administration of West Irian to Indonesia, his Government would be agreeable to determine the will of the people of West Irian through established processes of self-determination. He told me that if the Netherlands Government were agreeable to transfer the administration of West Irian to Indonesia, as a gesture of conciliation, the Indonesian Government would be prepared to make a similar gesture by promising some measure, after five years, whereby the people of West Irian would be given free choice regarding their future status.

The Netherlands representative did not have any immediate reaction to the idea of a trusteeship system for West Irian, but he stressed the fact that the crux of the problem is the guarantee of a genuine self-determination by the people of West Irian at a certain stage. He, however, promised to transmit to his Government the substance of our conversation and assured me that he would convey to me his Government's reply as soon as it was received.

On Sunday 21 January, I understand from you that both the U.S. Government and the Netherlands Government sought a clarification from you by telephone whether the idea of trusteeship and self-determination after five years of trusteeship was my proposal. Needless to say, it was certainly not my proposal, but one of the ideas which I had in mind at this stage of exploratory talks.

Statement by Dr. Van Mook

(Den Pasar Conference December 1946)

" ... it is decidedly not the intention of the Government to exclude New Guinea from Indonesia ... the addition proposed by the Government shows that it is the intention to keep the territory within the framework of the United States of Indonesia."

Statement by Dr. Van Royen

(General Assembly September 1948)

" ... the issue between the Netherlands and the Republic is not whether the people of Indonesia will become an independent nation. That issue has been decided and the creation of the United States of Indonesia, embracing the whole Archipelago is only temporarily delayed .... "

(Statement to the Security Council  
on December 22, 1948)

"As I explained at the outset, this dispute is not about the question of whether or not Indonesia will become independent. All parties agree that what used to be the Netherlands East Indies should become an independent State as soon as possible."



West Indian

Br. Parliament

23 Jan. 1962

Mr. Heath was asked if he would make it clear that British Government strongly supported efforts being made by United Nations Acting Secretary-General to mediate in matter. Mr. Heath replied: "We strongly support the effort which U Thant is making in this case and we will do everything we can to assist them. We hope they come to a speedy and successful conclusion."



The Government of Netherlands enters talks with objective of settling West New Guinea dispute and on clear understanding that this will require establishing conditions which will enable Government of Netherlands to terminate its administration over territory.

The Government of Indonesia enters talks with objective of settling West Irian dispute and on clear understanding that this will require establishing conditions assuring free choice (free expression of will) of Papuan people within five years.

SECRET

23 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 22 January 1962

The Netherlands representative saw me in the afternoon of 22 January and informed me that his Government is not in favour of the idea of a trusteeship system for Netherlands New Guinea with Indonesia as trustee. His Government still feels that a transfer of the administration of the area to the U.N., as proposed by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands at the 16th regular session of the General Assembly, would be the most feasible. Amb. Schürmann clarified this proposal by stipulating that the U.N. might even appoint Indonesians to certain key administrative posts to replace the existing Netherlands officials. A parallel would be the U.N. role in Libya and Somalia before the attainment of independence. When I asked him if his Government's reaction of the idea of trusteeship is absolute, he replied in the affirmative.

I then discussed with him the advisability of my making an appeal to the Government of the Netherlands with a view to effecting the release of the 35 Indonesians rescued by the Dutch naval boats in the recent clash off Netherlands New Guinea. I explained to him that my motive was purely humanitarian and that, if the Government of the Netherlands could respond to my request favorably, it might ease tensions and demonstrate to the whole world that the Netherlands was ~~will~~ all out for a peaceful solution of the problem. Amb. Schürmann assured me that he would convey my intention to his Government and let me know as soon as he received a reply. Until then I was not to make any appeal to the Government of the Netherlands.

On the same day the representative of Indonesia, accompanied by Mr. Tjondronegoro of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, <sup>saw me. Mr. Tjondronegoro/</sup> said that he was sent by President Sukarno to see me and to explain to me the attitude of the Indonesian Government towards the problem. He made it clear that in view of the very high emotional climate in Indonesia as a result of the sinking

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of the two Indonesian naval boats, President Sukarno had decided on taking appropriate retaliatory measures against the Netherlands armed forces in West Irian, but with due regard to my attempts at bringing the two parties together, action had been withheld for the time being. He also told me that, according to a very reliable source of information, the majority of the members of the Netherlands Government decided last week to negotiate with the Indonesian Government on the modalities of the transfer of administration of West Irian to Indonesia. However, he went on, for obvious reasons, the Netherlands Government had decided not to divulge this decision at this stage. I questioned him about the reliability of this source, and he stressed that the source was unimpeachable.

He brought from President Sukarno the following formula, which alone could be the basis of negotiations between the two parties. President Sukarno feels very strongly, according to him, that negotiations can take place only to discuss the following items:

1. transfer of the administration of West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, and
2. the internal self-determination of the people in West Irian, after a certain specified period.

Mr. Tjondronegoro also informed me that, if the Netherlands Government agreed to this formulation as a basis for discussion, ~~the~~ a public announcement to that effect must be made by the two Governments before discussions actually take place.

The Indonesian representatives also rejected the idea of trusteeship with Indonesia as administering authority. They explained to me that an 'internationalisation' of this administration has always been opposed by their Government.

They also stressed the urgency of the problem and they requested me to try to get a reaction of the Netherlands to their formulation as early as possible.

