



UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title

Page

5

Date

30/05/2006

Time

9:35:49 AM



S-0871-0001-05-00001

Expanded Number **S-0871-0001-05-00001**

Title **Items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Vietnam - Vietnam-USA -
former members of government**

Date Created **01/11/1965**

Record Type **Archival Item**

Container **S-0871-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Viet-Nam**

Print Name of Person Submit Image

Signature of Person Submit



*For your information,
with the compliments of
Madame Ngô - Dinh - Nhu*



*Pour votre information,
avec les compliments de
Madame Ngô - Dinh - Nhu*

d
29/11

FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND FOR RELEASE

INTERVIEW OF MADAME NGO-LINH-NHU
TO GENE GREGORY, CHIEF-EDITOR OF THE "WEEKLY TRIBUNE" OF GENEVA
(SWITZERLAND)
November 1, 1965

QUESTION : Madame Ngô, I have been reading such strange things in the press about you recently - things which I know not to be true - I have read, for example, that Mrs. Gregory is ghosting your memoirs and that you go to Roman parties nearly every night. I am wondering what has inspired the breaking of the conspiracy of silence against you in the press with this flurry of fictitious stories.

ANSWER :

I do not think that such fictitious stories mean that the conspiracy of silence against me has really been broken. It would rather mean that some have felt it necessary to explain how uninteresting indeed to speak of someone incapable of doing anything by herself, while capable of enjoying herself in the most frivolous of ways, in spite of all the sufferings of her country and her people.

Politically, it might mean that some still fear my influence in Vietnam as well as with the increasing number of those who remember I was the only one to have warned so loudly and in time that anyone who would take seriously the so-called "buddhist affair" in Vietnam - the communist inspired and American financed alibi for the plot against the Ngô-Linh-Diệm Government - would be exposed to ridicule and catastrophe.

It is strange, after all, that there could be anyone in the world to bow to those who, in the name of a most pharisaic "compassion", dared, with hypocritical pity and cynical praise, fool and incite the maniacs and the naive to burn themselves to death for imaginary grievances, while they threw stones at those who denounced their criminal incitements. I wonder if the countries, which screamed the most at me, will ever see fit to overthrow by force their elected leaders, because they will experience the same kind of protest burnings, even though such manifestations would not be a result of foreign incitements like in Vietnam, but only of deep and sincere anguish for real grievances.

QUESTION : It has become increasingly apparent to those who are following the war in Vietnam that the U.S. policy which brought about the overthrow of the government of President Ngô-Dinh-Diệm was the principal error which necessitated the present escalation. Some would explain the error as one of calculation, a mistaken judgment - but nonetheless an honest error. This is obviously a question to which you must have given considerable thought. What do you consider to be the explanation for the error ?

ANSWER :

Every time I attribute to U.S. policy some kind of intelligence, that is to say specific aims, I am accused of rash judgment. It would seem that to defend the U.S. attitude, in Vietnam, as elsewhere, one can only claim "immaturity, pretension and naivety, all in good faith". But I do not believe the policy which overthrew the constitutional government of Vietnam was a matter of "stupidity in good faith". It seems rather to have been the consequences of a policy deep-rooted in current American strategic thinking.

.....

QUESTION: How would you define that policy?

ANSWER:

It is like that of the Communists, a policy which seeks to maximize world influence. Everyone must recognize that such a struggle for world influence exists.

While the Communists are motivated in their quest for influence by ideological considerations, which makes them believe that all means to obtain their objectives are good, American policy appears to be influenced by considerations of "self-preservation" more than by anything else. But that policy, in practice, seeks the same objective - a world in which maximum advantages accrue to the particular national power in question, in this case the United States. The motivation and the means of obtaining the objective may differ, but the objective remains essentially the same for both sides.

QUESTION: Assuming that a world which is safe for the United States, one in which maximum American influence is the fundamental objective of American policy, what appear to you to be the principal characteristics of that policy?

ANSWER:

The answer to your question lies at once in the character of modern warfare and in the division of opinion in the United States on how best to defend American interests in the present world struggle for influence.

There are three generally recognized forms of warfare: subversive, conventional and nuclear.

In subversive warfare, the Communists maintain the initiative with ideology supported by total use of instruments of subversion - agitation, propaganda and unrestricted but well-directed terror. They seek to avoid conventional and nuclear warfare, merely because they are convinced of their superiority in subversive warfare.

In the United States, those sincere and patriotic liberals - I do not speak of the crypto-communists or pro-communists who masquerade as "liberals" - seem to have found their answer to communist subversive warfare in "democratisation" and...corruption. They believe, for example, that, with the slogan of "democratisation", they can compete with the communists in their slogan of "liberation", and that with money they can tempt the people much more easily than can the promises of a fallacious ideology.

This thesis is based upon the belief that a certain brand of "democracy" is the superior weapon of subversive warfare, a form of warfare in which the United States, according to American liberals, should not feel any complex of inferiority, since corruption can compete effectively with ideology and terror. This thesis is based, also, upon the belief that so-called democracy supported by foreign aid is the best way for the wealthier power to maximize world influence.

But, such a "democracy" is worthless, since it is a kind which must be imposed upon others. And since this denies independence to such "democratic" nations, it cannot fulfill their national aspirations.

.

Indeed, the policy of "corruption", often hidden under the label of "American Aid", entails a degree of American intervention in the internal affairs of the country receiving aid, which ultimately negates true popular sovereignty and the essential quality of national integrity for the governments it supports.

Such a policy must fail. Money to support a good cause based on a good program can work miracles, but money which perverts the very democracy which is advocated and destroys the integrity of nations, shall never create influence which is after all the ultimate objective in the present world struggle. And alas it is the unfortunate destiny of Vietnam to pay dearly as the proof of that truth.

