

Noted

Confidential

Update Note for the Secretary-General  
4 August 2009

*Frank*

*16*

1. Sudan/Chad

The Mission of Sudan sent a letter yesterday to the President of the Security Council informing that on 28 July Chadian troops crossed the border with 30 tanks and 4 armoured vehicles and attacked the Sudanese village of Arwa and kidnapped Sudanese citizens. It states that the GoS reserves its right to respond to such attacks in a manner that will prevent any repetition thereof and preserve its national security.

2. Sudan

Bassole reports<sup>1</sup> on his Mediation strategy for the upcoming weeks. He observes that given the intransigent positions of both the JEM and SLM-AW (Abdul Wahid) and high level of Chad-Sudan tensions, the Mediation will be concentrating on first encouraging the GoNU and an enlarged Tripoli Group to sign a framework agreement that will lead to an improvement of the situation on the ground in Darfur. A framework agreement will not only set the agenda for the final round of peace negotiations but also include commitments by the parties to cease hostilities and improve the security situation. Following the negotiations of a framework agreement and cessation of hostilities, the Mediation will encourage the JEM and the SLM-AW to take part in the negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement. The Mediation will also encourage partners to work to reduce Chad-Sudan tensions. Finally, the Mediation will organize a forum to involve civil representatives and opinion leaders from all of the ethnic communities in Darfur.

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3. Mauritania

In Mauritania, despite the Constitutional Court's confirmation of the election of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz as the country's new President on 23 July, two former candidates and opposition leaders, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir and Ahmed Ould Daddah, are still contesting the results of the poll. On 28 July, they issued a joint declaration criticizing the Court's decision and the manner in which it was issued. They demand an investigation into the alleged "fraudulent manipulation of the electoral process". In their estimation, the political crisis in Mauritania has not been

<sup>1</sup> (CEY-066 of 3 August 2009)  
29-08040

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resolved. Against this background, the elected President, General Aziz is scheduled to be sworn in on 5 August 2009.

#### **4. Nigeria**

On Nigeria, Djinnit informs that several days of violent clashes with members of a fundamentalist Islamic sect in northern Nigeria has left hundreds dead and thousands displaced. The group known as Boko Haram ("Western education is sacrilege") has been campaigning for the imposition of strict Islamic sharia law in Nigeria. President Imar Yar'Adua ordered national security agencies to take necessary action to contain the attacks as violence spread from state to state, but claimed it was not "an inter-religious crisis" and that the situation was under control. Police reportedly have been on red alert in Abuja, as well as in the wider Federal Capital Territory as of 27 July. Incidents of taking hostages to serve as human shields were also reported.

On 30 July, Nigerian security forces stormed a mosque where militants had been hiding, after shelling their compound the night before. Both the leader and deputy leader of Boko Haram were killed by Government forces, and many of their followers were arrested or forced to flee.

Boko Haram has existed at least since 2004 and has a presence across northern Nigeria. The group preaches "jihad" against the Nigerian State and is opposed to Western education, which it views as contrary to Islam. Its members seem to be largely educated to "western" standards, but with no economic prospects, they hold the elites in Government responsible for their predicament. They are particularly angry that the introduction of moderate sharia law in 12 northern states 10 years ago has not halted the corruption that keeps most Nigerians impoverished, while a minority prospers from the country's immense oil wealth. Their leader's death could provoke more violence, and though his followers may now be in disarray, their grievances remain unaddressed.

#### **5. Cyprus**

Further to yesterday's update, Zerihoun refers<sup>2</sup> to a flurry of media speculations on a possible SG visit, set off by a 2 August Kathimerini story. It cited diplomatic sources as stating that with the visit, the UN wanted "to give more of a push to direct negotiations". A diplomatic source was quoted in the paper as saying a visit by the SG, would provide "a show of practical

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<sup>2</sup> (UNFICYP Weekly Situation Report of 4 August 2009)  
29-08040



support". The gesture was directed at public opinion in both communities given that "the UN is concerned about the general indifference and pessimism of both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots towards the direct talks", the newspaper went on.

