

[7 CONFIDENTIAL]

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 51002
BOX 103
FILE 6
ACC. 198/082

2
KC
I suggest
the inclusion
of a representative
of the Bureau of
Information (Spokesman)
OSRSG AMK this
16/5

UN RESTRICTED

FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH
KIGALI

16 May 94

3000.10 (Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: ATTENDANCE AT FC'S MORNING AND EVENING BRIEFING

1. With effect from 161900 May 94 only the under listed appointment holders are requested to attend the morning briefings of the Force Commander:

- a. DFC.
- b. Rep from SRSG.
- c. CAO or Rep.
- d. CMO.
- e. COO.
- f. CHAO.
- g. CMPO.
- h. C Plans O.
- i. C Log O.
- j. Rep from HA Team.
- k. CO BYUBAT.
- l. SDO (Ops).
- m. OC Tun Pl.
- n. Force Info Offr (Media Monitor).
- o. MA to FC.
- p. MA to DFC.
- q. UNAMIR Military Spokesman.

3
Dre
Huu
17/5

2. Evening briefings will be attended by all listed above except CO BYUBAT and OC Tun Pl. Those appointment holders listed in para 1 (a-q) will ensure they brief their subordinates in turn.

TRANSITION PERIOD
UNAMIR 1 TO 2
UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

3. In addition to the above mentioned officers, FC or DFC may invite any visitors or persons deemed necessary.

4. All participants are requested to keep the Ops Room clean and keep the chairs in the arranged order.



MOEEN UDDIN AHMED
Colonel
For Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

CO BYUBAT
OC Tun Pl

Internal:

CAO
CMO
COO
CHAO
CMPO
C Plans O
C Log O
HA Team
SDO (Ops)
Force Info Offr (Media Monitor)
MA to FC
MA to DFC
UNAMIR Military Spokesman

Info:

SRSG

FC

DFC

UN RESTRICTED

TRANSMITTED
2071 12MAY

UN RESTRICTED

FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH
KIGALI

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- k. CO BYUBAT.
- l. SDO (Ops).
- m. OC Tun Pl.
- n. Force Info Offr (Media Monitor).
- o. MA to FC.
- p. MA to DFC.
- q. UNAMIR Military Spokesman.
- r. Camp Comdt.
- s. MIO (G-2).

UN RESTRICTED

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MOEEN UDDIN AHMED
Colonel
For Force Commander

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Action:

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OC Tun Pl

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CMPO
C Plans O
C Log O
HA Team
SDO (Ops)
Force Info Offr (Media Monitor)
MA to FC
MA to DFC
UNAMIR Military Spokesman

Info:

SRSG
FC
DFC



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Kigali, 10 May 1994

Colonel Alex KANYARENGWE
Chairman
Rwandese Patriotic Army
Mulindi

SUBJECT: UNAMIR Mandate and Force Structure
- Proposal to the Security Council

Dear


Please find attached the aide-mémoire which has been sent to the Security Council for background, review and decision.

This document is aimed at providing the Security Council with an updated assessment of the conflict situation in Rwanda, and provide a proposal for their consideration.

As this international decision body will be meeting over the next few days on the said subject, it is considered essential that the Rwandese Patriotic Front provide this office with its comments, suggestions and possible concerns as to the content of the attached document.

As may be expected, a detailed operational order and deployment plan are already in advanced stages of preparation. The undersigned remains available as always to review these elements with the appropriate authorities of your Movement.

Yours sincerely,


Roméo A. Dallaire
Major General
Force Commander

CNR 231 CNU 007 P1/2

UNAMIR OUTGOING CODE CABLE

194 MAY 11 05 36

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI ✓
INFO: A/CMO, UNOMUR, KABALE
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 10 May 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1545

SUBJECT: Restrictions on UNOMUR's activities

1. The French Permanent Mission has shared with us the attached self-explanatory cable received by them from the Quai d'Orsay. Grateful you confirm whether the NRA has recently been placing restrictions on UNOMUR's movements in the northern part of the Uganda/Rwanda border area near Kagitumba and, if so, what action has been taken in this regard.

2. Since this question has obvious political implications, we would appreciate receiving a full report on the matter. It would also be appreciated if you could instruct the Acting CMO of UNOMUR to send us more frequent and detailed reports, either directly or through you, on all developments relating to the implementation of UNOMUR's mandate. Regards.

(2)
D/C
Please action with
Annan. I told him to
be very careful with
the French Ambassador.
Please remind him.

194 MAY 10 P 10 15

13
1545
11/5

CNR 231 CNU 007 P2/2

OBJET : RESTRICTIONS IMPOSEES PAR LA NRA AUX ACTIVITES
DE LA MONUOR

RESUME: LES RESPONSABLES DE LA MONUOR M'INDIQUENT QUE DEPUIS DEUX SEMAINES, LA MONUOR EST EMPECHEE PAR LA NRA D'ACCEDE AU POSTE-FRONTIERE DE KAGITUMBA PRINCIPAL POINT D'ENTREE POSSIBLE D'UN SOUTIEN OUGANDAIS AU FPR.

X X X

1. LE COMMANDEMENT DE LA MONUOR A KABALE, JOINT A L'INSTANT PAR TELEPHONE, CONFIRME LES INDICATIONS RECENTES DU PAM ET DU CICR (CF TD KAMPALA 359 ET 360) SUR LE VERROUILLAGE CONJOINT, PAR LE FPR ET LA NRA, DE LA REGION FRONTIERE DE KAGITUMBA.