23 January 1962

The Indonesian representatives <sup>say</sup> ~~insist~~ that negotiations can take place only to discuss the following items:

1. transfer of the administration of West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, and
2. the internal self-determination of the people in West Irian, after a certain specified period.

25 January 1962

The Government of Netherlands enters talks with objective of settling West New Guinea dispute and on clear understanding that this will require establishing conditions which will enable Government of Netherlands to terminate its administration over territory.

The Government of Indonesia enters talks with objective of settling West Irian dispute and on clear understanding that this will require establishing conditions assuring free choice (free <sup>of</sup> expression/will) of Papuan people within five years.



SECRET

25 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

SUBJECT: Continuation of my note of 23 January 1962

The Netherlands representative saw me in the morning of 24 January and he informed me that he had not received any reply from his Government regarding my contemplated request regarding the release of the Indonesian crew.

I then showed him the Indonesian formula which was presented to me by the Indonesian representatives as a basis for negotiations. AM His first reaction was that the Netherlands Government would not be agreeable to enter into negotiations with the Indonesian representatives on the basis of the Indonesian formula, but he promised to transmit the same to The Hague and let me know of the reply as soon as he received it. Ambassador Schürmann reiterated the position of his Government that the crux of the problem is the genuine and effective implementation of the right of the people of West Irian for self-determination.

I then asked him if his Government would be agreeable to negotiate with the Indonesian representatives only to discuss the agenda, and not the substance of the problem, in my presence. He promised to transmit this request to his Government.

Ambassador Schürmann expressed distress at the rigidity of the Indonesian position, but he made it clear that this was his own reaction and that it did not necessarily reflected the views of his Government. I also mentioned to him that the Indonesian representatives had confided to me that they had private information to the effect that the majority of the members of the Netherlands Government was in favour of discussing the ways and means of the transfer of administration of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia, but for obvious reasons they would not like to make this public. Amb. Schürmann denied any knowledge of this, but he was sure that the information was absolutely without foundation.

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Amb. Sukardjo and Mr. Tjondronegoro of Indonesia saw me in the afternoon of the same day. I informed them that their formula for negotiations had been transmitted to the Netherlands representative who promised to seek his Government's instructions, and I also indicated to them that Amb. Schürmann did not consider that his Government would be agreeable to this formula. I reiterated the Netherlands viewpoint that the crux of the problem was a genuine and effective implementation of the right of self-determination of the people of West Irian within a specific period.

I also asked them if the Indonesian Government would be agreeable to negotiate with the Netherlands representative in my presence just to discuss the agenda, and not to go into the substance of the problem. The Indonesian delegates expressed doubts about their Government agreeing to this, since it would give the impression that the two delegations had entered into negotiations without any prior agreement on the substance.

I then suggested the advisability of the two delegations getting together privately, not in my presence, just to discuss the agenda. They assured me that they would communicate this request to their Government.

Today (25 January) Sir Patrick Dean saw me, and said that H.M. Government was very much interested in the progress of the private exploratory talks undertaken by me with the two delegations. I gave him a brief resumé of the negotiations, and he handed over to me the formulation which, his Government considers, would be of some help in my endeavours to bring the two parties together. The British formula is reproduced below:

"The Government of Netherlands enters talks with objective of settling West New Guinea dispute and on clear understanding that this will require establishing conditions which will enable Government of Netherlands to terminate its administration over territory.

"The Government of Indonesia enters talks with objective of settling West Irian dispute and on clear understanding that this will require establishing conditions assuring free choice (free expression of will) of Papuan people within five years."

SECRET

29 January 1962

To: C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 25 January 1962

Amb. Schurmann saw me today and informed me that the Netherlands Government agrees to enter into negotiations with the Indonesian representatives in my presence to discuss the agenda only, if not the substance of the problem. This was in confirmation of his first reaction indicated to me at our last meeting on 24 January.

I informed him that the Indonesian representatives were not too willing to enter into negotiations even to discuss the agenda if there was no indication of the Netherlands Government's willingness to include in the agenda the discussion of the transfer of administration of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia. I also informed him that the Indonesian representatives had been suggested to get in touch with the Netherlands representatives privately, not in my presence, just to discuss the agenda. Amb. Schurmann informed me that no such approach had been made by the Indonesian representatives, and even if such an approach were made he still considered that his Government would prefer that negotiations should be conducted in my presence. I then handed over to him a copy of the British formula mentioned in my note of 25 January. He considered that it should serve as a basis for discussion, but suggested that this formula should not be presented to the Indonesian representatives, as their outright rejection would put us in another difficult situation. He suggested that attempts should be made for negotiations in my presence just to discuss the agenda, preferably outside the U.N. building, in order not to attract public attention which the Indonesian representatives feared. He further suggested that if such negotiations take place, I should come out with my own formula similar to the British one as a basis for discussion. I assured him that I would continue to endeavour my utmost to bring the two parties together as early as possible. He suggested that since there are two Indonesian representatives in New York, he would like to have his colleague from Washington also here if negotiations come through. He suggested early next week as the most appropriate time.

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He also informed me that he had received a reply from his Government to my earlier query regarding the advisability of my sending an appeal to the Netherlands Government to release the Indonesian crew now being held in Netherlands New Guinea. He said that his Government would welcome such an appeal. I told him that my appeal would be sent out today. The same was communicated to him this afternoon.

