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RAPPORT DU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL SUR LA SITUATION AU RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Le présent rapport est soumis en application du paragraphe 17 de la résolution 925 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité, en date du 8 juin 1994, et du paragraphe 11 de la résolution 929 (1994) du 22 juin 1994, dans lesquels le Conseil a prié le Secrétaire général de lui faire rapport le 9 août au plus tard sur les progrès accomplis par la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) dans l'exécution de son mandat, la sécurité des populations en danger, la situation humanitaire et les progrès enregistrés sur la voie d'un cessez-le-feu et de la réconciliation politique, ainsi que le déploiement de la MINUAR renforcée. Le Secrétariat a présenté le 7 juillet un rapport oral au Conseil conformément au paragraphe 10 de la résolution 929 (1994) et le Conseil a été informé à la même date de l'arrivée à Kigali, le 4 juillet, de mon nouveau Représentant spécial, M. Shaharyar Khan. Les membres du Conseil ont été également saisis de la lettre que j'ai adressée le 1er août 1994 au Président du Conseil (S/1994/923) au sujet des troupes et du matériel supplémentaires dont avait besoin la MINUAR. Le présent rapport a été établi en fonction des renseignements dont disposait le Secrétariat au 1er août 1994.

2. Depuis l'adoption des résolutions 925 (1994) et 929 (1994), le cours des événements s'est modifié au Rwanda. Le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) s'est rendu militairement maître de la plupart du pays. En deux semaines, durant le mois de juillet, environ 1,5 million de Rwandais se sont réfugiés au Zaïre, ce qui a provoqué une crise humanitaire de dimension catastrophique. L'ancien "gouvernement intérimaire" a pris la fuite et, le 19 juillet, un gouvernement d'unité nationale a été constitué sur une base largement représentative.

II. SITUATION MILITAIRE

3. Le 4 juillet, les forces du FPR se sont emparées de Kigali, la capitale, pour prendre ensuite, le 5 juillet, Butare, la deuxième ville du pays, et, le 14 juillet, Ruhengeri, le bastion de l'ancien gouvernement. Les forces gouvernementales ont battu en retraite et se sont regroupées à Gisenyi et dans les environs, au nord-ouest, pour refluer peu après au Zaïre. Le 17 juillet, le FPR a pris Gisenyi et, le lendemain, a déclaré unilatéralement un cessez-le-feu mettant effectivement fin à la guerre civile déclenchée immédiatement après la mort des Présidents du Rwanda et du Burundi dans un accident d'avion suspect, le 6 avril, à la suite de quoi avaient été massacrés dans tout le pays l'opposition et l'intelligentsia hutues ainsi que des membres de la minorité tutsie et d'autres partisans du FPR.

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4. Comme le sait le Conseil de sécurité, la MINUAR, depuis le début de la crise, s'est attachée en priorité à parvenir à un cessez-le-feu et à mettre fin au carnage. Le commandant de la Force, le général de division Roméo Dallaire, avait intensifié les efforts dans ce sens depuis le début de juin lorsque les deux parties avaient entamé au niveau militaire des pourparlers en vue d'un cessez-le-feu sous les auspices de la MINUAR. Mon Représentant spécial a donné à cette question la priorité absolue dès son arrivée à Kigali et s'est mis directement en rapport avec les dirigeants des deux parties, en soulignant qu'il importait de parvenir à un cessez-le-feu immédiat, afin d'empêcher en particulier que la crise humanitaire ne s'aggrave davantage. Toutefois, les négociations en vue d'un cessez-le-feu ont marqué le pas jusqu'à la chute de Gisenyi, le 17 juillet, alors que plus d'un million de Rwandais s'étaient réfugiés au Zaïre.

5. Le commandant en second de la Force, le général de brigade Henry Anyidoho, avait auparavant réussi à ce que les deux parties s'entendent sur la plupart des éléments d'un cessez-le-feu, mais l'accord n'a pu se faire en raison de l'intransigeance des parties. Les forces gouvernementales exigeaient des garanties que le FPR n'était pas disposé à fournir, tandis que le FPR insistait sur l'adoption de mesures préalables pour arrêter les massacres persistants, que les forces gouvernementales se déclaraient incapables de prendre. Il apparaissait également que le FPR n'était pas prêt à cesser le feu avant d'avoir atteint ses objectifs militaires. Alors que ceux-ci semblaient tout d'abord consister à contrôler le plus de territoire possible, l'effondrement des forces gouvernementales à partir de la fin juin a évidemment encouragé le FPR à intensifier son offensive et à s'emparer non seulement de la capitale, mais aussi des arrières des forces gouvernementales jusqu'à la frontière zaïroise. Seule la "zone de protection humanitaire" créée par le groupement de forces français - l'opération "Turquoise" (voir par. 7 ci-après) - n'est pas tombée aux mains du FPR.

6. La poussée rapide du FPR a eu pour conséquence d'amener la population civile à fuir en masse les zones de combat. Cet exode aurait sans doute pu être contenu si la radio aux mains du "gouvernement intérimaire" n'avait pas diffusé intentionnellement des propos alarmants. Les réfugiés ont alors afflué vers le Zaïre, au nord-ouest, ce qui a pris de court les organismes humanitaires et les organisations non gouvernementales qui avaient prévu des déplacements plus au sud. Presque toutes les forces gouvernementales ont battu en retraite dans le désordre au Zaïre, où elles se sont débandées et auraient été pour la plupart désarmées par les autorités zaïroises; toutefois, selon des informations préoccupantes, elles essaieraient d'empêcher les réfugiés de retourner au Rwanda. Ainsi, les combats au Rwanda ont pris fin pour le moment, aucune opération militaire importante n'ayant été signalée depuis le 18 juillet.

7. Au cours de ces événements, le Gouvernement français a annoncé le 20 juin 1994 son intention d'envoyer une force dans la région, stationnée au Zaïre mais opérant à l'intérieur du Rwanda, afin de fournir une protection aux populations civiles arrachées en masse de leurs foyers par les combats, dont un grand nombre s'était enfui au Zaïre. Cette opération a été autorisée par le Conseil de sécurité, en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, dans sa résolution 929 (1994). Le 2 juillet, la France a annoncé que l'opération Turquoise créerait une "zone de protection humanitaire" dans le triangle Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro au sud-ouest du Rwanda, couvrant environ un cinquième du territoire rwandais. Tout en exprimant sa vive opposition à

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l'initiative française, le FPR n'a pas cherché à affronter les forces françaises qui, de leur côté, ont évité les provocations. Dès le départ, une coopération étroite s'est instaurée à tous les niveaux entre la MINUAR et l'opération Turquoise, des contacts fréquents étant assurés entre les commandants des deux forces. Des officiers de liaison de la MINUAR ont été immédiatement mis en poste au quartier général de la force française à Goma, au Zaïre, et un bureau de liaison français a été créé par la suite au quartier général de la MINUAR à Kigali. Dans sa résolution 929 (1994), le Conseil de sécurité avait autorisé le déploiement de la force française jusqu'au 21 août 1994 et, le 11 juillet, le Premier Ministre français a fait connaître au Conseil ainsi qu'à moi-même la décision du Gouvernement français de commencer le retrait au 31 juillet.

III. SITUATION HUMANITAIRE

8. La violence persistante au Rwanda a provoqué une crise humanitaire pratiquement sans précédent. Sur une population totale d'environ 7 millions d'habitants, 500 000 ont été tués, 3 millions ont été déplacés à l'intérieur du pays et plus de 2 millions se sont enfuis dans des pays voisins. Bien que l'exode semble s'être ralenti, la situation demeure explosive et extrêmement fluide. Particulièrement inquiétante est la possibilité d'un autre départ massif de la zone de protection humanitaire au sud-ouest du Rwanda lorsque les forces françaises se retireront.

9. La communauté internationale doit faire face à quatre tâches humanitaires fondamentales : répondre aux besoins immédiats et vitaux des réfugiés; faciliter le retour rapide de ceux qui ont quitté leurs foyers; rétablir l'infrastructure essentielle au Rwanda; assurer une transition sans problème dans la zone de protection humanitaire créée par les forces françaises.

10. Il est difficile de décrire les horreurs qu'ont connues ceux qui ont fui le Rwanda, poussés dans bien des cas par les émissions de propagande visant à semer la panique parmi la population. Le rythme des événements et le flot des réfugiés ont pris de court les organisations humanitaires qui ont vaillamment fait front à une situation impossible. Une épidémie de choléra a déjà coûté la vie à 20 000 personnes et constitue une menace permanente. Des milliers de corps n'ont pas été enterrés, ce qui risque de contaminer le reste de la population ainsi que les nappes d'eau souterraines de la région. La fourniture et la distribution des 30 millions de litres d'eau potable et 1 000 tonnes de vivres qui sont nécessaires chaque jour posent d'énormes problèmes de logistique.

11. De l'avis général, il est indispensable d'encourager et de faciliter le retour rapide des Rwandais dans leurs foyers. Cette action est essentielle étant donné les conditions qui règnent dans les camps de réfugiés et la nécessité d'assurer, dans les deux semaines à venir, la récolte qui fournit traditionnellement 60 % de la ration calorique annuelle des Rwandais. Il faudra pour cela créer la confiance parmi les réfugiés, mettre en place des entrepôts de transit et stocker à l'avance des fournitures humanitaires. Je suis profondément préoccupé par les informations selon lesquelles des personnes et des groupes de l'ancien "gouvernement intérimaire" et les forces gouvernementales rwandaises se livrent à des actes d'intimidation auprès des réfugiés des camps de Goma afin de les empêcher de regagner le Rwanda en leur disant que les troupes du FPR les tortureront et les mettront à mort s'ils retournent chez eux.

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12. Le conflit civil au Rwanda a détruit l'infrastructure du pays. Le relèvement à court et à moyen terme est essentiel pour absorber la population des rapatriés ainsi que pour réinstaller les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays. Il faut au minimum rétablir l'électricité, l'eau et les télécommunications. Il est également important de redonner au Gouvernement les moyens de s'acquitter de ses responsabilités.

13. On estime que jusqu'à 2 millions de personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays se trouvent dans la zone de protection humanitaire au sud-ouest du Rwanda. L'exode de cette population au Zaïre éclipserait l'horreur de la situation qui règne actuellement à Goma. Afin d'empêcher que cela ne se produise, il est nécessaire de faire en sorte que la MINUAR ait les moyens de prendre le relais dans cette zone et d'y renforcer la présence et les activités humanitaires.

14. Les mesures indiquées ci-dessus doivent être prises simultanément. Le fait de ne pas réussir à répondre comme il convient aux besoins dans un domaine donné se répercutera sur les autres domaines et affaiblira l'efficacité de l'action entreprise.

15. Devant cette situation complexe, les organisations humanitaires des Nations Unies, sous la direction du Bureau d'urgence de l'ONU pour le Rwanda, ont mis au point un appel interinstitutions commun des Nations Unies en faveur des personnes touchées par la crise au Rwanda afin de répondre aux besoins d'aide urgente et de relèvement jusqu'à la fin de l'année. Une somme de 434,8 millions de dollars des États-Unis est nécessaire pour appuyer ces activités urgentes. En lançant cet appel le 22 juillet, j'ai exhorté la communauté internationale à apporter en temps voulu des contributions généreuses afin que les programmes humanitaires essentiels puissent être exécutés. Une conférence d'annonce de contributions a été convoquée à Genève le 2 août. Je suis encouragé par l'accueil positif que des gouvernements ainsi que des particuliers désireux d'offrir leur aide ont réservé dès le départ à cet appel et je tiens à remercier les pays qui ont déjà apporté des contributions importantes.

16. Le Secrétaire général adjoint aux affaires humanitaires, M. Peter Hansen, s'est dernièrement (24 au 28 juillet) rendu à ma demande en mission au Rwanda et dans la région avoisinante. Il était accompagné de hauts responsables des principales organisations humanitaires des Nations Unies ainsi que de la communauté des ONG. Durant sa mission, M. Hansen a évalué la situation humanitaire et pris un certain nombre de mesures pour s'assurer que les arrangements de coordination voulus étaient en place; ceux-ci visaient notamment à établir une claire division des responsabilités entre les divers organismes des Nations Unies et une stratégie globale pour faire face à ce problème humanitaire d'une envergure exceptionnelle; et à transférer de Nairobi à Kigali le siège du Bureau des Nations Unies pour les secours d'urgence au Rwanda.

17. M. Hansen s'est entretenu avec mon Représentant spécial au Rwanda, mais aussi avec le Vice-Président Kagamé, et d'autres hauts fonctionnaires du nouveau Gouvernement afin d'étudier ce qu'il convenait de faire pour pouvoir fournir une aide humanitaire à toutes les parties du pays et les mesures qu'il fallait prendre d'urgence pour rétablir un climat propice au retour des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées. Il est rassurant que le nouveau Gouvernement se soit

déclaré prêt à encourager le retour de la population, à assurer sa protection et à permettre aux secours d'arriver jusqu'à ceux qui en ont besoin partout dans le pays. Des réfugiés ont déjà commencé à retourner au Rwanda.

18. Je tiens à remercier tous ceux qui travaillent dans des conditions extrêmement difficiles pour apporter des secours afin de faire face à un problème humanitaire de cette ampleur. Le personnel courageux de la MINUAR et les forces multinationales sous commandement de la France ont joué et continuent de jouer un rôle critique en sauvant des vies et en protégeant la population. Je voudrais également rendre hommage aux pays voisins qui ont accepté et protégé les réfugiés rwandais. Leur générosité a permis à des millions d'autres êtres humains dans le besoin de survivre. À l'heure actuelle, il importe au plus haut point que la communauté internationale mobilise les ressources nécessaires pour permettre aux organisations humanitaires de continuer à fournir l'aide dont la population a si cruellement besoin et même d'en accroître le volume.

IV. PLANS OPÉRATIONNELS RÉVISÉS DE LA MINUAR

19. J'ai déjà informé le Conseil dans ma lettre du 1er août des retards déplorables dans le renforcement de la MINUAR, autorisé par la résolution 918 (1994) du 17 mai 1994. Sans répéter mes observations, je me contenterai de souligner que les États Membres, en ne renforçant pas la composante militaire de la MINUAR avec la rapidité nécessaire, ont empêché la Mission de tenter de soulager les énormes souffrances humaines qui ont accompagné le conflit civil et les massacres délibérés de civils, principalement des membres de l'opposition hutue et des partisans des FPR.

20. La situation sur le terrain ayant changé radicalement dans les quelques dernières semaines, la MINUAR a ajusté ses plans opérationnels pour faire face à l'évolution de la situation dans le cadre du mandat donné par le Conseil de sécurité dans sa résolution 925 (1994). Les tâches principales de la MINUAR sont actuellement les suivantes :

- a) Assurer la stabilité et la sécurité dans le nord-ouest et le sud-ouest du Rwanda;
- b) Stabiliser et surveiller la situation dans toutes les régions du Rwanda de manière à encourager le retour des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées;
- c) Apporter sécurité et appui aux opérations d'assistance humanitaire au Rwanda même, pendant que les organisations humanitaires s'occupent d'assurer le retour des réfugiés;
- d) Favoriser, par la médiation et les bons offices, une réconciliation nationale au Rwanda.

21. Malgré les ressources extrêmement limitées dont dispose la MINUAR, la Mission a déjà pris certaines mesures. Elle a déployé une compagnie le long de la frontière près de Goma (Zaïre), ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'observateurs dans cette région et dans la zone contrôlée par l'Opération Turquoise. Dans l'attente des 5 500 hommes autorisés par le Conseil de sécurité, que la MINUAR

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devrait finalement recevoir, le commandant de la Force a prévu un déploiement dans cinq secteurs, comme indiqué sur la carte figurant dans l'annexe au présent rapport :

- a) Secteur I (nord-est) : 1 compagnie du génie
- b) Secteur II (sud-est) : 1 compagnie motorisée renforcée
- c) Secteur III (sud) : 1 compagnie motorisée renforcée
- d) Secteur IV (sud-ouest) : 3 bataillons d'infanterie mécanisés/motorisés
- e) Secteur V (nord-ouest) : 1 bataillon d'infanterie mécanisé/motorisé

22. Le quartier général de la Force resterait à Kigali, avec les unités minimums nécessaires pour assurer la protection, en même temps que des unités spécialisées pour les communications et la logistique et l'hôpital de campagne. Les observateurs militaires des Nations Unies et les contrôleurs de police civile des Nations Unies seraient déployés dans tous les secteurs suivant les nécessités opérationnelles.

23. Les zones suscitant le plus de préoccupations sont le nord-ouest où l'on veut réinstaller les réfugiés qui reviennent dans le pays et le sud-ouest où l'on souhaite éviter d'éventuelles explosions de violence. Le secteur nord-ouest jouxte la région du Zaïre où s'est rassemblée une multitude de réfugiés rwandais (plus d'un million) qui y vivent dans des conditions extrêmement difficiles. On sait qu'un grand nombre de membres des forces gouvernementales rwandaises et de la milice, ainsi que des éléments extrémistes soupçonnés d'avoir participé au massacre des membres de l'opposition hutue et des partisans des FPR sont mêlés aux réfugiés au Zaïre qu'ils essaieraient d'empêcher de retourner au Rwanda. C'est au sud-ouest que la situation est la plus instable; des éléments armés des forces gouvernementales rwandaises ont en effet cherché refuge dans la zone protégée par les Français. De plus, les réfugiés en quittant le Zaïre pour rentrer chez eux transiteront par ces deux régions. On s'attend également qu'un grand nombre de réfugiés en Tanzanie regagnent les secteurs I et II et un nombre considérable de réfugiés quittent le Burundi pour revenir dans les secteurs II et III; ces trois secteurs ne présenteront toutefois vraisemblablement pas les problèmes qu'on prévoit dans les secteurs IV et V.

24. La situation dans le secteur IV est particulièrement pressante du fait que le Gouvernement français est anxieux de retirer ses troupes avant le 21 août. Dans ses discussions avec la MINUAR, le nouveau Gouvernement a indiqué qu'il n'insisterait pas pour assumer immédiatement le contrôle de cette zone à condition que la MINUAR en assure la stabilité. Pour ce faire, il serait impératif que la MINUAR puisse déployer les trois bataillons prévus pour ce secteur. Au cas où ils ne seraient pas disponibles, la MINUAR devrait pénétrer dans cette zone avec une force amoindrie et un matériel minime. Le nouveau Gouvernement a jusqu'ici refusé d'accepter les troupes de certains pays d'Afrique participant à l'Opération Turquoise, mais il se peut qu'on puisse le persuader de permettre à ces troupes et à leur matériel de demeurer sur place.

Dans ce cas, on espère que la France sera prête à prêter une partie du matériel utilisé par l'Opération Turquoise.

V. PERSPECTIVES POLITIQUES

25. L'Accord de paix d'Arusha (voir A/48/824-S/26915) a été signé il y a un an dans l'espoir que l'équilibre politique qu'il prévoyait amènerait une stabilité durable au Rwanda grâce à une approche pluraliste du gouvernement de transition, lequel inclurait les divers partis apparus et aboutirait à des élections. Tant le "gouvernement intérimaire", établi aussitôt après le décès de l'ancien Président Habyarimana le 6 avril, que le FPR ont dans une certaine mesure professé leur attachement aux principes de l'Accord d'Arusha. Toutefois, le "gouvernement intérimaire" a déclaré que l'Accord reposait sur une prémisse fallacieuse, à savoir que l'animosité ethnique traditionnelle existant entre la majorité hutue et la minorité tutsie pouvait être surmontée par des moyens politiques; la seule solution serait un arrangement pouvant garantir non seulement les droits de la minorité mais également ceux de la majorité, de sorte qu'aucune n'ait à craindre la domination de l'autre; cet objectif ne pouvait être atteint ni par des moyens militaires, ni par l'organisation de simples élections. Le FPR, quant à lui, a affirmé que, s'il demeurait attaché aux principes de l'Accord concernant un compromis politique pluraliste, la subversion délibérée du processus d'Arusha par des éléments hutus extrémistes et les massacres prémédités et délibérés de Tutsis et de Hutus modérés, exigeait de réviser la formule d'Arusha, afin d'éviter qu'une telle situation ne se reproduise.

26. Le FPR contrôle le pays tant militairement que politiquement, à l'exception de la zone contrôlée par l'Opération Turquoise, et il a mis en place, le 19 juillet 1994, un "gouvernement d'unité nationale - à base élargie" pour une période intérimaire de cinq ans. Il a exclu l'ancien parti au pouvoir le Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND), ainsi qu'un parti ouvertement anti-tutsi, la Coalition pour la défense de la République (CDR), qui ne figurait pas dans le gouvernement de transition créé par l'Accord d'Arusha. Dans le gouvernement provisoire actuel, le poste de Président, réservé au MRND dans l'Accord, a été attribué à M. Pasteur Bizimungu, du FPR, et le poste de Vice-Président, non réservé dans ledit accord, au général de division Paul Kagame, commandant militaire du FPR, qui est également Ministre de la défense. Le Premier Ministre est M. Faustin Twagiramungu, du Mouvement démocratique républicain, et le Premier Ministre adjoint, le colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, du FPR. D'autres portefeuilles ont été attribués aux deux partis, de même qu'au Parti social-démocrate (PSD), au Parti démocrate-chrétien (PDC) et au Parti libéral (PL), qui étaient tous représentés dans le gouvernement provisoire précédent.

27. Depuis sa prise de fonctions, le Président Bizimungu s'est entretenu avec le Président Mobutu du Zaïre, le Président Mwinyi de Tanzanie, le Président Museveni d'Ouganda et le Président intérimaire du Burundi, M. Ntibantunganya. Les dirigeants rwandais encouragent les réfugiés à rentrer au Rwanda en donnant les assurances suivantes :

- a) Les réfugiés n'ont à craindre ni les persécutions ni les représailles. Ceux qui viennent de Goma ne feront l'objet d'aucun contrôle;

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b) Les réfugiés et personnes déplacées pourront regagner leurs foyers, se réinstaller dans leur exploitation agricole, récupérer leurs biens, etc.; si ceux-ci sont occupés par des tiers, les occupants illégaux seront expulsés de force. Les réfugiés rentrant au Rwanda en provenance d'Ouganda ne pourront faire valoir leurs droits en dépossédant des Rwandais de leurs droits légitimes;

c) Les criminels seront poursuivis en justice suivant la procédure prévue par la loi. L'ONU devrait nommer la Commission d'experts créée par la résolution 935 (1994), qui devrait commencer rapidement son enquête;

d) Le Gouvernement encourage les cadres civils et le personnel militaire à rentrer; et

e) Le Gouvernement coopérera pleinement avec l'ONU dans ses efforts visant à encourager le retour des réfugiés en rouvrant l'aéroport de Kigali, en autorisant l'installation d'une station de radio des Nations Unies et en facilitant la liberté de mouvement du personnel de l'ONU dans l'exercice de ses fonctions.

28. Il est évident que la tâche la plus urgente est actuellement de résoudre la crise humanitaire massive créée par les réfugiés au Zaïre et les personnes déplacées au Rwanda, de créer des conditions de sécurité et de normaliser la situation afin que ces malheureux puissent regagner leurs foyers et soient encouragés à le faire. Le nouveau Gouvernement ne pourra assurer des conditions de stabilité dans le pays qu'après que ces objectifs auront été atteints. Des pourparlers politiques avec les éléments modérés du MRND devraient toutefois être organisés dès que possible afin de mettre au point des arrangements politiques devant assurer la stabilité à long terme du Rwanda.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

29. L'agonie d'un petit pays contraint d'assister au massacre d'une partie importante de sa population et au déplacement de la moitié des survivants est l'une des situations les plus effroyables de ces derniers temps. Elle est d'autant plus tragique que la communauté internationale a hésité si longtemps avant d'intervenir, bien que la plupart de ses membres aient signé la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide. Comme je l'ai fait observer dans mon rapport du 31 mai 1994 (S/1994/640), par notre incapacité d'agir, nous nous sommes résignés aux effroyables pertes en vies humaines et à la souffrance d'un peuple tout entier. Afin de réparer ses torts, la communauté internationale doit, à tout le moins, faire en sorte que, par le biais des efforts déployés par la Commission des droits de l'homme, le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies chargé des droits de l'homme et la Commission d'experts créée par la résolution 935 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité, en date du 1er juillet 1994, les individus qui, à titre personnel ou dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ont déclenché ce cataclysme soient poursuivis en justice.