2. SELON LE COMMANDANT EN SECOND DE LA MONUOR, LA NRA SE MONTRE ANORMALEMENT RETICENTE A AUTORISER LES OBSERVATEURS A SE RENDRE DANS LA REGION DU POSTE-FRONTIERE DE KAGITUMBA. CEUX-CI NOURRISSENT, POUR LA PREMIERE FOIS DEPUIS LE DEBUT DE LEUR MISSION, DE FORTS SOUPCONS A L'EGARD DE LA NRA, PUISQU'IL S'AGIT DE LA ROUTE D'ACCES AU RWANDA LA PLUS DIRECTE, QUI FUT L'AXE MAJEUR DE L'OFFENSIVE DE 1990.

3. LE COMMANDANT-ADJOINT DE LA MONUOR ME PRECISE QUE CETTE ATTITUDE DE LA NRA A COMMENCE IL Y A QUINZE JOURS, LORSQUE LE FPR A CONQUIS LA ZONE SITUEE ENTRE LUBIRIZI ET KAGITUMBA.

DEPUIS LORS, LA NRA N'A CESSE DE TROUVER DES PRETEXTES POUR INTERDIRE A LA MONUOR L'ACCES DE CETTE ZONE, QUI LUI ETAIT AUPARAVANT PERMIS, ET QUI ENTRE PARFAITEMENT DANS LE CADRE DE SON MANDAT. IL EST DONC ANORMAL QUE LA MONUOR, MEME EN HELICOPTERE, SE VOIT DEPUIS DEUX SEMAINES INTERDIRE DE FAIT TOUT ACCES A LA ZONE FRONTIERE DE KAGITUMBA.

4. LE COMMANDANT DE LA MONUOR, LE COLONEL ASWAR, SE REND AUJOURD'HUI A KAMPALA POUR RENCONTRER LE CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR DE LA NRA ET DEMANDER DES EXPLICATIONS.

X X X

COMMENTAIRE . C'EST LA PREMIERE FOIS QUE LA NRA, EN INTERDISANT DE FAIT A LA MONUOR DE REMPLIR SON MANDAT, AVOUE QU'ELLE ENTEND DISSIMULER DES MOUVEMENTS, QUI POURRAIENT CONSISTER PAR EXEMPLE EN UN SOUTIEN AU FPR A PARTIR DE LA 2E DIVISION (10 000 HOMMES) SITUEE A MBARARA. /

Subject : Imposed restrictions on UNOMUR activities by the NRA -

Summary : The UNOMUR responsables in KABALE have indicated to me two weeks ago, that UNOMUR has not been allowed by NRA to get access to the KAGITUMBA custom office, main possible entry point of Ugandan support to the RPF

x x x

1/ The UNOMUR commander in KABALE, joined at this morning by phone, confirms the current indications of the World Food Program - and the ICRC (CF TD KANIPALA 359 & 360) on the joint locking up by the RPF and NRA of the KAGITUMBA border Region -

2/ According to the UNOMUR record in command, the NRA shows himself abnormally reluctant to authorize the observers to get access to the Region of KAGITUMBA border post. These goes gave the impression, for the first time since the beginning of their mission, big suspicions regarding the NRA. Since we are talking about the straightest access route to Rwanda, which had been the main axis of advance of the 1990 OFFENSE -

3/ The UNOMUR Deputy commander pointed out to me that the NRA attitude has begun 15 days ago when the NRA has captured the area located between LUBIRIZI and KAGITUMBA -

Since then, the NRA has not run out of pretentions not to allow to the UNOMUR the access to this area which was previously

admitted and which is ~~not~~ in perfect harmony of his mandate - So it is abnormal that UNOMUR, even in Helicopter, see themselves since two weeks not allowed to get access to the Border area of KASITUMBA

4 The UNOMUR commander, The Colonel ASWAR, is going today to KAMPALA to meet the NRA CHIEF of STAFF and seek for explanations -

^ ^ ^

Comments : This is the first time the NRA, by not allowing in fact the UNOMUR to fullfill its mandate, confirm his intent to disguise movements, which may consist for example on an RPF support from the 2nd Division (10,000 men) located in NIBARARA.


CNR 224 P1/7

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 May 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1526
SUBJECT: Documents received from US Mission

... Please find attached three self-explanatory documents received today from the US Permanent Mission which requested that they be forwarded to you. Regards.



Y- 9-94 MON 11:18

IO OFFICE ADMIN SERVICES

FAX NO. 2028476719

P. 02

SENT BY: FAX NO (255) (61) 887011 5- 5-84 : 15:56 :

AMEMBASSY DAR TZ

2028476719: 2
CNR 224 P2/7

**COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FACILITATOR, THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE OAU AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RPF**

1. ... A delegation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front led by the RPF Chairman, Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE met on 4th May, 1994 in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, with the Representative of the Facilitator to the Arusha Peace Talks, Hon. John S. MALICHIA, Prime Minister and First Vice President of the United Republic of Tanzania and on 3rd May, 1994 with the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity H.E. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim.
2. The RPF Chairman and the Prime Minister and First Vice President of Tanzania as well as the Secretary General of the OAU held exhaustive and frank discussions on the grave situation obtaining in Rwanda and in particular, the continued massacres of civilians and the resumption or non-resumption between the Rwandese Government Forces and those of the RPF.
3. They expressed deep concern over the tragic humanitarian catastrophe prevailing in Rwanda and the suffering of the Rwandese civilian population.
4. The Prime Minister and First Vice President, the OAU Secretary General and the RPF Chairman recalled the tripartite meeting involving the Prime Minister, OAU Secretary General and the Secretary General of the RPF on 24th April, 1994 in Arusha, Tanzania aimed at bringing an end to the hostilities.
5. After the consultations it was agreed that there is an urgent need to end the massacres and to halt all hostilities.
6. At the end of the consultations on 4th May, 1994, the Chairman of the RPF, on behalf of the RPF, undertook and AGREED to the following:

MAY- 9-94 MON 11:19

IO OFFICE ADMIN SERVICES

FAX NO. 2028478719

CNR 224 P3/7 P.03

SENT BY: FAX NO (255) (51) 88701; 5- 6-94 ; 15:57 ; AMENBASSY DAR TZ

2028470810:0 0

2

- a) The RPF re-affirmed its commitment to a ceasefire as already stated in its declaration of 23 April, 1994.
- b) The RPF mandates its field Commanders to negotiate the modalities of a ceasefire with the field Commanders of the Rwanda Government forces.
- c) The RPF, on its part, mandates the UNAMIR Force Commander to convene within seven (7) days, a meeting of the respective Commanders in order to negotiate the modalities for the ceasefire;
- d) The UNAMIR Force, in its present form as reflected in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 912 adopted on 21st April, 1994, shall monitor the said ceasefire which shall come into effect on a date and time to be agreed upon by the Commanders of the two forces;
- e) The OAU and African countries shall contribute to the monitoring and verification of the ceasefire.
- f) The RPF commits itself to respect the ceasefire.

