

112

SECTOR 5C, KIBUYE

13 SEPT 1994 - 31 JAN 1995

OPERATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 158

FILE 1

ACC. 1998/0283

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TO: SO2 HEL OPS KIGALI//SQN LDR DIXON//

FROM:MILOBS 4B KIBUYE//OPS//

SUBJ: HELQUEST

REF: TELECON MAJ LIDSTONE/SQN LDR DIXON 31 JAN 95

1.
 - A. MAJ RH LIDSTONE
 - B. MILOBS 4B//OPS//
 - C. E.N.T. KIBUYE
 - D. 11232 OR MOTOROLA CS-CEO
2.
 - A. 1 X HEL
 - B. 03 FEB 95. PREFERABLY 0900 TO 1000 BUT BEFORE 1330 IN ANY EVENT
 - C. HEL LANDING PT AT E.T.O. (FRAFBATT) KIBUYE
 - D. KIGALI
 - E. 4
 - F. 600 LBS/273 KG (EST)
 - G. 2 X MILOBS ON REDEPLOYMENT, 1 X MILOB ON CTO, 1 X MILOB ON DUTY TO KIGALI
 - H. KIGALI-KIBUYE-KIGALI DIRECT
 - I. N/A
 - J. MILOB ON DUTY WILL REQUIRE RETURN FLT ON 06 FEB 95
3. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT-----
-----APPOINTMENT-----*A/om 0-4B MILOBS*
4. SO2 G3 AIR-----

5. AUTHORIZATION-----

DUTY OFFICER'S REPORT

NAME: MAJ CHRISTOPHER ABUTIAE

PERIOD: 261600 - 262000 B JAN 95

REPORT

1. I took over the duties from Maj MELNIKOV at 261625 B JAN 95.
2. Maj MELNIKOV handed over to me the following stationary brought in from Kigali:
 - a. One Polaroid camera - close up 636
 - b. One film for the Polaroid camera - 20 photos
 - c. One multi-purpose Germicidal cleaner
 - d. One pkt paper clips.
 - e. One bottle Coloy - small size
 - f. One pkt magic tape.
 - g. One pkt thumb tacks.
 - h. Four lead pencils.
 - i. 5 reams of paper
3. There was a found wrist watch handed over to me.
4. Maj Lidstone issued the Sitrep to me at 1655. I had it sent by 1725 B Jan 95.
5. Maj Marino returned to station and spent some time reading through Sitreps. from 1655 up to 1900hrs.

6. Maj Acosta visited the duty officer at 1800 hrs.

7. Maj Muriro arrived with one new MILOB from Malawi. He was temporarily accommodated at Eto Barracks Frafbalt area.

~~8. Maj Muriro arrived with a vehicle mechanic who took away the discovered UNAMIR vehicle No 1077 to Kigali at 1615 hrs.~~

8.

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8. Maj Muriro arrived with a vehicle mechanic who wanted to take away the newly discovered UNAMIR No 1077. The CO Frafbalt refused to release the veh. Maj Muriro was forced to dispatch his vehicle with the mechanic back to Kigali at 1630 hrs.

9. There was no other major incident during the tour of my duty

10. I handed over to Maj Asad at 262015B
Jan 95

Abubakar Maj
CWO ABUTATE
Maj

Duty officer 262015B.

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TO: HQ MILOBS KIGALI

FROM: MILOBS 4B KIBUYE

SUBJECT: UNAMIR VEHICLE 1077

1. ON THE EVENING OF 19 JAN 95 A REPORT WAS RECIEVED THAT SUGGESTED AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON WAS IN POSSESSION OF SUBJECT VEHICLE IN THE KIBUYE AREA. DUTY PERSONNEL WERE ADVISED TO BE VIGILANT.
2. AT APPROXIMATELY 0645 HRS, 20 JAN 95, A PATROL FOUND THE VEHICLE ABANDONED OUTSIDE A RESIDENCE IN KIBUY-VILLE. THE INHABITANTS STATED THAT THEY HEARD THE VEHICLE ARRIVE AT APPROXIMATELY 0600 HRS BUT THAT THE OCCUPANT BOLTED WHEN THEY OPENED THE DOOR TO INVESTIGATE.
3. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN RECOVERED TO THE FRAFBATT WORKSHOP AND SECURED. THERE IS NO SIGN OF THE DRIVER. IT WAS NECESSARY TO BYPASS THE VEHICLE IGNITION LOCK.
4. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO ADVISE THE HISTORY AND STATUS OF THIS VEHICLE. A DUPLICATE KEY, IF AVAILABLE, SHOULD BE PROVIDED BUT THE VEHICLE SHOULD BE RE-KEYED AS IT MUST BE ASSUMED THE CULPRIT RETAINS THE ORIGINAL.
5. PLEASE PROVIDE DIRECTION FOR THE DISPOSITION OF THIS VEHICLE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS THIS SECTOR IS DEFICIENT IN VEHICLES, I REQUEST THAT IT BE ASSIGNED PERMANENTLY TO SECTOR 4B.


A BASHAR
LCOL
MILOB SECTOR COMMANDER

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Ø 83911

5009/80
Mr Dist vno

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FROM : G 3 PLANS

5000.46 (Plans)

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATED : 28 Dec 94

CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. Find the updated SOP on contingency plans laying down various measures to be adopted by the military staff members under different states of security.

2. Due to some essential additions, this copy supersedes the one sent vide letter 5000.46 dated 26 Dec 94. however Annexure 1 and 2 should be retained.

PK Malik
P K Malik
Maj
G 3 Plans 3
For G 3 Plans

Distribution List

MA to FC
DFC
COS
DCOS(Ops)
DCOS(Sp)
C Mil Ob Force
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G 1(FMO)
G 1(CMPO)
G 2(INFO)
G 3 (Ops)
G 3 (Engrs)
G 3 Liaison
Air Ops
G 4(Mov Con)
G 6(Comm)
Camp Commandant
HQ Mil Obs
INDBATT
FILE
G - 4 (Logistics)

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FROM : G 3 PLANS

5000.46 (Plans)

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

DATED : Dec 94

CONTINGENCY PLANS : SOP FOR

UNAMIR MILITARY STAFF

General

1. Reference security instructions on Plans NIKE, HECTOR and JASON.

2. In the event of deteriorating situation in Sector 6 the security measures will be activated in Kigali. This SOP lays down the measures to be adopted under various conditions to ensure safety of the military staff working at the HQ UNAMIR and HQ Mil Obs.

3. The various existing plans denote the following;

a. Op NIKE. It lays down the measures to counter the increased threat in the sectors. It enables increased presence in the sectors.

(i) NIKE GREEN. It indicates a low level threat and normal activities will continue.

(ii) NIKE YELLOW ALFA, BRAVO and CHARLIE. It caters for a medium level threat and normal ops will continue till the situation permits without endangering safety of personnel.

(iii) NIKE RED. This status denotes a high level threat. It lays down strict restrictions on op activities and movements.

b. Op HECTOR. This plan encompasses the reinforcement measures for the threatened sectors.

c. Op JASON. This plan entails the threatened sectors falling back to Kigali or being evac to neighbouring countries in JASON GREEN and YELLOW ALFA stages. it also lays down instructions for the preliminary evac during JASON YELLOW BRAVO STAGE and the final evac of the Core

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Group and the left over security force in JASON RED stage.

Threat

4. The current situation in Rwanda seems to be stabilised however it is likely that the former RGF which is believed to be in the process of regrouping may in future embark insurgency ops. The threat in Sector 6 is likely to develop after the situation in the other sectors is deteriorated. The developing threat is likely to afford reaction time to activate the alert measures in Sector 6 and thus Kigali.

5. The threat to UNAMIR in Kigali is likely to be ;
 - a. Insurgency threat aimed at BBGNU and the RPA.
 - b. Attacks on UNAMIR personnel/ property.
6. The above mentioned threat is likely to develop as under;
 - a. Infiltration in Sector 6 to assess the capability of RPA.
 - b. Ambushing of UNAMIR vehs and property.
 - c. Theft of vehs and personal and official property.
 - d. Extortion.
 - e. Sabotage of UN property.

Op Plan NIKE

7. NIKE GREEN (Low Level Threat).
 - a. The presence of troops will be increased in Sector 6 by the Sector Cdr accordingly.
 - b. Normal ops will continue.
 - c. Mil obs and the will be kept updated of the situation by the ops branch and the Sector 6 Cdr.
 - d. Prepare to meet the next level of threat.
8. NIKE YELLOW (Medium Level Threat).
 - a. YELLOW ALFA.
 - (i) Sector 6 troops consolidate on the platoon, coy

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and the battalion positions progressively as per the existing plan.

- (ii) Security of KPs to be enhanced.
- (iii) Curfew imposed for all UN personnel from 10 pm to 6 am.
- (iv) All movements to be in groups of atleast two persons.
- (v) Comm on motorola when moving out.
- (vi) Ops branch will ensure 24 hour comm with HQ Sector 6. It should be duplicated with tele.
- (vii) In case of emergency the duty officer in the ops branch should be approached on radio who will immediately get in touch with the HQ Sector 6 to rush in the RRF to the desired spot.
- (viii) Cdr Sector 6 to enhance the security at Hotel Meridien and Belgian Village to one section each and one platoon at the Amahoro Complex.

b. Yellow BRAVO and CHARLIE.

- (i) Plan HECTOR is likely to ordered at this stage to beef up the troops strength in Sector 6. It is likely that one/two coys will reinforce Sector 6 to counter the increased threat. Cdr Sector 6 will be the overall cdr.
- (ii) No distinct gap between BRAVO and CHARLIE.
- (iii) All movements restricted to that required to perform official duties only.
- (iv) All members of staff may fall back to the following Safe Areas;
 - A. Amahoro Hotel.
 - B. Amahoro Stadium for the over flow.
- (v) Security at Amahoro Complex enhanced to one platoon.
- (vi) Logistics branch to ensure the desired water and electricity supply in the Amahoro Complex.

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9. NIKE RED.

- a. Staff members fall back to Safe Areas, if not done already.
- b. Sector 6 Cdr to deploy one platoon RRF at the Amahoro Complex in addition to the one in defence of the Complex.
- c. Movements kept to the minimum even during the day time.
- d. All to use ballistic protective equipment.
- e. This stage may also entail evac of civil non essential persons leaving behind only a core group.
- f. All branches will prepare a list of non essential staff members to be evac in the next stage.

Op JASON

10. This plan entails evac from Rwanda. It may only be partially activated depending on the situation. The aim will be to remain in a position to redeploy when the situation improves. The plan will be activated when the situation in the sectors deteriorates to the extent that the security of even the military personnel is endangered. It may result in evac of the threatened sectors only.

11. JASON GREEN. This part deals with the preparation for the evac. UN Agencies and the NGO personnel may be evac in this stage. All branches will prepare the non essential staff members for evac. The affected sectors will prepare for the procedure of falling back to Kigali or evacuation to a neighbouring country as ordered by the FORCE HQ.

12. JASON YELLOW. This part defines the evac process.

a. Yellow ALFA.

(i) Threatened sectors withdraw to Kigali after destroying their non essential stores. All important and vital stores will be brought back to Kigali. Some contingents may be evac to the neighbouring country. Contingents will be intimated about the disposal of the above mentioned stores in that case.

(ii) All non essential military personnel including the staff will manifest with the Mov Con.

(iii) All non essential stores of only the

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contingents/ troops in Sector 6 will be destroyed after taking confirmation from this HQ.

b. Yellow BRAVO. It involves preliminary evac. It will be under taken when the final evac is most likely.

(i) All military non essential personnel and the left over civilians (core group) evac.

(ii) All troops not required for the defence of Kigali evac by land and/or air.

(iii) Units will be preferably evac by land route and others not forming part of formed contingents by air. The equipment of high value will be given priority in evac.

(iv) Those moving out by air will have a luggage weight limit of 15 kgs.

(v) All vehs and equipment not required by the minimum presence will be evac by land and/or air.

c. Yellow CHARLIE. It is the main evac stage.

(i) A Core Group will be formed which will continue functioning as the minimum presence, till the last evac. It will comprise of the following;

A. Appropriate representative of HQ UNAMIR.

B. Force Cdr/DFC/COS.

C. Core Ops personnel.

D. Engrs.

E. Air op staff.

F. Representative of the Logistics branch.

(ii) Important and essential stores evac.