30. En ce qui concerne la Commission d'experts, mon rapport du 26 juillet 1994 (S/1994/879) définit son mandat. Je lui ai demandé de me communiquer, avant le 30 novembre 1994, ses conclusions sur les éléments de preuve dont elle disposera concernant des violations caractérisées du droit international humanitaire et des actes de génocide, à partir desquels les auteurs de ces violations

pourraient être identifiés. La Commission est également habilitée à examiner la question de la juridiction, internationale ou nationale, devant laquelle ces personnes devraient être jugées. J'ai nommé les personnes ci-après en tant que membres de la Commission : M. Atsu-Koffi Amega, Président, (Togo), Mme Habi Dieng (Guinée) et M. Salifou Fomba (Mali).

31. Il incombe à la communauté internationale de faire tout son possible pour atténuer les horribles souffrances endurées dans les camps de réfugiés au Zaïre, de même qu'en Tanzanie, en Ouganda et au Burundi, et permettre aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées de regagner leurs foyers ou d'autres zones sûres dans des conditions de sécurité raisonnables. À ce sujet, j'exprime ma gratitude aux gouvernements qui ont décidé de déployer des troupes au Rwanda et/ou au Zaïre afin de fournir le soutien logistique indispensable à l'effort humanitaire. En même temps, je suis de plus en plus préoccupé par les problèmes de coordination qui se poseront si plusieurs forces étrangères sous commandement national travaillent aux côtés de la MINUAR qui est placée sous le commandement des Nations Unies, et des forces loyales au nouveau gouvernement. En principe, toutes les forces étrangères qui participent à l'effort humanitaire devraient faire partie intégrante de la MINUAR. Si cela est impossible, je demanderais instamment que le déploiement des forces étrangères soit autorisé par le Conseil de sécurité, même si leur mandat est purement humanitaire, et que des arrangements formels soient établis entre elles et la MINUAR en matière de liaison, comme cela a été le cas pour l'Opération Turquoise.

32. Les gouvernements qui possèdent les ressources nécessaires sont aussi instamment priés de les affecter à la reconstruction et au relèvement indispensables pour remettre le Rwanda en état. Je félicite les gouvernements qui commencent déjà à fournir ces formes d'assistance concrète.

33. Le gouvernement récemment installé au Rwanda doit également rassembler à nouveau son peuple dans le cadre de la réconciliation nationale. Même après la tragédie à laquelle il a été confronté, il doit faire preuve de magnanimité et empêcher que ses succès militaires n'entraînent un désir de domination permanente. Il doit veiller à ce qu'il n'y ait pas de représailles et permettre aux familles de regagner leurs foyers et à chacun de reprendre ses occupations professionnelles et de retrouver ses moyens d'existence. Le gouvernement doit accepter, dans l'armée nationale, les soldats des anciennes forces armées et les membres de la gendarmerie qui ne se sont pas délibérément livrés à des massacres aveugles. Il doit mettre en place un système judiciaire équitable et transparent afin de juger les individus soupçonnés d'être les instigateurs des massacres de leurs compatriotes ou d'y avoir participé.

34. Il s'agit là de tâches écrasantes pour un gouvernement qui vient de prendre le pouvoir dans un pays dévasté et anéanti. Outre l'aide humanitaire d'urgence et l'aide à la reconstruction et au relèvement qu'il faudra lui fournir, il devra également recevoir une assistance pour le rétablissement des systèmes d'administration, de justice, de police, des finances, d'éducation et de santé et pour l'exercice des autres responsabilités qui incombent à tout gouvernement. J'espère que les gouvernements lui fourniront cette assistance dans un cadre bilatéral ou par le biais des organismes des Nations Unies. Mais ce sont, en dernière analyse, les Rwandais eux-mêmes qui devront assumer ces tâches, ce


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qu'ils ne pourront faire que si le gouvernement s'engage à promouvoir une réconciliation véritable et totale.

35. L'objectif politique ultime doit être l'installation d'un système de gouvernement à base élargie donnant à tous les éléments de la société, quel que soit leur origine ethnique ou leur niveau social, un sentiment de sécurité et une place dans la vie du pays. L'Accord d'Arusha contient toujours des principes et fournit un vaste cadre pour la mise en place d'un tel système. L'Organisation de l'unité africaine et la République-Unie de Tanzanie, qui ont contribué à la négociation de l'Accord, auront un rôle spécial à jouer dans ce domaine. Les quatre voisins du Rwanda, assumant également une responsabilité particulière, devront promouvoir la stabilité dans ce pays en convalescence et empêcher que leur territoire ne serve à lancer de nouveaux actes de déstabilisation. Il est encourageant de noter que le nouveau gouvernement a établi avec eux des relations cordiales. Tous les pays de la région doivent s'efforcer de faire en sorte que les répercussions de la crise au Rwanda n'atteignent pas le Burundi car cela risquerait de déstabiliser la région tout entière.

36. En conclusion, je tiens à remercier mon ancien Représentant spécial, M. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, et mon nouveau Représentant spécial, M. Shaharyar Khan, de même que le personnel de la MINUAR pour le dévouement dont ils ont fait preuve dans les conditions les plus difficiles. Je tiens en particulier à exprimer ma gratitude au commandant de la Force, le général de division Dallaire, pour l'autorité remarquable dont il a fait preuve. Enfin, j'exprime, en mon nom propre et au nom de tous les membres du système des Nations Unies, mes sincères condoléances à toutes les personnes qui au Rwanda ont perdu des membres de leur famille dans une situation qui aurait été un cauchemar si elle n'était pas effectivement devenue réalité.





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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 17 and 11 of Security Council resolutions 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994 and 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994 respectively, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it by 9 August on the progress made by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of the population at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards a cease-fire and political reconciliation, as well as the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR. The Secretariat presented an oral report to the Council on 7 July pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 929 (1994), when the Council was also informed of the arrival at Kigali on 4 July of my new Special Representative, Mr. Shaharyar Khan. Members of the Council have also seen my letter of 1 August 1994 to the President of the Council (S/1994/923) about UNAMIR'S requirements for additional troops and equipment. The present report is based on information available to the Secretariat up to 1 August 1994.

2. Since the adoption of resolutions 925 (1994) and 929 (1994), the situation in Rwanda has been transformed. The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) has established military control over most of the country. About 1.5 million Rwandese sought refuge in Zaire over a two-week period in July creating a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic proportions. The former "interim Government" fled, and on 19 July a broad-based Government of national unity was formed.

II. MILITARY SITUATION

3. The RPF forces took full control of Kigali, the capital, on 4 July, of Butare, the second largest city, on 5 July, and of the former Government's stronghold, Ruhengeri, on 14 July. The retreating Rwandese Government forces concentrated in and around Gisenyi in the north-west, soon withdrawing into Zaire. On 17 July RPF took Gisenyi and on 18 July it unilaterally declared a cease-fire, effectively ending the civil war which had broken out immediately after the death of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in a suspicious air crash, on 6 April, which led to country-wide massacres of the Hutu opposition

and intelligentsia, as well as members of the Tutsi minority and other RPF supporters.

4. As the Security Council is aware, the foremost priority of UNAMIR since the start of the crisis was to bring about a cease-fire and a halt to the carnage. The Force Commander, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, had intensified those efforts since early June, when the two sides initiated cease-fire talks at the military level under UNAMIR's auspices. My new Special Representative made this his first priority upon his arrival at Kigali, establishing direct contact with the leadership of both parties and emphasizing the importance of achieving an immediate cease-fire, especially with a view to preventing further exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis. However, cease-fire negotiations remained stalled until the fall of Gisenyi on 17 July, by which time over a million Rwandese refugees had crossed into Zaire.

5. Although the Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier General Henry Anyidoho, had previously succeeded in bringing the two sides together on most of the requirements for a cease-fire, their insistence on including rigid conditions prevented the conclusion of an agreement. On the side of the Rwandese government forces, guarantees were demanded that RPF was not willing to give, while RPF insisted on prior measures to halt the continuing massacres, which the Rwandese government forces professed themselves unable to take. There was also a strong indication that RPF was not prepared for a cease-fire until it had secured its military goals. While at first these appeared to be the control of as much territory as it could secure, the crumbling of the fighting capacity of the Rwandese government forces from late June onwards evidently encouraged RPF to intensify its offensive and take control not only of the capital, but also of the rear areas of the Rwandese government forces up to the Zairian border. Only the "humanitarian protected zone" established by the French task force, "Operation Turquoise" (see para. 7 below), did not come under the control of RPF.

6. The swift RPF advance had the effect of causing large numbers of civilians to take flight from the areas of combat. This displacement of the population might well have been containable, had not panic been caused by deliberately inflammatory broadcasts from radio stations controlled by the "interim Government". These provoked a massive stampede of refugees across the border into Zaire in the north-west, overwhelming humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose preparations had anticipated the simultaneous movement of refugees further south. Virtually all the Rwandese government forces retreated in disarray into Zaire, where they no longer comprise an organized fighting force, most of the personnel reportedly having been disarmed by the Zairian authorities, though there are disturbing reports that they are trying to prevent refugees from returning to Rwanda. Thus, for the present, the fighting in Rwanda has ended, with no significant military operations being reported since 18 July.

7. In the course of these events, the Government of France announced on 20 June 1994 its intention to dispatch a force to the region, based in Zaire but operating inside Rwanda, to provide protection to the large number of civilians uprooted from their homes by the fighting, many of whom had fled into Zaire. This operation was authorized by the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the

Charter of the United Nations, in resolution 929 (1994). On 2 July, France announced that Operation Turquoise would establish a "humanitarian protected zone" in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south-western Rwanda, covering about one fifth of Rwandese territory. While expressing its strong opposition to the French move, RPF did not seek confrontation with French forces which, on their side, avoided provocation. From the start, close cooperation at all levels was established between UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise with frequent contact between both force commanders. UNAMIR liaison officers were immediately stationed at the headquarters of the French force at Goma, Zaire, with a French liaison office later being established at UNAMIR headquarters at Kigali. Resolution 929 (1994) had authorized the deployment of the French force until 21 August 1994, and, on 11 July, the Prime Minister of France informed the Council and me of the French Government's decision to commence its withdrawal by 31 July.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

8. The protracted violence in Rwanda has created an almost unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Of a total population of approximately 7 million, as many as 500,000 people have been killed, 3 million displaced internally and more than 2 million have fled to neighbouring countries. Although the flight of people seems to have slowed, the situation remains volatile and extremely fluid. Of particular concern is the possibility of another massive outflow from the humanitarian protected zone in south-west Rwanda when the French forces withdraw.

9. The international community is confronted with four basic humanitarian challenges: to respond to the immediate life-saving needs of refugees; to facilitate the early return of those who have fled their homes; to restore basic infrastructure in Rwanda; and to ensure a smooth transition in the humanitarian protected zone established by French forces.

10. It is hard to describe the horrors faced by those who have fled Rwanda, many of them inspired by propaganda radio broadcasts whose purpose has been to spread fear among the population. The pace of developments and the sheer number of people overwhelmed the capacities of the humanitarian organizations, which were striving valiantly against impossible odds. An outbreak of cholera has already claimed as many as 20,000 lives and remains a continuing threat. Thousands of corpses remain unburied, posing health hazards and endangering ground water sources in the area. The logistics of arranging the daily supply and distribution of 30 million litres of drinking water and 1,000 tons of food are daunting.

11. There is consensus on the necessity of promoting and facilitating the early return of Rwandese to their homes. This is essential given the conditions in the refugee camps and the need within the next two weeks to harvest the crops which traditionally supply 60 per cent of Rwanda's yearly caloric intake. This will require confidence-building measures among the refugees, the establishment of transit depots and the prepositioning of humanitarian supplies. I am deeply disturbed by reports that persons and groups from the former "interim Government" and the Rwandese government forces are intimidating refugees in the

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Goma camps to prevent them from returning to Rwanda by telling them that they face torture and death at the hands of RPF troops if they do so.

12. The civil conflict in Rwanda has destroyed the country's infrastructure. Short- and medium-term rehabilitation is essential for the absorption of the returnee population as well as the resettlement of the internally displaced. The restoration of electricity, the water supply and telecommunications are the minimum actions needed. It is also important to restore the capacity of the Government to carry out its responsibilities.

13. It is estimated that there are as many as 2 million internally displaced persons in the humanitarian protected zone in south-west Rwanda. An outflow of this group into Zaire would eclipse the current horrors of Goma. To prevent this from happening, it is necessary to ensure the capacity of UNAMIR to take over responsibility in this area and to increase the humanitarian presence and activities there.

14. The actions outlined above must be pursued simultaneously. Failure to respond adequately in any one area of need will weaken the effectiveness of actions in the other interrelated areas.

15. To respond to this complex situation, the United Nations humanitarian organizations, under the leadership of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office, have prepared a United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda covering emergency and rehabilitation needs until the end of the current year. To support these urgent activities US\$ 434.8 million are required. In launching this appeal on 22 July, I urged the international community to contribute generously and in a timely manner to ensure that vital humanitarian programmes could be implemented. A pledging conference was convened in Geneva on 2 August. I am encouraged by the initial positive response from Governments and, indeed, from ordinary people willing to help, and would like to thank those countries that have already made significant contributions.

16. At my request, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Peter Hansen, undertook a mission to Rwanda and to the neighbouring region from 24 to 28 July. He was accompanied by senior representatives of all principal United Nations humanitarian organizations as well as from the NGO community. During his mission, Mr. Hansen carried out an assessment of the humanitarian situation and took a number of measures to ensure that the necessary coordination arrangements were in place. These include a clear division of responsibilities among the organizations of the United Nations system, an overall strategy to meet this extraordinary humanitarian challenge, as well as a decision to move the headquarters of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office from Nairobi to Kigali.

17. Along with my Special Representative in Rwanda, Mr. Hansen met with Vice President Kagame and other senior officials of the new Government in Rwanda to discuss how humanitarian aid could be delivered to all parts of the country and the urgent steps required to re-establish a climate conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons. It is reassuring that the new Government has indicated its commitment to encourage people to return to Rwanda, to ensure

their protection and to permit full access to all those in need throughout the country. Refugees have already started to return to Rwanda.

18. I should like to express my appreciation to all the relief personnel, who are working in extremely difficult conditions to meet a humanitarian challenge of this scale. The courageous staff of UNAMIR and the French-led multinational force have played and continue to play a critical role in saving lives and protecting people. I would also like to pay tribute to those neighbouring countries that have accepted and protected Rwandese refugees. Their generosity has made a difference between life and death for millions of fellow human beings in need. At this time, it is essential that the international community mobilize the necessary resources to enable humanitarian organizations to maintain and increase deliveries of urgently needed assistance.

IV. REVISED OPERATIONAL PLANS OF UNAMIR

19. I have already informed the Council in my letter of 1 August of the deplorable delays in the reinforcement of UNAMIR as authorized by resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994. I shall not repeat my comments beyond stressing that the failure of Member States to reinforce the military component of UNAMIR with the necessary speed severely limited its capacity to reduce the human suffering that accompanied the civil conflict and the deliberate massacres of civilians, mainly members of the Hutu opposition and supporters of RPF.

20. With the situation on the ground in Rwanda having changed radically over the past few weeks, UNAMIR has adjusted its operational plans to cope with the altered circumstances within the framework of the mandate established by the Security Council in its resolution 925 (1994). UNAMIR's principal tasks are now as follows:

(a) To ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda;

(b) To stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of refugees and the displaced population;

(c) To provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda as humanitarian organizations arrange the return of refugees;

(d) To promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.

21. Even with the severely limited resources possessed by UNAMIR, the Mission has already taken action. It has deployed a company along the border near Goma, Zaire as well as a number of observers in that region and in the zone controlled by Operation Turquoise. In the expectation that UNAMIR will eventually receive the 5,500 troops authorized by the Security Council, the Force Commander has planned deployment in five sectors, as indicated in the map annexed to the present report and as follows:

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- (a) Sector I (north-east): 1 engineer company;
- (b) Sector II (south-east): 1 reinforced motorized company;
- (c) Sector III (south): 1 reinforced motorized company;
- (d) Sector IV (south-west): 3 mechanized/motorized infantry battalions;
- (e) Sector V (north-west): 1 mechanized/motorized infantry battalion.

22. The Force headquarters would remain at Kigali, with the minimum units required for protection, along with specialized units for communications and logistics, as well as the field hospital. United Nations military observers and United Nations civilian police monitors would be deployed in all sectors according to operational requirements.

23. The principal areas of concern are in the north-west to resettle returning refugees, and in the south-west to avert possible outbreaks of violence. The north-western sector borders Zaire near the vast throng of over a million Rwandese refugees assembled there in the harshest of conditions. It is known that substantial numbers of the former Rwandese government forces and militia, as well as extremist elements suspected of involvement in the massacres of the Hutu opposition and RPF supporters, are mingled with the refugees in Zaire and are reportedly trying to prevent their return. A more volatile situation prevails in the south-west, where armed elements of the Rwandese government forces have sought refuge in the French-protected zone. Furthermore, these are the two regions through which refugees will transit as they return from Zaire. Large numbers of refugees are also expected to return from Tanzania into sectors I and II, and a substantial number from Burundi into sectors II and III, but these three sectors are not expected to present the problems anticipated in sectors IV and V.

24. The situation in sector IV is particularly pressing in view of the anxiety of the French Government to complete its withdrawal by 21 August. In discussions with UNAMIR, the new Rwandese Government has indicated that it will not insist on taking control of this area immediately, provided that UNAMIR will ensure its stability. For this purpose, it would be imperative that UNAMIR be able to deploy the three battalions intended for this sector. Should they not be available, UNAMIR would have to go into the zone with depleted strength and threadbare equipment. The new Government, so far, has refused to accept that UNAMIR should include troops from some African countries participating in Operation Turquoise, but it may be possible to persuade it to permit these troops, along with their equipment, to remain. In that case, it is hoped that France will be prepared to lease some of the equipment being used by Operation Turquoise.

V. POLITICAL ASPECTS

25. The Arusha Peace Agreement (see A/48/824-S/26915) was signed a year ago in the hope that the political balance it stipulated would bring lasting stability to Rwanda through a pluralist approach of a transitional government, which would

include the numerous parties that had emerged, leading to elections. Both the "interim Government", established immediately after the death of President Habyarimana on 6 April, as well as RPF, professed some commitment to the principles of the Arusha agreement. However, the "interim Government" took the position that the agreement was based on the fallacious premise that the historic ethnic animosity between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi could be resolved by a political formula; the only solution would be an arrangement which could guarantee the rights not only of the minority but also of the majority so that one would not fear domination by the other; this could be achieved neither through military means nor through simple elections. For its part, RPF maintained that while it remained committed to the Arusha principles of a pluralist political compromise, the deliberate subversion of the Arusha process by extremist Hutu elements and their planned and deliberate massacres of Tutsi and moderate Hutu called for changes in the Arusha formula to ensure that this could not occur again.

26. For the present, RPF has not only military but also political control of the country, other than the area controlled by Operation Turquoise, and it installed a broad-based Government of National Unity on 19 July 1994 for a transitional period of five years. It has excluded the former governing party, the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement, as well as an openly anti-Tutsi party the Coalition pour la défense de la République, which was not included in the transitional government established by the Arusha agreement. In the present transitional Government, the post of President, reserved for the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement in the Arusha agreement, has been allocated to Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu of RPF, and the post of Vice President, not provided for in the Arusha agreement, has been allocated to Major-General Paul Kagame, military commander of RPF who is also Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister is Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu of the Mouvement démocratique républicain and the Deputy Prime Minister is Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe of RPF. Other portfolios have been allocated to these two parties as well as the Parti socialiste démocrate, the Parti démocrate chrétien and the Parti libéral, all of which were members of the previous transitional Government.

27. Since taking office, President Bizimungu has met with President Mobutu of Zaire, President Mwinyi of Tanzania, President Museveni of Uganda and the Interim President of Burundi, Mr. Ntibantunganya. The Rwandese leadership is encouraging refugees to return to Rwanda by publicizing the following assurances:

(a) Refugees need not fear persecution or reprisals. Refugees returning from Goma will not be screened;

(b) Refugees and displaced persons can return to their homes, properties, farms, etc. If these have been occupied by others, unauthorized occupants will be forcibly ejected. Uganda-based refugees returning to Rwanda have no right to assert their claims by dispossessing Rwandese of their legal rights;

(c) Criminals will be prosecuted according to a process of law. The United Nations should appoint the Commission of Experts established by resolution 935 (1994), which should urgently begin its investigation;

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(d) The Government is encouraging civilian officials and army personnel to return;

(e) The Government will give full cooperation to United Nations efforts to encourage refugee return by reopening Kigali airport, permitting the establishment of a United Nations radio station and facilitating freedom of movement for United Nations personnel carrying out their functions.

28. It is evident that the highest priority at the moment is the resolution of the massive humanitarian crisis caused by the refugees in Zaire and the displaced persons in Rwanda and the establishment of conditions of security and normalcy to encourage and enable these unfortunate people to return to their homes. Only then can the new Government ensure stable conditions in the country. Political discussions with moderate elements of the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement to work out political arrangements for the long-term stability of Rwanda should, however, begin as soon as possible.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

29. The agony of a small country which is having to endure the massacre of a substantial portion of its population and the displacement of half the survivors is one of the most hideous events in recent times. It is all the more tragic that the international community hesitated for so long to intervene, despite the fact that most of its Member States have signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As I remarked in my report of 31 May (S/1994/640), by our failure we have acquiesced in the horrifying loss of human life and the suffering of an entire people. To make amends, the international community, at the very least, must ensure that, through the efforts of the Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Commission of Experts established by Security Council resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994, those individuals responsible in their personal and official capacities for unleashing and instigating this cataclysm are brought to justice.

30. As regards the Commission of Experts, my report of 26 July 1994 (S/1994/879) set out its mandate. I have requested it to provide me, not later than 30 November 1994, with its conclusions on evidence of specific violations of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide, on the basis of which identification of the persons responsible for those violations could be made. The Commission is also empowered to examine the question of the jurisdiction, international or national, before which such persons should be brought to trial. I have appointed the following persons to serve as members of the Commission: Mr. Atsu-Koffi Amega, Chairman (Togo), Mrs. Habi Dieng (Guinea) and Mr. Salifou Fomba (Mali).

31. It is incumbent upon the international community to do everything in its power to alleviate the appalling human suffering in the refugee camps in Zaire, as well as in Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi, and to enable refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes or other safe areas in reasonable security. In this connection, I am grateful to those Governments that have decided to deploy

troops to Rwanda and/or Zaire in order to provide critically needed logistic support to the humanitarian effort. At the same time, I am becoming concerned by the problems of coordination that will arise if several foreign forces under national command are working along side UNAMIR, which is under United Nations command, and the forces loyal to the new Government. Ideally, all foreign forces engaged in support of the humanitarian effort should be part of UNAMIR. If this is not possible, I would urge that the deployment of the foreign forces should be authorized by the Security Council, even if their mandate is purely humanitarian, and that formal liaison arrangements should be established between them and UNAMIR, as has been the case with Operation Turquoise.

32. Governments which possess the necessary resources are also urged to apply them toward the reconstruction and rehabilitation needed to bring Rwanda to its feet again. I commend those Governments that are already beginning to provide these forms of tangible assistance.

33. The recently installed Government in Rwanda also bears responsibility for bringing its people together again in national reconciliation. Even in the wake of the tragedy that it has confronted, it must show magnanimity and not allow its military success to create a desire for permanent dominance. It must ensure that there are no reprisals. It must enable families to regain their homes and individuals to return to their professions and livelihoods. It must accept in the national army those soldiers of the former armed forces and gendarmerie who did not deliberately engage in wanton killings. It must install an equitable and transparent system of justice to try those suspected of instigating or participating in the massacres of their compatriots.


34. These are overwhelming tasks for a fledgling Government which has taken power in a wrecked and devastated country. In addition to the urgent humanitarian needs and help in reconstruction and rehabilitation, the Government will also require assistance in re-establishing systems of administration, justice, police, finance, education and health and all the other responsibilities a Government must discharge. I hope that Governments will make this available on a bilateral basis or through the United Nations system. But, ultimately, it is the Rwandese who must assume these tasks, and this can only be done if the Government commits itself to genuine and full reconciliation.

35. The ultimate political aim must be the installation of a broad-based system of government that will give all elements of society, irrespective of ethnic origin or social level, a sense of security and a stake in the country. The Arusha agreement still provides principles and a broad framework for establishing such a system. The Organization of African Unity and the United Republic of Tanzania, which were instrumental in the negotiation of the Arusha agreement, will have a special role to play. Rwanda's four neighbours also have a special responsibility to promote stability in this recuperating country and to ensure that their territories are not used for further destabilization. It is gratifying to note that the new Government has established cordial contacts with all four neighbours. All countries in the region must work to ensure that the repercussions of the crisis in Rwanda do not strike at Burundi, for this could destabilize the entire region.