Amb. Sukardjo and Mr. Tjondronegoro saw me this afternoon and asked me if there was further development. I told them that I was under the impression that, on the basis of our discussion of 24 January, they would try to establish private contacts with the Netherlands representatives, and that was the reason why I did not send for them earlier. They told me that they were not enthusiastic about establishing private contacts with the Netherlands representatives even to discuss the agenda if there was no prospect of any reference to the transfer of administration to Indonesia. They said that so far the Netherlands Government has no intention of discussing the modalities of a transfer since the Netherlands spokesmen were still talking about the termination of their administration and some form of internationalisation of the administration as the next stage. They reiterated the Indonesian position that they could not enter into negotiations with the Netherlands without some kind of understanding, if not explicit, that the Netherlands Government would be prepared to discuss the transfer of administration to Indonesia after some interim arrangements have been made to facilitate such transfer. I told them that there was no prospect of the Netherlands Government making such a commitment before the negotiations started, and suggested that this should be brought up in the informal and private negotiations which I have suggested. I requested them to seek instructions from Djakarta regarding the need to enter into informal and private negotiations in my presence just to discuss the agenda, some time early next week. They promised to transmit my request to Djakarta, but maintained their original position that without any indication on the part of the Netherlands that the agenda would include the transfer of administration to Djakarta after some kind of an interim arrangement without involving the U.N., their Government would not be agreeable to the course suggested.

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Then they handed over to me a document entitled "The Indonesian-Netherlands Reconciliation Committee", which, they said, was published at The Hague in November 1961, signed by 171 prominent citizens of the Netherlands. They claim that the proposals contained in that document went much further than that held by the Netherlands Government at present. They requested me to study this document and suggested that I might find some appropriate basis for private and informal negotiations.

Mr. Tjondronegoro insisted that the time element is very important and expressed his suspicion that the Netherlands Government was playing for time. He also told me that he had been receiving queries from Djakarta asking for any progress in our exploratory talks and that he had to report back that there had been no progress. I told him not to be pessimistic since everyone should be extremely patient to achieve positive results in such negotiations.

I also informed them of my decision to appeal to the Government of the Netherlands to release the Indonesian crew now held in custody in Netherlands New Guinea. I also informed them that this appeal would be made late in the afternoon. Strangely enough there was no reaction from either of them.



He did meet me by the two  
representatives of Indonesia today.  
Hus.  
24/1/62

THE "INDONESIA-NETHERLANDS RECONCILIATION" COMMITTEE.

On the basis of the following considerations of the undersigned, coming from several political and interest groups, appeal to the Government and both Chambers of Parliament, as indicated in the last paragraph of this statement:

CONSIDERATIONS

1. The undersigned are convinced that it is impossible to materialize a solution of the New-Guinea problem by excluding the essential principles of settlement in the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Such a solution would create an explosive atmosphere in South East Asia which in the first place would be disastrous to New-Guinea and its people.
2. This conviction also indicates the absolute necessity of negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia at the earliest possible time in order to reach a solution, agreeable to both countries.
3. Therefore, the undersigned are of the opinion that - as has been stated also by one of the Government factions in the Second Chamber of Parliament - "internationalization" of the Dutch authority and policy with regard to New Guinea without immediate reconciliation between the Netherlands and Indonesia, would only mean a transfer of this conflict to the United Nations.
4. The external right of self-determination as promised by the Government to the people of West New-Guinea and fixed in advance as such was meant in the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to the General Assembly, would make the solution of the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia impossible.
5. As a matter of urgency the undersigned are of the opinion that now is the time for negotiations, and consider the materialization of such a meeting as possible.

Whenever there is the desire to come to an agreement difficulties of a formal character can be surmounted. The essential condition for such a negotiation is to be found in the repeated statements from the Indonesian side, concerning its willingness to normalise relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

6. The undersigned are pleased to state that Indonesia has suggested a free exchange of thoughts with New-Guinea which will be an important step in the right direction.
7. The undersigned are convinced that while looking for an acceptable 'form' of reunification of West New-Guinea with Indonesia the people of West New-Guinea should be represented. If such an agreeable 'form' of reunification could be found a period of transition will be necessary. This period of transition can only bear fruit for the Papuans if the authority during this period of transition is based on good cooperation between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The undersigned ascertained themselves that such a period of transition will also be accepted by Indonesia. If one of these countries is interested in an 'international control' during the period of transition, it is the opinion of the undersigned that this is attainable. No doubt the framework of the administration will become a main project in the aforementioned pleaded direct discussion between both countries.
8. The undersigned attach much importance to Indonesia's judgment that at the transfer of authority to Indonesia, West New-Guinea will be given its internal right of affairs with a sound autonomy.

Appeal:

On the basis of the above-mentioned considerations the undersigned appeal to the Government and both Chambers of Parliament to negotiate in the interest of Indonesia, the Netherlands as well as the people of West New-Guinea.

THE "INDONESIAN-NETHERLANDS RECONCILIATION" COMMITTEE,

Mrs. Prof.Dr.E.M.A.A.J.Allard, Nijmegen  
Prof.Dr.H.Bergema, Baarn.  
Prof.Dr.E.L.Smelik, Amsterdam.