(iii) Non essential stores of units which withdrew from Kigali destroyed under the arrangements of Engrs.

JASON RED. It involves the final evac of the Core Group Rwanda. The security force will be evac by the land route the Core Group by air. Remaining stores will be destroyed by Engrs.

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Miscellaneous Aspects

14. Destination After the Evac. To be intimated in due course of time.

15. Earmarking of Accn in the Safe Areas. It will be coordinated by the G 3 Plans and all the branches will be intimated accordingly.

16. Family Members. The SRSG has instructed vide circular on security plans, dated 16 Dec that the responsibility for the security and evac of family members is that of the concerned officers. They should be evac before UNAMIR evac process starts.

17. Non Local Domestic Help. Same as above.

18. Forms to be Filled. The following forms need to be filled at the earliest and forwarded to CMPO and the Plans branch. Copies are attached as Annexure 1 and 2.

a. General Info. Copy attached as Annexure 1. Two copies per officer to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

b. Inventory for Personal Effects. One copy to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

19. Evac of Office Equipment. CMPO will coordinate the evac of essential office stores. Forward a list of office equipment in your branches to the CMPO by 09 Jan 95 to enable him to screen the same into essential category.

Check List

20. Forms as mentioned in paragraph 18 to be forwarded to CMPO by 30 Dec 94.

21. List of office equipment as mentioned in paragraph 19 to be forwarded to CMPO by 09 Jan 95.

22. All branches to prepare the list of non essential staff members and forward to the Plans branch by 09 Jan 95 as mentioned in paragraph 9 above.

23. Plans branch will compile the list of Core Group by 09 Jan 95.

24. All staff members should be in possession of ballistic equipment.

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Military Parallel States of Security to That Defined by the SRSG for the UNAMIR

25. The SRSG vide his letter dated 16 Dec 94 has defined five security conditions for the UN personnel. This branch has already intimated the security states pertaining to the military persons vide instructions on plans Op NIKE, HECTOR and JASON. Following are the parallel states applicable to the military personnel;

<u>Phases</u>	<u>Defined by the SRSG</u>	<u>Applicable to mil persons</u>
a. Phase-1	Precautionary (Movements restricted to essential activities)	Op NIKE GREEN, YELLOW and may be Op HECTOR.
b. Phase-2	Restricted movements (All movements to be restricted)	NIKE RED
c. Phase-3	Relocation (Persons, to the extent property relocated to conc centres in anticipation of evac)	NIKE RED
d. Phase-4	Programme suspension (Regular ops can not continue, all non essential persons evac)	JASON GREEN, YELLOW ALFA and BRAVO
e. Phase-5	Evac (All ops halted and all persons evac)	JASON YELLOW CHARLIE and JASON RED.

26. It is for info and neccessary action please.

P K Malik
P K Malik
Maj
G 3 Plans 3
For G 3 Plans

Distribution List:

<u>Action</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
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DFC	2

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DCOS(Ops)	4
DCOS(Sp)	5
C Mil Obs Force	6
HAC	7
G 1(FMO)	8
G 1(CMPO)	9
G 2(INFO)	10
G 3(Ops)	11
G 3(Engrs)	12
G 3 Liaison	13
Air Ops	14
G 4(Logistics)	15
G 4(Mov Con)	16
G 6(Comm)	17
Camp Commandant	18
HQ Mil Obs	19

Info

INDBATT	20
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FOR ALL TO READ

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MILOB GP HQ

TO : FORCE HQ (OPS)
ALL MILOB SECTORS

DATE: 21 DEC 94

FROM : DCMO
MILOB GP HQ

REF: 6465/OPS/MILOBS

INFO : FC
DFC/CMO

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - OP HOPE

1. Please find herewith attached an After Action Report on 'OP HOPE' containing 11 pages.
2. This letter may please be down graded to UNCLAS after detaching the contents.
3. Best Regards.



MOEEN U AHMED
Col
DCMO

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DPS

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MILOB GP HQ

OP HOPE
AFTER ACTION REPORT

GENERAL

1. Over the recent past, there have been continuous reports of spurts of criminal activities by some threat forces in KIBEHO and NDAGO refugee camps located in Sector 4A. By virtue of these unlawful acts, these threat elements had begun tarnishing the good and noble work of UNAMIR, NGOs and Humanitarian agencies working hand in glove for peace and stability in RWANDA. Therefore, in response to this internal threat, UNAMIR in coordination with RPA , took up the onus to carry out 'OP HOPE' from 14 to 16 Dec 94. It was the maiden operation of such magnitude undertaken by UNAMIR and its outcome truly reinforced an age old ethos of UN, ie "Unity in Diversity".

AIM

2. The aim of 'OP HOPE' was to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements and in that MILOB GP was to remain in a supporting role to the formed troops.

PARTICIPATION

3. A total of 79 MILOBs participated alongside 1473 troops and staff. Also, two RPA battalions took active part in this operation. Acting Force Commander/CMO had established his Tac HQ at KIBEHO and commanded/conducted the operation. His participation on the ground gave impetus to the operation. The details of MILOB participation are as follows:

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- a. HQ MILOB GP. 5 Officers including DCMO.
- b. Sector 1. Total three MILOB teams out of which one team was placed under command Nigerian Company and two teams placed under Sector 3 as reserves located at BUTARE.
- c. Sector 2. Total three MILOB teams; one team under command company ex ZAMBATT and two teams placed under command Sector 3 as reserves located in BUTARE.
- d. Sector 3. Total three MILOB teams besides the Sector Comd and four MILOBs to establish and man the alternate MILOB Tactical HQ at BUTARE. These three MILOB teams were located at KIBEHO and placed under command the MILOB Tactical HQ.
- e. Sector 4A. Total three MILOB teams, all placed under command GHANBATT.
- f. Sector 4B. One MILOB team placed under command company ex FRAFBATT.
- g. Sector 4C. Total three MILOB teams, all under command ETHIOBATT.
- h. Sector 5. Total three MILOB teams all under command TUNBATT.
- j. Sector 6. Total three MILOB teams all placed on one hour's notice at KIGALI.

TASKS OF MILOBS

- 4. The MILOB GP HQ was tasked to establish a MILOB Tactical HQ at KIBEHO, to be co-located with the Force HQ. Also an

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alternate MILOB tactical HQ was to be established and manned at BUTARE. The tasks that were assigned to the MILOBs operating under command contingents included the following:

- a. Perform MILOB tasks assigned by respective contingent commanders.
- b. To monitor all activities and security situation within own area of operation.
- c. To inform MILOB Tac HQ of the situation on the assigned objectives to their force elements.
- d. Continuous reporting on the progress of operations.
- e. Report any violation of human rights.
- f. Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops and NGOs and civil authorities within own area of operations.
- g Submission of SITREP on 12-hour basis.
- h. Maintain post operation presence in KIBEHO and NDAGO camps and report situation.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

5. Mov to Assy Area. The assy area selected was BUTARE. The troops and the MILOBs participating in this operation assembled at BUTARE on 12 Dec 94. The logistics infrastructure catering for rations, water and POL was created at the Assy Area. Marrying up of MILOBs with their respective contingents took place. Selective recce of the objective area was carried out by certain key appointments holders. Confirmatory orders were issued at various

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levels. This phase of the operation passed off smoothly as planned.

6. Mov from Assembly Area to Camp Site. The move from the Assy area to the camp sites (objectives) was carried out over two routes, ie, BUTARE-GIKONGORO-KIBEHO (RED ROUTE) and BUTARE-KIBEHO (GREEN ROUTE), commencing 140015 hrs. The troops arrived at the release point at 140315 hrs. This phase of the operation was carried out smoothly and as per the time plan despite it involving movement of large convoy of vehicles over hilly terrain and during night on approximately 45 kms of unmetalled road.

7. Area To be Searched. The KIBEHO and NDAGO camps put together constituted an area of approximately five square kilometers. The whole area was divided into 11 distinct objectives. The distribution of the objectives for the purpose of the search was done as follows:

- a. TUNBATT - 1 & 3.
- b. GHANBATT - 2 & 8.
- c. ETHIOBATT - 4 & 6.
- d. FRAFBATT - 5 & 9.
- e. ZAMBATT - 7 & 10.
- f. INDIBATT - 11.

8. Search Operations. The troops commenced simultaneous search of these assigned objectives at 140530 hrs. RPA identification and liaison teams were integrated with the contingent down to platoon level. Force and MILOB Tactical HQ were co-located at KIBEHO and so were Advanced dressing Station under AUSMED and

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Detainee Processing Centre under CIVPOL and MP. Initially the search operation progressed slowly but later on it picked up the right momentum. The MILOB teams with each search party gave a continuous progress of operation over radio. The three MILOB teams earmarked as reserves at KIBEHO were tasked to carry out patrolling on the entire area and monitor the activities in the Detainee Processing Centre. The Force Tactical HQ was constantly kept informed of the MILOBs' reports. The complete operation was carried out with true professional zeal and military finesse which helped prevent any untoward incident. Finally, at 141700 hrs, the search ended on completion of the task. The whole operation resulted in the arrest of 43 potential criminals and confiscation of following weapons:

- a. Machetes - 810.
- b. Spears - 58.
- c. Axes - 190.
- d. Bayonets - 4.
- e. 7.62 rounds - 21.
- f. Magazines - 1.
- g. Swords - 5
- h. Knives - 214.
- j. Harpoons - 16.
- k. Sickles - 10.

9. De-Induction. The de-induction of troops from the camp

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sites commenced at 150800 hrs. Five MILOB teams were left behind for maintaining post operation presence and to monitor the situation.

LESSONS LEARNT

10. A deep peep down memory lane of military history would reveal that many battles have been lost by strong armies just because their commanders ignored the valuable lessons they learnt from their previous battles. During OP HOPE, many important military lessons have been re-validated. The aim here has been to avoid any surgical approach to the retrospection but reviewing to embed certain important military issues involved in this operation which ensured success.

a. Planning and Preparatory Stage.

(1) Need for Detailed Planning. In an operation of this magnitude and that too conducted by a unified force of heterogenous characteristics, there is an over-riding need for planning into greater details. The objective area was quite vast, and therefore divided into 11 parts which automatically called for detailed planning, which was done meticulously.

(2) Intelligence Acquisition. P r o c e s s e d information about the objective much prior to the launching of the operation, is the key to success. Therefore, there is a need to evolve some kind of intelligence acquisition plan long before the launching of intended operation which would ensure coordination of intelligence effort.

(3) Secrecy. An operation of this nature needs absolute secrecy. The secrecy of this op was

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neutralised to a great extent. UNAMIR comprises not only force components but also various other agencies. Also, UN operations have always attracted the media. Therefore, utmost care should be exercised while conceiving such operations or else the outcome may prove disproportionate to the effort involved. Also, plans should be unfolded on need-to-know basis only. All personnel must handle operation-related documents with due vigilance.

(4) Liaison and Coordination. OP HOPE enticed the participation of force elements, MILOBs, staff at various levels, a few UN agencies and the RPA. A constant liaison and coordination was to be the order of the day. Commanders at various levels have to apply their minds to various contingencies and problem areas and thereafter endeavour to sort out arising nitty-gritties. Liaison and coordination was planned from the very beginning of the operation and was executed throughout the conduct of the operation.

(5) Intergration of Logistic Representatives. As the logistics infrastructure would always take time to create, re-establish or move, it is of prime importance to involve the logistics representatives right from the initial stages of the planning. This would enable them to plan and pre-position the logistic requirements at correct point of time and place. The only drawback worth mentioning in the operation is logistics. it could have been better if logisticians had given due importance after they had received the warning order.

(6) Detailed Briefing. Need for a detailed briefing requires no emphasis. The most effective way of

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amalgamating force elements of different nationalities with varying shades of training and weaponry into a single mould, enabling them to operate shoulder to shoulder would be by means of a detailed and thorough briefing by commanders at all levels.

(7) Need for Simple Plan. Plan should be as simple as possible. It is easy to execute a simple plan which also readily lends itself to any modification when need arises. Such need is further felt especially when troops with varied training backgrounds are involved together.

b. Move and Occupation of Assy Area.

(1) Guidance at Assy Areas. Proper arrangements for guidance while the troops arrive in the assy area would avoid confusion, save movement and result in rapid deployment.

(2) Recce of Objective Area. A controlled recce of the objective area while troops are in occupation of the assy area is a must. This will have to be done discreetly.