B. International Force

7. On the idea of an International force called for by the UN Security Council, the Chairman of the RPF submitted the position of the RPF as follows:

- 1) The force should play a humanitarian role in terms of escorting humanitarian relief convoys to sites/camps or areas where displaced persons may be present as well as to other areas where the civilian population is in need of humanitarian assistance;

Y- 9-94 MON 11:20

IO OFFICE ADMIN SERVICES

FAX NO. 2028476719

P.04

SENT BY: PAX NO (266) (51) 007011 G- G-04 1 15:59 :

AMEMBASSY DAR TZ

CNR 224 PL/7 2028476719: 4

3

ii) The force should assist in the verification and monitoring of the ceasefire, modalities of which are to be agreed upon by the field Commanders of the two forces.

iii) It shall also assist in the protection of the civilian population.

iv) The composition and terms of reference of the force shall be agreed upon and worked out by the field Commanders of the two forces.

C. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

1. The Chairman of the RPF expressed the need to hold, as soon as possible, negotiations on the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. In this regard, he expressed RPF's position that the massacres would have ended and the ceasefire would be holding in order to hold the said negotiations.

2. The Chairman of the RPF suggested that the venue, date and agenda for such negotiations should be discussed and agreed upon by the field Commanders of the two forces in the course of the negotiations on the modalities for the ceasefire.

3. The Representative of the Facilitator, Hon. John S. Malecela Prime Minister and First Vice President expressed satisfaction at the renewed commitment of the Rwandese Patriotic Front to a ceasefire and to the Arusha Peace Process.

4. He urged the UNAMIR Commander to expedite action with regard to the convening of the meeting of the field Commanders of the two forces.

5. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity for his part took note of the decisions taken by the RPF Chairman which

are likely to contribute to the improvement of the security and humanitarian situation in Rwanda.

6. He reaffirmed the support of the OAU for the Arusha Peace Process as well as the OAU's continued commitment to the restoration of peace in Rwanda.

7. Done at Arusha on 4th May, 1994.

Signed.....
Col. Alexis
Kanyarengwe,
Chairman of the
Rwandese Patriotic
Front

Signed.....
Hon. John S. Malecela
Representative of the
Facilitator

Signed.....
Dr. M.T. Mapuranga
Assistant Secretary
General
(Political)
for the Organization
of African Unity

DECLARATION DE CESSER-LE-FEU

Devant l'urgence et dans le souci majeur de ramener la paix gravement compromise au RWANDA, il a été convenu entre les parties en présence de mettre immédiatement fin aux hostilités.

Par conséquent, un cessez-le-feu sera instauré le dimanche 24 avril 1994 à midi.

L'entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu concerne également toute personne ou groupe d'individus détenteurs d'armes et/ou d'autres moyens d'agression.

De plus, il est demandé aux observateurs des Nations Unies sur place de suivre l'application du cessez-le-feu.

Enfin, les pourparlers entre belligérants débuteront 48 heures après l'instauration du cessez-le-feu, en présence des chefs d'Etat du ZAIRE, de l'UGANDA, du KENYA et de la TANZANIE ou de Leurs Représentants, en un lieu qui sera déterminé de commun accord.

Fait à Gbadolite, le 23 Avril 1994.

POUR LE FRONT PATRIOTIQUE
RWANDAIS (F.P.A.),

1.

2.

POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT RWANDAIS
Par délégué

1. Général de Brigade
GASTON MUKUNDA

2. Colonel NIKIRAZAHO AYOYE

NY- 9-94 MON 11:22

10 OFFICE ADMIN SERVICES

FAX NO. 2026476719

SENT BY FAX NO. (255)

(51) 857011 8- 5-94 1 15:19

AMEMBASSY VAN 167

DATE DEPART 11/11/94

P. 07

A 13:00

AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DAMS

33 1 47 53 49 88 P.03

CNR 224 P7/7

Déclaration de cessez-le-feu.

Devant l'urgence et dans le souci majeur de ramener la paix gravement compromise au RWANDA, il a été convenu entre les parties en présence de mettre immédiatement fin aux hostilités.

Par conséquent, un cessez-le-feu sera instauré le dimanche 8 mai 1994 à minuit.

L'entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu concerne également toute personne ou groupe d'individus détenteurs d'armes et/ou d'autres moyens d'agression.

De plus, il est demandé aux observateurs des Nations Unies sur place de suivre l'application du cessez-le-feu.

Enfin, les pourparlers entre belligérants débuteront 48 heures après l'instauration du cessez-le-feu, en présence des Chefs d'Etat du KATSE, de l'UGANDA, du KENYA et de la TANZANIE, ou de Leurs Représentants, en un lieu qui sera déterminé du commun accord.

Fait à Gbadolite, le 5 mai 1994.

POUR LE FRONT PATRIOTIQUE
RWANDAIS (F.P.R.),

POUR LES FORCES ARMÉES
RWANDAISES,

TITO NTARUKURU *Tito Ntarukuru*
Membre du Bureau
Politique du F.P.R.