## 6. Nepal

Landgren reports<sup>3</sup> that the major political parties reached consensus on setting up a High-Level Political Mechanism (HLPM) to move the peace process forward and established a "task force" to draft the Terms of Reference.

## 7. Myanmar

The Political Unit and Mr. Gambari's office are finalizing the preparations for tomorrow's Core Group meeting, and have submitted draft materials for your review. It was brought to our attention that some Member States have apparently voiced a degree of "puzzlement" over the exact purpose of this meeting and its timing, with some also wondering whether this was linked with or prompted by the SG's meeting with UK PR last week.

## 8. Afghanistan

As mentioned in the Update of 29 July, the Political Unit liaised with PDKO regarding increasing attention on a possible reconciliation process. Eide has provided his initial thoughts, noting his view that a partial reconciliation process would not be sustainable and that a meaningful process would have to be comprehensive and inclusive of the political superstructure of the Taliban. Looking ahead into the post-electoral period, he concludes that positioning the UN for a possible mediation role, though not easy, is necessary. A copy of this confidential code cable is attached in full. (*Attachment 1*)

UNAMA further reports<sup>4</sup> that in an interview with the UN News Centre, SRSG Eide stressed that political reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan must accelerate after presidential elections, warning that regardless of the result of the poll, military operations will not bring durable peace. Eide stated that the most important challenges to be faced by a new Government after elections will be to maintain stability in the country, and to ensure that all candidates accept the results.

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<sup>3</sup> (CQN-072 of 4 August 2009)

<sup>4</sup> UNAMA Daily Situation Report of 4 August 2009)


On the same issue of reconciliation, DPKO separately explained to the Political Unit that while in the past UNAMA had lacked the capacity to produce and share with UNHQ meaningful analyses on reconciliation, since Eide's arrival, low-key province-based efforts have been initiated to reach out to all relevant local leaders, including those associated with the Taliban. Building on the above cable and the meeting with DPKO, the Political Unit intends to initiate a regular, working-level Core Group on the reconciliation (and possibly other) issues, involving DPKO as well as DPA (especially in view of the linkages with Pakistan).

#### **9. Indonesia**

Pascoe has sent the SG an analysis<sup>5</sup> of the presidential election and future implications in Indonesia. (*Attachment 2*)

#### **10. Security Council - Children and Armed Conflict**

SRSR Coomaraswamy informs that the Security Council has adopted today a new resolution on children and armed conflict which now requires that the Secretary General annex to his reports lists of parties that kill and maim children with impunity and those who commit sexual violence against children (in addition to the present list that contains those who recruit and use children as soldiers). Coomaraswamy notes that this is a major step forward in combating impunity. Mexico, as chair of the working group, must be credited with this achievement. Everyone is happy with the result.



Political Unit  
4 August 2009

cc: DSG, VN, KWS

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<sup>5</sup> (29-07971)  
29-08040

**ONLY**

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS  
CODE CABLE OPERATIONS

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2009 AUG -4 A 9:22

CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

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TO: LE ROY, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: NAMBIAR, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
PASCOE, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: EIDE *EBE* UNAMA, KABUL  
DATE: 4 August 2009  
NUMBER: *CFN-130*  
SUBJECT: Reconciliation

1. Over the last two weeks there has been an increasing focus on reconciliation. Both UK Foreign Secretary Miliband and US Special Envoy Holbrooke have made statements declaring their readiness to initiate a reconciliation process with Taliban commanders on the ground. The new NATO Secretary General has made similar remarks. I have, over the last year, repeatedly expressed the view that a partial reconciliation process would only produce partial results and would not be sustainable. I have argued that a comprehensive and meaningful process would have to include the political superstructure of the Taliban - a view shared by President Karzai. At the same time, I have avoided commenting on any names, such as Mullah Omar.

2. Three days ago an article appeared in the Sunday Times of London with the headline: "UN Chief scorns Miliband plan for Taliban talks". The headline is highly misleading. My interview with the Sunday Times took place well before Miliband gave his speech at NATO. The newspaper did not use my comments until after Miliband made his statement, making it appear as if I were reacting to it. I have explained

~~Ambassador has invited key players, including UNAMA, to~~



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this to the UK Ambassador and my explanation has been conveyed to London. I have not heard any negative comments. However, several other European newspapers picked up the story and continue to ask questions. In my responses, I have tried to correct the impression that a confrontation exists. Subsequent quotations from me have been printed as a result of these questions. At my last press conference on Sunday afternoon, I had not planned to raise the topic at all, but had to respond to questions. The issue was therefore widely covered in the media.