(3) Need for Minimising Movement. During OP HOPE, there was a large volume of unnecessary movement in BUTARE. This is totally uncalled for and may result in premature disclosure of our interest. Therefore, all ranks need to be educated about this. Establishing certain numbers of Traffic Check Posts and manned by MP personnel would help curtail all unnecessary movements.

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c. Conduct Stage.

(1) Flexibility of Plan. Though the plan should be made flexible, any last minute changes should be avoided since it will only result in confusion and fatigue.

(2) Correct Radio Procedure and Discipline. There were many outstations on Force as well as MILOB radio net. Everyone was operating concurrently and required to pass on information simultaneously too. Therefore, the knowledge of correct radio procedure and discipline is vital for smooth conduct.

(3) Human Rights Implications. OP HOPE was a delicate operation since it could attract a lot of human rights implications. It called for utmost care and attention while conducting a search, handling detainees or interrogating them. Any harsh treatment or deviation from the laid-down rules of the game could have tarnished the image of UNAMIR since the media would have blown the issue out of proportion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. Loc of HQ. During 'OP HOPE', the force and MILOB Tactical HQ were located inside the objective area right on the commencement of the operation. It could have invited trouble had there been any retaliation or reaction from the threat forces while the troops commenced the search. It is therefore suggested that the HQ should only be brought inside the objective area once the initial phase is over and a secured area within the objective has been created.

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12. Aerial Recce of the Area of Intended Operations. Prior aerial recce of the area of intended operations would surely pay rich dividends. Though it was planned, it could not be undertaken due to bad weather. Some of the contingent commanders missed ground recce which should have been carried out prior to the operation.

13. Maintenance of Secrecy of Intended Operations. Utmost discretion has to be exercised at all levels such that while planning, preparing and executing the operation-related activities, no lapse of security is allowed to occur. Classified information must be unfolded strictly on a need to know basis. Moreover, omnipresence of enthusiastic media personnel adds a new dimension to the security threat. One has to be very careful while dealing with these media men and avoid temptation of publicity. Best thing would be to leave such interaction to the UN authorised personnel only. It was discouraging to hear the news of OP HOPE on BBC and Rwandan local radio prior to the commencement of the operation.

14. Need for Joint Planning. So as to evolve a credible tactical plan, it is suggested that the logistic representative be incorporated into the planning process right from the conception stage. This arrangement will produce matching tactical and logistic plans. Moreover, it will provide more reaction time to the logistics branch to make arrangements to cater for logistical needs at various stages of the operation.

CONCLUSION

15. OP HOPE has been a success because it was meticulously conceived and planned and boldly executed. The operation was orchestrated in a truly professional manner and hence prevented any violence. All the troops and MILOBs performed their tasks with pride, enthusiasm and sense of respect for the human race.

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9. Agricultural Activities. Quite a remarkable increase was observed in agricultural activities throughout the sector. In Rwamatamu commune however, the Bourgemestre complained about inadequacy of hoes. Out of a request for 5,745 hoes made, only 3,200 has been delivered and this has been observed to be the general problem in the sector. An NGO named CHRISTIAN REFORMED WORLD RELIEF COMMITTEE is helping the farmers in the Commune.

10. Children Attending School. In Rwamatamu commune which was extensively patrolled during the period under review the following data was gathered:

a.	No of primary schools	-	22
b.	No destroyed during war	-	11
c.	No presently open	-	11
d.	No of pupils	-	3,200
e.	No of teachers	-	189
f.	Whether teachers are paid-		Yes

11. Means of Transportation. No additional public transport other than the two government buses has been noticed plying the route KIGALI- GITARAMA- KIBUYE- CYANGUGU and vice versa.

12. Crossing Points. No crossing point exists in this sector.

GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

13. Treatment of Returnees by RPA. The only case of harassment was reported in GISOVU where the Commune Counsellor Mr MATHIAS NGANE was alleged to have been beaten up by the RPA on 08 Jan 95. Some reports from locals of returned people being harassed by the RPA have not been confirmed.

14. Influential People in the Sector. No change.

15. Flow of Rumours from Camps in Zaire. Similar rumours of impending attack on Rwanda by former government forces still persist.

16. Meeting with Local Authorities. No formal meetings have been held. However, there has been informal meetings with the local RPA Comd and the Prefect.

17. Resources Available to Local Authorities. No additional resources have been allocated during the period. The local authorities continue to work under the rough conditions.

18. General Situation. This can be said to have improved over the period.

UN RESTRICTED

19. Market Activity. This continues to be brisk in the whole sector.

20. Public Services Provided by the Government. No significant improvements has been noticed during the period.

21. Sanitation / Medical Services. MSF has started running a clinic at KIVUMU Hospital. The FOOD-FOR-WORK programme is also helping improve sanitation in the Communes.

22. Prisons. Reports indicate that 66 people were arrested by the RPA in BIRAMBO during the period. This reports are being investigated. Two detention centres have also been discovered in BIRAMBO holding 105 prisoners. The refusal of the RPA to allow MILOBS access to prisons is hindering investigations.

23. Cooperation between MILOBS and Custom Authorities. There are no custom authorities in this sector.

NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS AND UN AGENCIES

24. In addition to the agencies mentioned in the previous reports, Human Rights mnitors have reported in this sector since 15 Dec 94.

25. One new NGO Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC) has started work in RWAMATAMU Commune during the period.

26. Cooperation between MILOBS and NGOs. This remains cordial.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

27. No change.

CONCLUSION

28. During the period under review, a marked improvement in relations between the RPA and the locals has been noticed. The RPA still refuse MILOBS access to prisons. The FOOD-FOR WORK spirit has gone on well in the whole sector. The general security situation in the sector seems to be improving.

EC QUIST
Lt Col
Sec Comd

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 27 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : Plans 50/94

SUBJECT : WEEKLY SRSG RETURN ON ACTIVITIES IN SECTORS

1. MILOBs in all Sectors are now required to work on statistics and produce the exact picture of their daily activities.
2. This document serve as a guideline for the return to be submitted weekly on Tuesdays for further transmission to the SRSG's office. Sector Comds are required to make this return a priority.
3. The return shall be outlined as follows:
 - a. Issues Related to Returnees and Original Inhabitants. Under this paragraph the report shall cover:
 - (1) The percentage of the original inhabitants who have come back into your sector.
 - (2) The number of the new comers who have settled in your sector.
 - (3) Whether there are any indications that property is being invaded. You are to produce statistics.
 - (4) Whether agricultural activities have resumed and outline the harvest and the new planting by percentage.
 - (5) The percentage of children attending school and their attendance and non attendance bracket. Outline the number of schools in your sector. Indicate whether Government or private and level of education offered.

1

UN RESTRICTED

Ops Off
Discuss with me on return
from Sector Comds Conf.

EEB

Seen

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09/12

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Ops Gen.

UN RESTRICTED

(6) The means of transport the public, refugees, merchants and others are using.

(7) Which other crossing points other than Government controlled entry/exit points are being used. Distinguish who uses such crossing points, rate of crossing and strength. Consider also the time the crossing points are being used, that is whether day or night.

b. Government Activities. Government activities have direct impact on reassuring the people and assist on confidence building among them. This paragraph shall cover:

(1) The treatment of returnees by the RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA).

(2) Those who influence people in the sector whether they are individuals or groups whether it is the radio or word of mouth/direct conduct being used.

(3) What is the flow of rumours from camps in ZAIRE like? What is and who is the source for such rumours?

(4) Whether you are meeting the local authorities, teachers, priests, doctors, NGOs and commune leaders. How many times per week.

(5) The type of resources the local authorities have to assist on their daily functions. Highlight on vehicles, office equipment, employees and finance. Verify whether employees are being paid.

(6) Outline whether the situation is deteriorating or improving. Consider criminal or sabotage incidents, human rights violations, hospital occupancy, in addition report on market activity by assessing the flow of new commodities, availability of the local authorities and informal activities within the sector ie: the frequenting of restaurants, bars and shops.

(7) The public services provided by the Government. This can be first aid, nutrition, vaccination, road construction, water and sanitation etc. You are to include the number of health centres and highlight those that are functioning or not functioning.

(8) Whether there are prisons and how many they are. Establish also whether

UN RESTRICTED

there are clandestine prisons and their locations. If there is not any form of prisons outline where detainees are being held.

(9) The cooperation that exists between MILOBs and customs authorities. Also cooperation with other authorities you interact with.

c. Non Governmental Organizations(NGOs) and UN Agencies.

- (1) Whether NGOs are assisting the Government or working counter purpose.
- (2) Whether their activities are intrusive or cooperative.
- (3) The level of cooperation between MILOBs and NGOs.

4. After compiling all this information you are required to state your source of information. As a guide, make maximum use of the authorities, NGOs, the public and please state whether you can verify your information.

5. This report is very important, we are all to strive hard to ensure it is compiled weekly and submitted to this HQ every **Tuesday** starting from the 06 Dec 94.

6. All are to action without fail.

M Masanganise
M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

Info:

FHQ (OPS)

FHQ (Plans)

CMO

DCMO

SOO

SMPO

SLOGO

SEC-4B

UN RESTRICTED

To : See Distr.

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 24 Nov 94

Sub : MILOBS CHAIN OF COMMAND

1. In many instances it has been discussed and decided that all types of correspondences which need FHQs attention must go through MILOB GP HQ. But it has been observed with great concern that still some of the sectors had a tendency to contact directly to UNAMIR HQ could be for quick response. Direct correspondences with UNAMIR HQ many a times put this HQ in embarrassing situation. More so related Branch head including CMO/DCMO remain unaware of the whole situation. Rwandese Govt and other civil organizations including NGOs may be suggested to contact directly to UNAMIR HQ to meet up their demands and requests.

2. This is for strict compliance.

M M Manganise
M M MANGANISE
Lt Col
For CMO

Distr :

Action :

All MILOB Sectors

Info :

CMO

DCMO

SMPO

SLOGO

PLANS

OPS

*Ops offr / Admin / hogo to
meet for guidance.*

30/11

*Seen
MS
01/12*

UN RESTRICTED

ops admin

BAARZYUW UCCVVDAP04 3201320-RRRB--UCCVVDF.

ZNY RRRRB

R 161245Z NOV 94

OM UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//G3 AIR OPS

TO SECTOR 4B HQ//MILOBS

BT

R E S T R I C T E D CIP 30-02

REF YOUR SIGNAL 141025Z NOV 94. HELICOPTER APPROVED FOR TASK 1702B

IT WILL ARRIVE AT KIBUYE 0730 WITH 60 MINS AVAILABLE FLYING TIME.

HELO WILL NEED TO DEPART BY 1030 LATEST. PROVIDED CREW WITH MARKED

MAP BRIEF IF REQUIRED. I WILL BRIEF CREW TO SHUT DOWN FOR BRIEF.

NOTE YOUR INTENTION TO USE HELICOPTER SUPPORT AND FULLY APPROVE.

PLEASE PASS AIR TASK REQUEST TO G3 AIR OPS WITH 24 HOURS NOTICE

AND WE WILL CONFIRM TASK THROUGH UNAMIR OPS RADIO ROOM.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

BT

#0004

Received 11-16-1994 14:16:54

May Myaka

1. You will conduct this recce with Capt Sissao and May Hagne.
2. I believe May Muviro has already briefed you about this.

3

16/11

Seen
16/11

UN RESTRICTED

To : Sectors 4A, 4B, 4C


From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : ?? Nov 94

Sub : USE OF FLAKE JACKET AND UN HELMET

1. From the past few incidence, it has been observed that in general the security situation in sectors 4A, 4B and 4C are deteriorating gradually. It is more prominent in the DPs camps. So, it is directed that during patrols, recce mission and investigation all the MILOBs of the above mentioned sectors are to wear 'flake' jacket and UN helmet for safety purpose.

2. It is for your nec action and strict compliance.



ANOCHKINE ALEX

Lt Col

For CMO

Info :

DCMO

All Sectors (except 4A, 4B, 4C)

SLOG O

1. All MILOBs with Flake jackets should carry them in their vehs when on ppls or travelling.
2. I will inform MILOB HQ that we need to be issued with these jackets.

ADD
17/11

Seen
MS
17/11

15 Nov 94

SECT-9B

UN RESTRICTED

To : SAC, AA, 45, 46

From : MILCS CP HQ

Date : 15 Nov 94

SUB : USE OF FLAME JACKET AND OR HELMET

1. From the past few incidents, it has been observed that in general the security situation is becoming AA, 45 and 46 are being treated gradually. It is noted that in the line center, it is observed that during past few days mission and investigation all the MILCS of the above mentioned sectors are to wear flame jacket and or helmet for safety purpose.