JEAN-BOSCO MUTERA *Jean Bosco Mutera*
Membre du Bureau
Politique du F.P.R.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 08 MAY 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR _____
SUBJECT: DRAFT NON-PAPER ON RWANDA - COMMENTS

1. Reference your Code Cable 1505, of 07 May 94 please find attached my comments on the above subject.

2. Thanks and regards.

NOTES/COMMENTS TO
NON-PAPER ON RWANDA
08 MAY 94

1. Herewith are comments on the reference "Non-Document". The "Non-paper" is truly excellent and a most perspicacious presentation of the situation and the needs that will hopefully solve the problem.

2. FC has met on three occasions with RPF Chairman of High Command (Maj Gen P Kagame) and some of the political staffs and on four occasions with the leadership of the RGF (The Chiefs of Staff Army, at least twice, Gendarmerie, Minister of Defence and Minister of Works and Social Affairs who is responsible for Humanitarian dossiers). Their responses vary:

a. RPF. Consistent about force not having an intervention task, nor be so strong as to be able to have such a mandate thrust upon it. In agreement with the Humanitarian security tasks although convinced we are at least three weeks too late. Very specific in stating that our forces must not place themselves in any situation that may obstruct the operational and tactical aims of the RPF, unless we are involved in cease fire mode.

b. RGF. The COS of the Army has noted the overall concept and deployment plan but does not seem to have fully grasped the details of it all. He stated however that no force should come in to impose a cease fire nor to divide the country in two. The option of Humanitarian security assistance tasks behind the lines seemed reasonable to him as he did not have the forces to do it himself unless there was a cease fire. Both ministers were concerned that the Security Council might create a mandate and a force without full consultation/support from the Rwandese. They both, although the meetings were held separately on different days did not feel that such strong security measures were needed as the situation really calmed down; that Kigali was not the reflection of the whole country, that pacification of the militia and self-defence units was on its way. We discussed the fact that their credibility in this area was weak and that even recent incidents did not fully support the statement. The Minister of Social Affairs stressed that they needed aid now and that the troops deployment and new mandate approval process in New York should not, must not slow down nor prevent the immediate distribution of aid.

c. UNAMIR must continue particularly on the RGF side, to sell the mandate and force structure to them, and they to their public, as fast as possible so as to avoid confrontation and serious implementation complications. FC has meetings set up for tomorrow 09 May 94 with COS Army and Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior.

3. The following are specific comments to the " Non- paper":

a. Para 1. We suggest that the last sentence should read "The First Step in bringing the parties back to the Arusha process is to address the humanitarian crisis, and assist in re-establishing a stable and secure environment in the country. This hopefully will ease the tension between the warring factions and possibly lead to a cease fire.

b. Para 2. Paragraph to now read: " At present, the situation in Rwanda has not improved to any significant extent with some massacres still being reported indirectly slaughter with the displacement of nearly 2 million civilians as well as combat between Rwandese Government Forces RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)..Militia and other unruly elements continue to operate although in lesser numbers than at the outbreak of the conflict, killing and ...

c. Para 3 Line 5. It states: "their safety assured on an urgent basis". The word assured is too strong for the task in question. We cannot assure the safety of about 2 million displaced persons. The words "significantly enhanced" would be more appropriate unless we wish to speak of those minorities who are held up in churches etc and are at risk of being massacred, then we can say "assured" as it will be one of our primary tasks anyway.

d. Para 4. Line 1. The word "support" does not reflect the true nature of the mission. The change should read "assist in the provision of security and support to the displaced".....and to "cooperate with the Humanitarian Agencies in the provision of aid".

e. Para 5. b. To read: an agreed cease fire will "most likely" not...

f. Para 5. d. To read the need to "assist in stabilizing the security situation" in Rwanda.....

g. Para 5. e. The threat of imposing Kigali Airport as a neutral zone in the second part of the phase is very much out of character with the rest of the document. The sub-para should read: the mission "will be established... parties. Should consent not be given by both parties the force will consider possible alternate airheads such as Goma Zaire or

Entebbe Uganda".

h. Para 6. Line 1 Should read: would be "to assist in the provision of support".

j. Para 6. b. Line 5 Should read: will be "patrolled and monitored by UNAMIRA in conjunction with authorized security forces".

k. Para 8. d. Line 1 Should read: approx "219 which includes" a supporting ...

l. Para 8. f. Should read: group of "320" officers.

m. Para 9. Phase 2. Last sentence should read: "be deployed in the Kigali Sector and in surrounding Prefectures where the security situation is of greatest concern and where we have the highest concentration of displaced persons".

n. Para 9. Phase 3. Should add: The rest of the support battalion will establish logistic and engineer advance bases in the Ruhengeri, Byumba and Butare Prefectures in order to better serve the field force. The two new battalions will be deployed principally in the Western and Northern portions of the country where in the first case significant security / extremist pockets could spontaneously come back to life and cause serious problems and in the latter case where intensive de-mining and of refugees moving back into Rwanda after over 30 years may be a cause of serious friction due to a lack of living space.

o. Para 11. Line 4. Please add "GABIRO".

p. Para 12 Line 5. Please change Area Commanders to "Sector Commanders".

q. Para 12. Last phase. Please eliminate this phrase as the rear link with UN HQ is already established by our civilian communications branch.

r. Para 15. You may wish to amend this para according to the points raised in para 2 of this cable.

4. May I say once again that FC can achieve the aim with the mandate and the force structure described in this non-paper if, and only if, the force made at his disposal will demonstrate the desire the determination and the courage to implement the clear rules of engagement that have been proposed for these tasks.