Co-signers:

1. Drs. J.C.van Andel, Utrecht; 2. Dr.J.J.A.van Bakel, Nijmegen; 3. Prof.Dr.W.Banning, Driebergen; 4. A.van Basten Batenburg, Nijmegen; 5. Drs.J.Berg, Lunteren; 6. Prof.Dr.H.Berkhof, Oegstgeest; 6. Prof.Dr.H.Bianchi, Amsterdam; 7. Dr.J.Blauw, Hilversum; 8. Dr.F.Boerwinkel, Driebergen;

9. Dr.J.A.Bornewasser, Nijmegen; 10. Prof.Dr.J.G.G.Borst, Amsterdam; 11. Prof.Dr.P.J.Bouman, Groningen; 12. Prof. Dr.G.Billenburger Wurth, Kampen; 13. Ds.A.de Bruin, Den Haag; 14. Dr.J.J.Buskes, Amsterdam; 15. Prof.Dr.F.J.J.Buitendijk, Amsterdam; 16. Mrs.M.Cohen Stuart-Franken, Bennekom; 17. Ir. Ch.G.Cramer, Overveen; 18. Drs.P.W.Das, Eindhoven; 19. Prof. Dr.G.Th.J.Delfgaauw, Amsterdam; 20. Prof.Dr.N.A.Donkersloot, Amsterdam; 21. Mr.F.M.J.J.Duynstee, Maastricht; 22. Ds.B.Arps, Oegstgeest; 23. Dr.F.L.Bakker, Amsterdam; 24. Miss.Dr.Johan. J.C.Barten, Nijmegen; 25. Prof.Dr.M.A.Beek, Amsterdam; 26. Prof.Dr.S.F.H.J.Berkelbach v.d. Sprenkel, Utrecht; 27. P.B. van den Biggelaar, Amsterdam; 28. Prof.Dr.P.A.H.de Boer, Oegstgeest; 29. Prof.Dr.J.G.Bomhoff, Leiden; 30. A.Borst Pzn., Wassenaar; 31. Dr.H.Bouman, Den Haag; 32. Prof.Dr.J.H.Brouwer; 33. Dr.W.J.C.Buitendijk, Doorn; 34. E.M.Buterr Sr., Amsterdam; 35. Prof.Dr.P.J.A.Calon, Nijmegen; 36. Prof.Dr.H.P.A. Cornelissen, O.P., Nijmegen; 37. Prof.Dr.W.F.Dankbaar, Groningen; 38. Prof.Dr.B.Delfgaauw, Haarlem; 39. Dr.C.J.Dippel, Eindhoven; 40. Prof.Mr.F.J.F.M.Duynstee, Nijmegen; 41. Dr. J.H.Dijkhuis, Utrecht; 42. Ds.M.E.van der Veen, Oegstgeest; 43. Mr.M.A.Verdaasdonk, Amsterdam; 44. Mrs.Prof.Dr.E.Visser, Groningen; 45. Mrs.Prof.Dr.C.J.de Vogel, Utrecht; 46. Prof. Dr.H.de Vos, Groningen; 47. Ds.D.G.van Vreumingen, Groningen; 48. B.Weduw. Hilversum; 49. Ds.H.A.Wiersinga, Baarn; 50. Jhr.Prof.Dr.J.S.Witsen Elias, Blaricum; 51. Prof.Mr.S.F.L. Baron van Wijnbergen, Nijmegen; 52. Prof.Dr.H.R.Wijngaarden, Amsterdam; 53. Prof.Dr.J.Veldkamp, De Bilt; 54. Dr.J.A.Verdoorn, Amsterdam; 55. Ir.Joh.Visser, Nijmegen; 56. Ds.P.J.F. van Voorst Vader, Eefde; 57. Prof.F.Vreede, Laren; 58. Miss Dr.A.de Waal, Utrecht; 59. Dr.H.J.Westerink, Leiden; 60. Prof.Dr.J.Wils, Nijmegen; 61. Ds.J.R.Wolfensberger, Amsterdam; 62. Mr.H.J.Wijnmalen, Rijswijk; 63. Dr.E.Emmen, Scheveningen; 64. Louis Frequin, Nijmegen; 65. Dr.W.F.Golterman, Amsterdam; 66. Prof.Dr.H.J.Gronewold, Groningen; 67. J.J.Guitemeau, Nijmegen; 68. J.Ph.Habig, Amsterdam; 69. Drs.P.W.van der Heide, Zeist; 70. Ds.G.F.W.Herngreen, Groningen; 71. A.J.R.A.M.van Heijst, Den Haag; 72. Ds.H.A.C.Hildering, Elden; 73. F.W.M.van Hoesel, Heelsum; 75. Dr.B.Hoogvliet, Rotterdam; 76. Prof.Dr.J.A.Huisman, Zeist; 77. Ds.Okke Jager, Haarlem; 78. S.P.A.Jelsma M.S.C., Den Haag; 79. Miss.Dr.M.C. Jongeling, Haarlem; 80. Prof.Dr.G.Th.Kempe, Utrecht; 81. Dr. J.Kiers, Delft; 82. Mrs.Prof.Dr.D.J.Kohlbrugge, Utrecht; 83. Dr.W.T.Kroese, Almelo; 84. Ds.M.A.Krop, Groningen; 85. Ds.H.M.Kuitert, Amsterdam; 86. Prof.Dr.M.J.Langeveld, Bilt-hoven; 87. J.van der Leeden, Rotterdam; 88. L.Lhoest, Maastricht; 89. Prof.Dr.Th.J.G.Locher, Leiden; 90. Mrs.S.Lijftogt-Krayenhoff v.d. Leur, Utrecht; 91. Dr.P.J.Meertens, Amsterdam; 92. D.van der Meulen, Sr., Oorssel; 93. Dr.J.J.Meuze-laar, Amsterdam; 94. Dr.D.N.van der Neut, Zeist; 95. Prof. Dr.G.C.van Niftrik, Amsterdam; 96. Drs.J.H.van Oostveen,