2. It is for your info and use.

Reference

ALPHABETICALLY

101

101

1. The purpose of this document is to provide information on the use of flame jackets and helmets for security personnel. This document is intended for use by all personnel who are required to wear flame jackets and helmets. It is important that all personnel understand the correct use of these items to ensure their safety and the safety of others.

INVESTIGATION
REPORTS

UN RESTRICTED

To : All Sectors

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 15 Nov 94

Sub : SUBMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORTS

1. It is learnt from the daily sitrep that many incidents or cases are being investigated by the MILOBs of different sectors. But all the reports are not send to MILOB GP HQ after completion of the investigation. Thus the HQ remain half heartedly informed about the incident for which follow up action cannot be taken from this end. So to expedite the follow up action, it is requested that all the investigation reports in completed form must reach ~~to~~ MILOB GP HQ ~~on~~ every Monday for onward despatch to FHQ for nec action.

2. This is sent for your nec action pl.

Info :

. DCMO

ANOCHKINE ALEX

Lt Col

For CMO

Ops Offr / Im hndrs
Note for future guidance.

CCB

17/11

Seen

Mhs

17/11

UN RESTRICTED

SECT-4B

UN RESTRICTED

TO : ALL SECTORS
FROM : NIOSH CP HQ
Date: 12 Nov 84

SUBMISSION OF INVESTIGATION REPORTS

1. It is learned from the daily report that many incidents of cases are being investigated by the NIOSH CP HQ after completion. But all the reports are not sent to NIOSH CP HQ after completion of the investigation. Thus the HQ remains with a backlog of about the incident for which follow up action cannot be taken. It is requested that all the investigation reports be completed and sent to NIOSH CP HQ by every Monday for prompt dispatch to the HQ for action.

2. This is sent for your action.

WALTER H. MEX

Info: [unclear]
DOH

11/12/84
11/12/84

11/12/84

11/12/84

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 29 Sep 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : Plans 16/94

INFO : UNAMIR HQ (OPS)
CMO
SOO

SUBJECT : REDEMARCATION OF MILOB SECTORS

1. For effective Command and Control of MILOB Sector 2, the sector will be redemarcated into two sectors in line with Prefecture boundaries as follows:

- a. Sector 2 - KIBUNGO
BUGESERA
- b. Sector 6 - KIGALI

2. Deployment in this sector will be prioritised as follows:

- a. Priority 1. Deployment of MILOBS into Sector 2 (KIBUNGO). Four MILOB Teams from KIGALI Sector are to be thinned out immediately to form the nucleus of this sector. The Command structure for this sector will be outlined soon.
- b. Priority 2. Deployment of MILOBS into Sector 2 (BUGESERA). Strength of MILOB Teams to be deployed in this sector will be initiated soon.

3. Other Boundaries. The boundary between Sectors 4A and 4B was originally marked out irrespective of the Prefecture boundaries. This boundary is to be readjusted as per the Prefecture boundary by the respective Sector Comds.

4. Sector 5 Comd is advised to take note that the boundary of Sector 4B with Sector 5 is to be moved slightly North into his sector to fall in line with the Prefecture boundary also. Sector Comds concerned are to submit reports to this HQ on the location of the new boundaries after the adjustment.

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5. Sector 3 shall remain without any alterations.
6. Accept for your information and necessary action.

MMAA14714-

M J MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

2
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SECTOR 4A

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

MILOB GP HQ

Copy No... of....

MILOB GP HQ

KIGALI

PLANS OPO/02/94

See Distribution

23 Sep 94

OPERATIONS ORDER NO 02 - OP HOMEWARD

SITUATION

1. **GENERAL**. UNAMIR remains committed to assisting in the relocations of refugees and displaced persons throughout the AOR.
2. **SPECIFIC**. Occupants of some camps in Sector 4A have demonstrated a clear desire to return to their homes in the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures. UNAMIR currently has considerable transport assets available to support such an Op.

MISSION

3. To provide MILOB Sp for Op HOMEWARD.

EXECUTION

4. **Gen Outline**. MILOB Sectors 3, 4A and 4B to liaise with TAC HQ (BUTARE), HAC, RPA Comds, BRITCON and ZAMBATT for the efficient conduct of the Op HOMEWARD.

5. **Task**

- a. **MILOB Comds Sector 3, 4A and 4B**

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UN RESTRICTED

- (1) liaise with RPF Comds/ COs as arranged by HAC.
- (2) Provide escorts to all convoys.
- (3) Clear and supervise check point procedures.
- (4) Est comms links with convoy to MOVCON at TAC HQ.
- (5) Liaise with local Prefect to establish reception arrangements for refugees/ displaced persons.

6. Coordinating Instructions

a. Coordinating Meeting. Action addressees to nominate suitable representatives to attend a coordinating meeting chaired by HAC at TAC HQ on Tue 20 Sep 94 at 1000hrs.

b. Timings. Op HOMEWARD to commence before the wet season begins. Detail timings will be worked out at Sector HQ level

COMMAND AND CONTROL

7. OP HOMEWARD will be commanded by COO at Tac HQ.
8. MILOB HQ will control UNMO escort requirements.

Moeen Ahmed
MOEEN AHMED
Col
A/CMO

Distribution:

External:

Information:

TAC HQ

Internal:

Action:

MILOB Sector 3

MILOB Sector 4A

MILOB Sector 4B

Information:

MILOB Sector 1

MILOB Sector 2

MILOB Sector 4C

MILOB Sector 5

*I wonder how this was
dated on 23 Sep ~~when~~
the Coord Meeting was
to take place on 20 Sep
26/9*

SECTOR 4A

UN RESTRICTED

Section 4 B

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date: 08 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : 6464/OPS

SUBJECT : ROAD RESTRICTIONS

References:

- A. Force HQ OPO No 18 dated 31 Aug 94.
- B. Force HQ OPO No 19 dated 04 Sep 94.
- C. MILOB Gp HQ Instruction Plans 25/94 dated 29 Sep 94.
- D. Force HQ OPO No 20 dated 06 Oct 94.

1. Be informed that Reference A was cancelled by Reference D above.
2. Annex D of Reference D above outlines routes. The routes referred to by the Annex are not for security purposes but rather, major supply networks.
3. As far as route restrictions are concerned, all MILOB movements shall be as directed by the Sector Commanders.
4. All to be informed.

Info :
F HQ
SLOGO.

MMA 1714 1135
M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

UN RESTRICTED

Seen
200
15/11

For use to read

82-0,02 43

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Ops OR
Take note for
future tasks.
all
15/11

UNITED NATIONS

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 13 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : Ops/121/94

SUBJECT : ESCORT BY MILOBS

1. MILOB tasks include the escorting of BROWN and ROOTS, Displaced Persons convoys, VIPs and other prioritized movements. Such tasks are given by Force HQ to MILOB GP HQ who in turn tasks and coordinates such movements.

2. Many problems were realized in the past with regard to coordination of such movements. Below are principles that shall guide MILOB Sectors in executing escort duties.

a. If tasks exceed the capability of a Sector, MILOB GP HQ shall coordinate regrouping of resources from other sectors to support.

b. Escort tasks that overlap boundaries shall be coordinated by MILOB GP HQ to facilitate for handover/takeover between sectors. It is more ideal to effect handover/ takeover to benefit turnaround timings, retasking of teams and maintenance requirement on vehicles. Fatigue of MILOBS should also be taken into consideration.

c. Displaced persons escorts shall be handed over to the receiving sector or moved by receiving sector from embarkation point to drop off point depending on distances. The reason is that such people will need constant surveillance hence the receiving sector shall be charged with the resettling responsibility.

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- d. VIP escorts shall not be handed over unless clear instructions are given from this HQ with the consent of Force HQ. Such instructions must be accompanied by the identification of the authority issuing the decision.
 - e. All other escort tasks shall be executed on a routine basis. General understanding between sectors is a prerequisite.
4. Suggestions are always welcome in order to achieve efficiency.

MJ Masanganise
MJ MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

Info :

DCMO
SLOGO
SMPO

UN RESTRICTED

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TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 05 OCT 94

INFO : DCMO
SOO
SMPO

Ref : PLANS 27/94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON UNAMIR PERSONNEL OPENING FIRE

Refs : A. HQ UNAMIR OP DIRECTIVE 02 - ROE - 22 JUL 94.

B. AMENDMENT 1 TO REF A DATED 10 SEP 94.

1. THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED IN THE EVENT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL
OPENING FIRE IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. MILOB GP HQ DUTY OFFICER IS TO BE INFORMED THAT THE EVENT
HAS OCCURRED BY THE FASTEST POSSIBLE MEANS. THE SECTOR
COMMANDER CONCERNED IS TO FOLLOW THIS UP:

- (1) WITH A DETAILED REPORT WITHIN ONE HOUR OF THE EVENT.
- (2) WITH A WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN 3 HOURS OF THE EVENT.

B. THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO INFORM:

- (1) CMO OR DCMO
- (2) SOO
- (3) HQ UNAMIR DUTY OFFICER
- (4) CONTINGENT SENIOR CONCERNED

2. THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO LOG AND DISTRIBUTE REPORTS FROM THE
SECTOR COMMANDER TO THOSE LISTED ABOVE, AS THEY ARE RECEIVED.

3. SECTOR COMMANDERS ARE TO BE PREPARED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION
IF ORDERED BY MILOB GP HQ / HQ UNAMIR. THEY SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY

1

UN RESTRICTED

D/S offr seen
hio Sam
ADMIN/LOGO *202*

UN RESTRICTED

AWARE OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR:

- A. PRESERVING/RECORDING EVIDENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT.
 - B. WITNESS LISTS.
 - C. WITNESS STATEMENTS.
 - D. STATEMENTS BY THE INDIVIDUAL(S) WHO OPENED FIRE.
 - E. MP INVESTIGATION UNDER NATIONAL AND/OR UNAMIR AUSPICES, AS ORDERED BY HQ UNAMIR.
4. ADDRESSEES ARE REMINDED OF THE NEED FOR ALL PERSONNEL TO BE FULLY BRIEFED ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE CURRENT ROE, REFS A AND B.

masanganise
M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

Ops Offr / Team hdlrs
all to note for guidance
in the future.

SAD
sp10

Seen
Mr TMA

SECTION 4 B

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 17 Oct 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : 6464.2 /OPS

SUBJECT : CHANGE OF CHANNEL

1. Wef 0800hrs 13 Oct 94, Sector 3 will operate on Channel 13 instead of Channel 12.
2. All Sectors and individuals wishing to communicate with any call sign in Sector 3, are to switch to the appropriate channel.
3. Accept for strict compliance.

all to note
SAD
OB OFF seen 17/10

S ILIYA
Lt Col
S O O

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

To : See Distr
From : MILOB GP HQ (Ops Br)
Dat 17 Oct 94.
: WEEKLY SECURITY REPORT

1. Please find a weekly security report of UNHCR for your information.

M Hassan
M NAIM HASSAN
Sqn Ldr
FOR CMO

Distr:
External:
Info:

Sec 1
" 2
" 3
" 4A
" 4B ✓
" 4C
" 5
" 6

*all offrs to read for
their information.*

*Us offr Seen
17/10*

CMO
17/10

UN RESTRICTED



Sub-Office Goma
35 Av. President Mobutu
B P 14, Goma
Zaire

to Secs.

Sous-Délégation pour le Goma
Fax: 871 175.457
Tel: 871.682.282.936
Telecel: 011 242 RR 40395/6/8

WEEKLY SECURITY REPORT (2 OCTOBER 1994)
=====

Overview of last week's incidents:

27/9 Hostage taking Several women were taken hostage in Mugunga camp suspected to support refugees to return to Rwanda.

28/9 Hostage threat in Camp Kituku In the morning Caritas International reported that in Kituku camp threats were issued to take Caritas and UNHCR staff hostage. Reason: discontent about inadequacy food supplies, particularly beans. Both agencies decided to avoid Kituku for the next 48 hours.

ARC driver arrested ARC requested UNHCR assistance to discuss the arrest of one of their drivers by the Gendarmerie. Reason: the driver was unable to show his original assurance papers. (The policeman involved would have harassed the same driver regularly by asking money and by taking in the originals if the money is not paid.) Driver was released.