3. This episode nonetheless reflects increasing attention on the possibility of a reconciliation process. In particular the US and UK are giving more attention to how such a process could be shaped and implemented. Here in Kabul, I have spoken to the new UK Ambassador about this issue. While positions differ, I would not exclude that my position on reconciliation is what many in Washington and London would like, but find it difficult to say at this time. Positions have to develop and mature for domestic reasons. With thousands of troops on the ground, it is also hard to go any farther than these two countries now do. However, personalities such as Barney Rubin have for a long time advocated a more ambitious approach and tried to make contact with Taliban leaders - unsuccessfully so far.

4. The current Afghan Government lacks a plan for reconciliation. Recently, two ministers have produced papers on the structures required for a reconciliation process and work is underway to refine these papers. The UK Ambassador has invited key players, including UNAMA, to

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discuss the more "technical" parts of this process. So far, the lack of a plan has made it difficult to pursue "local" reconciliation efforts since there basically has been nothing to offer reconciled insurgents.

5. UNAMA of course maintains contacts with the insurgency via different channels and intermediaries. It seems clear to us that any direct contact between the Taliban and the US/UK is highly unlikely. The question is whether the UN would be an acceptable intermediary. So far the signals are mixed. There is scepticism within the insurgency about the UN's impartiality because of what is seen as a too close relationship to the international military forces. However, there have also been signals obviously intended to test the UN. My focus on detention centres over last week, which was widely covered in the press, was also intended to send a signal to the insurgency. I believe that our engagement in the detention issue has been picked up. It is also widely known that we have played a balanced role on civilian casualties, although our last report ("UNAMA Mid-Year Bulletin on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict") resulted in unfavourable comments from Taliban representatives.

6. Positioning the UN for a possible mediation role is not easy. But it is necessary if we are to avoid a situation where the US comes to the conclusion that it can take over the process, which I believe would be counter-productive. It is possible that conditions after the election would allow a reconciliation process to begin. The current Government appears to be planning for this and the

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UN enjoys all the support it needs from President Karzai.  
The preparedness of the main opposition candidates to begin  
a reconciliation process, if elected, is less clear.

Best regards.

[Drafted by SRSG]




**ACTION  
COPY**

Note to the Secretary-General

**INDONESIA:**

**ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS**



Attachment # 2

*Confidential*

Overview

1. The landslide victory of incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in the July 8 presidential election has been hailed as a sign of Indonesia's political maturity and democratic consolidation, a strong vote of confidence in the Yudhoyono administration and the end of post-Suharto politics. According to the official count by the General Election Commission (KPU) on 24 July, Yudhoyono won 60.8 % of the votes, collecting nearly 74 million votes to win a second, five-year term. Former president Megawati and Vice President Kalla had 26.8 % and 12.4 %, respectively. The election was Indonesia's second direct presidential election. The inauguration date has been set for 20 October.
2. Although the election was conducted largely devoid of violence, controversy remained over the accuracy of the voters roll and the quality of electoral administration. In effect, on 28 July, Megawati launched a Constitutional Court challenge to SBY's re-election victory, claiming that millions of voters were disenfranchised by inaccurate voter lists and insufficient polling booths in key districts. Subsequent to the Constitutional Court filing, Megawati's campaign team is demanding either a re-vote or a runoff of the presidential election. Some independent poll watchdogs have accused the KPU of being biased and criticized the silence and complacency of political parties and civil society groups.