Amsterdam; 97. Ds. J. Overduin, Veenendaal; 98. H. J. Ploos van Amstel, Utrecht; 99. Prof. Dr. J. Presser, Amsterdam; 100. H. M. van Randwijk, Amsterdam; 101. Drs. J. Reiling, Bilthoven; 102. J. A. Riedel, Colmschate; 103. Lou H. Th. Ritzen, Maastricht; 104. Prof. Mr. B. V. A. Roling, Groningen; 105. Ds. J. A. C. Rullmann, Baarn; 106. Prof. Dr. F. L. R. Sassen, Den Haag; 107. Prof. Mr. L. G. A. Schlichting, Mijmegen; 108. W. J. Schouten, Amsterdam; 109. Prof. Dr. J. N. Sevenster, Amstelveen; 110. Prof. Dr. J. Th. Snijders, Haren; 111. J. Stap, Amsterdam; 112. Prof. Drs. C. van der Straaten, Den Haag; 113. Dr. Kr. Srijd, Amsterdam; 114. Dr. J. L. Swellengrebel, Oegstgeest; 115. L. A. M. H. Tielens, Maastricht; 116. Dr. K. F. Vaas, Yerseke; 117. Dr. H. Van der Veen, Leiden; 118. Prof. Dr. H. M. M. Fortmann, Nijmegen; 119. Dr. J. C. Gilhuis; 120. Prof. Mr. W. C. L. van der Grinten, Nijmegen; 121. Prof. Dr. W. K. Grossouw, Nijmegen; 122. Dr. C. Haanen, Nijmegen; 123. Drs. J. van Halewijn, Nijmegen; 124. Prof. Dr. G. C. Heringa, Zuidlaren; 125. Prof. Dr. H. J. den Hertog, Wageningen; 126. Prof. Dr. K. A. H. Hidding, Leiden; 127. H. Hilling, Wassenaar; 128. Prof. Dr. S. Hofstra, Amsterdam; 129. Dr. Jacob Houtman, Lichtenvoorde; 130. L. A. Huygen, Maastricht; 131. Prof. Dr. H. H. Janssen, Nijmegen; 132. J. J. Jiskoot, Den Haag; 133. Mr. W. H. A. Jonkers MSC, Nijmegen; 134. P. C. van Keulen, Delft; 135. Dr. P. J. Koets, Amsterdam; 136. Prof. Dr. H. Kraemer, Driebergen; 137. Ds. K. H. Kroo, Amsterdam; 138. Prof. Dr. G. Kuiper, Hzn., Amsterdam; 139. Prof. Dr. C. D. de Langen, Utrecht; 140. Miss. Mr. W. M. W. van Lanschot, Utrecht; 141. H. B. van Leeuwen, Rotterdam; 142. Prof. Dr. R. A. J. van Lier, Wageningen; 143. Ds. P. J. Luijendijk, Ermelo; 144. Drs. J. P. J. Maassen, Nijmegen; 145. Prof. Dr. K. Meeuwesse, Nijmegen; 146. Ds. D. van der Meulen, Amstelveen; 147. D. H. M. Meijnen, Den Haag; 148. Mr. J. J. H. Nieskens, Eindhoven; 149. G. A. van Oorschot, Amsterdam; 150. Mr. M. A. W. van Oppen, Maastricht; 151. Prof. Dr. C. A. van Peursen, Leiden; 152. Prof. Dr. Fred. L. Polak, Boekelo; 153. Ds. E. Pijlman, Wassenaar; 154. Drs. P. B. Renes, Gorinchem; 155. J. W. E. Riemens, Amsterdam; 156. Tjalie Robinson, Den Haag; 157. Prof. Dr. P. J. Roscam Abbing, Groningen; 158. Dr. Paul Rijkens, Den Haag; 159. Prof. Dr. R. Schippers, Amsterdam; 160. Ir. K. Scholtens, Den Haag; 161. Prof. Dr. H. Schulte Nordholt, Eelde; 162. Miss. Chr. Slotemaker de Bruine, Oegstgeest; 163. Drs. A. M. Stadhouders, Nijmegen; 164. Mr. G. A. van den Steenhoven, Den Haag; 165. Prof. Dr. S. Strasser, Nijmegen; 166. Ir. J. H. Sweering, Maastricht; 167. Prof. Dr. A. Teeuw, Leiden; 168. Prof. Dr. H. A. Tolhoek, Groningen; 169. Dr. L. F. Troebels, Nijmegen; 170. Dr. J. M. van Veen, Driebergen; 171. Ir. J. P. H. van der Veen, Leiden.-

The signature of the above co-signers are with  
the Secretariat of the Committee.

THE "INDONESIA-NETHERLANDS RECONCILIATION" COMMITTEE,

Mrs. Prof. Dr. E. M. A. A. J. Allard, Nijmegen.  
Prof. Dr. H. Bergema, Baarn.  
Prof. Dr. E. L. Smelik, Amsterdam.

*original with*

*Mr. Navasinkam*

New York, 30 January 1962

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I take pleasure in conveying to you below the answer of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands to your message of yesterday's date:

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your message of January 29, in which you directed an appeal to the Netherlands Government for the release of the Indonesian prisoners who are held in Netherlands New Guinea, following the incident off the coast of the territory between Netherlands and Indonesian naval units which occurred on January 15.