The very fact that the liberals of the U.S. consider corruption in a kind of "democratisation" imposed by them on the less-developed countries, evidences an absence of morality in their political concepts. The fact that they appear not to care so much for military bases in or legal sovereignty over those countries, does not therefore posit the absence of "imperialism" in their policies, but rather that they prefer to avoid the hardships of conventional warfare and to rely on the threat of nuclear warfare in the event they are defeated in subversive warfare and cannot go to negotiations on their terms. That this policy of nuclear threat is not mere supposition is proven by the missiles affair of Cuba, in 1962.

This explains why the communists and the liberals of the United States allied themselves to overthrow the constitutional government of President Ngô-Đình-Diệm. That government had found, with their Nhân-Vi (respect for human dignity, or humanism) doctrine, based on the strategic hamlets, an effective means of combating communism which assured a true democratic life without turning the country into a prostituted "democracy" in the hands of the U.S.A. or a battlefield for subversive warfare between the communists and the United States.

This explains also why the Nhân-Vi doctrine which only needs to be viewed honestly by the world, is strangled by a world conspiracy of silence when it is not of distortions, even when, contrary to the materialistic ideologies it opposes, it has never used material force or deceit to spread its influence.

This also explains why the direct confrontation between the communists and the United States which followed the overthrow of President Ngô-Đình-Diệm resulted in the defeat of the United States in subversive warfare, forcing the United States to escalate the war, rather than letting the Vietnamese nationalists who are perfectly capable of coping with the communists in subversive warfare, to return to power.

It explains too why in that escalation, it is now those who believe in conventional wars who are taking over in the U.S.

If it succeeds, the United States will try to impose the kind of "democracy" it wants for all countries on which it wishes to keep its "influence". But then, subversive war with the communists will again burst out and drag on, because the only ones who can put an end to it, by taking side for one or the other, are the nationalists. And they will not do it as long as they are not assured that it is worthwhile. Why should they if only to become the tools of one or the other? And it will be so as long as the world does not understand that to put an end to colonialism has no meaning if imperialism, either Communist or from the West, is not also denounced and effectively restrained.

So either it succeeds or fails in this conventional war, and if the U.S. is sincere when it speaks so loudly of Peace, it must finally let the Vietnamese nationalists take over, giving substance to their assurances that the U.S. is fighting to defend the independence and

freedom of Vietnam. Otherwise it must bear with the communists, the responsibility of an endless subversive war, and the risk of an all-out world conflagration in which the temptation of a nuclear solution will always be present.

Presently, those Americans who sponsored the November 1963 coup d'etat are trying to liquidate all the leading nationalists, in order to prevent their return to power. For them this would be an unbearable shame for the United States which went to the point of allying itself with the communists to crush them. The communists try to do the same, for they know that with the return of the Vietnamese nationalists, they will be defeated in the only warfare in which they believe they have some superiority, subversive warfare. Neither seems to realize that, by thus doing they are only exposing themselves to endless subversive war and exposing the world to all-out war.

So you see why I do not believe in "error in good faith", but rather in a precise and determined policy from Washington, which began in 1960, with the first attempt to overthrow President Ngô-Đinh-Diệm in an unsuccessful military putsch on 11 November 1960. All Vietnam believe that putsch was tacitly supported by Washington - if indeed we may call it "tacit", in spite of the public presence of Americans in the ranks of the rebels, during the attempted putsch, combined with an official declaration from Washington putting on the same level the rebels and the constitutional government of Vietnam as just "two anti-communist parties in presence".

The American policy decision to get rid of a government truly independent and nationalist, though effectively anti-communist, can only be explained by communist infiltration in the most important policy positions of the American administration, or the determination of the American governments (both Republican and Democratic) to confront communism on their own terms.

If it is the former, it may be explained by the fact that the pro-communists in the United States administration think that the time is ripe to strike at all anti-communist allies of the United States, the more so if they are effective, the more so if they are truly representative of their people. Their aim would be to strike at American prestige, to raise doubt, mistrust, hatred against the U.S. and thus isolate it for the time it would itself be submitted to subversive warfare on its own territory. But even in that pro-communist tactic, one would feel a policy which seems to use Washington not only to strike at all honest anti-communists but also to all dogmatic communists, as if Moscow has not found anything better than to use Washington to threaten if not to blackmail, or even perhaps, for example, to get rid of those who might embarrass it with sudden "retour d'alliance", when it decides to give the last punch to the U.S. Anything which seems to depart from this policy might then be tricks to screen it, and might well be again dangerous miscalculations.

If it is the latter reason, the U.S. attitude may be explained by the fact that after assessment of the force in presence, - thanks to the successful U2 spying program, as it is believed - the American administrations, both Republican and Democratic, are determined, with no concern or respect for their allies and their legitimate aspirations, to choose a battlefield and confront the communists either in subversive warfare with corruption as the means, or in any other kind of escalation, should they meet defeat on the subversive ground.

Presently, while seeming to seek negotiations in a way that the United States does not hesitate to present as most "humble", it gives the distinct impression that it is rather seeking, with Vietnam as bait and spring-board, every pretext to bomb China. In a conventional

confrontation which seeks to avoid nuclear threat, China must become naturally the first target, but all the world problems will surely not disappear with the blowing up of China, while in truth they lie in the very fact that the U.S., like the Communists, dogmatic or not, have nothing worthwhile to offer the world.

But whatever the United States may do now, it will do alone, with a few fellow travelers helping reluctantly and the rest of the world watching as spectators, and not always such sympathetic ones. The world, indeed, cares for no settlement of accounts, but is now critical of the U.S. for all the trouble in Vietnam, for if it remembers all the howling against the constitutional government of Vietnam whose overthrow seemed to be wished by all, but whose disappearance has only provoked the present world tension, naturally it considers the U.S. as mainly responsible for having "so obviously misinformed world opinion." This is most ironical now when one remembers that the U.S. could not present a single pretext for having stabbed an ally at war against a common enemy, except that "being a democracy based on the respect of opinion, it had to bow to it."