Tense situation in Katale Camp At the end of the day field officers report a tense situation in Kattali. Militia have started to control the whole camp area. Their object seems to be to drive the scouts out of their "powerful" position as traffic controllers.

29/9 Roadblock in Kibumba After a theft of a bicycle in Kibumba camp a confrontation between two groups leads to a roadblock for a short time just south of the UNHCR location. An UNHCR intervention is responded by throwing stones. After this incident the situation calms down.

Medical care in Goma Assist UK reports to have transported a victim of a (one sided) road accident (to avoid a collision with their truck) to the hospital in Virunga. A doctor, who happened to be a brother of the victim, gave first aid to the patient, "confiscated" the passport of the driver and finished his treatment by beating up the interpreter of Assist UK.

Person killed in Katale The situation in Katale continued to be tense after a militia have been killed last night. Militia had roadblocked the main roads and were controlling the whole area. All relief traffic was advised to avoid the area. Senior field officer, commissaire de Zone a.o. negotiated with

the "president" of the militia about the release of the two scouts. They agreed on the transport of both scouts to the Gendarmerie in Rutshuru for further investigation. At 13.00 hrs the situation in Katale was back to normal.

^{7/1}
~~Pillage~~ by Rwandese refugees? The coordinator of a private school in Goma reports the looting yesterday by Rwandese refugees of all books, blackboards and furniture (est. \$ 18 000) out of his school. A survey at the spot did raise some questions about the indicated events. The case is handed over to "Social".

30/9 NGO's organizations leave Katale In the morning, after Care Canada had found out that militia were in complete control of Katale camp and that they were searching for two of their reliefworkers, nearly all relief organizations (Care, Concern, Assist UK a.o. left Katale and gathered in Rutshuru. Round 14.00 hrs, after having received the information that not two but seven relief workers were targeted by the militia, they left Rutshuru going northbound in the direction of the Uganda border. Later MSF Holland, situated in the southern part of the camp, had their expatriates returned to Goma. Since 8.30 hrs all relief traffic was advised to avoid the Katale area.

NGO's and UNHCR back in Kituku Today the senior field officer, the protection officer, the commissaire de Zone. Col.Tafua (Gendarmerie) and Caritas met (after 48.00 hrs) with the refugees leaders in Kituku camp to discuss the threats against the Caritas staff. After all "misunderstandings" were cleared all parties agreed on continuing all operations in good cooperation.

02/10 Evacuees arrive in Kabale Uganda Confirmation was received that the 80 evacuees of Katale safely arrived in Kabala, Uganda.

Discussions with refugee leaders in Rumangabo Security was provided to (UNHCR and Care) representatives discussing the security situation and other problems in Katale in Victoria Camp Rumangabo from 07.00-19.00 hrs.

Handgrenade explodes The Swedish Rescue Board reports an accident with a handgrenade in Rumangabo last night. The "owner" died shortly after the accident.

Shooting at the road to Mugunga At 05.00 hrs heavy shooting was reported between Goma and Mugunga. An assesment at 05.15 hrs learned that the situation was calme. No evidence was even found that there had been any incident.

U.N.H.C.R. security consultant,

(Albert Kuiper)

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL

DCMO - 5/18/94
Action
SMPO 19/94

To: Distribution List

From: Force Commander

Blouissignat mgn

Date: November 1994

Subject: Contingency Plans

1. Enclosed are the HQ UNAMIR contingency plans for:
 - a. Security Alert - Op Plan NIKE;
 - b. Reinforcement - Op Plan HECTOR; and
 - c. Withdrawal and Evacuation - Op Plan JASON.
2. Addressees are to develop outline operation/support plans for submission to G5 Plans, HQ UNAMIR, by 5 Dec 94 as follows:
 - a. Military, CIVPOL and MILOBS:
 - (1) Sector 1 - CO NICOY;
 - (2) Sector 2 - CO GHANBATT;
 - (3) Sector 3 - CO MALAWI and MALICOY to submit plans through Sector Comd;
 - (4) Sector 4A - CO ZAMBATT;
 - (5) Sector 4B - CO FRAFBATT;
 - (6) Sector 4C - CO ETHIOBATT;
 - (7) Sector 5 - CO TUNBATT;
 - (8) Sector 6 - COs INDBATT, CANCON and AUSMED.
 - b. Staff:
 - (1) Personnel/Logistics Support - DCOS SP
 - c. Civilian:
 - (1) UNAMIR civilian staff;)
 - (2) FSA personnel;) - Special Task Officer to CAO (Mr Lombardo) to coordinate
 - (3) Brown and Root personnel)
 - d. UN Agencies - HAC to coordinate with respective Security Officers.

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL

Ops OR
1. Study this
2. Do the nec liaison
with FRAFBATT Ops on
our protection and move
EOD
T/R.

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- e. NGOs - Sector Commanders (HAC to assist).
- 3. POC for enquiries is G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR.

Distribution List

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5000.46 (Plans)

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PART I

UNAMIR SECURITY ALERT CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN NIKE

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Security Alert Measures (SAMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan NIKE. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE are:

a. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs could be activated concurrently with Op Plan HECTOR.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III. Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be invoked if Op Plan JASON is activated.

2. Op Plan NIKE provides for the increase of UNAMIR security in the event of a deteriorating situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement (ROE) levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE.

THREAT

4. It is assessed that RGF has a developing capability to establish an insurgency threat against the BBGNU. The scale of this potential will increase with time. Current assessment is that the threat is likely to be manifest as follows:

a. Initially in Sector 4/5.

b. Concurrently in more than one border area.

c. In Kigali.

d. In the interior but not until the re-establishment of the population base in rural areas.

5. The threat to UNAMIR is likely to be:

a. A collateral threat caused by attacks on the BBGNU and RPA. Soft targets would be particularly vulnerable under these conditions.

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b. Direct attack on UNAMIR in order to achieve political ends.PROTECTION

6. In either case, the protection of UNAMIR personnel must be paramount. Under the current mandate UNAMIR also has a duty to protect the following:

- a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. NGO Personnel.
- c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.
- d. Any other person under UN protection.

7. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan NIKE gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

SECURITY ALERT MEASURES

8. Command. The responsibility for adherence to Security Alert Measures (SAMs) devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of HQ UNAMIR.

9. SAMs. UNAMIR SAMs under Op Plan NIKE will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each SAM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

a. **GREEN**. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See Annex A.

b. **YELLOW**. Medium level threat. Increased security activities. - See Annex B. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:

- (1). **ALFA**. Withdrawal to platoon positions.
- (2). **BRAVO**. Withdrawal to company localities.
- (3). **CHARLIE**. Withdrawal to battalion defended areas.

c. **RED**. High Level threat. Maximum security activity. Civil evacuation if required. UNAMIR evacuation plans in readiness for immediate execution. See Annex C.

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10. Activation. The activation of Op Plan NIKE will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. The codeword - Op Plan NIKE.
- b. The unit/Sector to which the SAM applies.
- c. The SAM to be adopted.
- d. The time by which the SAM is to be activated.
- e. The ROE readiness/alert status
- f. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan NIKE activation.
- g. Confirmation details.

11. Example. An example Op Plan NIKE activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

4C THIS IS ZERO.

- A. OP PLAN NIKE.
- B. ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C.
- C. YELLOW ALPHA
- D. BY 241200B OCT 94.
- E. ROE YELLOW
- F. SIGHTINGS OF ARMED INSURGENTS IN GISAKURA AREA.
- G. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.

12. Reaction. On receipt of the Op Plan NIKE SAM message, the receiving unit is to:

- a. Follow the action outlined in the relevant Annex to this Instruction.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units.
- c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next SAM level.

13. Delegation. The authority to raise a SAM level is delegated to Sector Commanders, if they consider that this is warranted by the threat. They do not have the authority to lower a SAM level. In the event that a Sector Commander judges that a SAM level is to be raised, he must:

- a. Inform HQ UNAMIR by the fastest possible means, giving reasons for the increase in level.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sector Commanders.

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- c. Provide regular advice to HQ UNAMIR on his perception of the threat.

14. Reporting. Under NIKE YELLOW and RED, units and sub-units are to make reports as follows:

- a. Any unusual activity related to the threat to be reported immediately.
- b. Specific reference to Op Plan NIKE activity is to be made as part of the SITREPs at 0600 and 1800 hrs.
- c. A weekly summary of Op Plan NIKE activities.

15. Status of MILOBs. MILOBs have special status under the UN Convention, wherein they are defined as "experts". Because they are unarmed, early consideration for their security should be given by Sector Commanders. MILOBs are to be controlled as described in Annexes A-C.

16. Status of UNCIVPOL. UNCIVPOL authority can offer some advantages over military authority, in certain circumstances. Sector Commanders are to consider requesting UNCIVPOL support to enhance their security arrangements, particularly for the following:

- a. Crowd control.
- b. Personal search.
- c. Law and order enforcement.
- d. Guarding of Key Points.
- e. Liaison with Gendarmerie.

FURTHER ACTION

17. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector commanders are to develop formal RRF contingency plans, which match Op Plan NIKE escalation as follows:

- a. NIKE GREEN. One section per company at 30 mins NTM.
- b. NIKE YELLOW. One section per company at 10 mins NTM.
- c. NIKE RED. One platoon per company at 10 mins NTM.

18. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan NIKE are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan NIKE sub-plans to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

19. Protected Personnel. Sector Commanders are to submit initial estimates of the numbers and deployment of Protected Personnel to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

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20. Warning and Reporting Procedures. G3 Ops is to develop Op Plan NIKE Warning and Reporting Procedures by 5 Dec 94.
21. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan NIKE measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.
22. Administration and Logistics. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan NIKE by 5 Dec 94.
23. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan NIKE, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

PART I ANNEXES

- A. Op Plan NIKE GREEN - Normal Activities.
- B. Op Plan NIKE YELLOW - Medium Level Threat.
- C. Op Plan NIKE RED - High Level Threat.

ANNEX A TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Carry out reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under NIKE YELLOW and RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Protected Personnel. Establish the identity, numbers and locations of Protected Personnel within AOR, and brief them on the procedure to be followed under NIKE YELLOW and RED. This must be done discreetly in a manner which avoids alarmism.
4. MILOBs. Ensure that all MILOB personnel within the Sector are briefed on Op Plan NIKE contingencies.
5. UNCIVPOL. Consider how UNCIVPOL deployment could be utilised to enhance military security arrangements.

ANNEX B TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Normal Operations. Units and sub-units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under NIKE RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - (1). Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR.
 - (2). Maintain a register of these details.
 - (3). Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - (4). Develop plans to marshall those personnel into UNAMIR Safe Areas.
 - (5). Inform those personnel of the action to be taken to withdraw them to UN Safe Areas.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. Under Op Plan NIKE, withdrawal to Safe Areas will be ordered as required. Safe Areas are designed to provide increased protection of Protected Personnel, not to defend an area from direct attack, although they must be capable of doing so. The occupation of Safe Areas will be ordered as follows:
 - a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Section outposts to withdraw to platoon positions. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of section level.
 - b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO. Platoons to withdraw to company localities. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level.

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c. NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE. Companies to withdraw to battalion defended areas. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.

6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During execution of NIKE YELLOW or RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, on a voluntary basis. UNAMIR personnel are not in a position to enforce withdrawal. Advice which can be given as a professional recommendation only. Withdrawal of these personnel should occur under the following conditions:

- a. At the request of the personnel concerned.
- b. On the advice of the Sector Commander.
- c. On orders from HQ UNAMIR.

7. Reception. Platoon, company and battalion locations must have provision for the inclusion of Protected Personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

8. Fixed Installations. Sector Commanders are to increase the security of fixed installations, which include communications repeater sites, under NIKE YELLOW. In practice, it may be practical to co-locate platoon, company and battalion positions with fixed installation. In other cases, this may not be possible and the following minimum security is to be provided:

- a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Minimum of one section to augment security at fixed installations.
- b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO AND CHARLIE. Minimum of one platoon to augment security at fixed installations.

9. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE YELLOW, provided that the following criteria are fulfilled:

- a. They are not sent to the site of a known or suspected threat.
- b. They travel as a minimum party of six in two vehicles.
- c. They have guaranteed communications.

10. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:

- a. Minimum convoy is four vehicles.