In the same spirit which animated Your Excellency's appeal the Netherlands Government are prepared to release these prisoners through the intermediary of the United Nations Organisation, in the hope that this voluntary gesture may contribute to easing the present tension and thus to improve the climate for negotiations between the parties under your auspices.

I welcome your suggestion to send to Netherlands New Guinea a United Nations representative who would meet the prisoners, discuss mutually satisfactory arrangements for their repatriation and who would also accompany them on their return to Indonesia. Instructions will be sent to the civilian and military authorities in Netherlands New Guinea to give every assistance to your representative. Our Permanent Representative in New York has been instructed to assist the members of your staff in making the necessary arrangements.

Highest consideration,

J. de Quay

Prime Minister of the Netherlands."

Yours sincerely,

The Secretary-General  
of the United Nations

New York  
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*Text of P.M.'s letter*

*Press release*

*SG/1128, 1/II/62*

*CS*

C.W.A. Schurmann



29 January 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I shall be grateful if you could arrange to send the following confidential message to His Excellency the Prime Minister of the Netherlands. I believe that the text of the message was discussed with you by Mr. Narasimhan.

"I am grateful to Your Excellency for your cable of 18 January in which you have informed me that the 'Netherlands Government are determined to continue in the attitude of utmost restraint'. I have been discussing with your Permanent Representative in New York the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the whole question of Netherlands New Guinea.

"Meanwhile, I would like to make an appeal in regard to the prisoners that are now held in Netherlands New Guinea, following the incidents of 15 January. I shall be very grateful if, as a humanitarian gesture which might help in easing tensions all round, your Government would agree to the release of these prisoners and to their repatriation to Indonesia. If the response of Your Excellency and your Government to this appeal were to be favourable, I shall discuss with your Permanent Representative modalities of actual transfer of these prisoners from Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia.

"What I have in mind is to send to Netherlands New Guinea a United Nations representative who would meet the prisoners, discuss mutually satisfactory arrangements for their repatriation, and also accompany them on their return to Indonesia.

"Highest consideration."

I hope that, as soon as you have a reply to this message, you will communicate with me.

Yours sincerely,

U Thant  
Acting Secretary-General

H.E. Mr. C.W.A. Schurmann,  
Permanent Representative to  
the United Nations,  
Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to  
the United Nations,  
711 Third Avenue, 18th floor,  
New York, N.Y.

Text of 3/6 letter to  
P.M. - Press Release  
5/6/1128, 1/11/62

On January 30, 1962 the Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Malik, met the Netherlands Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Baron Bentinck, in London.

Mr. Malik said that he wished to convey certain ideas before Ambassador Sudjarwo was to continue the conversations in New York. He mentioned that the Acting Secretary-General of the UN had thus far done no more than listen to both parties and that he would not attempt to bring them together at the conference table until he had heard the result of Mr. Malik's conversation with Baron Bentinck. He went on to say that the Indonesian ambassadors in Washington and Bonn were under the impression that the Netherlands Government was prepared to hand over the administration of New Guinea to Indonesia in exchange for guarantees with respect to the welfare of the population. This, for Indonesia, was the basis of the interview and he presumed the Netherlands was prepared to accept it.

Baron Bentinck replied that the Netherlands Government was not prepared to make the transfer in question nor to accept it as a precondition for negotiations.

Mr. Malik then hinted at Indonesian preparedness to mitigate its stand somewhat and ended by saying that it would depend on the outcome of the interview whether the Secretary-General's offer to hold discussions in his presence would be accepted.

Baron Bentinck stated that the Acting Secretary-General would be informed of the content of the interview.

*Handed over to me by Amb. Shumann  
at 10.30 a.m. Friday, 2<sup>nd</sup> February.*

*Har.  
4/2*

On February 2, 1962 Ambassadors Malik and Bentineck met again in London.

On instructions from the Netherlands Government Baron Bentineck informed Mr. Malik that, as the Prime Minister had recently stated in a letter addressed to the Second Chamber of Parliament, the Government was not prepared to enter into any bilateral negotiations; it would only negotiate in the presence of a third party. From the Dutch side no preconditions for such negotiations were made; on the other hand no Indonesian preconditions (or basis for negotiations) could be accepted either. In the view of the Netherlands Government it went without saying that during the talks in the presence of a third person each of the two parties would be at liberty to advance its own ideas, which, so far as the Indonesians were concerned, meant the "basis" mentioned by them.

The Netherlands Government, Baron Bentineck intimated, had not asked for the interview, but the Dutch Ambassadors had been authorized to receive any oral communications the Indonesian representatives wished to make to them. Baron Bentineck had no special authorization apart from this general one. He would see to it that what Mr. Malik had to say would be reported to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.

Mr. Malik said that he had expected a different reply because he had hoped that the Netherlands Government would have instructed Baron Bentineck to react favourably to the Indonesian wish for transfer of administration (or principle of transfer of administration). Especially since the Indonesian Government was prepared to guarantee complete self-determination for the population of Netherlands New Guinea, to be exercised after a number of years to be agreed upon, Mr. Malik thought the Netherlands had mentioned five years and was ready to agree to this.