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36. In conclusion, I should like to commend my former Special Representative, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, and my new Special Representative, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, as well as the personnel of UNAMIR, who have worked with dedication under the most demanding conditions. I must especially commend the Force Commander, Major-General Dallaire, for his outstanding leadership. In ending, I extend on my own behalf and on behalf of all members of the United Nations our heartfelt condolences to all in Rwanda who have lost members of their families in what would have been a nightmare had it not actually come to pass.



**UNITED
NATIONS**

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/48/57
31 January 1994

Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 44

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/48/L.47 and Add.1)]

48/57. Strengthening of the coordination of
humanitarian emergency assistance of the
United Nations

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 46/182 of 19 December 1991 and 47/168 of 22 December 1992,

Reaffirming also the guiding principles contained in section I of the annex to its resolution 46/182,

Noting that States have submitted replies to the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 of its resolution 47/168,

Taking note of the relevant decisions of operational agencies, organizations, programmes and funds of the United Nations system concerning their participation in a coordinated response to humanitarian emergencies,

Deeply concerned about the increasing number and growing magnitude and complexity of natural disasters and other emergencies,

Concerned about the impediments created by natural disasters and other emergencies to the efforts of the affected countries to achieve development,

Emphasizing the importance of a timely, prompt and effective humanitarian response,

Stressing the importance of a coordinated response to natural disasters and of technical and financial assistance to the natural-disaster-prone countries in the fields of disaster preparedness and mitigation, including exchange of information and post-disaster development activities,

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Noting the encouraging results of the operation of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund and its increasing utilization by the operational agencies,

Recognizing the increasing need for humanitarian assistance and adequate financial resources to ensure a prompt response by the United Nations to humanitarian emergency situations, both for relief and for the continuum to development,

Recognizing also the need to strengthen coordination further, in particular field coordination, on humanitarian assistance, bearing in mind that coordination should be field-oriented,

Noting also the humanitarian and rehabilitation aspects of the problem of mine clearance, in the context of its resolution 48/7 of 19 October 1993,

Welcoming the efforts being undertaken in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to develop a coherent and complementary approach on the part of the relevant operational and development actors to the continuum-related activities,

Stressing the need for adequate protection of personnel involved in humanitarian operations in accordance with relevant norms and principles of international law and within the context of General Assembly resolutions 47/120 A of 18 December 1992 and 47/120 B of 20 September 1993, taking into account recent initiatives in this regard, 1/

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General; 2/
2. Agrees fully with the agreed conclusions of the Economic and Social Council, 3/ the implementation of which will be reviewed by the Council at its substantive session of 1994;
3. Emphasizes the leadership role of the Secretary-General, through the Emergency Relief Coordinator and working closely with him, in coordinating a coherent and timely response to humanitarian emergencies;
4. Stresses the essential need for improved coordination within the United Nations system, and, while reaffirming the mandate and functions of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs to that end, requests the Emergency Relief Coordinator to improve coordination and management further, both at Headquarters and at the field level, including the coordination of the work of the relevant operational agencies;

1/ See Security Council resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993, A/48/349-S/26358 and General Assembly resolutions 48/37 of 9 December 1993 and 48/42 of 10 December 1993.

2/ A/48/536.

3/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/48/3/Rev.1), chap. III.

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5. Invites the intergovernmental bodies of the relevant operational organizations and agencies to provide full support for system-wide coordination, under the leadership of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, in order to facilitate an effective response at Headquarters and at the field level to natural disasters and other emergencies;

6. Also stresses, in this regard, that the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, under the leadership of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, should serve as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination, meet more frequently and act therefore in an action-oriented manner on policy issues related to humanitarian assistance and on formulating a coherent and timely United Nations response to humanitarian emergencies;

7. Further stresses the necessity of accelerating the development of an emergency information system, within the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, to collect and disseminate timely information on natural disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, including information provided by the national Government, United Nations agencies, donors and relief organizations, to provide early warning of a crisis, to assess needs on a continuing basis and to track financial and other contributions;

8. Recognizes the need to increase the resources available in the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, including through timely repayment of funds, invites potential donors to make additional contributions to the Fund, and requests the Secretary-General to conduct consultations to that effect, taking fully into account the need to secure contributions to the Fund on an assured, broad-based and additional basis;

9. Decides to expand the scope of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund to include the International Organization for Migration;

10. Invites operational agencies to contribute to field-level coordination in the early stages of an emergency;

11. Requests the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to agree, as a matter of urgency, on the best means and guidelines to ensure adequate human and financial resources for rapid response coordination, including the provision of resources that could be drawn on by the Emergency Relief Coordinator for establishing special coordination arrangements in the initial stage of an emergency, taking into account the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 46/182 and 47/199 of 22 December 1992 and of the agreed conclusions of the Economic and Social Council related to field-level coordination; 4/

12. Decides also, pending a final decision to be taken by the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1994, on the basis of the recommendations of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, as well as on the experience gained, to authorize, in exceptional circumstances, on a time-bound basis and while preserving the revolving nature of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and relevant operational

4/ Ibid., chap. III, sect. A, paras. 18-20 of the agreed conclusions.

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agencies, under the leadership of the Coordinator, to draw from the interest earned by the Revolving Fund to enhance rapid response coordination where insufficient capacity exists at the field level;

13. Also requests the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to provide recommendations on other issues related to field coordination, including measures taken for clear allocations of responsibilities at an early stage of an emergency, in particular by entrusting the primary responsibility to the operational agencies, as appropriate, and on standardized procedures for joint emergency needs assessment missions, under the overall leadership and coordination of the Emergency Relief Coordinator;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to include in his annual report on the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance recommendations on practical measures to enhance the coordinated system-wide support for efforts to facilitate the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation and development and, particularly in the context of activities of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the promotion of national capacity-building to help prevent and mitigate future emergencies;

15. Also requests the Secretary-General to continue to strengthen the consolidated appeals process, making it more field-oriented, and to ensure that such appeals are based on specific priorities resulting from comprehensive and realistic projections of relief requirements for natural disasters and other emergencies requiring a coordinated response, and in this context invites all concerned operational and humanitarian organizations and agencies to cooperate and fully participate in the preparation of these appeals;

16. Calls upon States to respond quickly and generously to consolidated appeals for humanitarian assistance, taking into account rehabilitation and long-term development requirements;

17. Invites the Secretary-General to examine further all possible ways and means to provide, within existing resources, adequate qualified personnel and administrative resources commensurate with the responsibilities of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in dealing with the increasing number of natural disasters and other emergencies;

18. Stresses the importance of the Emergency Relief Coordinator participating fully in the overall United Nations planning of responses to emergencies in order to serve as the humanitarian advocate in ensuring that the humanitarian dimension, particularly the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality of relief assistance, is taken fully into account;

19. Emphasizes the importance of the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator in facilitating access by the operational organizations to emergency areas for the rapid provision of emergency assistance by obtaining the consent of all parties concerned, through modalities such as the establishment of temporary relief corridors where needed, days and zones of tranquillity and other forms, including facilitating for those organizations the return of refugees and displaced persons;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to include in his annual report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session recommendations on ways and means to improve the operational capacity of the emergency stockpiles, as well

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as an analysis of the advantages or disadvantages, including promptness of the response and cost-effectiveness, of the establishment of regional warehouses, taking into account the existing facilities and the possibility of strengthening them;

21. Also requests the Secretary-General to include in his report to the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1994 the recommendations of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee requested in paragraphs 11 and 13 of the present resolution;

22. Further requests the Secretary-General to include in his annual report on the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session information on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution and on ways of further strengthening coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance within the United Nations system.

78th plenary meeting
14 December 1993

TOTAL P..

STATISTICS ON THE MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA BY
UNAMIR FORCES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

03 May 94 Unsuccessful attempt to evacuate 60 Rwandese from Milles Collines Hotel to Kigali Airport

27 May 94 Safe transfer of 480 displaced from Milles Collines Hotel and Amahoro Stadium using Ghanaian UN troops and UNMOs

28 May 94 Safe transfer of 695 displaced from Milles Collines Hotel and Amahoro Stadium using Ghanaian UN troops and UNMOs

29 May 94 Transfer operation stopped due to convoy being fired upon by machine gun

30 May 94 Safe transfer of 536 displaced from Milles Collines Hotel and Amahoro Stadium using Ghanaian UN troops and UNMOs

31 May 94 Transfer operation suspended due to shelling of the convoy route

3 Jun 94 Safe transfer of 339 displaced from Sainte Famille Church and Amahoro Stadium however operation was halted when the convoy was fired upon

13 Jun 94 Safe transfer of 550 displaced from Sainte Famille Church and King Faycal Hospital. Drunken and armed militiamen caused difficulties with the transfer from Sainte Famille

14 Jun 94 Militia force suspension of transfer of displaced

17 Jun 94 RPF conducted a night raid on the St Paul camp and were successful in liberating an unknown number of displaced persons

18 Jun 94 Safe transfer of 824 displaced from King Faycal Hospital and Milles Collines Hotel using Ghanaian UN troops and UNMOs

20 Jun 94 Safe transfer of 480 displaced from King Faycal Hospital and Sainte Famille Church

22 Jun 94 Transfer operation suspended due to heavy fighting in the city

25 Jun 94 Transfer operation is aborted due to belief by RGF troops that French have intervened in operation on their behalf

04 Jul 94 RPF take control of Kigali City.

Throughout the fighting in the city of Kigali from 27 May to 20 Jun, UNAMIR successfully moved a total of 3,904 displaced persons. UNAMIR was successful in ensuring that the 60 Rwandese involved in the evacuation operation of the 03 May 94 were returned to the Milles Collines without loss of life.

16 Aug 94 UNHCR transported 550 displaced persons from Gisenyi to Kigali. IOM transported 450 displaced persons from BYUMBA to Kigali. UNAMIR returned from delivering food to KIBUYE and transported 200 displaced persons to Kigali

18 Aug 94 IOM transferred 393 orphans from Byumba to St Paul orphanage in Kigali. IOM transferred approximately 200 persons from Ruhengeri to Kigali.

20 Aug 94 IOM transported 136 displaced persons from Byumba to Kigali. Canadian C-130 brought 14 displaced persons from Cyangugu to Kigali

21 Aug 94 Canadian C-130 brought 20 displaced persons from Cyangugu to Kigali

22 Aug 94 UNHCR transported 118 displaced persons from Kibuye to Kigali using IOM vehicles

23 Aug 94 IOM transported 209 displaced persons from Byumba to Kigali. Canadian C-130 transported 44 persons to Kigali from Bukavu

25 Aug 94 BRITCON transported 106 displaced persons from Cyangugu to Kigali. IOM transported 85 displaced persons from Kisaro Camp in Byumba to Kigali

26 Aug 94 IOM transported 64 displaced persons from Kisaro Camp in Byumba to Kigali (Byumba Camps empty). BRITCON moved 500 displaced persons from Kibuye to Kigali (80 were dropped in Gitarama)

28 Aug 94 IOM transported 300 displaced persons from Cyangugu and Gisenyi to Kigali. BRITCON moved 400 displaced persons from Cyangugu and Kibuye. Three displaced persons from Kibuye were arrested by RPA at crossing point, one attempted to escape and was shot dead. WFP transported 250 persons from Kibuye to Kigali.

29 Aug 94 UNAMIR transported 60 displaced persons from Cyangugu to Kigali.

30 Aug 94 Two UNHCR convoys carried 300 displaced persons to Kigali and 100 to Gitarama. BRITCON convoy returned 300 displaced from Cyangugu to Kigali.

During the month of Aug, 6,879 displaced persons were transported to Kigali in support of the Rwandese Government. In addition a further 350 were transported to other areas.

24 May 1994

LIST NO ONE; FIRST TRUCK; FIRST DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	GAKUSI	JEAN BAPTISTE	UN ID and RWANDAN ID	2	Gakusi
2.	BEATRICE	KAMPIRWA	Rwandan ID	1	Kamper
3.	CHARLOTTE	MUKANYIBUKA	lost ID		
4.	SILAS	MBARUSHIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	Silasy
5.	Diocelle	MUKAMURAMBA	Rwandan ID	1	Diocelle
6.	Genevieve	UWAMARIYA	Rwandan ID	1	Genevieve
7.	Phélemine	MUKABURANGWA	Rwandan ID	1	Phélemine
8.	Sarah	NTAWURABARUNDI	Rwandan ID	1	Sarah
9.	Rose	NYIRAHABIMANA	MINOR		Rose
10.	Gertrude	UWIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	Gertrude
11.		BARAWIGIRIRA	SRPTAN Minor		
12.	Antoinette	NISHYIREMBERE	Rwandan ID	1	Antoinette
13.	Annonciata	MUKANGANGO	Rwandan ID	1	Annonciata
14.	Valérie	MUKESHIMANA	Rwandan ID		Valérie
15.	Jeanvière	KABALIHA	Rwandan ID	1	Jeanvière
16.	J. M. Vianney	MAKABUZA	Rwandan ID	1	J. M. Vianney
17.	Odette	MUJAWAMARIYA	Rwandan ID	1	Odette
18.	Aimable	MUSABE	Rwandan ID	1	Aimable
19.	Alphonsine	UWAMAHORO	MINOR		Alphonsine
20.	Léa	UWAMAHORO	Rwandan ID	1	Léa
21.	Jean Chrysostome	NSENGIYUMVA	Rwandan ID	1	Jean Chrysostome
22.	Epiphane	KAMUGISHA	Rwandan ID	1	Epiphane
23.	Jean	NDAYAMBAJE	Rwandan ID	1	Jean
24.	Marie Assumpta	UWARAMUTSE	Rwandan ID	1	Marie Assumpta
25.	Téléphore	KARANUWA	Rwandan ID	1	Téléphore
26.	Thérèse	MUTUMWINKA	Rwandan ID	1	Thérèse
27.	Ludica	MUKAMUYARA	MINOR		Ludica
28.	Athanase	IYAMUREMYE	Rwandan ID	1	Athanase
29.	Thérèse	MUJAWAMARIYA	Rwandan ID	1	Thérèse
30.	Rose	UWAMAHORO	MINOR		Rose

24 May 1994

LIST NO TWO; SECOND TRUCK; FIRST DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	CYPRIEN	NGAYABERURA	Rwandan ID	1	
2.	FABIEN	SIBUMANA	Rwandan ID	1	
3.	STRATON	MPEREKEJE	Rwandan ID	1	
4.	INNOCENT	MPAGAZEHE	Rwandan ID	1	
5.	JEAN	NDAYAMBAJE	Rwandan ID lost	1	
6.	CELESTIN	KALIMWABO	Rwandan ID	1	
7.	AMINADAB	MUNYAKARAMA	Rwandan ID	1	
8.	THEOPHILE	KAHIRANGA	Rwandan ID	1	
9.	BONIFACE	SINDIBONA	Rwandan ID	1	
10.	EDISON	HAKIZIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	
11.	ESPERANCE	TUNGANDAME	Rwandan ID	1	
12.	FATRICE	VUGUZIGA	Rwandan ID	1	
13.	SAMUEL	MUHAYIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	
14.	GASTON	KANAMUGIRE	Rwandan ID	1	
15.	VESTINE	UWAMARIYA	Rwandan ID	1	
16.	FRANÇOIS	KANAMUGIRE	Rwandan ID lost	1	
17.	BENJAMIN	NTIRUNKUNDIYE	Rwandan ID	1	
18.	Pauline	MUKABATSINDA	-	-	
19.	CLEMENTINE	MUKASHYAKA	Rwandan ID	1	
20.	ELIEL	HARELIMANA	-	-	
21.	LADISLAS	NSHUTIRAGUMA	Rwandan ID	1	
22.	ROSE	MUKANTWALI	Rwandan ID	1	
23.	EMERENCE	BENEJO	Rwandan ID	1	
24.	ALOYS	NDIKURYAYO	Rwandan ID	1	
25.	DANCILLA	NIYONGIRA	Rwandan ID	1	
26.	ANANIE	KALINDANYI	Rwandan ID	1	
27.	ODA	TWINYANGE	Rwandan ID	1	
28.	MAURICE	SHUMBUSHO	Rwandan ID	1	
29.	J. PIERRE	NTWALI	Rwandan ID	1	
30.	CHRISTINE	MUKASHYAKA	Rwandan ID	1	



























24 May 1994

LIST NO THREE; THIRD TRUCK; FIRST DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	ASSIEL	KAREGEYA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
2.	ANNONCIATA	MUKAMUHIZI	Rwandan ID	1	
3.	JUSTIN	SIBOMANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
4.	J. DAMASCENE	RUTAGENGWA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
5.	LAURENCE	KAYIGIRE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
6.	VALERIE	KABAGWIRA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
7.	BEATA	LWAMAHORO	-		
8.	FABIEN	NGENDAHIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
9.	FAUSTIN	MVEJURU	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
10	MEDIATRICE	MUKAKABESU	Rwandan ID	1	
11	VINCENT	BIZIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
12	ALPHONSE	MPAGAREHE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
13	VENANTIE	BARAKAGIRA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
14	MARIE NADINE	INGABIRE	STUDENT		<i>[Signature]</i>
15	DJIER	HABIMANA	"		<i>[Signature]</i>
16	FATUMA	MUKASEKURU	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
17	MARIE GRACE	UGIRUMURERA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
18	JUDITH	TUYISABE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
19	VIRTEUR	NZEYIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
20	AUGUSTIN	RUHANGARA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
21	PERESI	NYIRAHAKIZIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
22	IMMACULEE	NIKUZE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
23	BEATRICE	MUKAKARARA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
24	MARCELLINE	MUKARUDEGE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
25	DENIS	NSANZABALINDA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
26	PATRICIE	ILIBONEYE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
27	DENISE	UWIZEJE	Student		<i>[Signature]</i>
28	BEATRICE	MUKANDAHAGE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
29	VEREDIANE	MUKAGASHONGORE	lost ID		<i>[Signature]</i>
30	VINCENT	HARELIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>

24 May 1994

LIST NO FOUR; FOURTH TRUCK; FIRST DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	Theogene	MUNYAKAYANZA	Rwandan ID	1	
2.	Patrice	NTAKIRUTINKA	Rwandan ID	1	
3.	Darcelle	NIKUZE	Lost ID		
4.	Simon	MUPANDA	Rwandan ID	1	
5.	Annonciata	MUKASHEMA	Rwandan ID	1	
6.	Charles	KAGAME	Rwandan ID	1	
7.	Brigitte	MUKANTAGARA	Rwandan ID	1	
8.	Marie	MUKAYIRANGA	Rwandan ID	1	
9.	Anasthole	MUHIADANGINGA	Rwandan ID	1	
10.	Aguilina	KAMATAMU	Rwandan ID	1	
11.	Marianne	KAMANZI	Rwandan ID	1	
12.	Goretti	Djamila	Rwandan ID	1	
13.	Celestin	MURAGIJIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	
14.	Leatitia	UWIMBARAZI	Rwandan ID	1	
15.	Joseph	VUGAYABAGABO	Rwandan ID	1	
16.	Jean Paul	KAYUMBA	Rwandan ID	1	
17.	Jean Paul	HAKIZIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	
18.	Vincent	DWABAHIZI	Rwandan ID	1	
19.	Beatrice	NIIZEYIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	
20.	Claudine	MUKANGANGA			
21.	Concessa	MUKANKIKO	MINOR		
22.	Franine	MUKAHIGIRO	Rwandan	1	
23.	Justine	MUREKATETE	Rwandan	1	
24.	Jean Bosco	NSEKABASHIMA	MINOR		
25.	Francois	UMVIMANA	Lost ID		
26.	Pelagie	MUKANDEKEZI	Rwandan ID	1	
27.	Lousien	NTIRUSHWAMAROKO	MINOR		
28.	Gerardine	KABERA	Rwandan ID	1	
29.	André	HABIYAMBERE	Rwandan ID	1	
30.	Narcisa	TWAGIRAMUNGU	Rwandan ID	1	





















24 May 1994

LIST NO FIVE; FIRST TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	MICHEL	NYANDWI	Lost ID		<i>[Signature]</i>
2.	ILDEPHONSE	KAREMERA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
3.	JUVENAL	BICAMUNDAKA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
4.	J. JAMASCENE	HAKIZIMANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
5.	FRODOVALD	MBONIVEZE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
6.	ANDRE	HABIMBERE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
7.	CHARLES	KARASIRE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
8.	DENISE	MUKAKIMENYI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
9.	JAMARSE	NYIRABAPAGASI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
10.	CYRILLE	NDATIMANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
11.	STANISLAS	RWAYIHIGI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
12.	SERVAIS	NYILIMBIBI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
13.	THERESE	MUKABANANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
14.	M. FLORENCE	UWANYIRIGIRA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
15.	MATHIAS	NTIGULIRWA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
16.	CHARLES	ZUBA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
17.	FRANCINE	MUKAHIGIRO	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
18.	CONCESSA	MUKANKIKO	-	-	
19.	CLAUDINE	MUKANGANGO	-	-	
20.	THEOPHILE	TUBANAMBAZI	Lost ID	-	<i>[Signature]</i>
21.	EMMANUEL	HITAYEZU	-	-	<i>[Signature]</i>
22.	BEATRICE	NYIRAMARIRO	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
23.	RAMADHANI	MIGAMBI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
24.		SIBOMANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
25.	SYLVAIN	UWIMANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
26.	PASCAL	RUTAGAMBWA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
27.	ESPERANCE	MUKASHYAKA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
28.	FLORENCE	UWURUKUNDO	lost ID		<i>[Signature]</i>
29.	JACQUELINE	MUKANKUSI	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
30.	THERESE	MUKAKABERA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>

24 May 1994

LIST NO SIX; SECOND TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	PIERRE CLAVER	BIGIRIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	
2.	JEAN BOSCO	NJIRIMANA	"	1	
3.	MARIE AIMABLE	UMURERWA	lost ID	1	
4.	DAPHROSE	MUSABYIMANA			
5.	ALICE	UMULISA	lost ID		
6.	CLARISSE	UMURJEYI			
7.	ZAINABU	KANONDO	lost ID		
8.	CHEMSA	HITIMANA			
9.	JARIA	UMUHUZA	lost ID		
10.	MARTIN	LIBAKARE	Rwandan ID	1	
11.	EMMANUEL	BAGIRISHERA	"	1	
12.	JEAN DE DIEU	MUNYAKAZI	"	1	
13.	ISMAEL	NZEJIMANA	"	1	
14.	CYRILION	HABYARIMANA	PP	1	
15.	HILAIRE	MUKAKIBOSO	Rwandan ID	1	
16.	LAURENCE	NJIRANSABIMANA	"		
17.	PAUL	NDABAVUNYI	Rwandan ID	1	
18.	ANDRE	NGENDABANZA	"	1	
19.	HELENE	MUKAMURENZI	"	1	
20.	JEANINE	KANZIMA	"	1	
21.	CHARLOTTE	MUKANKUBANA	student	1	
22.	JEAN MARIE V	BIRANTEJE	Rwandan ID	1	
23.	THACIANA	NJIRANDOLIMANA	"	1	
24.	JOSEPHINE	MUGIRANEZA	"	1	
25.	ALFRED	NDUTIYE	"	1	
26.	SATIVA	MUKARUZIGA	"	1	
27.	CECILE	MUKANKUSI	lost ID		
28.	CELESTIN	DUKORERIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	
29.	EDOUARD	NZEJIMANA	"	1	
30.	CHARLES	KAJEMUNDIMWE	"	1	

24 May 1994

LIST NO SEVEN; THIRD TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	EVERIANE	TUYISENGE	—	—	<i>[Signature]</i>
2.	JANVIERE	KAJIRERE	PP	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
3.	JEAN	KANAMUGIRE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
4.	VINCENT	NTIHIGWA	lost ID		<i>[Signature]</i>
5.	APOLLINARIE	BAMURANGE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
6.	EMILIE	MUKAGASANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
7.	FAUSTIN	NKUNDABATWARE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
8.	ERASTE	BALIZENE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
9.	AUGUSTIN	MULINDANGABO	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
10	BONIFACE	NTAMAKIRIRO	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
11	JEUDONNE	NIYONTEZE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
12	ANASTASE	KABANDA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
13	MEDIATRICE	UWIMANA	lost ID		<i>[Signature]</i>
14	SILAS	HAVUGIMANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
15	FRANCINE	MUKANDENGO	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
16	CYRILLE	NKURUNZIZA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
17	FLORENCE	MUKAKIMENYI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
18	DEOGRATIAS	NDIMUBANZI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
19	SPECIOSE	MUKANKUNDIYE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
20	DEOGRATIAS	HAVUGIYAREMYE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
21	FELICIEN	MUNYEMANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
22	ANICET	HABARUREHA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
23	CESARIE	MUKAMUKANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
24	ANDRE	UWIMANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
25	EVARISTE	KAMANZI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
26	JEAN	NDIKUYEZE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
27	LAMBERTE	NYIRABIREMBO	lost ID		<i>[Signature]</i>
28	JEROME	MBONYUNOVUNYI	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
29	JOSEPH	NYAMULENZE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
30	JOSEPHINE	NYIRABAGABE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>