Political Dynamics Surrounding the Elections

3. The 2009 electoral process has revealed some characteristics of the political dynamics in Indonesia.
  - (a) *Political volatility:* The results of the 9 April legislative elections were indicative of what was widely expected to be an "easy" electoral victory for SBY in the presidential election. His Democrat Party (PD), just under 10-years-old, emerged as the only party to have won more votes compared to 2004 (up to 20% from 7%), and has emerged as a leading electoral force. The political opposition parties had been significantly weakened by their poor performance during the legislative elections. Kalla's Golkar party has seen a steady decline in popularity (down from 22% to 14%), despite its strong organizational network inherited from the Suharto era. Similarly, Megawati's Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP)'s vote went down from 18% to 14%, due to her poor performance as president and her refusal to relinquish leadership. The combined vote of the Islamic parties also dropped from 25% to 16%, an indication of the declining support for them.
  - (b) *End of Suharto's legacy?* Most parties entered this year's elections led by personalities from the pre-1998 era, and the high-profile vice presidential candidates Prabowo Gerindra and Wiranto particularly highlighted the presence of former generals in Indonesian politics (SBY himself is, of course, also a retired four-star general). The overwhelming defeat of both Megawati-Prabowo and Kalla-Wiranto, however, showed that both camps failed to keep pace with the maturing of the Indonesian electorate. Playing on issues of religion, ethnicity, and money politics was once the mainstay of Indonesian politics but failed to attract any significant number of voters during this year's elections. Both Prabowo and Wiranto in particular have been accused of human rights abuses, which may have alienated the more educated voter base and human rights activists. On the other hand, Yudhoyono's choice of Boediono, former Governor of the Central Bank of Indonesia, as his Vice Presidential candidate strengthened the SBY ticket, and indicated Yudhoyono's preference to lean on experienced technocrats for his administration.



(c) *Voter discontent or maturing democracy?* Another trend that has emerged in these elections was an increasing voter abstention, resulting from a combination of voter apathy and deliberate non-participation: many polling organizations put voter abstention at 40% (up from 30% in 2004 and 7% in 1999) for the April legislative elections. The new parliament, therefore, represents only around 55% of the population and is made up of parties with limited popular support. This general trend of increasing and deliberate voter abstention could also be an indicator of either a more critical electorate with higher demand for policy change or even an outright rejection of the candidates who all rose to power during the Suharto era.

### Significance and Challenges


4. The significant election results have equipped President Yudhoyono with a strong mandate and support. It is expected that Yudhoyono will move more decisively on corruption, government reform, poverty and economic growth. He will, nevertheless, face some key challenges, including:

(a) *Complex relations with the legislature:* the key for a successful implementation of the President's reform agenda will largely depend on how he will be able to manage relations with the lower house of parliament, the House of People's Representatives (DPR). A series of constitutional reforms from 1993-2003 has significantly shifted the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, resulting in a more powerful role for the DPR. While this is a healthy sign of checks and balances, Yudhoyono will continue to face challenges in pushing through a series of legislation to implement his reform agenda. As the power of the central government has been deliberately weakened through the 2001 decentralization process, reform and policy implementation at the local levels will require more time. Nevertheless, by constitutional provision, laws cannot be passed without 'joint agreement' between the president and the DPR, and the President will be able to negotiate from a position of strength, provided that he quickly establishes an effective working relationship with parliament.

(b) *Counterterrorism:* The unexpected and deadly bombing attacks in two hotels in Jakarta on 17 July served as a stark reminder of the threat that terrorism continues to pose. Since 2002, Indonesia had arrested over 200 militants and had gained the reputation of having an effective counter-terrorism strategy. While the chances of another major attack are expected to be slim, it is reported that several hardcore militants committed to terrorism remain at large in the region. The Yudhoyono administration will have to redouble its commitment to eradicate terrorism and join forces with regional governments in these efforts.

(c) *Human Rights:* While many aspects of Indonesia's democracy have been consolidated, key human rights questions remain, particularly those linked to the situation in Papua, where ongoing human rights abuses have been reported. Amnesty International has reported that torture, excessive use of force and unlawful killing by police and security forces persisted in Papua, with no progress made in establishing accountability mechanisms for past gross human rights violations. International demand for the Government's improved performance on human rights will likely continue.

5. Overall, Indonesia is seen to be set for a period of competent governance and moderate economic progress during a second Yudhoyono term. Hopes are that the re-elected president will overcome his past cautious decision-making style and seize the opportunity to further strengthen Indonesia's status as a responsible and respected regional power.

  
B. Lynn Pascoe  
31 July 2009