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- b. Minimum protection is one section per convoy or packet.
 - c. Movement off MSRs is minimized.
 - d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
 - e. Movement at night is minimized.
11. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:
- a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
 - b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to stockpiled at unit level.
 - c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plans HECTOR and JASON.
 - d. Leave. Leave is restricted to compassionate cases only.
 - e. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE YELLOW or RED.

ANNEX C TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Operations. Where possible, units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under Op Plans HECTOR AND JASON.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - a. Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR, if this has not been done under NIKE YELLOW.
 - b. Maintain a register of these details.
 - c. Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - d. Advise those personnel of the need to move into Safe Areas immediately.
 - e. If ordered by HQ UNAMIR, plan to escort those personnel to Kigali or a neighbouring country.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. If withdrawal to battalion defended Safe Areas has not been ordered under NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE, an increase in SAM to RED automatically orders this withdrawal. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.
6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During NIKE RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. Sector Commanders are to give those personnel strong advice to withdraw to Safe Areas immediately.
7. Reception. Safe Areas must have provision for the inclusion of the UN and NGO personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

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8. Further Withdrawal. UN and NGO personnel may be further withdrawn, on a voluntary basis, as ordered by HQ UNAMIR. They may be escorted to Kigali or a neighbouring country.

9. Fixed Installations. Under NIKE RED, the minimum force required to augment security at fixed installations is one platoon. Sector Commanders are to recommend whether or not fixed installations should continue to operate in this security environment.

10. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel in Safe Areas are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may not be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE RED, without the specific authority of the Force Commander.

11. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:

- a. Minimum convoy is eight vehicles.
- b. Minimum protection is two sections per convoy or packet.
- c. No movement off MSRs.
- d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
- e. No movement at night.

12. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:

- a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
- b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to be stockpiled at unit level.
- c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plan HECTOR and JASON.
- d. Leave. No leave is to be granted.
- e. Dress. All personnel are to wear ballistic protective equipment and headgear where issued.
- f. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE RED.

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5000. 46 (Plans)

PART IIUNAMIR REINFORCEMENT CONTINGENCY PLANOP PLAN HECTORGENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Reinforcement Measures (RMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan HECTOR. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR are:

a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be linked to Op Plan HECTOR RMs.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III.

2. Op Plan HECTOR provides for the reinforcement of UNAMIR units and locations in the event of a deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the ROE levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR.

4. Scenario. It is not possible to anticipate specific scenarios. Op Plan HECTOR seeks to generate additional formed bodies of troops to enhance the security cover provided in certain Sectors. It is expected that such reinforcement would be in a scenario in which an additional presence would improve the security situation, or provide better protection for UNAMIR personnel or those who UNAMIR has a duty to protect. In other scenarios, reinforcement would not be the appropriate response.

REINFORCEMENT MEASURES

5. Command Responsibility. The responsibility for implementation of RMs devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of Main HQ. The two key players are:

a. Reinforcing Sector Commander (RSC). The Sector Commander from whose Sector formed bodies of troops will be deployed to reinforce another Sector.

b. Gaining Sector Commander (GSC). The Sector Commander receiving reinforcing formed bodies of troops.

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6. Command Relationship. The delegation of command to the GSC will be coordinated by HQ UNAMIR. In principle, the GSC will assume TACON of reinforcing troops, subject to national command restrictions.

7. Requirement for Reinforcement. HQ UNAMIR will determine whether a Sector is to be reinforced on the basis of the following:

- a. At the request of the GSC.
- b. On evidence of a deteriorating security situation in the Sector(s) concerned.
- c. To preempt a threat which is expected to materialize.
- d. In response to a changing political situation.

8. Level of Reinforcement. Under Op Plan HECTOR, reinforcement up to multiple company level, by formed platoons and companies, can be ordered as required. Reinforcement by a complete battalion is unlikely, but can be ordered by HQ UNAMIR if required. Reinforcement of Kigali at battalion level is to be coordinated under the Force Evacuation Plan, Op Plan JASON.

9. RMs. UNAMIR RMs under Op Plan HECTOR will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each RM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

- a. GREEN. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See Annex A.
- b. YELLOW. Medium level threat. - See Annex B. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:
 - (1). ALFA. Reconnaissance. Main Body at 24 hrs NTM.
 - (2). BRAVO. Deployment of Advance Party. Main Body at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
- c. RED. High Level threat. Deployment of Main Body. See Annex C.

10. Activation. The activation of a RM will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. The codeword - Op Plan HECTOR
- b. The Reinforcing Sector(s).
- c. The Gaining Sector(s).
- d. The level of reinforcement.

- e. The RM to be adopted.
 - f. RV location for YELLOW ALFA.
 - g. The time at which the NTM is to be achieved.
 - h. The ROE readiness/alert status.
 - i. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan HECTOR activation.
 - j. Confirmation details.
11. Example. An example Op Plan HECTOR activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

1,2 AND 5 THIS IS ZERO.
 A. OP PLAN HECTOR.
 B. SECTORS 1 AND 2 TO REINFORCE SECTOR 5.
 C. SECTOR 1 TWO PLATOONS.
 D. SECTOR 2 ONE COMPANY.
 E. YELLOW ALFA.
 F. RV SECTOR 5 HQ AT 240800B OCT 94.
 G. RM TO BE ACHIEVED BY 241200B OCT 94.
 H. ROE GREEN
 I. AUGMENT SECURITY IN RUHRENGER! AND NDIZA AREAS.
 J. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX

12. Reaction. On receipt of an Op Plan HECTOR message, addressees are to:
- a. Carry out the action described in the relevant Annex.
 - b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units when RMs are in place.
 - c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next RM level.
13. Safe Area Contingency Positions. Sector Commanders are to carry out reconnaissance of contingency positions for deployment of reinforcing units. In principle, it is to be expected that reinforcing units would be withdrawn under NIKE RED. If the tactical situation prevents this, they will need to remain in the Gaining Sector. As a precaution, contingency reconnaissance should be carried out as follows:
- a. Within each company Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one platoon position.
 - b. Within each battalion Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one company position.

14. Summary of NTM Timings: Op Plan HECTOR

RM	RECCE PARTY	ADVANCE PARTY	MAIN BODY
GREEN	6 hrs	12 hrs	48 hrs
YELLOW ALFA	Move	6 hrs	24 hrs
YELLOW BRAVO	-	Move	12 hrs
YELLOW CHARLIE	-	-	6 hrs
RED	-	-	Move

15. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector Commanders are to maintain RRF readiness as described under Op Plan NIKE.

FURTHER ACTION

16. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan HECTOR are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan HECTOR plans to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

17. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan HECTOR measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS C-3.

18. Communications. FSO is to highlight communications issues concerned with Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94. Consideration should be given to:

- a. CNR compatibility.
- b. Frequency harmonisation.
- c. CEOI planning.

19. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94.

20. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan HECTOR, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

Part II Annexes:

- A. Op Plan HECTOR GREEN - Normal Activities
- B. Op Plan HECTOR YELLOW - Medium Level Threat
- C. Op Plan HECTOR RED - High Level Threat

ANNEX A TO
TO PART II TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Identify:
 - a. Possible locations for use under HECTOR YELLOW and RED, at platoon and company level.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Administration of Reinforcing Troops. Make contingency plans to administer one three platoon company consisting of the following:
 - a. 120 personnel.
 - (1). Recce Party - 5.
 - (2). Advance Party - 10.
 - (3). Main Body - 105.
 - b. 10 vehicles.
4. Preparation of Own Troops. Prepare to deploy formed bodies of troops to another Sector. Battalion Sectors should initially plan on preparing one company; Company Sectors should initially plan on preparing one platoon, as follows:
 - a. Notice to Move (NTM).
 - (1). Recce Party at 6 hrs NTM.
 - (2). Advance Party at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). Main Body at 48 hrs NTM.
 - b. Equipment. Fully equipped and scaled for 7 days operations.
 - c. Combat Supplies. Self contained for 3 days.

ANNEX B TO
PART II TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Reconnaissance. If reinforcement is being planned, carry out detailed reconnaissance of locations earmarked for reinforcement under HECTOR RED, including routes.
3. Preparation for Reinforcement. If ordered to prepare to reinforce another Sector, reduce NTM to:
 - a. HECTOR YELLOW ALFA.
 - (1). Recce Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Advance Party - 6 hrs.
 - (3). Main Body - 24 hrs.
 - b. HECTOR YELLOW BRAVO.
 - (1). Advance Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Main Body - 12 hrs.
 - c. HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
4. Reception Arrangements. If reinforcement of the Sector is planned:
 - a. Issue verbal orders on arrival of the Recce Party.
 - b. Appoint an LO to coordinate reception arrangements.
 - c. Provide guides, movement control and signing as required.
 - d. Coordinate C2 including communications electronic instructions.
 - e. Prepare accommodation, if available, taking into account the tactical situation.
 - f. Coordinate administrative support.

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ANNEX C TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
PART II TO
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Deployment on Reinforcement. If ordered to reinforce another Sector, deploy the Main Body immediately.
3. Reception Arrangements. If receiving reinforcements:
 - a. Issue confirmatory orders.
 - b. Coordinate C2 arrangements.
 - c. Arrange administrative support as required.

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PART IIIUNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLANOP PLAN JASONGENERAL

1. This instruction covers the UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan (WECP) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan JASON. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan JASON are:

a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. Raising of Op Plan NIKE SAMs will inevitably precede implementation of Op Plan JASON.

b. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II.

2. Op Plan JASON provides for the withdrawal and evacuation of UNAMIR and associated personnel in the event of a seriously deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied on a national basis.

PROTECTION

3. Under the current mandate, UNAMIR has a duty to protect the following:

a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.

b. NGO Personnel.

c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.

d. Any other person under UN protection.

4. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan JASON gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

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PRINCIPLES OF EVACUATION

5. An Evacuation will be the Last Resort. Before it is ordered, UNAMIR will seek to continue the mission, whilst retaining security by:
 - a. Increasing Security Alert Measures (SAMs). Op Plan NIKE.
 - b. Reinforcing threatened Sector(s). Op Plan HECTOR.
 - c. Withdrawing to Kigali, from where evacuated Sectors can be re-occupied, if there is a decrease in the threat.
 - d. Evacuating Kigali at the end of the withdrawal process.
6. UNAMIR will Present Strong and Coherent Resolve. An evacuation will only be ordered where there is no alternative. Even when non-essential personnel have been withdrawn or evacuated, a high security core of troops will provide a presence until evacuated.
7. Protected Civilians will be Evacuated First. They will be offered early withdrawal to Safe Areas, escorted to Kigali and advised to leave when the security situation makes their presence no longer tenable.
8. Equipment will not be Abandoned. Where possible, only equipment of low value will be left in Rwanda.
9. Kigali International Airport will be the Primary Means of Evacuation.
10. Final Evacuation Phase will be Conducted by Road.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11. A possible sequence of events for the implementation of Op Plan JASON is given below:

SER	EVENT	RESPONSE
1	Insurgent threat increases in Sector(s).	Security Alert Measures increased under Op Plan NIKE.
2	Greater presence required to ensure security in Sector(s).	Op Plan HECTOR invoked to threatened Sector(s).
3	Situation worsens in threatened Sector(s).	Protected Personnel withdrawn to Kigali.
4	Increase in threat in other Sectors.	Non-essential personnel withdrawn to Kigali. Op Plan HECTOR invoked if troops available.

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5	Threat increases in all Sectors.	Op Plan HECTOR concentrated on Kigali Sector.
6	Kigali comes under direct threat.	Op Plan JASON activated. Protected Personnel advised to leave.
7	Insurgency in Kigali worsens.	Non-essential personnel evacuated.
8	Situation deteriorates.	Destruction plans prepared Some operational personnel evacuated.
9	Government loses control.	Bulk of operational personnel evacuated by air/road. Destruction plans invoked.
10	Order to evacuate given.	Remainder of available personnel leave by air. Security Force leaves by road.

12. Alternative Scenarios. A number of other scenarios could invoke Op Plan JASON. In the main, however, a progressive deterioration, leading to a total collapse of security would be required before the full plan would be implemented.

13. Degree of Evacuation. Op Plan JASON may be only partially executed. A stabilisation of the security situation would limit the degree of evacuation. Similarly, the process of evacuation could be reversed if the situation were to improve.

STAGES OF EVACUATION

14. **JASON GREEN.** During JASON GREEN, normal operations will continue. Preparation for further stages will be carried out. Major changes to the security environment will include:

- a. Op Plan NIKE SAMs may be raised.
- b. Op Plan HECTOR RMs may be activated to increase presence in threatened Sector(s).
- c. For full details, see **Annex A**.