24 May 1994

LIST NO EIGHT; FOURTH TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	ANNONCIATA	MUKANKUSI	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
2.	EMMANUEL	SENJONI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
3.	PHILOKENE	MUKAGATARE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
4.	MOHAMMED	AHRI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
5.	REHEMA	MUKABIDERI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
6.	PROTOGENE	MWISENEZA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
7.	FAUSTIN	SEKABIBI	Student	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
8.	JUVENAL	BUCYANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
9.	AUREA	UWIMANIZANYE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
10	LEA	UMUHOZA	Student	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
11	JEANNETTE	MUKAMUREHE	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
12	EUGENE	MUSANGANIRE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
13	ELISE	MUKAJIRANGA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
14	LIVENS	KAJITESI	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
15	BEATRICE	MUKABERA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
16	CHRISTINE	USABWINANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
17	JEAN BAPTISTE	RUHUMULIZA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
18	CECILE	MUTAWANARIYA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
19	VERONIQUE	AMNAZO	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
20	PASCAL	SEBYATSI	lost ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
21	CONCILIA	NJIRAMANA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
22	BERNADETTE	MUREKATETE	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
23	JEAN BOSCO	USABIMANA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
24	LADISLAS	RUDAHINYUKA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
25	DANCILLA	MUKAMWIZA	lost ID		<i>[Signature]</i>
26	MARIE JOSEE	NO RS			
27	HELENE	UWIZEYE			
28	JAPHET	RUDATSIKIRA	Rwandan ID	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
29	NOËL	KARURANGA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>
30	CANISIUS	KABANDA	"	1	<i>[Signature]</i>

24 May 1994

LIST NO ONE; FIRST TRUCK; FIRST DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	RUTAGENWA	JEAN BOSCO			
2.	MUJAWAMALIYA	CHRISTINE			
3.	MUKABALISA	JULIENNE			
4.	BIZIMANA	MAURICE			
5.	UWAGAGA	CLEMENTINE			
6.	MUKAKIMENZI	JEANNE			
7.	BAHINTASI	ALBERT			
8.	KANZAYIRE	LACTITIA			
9.	UMUTONI	NADINE			
10.	RUKUNDO	ELVIS			
11.	UWERA	HUGUETTE			
12.	UWIMANA	ANYSIE			
13.	MUKAKAYIRANGA	ADDRATA			
14.	NKUSI	GILBERT			
15.	RUKAMUVONI	ALPHONSE			
16.	MBOMIGALA-NKUSI	CHRISTIAN			
17.	RUGENI-NKUSI	SANDRINE			
18.	RULINGA-NKUSI	VADEGE			
19.	SEMIGABO	EUGENE			
20.	NYAMASWA	EUGENE			
21.	KAYITARE	JEAN PIERRE			
22.	NYIRAMONGI	JEANNE D'ARC			
23.	RUDASINGWA	J.M.V.			
24.	BYILINGIRO	SERAPHIN			
25.	GASHUMBA	CHANTAL			
26.	MPINYUZE	EUGENE			
27.	MUKUNDE	GUSTAVE			
28.	BUCHANA	YVES			
29.	MUTESA J.M	VIANNEY			
30.	MURUTAMPUNZI	BONIFACE			

24 May 1994

LIST NO TWO; SECOND TRUCK; FIRST DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	MUNYAKAZI	M. LEINUALDA			
2.	NTIDENDERERA	BAPTISTE			
3.	BITEGA	JEANNE			
4.	MUTESI	RITA			
5.	NYINAWINGIRI	ANGELIQUE			
6.	INGABIRE	WADINE			
7.	UMUTONIWAHO	CYNTHIA			
8.	NIWEMUKIZA	PROVIDENCE			
9.	NGARAMBE	PAUL			
10	NDARUHUTSE	J. DE DIEU			
11	SEMALI	ASSIEL			
12	KANYONGA	SEVA			
13	MUKARUTABANA	THERESE			
14	RUTABANA	CHRISTOPHE			
15	SEMALI	JACQUES			
16	MUREKATETE	JENERANDA			
17	MUKAMURIGO	MARTHA			
18	MURWANASHYA	J. PIERRE			
19	NGIRUWIGIRE	J. PAUL			
20	RUBAYIZA	AUGUSTIN			
21	MBARUSHIMANA	AIMABLE			
22	BUGENIMANA	CLAUDETTE			
23	SEMANA	YOKANA			
24	GATETE	IDRISA			
25	MUKANDORI	REHEMA			
26	UWIMANA	AMINA			
27	UWAMURERA	ASIYA			
28	UMUTONI	ZAHARA			
29	GAKERI	CALLIXTE			
30	HAKIZIMANA	SULEMAN			

24 May 1994

LIST NO FOUR; FOURTH TRUCK; FIRST DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	HAGUMAMASAZIRO ABEL				
2.	UMAJENERA BEATRICE				
3.	HAGUMA SAMIR				
4.	HAGUMA NASSIR				
5.	UMETONI CHANTAL				
6.	UBALITONG ERIC CLEMON				
7.	ZIRONI MURIAN				
8.	RUBAKISIBO EMMIE				
9.	KAMALI BRIGITE				
10.	KARANGWA YIFE FLORENCE				
11.	KARANGWA FLORE				
12.	RUZINDABA DIANE				
13.	UMULISA JECELYNE				
14.	HABIB HAMAD				
15.	INGABIRE ALICE				
16.	GASETE IDRISSA				
17.	DIX DESIRE				
18.	SHENGERO SOLANGE				
19.	UMUBYEZI BRIGITE				
20.	NDAMUKUNDA ANNELORE				
21.	MUGABONKIEZI DICKAS				
22.	NISIBIZI OSEE				
23.	GATABAZI JOSEPH				
24.	MWENZIKAZI FRANÇOISE				
25.	MUKARUZAMBA FRANÇOISE				
26.	MUKARUHINDA EUGENIE				
27.	MANZI FABRICE				
28.	RUCYAHANA KEVIS				
29.	KAYITAHU JESUE				
30.	MUSONI EDOUARD				

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24 May 1994

LIST NO FIVE; FIRST TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	RUBANGURA	VEDASTE			
2.	RUBANGURA	YUETTE			
3.	RUBANGURA	YVE			
4.	RUBANGURA	AUGUSTIN			
5.	RUKATTABIRE	RENE			
6.	RUBANGURA	CLAUDETE			
7.	RUBANGURA	CLAUDINE			
8.	MUKAYIRANGA	CARITAS			
9.	UWIMANA	FLORA			
10.	UWAMALIYA	CHRISTINE			
11.	GAFUFURU	CLAUDE			
12.	PADY	PATRICK			
13.	NGENDAHIMANA	YVON			
14.	MAKUSA	CHRISTIAN			
15.	RUGEMANSURU	ALAIN			
16.	MUKANDEKWE	COLETTE			
17.	MAKUSA	YVONNE			
18.	MUHIMPUNDU	GODELIEVE			
19.	MAHAMUAGABO	MARC			
20.	KAZARWA	XAVIERINE			
21.	RUGEMANSURU	ANDRE			
22.	MUHAMUAGABO	OLIVIER			
23.	MAKUSA	BERTIN			
24.	NDIZEYE	MARTIN			
25.	NTWARABASHI	SALVA			
26.	DUSABIMANA	MIRIE CHANTAL			
27.	MUKAMUDODO	DEMILLIA			
28.	NTAWISHAKA	EMMANUEL			
29.	NKUNDIYE	FRANÇOIS			
30.	MUDADIRA	JEAN DAMASCENE			

24 May 1994

LIST NO FIVE; FIRST TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	KARANGWA	JEAN BOSCO			
2.	KARANGWA	SANDRINE			
3.	KARANGWA	STELLA MATDETINA			
4.	KARANGWA	CYNTHIA			
5.	RUTERANA	NADEGE			
6.	RUTERANA	BERNISE			
7.	MUHIMPUNDU	JOSIANE			
8.	BAZUBAGIRA	HONORINE			
9.	NYIRABAHIZI	FRANÇOISE			
10.	NAYIGIZIKI	NICODÈME			
11.	MUSONERA	EMMANUEL			
12.	KAREKEZI	ATHANASE			
13.	MUSONI	ANDRÉ			
14.	RUVENGE	HARUNA			
15.	KARISA	CELESTIN HAKIZANUNGU			
16.	NTAGANDA	INNOCENT			
17.	KARANGWA				
18.	NZIZERA	ALEXANDRE			
19.	MUREKEZI	OLIVIER			
20.	KAVIRANDA	LOUISE			
21.	TWAHIRWA	BEATA			
22.	BURU-MUZUMURIMBI				
23.	UWINGABE	CALIXTE			
24.	NTWARI	DAVID			
25.	MUNYANEZA	EVARISTE			
26.	MUGABO	MICHEL			
27.	MUSHATSI	JOSEPH			
28.	MPUMBYA	PULCHERIE			
29.	KANDABANA	JEAN PIERRE			
30.	SIBOMANA	JEAN CHRYSOSTOME			

24 May 1994

LIST NO FIVE; FIRST TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	MUCYO JEAN DE DIEU				
2.	MUCYO EMMANUEL				
3.	KAYIDE THAULIN				
4.	MPAMA JULES				
5.	MUREGASHURU URBAIN				
6.	VUNINGOMA ALEXIS I				
7.	MUREKATETE ROSE				
8.	UWASE LILIANE				
9.	NGOMA ROGER				
10	MILISA MOSES				
11	GRATIA				
12	UMULISA MARIE JOSEE				
13	UWICHEZA MICHELINE				
14	UWICHEZA THERESE				
15	UMURERWA DIDACE				
16	UMUKOZA ALICE				
17	MULIKANWA GERTRUDE				
18	NYINAWINKINDI CANDIDE				
19	MUKAMANA CECILE				
20	FUNDI JEAN PIERRE				
21	UWAMALIYA EUGENIE				
22	HIZIKI PAMELLA				
23	FUNDI BELISE				
24	MUKAMUDENGE PHOEBE				
25	MUKANYONGA IMMACULEE				
26	MUKASA BERNARD				
27	KAJUGA JEAN WYCLIFF				
28	TAMUZAYIRE THERESE				
29	NYIRAMUGWEZA MONIQUE				
30	BAKAMANA DONATHA				

24 May 1994
LIST NO SIX; SECOND TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

RPF

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	NIKUSI GREGOIRE				
2.	MUKAMUSONERA ANASTASIE				
3.	RUGASIRA ANATELE				
4.	HABIMANA INNOCENT				
5.	MUKARUKAKA MARUVENANCE				
6.	RUTAYISIRE XAVIER				
7.	SAGAHUTU EMMANUEL				
8.	TWAGIRAMANA ERIC				
9.	RURANGWA MURAT THYERRE				
10	MUMPOREZE JOJO				
11	NDAHIMANA NATHAN				
12	MUTSINZI EDOUARD				
13	NYARWANA SCHOLA				
14	MUTSINZI ERIC				
15	RUGEMA EUGENIE				
16	UMUTONI PAULINE				
17	UMUTESI TITIANE				
18	UMURUNGI DIANE				
19	UMUHABA NADINE				
20	MURUMBIYI KICHA				
21	IGAKAREMYE ALAN				
22	MUKANDUTSE ANNOUNCIATA				
23	IGAKAREMYE GILBERT				
24	IGAKAREMYE EUGENE				
25	IGAKAREMYE J BAPTISTE				
26	IGAKAREMYE TOLES				
27	MUKAREMIRA JACQUELINE				
28	NYAMPUNDU M AIMEE				
29	MUGOREMBO LUCIA				
30	KALIGIRWA VIANNEY				

24 May 1994

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LIST NO SEVEN; THIRD TRUCK; SECOND DAY.

No	Name	Family Name	Type of ID papers	Number of ID papers	Signature
1.	MUKAMUNZI	VESTINE			
2.	MUHORAKERE	CHRISTINE			
3.	UWAMUIZA	VESTINE			
4.	KAMALIZA	EVANGELINE			
5.	GATERA	JEAN PIERRE			
6.	UWIZUBABAZI	NADINE			
7.	UWAMAHYA	ALICE			
8.	MUGABO	EMMANUEL			
9.	UWAMUNDU	JACQUES			
10.	KARERA	AUGUSTIN			
11.	MUKATANI	XAVERINE			
12.	KAYITENGIRWA	HONORINE			
13.	KARERA	HONORE			
14.	KAYITESI	GISTE			
15.	ITANZI	JEAN MICHEL			
16.	ITETE	JEAN SAULVERO			
17.	NYAMPINGA	VICTOIRE			
18.	MUHIZI	VICTOR			
19.	MUKAMWIZA	BEATA			
20.	NYIRAMBIBI	EMERSTHA			
21.	UWIMPUNDU	BEATRICE			
22.	MULINDABIGWI	MELUORE			
23.	MUKARWEGU	CATHERINE			
24.	KANDAGIRWA	ALINE			
25.	ISHIMWE	EDMINE			
26.	UTAVUNANA	LOUISE			
27.	MUKABAGORORA	ESPERANCE			
28.	MUKAREMERA	FEBRONIE			
29.	MUKANKUSI	MARIE LOUISE			
30.	UWUASA	JEANNE D'ARC			

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
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Programme des Nations Unies
pour le Développement



Développement mondial

FACSIMILE

A : Mr. Pierre Mehu
Directeur Exécutif a.i.
MINUAR - Kigali

Date : 28 juin 94

FAX: 212 963 3090

Ref: PRO 301 Rwanda
Nbre de page: 2
(y compris cette page)

DE: Stanislaus Nkwain
Représentant Résident a.i.
PNUD / Kinshasa

OBJET : Visite à Goma du Commandant de la Force de la MINUAR

J'accuse réception de votre fax du 26 juin 1994 relative à l'objet ci-dessus.

Suite à un entretien téléphonique hier 27 juin 1994 avec le Directeur du Cabinet du Président de la République, il a été convenu que je soumette une requête officielle dont vous trouverez copie ci-jointe pour permettre à la Présidence d'en informer les autorités locales zaïroises à Goma.

Il a été par ailleurs souhaité que dans l'avenir, les autorités zaïroises soient informées à temps des missions de cette nature pour leur donner suffisamment de temps de préparation.

Salutations.

E/Diz



SNN/mk

PRO/332/94
UNAMIR

Le 27 juin 1994


Monsieur le Directeur du Cabinet,

Objet : Visite à Goma du Commandant de la Force de la MINUAR.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Commandant de la Force de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), le Major Général Romeo DALLAIRE, a l'intention de se rendre à Goma au Zaïre le jeudi 30 juin 1994 pour y rencontrer le commandant des forces françaises.

Je vous saurais gré de bien vouloir me confirmer à votre plus proche et meilleure convenance, à l'intention du Directeur de la MINUAR, l'accord des autorités Zaïroises pour cette mission.

Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Directeur du Cabinet, à l'assurance de ma parfaite considération.



Stanislaus Nkwain
Représentant Résident a.i.

Monsieur Le Professeur Vunduawe Te Pe Mako
Directeur du Cabinet
du Président de la République
Kinshasa/Ngaliemma.

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FROM DPIIDS

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5 July 1994

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR RWANDA TAKES
OFFICE

KIGALI, 1 July (UNAMIR) -- The new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Shahryar M. Khan, took office today. He replaced Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon.

Mr. Khan, a Pakistani national, was born on 29 March 1934 in Bhopal State, India. He studied at the Royal Indian Military College in Dehra Dun, India, from 1945 to 1975 and at Oundle School, United Kingdom, from 1948 to 1952.

Mr. Khan graduated from Cambridge University where he studied from 1953 to 1956 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston (1958-1959). He began his foreign affairs career in 1957 and held posts in London, Tunis, Geneva and Islamabad from 1960 to 1967.

From 1977 to 1982, Mr. Khan was ambassador to Jordan; from 1982 to 1987 he was in charge of the United Nations Office in the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with special responsibility for Afghan affairs. From 1987 to 1990, he was Pakistan's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom and during the same period he was Pakistan's Special Envoy in West Africa. From 1990 to 1994, Mr. Khan led the Pakistani delegation in the series of Indo-Pakistani talks and was Special Envoy of the Pakistani Prime Minister to India in 1993.

The new Special Representative was also a member of the Pakistani delegation for several sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and at several regional summits in Africa, Asia and Europe.

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NATIONS UNIES
LE HAUT COMMISSAIRE ADJOINT
POUR LES REFUGIES



UNITED NATIONS
THE DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES

94 JUL

17

Case postale 2500
CH-1211 Genève 2 Dépôt
Suisse

FAX MESSAGE

PLEASE DELIVER THIS MESSAGE

OUR FAX NUMBER

(DIRECT LINE) IS: 41 22 739-8642

TO: Mr. M. Shahryar Khan, Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Rwanda

FROM: Gerald Walzer

DATE: 12 July 1994

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER PAGE: 4 PAGES

PRIORITY: URGENT

COMMENTS/MESSAGE:

Dear Mr. Shariar Khan,

Please find attached the report just received from Mr. Daniel Bellamy, UNHCR's senior officer presently in Goma, concerning his mission yesterday 11 July to northwestern Rwanda. The report is extremely alarming, and I thought you should be aware of its contents without delay. We shall be reviewing this report today and will also inform DHA/NY for any further action, but thought that you might wish this advance information in case any intervention on your part is possible.

Further, please accept belatedly my congratulations upon your assignment, which I am aware is extremely complex. I wish you every success. I was sorry not to have been able to meet with you as you were on your way to Rwanda, but hope to see you sometime in the near future.

Please be assured, and this also on behalf of the High Commissioner who is presently on her way back from mission in Tanzania, that UNHCR wishes to cooperate with and assist you in your very difficult mission. The High Commissioner's Special Envoy in the region, Mr. P.M. Moussalli, hopefully will be able to travel to Kigali on Thursday 14 July and will be in touch with you there.

SRSG

E/Dir

If you have any advice/suggested action on the situation detailed in the attached report, we would be grateful to hear from you. I can be reached in Geneva as follows:

Office telephone: (41)(22) 739-8200


Office fax: 739-8642

Home telephone: 779-2420

Home fax: 779-2420

Once again, please accept my congratulations and warmest regards.

Sincerely yours,



P.P. Gerald Walzer

Goma (UNHCR) 12JUL94 0640z
ZRE/GOM/HCR/0070
ZRE/GOM/KEN/HCR/0031
ZRE/GOM/TAN/HCR/0014
GOM/KIN/HCR/0050
GOM/BUK/HCR/0021

Att: AKODZENOU/VAN DRUNEN

(copy AA/
Fleet -

To: Mr. G. WALZER, DHC, Geneva.
Fmr D. BELLAMY, Goma (on mission).

Subject: Trip report.

PRIMO

Following are facts found during mission to GISENYI-RUHENGERI (Rwanda) on 11 July 1994.

1. Mission with DHA, UNICEF, IDI. Security offered by Rwandese Armed Forces. Accompanied by one official of the Ministry of labour and social affairs.
2. Travelled on road Gisenyi-Ruhengeri but were obliged to stop and reverse because very high flow of people on the road. Then went direction of Kabaya (east of Gisenyi).
3. On 11 July, RPF shelled Ruhengeri City (an important military stronghold, some 60 km from Gisenyi). This forced civilian to flee in direction of Gisenyi. Between Mukingo and Ruhengeri, we estimated that some 100-150,000 were moving towards Mukingo. Between Mukingo and Nkuli, the flow was less dense, but more people were already staying on the road sides. Estimated number of both moving and settling people around 100,000 persons. From Nkuli in direction of Gisenyi, a moving population of less than 100,000 persons. In the coming 1-2 days, the city of Gisenyi estimated to be between 30-50,000 before the war, where some 130,000 IDP are already settled may be an area where half a million people would concentrate.
4. Although soldiers were everywhere on the road, there was no sign of military preparedness for counter-acting the RPF military advance. No sign that the army is preventing fleeing people to go towards Gisenyi. Interviewed people mentioned Gisenyi area as their first direction, but also indicated that Zaire would be the final step if necessary.
5. People were moving by foot (very few cars, trucks) carrying basic belongings including some food (for 2-3 days per family) and cooking implements. Families were complete (parents with children). No wounded people. No panic, no violence during movement.
6. No established camp on the road. In Nkuli, around 16.00 H, people were starting to cut trees to build huts for the night. That would indicate that people will not stabilize but will be ready to move.
7. No presence of relief organizations (such as Rwandese Red Cross), no NGO. ICRC delivered food to some 5,000 persons, but stopped because of riots.
8. No emergency preparation in Gisenyi area to cope with the arrivals of IDP.

10. The Kabaya region did not seem to have received a lot of IDP. However, it may be a new center for the people who have fled Kigali and now are arriving north. Should the RPF move further between Giterama and Kibuye, people will move towards Kabaya.

SECUNDO

Information from the French Humanitarian cell in GOMA.

1. Persons met: Colonel SCHILL, Lt Col NADAR, Mr. TROUARD-RIDOLLE.
2. Very limited role of this humanitarian cell (liaison role between operation Turquoise and NGO, distribution of 400 mt of relief aid and information center for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
3. Strong desire to find NGO and relief organisations including UN to intervene in Turquoise zone.
4. Intention to withdraw end of July from the south of Rwanda and to be replaced by UNAMIR. However, mandate and rules of engagement of Turquoise (based on Chapter 7) are different from UNAMIR role.
5. Strong feeling of the population of being protected by the Turquoise operation. At the same time disappointment in Gisenyi at not being included under the same protection.

TERTIO

Some recommendations/thoughts.

1. Presently impossible to assist population moving in large number. ICRC stated the same opinion. Other solutions must be found.
2. Should RPF move further west, people will cross into Zaire. Arrivals' number may vary between 200,000 and 500,000.
3. Need for our HCR staff in Goma to be in contact with some officials in Gisenyi to follow movements of population.
4. Contact with DHA and other UN agencies and ICRC in Goma to be continued.
5. HC should be in contact with UN representative in Rwanda (Mr KHAN) to push for cease fire and preventive measures to avoid further movements across borders.
6. If there is no cease-fire followed by serious positive negotiations, movements will continue. However RPF has no interest in seeing people go into Zaire.
7. Further displacement of population would compromise the present bean harvest and the future cultivation period and create serious deficit for many months.
8. UNHCR should be ready to cope with arrivals of refugees in Goma area (funds, materials, logistics, agreements with NGO, personnel, sites, etc...). S.O. Goma has no money at all to run the office, despite several requests for replenishment.

QUARTO.

Moving from Goma to Bukavu on Tuesday morning with French plane.

BELLAMY.

Sent by C130

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HAUT COMMISSAIRE AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME

Télégrammes: UNATIONS, GENÈVE

Téléc: 41 20 02

Téléphone: 917 1234-907 1234

Téléc: (22) 917 0129

Ref. N°: G/SO 214 (93)

(à rappeler dans la réponse)



IN FAX 1360 1/7
UNAMIR
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA

94 JUL 28 10 35

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Palais des Nations
CH-1211 Genève 10



22 July 1994

Dear Mr. Khan,

I should like to congratulate you on your appointment to the most difficult and challenging task of Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda and to extend to you my sincere good wishes for the success of your mission.

Copy of the case
He (CV) from
Sec-
297

As you may know, I visited Rwanda in May 1994 and proposed the holding of a special session of the Commission on Human Rights, recommending, inter alia, the appointment of a Special Rapporteur who would examine and publicly report on all human rights aspects of the situation, including root causes and responsibilities for the recent atrocities, and would be assisted in the collection and analysis of information by a team of human rights field officers acting in close cooperation with UNAMIR and other United Nations agencies and programmes from within Rwanda, as well as from neighbouring countries where Rwandan refugees are located. The Commission met in a special session on 24 and 25 May and adopted resolution S-3/1, by which it requested its Chairman to appoint a special rapporteur to investigate at first hand the human rights situation in Rwanda and to receive relevant, credible information, from governments, individuals, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and to avail himself of the assistance of existing mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights. For ease of reference I attach a copy of the resolution.