QUESTION: The second facet of the liberal policy to cope with subversive warfare you have called "corruption", and which you equate with U.S. financial aid. This is a rather harsh term which Americans who consider their foreign aid program as an act of civic minded generosity will find difficult to accept.

ANSWER:

I am sure that it will shock many Americans. But this is the sad reality which confronts countries who have received - out of necessity born of aggression from without - American Aid and is one explanation for countries who enjoy peace refusing it.

It may appear natural to some to insist that any country which accepts American Aid must accept American advice and American presence. But what may look natural, at first, proves to be full of dangerous pitfalls as the Vietnam case is a proof. And the Americans more than anyone else should understand that situation, since in the United States itself, individual states find it normal to protect their rights against federal encroachment, which most frequently is the result of federal aid to the states.

This same problem arises, but in much stronger dimensions, with newly independent countries. Abusive conditions of assistance all too often entail the negation of independence which has been regained at so great a cost and so long a struggle.

One of the added dimensions of this problem is supplied by such facts as the increase in American Aid to a given country all too often also entails a proportionate increase of king-making activities, under the cover of the American Aid programs themselves.

Those activities necessitate coup d'etats to eliminate governments which, for one reason or another, are objectionable to policy-makers in Washington or to those who are administering such policy in countries like Vietnam. Those activities have become an essential part of the U.S. response to subversive war. Just as has the large scale bribery in a multitude of forms, often in ways which seem innocent enough to Americans themselves, such as with good salaries, awards, travel and various types of retainers - but also as outright payments of substantial sums of money.

In short, this policy is predicated on the conviction that the United States can buy allies, supporters and friends (who are often regarded as puppets by others), if only they serve the general objectives.

of opposing communism.

The results are disastrous. The true nationalists in these countries, forced constantly to accept dubious elements in the key posts of the nation, under American insistence for "broadening the participation of popular elements in the common struggle" are ultimately pushed into opposition to the U.S., and more often than not into alliance with the communists. The pretext for a communist war of National Liberation is thus established. Then, more often than not, the U.S. finds that those they have bought are unreliable and incompetent, which detracts from the success of their policy. And because in the process, nationalist political organization is destroyed or alienated, the U.S. finds the only organized force which will suit their purposes is the most undemocratic of all - a military dictatorship.

QUESTION: But this support of a military dictatorship is certainly contradictory to the liberal policy of democratisation as a defense against communism.

ANSWER:

Yes, it is, but in every case this means that the "liberal" policy of the U.S.A. has failed, yielding eventually to the conservatives who believe in the American superiority in conventional war and do not hesitate, therefore, to transform subversive war into conventional war. Conventional warfare demands large local armies, which enhances the importance and power of the military. So a military dictatorship is convenient, if not a logical outgrowth of this policy.

Internationally, however, military dictatorships generate little support and tend to discredit American policy. The escalation of subversive wars to conventional wars produces the same reaction. The results of this policy fit the pattern apparent today in Vietnam, the isolation of the United States.

I think the policy of the Conservatives in the U.S. is also based on a false premise. In appearance, they seem to approve any government which can maintain stability in the face of the communist threat. This is fine when it happens to be a government truly representative of the people, a government acting in the interests of the people. But when it is not this, their policy loses its value also, because an iron hand of police control is not enough to lead a people to a better life than the communists provide.

The liberals of the U.S. claimed the Ngo Dinh Diem government was such a police state. Being guided in this by an unhealthy purpose, it is therefore normal that they should commit errors which finally show the "liberal" policy of the U.S. for what it is, while depriving the American "liberals" of a Vietnamese alliance many found ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ too honorable for such a policy. In any case, they have failed so completely in their policy that now they have to turn to their opponents, the conservatives to save them from what they have done.

QUESTION: Do you believe the U.S. can gain a military victory over the Vietcong with the present escalation?

ANSWER:

Even if it can, then what? Will it mobilize divisions and divisions of its own army outside the U.S., in order to maintain such precarious military victories? How can it be when subversive war will

be on its own territory? When the communists see that each time the U.S. is defeated in subversive war it jumps into conventional war to the point that genocide becomes a common practice; they will feel forced even sooner than intended, to wage subversive war against the U.S. on its own territory. There, at least, conventional war will not be so easy, so they believe.

As for Vietnam, the isolation of the United States internationally, and the inability to find now a stable and respectable government "Made in USA" for Vietnam, do not augur well for an ultimate American victory in Vietnam, and surely not in the way the U.S. hopes, which I have just defined for you. On the other hand, we should never wish that kind of an American victory, for it would surely lead to the third world war.

Out of pretension, the U.S. has committed error on error, crime on crime in Vietnam. It has aroused such hatred on all sides that only its shame in Vietnam, or its willing humility and sincere love towards its victims can appease somehow. And I do not call it "humility and love" when, after helping to murder the patriots of Vietnam in treachery and after destroying the whole country with tons of bombs, the Americans reconstruct it, and that only to keep it dependent on them through their puppets, as a military base when not as another Asian brothel for the U.S. empire.

No one, and not God himself, would bear that a power in the world dare play the Almighty on such a moral basis. And if God will not do justice quickly, man will try to do it by himself, which is much more dangerous and harmful for all. Or other nations will just try to compete with the U.S. on the same moral basis. Either one way or the other, this will lead to the third world war.

QUESTION: But what then is the solution in Vietnam? It is generally accepted now that a succession of errors has only worsened the situation. There are those who see no hope of a solution which includes a free Vietnam. Is there one?