15. **JASON YELLOW.** Under JASON YELLOW, the WECP will be stage, as described in **Annex B**, as follows:

- a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Orders for withdrawal to Kigali.
- b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Protected and Non-Essential personnel evacuated.

c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Bulk of personnel evacuated by air/road.

16. JASON RED. Kigali/Rwanda evacuated by air. Security Force leaves by road. See Annex C.

RESPONSIBILITIES

17. Overall Responsibility for WECP. Chief Security and Area Security Coordinator for Rwanda is responsible for the coordination of the UNAMIR WECP.

18. Military Aspects of WECP. G3 Plans is responsible for the planning of military aspects of Op Plan JASON within HQ UNAMIR. Within UNAMIR, military responsibility for the WECP devolves to:

- a. Sector Commanders to coordinate withdrawal of their Sectors to Kigali.
- b. Sector Commander Sector 6 (Kigali) for the reception of units withdrawn to Kigali prior to evacuation.
- c. G3 Ops for the coordination of deployment of units.
- c. DFC/COS for the coordination of evacuation of Kigali, devolved as follows:
 - (1). Security and Protection - DCOS Ops.
 - (2). Transport, Movement, Sustainment and Destruction - DCOS Sp.
- d. Contingent/unit/sub-unit Commanders for the coordination of contingent plans to conform with UNAMIR plans and national requirements.

19. Protected Personnel. Those organisations representing personnel protected by UNAMIR are responsible for briefing their personnel on the HQ UNAMIR WECP and for ensuring that their own instructions conform to the overall plan. These include:

- a. UN agencies.
- b. UN Aid agencies.
- c. NGOs.
- d. Contractors.

20. Destruction Plans. **UNAMIR equipment will not be permitted to fall into the hands of an aggressor, unless there is no way to prevent this. Sector Commanders and HQ Staff branches are to prepare lists of equipment which meet the criteria below.** In principle, all usable UNAMIR stores and equipment will be evacuated. The following categories of stores and equipment are to be used:

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- a. Essential. Those stores and equipment without which the Force cannot evacuate in good order. This category includes all weapons, vehicles, fighting equipment scales and combat supplies for 7 days. It may also include critical information which will enable the Force to resume operations in Rwanda with minimum loss of efficiency.
- b. Important. Those stores and equipment which are high value, and whose loss would involve difficulty in fulfilling the mission, or considerable expense to the UN. These include alternative communications equipment, computers, medical stores, support equipment scales and remaining combat supplies.
- c. Non-Essential. Those stores and equipment which are difficult to evacuate and whose loss does not incur considerable expense to the UN. These include defence stores, office and accommodation stores, and land line already in place.

FURTHER ACTION

21. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). G3 Ops is to develop a RRF plan for Op Plan HECTOR, taking into account RRF procedures adopted under Op Plan NIKE and the RRF to be provided by Comd Sector 6 during JASON YELLOW. See Annex B para 5.
22. Reception Plan. Commander Sector 6 is to develop a reception plan, in line with deployment under JASON YELLOW, as detailed by G3 Plans.
23. Protected Personnel. Parent Organisation of Protected Personnel are to develop their own evacuation plans, using Op Plan JASON as the template. These should be submitted ASP. UNREO is to ensure that the Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are briefed on the security requirements of UNAMIR and that they submit, by 5 Dec 94:
 - a. Lists of all personnel in country.
 - b. Lists of vehicles, with stores and passenger capacity.
 - c. Location of assets.
 - d. Priority for evacuation.
 - e. Any call on evacuation resources which might be of use to UNAMIR.
24. Military Evacuation. Sector Commanders, Contingent Commanders and HQ UNAMIR staff branches are to submit outline lists of personnel and equipment to be evacuated by 5 Dec 94, to include:
 - a. Non-Essential Personnel.
 - b. Essential and Important Stores by tonnage and category.
 - c. Integral lift capability for personnel and stores.

25. Communications. FSO is to develop an outline Force Communications Plan to support Op Plan JASON by 5 Dec 94.
26. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan JASON when initial civilian and military evacuation lists have been submitted.
27. Review. G3 plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan JASON, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

OP PLAN JASON GREENGENERAL

1. When JASON GREEN is in force, normal operations may continue, where the threat permits. This state is the opportunity for all preparatory action to be carried out, in the event that a higher Op Plan JASON state is ordered. Time utilised efficiently in planning Op Plan JASON activation during this period will pay dividends.

2. Op Plan NIKE. Op Plan NIKE may operate independently of Op Plan JASON. It provides for the raising of Security Alert Measures (SAMs), on a Sector or national basis as required. It is unlikely that Op Plan JASON would be activated unless the security situation had already warranted a SAM increase to NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE or NIKE RED. The withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas can be expected before Op Plan JASON states are increased. Their evacuation from threatened Sector(s) under Op Plan JASON would follow naturally from this situation.

3. Op Plan HECTOR. Op Plan HECTOR may also operate independently of Op Plan JASON. As the UN intends to present a robust resolve in the face of an increased threat, it is likely that Op Plan HECTOR escalation to HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE or HECTOR RED would be invoked before Op Plan JASON activation. The reinforcement of Kigali is a process which follows naturally from the reinforcement of other threatened Sector(s).

OUTLYING SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Preparation. Sector Commanders of outlying Sectors (ie not Kigali, Sector 6), have specific command responsibilities under Op Plan JASON. These include:

- a. Preparation of Sector units and sub-units for Op Plan JASON activation.
- b. Briefing of all personnel.
- c. Contingency planning.
- d. Subsidiary Plans:
 - (1). Communications Plan.
 - (2). Logistic Plan.
 - (3). Movement Plan.
 - (4). Destruction Plan.

5. Military Information. Sector Commanders are responsible for the provision of up to date military information, where the tactical situation allows the deployment of troops, specifically in the following key areas:

- a. Insurgent activity.
- b. Developing threat.
- c. Route information, between locations and to/from Kigali.

6. Protected Personnel. UN, NGO and other Protected Personnel are to be considered when planning Op Plan JASON contingencies. Sector Commanders **are to plan to:**

a. Ensure that OP Plan NIKE SAMs are promulgated to all Protected Personnel and that they are:

- (1). Listed and registered.
- (2). Briefed on the developing threat situation.
- (3). Encouraged to withdraw to Safe Areas, as the threat evolves.
- (4). Administered within Safe Areas if necessary.

b. Provide up to date information to Main HQ on Protected Personnel, if deployed to Safe Areas, to include:

- (1). Names & Parent Organisation.
- (2). Locations.
- (3). Medical Condition.
- (4). Available transport.
- (5). Stores and Equipment.
- (6). Capability for self-sufficiency.
- (7). Intentions.

c. Brief Protected Personnel on the means by which their parent organisation is planning to evacuate them. If Motorola communications are intact, this may not be required.

d. Escort Protected Personnel to Kigali for further evacuation to another country, if ordered to do so.

KIGALI SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Sector Command. Sector Commander Sector 6 Kigali, has specific responsibilities for the development of OP Plan JASON plans. He is responsible for coordinating the reception as ordered by HQ UNAMIR, within Sector 6 of the following:

- a. Those units, sub-units and contingents currently deployed in Sector 6.
- b. Those units and sub-units redeployed to reinforce Sector 6 under Op Plan HECTOR.
- c. Those units and sub-units redeployed to Sector 6 under Op Plan JASON.
- d. Protected Personnel occupying Safe Areas under Op Plan NIKE.
- e. Protected Personnel still occupying work locations in Kigali City.

8. Kigali International Airport (KIA). KIA is central to the UNAMIR WECP. The retention of security in the area of KIA is critical to the continued maintenance of the Force and of the evacuation of UNAMIR personnel, equipment and stores. G3 Plans is to plan to deploy elements of the Force under Op Plan JASON, to guard KIA as follows:

- a. Airport buildings including Control Tower.
- b. Marshalling apron work areas.
- c. Perimeter.
- d. Flight paths which could be threatened by low-level air defence systems.

9. Key Points (KPs). The protection of KPs will be essential to the implementation of Op Plan JASON. A full list of KPs, to be guarded by elements of the Force is to be evolved by G3 Plans, in discussion with other UN and NGO representatives. The number of KPs will be the minimum consistent with the threat and the maintenance of the Force. It is likely to include:

- a. Amahoro Hotel.
- b. Amahoro Stadium Complex including 500 Man Camp.
- c. Third Line Supply Compound.
- d. Wksps.
- e. Kigali City Hospital (AUSMED).
- e. UNDP Building.

10. Contingency Planning. G3 Plans is to plan the deployment of all Force units within Sector 6 under JASON YELLOW ALFA. These plans are to include:

- a. Deployment areas for all units and sub-units, recced to platoon level.
- b. Requirement for defence stores.
- c. Development of RRF plans.
- d. Accommodation requirements.
- e. Administrative arrangements including the delivery of water.

11. Communications. FSO is to develop a communications plan for the use of Sector 6 units deployed under JASON YELLOW and RED.

LOGISTIC PLANNING

12. General. Preliminary logistic planning by DCOS Sp for the activation of Op Plan JASON YELLOW and RED should commence immediately. Information is required to predict the sustainment requirements for the Force deployed into Sector 6. Consideration should be given to providing raw data from which operational options can be developed. Some issues are:

- a. The number of personnel to be evacuated during JASON YELLOW and RED.
- b. The means by which evacuation can be achieved.
- c. The impact on Op Plan JASON caused by a closure of KIA.
- d. Practical guidance for comparison of Force sustainment/structure requirements, when the Force is deployed to Kigali.
- e. Minimum stocks required based on 14 days without resupply.
- f. Accommodation options.

ANNEX B TO
PART III TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN JASON YELLOW

GENERAL

1. **JASON YELLOW** is the trigger for the UNAMIR WECP to commence. It stages the withdrawal and evacuation process between JASON GREEN, the planning phase, and JASON RED, the final evacuation of Kigali and Rwanda.
2. **JASON YELLOW** is staged as follows:
 - a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Outlying Sectors withdrawn to Kigali.
 - b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Evacuation of Protected and non-essential personnel.
 - c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Evacuation of bulk of UNAMIR personnel.

JASON YELLOW ALFA - WITHDRAWAL PHASE

3. Outlying Sector Command Responsibilities. On the receipt of a JASON YELLOW ALFA message, outlying Sector Commanders are to:
 - a. Marshall units and sub-units in Safe Areas.
 - b. Marshall Protected Personnel into Safe Areas.
 - c. Prepare orders for a road move to Kigali, utilising routes recd under JASON GREEN.
 - d. Be prepared to receive detailed reception coordinating instructions from HQ UNAMIR, including timings.
 - e. Prepare Non-Essential stores for destruction.
 - f. Carry out route clearance and security.
 - g. Before departure, destroy Non-Essential stores.
 - i. Move to Kigali.
4. Sector 6 Commander Responsibilities. On receipt of JASON YELLOW ALFA message, Sector 6 Commander is to prepare reception arrangements for units withdrawing to Kigali as follows:

- a. Escort convoys from release points within Sector 6 to deployment areas.
 - b. Provide guides down to platoon level.
 - c. Provide security to units which are occupying their deployment areas, until local defence has been established.
 - d. Allocate two platoons to act as RRF at 5 mins NTM during occupation of deployment areas.
 - e. Escort Protected Personnel to parent organisations, if the security situation permits.
5. Deployment Coordination. G3 Ops/G3 Plans will coordinate the deployment of units within Sector 6. This will involve:
- a. Identification of deployment areas.
 - b. Coordination between units.
 - c. Arrival procedures.
 - d. Issue of defence stores.
 - e. Key Point isolation and guarding procedures.
 - f. Development of Map/Locator list for Sector 6.
 - g. Control of movement.
 - h. Security procedures and ROE.
 - i. RRF allocation.
 - j. Administrative arrangements.
6. Arrival Procedures. On arrival in Sector 6, units and sub-units will deploy to designated areas. Immediate actions on arrival are:
- a. Establish perimeter defence of designated area(s).
 - b. Coordinate return of Protected Personnel to parent organisation with Commander Sector 6, if the security situation permits.
 - c. Allocate RRF for local defence and take over responsibilities from Commander Sector 6.

- d. List non-essential personnel and manifest for evacuation under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- e. Identify Important stores for evacuation.
- f. Identify Non-Essential stores for destruction.