5. Lastly the proposed name of the Mission "UNAMIR-A" seems rather cumbersome. Simply UNAMIRA is phonetically most acceptable in the local parlance, and it would stand for "United Nations

UNAMIR

CRN-156 1/15

194 MAY -5 21 09

PAGE 1

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: BARIL FOR ANNAN (ONLY), UNATIONS, NEW YORK
(NO DISTRIBUTION)

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 5 MAY 1994

NUMBER: MIR-907

SUBJECT: PROPOSED FUTURE MANDATE AND FORCE STRUCTURE OF UNAMIR

1. THE ENCLOSED IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION.
2. REGARDS.

① FC
at para 28 - conclusions.
I believe every effort of
ours should be geared to
having a cease fire. The UN should
seek to achieve this. Operating
behind the lines to encourage
the fighting to see a victor
and the vanquished will only
put UN forces in a more serious
danger than we have hitherto
experienced. We shall discuss this
further.

DFC
11/5
DFC/eos.

UNAMIR
194 MAY -5 22 00

2/15

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
Kigali

5 May 94

3000.1(COO)

SUBJECT: UNAMIR - PROPOSED FUTURE MANDATE AND FORCE STRUCTURE

GENERAL

1. One month has passed since fighting broke out in Rwanda. RPF and RGF have unilaterally and separately declared cease-fires but to no tangible avail. Current negotiations in Arusha may provide a cease-fire with some conditions. The intensity of fighting has increased over the last 36 hours particularly in the eastern part of the city.

2. RPF has surrounded Kigali city from North, East and West and is closing in on RGF fortified positions in the city. Very few RGF counter offensives have been conducted and they have met with limited or no measurable success. They rather have essentially taken casualties and withdrawn to their original positions. The bulk of the RGF forces seem tired of the fighting. Some young officers of the RGF have even made statements of desperation such as conducting massacres in refugee camps before they are pushed out of Kigali.

3. There is however a third element or force that has significantly affected the overall situation behind the RGF lines and it has been mixing with the general population. It seems to have its base in the political militia, the youth wings and the local quarter self-defence groups. These groups have demonstrated fanatical and ruthless actions and quite often are under the influence of alcohol and drugs while at the barricades or while roving the streets and hillsides. They have been the principal authors, as far as can be ascertained, of the terrible atrocities and destruction throughout most of the country.

4. Each individual cell seems to have a self appointed leader who does not necessarily obey or take orders from anyone in the normal chain of authority. They are mostly armed with traditional weapons but several carry arms and grenades. They seem to have enough money (mostly looted) to sustain their actions for sometime. Even if a cease fire were brought into effect it may be difficult to control these groups as they tend to either incite and/or coerce the locals to join them.

CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE AND TASKS

5. Strength. During the thick of the battle, it was decided

3/15

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to thin out UNAMIR forces to a workable strength under the modified mandate of 21 Apr 94. Total strength of UNAMIR is at present 449. Present formed troops strength is two and one half companies.

6. Tasks. Our current force structure is based on a very limited self defence capability of UN installations, an armed presence at the airfield, monitoring displaced persons camps, liaison and humanitarian monitoring/assistance tasks. Specifically:

- a. Provide security to all UN installations.
- b. Escort duties to VIPs and convoys.
- c. Provide security to all the displaced persons in UN installations.
- d. Monitor security and humanitarian activities in refugee camps not held by UNAMIR.
- e. Provide some humanitarian assistance to the displaced persons needs.
- f. Coordinate security arrangements of all humanitarian efforts with other organizations.
- g. Continue to pursue cease fire negotiations.
- i. Continue monitoring fighting activities by both sides through the use of UNMOs.
- j. Coordinate the security needs and assist the Humanitarian agencies advance party in its tasks of building the data base and plan of action.

7. Limitations. UNAMIR, under its current structure and mandate, is not capable of countering the civil defence militia actions. UNAMIR cannot take forceful actions that are overtly confrontational in nature as the current self protection capabilities of the Force cannot meet all the essential requirements. Should both the forces agree to a cease-fire, it would be difficult to maintain even a minimum monitoring capability. The possibility of a GREEN LINE type of Buffer Zone could arise and would require a significant increase in force levels.

CURRENT SITUATION IN RWANDA AND ITS FUTURE PEACEKEEPING NEEDS.

8. The whole world is looking forward to a cease-fire, so is UNAMIR in Rwanda. With the cease-fire, we could move into a

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new scenario in Rwanda. Although the ARUSHA ACCORD is still in the background, its validity in a future Rwandese peace process is certainly in jeopardy. RPF has brought the Northern, the Eastern and parts of the Southern portions of Rwanda under its control. The capital is also divided into two. It is quite likely that RPF is not going to give away their military gains. The country is so far militarily divided in two along the battle lines described above which are still fluid because the RPF offensive does not seem to have run its course yet.

9. In the RGF held territory, civil defence militias are unruly, unmanageable and unpredictable as already described. The government and its armed forces seem to have limited to no control over them and although they state they are attempting pacification, they have not really been able to bring these militias under their grasp. Some elements of these militias do seem to move and gain their strength in areas where certain components of the RGF Army are in evidence. The direct links in this regard are not quite clear as yet but we are attempting to grasp their real chain of command.

10. The prospect of a long and arduous round of negotiations to bring about a politically viable peace settlement could lead to underground actions and even anarchy especially in the areas that are still under the control of the RGF. This would continue to create security problems and possible breakdowns of the local essential services. Under these circumstances large and extended humanitarian activities will most likely be difficult at best.

11. The failure of several attempts to reach a cease fire implies that both factions may wish to continue to prosecute the war which may lead to one of the following scenarios:

- a. RGF counter offensive.
- b. RPF capture of the whole country.
- c. RPF halting along an identifiable line.
- d. RPF capturing the whole country and then withdrawing to an identifiable line during negotiations in order to give the impression of having made some concessions.