ANSWER:

It becomes more apparent all the time that without legality, nothing can be done. Indeed, from a world so relaxed that its main problem, at that time, seemed to be "how to make happy a few maniacs who burn themselves because they are unhappy with the Ngo Dinh Diem government", world tension has come, as a start, because of the overthrow of the legal government in Vietnam. So, the only logical solution is FIRST to return to the previous situation for Vietnam, that is to say, to legality, to the Constitution: besides, it is the only solution that remains which can rally the Vietnamese nationalists.

The National Assembly which has been elected by universal suffrage just before the bloody overthrow of the Constitutional Government of Vietnam in 1963 must be called to take the necessary measures, within the context of the Constitution, to form a government, to call for election, in short to cope with the drawn-out crisis and see the nation through this period of danger. They are the elected representatives of the people and the only ones who can establish the legality and independence which will bring meaning to the life of the nation.

Refusal of that constitutional solution by the U.S. means that the U.S. prefers to be the lords of an American war rather than the allies of a Vietnamese peace. Refusal of that solution, from a

.

Vietnamese is to unmask himself as the chattel of the imperialists, communist or otherwise. Refusal of this solution from any other would be incomprehensible to me, since what Vietnam needs to succeed is only this: first, a moral basis which is legality supported by a worthy national doctrine, then the kind of psychological and material support which the Communist regime of North Vietnam receives from the Communist world. That is all Vietnam asks from the Free World. With that, we can apply the Vietnamese program with which we were winning the war in 1963 - and it is the only one which can be called a solution. Above all, it is our own Vietnamese solution, it guarantees our independence, and it has proven itself.

The U.S. may believe that the Vietnamese do not care for any national solution and would be satisfied with just some sort of freedom and food. It might be true, if the Vietnamese were just illiterate and prehistorical tribesmen from the jungle and not what they are in fact, people with strong nationalist pride and a long history of fierce struggle for independence. That national spirit is proven, among many other accomplishments, by the heroic resistance to Chinese invasion, from the Trung Sisters in the first century of our era (43 A.D.) and by the victory of Tran Hung Dao over Kublai Khan in the 14th century, as well as by the Dien Bien Phu victory over colonialism.

The communists have tried to claim this last victory as theirs, but this is doubtful. Indeed, if the Vietnamese fought so well and won in Dien Bien Phu, it was surely not for the triumph of communism, but only for the national goal of "Independence and Respect for Human Dignity." That national spirit is the more exalted now by recent long years of sacrifice and struggle for that national goal and ten years of true independence and dignity gained under inspiring national leadership.

How revealing therefore of the total lack of understanding of our country when one hears the official representative of the U.S. in Vietnam, saying to the U.S. press: "These people (of Vietnam) have always had a strong sense of people-hood. What we are now trying to give them is a strong sense of nation-hood."

Strange Santaclausaphrenia!

Is it not, indeed, for having minimized, if not ignored that "strong sense of nationhood" of the Vietnamese people that the world in general and the U.S. in particular, have had to face such a tragic surprise in Vietnam? And the U.S. is "now trying to give" us "a strong sense of nationhood"! Which one? one wonders, since ours has been trampled upon with so much pretentious ignorance!

But whether they recognize this Vietnamese fact or not, - our "strong sense of nationhood", - the communists and the U.S. seem convinced that they can go through with their intentions, thanks to one of these tricks which both are doing their best to achieve.

In truth, I do not even wish to mention negotiations, though I am not at all against them, for it would be the end of all if the communists are allowed to face in a so-called "world conference", only their own puppets disguised as "Liberation front" or "Buddhist majority", to discuss the best way to deliver Vietnam to them. It would not be better for us if, facing the communists, Vietnam is represented by U.S. puppets. I do not wish to elaborate on these two possibilities, for both mean defeat, a cruel and undeserved defeat for Vietnam and for

all those who believe in the independence of the nations, and the respect for human dignity as the only durable conditions for peace.

Indeed, if one of these two possibilities comes true and brings satisfaction either to the communists or to the U.S., it will only increase the frictions we are now witnessing in the world, frictions which are already the chain reaction of the confrontation between communists and the U.S. in Vietnam, and which will surely not find an end in a solution ignoring so obviously the will of the Vietnamese people; and leaving so many dangerous temptations to those who, in their struggle for "world influence", covet Vietnam.

QUESTION: What do you think would be the outcome of negotiations with North Vietnam, and what do you mean by "dangerous temptations"?

ANSWER:

I would not trust the outcome of any negotiations in which the nationalists, authenticated by their loyalty to the Constitutional Republic of Vietnam, that is to say to the Nhan-Vi Constitution of Vietnam, cannot represent their country. And if I do not trust such negotiations, the greatest majority of Vietnamese will feel the same way. I believe I have a right to say that. After all, in the absence of President Ngo Dinh Diem and of my husband, I alone now, as their nearest collaborator and in my own right, represent the majority of the Vietnamese people: the loyal elements of the army, the paramilitary forces, the combatant youth, the republican youth, the labor unions - all founded by my husband and loyal to him - and, last but not least, the women who alone represent already more than half of the population, - and of whom I have made one of the best-organized forces of the nation - and no one can challenge that position, which is mine.

In fact, since the end of 1962, that is to say as soon as I saw evidence of the effectiveness of the Vietnamese solution of Nhan-Vi democracy in all fields; political, economic, social and military, I had the immediate desire to end the fratricidal war between North and South through negotiations. I was inclined to this by my willingness to give the benefit of doubt to the North, supposing, for example, that its population might be following communism in all knowledge and willingness - which in fact can hardly be proven in a totalitarian regime like communism. I was willing also to suppose that all the crimes of common right committed by the communists would be only "individual perversity rejected by the communist leaders", as the communists are used to saying when caught red-handed.

