

10. The following is a list of the first 100 items in the series.

14/07/1901 - 14/07/1901

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SERIES 9-0787

BOX 13

FILE 9

ACC. 1000

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

of a Board of Enquiry assembled at United Nations Organization in the Congo, Headquarters on the 14th July 1961

for inquiring into the circumstances under which, in the last week of April 1961, at Port Francqui, personnel of the UN Force were killed, lost and presumed dead.

by order of

General Sean Mac Eoin, Commander of the UNFIC

The convening order is as follows:

CONVENING ORDER NO. 1, dated 10 July 1961

by

General Sean Mac Eoin, Commander of the UNFIC

A Board of Inquiry composed as under is hereby appointed:

- (a) President: Colonel H.W.C. STETHEM (Canadian)
- (b) Members : Major B. LINDBLAD (Swedish)
Major R.F. MORGAN (Ghanaian)

for inquiring into the circumstances under which, in the last week of April 1961, at Port Francqui, personnel of the UN Force were killed, lost and presumed dead.

The Board shall assemble first at LEOPOLDVILLE, at a time and date specified by the President and subsequently, wherever the President deems necessary, at times and dates to be specified by him.

The Board will record statements and gather evidence to enable it to record its findings on:

- (a) the cause of the incident leading to an armed engagement between the UN Force and the ANC;
- (b) number of personnel wounded and dead, on both sides, giving full particulars of individuals, injuries and cause;
- (c) number of UN personnel missing, giving details, and results of searches carried out;
- (d) loss or damage to UN regimental and other property by items and costs.

After recording its findings, the Board will express an opinion as to the cause and the responsibility of person(s) which occasioned the incident.

Detailed terms of reference for the Board are appended at Appendix 'A' to this Convening Order.

Proceedings in quadruplicate will be rendered to the Force Commander by 30th July 1961.

Sean Mac Eoin Lt. Gen.
Commander United Nations Force in the
CONGO.

Appendix 'A'

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. To investigate and report on the events, in chronological order, leading up to and on the killing of Ghanaian, British and Swedish Military personnel on the 26 April et seq 1961.
2. To investigate and report on the situation which obtained at Port Francqui at the time of the incidents on 26 Apr 61, including full particulars on the UN detachment, Movement Control team and ANC.
3. To give complete particulars, including name, rank, army number and nationality of those whom the Board of Inquiry establishes to be:
 - a. Dead
 - b. Missing, presumed dead
 - c. Missing
 - d. Wounded or injured
4. The nature and extent of wounds or injuries inflicted upon individuals.
5. Particulars of casualties, if any, sustained by the ANC and/or Congolese civilians and the cause of such casualties.
6. To give details of the search carried out to-date in an effort to locate the missing personnel, and with what results, and to determine whether any further search is likely to result in locating any of the missing persons.
7. In the case of those considered to be either Missing, presumed dead, or Missing, to give details of the circumstances under which they were last seen and any other particulars which might assist in determining if they are likely to have survived.
8. To give particulars of damages or losses to UN equipment and stores and to buildings occupied by UN personnel giving details and approximate cost of such damages or loss.
9. To give particulars of unit or personal property damaged or lost during incident, with approximate cost of such damage or loss.
10. The Board of Inquiry shall make findings and give an opinion as to responsibility for the occurrence.

The members of the Board assembled according to the convening order.

Major Morgan produced the proceedings of a Board of Inquiry, which was convened by the Commander of HQ 2 Ghana Brigade and of which he was President. The Board having studied these proceedings decided that they should form part of and be included in these proceedings as evidence.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

of a
Board of Inquiry
assembled at
on the

HQ 2 Ghana Inf Bde, LULUABOURG.
17th May 1961

by order of

COMMANDER GHANA INF BDE LULUABOURG

for the purpose of investigating the PORT FRANQUI and DOMIONGO incidents which led to :

- a.. The death or disappearance of 2 officers and 40 ORs of Ghana Inf Bde ONUC.
- b. The loss of ONUC, Ghana Army and Regimental property.

PRESIDENT - Major R.F. MORGAN - 2 Ghana R.

MEMBERS - Lieut E.N.N. DEDJOE - HQ 2 Ghana Inf Bde Gp
2/Lieut R.W. MOORE - HQ 2 Ghana Inf Bde Gp

CONVENING ORDER

1. A Board of Inquiry composed as under will assemble at a place to be detailed by the President at 1400 hrs 17 May to investigate the PORT FRANQUI and DOMIONGO incidents on 27/28 Apr 61, which led to:

- a. The death or disappearance of 2 offrs and 40 ORs of Ghana Inf Bde ONUC.
- b. The loss of ONUC, Ghana Army, and personal property during the incidents.

President: Major R.F. MORGAN - 2 GHANA R.

Members : Lt E.N.N. DEDJOE - HQ 2 GHANA INF BDE GP
2/Lt R.W. MOORE - HQ 2 GHANA INF BDE GP

2. The inquiry will investigate fully all the circumstances and will record all evidence relevant to the inquiry.

3. The officer convening the board of inquiry directs that evidence will be taken on oath.

4. The Inquiry will report on the following matters:-

- a. The outline of events which took place at the two incidents
- b. whether officers and ORs now posted as presumed killed should be posted as killed whilst on duty with ONUC forces and, if so, to give effective dates
- c. to produce separate lists of ONUC, GHANA Army and private property lost in the incidents.