Ambassador Malik stated explicitly that he had been authorized by President Sukarno and his Government to make this offer of self-determination. He showed two papers, signed respectively by Foreign Minister Subandrio and President Sukarno, and said that they authorized him to hold preliminary conversations with a Dutch representative prior to final talks. (the texts were in Indonesian, a language which Baron Bentineck does not know). Baron Bentineck replied that he had no authorization except to listen. Mr. Malik then went on to say that he was the only Indonesian to have such authority and that Ambassadors Sudjarwo and Sukardjo did not have it. He repeated that he was empowered to hold talks with a Dutch representative in order to prepare for the final talks in the presence of U Thant.

-Baron-

*Handed over to me by  
Amb. Shumenn at 3.10 p.m. today.*

*A  
7/12*

*7/II/62*

Baron Bentinck urged Mr. Malik not to insist on preliminary talks but to accept to discuss the matter in the presence of the Acting Secretary General.

Mr. Malik indicated that it had been difficult to persuade President Sukarno to accept any talks at all and to offer self-determination but that the success of the talks must be certain before Indonesia could enter upon them. To that end the offer of self-determination should be matched by one of transfer of administration. Baron Bentinck's reply was that, in the Netherlands view, in case of transfer of administration the self-determination would be stultified and that therefore this transfer could not be accepted as a precondition.

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SECRET

3 February 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan,  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 29 January 1962

Amb. Schurmann saw me at 3 p.m. on 30 January and handed over to me the reply from the P.M. of the Netherlands to my appeal of the previous day, expressing the readiness of the Netherlands Government to release the Indonesian prisoners through the intermediary of the United Nations. I informed him that I had in mind the TAB Resident Representative in Djakarta to serve as my representative for the purpose. Amb. Schurmann was not agreeable to this idea, and he suggested that ~~him~~/UN official of a higher status should be considered for such an assignment. He also said that the assignment of the UN ResRep in Djakarta would imply some form of recognition of a link between Djakarta and Netherlands New Guinea. I told him that I would give further consideration to this question.

On the same evening I sent for Amb. Sukardjo and informed him that the Netherlands Government had responded very favorably to my appeal, but he strongly objected to the idea of UN involvement in such an undertaking. He suggested that the proposed intermediary should be outside the UN and should not represent the UN. When I explained to him that it was I who had suggested to the Netherlands Government that a UN representative should make the necessary arrangements in West Irian, he expressed surprise at my initiative on these lines. When I told him that it was my original idea to send our TAB representative in Djakarta to West Irian, he seemed to favour this idea, but I did not pursue the matter further since the Netherlands representative was not agreeable to it earlier. As a compromise I told the Indonesian representative that I would request the ICRC to designate an official to act on my behalf and make on the spot arrangements for the evacuation of the prisoners, he said he would transmit this information to Djakarta.

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It was agreed that copies of my appeal to the Netherlands Prime Minister and his reply were to be released simultaneously in New York and The Hague at 12 am EST on 31 January, but in view of the Indonesian reaction I decided to defer public release until the next day. I understand ~~from~~ that you contacted Amb. Schurmann on the same night and requested him to delay the release by 24 hours.

Amb. Schurmann saw me at noon on 31st January, and I explained to him the circumstances leading to the postponement of the proposed release of letters. He told me that he had communicated your request the previous night to The Hague, but he was not sure whether his message would get there in time. In his opinion, although The Hague might get his message in time, he was not sure if the Netherlands authorities in Netherlands New Guinea would get it in time. He was favorable to the idea of asking the ICRC to designate an official who could act on my behalf. I immediately sent a cable to the President of the ICRC through Spinelli.

Amb. Yost of the U.S. Mission saw me in the afternoon and informed me that President Kennedy was very much interested in the exploratory talks now being held here, and I explained to him the latest developments. He informed me that the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington was leaving that night for The Hague for urgent consultations.

On February 1st I received a cable from the President of the ICRC informing me that he would designate an official of the ICRC to act on my behalf for the repatriation of the Indonesian prisoners. Copies of my letters to the Netherlands P.M. and his reply together with the summaries of my cable to ICRC and their answer to me were released to the press on 1st February (SG/1128).

After the release Amb. Sukardjo saw me and informed me that his Government would take a very strong objection to the use of the word "repatriation" as it would imply the sending of the prisoners from one country to another, while, in fact, the two areas are part of one country. I explained to him that there was no other word in the English language to describe such an activity.

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Amb. Schurmann saw me on 2 February and handed over to me a note on a meeting between the Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow and the Netherlands Ambassador to London on 30 January in London. He also informed me that the Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Malik, came to London to meet the Netherlands Ambassador to London, and there were high expectations that the visit would be significant. However, from this note, which he handed over to me, it was clear that there was no special significance to it except that the two representatives met and exchanged views for the first time. He also confirmed the news conveyed to me earlier by Amb. Yost that the Netherlands ambassador in Washington had left The Hague for consultations and that he would be back in New York next Thursday (8 February). He also suggested that if I could come up with some formula as a basis for negotiation, he and his colleague (Amb. van Royen) could get together with the two Indonesian representatives in my presence on that day. A copy of the note handed over to me by Amb. Schurmann is appended herewith.

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

680 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

February 9, 1962

No. II/62

## USSR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON WEST IRIAN

On February 8, 1962, TASS, the official Soviet press Agency, made public the Statement of the Soviet Government on West Irian. Following is the full text of this Statement.