12. In the first two scenarios, UN could find itself doing more humanitarian activities and monitoring of the situation than peacekeeping. In the last two cases, a foreseeable GREEN LINE will possibly be drawn between the forces, although where it will finally be drawn is still difficult to predict at this

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time. This situation would necessitate monitoring not only of the cease fire line, but also selected points along the borders with the neighbouring countries to check possible inflow of military hardware. This option does reject the spirit of the Arusha Peace Agreement of 04 Aug 93, but in reality it may be difficult to have a unified country after such bitter fighting and massacres.

13. In a situation where the country is potentially partitioned as a result of a war, a number of issues arise that may have to be addressed. Mass migration, revenge killings, continued hostilities between the factions, political stalemate and a continuous decline in economic activities are the major ones.

14. Mass Migration. As a result of the war, there has been a mass movement of displaced persons to safe areas. This is likely to continue leading to the creation of more refugee/displaced persons centres. Their security and upkeep requires a significant involvement by the UN and NGOs (Non-Government Organizations), at least until the threat of massacres decline. Besides the movement of the displaced persons, others may return to their former places of residence where they may be having their immovable properties as soon as there is a cease fire. This may require the presence of UN troops in the various important towns and cities to provide monitoring and assistance in the reestablishment of law and order.

15. Revenge Killings. Revenge killings for atrocities committed by one party or the other, could occur even during the cease fire period. The presence of the militia and elements of the Presidential Guard still poses significant threats to peace and security. Even though, in the long term, this would abate with a political settlement, in the interim, it is imperative to operate a UN-base security measure to prevent such actions. Hence, the presence of UN troops is required for this purpose. Large quantities of arms that have gone into the wrong hands or irresponsible members of the public must be retrieved under local authorities and UN arrangements. This could be achieved by the establishment of check points, road blocks and urban/town patrolling and searches as examples.

16. Continued Hostilities Underground. A continuation of the hostilities could occur in the form of sabotage activities and small scale guerilla operations conducted by hard core extremists of the losing side of the war. This would require the monitoring of the military as well as policing of important towns and cities along the cease fire line.

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17. Economic Decline. Obviously, this battered and already poor country will continue to see a decline in its economy due to the breakdown of its infrastructure, which is generally built on regional inter-dependence. A UN presence, however, could improve the situation and encourage normal economic activities including the transfer of goods and services from one region to another. In particular, the airport which provides external link and therefore an asset for economic activities, must be secured and should be considered as a neutral ground and out of the hands of both parties. Hence, it would be under the control of the UN troops to facilitate resupply of troops and inflow of humanitarian goods, in view of the enormous humanitarian assistance tasks that lie ahead.

FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE AND TASKS

18. UNAMIR does not require a Chapter 7 level mandate in order to conduct its possible future tasks in Rwanda. It does however need the maximum of latitude in interpretation of elements of Chapter 6 regarding the potential use of force. The overriding criteria in that regard is the crimes against humanity aspect. Persons or groups who would interpose themselves between needy/displaced/dying persons and essential survival food/medical convoys are in our estimation directly contributing to the latter demise and as such should be handled in a forceful manner under the auspices of chapter 6.

19. Concept of Operations. A cease-fire may not be agreed to by both parties in the near future but Rwandese basic needs to survive require immediate massive humanitarian assistance as a first and foremost priority. In order to perform humanitarian tasks in a reasonable secure environment, that is not in evidence at this time, the force structure should be designed in such a way that it has the following operational capabilities:

- a. A force structure for security and support of humanitarian activities.
- b. The formed troops need to face Militia and/or local civil defense forces and conduct deterrent operations such as arms seizure and recovery.
- c. Maintain adequate logistic support for its sustainability.

20. The general concept of operation proposes to divide the entire country into seven Zones based on the following factors:

- a. Prefecture administrative boundaries.

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- b. Displaced people and refugee camps.
- c. Built-up areas.
- d. Lines of communication.

21. Each zone is to have a formed troop and UNMO/CIVPOL monitoring capability. The zones may be divided into sub-zones and the number of sub-zones would again depend on the factors already discussed. Furthermore, the Uganda border activities continue to be monitored by UNOMUR located at Kabale. The requirement of monitoring the border areas of ZAIRE, BURUNDI and TANZANIA with UNMOs based in Rwanda with the task of verifying the possible entry of arms and war material into the country.

22. Lastly in order to conduct assistance and support the investigations of war and civil crimes and to assist in the restoration of law and order situations in Rwanda, at least 90 Civilian Police will be needed. They would operate jointly with local authorities and the force elements in each zone. It is imperative that the CIVPOL be placed directly under command of the Force Commander in order to ensure intimate coordination and assignment of tasks and effort particularly during the initial phase of the security effort.

23. Force Requirement. To meet the needs explained above a reasonably capable force, strong and self-protected, self sufficient and highly mobile in all respects is needed to operate efficiently throughout this rather large operational area. We thus propose two possible force structure options. A full and effective force of approximately 8,000 troops (eight infantry battalions) or a minimum viable force in the order of 5,500 (five infantry battalions).

24. Full and Effective Force. The composition of this force of eight infantry battalions out of which four would be mechanized with support elements is described at Annex A. The battalions would be operationally deployed as follows:

- a. Zone 1. Comprises of CYANGUGU, GIKONGORO and BUTARE prefectures. Zone HQ will be located at BUTARE. The area is presently under the control of RGF. BUTARE will also be used as a Logistic Base. The area can be used for dumping of relief material coming from BURUNDI.
- b. Zone 2. Comprises of KIBUYE and GITARAMA prefectures. Zone HQ will be located at GITARAMA. Bulk of the area is presently under the control of RGF.

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bulk of zones now?