Mr. René Degni Ségui, Dean of the Faculty of Law at Abidjan University, was subsequently appointed Special Rapporteur and, in accordance with the Commission's request conducted his first mission to Rwanda and some neighbouring states from 9 to 20 June 1994. The preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1995/7) was presented to the members of the Commission on Human Rights on 28 June 1994 and, in accordance with the terms of the resolution, was subsequently made available to the Secretary-General, the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The mandate entrusted to the Special Rapporteur contains two elements:

- (a) to examine the situation of human rights in Rwanda, including root causes and responsibilities and report thereon periodically; and

Mr. Shahryar Khan
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in Rwanda
c/o UNAMIR
Kigali

OIC (SRSG)

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PHONE No. : 2546222668

From : UNAMIR NAIROBI KENYA

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(b) to make available to the Secretary-General systematically, compiled information on possible violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law. The Commission has affirmed that all persons who committed or authorized such violations are individually responsible for them and that the international community would exert every effort to bring them to justice.

At the request of the Commission, I have been making the necessary arrangements for the Special Rapporteur to be assisted by a team of human rights field officers acting in close cooperation with UNAMIR and other United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Rwanda. The first two field officers were placed in the field on 10 June 1994 and three others are expected to take up their assignment at the beginning of August.

The Security Council, by resolution 935 of 1 July 1994, requested the Secretary-General to establish a Commission of Experts to examine and analyze information submitted with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide.

Given the strong similarity between the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts, it is in principle envisaged that the investigatory work for the two procedures should be carried out within the framework of the same structure, that is, by strengthening the human and financial resources available to the field operation I have established.

Let me finally draw your attention to the specific request in Commission resolution S-3/1 that I take the necessary steps to ensure that future efforts of the United Nations aimed at conflict resolution and peace-building in Rwanda are accompanied by a strong human rights component. I am, therefore, looking forward to our close collaboration and would be most grateful for any advice and assistance you might be able to provide to the field officers of the Centre of Human Rights. At the same time I wish to assure you that I will keep you informed of all major developments regarding the field investigations in Rwanda.

Yours sincerely,


José Ayala Lasso

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II. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION AT ITS
THIRD SPECIAL SESSION

S-3/1. The situation of human rights in Rwanda

The Commission on Human Rights

Meeting in special session

Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, and other relevant international human rights instruments,

Conscious of its responsibility to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and resolved to remain vigilant with regard to violations of human rights wherever they may occur and to prevent such violations,

Noting with deep concern that a situation of ethnic and political armed conflict, systematic slaughter and massacres continues to exist in Rwanda, resulting in grave violations and abuses of human rights, including massive loss of lives, which may exceed five hundred thousand, and destruction of property,

Recalling that the killing of members of an ethnic group, with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part, constitutes the crime of genocide,

Believing that genocidal acts may have occurred in Rwanda,

Expressing its grave concern at the failure to date of the Rwandan authorities to condemn the ongoing massacres in the country,

Expressing its solidarity with the families of the victims of the conflict, the people of Rwanda and neighbouring countries which are receiving refugees,

Recalling the request of the Security Council to the Secretary-General to collect information on the responsibility for the tragic incident that resulted in the death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi,

Commending the initiative taken by the High Commissioner for Human Rights and his timely visit to Rwanda,

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Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General's Special Representative on Rwanda, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, as well as of the existing mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights, particularly the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and of non-governmental organizations,

Noting also with appreciation the efforts of the Chairman and Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi, in his capacity as the Facilitator of the Arusha Peace Process, and the Organization of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,

Stressing the need for the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement by all parties to the conflict,

Alarmed at the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (E/CN.4/S-3/3) and the information provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organizations concerning the deteriorating human rights situation in Rwanda, in particular the massacre of innocent persons,

Alarmed also at the reports of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, concerning a deliberate policy which advocates ethnic and political intolerance, hatred and violence,

Underlining the need for the international community to move with speed to protect innocent civilians and deliver humanitarian assistance, a task which can be most effectively accomplished within the framework of the United Nations,

Conscious of the fact that the magnitude of the tragedy in Rwanda requires the kind of coordination and resources which can only be effectively sustained by the United Nations,

Convinced that the operation in Rwanda will continue to be a United Nations undertaking, and supporting the Secretary-General's encouragement to States Members of the United Nations to provide the needed troops and equipment to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR),

Recalling the recent Security Council resolution (918 (1994) of 17 May 1994), in which the Council authorized the expansion of the UNAMIR force level up to five thousand five hundred troops,

Recognizing that effective action to prevent further violations of human rights must be a central and integral element of the overall United Nations response to the situation in Rwanda,

Recognizing also that a strong human rights component will be indispensable to the political peace process and the post-conflict reconstruction of Rwanda,

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1. Condemns in the strongest terms all breaches of international humanitarian law and all violations and abuses of human rights in Rwanda, and calls upon all the parties involved to cease immediately these breaches, violations and abuses and to take all necessary steps to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and for humanitarian law;
2. Also condemns in the strongest terms the kidnapping and killing of military peace-keeping personnel attached to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), which constitutes a blatant violation of international humanitarian law;
3. Condemns equally the killing of personnel attached to humanitarian organizations operating in the country;
4. Further condemns in the strongest terms the kidnapping and murder of the Prime Minister, Ms. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and some of her cabinet ministers and government officials, as well as the wanton killings of innocent civilians and the destruction of property;
5. Commends the High Commissioner for Human Rights on his recent mission to Rwanda, welcomes his report on the situation of human rights in the country and endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained therein;
6. Calls upon the Government of Rwanda to condemn publicly and take measures to put an end to all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all persons within its jurisdiction or under its control and to ensure that the human rights of all individuals within its jurisdiction, irrespective of their ethnic origin, are fully respected;
7. Calls upon the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to prevent persons under its command from committing human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law;
8. Strongly urges all parties to cease immediately any incitement to violence or ethnic hatred;
9. Commends the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Special Representative on Rwanda, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania in his capacity as the Facilitator of the Arusha Peace Process, the Chairman and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, all countries contributing troops and other support, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat and all neighbouring countries hosting refugees from Rwanda, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations, for their efforts in alleviating the suffering of innocent victims of this tragedy;
10. Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for the parties to the Arusha Peace Agreement to cooperate fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with UNAMIR in order to create the necessary conditions conducive to the immediate resumption of the implementation of the Agreement, which constitutes the framework for peace, national reconciliation and unity in the country;

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11. Welcomes the Security Council's decision to authorize expansion of the UNAMIR mandate under resolution 912 (1994) to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it:

(a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;

(b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;

12. Calls upon the responsible authorities, groups and individuals in Rwanda to facilitate the access of humanitarian relief to all in need;

13. Expresses its alarm at all repressive policies and policies directed against members of particular ethnic groups, and also calls upon all parties concerned to ensure the protection of the rights of all persons regardless of their national or ethnic, religious or linguistic background;

14. Calls upon the parties to the conflict to ensure safe passage for those fleeing from the conflict areas including, where necessary, to asylum countries and to ensure the right to return under safe conditions;

15. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all persons being held illegally against their will in camps, prisons or other places and for them to be permitted to be moved to safety;

16. Demands that all parties immediately notify the appropriate humanitarian organizations of the location of all camps, prisons or other places of detention, and that the parties concerned ensure immediate and unimpeded access to such places;

17. Affirms that all persons who commit or authorize violations of human rights or international humanitarian law are individually responsible and accountable for those violations and that the international community will exert every effort to bring those responsible to justice, while affirming that the primary responsibility for bringing perpetrators to justice rests with national judicial systems;

18. Requests the Chairman to appoint a special rapporteur, for an initial period of one year, to investigate at first-hand the human rights situation in Rwanda and to receive relevant, credible information on the human rights situation there from Governments, individuals and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, including on root causes and responsibilities for the recent atrocities, on a continuing basis, and to avail himself or herself of the assistance of existing mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights;

19. Requests the existing mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights, including the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, the

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Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, as well as human rights treaty bodies, where appropriate, to give urgent attention to the situation in Rwanda and to provide, on a continuing basis, their full cooperation, assistance and findings to the Special Rapporteur and to accompany the Special Rapporteur in visiting Rwanda whenever necessary;

20. Requests the Special Rapporteur to visit Rwanda forthwith and to report on an urgent basis to the members of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the country, including his or her recommendations for bringing violations and abuses to an end and preventing future violations and abuses, providing a preliminary report no later than four weeks from the adoption of the present resolution, and requests the Secretary-General to make the report of the Special Rapporteur available to the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly and the Security Council;

21. Also requests the Special Rapporteur to gather and compile systematically information on possible violations of human rights and acts which may constitute breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity, including acts of genocide, in Rwanda and to make this information available to the Secretary-General;

22. Calls upon all parties to the conflict to give their full cooperation to the Special Rapporteur, in order to ensure the fulfilment of his or her mandate;

23. Requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make the necessary arrangements for the Special Rapporteur to be assisted by a team of human rights field officers acting in close cooperation with UNAMIR and other United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Rwanda;

24. Also requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to take the necessary steps to ensure that future efforts of the United Nations aimed at conflict resolution and peace-building in Rwanda are accompanied by a strong human rights component and that this process is effectively supported by a comprehensive programme of human rights assistance;

25. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Special Rapporteur to fulfil his or her mandate;

26. Decides to remain seized of the issue.

4th meeting

25 May 1994

(Adopted without a vote. See chap. IV.)

d'utiliser de son influence pour sauver rapidement les personnes en danger dans la zone de sécurité de Cyangugu.

2. Le Gouvernement Provisoire Rwandais ayant fui vers le Zaïre après avoir mené la propagande qui invite la population rwandaise résidant dans la zone de sécurité du Sud-Ouest du Rwanda à le suivre à l'étranger, a créé des problèmes graves d'insécurité :

a) Les militaires et les Interahamwe armés détruisent et pillent les centres administratifs préfectoraux, communaux et scolaires ;

b) Les militaires et les Interahamwe armés menacent de piller et de massacrer les personnes résidant dans la zone de sécurité et qui ne veulent pas fuir leur pays ;

c) Les militaires et les Interahamwe détruisent et pillent les centres de développement situés dans la zone de sécurité du Sud-Ouest du Rwanda ;

d) Les personnes restées dans la zone de sécurité n'ont plus d'autorité préfectorale, communale, de secteur, ou de cellule sur laquelle elles peuvent se référer.

3. Les participants à la réunion demandent aux militaires français responsables actuels de la zone de sécurité du Sud-Ouest du Rwanda de désarmer immédiatement les militaires rwandais et les Interahamwe qui sont restés dans la zone ou qui reviennent du Zaïre pour piller et menacer la population qui ne veut pas fuir son pays.

4. Les participants à la réunion demandent à la MISSION TURQUOISE de s'entendre avec le Gouvernement d'Union Nationale sur la solution à apporter au problème des personnes résidant dans la zone de sécurité du Sud-Ouest du Rwanda et

qui veulent regagner leurs biens
KIGALI et dans d'autres préfectures du Rwan
(mettre en place les modalités de retour facile et
rapide).

5. des participants à la réunion
demandent au Gouvernement Rwandais d'Union
Nationale de protéger la population en mettant
provisoirement et rapidement les responsables
préfectoraux, communaux, de secteur et de cellule.

6. des participants à la réunion d
GIHUNDWE en commune CJimboGO ont mis en
place un comité de sécurité composé de trois
personnes ci-après:

- Mme NYIRABUKYE Bernadette
Responsable du Centre Scolaire de NYAKAHYINJA
- Monsieur NDEZE François Xavier
Magistrat domicilié en secteur Gihundwe,
Commune CJimboGO
- Monsieur BENDA LEMA François
Economiste de carrière, réfugié en commune Cji

a) la mission de ce comité est d'être un intermédiaire
entre la population et les autorités militaires françaises
ou les autorités militaires de la MINOR II

b) En deuxième étape, la mission du comité de sécurité
consiste à soumettre les problèmes de la
population aux autorités établies par le
Gouvernement Rwandais d'Union Nationale.

- 4 -


Monsieur le Responsable Militaire, nous pensons qu'en vous soumettant ces problèmes liés à la vie des populations rwandaises en danger de mort, vous pourrez apporter des soulagements souhaités par les participants à la réunion de GIHUNDWE du 20 juillet 1994.


Membre du Comité de Sécurité en
secteur GIHUNDWE, Commune CJimBOGO


NJIRABUKEYE Bernadette

NDEZE

BENDA LEMA


21.7.94


Francois Xavier


Francois

Copie pour information

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République Rwandaise
à KIGALI
- Son Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre du Gouvernement
d'Union Nationale
à KIGALI

NYANDWI Justin
C/o Cellule TURATIBI
Secteur GIHEKE
Commune GISUMA
CYANGUGU

Murambi, le 20 juillet 1994

Objet: Demande de Secours.

A Monsieur le Commandant
de l'Opération Turquoise
en Préfecture de CYANGUGU

Monsieur le Commandant,
L'honneur m'échoit d'adresser
la présente, au près de votre haute bienveillance, dans le but
de solliciter une protection en matière de sécurité et une
intervention aux autres problèmes y relatifs que nous avons.
En effet Monsieur le Commandant,
je suis ex-Bourgmestre de la Commune TURATIBI en préfecture
de GITARAMA et je me suis réfugié à CYANGUGU.
Après avoir remporté les élections du Bourgmestre de TURATIBI
d'avril 1993, j'ai dû faire face aux mauvaises idées et actions
de certaines autorités politico-administratives préparant les
derniers massacres: après mon investiture le 5 Août 1993,
j'ai lutté contre les tueries de personnes innocentes relatives
à celles qui se trouvaient en préfecture de GISENYI, KIGALI
(BUGESERA), RUHengeri et KIBUYE, que ces autorités politico-
administratives notamment ceux du FPR et ses alliés,
voulait propager dans la Commune à ma charge qui
comptaient à ce moment-là plus de 35% de Tutsi. Face
à cette question, j'ai adressé une lettre ouverte et détaillée
à Monsieur le Préfet de GITARAMA, réservant copie à
Monsieur le Président de la République, à Madame le
Premier Ministre, aux Ambassadeurs accrédités au Rwanda,
aux Chefs des partis politiques et aux autres sensibilités socio-
politico-administratives. La crise d'alarme n'a pas eu
une réponse positive sauf une commission de la primature
qui malheureusement n'a pas pu sortir les résultats de
son enquête à cause peut-être du blocage.
Au début des massacres d'avril 1994, j'ai pris toutes mes
précautions pour que ce désastre n'arrive dans ma
Commune; difficilement j'ai pu tenir la situation pendant
plusieurs jours alors que dans d'autres Communes étaient déjà
brûlées.
Cette cause de défendre la vie des populations innocentes, j'ai
aussi défendue au Conseil du Gouvernement du 18/4/1994
et à celui de Préfecture du 21/4/1994 mais elle n'a pas
eu une suite favorable, par contre ma tête a été mise
à prix à l'instigation de la RTM et des INTERAHAMWE:

Le 10/4/1994 quand j'étais à KIGALI pour sauver mes amis, j'ai dû être tué par les INTERAHAMWE du Conseil de KINISIA avec madame KIRUSHARA ROSE et à sa présence sauf que j'ai été sauvé par un agent de la PVK après de longues explications. Le 20/4/1994 à mon domicile à MUSATIBIRA, j'ai été attaqué par les INTERAHAMWE armés d'armes blanches et fusils venant de KIGALI mais en collaboration avec ceux de MUSATIBIRA. C'est par chance qu'avec ma femme j'ai pu être sauvé après une course à pied de plus ou moins 10 kms pour arriver à NYATACUYE où nous nous sommes réfugiés pendant 10 jours, une période où les massacres faisaient rage dans ma commune. Cette fois-là j'étais déjà débordé, je ne pouvais rien faire étant donné que moi aussi j'étais chargé.

Le 18/6/1994, le jour de ma destitution et le 19/6/1994, après une réunion qui s'est tenue par les INTERAHAMWE, on allait me tuer avec ma femme sauf que l'action a raté consécutivement à MUSATIBIRA et à KAYENZI. Ce qui m'a poussé directement de me réfugier à KIBUYE. Ce qui m'est très dangereux est que ces INTERAHAMWE me poursuivent même à mon endroit de refuge, ça a été le cas en commune KIVUTU à KIBUYE où après l'échec de me faire du mal, ils m'ont obligé de me réfugier au Zaïre derrière les gens avec lesquels je ne partage pas les idées, c'est comme ça qu'avec ma famille nous nous trouvons ici à CYANGUHU.

Comme je ne veux pas courir derrière ces malfaiteurs réfugiés au Zaïre,

Comme je ne suis coupable de rien et que par conséquent je continue d'être poursuivi par les INTERAHAMWE

Comme je tiens à tout prix retourner chez moi afin d'aider mes compatriotes à construire notre pays,

je vous demande Monsieur le Commandant de bien vouloir :

- nous protéger pendant que nous n'avons pas encore eu des possibilités de retourner chez nous.
- nous aider à contacter le Gouvernement rwandais afin de nous faciliter le retour chez nous.
- nous transmettre la copie de cette lettre au Gouvernement rwandais.

Monsieur le Commandant, je vous signale qu'ici je suis avec d'autres familles avec lesquelles nous partageons cette idée; leurs listes est en annexe de la présente. Notre adresse est NDAMISHIMYE Joseph travaillant à l'OCIR Thé-SHAGASHA (Cellule MURATI), Secteur GIKIKE, devant le Bureau Commune de GISUTTA à plus ou moins 400m.

En attendant une suite favorable à ma demande, Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant, l'expression de mon profond respect.

C.P.T. à :

NYATACUYE Justin

Liste des familles réfugiées à CHANGU, Commune
GISHUWA, Secteur GISEKE, Cellule MURAMBA, avec
NYANDWI Justin, Ex-Bourgeoisie de MUSA MUBIRA-GITARE.

Nom du chef de famille et la fonction antérieurement occupée	Personnes en charge	Commune et préfecture d'origine.
KARERA Jean Népomuscène Enseignant	MUKAPASABO Immaculée KAKERANGABO Innocent NTANDWI Pierre MUSAWAPARIYA Chantal UMWAPARIYA Spéciose UMUPUHWE Immaculée NDABARAPIYE Joseph KAKERA Delphine BUSINGIZIPANA J. Nép. NDENGETINKA Sylvain HAKIZITFURA Joseph USABUTUPUREMYI Vincent	MUSAPIRA - GITARA " " " " " " " " " " TUSHUBATI - GITARA NYATABUYE - GITARA
NDAGISIPANA Félix Agronome de la commune MUSAPIRA	MURKEYISONI Marie Claire MUKIZA Roger MUTISHIRE Régine	MUSAPIRA - GITARA " "
MUKANA BUKIBANO Josepha Cultivatrice	N. NDAGISIPANA Alice UMWATISAHA Pacifique MUKUNDENTE Eug	MUSAPIRA - GITARA
KAZINDU Emmanuel (Ngarama - Byumba) Homme d'affaires	MURKATETE Rayisaba MUTE TERI Ayiza MURWANASHAKA MSENGYUTWA Vincent	BICUPDI - KIGALI " " NGARAMA - BYUMBA
BUGENIMANA Thierry (Murambi - Byumba) Chauffeur	GWIZA Yvette	MURAMBI - BYUMBA
RUSAGARA Homme d'affaires	—	MURAMBI - BYUMBA
MTERAHABONA Emmanuel Commerçant	—	BICUPDI - KIGALI
NYIKATUNGA Epiphane Elève	RYUVANI	MURUMBA - BYUMBA

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERALS/1994/879
26 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
COMMISSION OF EXPERTS PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 935 (1994) OF 1 JULY 1994

I

1. In the Statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21), the Council condemned all breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalled that persons who instigated or participated in such acts were individually responsible. It further recalled, in that context, that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such group, in whole or in part, constituted a crime punishable under international law. By that Statement, I was requested, *inter alia*, to make proposals for investigation of the reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict.

2. In its resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, the Security Council reiterated its condemnation of the continued killing of civilians with impunity, and recalled that such killings constituted a crime punishable under international law. In paragraph 18 of that resolution, the Council requested me to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict. In its resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, the Council noted with grave concern the reports indicating that acts of genocide had occurred in Rwanda and recalled that genocide constituted a crime punishable under international law.

3. In my report on the situation in Rwanda of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640), I noted that massacres and killings were continuing in a systematic manner throughout Rwanda, and indicated that only a proper investigation could establish the facts and definite culpability. In paragraph 36 of that report, I concluded, on the basis of the findings and evidence of the special mission to Rwanda, that there could be little doubt that the large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group constituted genocide.

4. By paragraph 1 of its resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994, the Security Council requested me to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information submitted pursuant to

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the said resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or the efforts of other persons or bodies, including the information made available by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Rwanda, with a view to providing me with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide.

5. The present report is submitted pursuant to the request contained in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 935 (1994).

II

6. Members of the Security Council may recall that a parallel initiative has been taken by the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, the Commission requested its Chairman to appoint a Special Rapporteur to investigate at first hand the human rights situation in Rwanda and to receive relevant, credible information on the human rights situation from Governments, individuals and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, including on the root causes and responsibilities for the recent atrocities. The Commission requested the Special Rapporteur to visit Rwanda and report on the human rights situation in that country, including recommendations for bringing violations and abuses to an end and preventing future violations and abuses. The Special Rapporteur was also requested to gather and compile systematically information on possible violations of human rights and acts that may constitute breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity, including acts of genocide, in Rwanda and to make that information available to me. The Special Rapporteur presented his report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda on 29 June 1994 (E/CN.4/1995/7).

7. In establishing the Commission of Experts, as requested by the Security Council, I have taken note of the similarity between the mandates entrusted to the two investigative bodies. With a view to avoiding unnecessary overlapping and to ensuring maximum cooperation between the two bodies, I have decided to establish the Commission of Experts in a way that would maximize the efficient use of scarce resources and reduce costs. I expect that the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights will cooperate closely with the Commission of Experts and provide it with all the information at his disposal. I shall take the necessary administrative steps to ensure continuing collaboration between the two bodies.

8. The terms of reference of the Commission of Experts, as set out in Security Council resolution 935 (1994), will be to examine and analyse the information submitted pursuant to the said resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or the efforts of other persons or bodies, including the information made available by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Rwanda, with a view to providing me with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of specific acts of genocide. Given the urgency of the matter, I hope that that report will be submitted well within

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four months of the establishment of the Commission of Experts as envisaged by the resolution, and in any event not later than 30 November 1994.

9. In considering how best to bring about an early report to the Security Council, it is envisaged that the work of the Commission of Experts will be in two stages. In a first stage, the members of the Commission will review and update the information that is available from all sources and carry out its own investigations in Rwanda to complement those already undertaken by the Special Rapporteur. That task should be accomplished within the first weeks of the Commission's existence.

10. The second stage of the Commission's work will be to draw up its conclusions on the evidence of specific violations of international humanitarian law, and in particular acts of genocide, on the basis of which identification of persons responsible for those violations could be made. In the light of these conclusions, the Commission will examine the question of the jurisdiction, international or national, before which such persons should be brought to trial.

11. I have, therefore, decided to establish a Commission of Experts, to be composed, in the first instance, of three members, one of whom will be designated, by me, as the Chairman. In selecting the members, I will take into account their qualifications in the areas of human rights, humanitarian law, criminal law and prosecution, as well as their integrity and impartiality. I shall notify the Security Council shortly of my appointments. I reserve the right to expand the membership of the Commission as necessary.

12. The members of the Commission will serve in their personal capacity.

13. The Commission will adopt its own rules of procedure. In the absence of consensus, decisions of the Commission will be taken by a majority vote.

14. For reasons of efficiency, practicality and economy, the Commission will be located at the United Nations Office at Geneva, where it will benefit from the resources of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and its substantive, secretarial and administrative assistance. To the extent possible, and in order to avoid duplication, the Commission will also rely upon the resources already made available to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights.

15. Arrangements for the financing of the Commission of Experts will be made. In addition, I will take steps to establish a Trust Fund to receive voluntary contributions from States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as natural and juridical persons, to assist the Commission of Experts in carrying out its plan of work.

16. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 ^{1/} will apply to the Commission and its members. The members of the Commission will have the status of experts on missions within the meaning of article VI of the Convention.

Notes

^{1/} Resolution 22 A (I).