Of course, such suppositions are rather far-fetched, when one knows the communist ideology. But knowing also the ardent desire for independence of the Vietnamese people, I was ready to consider that, as long as one could not oppose the communist ideology as means to independence, by a more effective and more human solution, one could not presume that one would be more right than those who believe that "all means are good to achieve independence, when there is no other solution." But when our solution, which we call Nhan Vi, had proven itself, I thought at that point that arms might not be needed to convince those who opposed us, since they might have just the same purpose, independence.

I preferred, therefore, to try first negotiations. It is why I urged my husband to receive the guerillas sent to him in an attempt to have direct clarifications about our Chieu Hoi campaign (a kind of amnesty program called Return of Prodigal Brothers). I personally was even ready to do more, and there were acquaintances known to both sides

aware of this.

Unfortunately, feeling defeat near and wishing to create for themselves a "position of strength" before any talks, the communists, in a desperate gesture found it necessary to indulge in that diabolical farce so-called "buddhist", while inciting the Americans to the crime of Nov. 1, 1963. That crime is the main cause of this present tragic and miserable situation of my country.

In spite of everything, and since South Vietnam has a valuable solution which has proven itself in all fields of a nation's life, I still believe in negotiations. But negotiations cannot be brought about with "bonbon drops mixed with blood-letting" or with a knife at the throat of anyone. That American style "negotiations" might work with Americans, but surely with no one else. Negotiations cannot be brought about with material force, when one leaves the door wide open to so many temptations because of one's moral weakness.

It is in fact frightening, that absolute ignorance, of the Free World in general and of the United States in particular, of their real weakness which is such a terrible temptation for the communist world. This is frightening, because if the U.S. senses that weakness, it only knows how to make up for it, with...more arms. But more arms on the Free World side would hardly intimidate the communist side, since everyone knows that armaments are always double-edged and that ammunitions, with just enough skillful subversion...can blow first in the midst of those who have them.

The communists, though materialistic, have never doubted moral strength; and this is not the only contradiction of communism! Their greatest temptation, therefore, is the ideological and moral weakness of the West, temptation amplified by the knowledge of the prejudice of hatred and contempt of the coloured races against the white, that is to say of "the have nots" against "the haves", of those who have been exploited against their exploiters, in brief of East against West. That prejudice may not be felt by the westerners individually, in their personal relationships with Asians and Africans; it is nevertheless strong and latent in the minds and hearts of most of the coloured peoples who cannot help thinking, often rightly, that their state of present underdevelopment is only due to exploitation and robbery from those who, far from helping them sincerely now to make up for a sad past, know only from a privileged position how to try to still dominate them, giving them help as if they were beggars. The great damage is that such prejudice, far from subsiding with more contacts on both sides, is only fanned among the leading classes of the coloured peoples, by press and literature from the West, where one keeps seeing immature beings speaking pretentiously of people and countries of the East which they hardly know, and in spite of that, posing as and acknowledge by their own people as "experts of eastern affairs."

This undeniable prejudice is naturally sensed by the communists, and is another great temptation for them, which the armed superiority of the West can never discourage; it is only a dangerous incentive to more hatred and contempt. It is indeed a false premise to believe that one can force respect with more material force. I believe rather the contrary.

Arms may help surely, but better, they may sometimes be unnecessary, if one has a moral basis to support one's cause. This is not the case of the United States, especially in Vietnam since Nov. 1, 1963.

.

I believe, like many, that greed - which is often nothing but the thirst for perfection, a search for satisfaction in all fields - cannot be denied to man or abusively channelled or impeded, without stopping all his progress, that is to say without leading him to a kind of suicide, the denial of his very *raison de vivre*. Of course, *grandpère*, *verdadichy* license is as bad as greed denied. In any case, is not greed the only motor inherent to man and able to lead him towards his most legitimate goal, his fulfilment? But, how much wisdom and virtue man needs to reach his fulfilment, when one sees him in his search of it, directed only by his free choice and motored by his greed, on a path full of temptations of all kinds! And the temptations are not of a benign sort, when one sees so many wars and sufferings coming all from a perverted greed, inciting man to kill man, making war on his neighbors the better to rob them. But with science permitting man to draw from nature much more, the maximum, and thereby giving him the means not only to satisfy himself, but even to help his neighbors infinitely rather than coveting them and robbing them - what do we see?

We see the privileged man, instead of understanding better the meaning of science and bowing before the greatness of his Creator, a greatness which science reveals so well, and trying to fulfil his ultimate greed which is spiritual - "love and glory" - in the service not only of himself but as much of his neighbors and in gratitude towards the Creator who provides the means together with the order "Love thy God before all, and thy neighbor as thyself"; we see that man trying to keep for himself alone what science has given him - material force stemming from material wealth. Worse, we see him in his perversity going to the point of believing as wise and legitimate, a policy of "self-preservation", which only leads him to suicide. Thus he does not hesitate to encourage, in the most hypocritical way, his needy neighbours to artificially reduce their number, rather than helping them to satisfy their needs, thus avoiding such unnatural design which strikes at the very basic concept of self-preservation of humanity. As for his capacity, he prefers to forge with it "preventively", all kinds of offensive arms against his neighbors as if they were not a part of humanity, too, members of the same body, whose legitimate needs could be appeased by fear if not crushed with arms!

Then, in the belief that all this is permissible for him - since he has "no more the intention of taking anything from anyone, but only of giving to those who please him" - that privileged man does not hesitate to try to spread his "influence" through material force and material temptation, to incite his neighbours "to love" him and "to glorify" him!!

Thus, incapable of mastering himself through physical and material restraint, the surest way of attaining the intelligence of spiritual fulfilment, man - so loved by his Creator that being permitted to satisfy himself in the material domain first and being left to the inspiring search to satisfy himself spiritually - would only know how to believe himself a God to whom is due, even by force and through fear and corruption, what God Himself would not accept from man otherwise than by free choice through virtue.