- c. Zone 3. Comprises of GISENYI and RUHENGARI prefectures. Zone HQ would be located at RUHENGARI. Bulk of the area is held by RGF but fighting is still going on in RUHENGARI area where RPF launched an offensive to capture RUHENGARI.
- d. Zone 4. Comprises of BYUMBA prefecture. Zone HQ to be located at BYUMBA. One of the sub-zone HQ would be located at GABIRO which has an airfield and is located on the main road between Uganda and Rwanda. GABIRO would also be one of the Logistic Bases for the force and the humanitarian aid coming into Rwanda. The area is presently under the control of RPF. Tutsis from the south have migrated to this area and taken shelters under the umbrella of RPF. Thousands of displaced persons are now presently staying here.
- e. Zone 5. Comprises of KIGALI prefecture. Bn HQ would be located at BUGESERA. This area is mostly dominated by RPF. Major atrocities have taken place in this area.
- f. Zone 6. This is the KIGALI City area. One mech and one motorized battalion will be deployed in the area. Mech bn will carry out escort duties and also be the force reserve. The city is surrounded by RPF and they have taken over some parts of it. Rests are held by RGF.
- g. Zone 7. Comprises of KIBUNGO prefecture. Zone HQ will be located at KIBUNGO. The area is under RPF control. About two hundred thousand displaced persons have concentrated in this area (mostly Hutus) to cross over to TANZANIA.
- h. Force Support Bn. To maintain the above force a Force Support Bn will be needed. Engineer Coy, should be capable of undertaking following tasks:
 - (1) Demining.
 - (2) Bomb disposal.
 - (3) Road Repair.
 - (4) Bridge Repair.
 - (5) Infrastructure Enhancement.
- i. Helicopter Squadron. It will consist of two

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flights. These are:

- (1) A UTTH troop/Support Flight - Min 1/2 coy lift at a time possibly based on 8 x Bell 212 type helos. MedEvac and logistic support also needed. Night vision capability recommended.
- (2) Recce/Armed Flight - Up to 8 x Light helicopters with light armament capability but capable of night vision operations.
- j. MILOB. An observer group of approx 300 officers will be required to conduct the humanitarian security monitoring and to provide liaison and escort duties throughout the country and also along the border areas. They will be structured by zone team bases established and co-located with the formed troops.
- k. A Force HQ with its military signals/communication sqn to be built around the nucleus of the present HQ, should continue to operate in KIGALI to exercise command over the new force. A military police force of a small company for internal force security is also needed.
- l. CIVPOL. A force of 90 UNCIVPOL divided between the Kigali area and the zones in a similar fashion as the MILOBs but dedicated to integrating their monitoring efforts into the local authority capability.

25. Minimum Viable Force. To perform the above stated tasks, UNAMIR needs an absolute minimum of five infantry battalions out of which three must be mechanized. This force would have significant capability limitations in relation to the full and effective force option. The infantry battalions will be more stretched as some of the zones have been grouped into larger sectors. The reduced effectiveness of the formed troops will have a negative impact on the stabilizing presence of the force as it will be certainly less in evidence. The number of convoy escorts, safe refugee areas and deterrent operations will be reduced by nearly half of those potentially conducted by the full and effective force. The detailed structure is at Anx B.

- a. Sector 1. Comprises of CYANGUGU, GIKONGO and BUTARE prefectures. Sector HQ will be located at BUTARE. BUTARE will also be used as a Logistic Base. Materials coming from BURUNDI can be dumped here. A motorized bn will be needed for this sector. The

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area is presently under the control of RGF.

- b. Sector 2. Comprises of GISENYI, KIBUYE and GITARAMA prefectures. Sector HQ will be located at GITARAMA. One mechanized bn will be needed for this sector. The area is under the control of RGF.
- c. Sector 3. Comprises of RUHENGERI and BYUMBA prefectures. Sector HQ will be at BYUMBA. One motorized bn will be responsible for this Sector. Except for a portion of RUHENGERI, the rest of the area is under the control of RPF. GABIRO will be one of the logistic bases.
- d. Sector 4. Comprises of KIGALI and KIBUNGO prefectures. Sector HQ will be at RWAMAGANA. One mechanized bn will be needed for this Sector. Most of the area is controlled by RPF.
- e. Sector 5. It is the KIGALI CITY area. A minimum of one mechanized battalion will be deployed in the area. Mech bn will carry out escort duties, protect UN Installations and also be the Force reserve.
- f. Force Support Bn and Other Elements. The force structure of this unit has been reduced or maintained from/at the full and effective level according to demands and tasks.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE AND TASKS

26. The deployment of Force would be conducted in three phases as described below. An overriding factor in the deployment and sustainment of the Force is the guaranteed availability of the Kigali airport for the Mission. This essential infrastructure must be confirmed as a Neutral Territory under UN control and affirmed as a basic criteria for any new mandate. Both parties, who have already publicly expressed the desire to have inputs into the composition and deployment of the force, must also agree to the sanctity of the airport for UN and humanitarian traffic only, at least until a cease fire is approved and implemented.

- a. Phase 1. Ghana Bn is brought to its full strength of 800 personnel and equipped with 50 X M113 APCs. This is the preferred vehicle because of overwhelming impact of such a tracked vehicle, due to the ease of maintenance and driver training, the availability of spare parts and its general reliability. This unit would ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport and the Amahoro complex, and be the Force reserve.

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- b. Phase 2. Inducting two mechanized bns based on 50 X M113 each and some advance elements of the support battalion and all of the Force HQ and signal sqn into operational area within 7-14 days from D Day (Decision Day of Security Council). These shock troops will be deployed with vigour in order to establish the credibility and seriousness of the mandate in the Kigali Secure Area. These units will conduct the immediate convoys and be responsible for the distribution centre security and launch deterrent operations with the local authorities.
- c. Phase 3. Inducting the rest of Force Support Bn and the other infantry battalions. Bns should be effective in Rwanda within one month from D Day. They will be tasked to secure the other sectors of the country.