**NATIONS
UNIES****S****Conseil de sécurité**Distr.
GÉNÉRALES/1994/879
26 juillet 1994
FRANÇAIS
ORIGINAL : ANGLAIS**RAPPORT DU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL SUR LA CONSTITUTION D'UNE
COMMISSION D'EXPERTS CONFORMÉMENT AU PARAGRAPHE 1 DE LA
RÉSOLUTION 935 (1994) DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ EN DATE DU
1er JUILLET 1994****I**

1. Dans une déclaration présentée par le Président du Conseil de sécurité, le 30 avril 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21), le Conseil a condamné toutes les violations du droit international humanitaire au Rwanda, en particulier celles commises à l'encontre de la population civile, et rappelé que les personnes qui fomentent de tels actes ou qui y participent en portent individuellement la responsabilité. Dans ce contexte, il a rappelé en outre que l'élimination des membres d'un groupe ethnique avec l'intention de détruire ce groupe totalement ou partiellement constitue un crime qui tombe sous le coup du droit international. Dans la déclaration susmentionnée, j'ai été prié, entre autres, de formuler des propositions relatives aux activités d'enquête à mener touchant les violations graves du droit international humanitaire qui auraient été commises au cours du conflit.

2. Dans sa résolution 918 (1994) du 17 mai 1994, le Conseil de sécurité a de nouveau condamné les massacres de civils qui se poursuivent avec impunité, et rappelé que ces massacres constituent un crime qui tombe sous le coup du droit international. Au paragraphe 18 de cette résolution, le Conseil m'a prié de lui présenter aussi tôt que possible un rapport d'enquête sur les violations graves du droit international humanitaire commises au Rwanda durant le conflit. Dans sa résolution 925 (1994) du 8 juin 1994, le Conseil a pris note avec une vive préoccupation des informations suivant lesquelles des actes de génocide ont été commis au Rwanda et rappelé que le génocide constitue un crime qui tombe sous le coup du droit international.

3. Dans mon rapport sur la situation au Rwanda en date du 31 mai 1994 (S/1994/640), j'ai indiqué que le carnage et les tueries systématiques se sont poursuivis dans l'ensemble du pays, et que seule une enquête menée en bonne et due forme permettrait d'établir les faits et d'identifier les coupables. Au paragraphe 36 de ce rapport, je concluais que, d'après les renseignements et les témoignages recueillis par la mission spéciale au Rwanda, il ne faisait guère de doute que les massacres de grande ampleur perpétrés à l'encontre de communautés et de familles appartenant à un groupe ethnique particulier constituaient un génocide.

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4. Au paragraphe 1 de sa résolution 935 (1994) du 1er juillet 1994, le Conseil de sécurité m'a prié de constituer d'urgence une commission impartiale d'experts chargée d'examiner et d'analyser les informations qui auront été communiquées en application de cette résolution, ainsi que celles qu'elle aura pu recueillir par ses propres moyens ou par l'entremise d'autres personnes ou entités, dont celles qu'aura pu lui faire tenir le Rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l'homme pour le Rwanda, en vue de me présenter ses conclusions quant aux éléments de preuve dont elle disposera concernant les violations graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire du Rwanda, y compris d'éventuels actes de génocide.

5. Le présent rapport a été établi comme suite à la demande formulée au paragraphe 3 de la résolution 935 (1994) du Conseil.

II

6. Les membres du Conseil de sécurité se souviennent peut-être que la Commission des droits de l'homme a pris une initiative parallèle. Dans sa résolution S-3/1 du 25 mai 1994, la Commission a prié le Président de nommer un Rapporteur spécial qui serait chargé d'enquêter sur place sur la situation des droits de l'homme au Rwanda et de recueillir, auprès des gouvernements, des particuliers et des organisations intergouvernementales et non gouvernementales, tous renseignements dignes de foi sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans le pays, y compris sur les causes profondes des atrocités récentes et les responsabilités en la matière. Elle a prié le Rapporteur spécial de se rendre au Rwanda et de faire rapport sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans ce pays, y compris ses recommandations en vue de mettre fin aux violations et aux abus et d'empêcher qu'il ne s'en produise de nouveaux. Le Rapporteur spécial a également été prié de rassembler et de compiler systématiquement des renseignements sur les violations des droits de l'homme qui peuvent se commettre et sur les actes qui peuvent constituer des violations du droit international humanitaire et des crimes contre l'humanité, y compris les actes de génocide, commis au Rwanda, et de me communiquer tous ces renseignements. Le Rapporteur spécial a présenté son rapport sur la situation des droits de l'homme au Rwanda le 29 juin 1994 (E/CN.4/1995/7).

7. En constituant la Commission d'experts demandée par le Conseil de sécurité, j'ai tenu compte de la similitude qui existe entre les mandats confiés aux deux organes d'enquête. Afin d'éviter tout chevauchement superflu et d'assurer une coopération optimale entre les deux organes, j'ai choisi une manière de procéder qui garantit une utilisation optimale des ressources limitées disponibles tout en réduisant les coûts. Je compte que le Rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l'homme coopérera étroitement avec la Commission d'experts et qu'il lui communiquera toutes les informations dont il dispose. Je prendrai les dispositions administratives voulues pour assurer une collaboration suivie entre les deux organes.

8. La Commission d'experts aura pour mandat, conformément à la résolution 935 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité, d'examiner et d'analyser les informations qui lui auront été communiquées en application de cette résolution, ainsi que celles qu'elle aura pu recueillir par ses propres moyens ou par l'entremise d'autres personnes ou entités, dont celles qu'aura pu lui faire tenir le Rapporteur

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spécial de la Commission des droits de l'homme pour le Rwanda, en vue de me présenter ses conclusions quant aux éléments de preuve dont elle disposera concernant les violations graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire du Rwanda, y compris d'éventuels actes de génocide. Étant donné l'urgence de la situation, j'espère que le rapport de la Commission d'experts sera présenté rapidement dans les quatre mois qui suivront sa mise en place, ainsi que le prévoit la résolution, et, en tout état de cause, le 30 novembre 1994 au plus tard.

9. En étudiant les meilleurs moyens de procéder pour présenter un rapport au Conseil de sécurité à une date rapprochée, j'ai envisagé deux étapes pour le déroulement des travaux de la Commission d'experts. Dans un premier temps, les membres de la Commission analyseront et mettront à jour les informations qu'ils auront recueillies auprès de toutes les sources, et ils mèneront leurs propres investigations au Rwanda pour compléter celles entreprises précédemment par le Rapporteur spécial. Ces tâches devraient être accomplies dans les premières semaines qui suivront la création de la Commission.

10. Dans un deuxième temps, la Commission rédigera ses conclusions sur les éléments de preuve qui ont trait à des violations caractérisées du droit humanitaire international, et en particulier à des actes de génocide, éléments à partir desquels il serait possible d'identifier les auteurs de ces violations. À la lumière de ces conclusions, la Commission examinera la question de la juridiction - internationale ou nationale - devant laquelle ces personnes devraient passer en jugement.

11. En conséquence, j'ai décidé de créer une Commission d'experts, qui sera composée, pour commencer, de trois membres, dont l'un sera désigné par moi comme président. En nommant les membres de la Commission, je tiendrai dûment compte de leurs qualifications professionnelles, en particulier dans les domaines des droits de l'homme, du droit humanitaire, du droit pénal et de la répression, ainsi que de leur intégrité et de leur impartialité. Je notifierai prochainement au Conseil de sécurité les nominations auxquelles j'ai procédé. Je me réserve le droit d'augmenter le nombre des membres de la Commission en cas de besoin.

12. Les membres de la Commission exerceront leurs fonctions à titre personnel.

13. La Commission adoptera son règlement intérieur. En l'absence de consensus, ses décisions seront prises à la majorité des membres présents et votants.

14. Pour des raisons d'efficacité, de commodité et d'économie, la Commission aura son siège à l'Office des Nations Unies à Genève, où le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme fournira les ressources voulues ainsi qu'un appui fonctionnel et des services administratifs et de secrétariat. Dans la mesure du possible et pour éviter les doubles emplois, la Commission aura recours aux ressources déjà mises à la disposition du Rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l'homme.

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AUG-01-94 17:25

GABY OLIVER LUXEMBOURG EUROPE

BONJOUR

TEL: 02-355-23009

MKF :- 2097

FC

COO

(F/DIR)

Luxembourg, 1 st August 1994

Gaby OLIVER

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To the First Commander
of the Military Center
of the United Nations
MINUAR - KIGALI

Fax: 001-212-963-3090

Concern: Request to search for a missing person: Mr. Pierre RUTARE
from KIGALI, Rwanda.

Dear Sir,

On behalf of Missis Alphonsine RUTARE and her 3 children, who live at my home, I wish to ask you to search for his husband.

Mister Pierre RUTARE is an architecte and the administrative-manager of the office for planning, consulting and services B 2 G, Avenue de la Justice, P.B. 327, KIGALI, Rwanda. He also is partner in the Association: B2G-TETRA-LUXCONSULT, Luxembourg.

The RUTARE-Family lived in the section: of RUGENGE, cell: BWAHILIMBA, Community of NYARUGENGE, district of the City of Kigali.

Missis RUTARE, who later on stayed in the Center of the Church St. Paul, has seen her husband for the last time on the 15 th April 1994, when he left for the office to get a check. He was in contact with a person, who had promised to safe them. Mr. RUTARE also promised to give his car.

There are rumours that he has been seen in TANZANIA. We are informed that the Embassy of Tanzania at Kigali has evacuated people. It is possible that he has been obliged to join the Ambassy of Tanzania. He has planned the

1INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Chief Ops Offr

From: HAC

Date: 13 Aug 1994

Subject: DAILY HUMANITARIAN REPORT NO 111

1. During the past 24 hours the following incidents are significant:

a. Displaced Persons.

- (1) IOM transported 270 persons from Rutare to Kigali under UNAMIR escort.
- (2) ICRC will have confirmation on airlift of orphans from Bukavu later in the evening or early in the morning. They have asked for UNAMIR assistance to check the orphanage for ordnance prior to arrival of orphans.

b. Humanitarian Assistance.

- (1) UNAMIR food convoy carrying 20 Tons of food left Kigali for Kibuye. Five Britcon vehicles will load from WFP and move to Kibuye tomorrow.
- (2) Representative of Chef du Cabinet of Ministry of Rehabilitation asked UNAMIR assistance in cleaning St Paul for orphans. HAC provided some cleaning material from Australian Contingent and liaised with ICRC to provide more material tomorrow.

c. Evacuation of ex-patriates. NTR.

d. Miscellaneous. NTR.



1INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Chief Ops Offr

From: HAC

Date: 14 Aug 1994

Subject: DAILY HUMANITARIAN REPORT NO 112

1. During the past 24 hours the following incidents are significant:

a. Displaced Persons.

- (1) UNHCR reported that they used 8 trucks from IOM stationed in GISENYI to transport some 400 displaced persons from GISENYI to KIGALI. They reported that the convoy was stopped approximately ten times along the route where luggage was checked by RPF troops.
- (2) ICRC was informed of flight details for airlift of orphans from BUKAVU to KIGALI. EOD team will verify orphanage tomorrow for unexploded ordnance and mines.
- (3) IOM is scheduled to move 16 to 18 trucks to BYUMBA tomorrow to bring displaced persons home.

b. Humanitarian Assistance.

- (1) UNAMIR food convoy unloaded 45 tons of food in KIBUYE using CANCON and BRITCON vehicles. They are due to return carrying displaced persons.
- (2) HAC delivered cleaning materials to St Paul to assist authorities in preparing it to receive orphans.

c. Evacuation of ex-patriates. NTR.

- d. Miscellaneous. A strategy meeting was held today at UNDP concerning the situation of the displaced in the FPZ. The meeting was chaired by Charles Petrie of UNREO and CHAO was in attendance.

food. we shall
have it put up
with real black?
patiently.
S.S.
ED
/C



MFF: - 229/6

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA
CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

TO: General Romeo Dallaire UNAMIR Force Commander Kigali	FROM: Mr. J.L. Gómez del Prado Officer-in-Charge, Special Procedures Centre for Human Rights Geneva
FAX #: 001.212.963.30.90	FAX #: 41/22/917.00.92 PHONE #: 917.38.75
SUBJECT: Commission of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 935 (1994)	
DATE: 15 August 1994	2 PAGES ATTACHED DRAFTER: SK

MESSAGE:

Please find enclosed a letter addressed to you by the Chairman of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 935 (1994), Mr. Atsu-Koffi Amega. For your information, I should also like to attach copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Amega to the Rwandese Government through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rwanda, Mr. Khan.

copy given to Karen S. I would be most grateful if your office could make a copy of this correspondence available to Ms. Karen Kenny.

With many thanks and kind regards, J.L. Gómez del Prado.

UNATIONS. GENEVA

②
SRSG
HAC
your information
please.
17/8

FC E/DIR

OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENÈVE



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA

CENTRE POUR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME

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CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Palais des Nations
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Réf. N° : G/SO 214 (93 COM)
(à rappeler dans la réponse)

15 août 1994


Monsieur le Commandant,

J'ai l'honneur de m'adresser à vous en ma qualité de Président de la Commission d'Experts établie par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies conformément à la résolution 935 (1994) du Conseil de Sécurité. Par ladite résolution, la Commission d'Experts a été chargée d'examiner et d'analyser des allégations concernant les violations graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire du Rwanda, y compris d'éventuels actes de génocide.

Comme vous le savez, cette Commission d'Experts est composée de trois membres, notamment Mme. Haby Dieng (Guinée), M. Salifou Fomba (Mali) et moi même.

La Commission d'Experts s'est réunie ce jour pour la première fois à Genève et a commencé ses travaux qui devraient aboutir à des conclusions. Celles-ci seront transmises au Secrétaire général dans un délai de quatre mois. Compte tenu de l'urgence de cette enquête, il est dans l'intention de la Commission d'Experts de se rendre au Rwanda dans les plus brefs délais. Je serais heureux si, lors de cette visite la Commission d'Experts pouvait se réunir avec vous pour un échange de vues. Je suis convaincu que votre évaluation de la situation au Rwanda, surtout en ce qui concerne la période entre le 6 avril 1994 et le cessez-le-feu, et vos conseils quant au mandat d'enquête confié à la Commission d'Experts lui serait de la plus grande utilité. Je vous communiquerai les dates de cette visite dès que le calendrier des activités de la Commission d'Experts sera établi.

Dans l'espoir d'une coopération fructueuse, je vous prie, Monsieur le Commandant, de bien vouloir agréer l'expression de ma très haute considération.


Atsu-Koffi Amega
Président
Commission d'Experts

Général Roméo Dallaire
Commandant de la Mission des
Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda
Kigali
Rwanda

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Chief Ops Offr

From: HAC

Date: 18 Aug 1994

Subject: DAILY HUMANITARIAN REPORT NO 116

1. During the past 24 hours the following incidents are significant:
 - a. Displaced Persons.
 - (1) IOM moved 393 orphans from BYUMBA orphanage to the Government orphanage at St Paul.
 - (2) IOM also moved displaced persons from RUHENGARI to KIGALI using 5 trucks. Numbers to be confirmed.
 - (3) IOM is scheduled to resume the transfer of displaced persons from BYUMBA to KIGALI tomorrow.
 - b. Humanitarian Assistance.
 - (1) WFP deployed to the St Paul orphanage to deliver HEB to newly arrived orphans.
 - (2) UNAMIR will deliver one week of food supplies to GITARAMA area tomorrow using 12 trucks.
 - c. Evacuation of ex-patriates. NTR.
 - d. Miscellaneous. Meeting was held at UNREO HQ to confirm Phase 2 of strategy for FPZ. Stores required to meet emergency were identified and planning is in progress.



1000(FC)

18 August, 1994

To : See Distribution

From: FC

JS

Subject: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RWANDESE COMMUNITIES

1. One of the major elements of the current mandate of UNAMIR is the provision of humanitarian assistance to Rwandese. Therefore the success of our mission will depend largely on how well we are able to achieve this task.


2. The SRSG has accordingly developed a plan, RWANDA EMERGENCY NORMALIZATION PLAN (RENP) which aims at a rapid but systematic normalization of the social and economic situation in Rwanda through international assistance. A copy of the plan is attached for your information.

3. In order to speed up the implementation of this plan, it is necessary that UNAMIR troops initiate and vigorously pursue humanitarian projects within their areas of operation, taking into consideration the primary needs of the different communities. Local initiatives will therefore be highly appreciated and encouraged and these may be co-ordinated with the Humanitarian Affairs Cell (HAC).

4. The following areas of activities may serve as guidelines:

- a. Medical assistance to communities.
- b. Engineer assistance in the areas of
 - (1) Re-habilitation and reconstruction works.
 - (2) EOD disposal.
- c. Communal labour to improve on the social and health needs of communities.
- d. Active assistance to UN Agencies and NGOs in the conduct of relief operations.
- e. Other activities, to encourage the local population to remain in their home areas.

5. All action addressees are urged to react to this memo with the desired sense of urgency and commitment.


RA DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:
Ghanbatt
Britcon
Ausmed Coy
Cansigs
Ethiobatt

Information

SRSG
DFC
CAO

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Chief Ops Offr

From: HAC

Date: 21 Aug 1994

Subject: DAILY HUMANITARIAN REPORT NO 118

1. During the past 24 hours the following incidents are significant:

a. Displaced Persons.

- (1) 20 displaced persons arrived by aircraft from CYANGUGU. They were brought into the city by UNAMIR bus.
- (2) IOM assisted SOS village in transporting orphans to Gisimba Orphanage.
- (3) UNAMIR convoy with trucks from UNHCR arrived in KIBUYE. They will return tomorrow with displaced persons from the area.

b. Humanitarian Assistance.

- (1) UNHCR convoy of 8 trucks carrying blankets left for CYANGUGU. They stayed overnight in BUTARE. They will travel under UNAMIR escort.

c. Evacuation of ex-patriates. NTR

d. Miscellaneous.

- (1) A meeting was held with the Minister of Rehabilitation and UN and NGO in the ministry. The Minister gave a briefing on the political situation in the country and requested all agencies to produce a paper indicating the persons both foreign and local that they employ and a resume of the tasks they have accomplished during the months of June and July as well as their short and long term future plans.
- (2) UNREO held a meeting to plan the execution of Phase 2 of the strategy for the SW of the country. It will involve the establishment of 4 camps South of CYANGUGU with efforts being coordinated and controlled at the UNREO Ops Cell. Mr Petrie will discuss the operation with CHAO today.

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Chief Ops Offr

From: HAC

Date: 27 Aug 1994

Subject: DAILY HUMANITARIAN REPORT NO 124

1. During the past 24 hours the following incidents are significant:

a. Displaced Persons.

- (1) BRITCON convoy should return 28 Aug with displaced persons from KIBUYE.
- (2) IOM will move about 400 persons from CYANGUGU.
- (3) HAC patrol visited North east Rwanda. Patrol report will follow.
- (4) HAC visited SOS Children's Village and NDARA orphanage. No problems evident,

b. Humanitarian Assistance.

- (1) WFP convoy departed fo KIBUYE with 60 Tons of food.

c. Evacuation of ex-patriates. NTR

d. Miscellaneous. SRSG attended general meeting at UNREO. He presented his plan for rehabilitation to the NGOs present,

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Kristen Scott Political Affairs Officer

From: HAC

Date: 31 Aug 1994

Subject: STATISTICS ON THE MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Ref: Your memo dated 27 Aug 94

1. Complete statistics of all movement of displaced persons in Rwanda is attached.

2. Answers to your specific questions are as follows:

a. UNAMIR only transports displaced persons from KIBUYE in conjunction with a logistic resupply operation for the forces in place or in conjunction with a food convoy for people in camps. Statistics over a seven day period are as follows:

(1) CYANGUGU (21 Aug - 28 Aug) - 630

(2) KIBUYE (21 Aug - 28 Aug) - 818

(3) GIKONGORO - 0

b. Returnees for the month of July - 6,499

c. Returnees for the month of Aug - 6,879

d. Total returnees noted to date - 13,378

3. Some problems noted with this operation are as follows:

a. The Rwandese Government and Prefecture of Kigali have not assisted in any way in this operation.

b. Displaced who returned to Kigali from Kibuye following the visit of the Minister of the Interior have approached HAC with reports that several have been taken by the authorities and have disappeared. The Rwandese man who returned to Kibuye to bring his family was arrested and thrown in prison yesterday. He was released when neighbours went to speak on his behalf. He also reported that the authorities refused to register his name when they arrested him.

c. Aid agencies operating in Kigali to meet the displaced are prepared only to assist them for one day.

d. There are no centers for the homeless who return.

e. Some returnees who return find that someone else is in their dwelling and consequently they are homeless.

ED
for 29/8/94
for 29/8/94
UNFEO

We should have some working


UNMIL
UNRECOP
attent

- f. UNAMIR vehicles returning with displaced are unable to feed and shelter them upon arrival in Kigali. An aid agency must be identified to provide this service for UNAMIR if the Force is to continue the exercise.
- g. Some transport resources are still committed to the Goma and Bukavu areas.
- h. UNHCR is moving displaced from the Cyangugu area and the Gisenyi area however their offices are not informing UNAMIR.

4. While the necessity to move displaced persons quickly from the Sector Four area to the RPA controlled area was necessary to limit a possible exodus to Bukavu, it is questionable whether this same type of fast paced operation is still necessary. The control of the return of displaced persons should be the responsibility of the Government whereby they register who leaves and enters an area. They should also be ready to provide for the returnees both with food, shelter and protection. They should also decide what aid they want from the Humanitarian Community to assist them in this operation.

5. If the operation continues as at present, HAC predicts that ex-INTERAHAMWE will return to the city, displaced persons will request UNAMIR to provide protection from the local authorities and displaced persons who are destitute will ask to be transported back to their camp location in CYANGUGU or KIBUYE where humanitarian assistance was available.

6. For your consideration.


D.J. MacNeil
Major
UNAMIR HAC Ops

To: Ms. Flexтина Forster, OCHA, O S R S G

From: Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao, OIC, OCHA, O S R S G

DATE: 1 September 1994

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE OFFICE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

It has pleased the SRSG to announce the following schedule of duties as the main concern of the unit/dept:

1. Overseeing and co-ordinating humanitarian assistance effort of United Nations agencies, bi-lateral donors, non-governmental organizations and other concerned institutions;

2. Developing strategies for effective distribution of humanitarian assistance and preparing reports on humanitarian relief operations;

3. Advising the Special Representative on all matters relating to Humanitarian Assistance and acting on behalf of the Director of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA).


4. Facilitating, monitoring and coordinating all Human Rights activities including the work of all the Human Rights Observers who should be assisted in all possible aspects of their job including briefings, interviews, etc. There are only four (4) Human Rights Observers (HROs) at the moment and OCHA should encourage them to be submitting regular reports to the OSRSG. Attached to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the UNDP headquarters here in KIGALI, herebelow are details of these HROs:

Karen Kenny	HOTEL ROMEO 1	Channel 8
Omran Ahmat	HOTEL ROMEO 2	Channel 8
Fatsah Ouquergouz	HOTEL ROMEO 3	Channel 8
Jorge Salazar	HOTEL ROMEO 4	Channel 8



F/1 2591

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA
CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS


TO: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Rwanda Kigali attn. M. Golo	FROM: M. G. Mautner-Markhof Chief, Special Procedures 
FAX #: 001.212.963.30.90	FAX #: 41/22/917.00.92 PHONE #: 917.38.75
SUBJECT:	
DATE: 31 August 1994	TOTAL 4 PAGES
DRAFTER: SK	

MESSAGE:

Please find enclosed, as requested, a copy of the memorandum addressed to Mr. Annan by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Ayala Lasso, on 15 August 1994. I would be grateful if you could make forward a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Gómez del Prado. (K)

Best regards.

UNATIONS. GENEVE.

*This is a reasonable request
I would like to discuss at a meeting
at which we may ask Sidis Dao
& Karen Kenny also*

29

GRSA CAO ED

*Note: Mr. Gomez /x above is
out of the country. Cop, however, handed
to Mr. Clarence [UNDP Building] Chief of
Human Rights Ops in Rwanda. 18.7.94*

OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENÈVE



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA

HAUT COMMISSAIRE AUX DROITS DE L'HOMME

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

MEMORANDUM

A-TO: Mr. Koffi Annan
Under-Secretary-General for
Peace-Keeping Operations

Ref

Geneva, 15 August 1994

DE-FROM: J. Ayala Lasso
High Commissioner for Human Rights

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. Ayala Lasso".

OBJET - SUBJECT: Human rights field activities in Rwanda

1. As you know, the Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution S-3/1, adopted on 25 May 1994 during its emergency session on Rwanda, requested me to establish a team of human rights field officers to assist the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Rwanda in the implementation of his mandate. Funds under the regular budget have been made for six field officer posts.