Thus, no more blinded by material needs, such a man would be blinded by his material achievements, though he can hardly attain them without nature on which he still depends entirely.

What are they worth, those who, though so obviously loved by the Almighty, says "yes" to Him but do nothing He tell them to do? Are

they as worthy as those who say "no" to the Father because they do not know Him yet but without realizing it do more of what he asks. What must one think of a man who, rather than looking for fulfilment in the only way his Creator permitted when He created him, arrived at such a high level of material capacity would then fall into insatiability; or, if he decides to look now for spiritual fulfilment, would only try to dominate his neighbours in order to be "loved" or "feared" by them, and thus keep the "glory" of a privileged position which has never been accorded for that purpose?

Such divagations would only be proof that the privileged man has so continuously betrayed all the providential graces poured on him, in the misuse of the instruments put in his hands, that he does not deserve to receive the last divine grace, wisdom, which alone can lead him surely to the ultimate goal of each man, "love and glory".

The U.S. especially, for it has given to itself the predestined role of "bearer of light" for humanity, symbolized by a proud and famous statue representing it as such, should remember the fate of Lucifer, himself "bearer of light" also, as his name recalls, but who, from an angel of light has become an angel of darkness, only because he was not up to his role.

"Noblesse oblige". The more one receives, the more one must give - and surely not in the way, usual to the USA, - if one wishes to still be chosen as the dispenser for all, and never see one's material power turning from a blessing into a curse just because one has ignored wilfully its real meaning when holding it in hands.

In this light which recalls the doom of selfishness and immorality, I find it mad and devilish that anyone in the world, chiefly in the free world so lacking in moral and effective ideas for a safe and sound democracy and for a foreign aid which would not turn into economic domination or mendicancy, one could - after permitting such a treachery and persecution against the Vietnamese nationalists and their Nhân-Vi democracy doctrine - still tolerate those who continue to crush them and their doctrine, to make believe that they have never existed.

It is still more incomprehensible that anyone in the world could believe that the Nhân-Vi solution could be distorted and exploited by the U.S. in Vietnam or that the Nhân-Vi solution could be erased and replaced by any other imperialistic solution of U.S. or communist inspiration, all presented as a "social revolution" to bolster the position of the usurpers and aggressors of Vietnam. It is, indeed, too well known who is the author of that Nhân-Vi solution, and how he has been and is treated by those who believe to be thus freer in their malevolent purposes. How in such conditions could anyone in Vietnam ever trust those capable of such vileness? And, again, this becomes another temptation for all "influence seekers", communist or otherwise, to step in. And no arms would ever be capable of dissuading them, since they would again have another temptation, the temptation of being still more able to crush the other side, if this side is deprived of the help of the nationalists, the only real force of any nation. That force may not be able to defeat a collusion of communists and the U.S., but it is nevertheless a force which must be respected if one is sincere when one speaks of Peace, Peace and Peace!

Recently (Oct. 13) an official representative of the U.S. launched, it appears, that "warning to the needy", as the U.S. press calls these words addressed to those who receive American Aid: "The need to distinguish between a reform movement allied with the communists and a reform movement dedicated to reform in freedom should be emphasized over and over again". This "warning" will meet deaf ears, and confusion

.....

will continue, as long as a third force does not emerge in the world, a force essentially moral - that is to say, with courage and without compromise, and ready to explicitly denounce the wicked and the illicit to enlighten the confused, giving thus its support, at least moral, to all national revolutions "dedicated to reform", not only, "in freedom" but "in independence from external influence."

It is exactly because this world is subjected to "struggle for influence" that such a moral force has the greatest chance of effectiveness. The consoling thing about the struggle for influence is that such a force, even deprived of material strength, can win, or at least help to win a deserving peace.

QUESTION: You said in a message on May 3 and you give the impression from what you said that your husband and President Ngo Dinh Diem are still alive. What makes you think this is so?

ANSWER:



In the first place, none of the reports of the supposed death of my husband and brother-in-law were convincing at the time. There were just too many things which did not seem possible. And the photographs contributed greatly to doubt, even at the time.

Then, I have received from sources I think I should trust, reports which give me reasons to believe they are still alive.

Anyway, dead or alive, they are heroes of whom mankind should be grateful and of whom Vietnam can be proud. They will remain inspiring symbol of spirit and rectitude, always triumphing over matter and over deceit and oppression.

As for me, alone or not, I shall not be less determined to fulfill what I know I can and must do. I used to wait patiently for my husband, when he gave so much of his time to Vietnam. I have the impression I am doing the same as before, when I continue to wait for him now. I used also to help my family and my people more than drawing my strength from them. Since then, hardships have only given me still more inspiration and faith in the cause I defend, which is much more than only the cause of my country.

Madame Ngô-Dinh-Nhu



ALD/ksn

Le 23 mars 1966

Monsieur,

Le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies n'a demandé d'accuser réception de votre lettre du 11 mars 1966 concernant le Viet-Nam.

Certes, le Secrétaire général souhaite faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour hâter le retour de la paix au Viet-Nam, mais, étant donné le caractère de ses fonctions, vous comprendrez certainement qu'il ne saurait apporter sa caution à des contacts, même confidentiels, qui n'auraient pas un caractère officiel.

Bien entendu, comme il l'a toujours fait dans le passé, le Secrétaire général ne manquera pas d'accorder la plus grande attention aux informations objectives des personnes qui seraient qualifiées pour lui faire connaître leur point de vue sur le Viet-Nam.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, les assurances de mes sentiments distingués.

L'Administrateur général

Robin T. Miller

Ho Thong Minh
Ancien Ministre
97 Rue Houdan
92 Sceaux (France)

cc: Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Miller
Mr. Lemieux ✓
Registry

MAR 13 1966

97 Rue Houdan

92 SCEAUX

FRANCE

Le II Mars 1966,

TO:	Mr. Narasimhan
1	
2	
3	
<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	

Excellence,

PO 200 PI

En Octobre 1963, la Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, organisation non gouvernementale affiliée à l'O.N.U, m'a envoyé à New-York pour assister, en qualité d'observateur, aux débats de l'Assemblée Générale concernant la discrimination religieuse au Sud Viet-Nam.