"The Soviet Government, steadfastly upholding the policy of safeguarding peace and consolidating the national independence of all countries and peoples, cannot help calling attention to the situation endangering peace, which has been created by the aggressive actions of the Netherlands against the Republic of Indonesia. Stubbornly refusing for a long time to settle the problem of West Irian peacefully, the Government of Holland has now embarked upon the road of direct military provocations. Considerable contingents of Dutch armed forces have of late been moved to the area of West Irian. One of the most outrageous acts of this sort was the piratic attack of Dutch warships on the Indonesian patrol boats in the open sea.

By resorting to such acts against the independent Republic of Indonesia, Holland strives to prolong its colonial domination over West Irian and also to retain this Indonesian territory as a stronghold of the aggressive Western military blocs in their struggle against the national - liberation movement of the South - East Asian peoples.

Such actions of Holland are in flagrant contradiction to the basic provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples, adopted by the United Nations Organization. This declaration is known to declare that any attempt to undermine national unity of territorial integrity of a country partially or completely is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The behaviour of the Dutch government proves that it does not reckon with the United Nations decisions and the will of the peoples to put an end to the outlived colonial system.

Why is Holland still ignoring the United Nations decision to do away with colonialism, which has a direct bearing on West Irian ?

This can be explained only by the fact that it is backed, just as the Portuguese and other colonialists, by such aggressive military alignments as NATO and SEATO, which are pursuing a policy of salvaging the remnants of the colonial system, a policy of suppressing the national - liberation movement of the peoples. Noteworthy in this connection is the statement by the commander of the Seventh United States fleet that in case of military operations between Indonesia and Holland the American naval forces would be moved into action.

It is common knowledge that for many years now the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has patiently endeavoured to settle the dispute with Holland over West Irian through negotiations. The Dutch ruling quarters stubbornly reply to the peace-loving proposals of Indonesia by provocations and subversive activity. All this, of course, cannot but invoke proper and lawful measures on the part of the Indonesian Government.

The Government of Holland put forth the idea of granting the so-called "right of selfdetermination" to the population of West Irian. But everybody knows full well that the population of West Irian decided its destiny together with all Indonesian people on the historical day of August 17, 1945, when the independent Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on all territory of the former Dutch East Indies. No matter to what manoeuvres the Dutch ruling circles resort, Holland will have to withdraw from the Indonesian territory it occupies.

The Soviet Government proceeds from the irrefutable premise that West Irian is an inalienable part of the Republic of Indonesia. The Soviet Union has supported and is supporting the lawful demand of the Indonesian people and their Government for immediate reunification of West Irian with Indonesia, for abolition of the Dutch colonial domination on that part of Indonesian territory. The Soviet people regards it as their duty to help all peoples fighting for the overthrowing of colonial oppression and for consolidation of national independence. The Soviet people follow with deep understanding and sincere sympathy the just struggle of the Indonesian people for the liberation of West Irian.

The Government of the Soviet Union finds it necessary to point out to those circles in Holland which are responsible for its policy that by taking to the road of provocations against Indonesia they are assuming grave responsibility for the consequences which may result from this policy. In our time when one spark may be sufficient for a big conflagration to break out, this playing with fire, no matter in what part of the world it takes place, is highly dangerous. The situation now obtaining in the West Irian area cannot but cause serious concern on the part of other states sincerely interested in preservation of peace and, it goes without saying, they cannot remain indifferent observers of the provocations directed against the Republic of Indonesia.

The Soviet Government is firm in its conviction that the people of Indonesia will be victorious in their just struggle."

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13 February 1962

SECRET

TO: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

FROM: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 3 February 1962

Ambassador Sukardjo of Indonesia saw me on 5 February and informed me that his colleague, Amb. Tjondronegoro, had left for London on the previous day to establish informal contacts with the Netherlands officials with a view to obtaining some agreed basis for negotiations. He also informed me that Amb. Tjondronegoro would proceed to Bonn in the Federal Republic of Germany to make similar contacts with the Netherlands officials. When I asked him when he would come back to New York, he told me that he had no idea. He indicated to me that, if no progress was made in these informal soundings, Amb. Tjondronegoro might return to Djakarta and report to his Foreign Minister.

On 7 February Amb. Schurmann of the Netherlands saw me and delivered a note on the meeting between Amb. Malik and Amb. Bentinck in London. A copy of this note has already been sent to you. The most significant part of this note, it seems to me, is the reported statement of Amb. Malik to the effect that he was the only Indonesian to have the authority to contact the Netherlands representative, and that Ambassadors Sukardjo and Tjondronegoro did not have such an authority. The substance of this note is more or less on the same lines as the substance of my exploratory talks here, since the Indonesian representative insisted on a discussion of the transfer of administration of the area in dispute to Indonesia before formal negotiations take place.

Amb. Schurmann also informed me that his colleague in Washington, Amb. van Royen, would be back in the U.S. that afternoon and that he would meet him at the airport during his brief stop-over on his way to Washington. He promised to see me again if there is any new element regarding the program <sup>problem</sup> after he had seen Amb. van Royen. Until now there was no further word from Amb. Schurmann, and it is apparent that there is no further development.

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On 12 February Amb. Sukardjo asked me if I had any further news from the Netherlands representative. I told him that there was none except that some progress had been made regarding the return of Indonesian prisoners from West Irian to Indonesia under the good offices of the ICRC. I also informed him that you are looking into the matter regarding the modalities of the return of Indonesian prisoners.

Today (13 February) Amb. Yost of the U.S. Mission saw me and asked me if there was any progress in my efforts to bring the two parties together. I informed him that there was no further development except certain news agency reports emanating from Bonn.