2. Pursuant to this request, the first two human rights field officers were sent to the area in early June. Two more are being deployed, and further two should follow shortly. According to the mandate given to the Special Rapporteur, their tasks included both monitoring of the current human rights situation in Rwanda ("horizontal approach") and gathering information concerning alleged human rights violations for a more in-depth investigation ("vertical approach"). Such information will also be indispensable for the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 935 (1994) to examine grave violations of international humanitarian law and genocide in Rwanda. The provisional basis of their operations was Nairobi, where UNREO kindly provided office space. In the meantime, as the situation in Kigali has changed considerably, the field officers have concentrated their activities more and more within Rwanda.

cc: Mr. Fall
Mr. Nyeremkye

- 2 -

3. In the light of the most recent developments, it has become clear that a much more numerous presence of human rights officers in Rwanda is required, particularly to monitor the return to Rwanda of the large numbers of refugees, especially from Zaire, and of internally displaced persons currently in the South-West of the country. It is envisaged that these monitors be deployed in teams of two in each of the ten prefectures of Rwanda, where they will constitute a permanent international presence. Led by an experienced coordinator, they will, inter alia, monitor the ongoing human rights situation, raise human rights awareness among the population and the local authorities, facilitate a climate of dialogue and assist in the resolution of potential conflicts at a local level. At the same time, they will form an information-gathering network for the team of human rights officers carrying out in-depth investigations.

4. On 2 August 1994, at the UN Pledging Conference on Rwanda I launched an appeal to the international community asking for funds for the financing of this expanded field operation. Several Governments, including those of Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United States of America, have already pledged money for human rights field monitoring. The Governments of Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have expressed their interest in making contributions.

5. At present, my office is in the process of selecting candidates for the field monitoring team. We are also assessing the needs of such an operation with regard to transport, communications, computer equipment and security. In this context, it should be noted that neither for the team of human rights field officers established pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution S-3/1 nor under the mandate of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 935 (1994) regular budget funds have been made available for any of these requirements.

6. With regard to the four areas mentioned above, our assessment is that the following would be indispensable to allow the 26 human rights field officers and their coordinator to operate with the necessary independence, in addition to the local support in each of the ten prefectures, including local secretarial staff and interpreters/translators:

a) Transport

- 15 vehicles (four wheel drive) equipped with VHF radio
(five cars would be needed immediately for the field officers already in the area, ten more within one or two weeks)

b) Communications

- satellite telephone and fax for the Kigali Office, which should be the basis for all operations
- 27 portable radios
- LAN cards and modems for desk-top computers

- 3 -

c) Computers

- four desk-top computers (two in Kigali, two in Nairobi)
- 25 laptop computers with 15 portable printers

d) Security

- bullet-proof vests
- UN armbands and caps

7. As soon as the funds requested in my appeal will become available, we will proceed with the purchase of the above-mentioned equipment. However, in order for the team to be fully operational before the end of the month, I would seek your advice and that of your Department as to whether certain items could be temporarily made available to us or be actually rented out.

8. Given the vast experience of your office, I would greatly appreciate it if you could let me have your suggestions regarding the human rights field operation envisaged in Rwanda. I think that it would be extremely useful for us if we could build on the positive experiences of cooperation in the field already developed in connection with Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia.

OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENÈVE

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UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA

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FACSIMILE
TRANSMISSION

Palais des Nations
CH - 1211 GENEVE 10



RÉF. N° : Date:
(à rappeler dans la réponse)

TO:

Mr. Gomez del Prado

FROM:

G. Mautner-Markhof
Chief
Special Procedures
Centre for
Human Rights

FAX NO:

FAX: (41 22) 917 00 92
PH: (41 22) 9173357

SUBJECT

=====

No. of pages attached :

=====

MESSAGE:

*We could unfortunately not
reach you in Aix to
discuss the contents of the
attached. Please let me have
your comments asap.*

OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENÈVE



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA

CENTRE POUR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME

CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

MEMORANDUM

A-TO: Mr. Denis Beissel
Field Operations
Fax No. 001.212.963.03.83

Ref: G/SO 214 (93)

DE-FROM: Mr. Georg Mautner-Markhof
Chief, Special Procedures

Geneva, 31 August 1994

OBJET-SUBJECT: Equipment for human rights field activities in Rwanda

1. I refer to our telephone conversation of yesterday and your kind offer to assist the Centre for Human Rights in the procurement and shipment of equipment for the human rights field operation in Rwanda initiated by the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
2. As I explained to you over the phone, we are currently deploying as a first step 25 human rights officers in the country. Five are already in place, another five are expected to arrive at the beginning of next week, and the remaining fifteen will follow shortly.
3. It is indispensable that the monitors be provided with the most essential equipment as quickly as possible, and I am, therefore, attaching a list of the most urgent items which we would very much hope to be available in the course of next week. A more detailed needs assessment will follow once we have more clarity about the number of persons that we will be able to send in September as well as their deployment and specific tasks.
4. As to the financing, I wish to confirm that UNDP is already in a position immediately to advance an overall sum of one million dollars for this operation, and additional contributions from various governments are being received. Payment for this initial shipment is thus definitely secured.
5. We have not yet appointed a Head of the field operation, but Mr. Gómez del Prado, who acts as Coordinator of the Commission of Experts on Rwanda and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, is currently in Kigali, in principle until 5 September 1994, and would be available through the UNDP office there for any direct contacts with your representative, Mr. Golo, that may be necessary with regard to practical aspects of the delivery. After his departure, we can certainly designate another officer as liaison person.
6. I am most grateful for your efforts in ensuring that this initial equipment reaches our monitors in the shortest possible time, and I shall of course subsequently contact you again to properly assess our medium and long-term needs.

**Immediate basic requirements for human rights field
activities in Rwanda**

1. Transport

10 vehicles with UN radio equipment (as many as possible with four-wheel-drive)

2. Communications

1 Inmarsat satellite telephone/fax station

25 VHF hand-held radios with repeaters and a base station

3. Computers and recording equipment

25 laptop computers

10 portable printers

2 desktop computers

2 desk printers

2 modems and LAN communication cards

25 portable tape recorders

500 cassettes

500 rechargeable batteries and 10 battery chargers

1 pallet of photocopying paper

4. Food

Food and water rations for 25 persons for 100 days

September 13, 1994 ,

To Whom it may Concern:

BACKGROUND

This memo is regarding the work of Samaritan's Purse International Relief in the Rutare Orphanage. Samaritan's Purse began supporting the Orphanage in May, 1994. At that time there were about 100,000 refugees in the area and 600 children housed in the orphanage (according to information supplied by local authorities). Initially, we agreed to co-ordinate food supplies for the orphanage for a period of 90 days, after which we would assess the situation. We have reconfirmed our commitment to the children and are therefore at a threshold of new beginnings. Our primary goal is to aid the government in reuniting children with their families but we are also prepared to provide a quality, long term care facility if necessary.

RELATIONSHIP DEFINED

We have supplied foods directly for the orphanage when necessary but most of the food staples were provided through the support of co-operating NGO's (ICRC, CRS). In an attempt to delegate responsibility to national staff, the recording and control of stock was solely their responsibility. The initial agreement was that they would have all stock records and keys. We attempted to meet the food requests whenever possible but sometimes we encountered discrepancies when we were told there was no food. Here are a few:

- sometimes when we were told there was no food further investigation showed that there was food but not necessarily the food being requested
- on one occasion we were told that we were out of beans but when we checked further we found that the beans had simply been moved. No one seemed to know who moved them
- on many occasions ICRC representatives expressed concern that the volume of food that we were consuming was too great for the number of children
- In addition to food, Samaritan's Purse has provided clothing, bedding, medicines, toys, and school materials. Samaritan's Purse had also agreed with Neppo Johnson (appointed administrator) to provide Kerosene for the lanterns on an 'as need' basis. SP also agreed to provide 40 litres of gasoline every two weeks for a truck to bring firewood. SP also paid 58\$ U.S. every two weeks for the truck rental and as of the middle of August Neppo also requested an additional 25,000 RF week to pay for firewood as the original source had been depleted. We finally agreed upon 40\$ U.S. every two weeks. Therefore, he was

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Meeting critical needs in crisis areas of the world.

personally given almost 100\$ every two weeks for orphanage affairs. This has been provided as background information as our organization has been accused of not providing for the Rutare orphanage and that we agreed to sell stock in order to buy food.

CONCERNS

In conjunction with all the chaos, two employees (Neppo Johnson/administration and Emmanuel Nyirinkindi /stock control) have been incarcerated regarding charges of embezzlement. These charges were brought up by administration from the district. The men have been since released from jail although there is apparently sufficient evidence against them (see report submitted to the military authorities by Kalissa dated September 12).

We have secured a new facility in Kigali which will help us meet our future goals for the children but unfortunately our attempt to move them has been met with great opposition. In particular, two issues have created problems with our working relationship. They are:

1. Staffing - the issue seems not to be how many staff members we bring but whom we bring. There are a few people who are making demands of how we staff our new site.
2. Stock control - as we increase our role in providing for the orphanage and therefore our total cash layout, we need to step up our own accountability. This has been met by great resistance. On one occasion we were told that we ~~can~~ not have access to the stock rooms. Since we must be accountable to our donors we must be able to access and control our stock.

Samaritan's Purse is anxious to move the children to the new location but is hesitant to transfer these problems to our new location. In terms of staffing, we are very flexible and open to negotiations; we only want to ensure that we have a staff who are deeply committed to the children. We feel we can resolve the issue of stock and staffing but the influence of the two employees in question is hampering our progress. We have not been able to determine who is ultimately responsible for the administration that has been appointed in Rutare. We are in a tenuous situation and want to proceed cautiously and respectfully, but we are also being asked by the Ministry of Agriculture to utilize our buildings as soon as possible.

SUPPORT REQUESTED

We therefore request an investigation into the actions of the two employees mentioned. It appears as though the work of Samaritans' Purse and some local administration has been slandered in the attempt to defend others. We are anxious to resume our many plans that we have for our new facility (clinic, schooling, etc) and so we would appreciate any assistance you can provide that would allow us to continue our work here.

Sincerely,

Jack C. Norman

Jack Norman
Rutare Projects Director

MEMORANDUM

9850-1

3 Sept 94

FC (thru DFC/COS)

REFUGEE RETURN

Ref: Rwanda Presidential letter dated 1 Sep 94 (attached)

1. The majority of concerns and issues in the letter at ref are outside of UNAMIR force's control or influence. Security of Tanzanian and Zairean refugee camps, the repatriation of refugees and the human rights issues are clearly outside UNAMIR's mandate for its military force. Those issues should be addressed by UNREO, UNHCR and other NGO's.

2. With respect to the establishment of safe corridors for the return of refugees, it should be noted that there is an NGO/humanitarian aspect as well as a military force/security aspect associated. In so much that it is my assessment that the current deployment, tasks and situation precludes the military force from assuming any additional tasks without receiving additional troop reinforcement beyond those currently authorized/planned.


3. Prior to considering the creation of safe corridors, UNAMIR should confirm the required information and determine feasibility of the following:

- Info to NGOs.*
- a. routes and location where corridors are required (ie: in all sectors or just in Sector 4);
 - b. whether refugee flow warrants this extraordinary measure;
 - c. final destination of refugees (to avoid "Kigali DP" situation from worsening);
 - d. assistance avail from IOM, UNHCR and other NGO's to screen/move refugees/DP's and establish "way stations"; and
 - e. establishment of collection pts at border and the provision of tpt, secur, escort is sufficient to BBGNU and achievable/practical for UNAMIR and NGO's.

FC
I agree with the pertinent issues raised by DCE's ops. I have asked if my MA to convene a meeting of the officers of page 2 para 4 for us to look through the matter.
Di 04/9
DFC

4. Suggest a meeting chaired by DFC/COS with DCOS OPS, DCOS SP, HAC, UNREO and SRSG rep be convened to resolve some of the issues in para 3 to determine feasibility and way ahead.

5. Furthermore, the attached letter should be referred to UNDP/UNREO in order to address the non-military issues.



J. Arp
Col
DCOS OPS

Attachement: 1



PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE
CABINET DU PRESIDENT

Kigali, le 01/09/1994

N°

[Handwritten signature]

Annexe :

Réf. N° :

Objet :

The Representative,
United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees
KIGALI / RWANDA

(2)

DLOS QM

*These reviews have
against and that is
in our capital to try
to put it*

A

MA 519

Dear Mr Representative.

During our discussions with the different citizens of our country, certain facts have emerged about the plight of Rwandese citizens who are living in refuge in our neighbouring countries that deeply concern us. In one meeting with the population in Ruhengeri town, citizens who had been living in refuge in Zaïre but had to flee from that country in fear of their life after being evicted from their home, exemplified a problem which is beginning to take on alarming proportions.

Mr Representative, the Interahamwe and political leaders who orchestrated the genocide in our country are still as active in their countries of asylum, as they were in our country. In Zaïre and Tanzania, they are still busy planning massacres and terrorising innocent citizens whose right it is to live in peace and security. They are busy creating the climate of insecurity that preceded the genocide in our country.

In Zaïre these Interahamwe found a group of Rwandese who had been living in exile for more than thirty years. They terrorised them and even evicted many of them from their homes and took ownership of the property they had acquired. As if this was not enough, even those who try to flee back to Rwanda are ambushed on the way and are either killed or maimed. In one incident alone more than twenty people returning to Rwanda were ambushed and killed. All this is done with the impunity that is characteristic of these interahamwe.

The Interahamwe and their leaders, including those suspected of having been the brains behind the genocide in Rwanda, freely, openly, and publically carry out propaganda inciting the population to hate, hunt and kill others on ethnic lines. Those refugees who dare to voice dissenting views are ruthlessly suppressed and those who dare to return to their homeland are actively hunted down and harassed if not killed. All this is done by people who at the close of day return to refugee camps run by the UNCHR.

In Tanzania, in the camps that house recent Rwandese refugees this same sorry state of affairs prevails.

The Interahamwe of Benako camp have earned themselves notoriety for stopping and harassing refugees attempting to return to Rwanda from the neighbouring countries. Again many innocent lives have been lost due

During our discussions with the local Tanzanian authorities, they indicated that they had little control over the activities and affairs of the camp because as they say, the camps are the UNHCR's responsibility and are under its jurisdiction.

We think, Mr Representative, that this state of affairs is unacceptable. not only is it against the 1952 Geneva convention on refugees but it is also inimical to the UNHCR principle of encouraging voluntary repatriation.

We strongly recommend that the UNHCR use its power and jurisdiction over the refugee camps wherever they maybe, to isolate and separate the interahamwe and their leaders from the rest of the population so that the people may be able to choose whether they want to return to their homes or stay in exile without coercion. In addition, the activities of the Interahamwe outside the camps should be severely curtailed.

As the security of Banyarwanda is our concern we strongly recommend that corridors be set up in order to facilitate safe returning of old or recent refugees who are willing to come back.

These are criminals who should only be brought before the courts of law . If the above is not done with all urgency, we fear that the world will only be fanning the beginnings of another holocaust.

Expecting a favourable response, accept Mr Representative, the expression of my highest consideration.


His Excellency Pasteur BIZIMUNGU
President of the Republic of Rwanda



C.C :

- Prime Minister
KIGALI
- V/President and Minister of Defence
KIGALI
- Mr SHAHARYER KHAN, Special Representative
of the UN Secretary General
KIGALI
- Maj. Gen. G.C. TOUSIGNAT
Force commander UNAMIR
KIGALI

MAP NO. 3807.1 UNITED NATIONS
SEPTEMBER 1993



MEMORANDUM

TO : ARTURO HEIN
UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR
UNREO

SHARARYAR KHAN
SASG

FROM : CHARLES PETRIE
UNREO

DATE : 15 AUGUST 1994

SUBJECT : FEASIBILITY OF CYANGUGU PORTION OF THE PHASE 2
OPTION

I refer to our conversation concerning the feasibility of setting up camps in the Gishoma area of the Cyangugu Prefecture. Recognising the limitations of such an approach as the situation stands now, I wish to put on paper the reasoning behind this proposal in order to ensure that the need for other elements/initiatives to come into play be clearly understood.

In preparing Phase 2 a number of assumptions have had to be accepted/understood:

1. a movement into Bukavu will result in certain death for a significant portion of the population. The cost of setting up the necessary infrastructure to address the needs of a large influx of refugees would be prohibitive. An international response to a major influx once it occurs would be of limited effectiveness given the unavailability of land to settle people, the extremely poor road infrastructure to Bukavu and within the area, the absence of an airfield ... To date UNHCR has been unable to settle the 100,000 refugees entering Bukavu and seeking UNHCR assistance
2. the populations are moving towards Zaire out of fear of the RPA, or more specifically the unknown linked to the RPA advance. The people are not fleeing an advancing army, nor are they necessarily responding wholeheartedly to ex-RGF instructions. People do not seem to be moving because of humanitarian need. Various rapid surveys effected by NGOs would seem to indicate that the people do not really want to move to Zaire

Given these assumptions it is felt that our plan should attempt to capitalise on the peoples hesitancy to move into Zaire and accept the fact that providing assistance into Bukavu is impossible. Consequently, the approach developed focuses on the establishment of camps in the southern portion of the Cyangugu Prefecture. This area offers the advantages of being:

?

1. logistically accessible
2. capable of absorbing large numbers of people
3. the furthest point from an RPF advance, and fairly easily identifiable/defendable as a potential safe zone
4. close to the Zairian border at a point capable of receiving a greater caseload of refugees (Ruzizi Plains)

Were the situation to be catastrophic the setting up of camps in this area by the humanitarian actors would offer the international community with a strategy/approach with which to address the situation: safe zones. An influx into Bukavu would offer no opportunity for effective international response.

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE
CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE SOUTHWEST

I. Overall Situation

People have commenced moving towards Zaire from the eastern part of the "French Humanitarian Zone". Daily figures remain fairly low, 5 000 out of Kibuye, 2 800 entering the forest from Gikongoro (both figures for 13/8, slight increases on 14/8). The moves are organised/supported by ex-RGF groups from Zaire:

- in Kibuye militia elements are said, even observed, to be blocking the movement of people east, and inciting people to flee southwest
- in the Gikongoro Prefecture similar intimidations are being put on the local populations. Until recently such efforts were supported by radio transmissions out of northern Burundi

Ex-RGF are also organising transportation from both Prefectures to Cyangugu. Reports indicate that the "intelligentsia" of the areas are being targeted for movement west and southwest.

Even though movements are being observed it is not obvious that the general population wish to move "en masse" as they did from the northwest some weeks ago. Groups are observed starting their move towards Zaire, but stopping along the way (only to be encouraged along by ex-RGF elements). It should be recalled that the southwest population currently in country have already ignored a summons to Zaire by the ex-RGF (mid-July). They are consequently not as tied to the old government as their northwestern counter-parts now suffering in Goma.

Relief assistance is entering the Gikongoro Prefecture in significant quantities. ICRC have distributed 1 000 mts and WFP over 600. The international NGO presence is very visual and assistance is increasing. The situation in Kibuye is not as positive, though the needs are significantly less given the outflow of 30,000 - 50,000 displaced to Giterama two weeks ago.

Consequently, the people are fleeing the eastern portions of the "French Humanitarian Zone" for reasons of fear of the RPF (aka RPA), and not as a result of humanitarian need.

The international community is faced with the challenge of implementing an emergency preparedness plan in Zaire, without provoking a massive movement west.

The projected situation in Bukavu resulting from a massive movement of displaced/refugees is apocalyptic. In comparison to Goma, in Bukavu:

- no international airport exists (Bukavu and Cyangugu airport could only be utilised over a two week period before being permanently out of commission)
- road infrastructure is extremely poor, and will worsen with the coming rains
- possible refugee sites are located further away from the point of entry (at least 20-30 Kms), and would take far longer to prepare than in Goma (two to three weeks in Goma)
- the people will arrive in a far weaker state having walked six days through an almost impenetrable forest with limited scavenging potential
- local authorities are even less enthusiastic than in Goma to host Rwandan guests

The conclusion of a UNREO chaired meeting between military contingent commanders, UN agencies and NGOs was that the cost of effective preparatory measures in Bukavu would be prohibitive.

II. Proposed Strategy

Based on the assumption that arrivals of refugees into Bukavu has to be considered a "failure" of the preventive/preparatory approach, the following phased strategy is proposed:

Phase 1 Containment

- a. Concentrate relief assistance in the Prefectures of Kibuye and Gikongoro, supporting ongoing political efforts
- b. Utilise the forest, a funnelling point, to our advantage (point for for disseminating information)

Phase 2 Positioning

Establish camps in the Cyangugu Prefecture. Massive inflow of humanitarian assistance

Phase 3 Disaster

Free-for-all in Zaire. Encourage people to go to camp structure in Cyangugu Prefecture

The implementation of the phases is obviously dependent on the magnitude of the moves west.

III. Immediate Humanitarian Actions

1. Encourage NGOs to focus on Phase 1 at least until 20 August:
 - increase NGO/UN coverage of Kibuye Prefecture
 - commence Phase 1 operations in Cyangugu in support of "political efforts" (18 August)
2. Monitor success of dialogue sessions between RPA and local authorities, and movements of displaced
3. Review possibility of utilising entry point into the forest as an area where political messages can be transmitted
4. Set up radio transmission for the zone (mobil transmitter)
5. Prioritise inflow of relief supplies in country (medical, water equipment)
6. Prepare plan to assist people crossing the forest (Phase 2)
7. Identify sites in the Gishoma portion of Cyangugu Prefecture, and finalise plan of action for Phase 2 (16 August)
8. Raise awareness over fate of Nyarushishi camp

15 August 1994

Humanitarian Organizations Working or Planning to Work in Rwanda (as of 11 August 1994)

AAR (Association to Aid the Refugees)
ACORD
Action Nord Sud
ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency)
AFRICARES
Africa Services
AFVP (Association Francaise des Volontaires du Progres)
AICF (Action International Contre la Faim)
AIDAB (Australian International Development Assistance Bureau)
AIDSCAP
AMERICARES
Atlas Logistique
AMDA (Association of Medical Doctors for Asia)
BUFMAR/ MEMISA
CARE International
CARITAS
Compassion
Concern Worldwide
Croix Rouge-Belgique
CRS (Catholic Relief Services)
DART/USAID
DSR
ECHO (European Communities Humanitarian Office)
EMERGENCY
FAO
Feed the Children-Canada
German Emergency Doctors (GED)
GOAL
Handicap International
ICRC
IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross Societies)
IMC (International Medical Corps)
INTERSOS
IOM (International Organisation for Migration)
Italian Team CCM
Jane's Love
Jumelage Rhenanie-Palatinat/Rwanda
LWR (Lutheran World Relief)
MEDAIR
MDM (Medecins du Monde)
MHD (Maltheser Hilfsdienst)
MSF (Medecins sans Frontieres)
Netherlands Development Organisation
Norwegian People's Aid
ODA (Overseas Development Administration-UK)
OXFAM-UK
Project Arn
Premieres Urgences
PSF (Pharmaciens sans Frontieres)
Refugee Trust
Salem Brotherhood
Samaritan's Purse
SCF (Save the Children Fund-UK)
SOLIDARITE
SOS Children's Village
Swiss Disaster Relief (SDR)
Terre des Hommes
Triangle
Trocaire
UN Center for Human Rights
UNDP (United Nations Development Program)
UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees)
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund)
UNREO (United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office)
Veterinaires des Volcans
WFP (World Food Program)
WHO World Health Organisation)
World Relief
World Vision
WOA- Refugee Care

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Chief Ops Offr

From: HAC

Date: 26 Aug 1994

Subject: DAILY HUMANITARIAN REPORT NO 123

1. During the past 24 hours the following incidents are significant:

a. Displaced Persons.

(1) IOM brought 64 displaced persons from KISARO camp near BYUMBA to KIGALI. MILOBs report that this transfer completes the operation in this area.

(2) BRITCON returned from KIBUYE with approximately 500 displaced persons. About 80 were dropped off in GITARAMA. UNHCR met them at NYAMIRAMBO stadium and issued tickets for meals and blankets.

(3) A convoy of 5 BRITCON trucks and 4 WFP trucks will set out for KIBUYE 27 Aug with food. They will return with displaced persons.

(4) Four Rwandese will accompany UNAMIR convoy to CYANGUGU to look for family members.

b. Humanitarian Assistance.

(1) WFP will send food convoy to KIBUYE in conjunction with BRITCON.

c. Evacuation of ex-patriates. NTR

d. Miscellaneous. NTR

DRAFT: 1
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than in Goma (two to three weeks in Goma)

- the people will arrive in a far weaker state having walked six days through an almost impenetrable forest with limited scavenging potential
- local authorities are even less enthusiastic than in Goma to host Rwandan guests

The conclusion of a UNREO chaired meeting between military contingent commanders, UN agencies and NGOs was that the cost of effective preparatory measures in Bukavu would be prohibitive.