J'ai beaucoup regretté de n'avoir pas pu alors vous rencontrer, car cela m'aurait permis de connaître le seul Asiatique ayant un statut tel qu'il pourrait, avec les idées précises et justes qu'il a sur le problème vietnamien, faire en sorte que la paix revienne dans mon pays. C'est donc beaucoup plus à l'Homme qu'au Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies que je voudrais aujourd'hui adresser ces lignes et j'espère que, étant de la même communauté de race et de religion, vous me comprendrez.

Avec mes amis, j'ai en effet pensé qu'une solution réaliste du problème sud-vietnamien devra se débattre entre toutes les parties intéressées, y compris le Viet-Cong, mais que le succès d'une telle négociation dépendra largement des contacts confidentiels entre Vietnamiens de tous bords sous l'égide d'une caution internationale. Nous serions évidemment heureux de pouvoir vous exposer plus clairement notre point de vue et solliciter éventuellement votre puissant appui pour essayer de mettre fin à une guerre fratricide qui n'a que trop duré.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

Ho Thong Minh
HO THONG MINH
Ancien Ministre

Unofficial translation from French

97 rue Houdan
92 Sceaux
France

11 March 1966

Excellency,

In October 1963, the International Federation for the Rights of Man, a non-governmental organization affiliated with the United Nations, sent me to New York as an observer to attend the General Assembly debates on religious discrimination in South Viet-Nam.

I was very sorry not to have been able to meet you then, because it would have given me an opportunity to become acquainted with the only Asian whose status would have permitted him - with his clear and fair-minded ideas on the Vietnamese problem - to help restore peace to my country. In writing these lines I am therefore appealing far more to the man himself than to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and I hope that, being of the same racial and religious community, you will understand me.

I and my friends feel that a realistic solution to the South Vietnamese problem should be discussed among all the parties concerned, including the Viet-Cong, but that the success of such negotiations will largely depend on confidential contacts between Vietnamese of all persuasions under international guarantees. We should naturally be glad to have an opportunity to convey our views to you in greater detail and, if possible, seek your valuable support in the attempt to end a fratricidal war that has gone on far too long.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) HO THONG MINH
Former Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

6 May 1966
ALD/ksn

8/5

Note for the Secretary-General

CONVERSATION WITH M. VU VAN THAI
(5 May 1966)

It is the hope of Vu Van Thai that the elections will be held in South Viet-Nam although he foresees much difficulty resulting from the opposition to elections in American circles in Saigon and in Washington. In his view, should the elections be held, the Buddhists would receive a narrow majority while a large minority would go to politicians supported by the Catholics and the sects. Therefore, a government could emerge supported by moderate Buddhist and Catholic leaders, with the army in a position to exercise a kind of veto (much the reverse of the present situation, whereby the army governs while the Buddhists are in a position to veto its decisions).

Vu Van Thai considers Tri Quang a remarkable political mind. He does not believe that the monk has had any dealings with the NFLSVN, contrary to what certain Americans suspect. Tri Quang's objective is to work towards peace by establishing a government in South Viet-Nam that will have enough popular support to make itself heard. In Vu Van Thai's view, the overall situation would be quite different if peace proposals were made by the Government of South Viet-Nam instead of being advanced by Washington. Tam Chau, the Saigon monk, is also a good leader. In spite of the NFLSVN radio and the American press, which report divisions among the Buddhists and between Buddhists and Catholics, there is more unity at present than at any time in the past. There are, as could be expected, different views on tactics, but not on the essentials, namely, the necessity to try to put an end to the war. However, there is always the risk that untimely American interventions might promote

dissension. Vu Van Thai believes that, in case of success at the elections, the monks would still remain behind the scenes while the rector of the University of Hue might be the secular leader.

Vu Van Thai was surprised that the NFLSVN had not attempted to make use of the recent political unrest. The infiltration of the Buddhist movement by communist elements was very limited. He explains this by the fact that (1) the Viet Cong were caught unaware of the magnitude that the movement was to take; (2) they are very distrustful of the Buddhists' intentions and are no longer interested in promoting what amounts to a neutralist movement in South Viet-Nam. Therefore, the NFLSVN's reaction has been purely negative; they have encouraged the belief that they were dealing with Tri Quang, etc. Vu Van Thai said that they nearly succeeded in convincing the Americans that the Buddhists were communist inspired. The American embassy in Saigon was advising the Government to take repressive measures against the Buddhists (they nearly arrested Tri Quang) and it considers it a miracle that civil war was avoided. He said he had a most difficult time convincing authorities in Washington not to intervene and that, be it only for this reason, he does not regret having accepted his job, whatever may happen in the future.

Vu Van Thai said that Ambassador Lodge has lost President Johnson's confidence following his blunder in supporting the elimination of General Thi which started all the unrest (although he might have been temporarily saved by the Catholics who were demonstrating recently in Saigon against him). In general, Vu Van Thai spoke highly of Ambassador Goldberg's moderating influence in Washington throughout this period. He said the same things of Vice President Humphrey in spite of his official speeches. He was more reserved concerning others, Rusk, McNamara and Walt Rostow.

Looking into the future, Vu Van Thai considers that the gravest danger will be the pressure on President Johnson to destroy by bombardment what remains in North Viet-Nam. The temptation of the "easy way out" will

be increasingly felt as the November elections in the United States approach. He said he spent some time in conferences at the Pentagon arguing against the continuous bombardment of North Viet-Nam (his theory is that intermittent bombing immobilizes a maximum of manpower in reconstruction tasks).