27. Potential Tasks. Tasks of UNAMIR Force can be divided into three. These are:

- a. Humanitarian Assistance Tasks.
 - (1) Establish safe haven type areas.
 - (2) Provide security for persons in danger.
 - (3) Security and monitoring of aid distribution chain.
 - (4) Arrangements for exchange of refugees and provide vehicles, escorts and liaison for this task.
 - (5) Assist in the relocation and support of refugees/displaced persons and affected areas.
 - (6) Dispose un-exploded bombs and breech mine fields.
 - (7) Take up repair works within capability.
 - (8) Provide medical assistance where possible.
- b. Security Tasks
 - (1) Convoy escorts.
 - (2) Disarming unauthorized population in support of local authorities.

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- (3) Secure displaced persons camp and Refugee Camps.
- (4) Secure transfer of people between warring areas/zones.
- (5) Control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc).
- (6) Violation investigation.
- (7) Deterrent/offensive operations against extremist groups.
- (8) Assist RPF/RGF in reestablishing law and order within their respective areas.

c. Cease Fire and Peace Accord.

- (1) Continue to mediate between two factions.
- (2) Pursue all communications/initiatives (bilateral or other) in order to support the evolving cease fire and possible peace process.

CONCLUSION

28. The new draft mandate for UNAMIR, when passed, will serve as a basis for continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda. Presently the military situation seems to suggest a partition of the country as a most likely outcome of the war. The concept of the operation may therefore be viewed in three stages. First and foremost is the immediate humanitarian assistance and security tasks throughout the country. Secondly and hopefully in parallel and supported by the positive effects of the first stage, the negotiated and subsequent implementation of a cease fire. Lastly, the establishment of a secure environment of the peace negotiations and implementation process.

29. Effective, immediate and credible participation of UNAMIR forces would call for an enlargement of the Force with the current structure forming its nucleus. The presence of the enlarged force with the muscle and the credibility will definitely serve as a deterrent to the civil defence militia illegal actions, will provide a viable presence for cease fire discussions and rapid implementation, will demonstrate determination in coming to grips with the terrible humanitarian problem and will provide a stable reference for all future discussions towards peace. The deployment of such a force must be conducted in the fastest time possible and

Why not a Cease-fire?
It seems to me that this priority is not right.
We should insist on getting a cease fire and not placing a cease fire second.
It must go along with demand for cease fire.

Do we want nearly to encourage them to keep on fighting so that we carry out humanitarian tasks behind their lines and wait to see a winner.

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
certainly no later than 14 days after the Security Council's decision for the immediate force of three battalions and the rest of the force in the next two weeks. However, the Kigali airport Neutral Territory criteria must be integrated into the mandate conditions of deployment. Both the RPF and RGF Chiefs of Staff have had discussions with the Force Commander on the concept of operations and the general deployment plan. They provided initial comment and agreement in principal on the broad outline and on the proposed tasks.


R.A. DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

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PROPOSED UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN SECURITY FORCE


FULL AND EFFECTIVE FORCE STR-8120



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PROPOSED UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN SECURITY FORCE

MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE STR-5526



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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DATIAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 3 May 1994
NUMBER: 1411

As previously agreed, please find attached Ould Abdallah's Sitrep No. 030/94 which includes the breakdown of OAU military observers now in Burundi (we have requested clarification of figures). He also has informed us that he will be awaiting the announced team on a 24 hours advance notice, and we have asked him to specify date.

Best regards.

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OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 3.5.94

Ref BU/SRSG/0172

TO: MR. MARRACK GOULDING USG/DPA - UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH RSEG - BUJUMBURA <i>AAA</i>
FAX No: 1-212-963-50 65	FAX No: (257) 21 28 68 (office) (071) 151 33 62 (Inmarsat) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 22 52 22 (hotel) (071) 151 33 61 (Inmarsat, after 5pm GMT)
ATTN:	CC: MR. K. ANNAN and MR. H. KITANNI
SUBJECT: SITREP No 030/94	No OF PAGES: 1

1. Situation continues to be calm in the capital and throughout the country. Northern neighbourhoods are quiet and normal life is resuming (buses circulate and shops are opened). Last night a few barricades were erected in Kamengé before being put down by army. Shots (handguns) were also heard but nothing reminiscent of previous weeks. Two, may be three armed members of activist groups presumably coming from Kamengé were caught yesterday and early today north of Bujumbura. Those arrested (about 30) during army intervention in Kamengé last Friday are still interrogated by security forces. Due to persistent chaos in Rwanda - 27 days after death of the two Presidents - tension remains perceptible in Burundi as most people are following news of killings and refugees plight up north.
2. If situation continues to be calm, public attention should however quickly focus on presidential successor. Would Constitutional Court decision (18.4.94) rejecting amendment of art. 45 of the Constitution be interpreted differently by Government? Would Government, through its majority in the Parliament introduce a new amendment? This approach seems wise to us. A third approach is suggested by Tutsi parties: political leaders of legalized parties meet to select a candidate, a Hutu from FRODEBU (leading party in the House). This candidate of consensus then takes oath before Parliament and Constitutional Court which registers the oath. The inconvenience of this proposal is that it has no legal basis, therefore the President will be prisoner of political parties and instability at state summit will continue. Political partners seem to agree on one thing: general elections are out of question.
3. A total of 19 officers arrived this week-end here in the framework of MIOB (former MIPROBU), OAU Observer Mission to Burundi. Those officers, coming from Burkina, Mali and Niger, are joining others already in town. Number of MIOB officers now present in Burundi is: Burkina (10), Mali (10), Niger (5), Tunisian (5 including Commander of the military component). Total number of officers expected is still as indicated in earlier SITREPS: 47. Our mission advisor is liaising with them.

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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UNAMIR

CNR 193 P 1/2

94 MAY -4 04 14

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DATE: 3 May 1994
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OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 3.5.94

Ref BU/SRSG/0172

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A. Ould Abdallah 3 May 1994

AOA/