JASON YELLOW BRAVO - PRELIMINARY EVACUATION

7. General. JASON YELLOW BRAVO will be ordered if the situation deteriorates to the point that:

- a. The presence of a full complement of UNAMIR personnel in Kigali places an unmanageable burden on the logistic structure necessary to sustain it.
- b. A large number of personnel cannot be properly employed due to security restrictions on their tasks.
- c. Protected Personnel could be placed in direct danger.
- d. Further evacuation seems likely.

8. Personnel. Personnel to be evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO are:

- a. The bulk of Protected Personnel, less those required as a minimum presence on the ground by their parent organisations.
- b. UNAMIR civilian personnel whose work in the security environment is no longer deemed essential.
- c. UNAMIR military personnel whose role cannot be carried out in the current security environment.
- d. Formed UNAMIR units no longer required to enhance the security of Kigali.

9. Equipment. It is not intended to evacuate equipment under JASON YELLOW BRAVO except for:

- a. High value equipment which would be particularly difficult to evacuate in an increased threat scenario.
- b. Essential equipment of any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this stage.

10. Personal Baggage. Personnel evacuated during Op Plan JASON will be restricted to minimum personal baggage. Commanders should issue instructions for personnel to carry:

- a. Personal Weapon.

b. Equipment up to 30 kg in weight.

c. Personal documents including passport.

11. Means of Evacuation. At this stage the primary means of evacuation will be by air. Evacuation by road will be carried out by any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this time.

12. Destruction. Destruction will not be authorised for Non-Essential stores left by any formed unit which withdraws at this time.

JASON YELLOW CHARLIE - MAIN EVACUATION

13. General. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE will be ordered if the security situation deteriorates to the extent that:

- a. The Force can no longer be easily sustained.
- b. The presence of a large body of troops means that the lives of UN personnel are placed at serious risk.
- c. The threat can more easily be met by a more compact force structure.
- d. The Force mission requires a presence at minimal deployment.
- e. Final evacuation under JASON RED is a likely possibility.

14. Personnel. Under JASON YELLOW CHARLIE, force strength will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of a UN presence. The following will be evacuated:

- a. All remaining Protected personnel.
- b. Those UNAMIR civilian personnel whose presence is not required for the maintenance of a Force presence.
- c. Those UNAMIR military personnel not required to provide a Force presence. This will involve a large number of administrative and support personnel, as well as those formed units not detailed off as Security Force.

15. Equipment. The following equipment will be evacuated:

- a. Important stores.
- b. Essential stores of formed units ordered to withdraw at this stage.
- c. The bulk of the vehicle fleet less those vehicles required in order to maintain a Force presence and Security Force.

OP PLAN JASON RED

GENERAL

1. JASON RED is the executive order to evacuate Rwanda. It involves:
 - a. The safe evacuation of the UN presence in Rwanda.
 - b. The evacuation of the Security Force.
2. JASON RED will be ordered by the FC when the following criteria have been fulfilled:
 - a. The UN presence in Rwanda no longer serves a military or political purpose.
 - b. The safety of those remaining UN personnel is in serious doubt.
 - c. The security situation in Rwanda is likely to deteriorate to a greater extent.

METHOD

3. Execution. JASON RED will be conducted as a 2 phase operation as follows:
 - a. Phase 1. Evacuation of remaining UN presence via KIA.
 - b. Phase 2. Evacuation by road of the Security Force.
4. Phase 1. Phase 1 will consist of the following elements:
 - a. Reduction of KP responsibility by Security Force to a minimum.
 - b. Centralisation of UN personnel in one location.
 - c. Provision of transitional security at KIA for final evacuation flights.
 - d. Route recce for land evacuation route.
 - e. Escort of remaining UN personnel to KIA by Security Force.
 - f. Evacuation of UN presence less Security Force.

5. Phase 2. Phase 2 will consist of the following.
 - a. Centralisation of Security Force.
 - b. Despatch of recce elements including engineer support.
 - c. Clearing of route if required.
 - d. Route security.
 - e. Road move to neighbouring country.
6. Command. The Force will be commanded by the FC until his departure. HQ UNAMIR core operations staff will continue to exercise command after his departure.
7. Liaison. Liaison for the execution of JASON RED will be effected with the local authorities. UNAMIR remains responsible for the safe evacuation of UN and Protected Personnel.
8. Communications. Security Force CNR will provide the main means of communication during JASON RED. FSO is to plan to provide out-of-country communications for use by Security Force during Phase 2.
9. Logistics. The Security Force is to be self-contained for 7 days.
10. Destruction Policy. Remaining Important and Non-Essential stores and equipment not destroyed or evacuated under JASON YELLOW will be destroyed by the Security Force before evacuation.

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 30 Sep 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ (PLANS & TRG)

Ref: PLANS 25/94

INFO : DCMO

SOO

SMPO

SLOGO

S Ln O

SUBJECT : ORGANIZATION OF MILOB GP

1. Attached are copies of the Organization of MILOB GP HQ and all Sectors including Pers Strength and vehicle requirement for your guidance and implementation.

2. Accept for action.

for
M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

I wonder why the structure has no Hum off, Assts to both Hum & Admin Ofrs and an MIO.

UN RESTRICTED

ead
7/10

DP offr seen

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SECTORS STRENGTH AND VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS

SECTOR 1.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 44 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 3

TEAMS - 12

TOTAL - 15

SECTOR 2.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 47 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 3

TEAMS - 13

TOTAL - 16

SECTOR 3.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 44 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 3

TEAMS - 12

TOTAL - 15

SECTOR 4A.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 26 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 2

TEAMS - 7

TOTAL - 9

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SECTOR 4B.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 26 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 2

TEAMS - 7

TOTAL - 9

SECTOR 4C.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 26 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 2

TEAMS - 7

TOTAL - 9

SECTOR 5.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 47 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 3

TEAMS - 13

TOTAL - 16

SECTOR 6.

TOTAL STRENGTH - 29 OFFICERS

VEHICLES.

HQ - 2

TEAMS - 8

TOTAL - 10

SECTION 4B

MILOB GP HQ
KIGALI

14 Sep 94

01/94/PLANS

See Distribution

COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS IN SECTOR 4

References :

- A. UNAMIR FORCE HQ Operation Orders No 11 dated 18 May 94.
- B. UNAMIR FORCE HQ Operation Orders No 10 dated 18 Jul 94.
- C. MILOB GP HQ Operation Orders of Jun 94.

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference is made to the CMO's meeting held on 09 Sep 94 at CYANGUGU where the Sector 4C Commander reflected a lot of problems with regard to the cooperation of MILOBs and armed troops.
2. It must be noted that the command and control responsibility of the two is undertaken by two separate HQs hence precise orders, rather functional instructions, must clearly outline the interaction system to avoid misunderstanding between the two.

3. Having gone through references A, B and C above, it has been noted that most of the tasks given to the MILOBs bare similarities with the tasks given to Armed Troops. A good example is Reference A paragraph 3, d, (2), (a) V and Reference B paragraph 11 ,g. If the similarity as reflected in these paragraphs is not clearly outlined, there is a likelihood of commanders on the ground to resist cooperation and making it difficult for HQs on apportioning blame, hence fluency on tasks will fail and might cause unnecessary friction within the Force.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to assist MILOB Commanders on the ground to establish a good working relationship with Armed Contingent Commanders.

SCOPE

5. The paper shall clarify the problems by outlining solutions which might bring about efficiency within the Force. The paper shall be as follows:

- a. Armed Contingent Tasks.
- b. MILOB Tasks.
- c. Suggested Solutions.
- d. Conclusion.

ARMED CONTINGENT TASKS

6. Reference A, paragraph 3, d, (2), (a) above outlines Armed Contingent Tasks as follows:

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- a. Establish Bn HQ at Butare with Coy dispositions in Gitarama, Kibuye, Cyangugu, and Gikongoro. Due to priorities, the deployment plan was changed hence a Bn complete with HQ was deployed in Cyangugu.
- b. Establish secured safe haven areas for refugees/displaced persons.
- c. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell and provide vehicles, escorts and liaison for this task.
- d. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- e. Participate in security operations with local authorities.
- f. Undertake control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
- g. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal extremists groups.
- h. Implement Sector Ops Guidance.
- j. Be prepared to monitor the cease-fire according to separate instructions.

MILOB TASKS

7. Reference B paragraph 11 above outlines MILOB tasks in the same Sector 4C as follows:
 - a. Carry out confidence building activities among the population.
 - b. Monitor and report security situation on a h basis.

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- c. Monitor French, RGF, Militia and RPF (if any) activities.
- d. Monitor and report all detailed FCF deployments, patrols etc.
- e. Request FCF to provide their modus operandi on all security and humanitarian matters.
- f. Monitor cease-fire with FCF when it occurs and report incidence of any violations.
- g. Coordinate and provide escorts to humanitarian assistance teams in coordination with FCF (when feasible).
- h. Monitor the process of repatriation and resettlement of refugees.
- j. Monitor and report activities of illegal groups/individuals.
- k. Perform any other tasks as and when ^{these} arise or given.

SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

8. A quick analysis shows minor differences because of the limitations of one group to the other. However, from an inward observation, MILOBs sources and provide while Armed Contingents receive and execute.

9. Note is given that where a Bn HQ is deployed, seniority of command rests with the Bn Commander, though with minimum control due to job specifications. This must not affect the cooperation of the two since both parties depend on the existence of the other.

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10. As a guideline, there are some areas which are still not safe. MILOBs require the protection of armed troops to venture into such areas hence troops can be provided under local arrangements. As for humanitarian convoys, reference is made to convoy SOPs.

11. It is suggested that where such mix is in existence, the two should introduce an Operations Coordination Centre where programmes can be reviewed and adjustments made to suite the interests of both parties.

CONCLUSION

12. This paper does not cover everything but seeks to advise the commanders on the ground to use their own initiatives in order to get the job done.

13. A lot of diplomacy is required if we want to get the best on what we are trying to achieve.

MMAHMMUW
M MASAGANISE
Lt Col
PLANS & TRG

Distribution:

External:

Action:

SECTOR 4C

Information:

FHQ

Internal:

Information:

CMO

DCMO

COO

SECTOR 4B ←

^{seen}
Ops Offr / Team hdrs
Take note and act accordingly.
@AD
17/9

5

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UN
STANDARD
BRIEFS

Section 4B

UN RESTRICTED
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR MINUAR

TO: ALL SECTORS
FROM: MILOBS GP HQ (PLANS & TRG)
DATE: 13 SEP 1994
SUBJECT: FORMAT FOR MILOB STANDARD BRIEFS

INTRODUCTION

1. Due to different training backgrounds, repetition and wastage of time, the following briefing procedure shall be adopted by all sectors as a standard lay out of all briefs to be presented to visiting dignitaries.

2. All briefs shall have the following headings:

- a. Introduction.
- b. Situation.
- c. Operation matters.
- d. Administrative matters.
- e. Logistic matters.
- f. Humanitarian matters.
- g. Problems.
- h. Conclusion
- j. Questions & Answers session.

3. All briefs shall have the following format:

- a. Introduction.

(1). Cover preliminaries.

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b. Situation.

- (2). Threats in the AO.
- (3). Government Forces Activities.
- (4). State of the Local population.
- (5). Government political programs.

c. Operational Matters.

- (6). MILOB ops.
- (7). Armed troops ops.
- (8). Comms.

d. Admin matters.

- (9). Str.
- (10). Medical
- (11). Morale

e. Logistics Matters

- (12). Transport
- (13). Accommodation
- (14). Food and Water
- (15). Generators
- (16). Computers
- (17). Communication Eqpts

* f. Humanitarian Issues

- (18). Refugees
- (19). Displaced people
- (20). NGO's activities

g. Problems

- (21). Outline all problems faced from paragraph (2) above.

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h. Conclusion

i. Questions and Answer Session

(CMO, BRANCH HEADS BRIEFS)

4. All Commanders are requested to be very short and precise with their briefs. Only important matters shall be reflected.

5. Thank you in anticipation.

MASANGANSE

M MASANGANSE

Lt Col

for CMO

seen

① Ops Offr / MIO

Take note and prepare the weekly briefs for me under Paras b & c respectively.

② Admin / Log Offr

You will prepare paras d and e

③ Humanitarian Offr

work on para "f".

④ All are to be submitted each Thursday morning for my perusal

UN RESTRICTED and compilation.

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17/9