In his view, the crucial period will come towards the end of this year. At that time, he believes that the military pressure on the Viet Cong forces will have reached its maximum. Of course, the USSR's assistance will increase. However, he does not discount all United States reports that the larger infiltration of North Viet-Nameese troops among the Viet Cong forces is creating difficulties. These North Viet-Nameese troops have been trained for more conventional operations and it is a fact that, in recent engagements, whole units have been destroyed.

In any case, Vu Van Thai believes that North Viet-Nam will then have to slow down its efforts in the South for purely conservative reasons. At that time, the temptation for the United States to increase the pressure on North Viet-Nam will be great. Vu Van Thai believes that, on the contrary, this should be the sign to start de-escalating the war, otherwise North Viet-Nam will be left no option but to call in outside help which would be equivalent to political suicide, and would be a disaster. In his view, the North Viet-Nameese communists may be more extremist than the Chinese communists, but they are less "doctrinaire". He also thinks that, at that time, a South Viet-Nameese government, issued from elections and with popular support, could then face the prospect of a coalition government with the NFLSVN.

Finally, Vu Van Thai repeated his favourite thoughts on coexistence between communists, neutrals and western allies in the context of a larger association of Southeast Asian states.

Unofficial translation from French

Q/ 25/5

CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: ASSOCIATION VIETNAMESE BUDDHISTS IN FRANCE
DATE: 21 MAY 1966

We earnestly request that you use your influence to prevail upon Washington and Saigon Governments to halt massacre populations Danang Saigon.

Association of Vietnamese Buddhists in France

INCOMING

INFO COPY

FILE NO.

ACTION

TO

NAH 151044C

1

WUFO46 36 INTL PD

CD PARIS VIA WUI MAY 21 2135

MONSIEUR THANT SECRETAIRE GENERAL

NATIONS UNIES NEWYORKCITY

NOUS VOUS PRIONS INSTAMMENT USER DE VOTRE INFLUENCE POUR
INTERVENIR AUPRES GOUVERNEMENTS WASHINGTON ET SAIGON AFIN AR-
RETER MASSACRE POPULATIONS DANANG SAIGON

ASSOCIATION BOUDDHISTES VIETNAMIENS FRANCE BP

40 ANTONY 92.

630P

Please return to L/S. 1000 1955

TELETYPE UNIT

1000 1955

1000 1955

Mrs. Nhu Now Defends Reds as 'Nationalists'

**In French Interview, She Calls
for World Talks on Vietnam**

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, July 18—Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of the late President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, has published a long interview in France that is both sympathetic to Vietnamese Communists and violently anti-American.

Calling for an international peace conference to settle the war in Vietnam, she volunteers to attend as a representative "of the purest nationalists."

As for the Communists, she says: "They are Vietnamese like us, and nationalists like us. And like us they seek justice. The world condemns them only because to get there they employ criminal means."

Mrs. Nhu's comments, published in the weekly *Le Nouveau Candide* and called "The Vitriolic Confidences of Madame Nhu," are in sharp contrast to statements she made in the days when she attracted international attention as one of the leading anti-Communists in Asia.

Coup Toppled Family

Mrs. Nhu's late husband was President Diem's brother and head of South Vietnam's political apparatus before the Ngo family was toppled from power in 1963 by a revolt of the military on Nov. 10, the date is now celebrated as National Day. President Diem and Mr. Nhu were assassinated by the military.

Mrs. Nhu, who was out of the country at the time of the revolt, now lives in Rome. She charges such high fees for interviews that her public statements are relatively few.

Mrs. Nhu gave the interview to Lucien Bodard, a French journalist long experienced in Indochina. He knew the Nhus before they came to power and during the height of their power.

Mr. Bodard found her views



Associated Press

Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu

so different from those she expressed in the past that he wrote at the end of the article: "This is the last and most startling incarnation of Madame Nhu: The Pacifist, Humanist. To think that I remember her as the symbol of the crusade against Evil and against Communism!"

In the interview, Mrs. Nhu says that it was at her suggestion that her husband was having secret contacts with representatives of North Vietnam and that he was on the point of signing a peace treaty when the Americans, frightened, deliberately launched a coup d'état and had the brothers murdered.

"I had even decided to make a fraternal gesture in sending my two oldest children to the north as pathfinders," she said. "I was touched by sharp nostalgia when I thought that they were going to see Hanoi."

**Says U.S. Had Diem Ousted
to Block Peace With Hanoi**

I was born, and all the beautiful sights of my youth."

Mrs. Nhu said that the Americans envisioned an expanding war and "It was the crime of my husband to be opposed to this war."

"The wrong of Nhu was not to believe in what the Americans call 'liberty' and which they preach to all," she said, "for that is the liberty of the jungle, which profits only the wealthy, only the powerful, and only the arrogant—that is to say, the Americans themselves. To the others they throw a few carrots, seasoned in plenty of humiliation, blackmail, threats and homicide."

Since the time of the coup, Mrs. Nhu said, the Americans have built up their expeditionary force, and are making "punitive expeditions, as if against the Apaches."

She said that all Vietnamese must get together and meet, not as enemies, but as brothers, and that an international or Asian peace conference must be called. There the Communists would be represented along with the "purest nationalists" that is to say the survivors of the Ngo family, their partisans and myself."

10 February 1967

Dear Mr. Tran Van Hui,

On behalf of the Secretary-General I acknowledge your letter to him dated 23 December 1966.

The Secretary-General has seen your letter and is deeply grateful for your kind words and sentiments regarding his efforts for peace and his acceptance of a further term of office. He reciprocates your expressions of good wishes for the new year.

Yours sincerely,

Ismat T. Kittani
Principal Officer

Mr. Tran Van Hui
74, Boulevard Maurice Barrès
Neuilly, France

cc. Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Lemieux ✓
Registry