II. Proposed Strategy

Based on the ~~prediction~~ ^{assessment} that arrivals of refugees into Bukavu has to be considered a "failure" of preventive/preparatory approach (versus the opinion that they can be assisted in Bukavu), the following phased strategy is proposed:

Phase 1 Containment

- a. Concentrate relief assistance in the Prefectures of Kibuye and Gikongoro, supporting ongoing political efforts
- b. Utilise the forest as a funnelling point, to our advantage (point for disseminating information, establishment of road block (very questionable))

Phase 2 Positioning

Establish camps in the Cyangugu Prefecture. Massive inflow of humanitarian assistance. Aggressive political initiatives with RPA in order to establish a form of safe zone (probably only palatable to RPA if limited in time)

Phase 3 Disaster

Free-for-all in Zaire.

The implementation of the phases is obviously dependent on the magnitude of the moves west.

III. Immediate Humanitarian Actions

1. Encourage NGOs to focus on Phase 1 for the next forty-eight hours. Increase NGO/UN coverage of Kibuye Prefecture
2. Monitor success of dialogue sessions between RPA and local authorities
3. Review possibility of utilising entry point into the forest as an area where political messages can be transmitted
4. Set up radio transmission for the zone
5. Prioritise inflow of relief supplies (medical supplies)
6. Prepare plan to assist people crossing the forest (Phase 2)
7. Identify sites in Cyangugu Prefecture

TEMPERATURE

The average annual temperature for Rwanda is 19.7° C. This, however, does not reflect the variations in the different regions. The three thermatic regions are based on mean monthly temperature variations. These variations are recorded during the daylight hours only. The three thermatic regions are:

- a. Below 1500 m. This area is primarily in the east but extends up the Nyabirongo River Valley. Temperatures in this region rise over 13° C during the day. The absolute maximum is 33° C and absolute minimum is 5° C. The average annual temperature for the region is 21° C;
- b. 1600-1900 m. This zone is one of transition between the low elevations and high elevations. The daily temperature variation in this zone is between 10° C and 12° C. The mean annual temperature varies from 19° C at 1700 m to 17.5° C at 1900 m. The absolute maximum in this region is 31° C and the absolute minimum is 5° C; and
- c. Over 2000 m. The mean annual temperature in this zone is 15° C. Daily temperature variation is less than 10°C. The mean maximum temperature in this zone is 22°C with the mean low being 9°C. The

PEOPLE

Population. Population of Rwanda is 7,347,000 with a density of 279 per km².

Ethnic Division. The indigenous population consists of three ethnic groups. They are the Tutsi 9%, Hutu 90% and Twa 1%. The Tutsi are a pastoral people who raise cattle. They are of Nilotic origin and are also known as Tussi, Batusi and Watusi. The Hutu are farmers of Bantu origin. They are also known as the Bahutu and Wakhutu. The Twa are pygmies and hunters. They are thought to be the remnants of the regions earliest settlers.

Language. The official languages are French and Kinyarwanda. The Kiswahili tongue is widely used in commerce. Kinyarwanda is a complex Bantu language and is spoken in the same manner by all Rwandese. The Rwanda Patriotic Front members are generally English-speaking.

Religion. About 45% of the population follow traditional beliefs. These beliefs include a supreme being called Imana. Roman Catholics make up 45% of the population and 9% are Protestant. Less than 1% of the population are Muslim.

What about AIDS and blood transfusions?

Although AIDS can be transmitted by transfusions of infected blood, in many places blood is screened for AIDS virus contamination before being given. If you need a blood transfusion, try to ensure that screened blood is used. Since more and more countries around the world are now testing blood for the AIDS virus, blood transfusions will increasingly be protected from AIDS virus contamination.

You can reduce the risk of serious injury, leading to possible need for blood transfusions, by taking ordinary, everyday precautions. Wear a seat belt and drive carefully. Don't mix alcohol with driving, boating or other activities that could lead to injury.

What about injections?

Avoid injections unless absolutely necessary. If you must have an injection, make sure the needle and syringe come straight from a sterile package or have been sterilized properly (by steam, boiling water or chemicals). For example, a needle and syringe which have been cleaned and then boiled for 20 minutes are ready for re-use.

Unless you have a prescription or a doctor's authorization, don't take your own needles with you.

Finally, if you inject drugs - no matter what kind - never use anyone else's equipment.

What about skin-piercing instruments?

Like needles and syringes, other instruments that pierce the skin (tattoo and acupuncture needles, ear-piercing equipment and dentists' tools) must always be sterile (used only once or sterilized between each use). As with needles and syringes, proper sterilizing of these instruments eliminates risk. In general, you should avoid any procedures which pierce the skin unless absolutely necessary.

What if you are already infected with the AIDS virus?

If you are already infected with the AIDS virus, consult your personal health care provider for guidance well in advance of your proposed travel.

PERSONAL PROTECTION MEASURES AGAINST MALARIA


Travellers can protect themselves quite effectively against mosquito bites, and in this way, prevent infections. This should constitute the traveller's first line of defense against malaria. Protecting oneself from insect or mosquito bites involves:

- Wearing sufficiently thick, long-sleeved clothing and long trousers when outdoors after sunset, and avoiding dark colours which attract mosquitoes;
- Smearing an insect repellent, such as dimethyl phtalate or N, N-diethyl-m-toluamide (DEET), on the parts of the skin remaining exposed (observing the manufacturer's precautions);
- Sleeping in properly screened rooms (this is generally the case with air-conditioning);
- Using "anti-fly" spray to kill any mosquitoes that may have entered in spite of the screening;
- Using mosquito nets around the bed at night, taking care to tuck in the net carefully under the mattress, and ensuring that the net is not torn, and that there are no mosquitoes inside; increased protection may be obtained by impregnating the net with permethrin or deltamethrin;
- Burning mosquito coils (but usually they do not last through the night).

January 1993

AIDS

Information for Travellers



**If you plan to travel, or are already on your way,
here are some basic facts about AIDS.**

**Concern about AIDS should not prevent
travel to any part of the world.**

**Whether at home or travelling,
avoiding AIDS is mainly up to you.**

AIDS.

Knowledge is the key to prevention

**You can protect yourself against AIDS everywhere in the
world, at home or travelling. Don't take risks during your
travel that could send AIDS home with you. If this advice
sounds strict, remember this: *with no cure or vaccine
so far for AIDS, prevention is vital.***

**For more information, please contact your health care provider
or your local, regional or national health authority.**

**This leaflet has been prepared by the
World Health Organization which
directs and coordinates international health
and is leading the global fight against AIDS.**



MINISTRE DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES
ET DE LA COOPERATION

N 204.01/554/RE/94

Le Ministère des Relations Extérieures et de la Coopération de la République du Burundi présente ses compliments à l'Ambassade de France à BUJUMBURA et a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance que le Gouvernement du Burundi vient d'apprendre que suite au mouvement massif de la population à la frontière commune entre le Zaïre et le Rwanda, le personnel oeuvrant au Centre de Distribution d'Electricité de MURURU II à CYANGUGU au Sud-Ouest du Rwanda se serait réfugié à BUKAVU en République du Zaïre.

Le Centre de MURURU II qui est un complexe extrêmement onéreux appartient au patrimoine de la Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands-Lacs (C.E.P.G.L.) est le fruit des efforts des peuples Burundais, Rwandais et Zaïrois.

En tant que membre de cette Communauté, compte tenu de l'urgence et de l'importance économique de ces infrastructures, le Gouvernement du Burundi sollicite le Gouvernement de la République Française de tout mettre en oeuvre afin que des éléments de l'Opération "Turquoise" situés dans la région puissent protéger ces infrastructures jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Le Ministère des Relations Extérieures et de la Coopération saurait gré au Gouvernement Français de bien vouloir accorder à cette demande l'urgence qu'elle mérite dans le cadre de nos excellentes relations.

Le Ministère des Relations Extérieures et de la Coopération saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Ambassade de France à Bujumbura les assurances de sa haute considération.

Fait à Bujumbura, le 23/7/1994


AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
BUJUMBURA



OSTOth Deposition
11/1/11

ABC:

1. PLEASE REQUEST THE FOLLOWING OFFICE (BUTLER/CRO/NUM)
FOR SENDING A REP TO
GITHAMMA WITH US TOMORROW
TO ATTEND THE FIRST CRO'S CONFERENCE
WITH HIS SET COUNCILS. THEY ARE
MEETING TO APPRAISE THE MEETING
WITH FUNCTION OFFICE AS WELL
AS THE CURRENT & FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.
2. THERE IS AN ORGANISED TOUR IN THAT
MEET AND TO BE FOLLOWED
SUNDAY'S LUNCH.

By A

Cus

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:
A:

DR. KABIA

FROM:
DE:

Kristen

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

15 SEPT 94

FOR ACTION

☒

POUR SUITE A DONNER

FOR APPROVAL

POUR APPROBATION

FOR SIGNATURE

POUR SIGNATURE

FOR COMMENTS

POUR OBSERVATIONS

MAY WE DISCUSS?

POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?

YOUR ATTENTION

VOTRE ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

COMME CONVENU

AS REQUESTED

SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE

NOTE AND RETURN

NOTER ET RETOURNER

FOR INFORMATION

POUR INFORMATION

SAMARETAN'S PURSE:
Dr. Kabia, thesepeople come to me
with their problemThey run an orphanage
and have been having
problems with local
Rwandese officials.Would you like Mr. DAO
to handle it? Please
advise. Thank you
Kristen

COM.6 (2-78)

September 13, 1994

To Whom it may Concern:

BACKGROUND

This memo is regarding the work of Samaritan's Purse International Relief in the Rutare Orphanage. Samaritan's Purse began supporting the Orphanage in May, 1994. At that time there were about 100,000 refugees in the area and 600 children housed in the orphanage (according to information supplied by local authorities). Initially, we agreed to co-ordinate food supplies for the orphanage for a period of 90 days, after which we would assess the situation. We have reconfirmed our commitment to the children and are therefore at a threshold of new beginnings. Our primary goal is to aid the government in reuniting children with their families but we are also prepared to provide a quality, long term care facility if necessary.

RELATIONSHIP DEFINED

We have supplied foods directly for the orphanage when necessary but most of the food staples were provided through the support of co-operating NGO's (ICRC, CRS). In an attempt to delegate responsibility to national staff, the recording and control of stock was solely their responsibility. The initial agreement was that they would have all stock records and keys. We attempted to meet the food requests whenever possible but sometimes we encountered discrepancies when we were told there was no food. Here are a few:

- sometimes when we were told there was no food further investigation showed that there was food but not necessarily the food being requested
- on one occasion we were told that we were out of beans but when we checked further we found that the beans had simply been moved. No one seemed to know who moved them
- on many occasions ICRC representatives expressed concern that the volume of food that we were consuming was too great for the number of children
- In addition to food, Samaritan's Purse has provided clothing, bedding, medicines, toys, and school materials. Samaritan's Purse had also agreed with Neppo Johnson (appointed administrator) to provide Kerosene for the lanterns on an 'as need' basis. SP also agreed to provide 40 litres of gasoline every two weeks for a truck to bring firewood. SP also paid 58\$ U.S. every two weeks for the truck rental and as of the middle of August Neppo also requested an additional 25,000 RF week to pay for firewood as the original source had been depleted. We finally agreed upon 40\$ U.S. every two weeks. Therefore, he was

P.O. Box 3000 Boone, NC 28607 • Phone: (704) 262-1980 Fax: (704) 262-1796

Meeting critical needs in crisis areas of the world.

personally given almost 100\$ every two weeks for orphanage affairs. This has been provided as background information as our organization has been accused of not providing for the Rutare orphanage and that we agreed to sell stock in order to buy food.

CONCERNS

In conjunction with all the chaos, two employees (Neppo Johnson/administration and Emmanuel Nyirinkindi /stock control) have been incarcerated regarding charges of embezzlement. These charges were brought up by administration from the district. The men have been since released from jail although there is apparently sufficient evidence against them (see report submitted to the military authorities by Kalissa dated September 12).

We have secured a new facility in Kigali which will help us meet our future goals for the children but unfortunately our attempt to move them has been met with great opposition. In particular, two issues have created problems with our working relationship. They are:


1. Staffing - the issue seems not to be how many staff members we bring but whom we bring. There are a few people who are making demands of how we staff our new site.
2. Stock control - as we increase our role in providing for the orphanage and therefore our total cash layout, we need to step up our own accountability. This has been met by great resistance. On one occasion we were told that we ~~can~~ not have access to the stock rooms. Since we must be accountable to our donors we must be able to access and control our stock.

Samaritan's Purse is anxious to move the children to the new location but is hesitant to transfer these problems to our new location. In terms of staffing, we are very flexible and open to negotiations; we only want to ensure that we have a staff who are deeply committed to the children. We feel we can resolve the issue of stock and staffing but the influence of the two employees in question is hampering our progress. We have not been able to determine who is ultimately responsible for the administration that has been appointed in Rutare. We are in a tenuous situation and want to proceed cautiously and respectfully, but we are also being asked by the Ministry of Agriculture to utilize our buildings as soon as possible.

SUPPORT REQUESTED

We therefore request an investigation into the actions of the two employees mentioned. It appears as though the work of Samaritans' Purse and some local administration has been slandered in the attempt to defend others. We are anxious to resume our many plans that we have for our new facility (clinic, schooling, etc) and so we would appreciate any assistance you can provide that would allow us to continue our work here.

Sincerely,



Jack Norman
Rutare Projects Director

SECTOR 4A FAX COVERSHEET

MKF - 2273

FROM: SECTOR 4 HQ

TO: HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS CELL (HAC)

ATTN:

SUBJ: SPECIAL REQUEST

NUMBER OF PAGES FOLLOWING THIS COVER SHEET: 1

FC COO

EX/DIR

13/08 '17 08:47

871 151 5562

UNAMIR SECTOR 4A

002

DEMANDE SPECIALE

MUKAHIRWA ANGELINE is worried if her husband is safe and sound. He left for KIGALI FROM GIKONGORO SECTOR ON SUNDAY AUGUST 7 1994, HE SAID HE WOULD CONTACT HER ON TUESDAY AUGUST 9 TO TELL HER HE IS OKAY. IT IS NOW THURSDAY AUG 11 AND SHE STILL HAS NO WORD. SHE WANTS TO KNOW IF ITS POSSIBLE TO FIND OUT IF HE IS OKAY. HERE ARE HIS PARTICULARS.

HIS NAME: NSENGIMANA VIATEUR


HE LIVES IN: COMMUNE NYARUGENGE

PREFECTURE VILLE DE KIGALI

HIS ID CARD NUMBER: No 7351 NYARUGENGE

HIS JOB: INSPECTEUR AT BANQUE CONTINENTALE AFRICAINE

HERE IS A DRAWING OF HIS HOUSE IN KIGALI:



ANGELINE MUKAHIRWA LIVES IN GIKONGORO SECTOR 4A
FIRST HOUSE AFTER ORINFOR.

SERIE 52

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Chief Ops Offr

From: HAC

Date: 12 Aug 1994

Subject: DAILY HUMANITARIAN REPORT NO 110

1. During the past 24 hours the following incidents are significant:

a. Displaced Persons

- (1) HAC escorted IOM vehicles to RUTARE. 980 displaced persons were moved. The displaced were dropped off in KIGALI and along the route to KIGALI. 150 were brought to RWAMAGANA.

b. Humanitarian Assistance

- (1) 93 Tons of food were received in KIGALI by WFP and will be stored in their warehouse.
- (2) MSF called HAC to request urgent donation of blood. Canadian Sigs Sqn sent two soldiers to King Faycal to give donation.

c. Evacuation of ex-patriates NTR

d. Miscellaneous.

- (1) UNAMIR in conjunction with US Forces assisted ICRC and UNICEF with the transportation of generators from the airport to locations in town.
- (2) SRSG attended General Meeting with UN and NGO organizations at UNDP conference room.

See
13.8.

This was given to
me by the Berlin
Kisten.
See
15.8

Security
→
[]

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS UNIT
Ms Felixtina Forster

Report to UNDP starting Monday, 5th September, 1994

- i) To attend UN inter-agency meetings 8 a.m.
Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays
- ii) To attend UNDP\NGOs meetings 5 p.m.
Tuesdays and Fridays submit notes

Report to HAC (Col. Yaache or Maj Macneil) as and when required and follow up on all humanitarian-related aspects/ projects and activities

Establish (a) Missing Persons' Bureau-- Coordinating with ICRC and other NGOs in handling REPORTS of Missing Persons i.e. both children and adults

Receive a dossier on each of the 84 NGOs working\operating in Rwanda and establish a comprehensive file for them here. The dossier should include a) mandate, b) activities in Rwanda to date and c) planned activities

Any other matter that may from time to time be delegated by the OIC, Humanitarian Affairs.

CAU

In a meeting between the UNHCR Ms. Sadako Ogata, the WFP Executive Director Ms. Catherine Bertini, the UNICEF deputy Executive Director Karin Sham Poo, the UNDP Assistant Administrator Ms. merlin Johnson-Sileaf and the DHA Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr. Peter Hansen, a broad understanding was reached on the allocation of responsibilities between the UN Agencies for the Rwanda Emergency. Individual UN Agencies were identified as sectorial or cross-sectorial reference point for the effective management of the humanitarian intervention.

Overall Coordination -- UNREO/DHA

1. Coordination of humanitarian relief assistance in Rwanda
2. Elaboration of strategies and contingency plans
3. Field monitoring, situation and needs assessments
4. Interaction with local authorities
5. Liaising with military contingent commanders and UNAMIR Force Commander
6. Security procedures and communications

KK DHO
Review in light
of our discussion
28/9/94
J

Sectoral and Cross-sectoral Focal/Reference Points

UNHCR

1. Operational coordination of relief activities outside Rwanda
2. Repatriation planning, establishment of way-stations and (*inter-alia* with IOM) organisation of onward transportation of refugees to home communities
3. Air transportation
4. Shelter materials/basic relief items
5. Protection monitoring (in coordination with the High Commissioner for Human Rights)

UNICEF

1. Water and Sanitation
2. Health and Nutrition
3. Unaccompanied minors and orphans
4. Non-food relief items
5. Education
6. Psycho-social needs

WFP

1. Food and rations
2. Land transportation
3. Storage
4. Food for work

FAO

1. Agriculture
2. Livestock

NOTE FOR THE FILE

MEETING OF BARONESS LYNDAL CHALKER
WITH NGOS HELD AT THE UNDP HEADQUARTERS IN KIGALI
2:45 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY, 31st AUGUST 1994

Introducing Baroness Chalker as the British Minister for Overseas Development to the various representatives of NGOs operating in Rwanda, the UNDP Resident Representative, Mr. Atturo Hein intimated that out of a population of 7.6 million, 600000 Rwandese were killed during the war whilst the remaining 7 million became either refugees in neighbouring countries (2 million) or displaced people within Rwanda (5 million). The seriousness of the problem attracted the attention of the UN and the international community who have demonstrated through will and deed, the desire to help the Rwandese government and people in this their urgent hour of need.

Baroness Chalker thanked all the NGOs and UNAMIR for the demonstrably good work that they have done here in Rwanda including in particular, the prevention of another "Goma" in Bukavu or Cyangugu when the French finally left Sector 4 in August 22, 1994. The Minister reported that the British contingent here informed her that they have so far succeeded largely because of the cooperation of UNAMIR and the NGO community here as a whole. Emphasising that as a government, Britain is very keen to render assistance to Rwanda, Mrs Chalker enquired whether NGOs had any special difficulties operating in Rwanda as it was Britain's desire to facilitate their operations here. "Are the supply lines interrupted?" She asked, stating that people do need supplies to solidify peace in Rwanda; particularly at this time when UNAMIR hopes to deploy in the south-east within days. Various views were expressed by the NGOs present emphasising:

- a) their absolute commitment to the humanitarian objective; including the repatriation of all refugees and displaced both within and without in the shortest possible time;
- b) the need for the refugees and displaced Rwandese to be relieved or disabused of the "fear of the unknown" through positive statements and actions- i.e. confidence building measures- particularly on the part of the BBGNU so that the process of repatriation would be facilitated, and not hampered unnecessarily through intimidation and a hovering sense of insecurity;
- c) the overriding need, particularly at this time of the year, for Britain and other donor countries and institutions to give material and financial support to the farming population in Rwanda so that they could till the soil this rainy season and rely on their harvests subsequently. Here, it is pertinent to note that if, as estimated, \$12 million is made available now in food aid (incl. seeds), the donor community would be spared \$100 million a season or two hence.

- d) the need for simultaneous emphasis on rehabilitation and reconstruction; especially in the area of human settlements since it is a fact that were all the displaced and refugees to return now, the government would not be in a position to accomodate them as too many structures were destroyed during the carnage. There is an equally pressing need therefore for shelter if humanitarian assistance is to be sustained.
- e) the need to strengthen the capacity of the government to govern the country as all public structures, including the banking system, had been destroyed in Rwanda during the war.
- f) the need to extol human rights concerns as this is the most attractive and sensible way for the BBGNU to guarantee (a) durable peace.
- g) In particular, the representative of AICF stressed the need for UNAMIR to re-examine its priorities in airlifting "essential items" from Nairobi to Kigali as, he said, UNAMIR would on occasions, give greater priority to airlifting personal belongings over and above drugs, for example, against the dictates of legitimate humanitarian concerns.

Expressing satisfaction over the candid exchange of views and sentiments, Baroness Chalker reiterated Gt. Britain's, and indeed the international community's commitment to helping Rwanda indicating, inter alia, that the British Government has already made a donation of vehicles to the Ministries of Health and Rehabilitation and Reintegration in a bid to build, in a way, the capacity of the new government to govern. The World Bank and IMF have just approved a loan that would enable the BBGNU commence business in earnest. The Minister also promised to assist in the provision of human settlements for needy Rwandese as and when requested.

On the question of legitimate human rights concerns, Lady Chalker intimated that it is usually not very easy for the international community to guarantee this. Yes, the British government can help in the creation of appropriate structures and culture for the observance of human rights and the rule of law particularly by the government. The appointment of Human Rights monitors alongside the work of the Human Rights Experts is a step in the right direction, the Minister emphasized.

In conclusion, Baroness Chalker lamented the whole concept/role of the UN not getting involved in civil wars, if only to prevent mayhem and acts of genocide. This traditional role of the United Nations, the Minister suggested, should be re-examined and it should not come as a surprise if this matter is brought to the General Assembly in the not too distant future.

Abu Bakarr Sidique Dao, OIC, O C H A/ O S R S G

31/8/94

Handwritten signature: N. S. S.

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Chief Ops Offr

From: HAC

Date: 05 Sep 1994

Subject: DAILY HUMANITARIAN REPORT NO 133

1. During the past 24 hours the following incidents are significant:

a. Displaced Persons NTR

b. Humanitarian Assistance

(1) Sector 4B asked about next delivery of humanitarian aid. HAC checked with ICRC. They will deliver food to the area this week.

(2) Sector 3 asked about an urgent delivery of food to Gitarama area. Concern agency is responsible for area. HAC will confirm with them today. WFP ready to make emergency delivery if required.

(3) MSF convoy carrying food and medecine will move to Cyangugu today with BRITCON convoy.

c. Evacuation of ex-patriates NTR

d. Miscellaneous.

HAC rep at TAC HQ Butare reported that 15 prisoners were handed over to RPA with presence of ICRC. One prisoner remains accused of clandestine ops. Tac HQ awaiting direction from Ops prior to having prisoner handed over to RPA.

5th September 1994

The special Representative
of the Secretary General of
United Nations;
Kigali-Rwanda.

Dear sir,

RE: APPEAL FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Recently, I received a letter from the Honourable Minister of Internal Affairs and Local Administration, ref. No 12/04.09.01/4; informing us of the famine and outbreak of epidemic diseases such as cholera, prevalent in the areas of BIRAMBO-KIBUYE (UNAMIR controlled zone), due to increasing numbers of displaced people and local population. *Medical Team*

The purpose of this letter is to appeal to your good offices for humanitarian aid in form of food, essential drugs and none food items.

Your positive and urgent response will be highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely

Jacques BIHOZAGARA
Minister of Rehabilitation
and Social Integration
Kigali-Rwanda

C.C:

- Hon. Prime Minister
Kigali.
- Hon. Minister of Health
Kigali.
- Hon. Minister of Internal
Affairs and Local Administration
P.O. Box 446 Kigali.

W.v.t. famine, latest
reports from Com mandet indicate that
food delivery - latest Thursday, 12th
Sept. c 47 tons of food aid.