5. The following military witnesses will be ordered to attend: As detailed by the President.

6. Special instructions are being issued to the President directing his attention to confining the work of the board to establishing the immediate events leading to the death or presumed death of officers and ORs and summarising losses of equipment etc.

7. The President will forward copies of the record of the proceedings to HQ 2 Ghana Bde Gp.

8. Camp 2 Bde will make arrangements for a room to be prepared for the Inquiry and will provide the stationery manuals and regulations, as noted hereunder, and will detail in orderly to the inquiry.

M.M.L.

Q.R.

Boards of Inquiry and Related Subjects, 1957.

Any other relevant publication

Signed E.T. TEDMAN, Major
Appointment DAA & QMG
2 Ghana Inf Bde Gp.

Dated 16 May, 1961.

GC 75435 WO II Ali Seibu, having been duly sworn states:-

I am the CSM OF 'A' Coy, 2 Ghana R which was stationed at Port Francqui. As the result of the arrival of two Congolese Provincial Ministers on the 26 Apr, and subsequent incidents, that happened on the 27 Apr, the situation in Port Francqui at approx 1800 hrs on the 27 Apr was as follows:

To the best of my knowledge, all NCO, and men were concentrated in the Coy billet area with the exception of one dvr and four Medical Orderlies who were in the hotel. All had been disarmed by the ANC earlier in the day and all equipment removed. An ANC CSM told us not to worry and that we would not be harmed. There was no guard on us. Capt Ralph and Lt Brown, who had been beaten up earlier in the day had been arrested and taken away by the ANC.

At 1900 hrs, ANC soldiers appeared and sentries were posted round our area. The night of the 27/28 Apr was quiet and no incidents occurred.

At approx 0800 hrs 28 Apr, I visited the hospital because an ANC, told me our officers were there. I spoke to Capt Ralph and Lt Brown who were in bed. They both had injuries, but both said that they were alright. I then returned to the Coy area. At approx 0930 hrs, an ANC NCO told me to concentrate all my men in one house, but I suspected that they were going to do something bad, so I said I could not do this because the house was too small. The ANC then went away. About 30 mins later, I heard firing in the distance coming from the direction of the MWEKA road. About 20 mins, after this, some persons started firing at us in the coy area. I could not see who, but I heard the bullets whistle overhead. I realized that the ANC were firing at us and I immediately shouted to my men to run and save themselves. I ran too and hid in the long grass nearby. For the next two or three hours, there was quite a lot of firing on our Coy area.

At about 1500 hrs, Pte Emmanuel ANKUMA, who was hiding nearby was discovered by a Congolese civil policeman. He got up and ran to me shouting "save me" Sergeant Major". The policeman fired three shots, the third of which hit Ankumah in the leg. He did not fire any more because one of his comrades prevented him. We were then taken to an ANC officer who had arrived by air from LULUABOURG. He asked why all Ghana soldiers had run to the bush, and I replied, because your soldiers were firing at us. He then gave orders to another officer to stop all firing and to collect all Ghana soldiers together. I then asked if I could go round to the town and outskirts myself, to shout for them. This he allowed and I collected about 19 men. The time was now approx 1830 hrs 28 April.

The next day the 29th April I again went round the town and outskirts and collected some more of my men. Later in the day Lt Donkor arrived and went round with me and a hugler. We collected a few more soldiers. The next day the 30th April I returned to LULUABOURG with all the Ghana soldiers we had found.

GC 75435 WO II Ali SEIBU

QUESTIONED BY THE BOARD:

- Q 1. Did you see any bodies of Ghanaian soldiers?
 A 1. NO
- Q 2. Can you give the names of personnel who you know were in Port Francqui on the 27 Apr, who are now known to be missing?
 A 2. Yes. I produce to the Board a list of such personnel.
 (Marked 'A' and attached).

GC 75435 WO II Ali SEIBU

LIST OF PERSONNEL KNOWN TO HAVE
BEEN IN PORT FRANQUI ON 27 APRIL, AND
NOW MISSING

\$

Capt T.G. RALPH (437144)
Lieut A.P.G. BROWN (445802)

GC	14734	Sgt	SEIDU GRUNSHIE
"	74854	Cpl	ISSAKA BAZABRIMI
"	79212	Cpl	HARUNA MOSHIE
"	48601	Cpl	KUREBILA FRAFRA
"	78544	Pte	SUMANU FRAFRA
"	82769	Pte	BUKARE BUSANGA
"	85138	Pte	BRAIMA FULANI
"	85401	Cpl	YAW LORSO
"	85366	Pte	ALI KONKOMBA
"	85970	L/C	BABAJOLLY LORSO
"18152176		Pte	AMADU FULANI
"18152396		L/C	SEIDU GRUMAH
"18152837		L/C	HASSAN HAUSA
"18153274		Pte	AKUMAFAKEMA BUILSA
"18153576		Pte	JOHN GRUNSHIE
"18153913		Pte	YAKUBU GRUMAH
"18154426		Pte	ASAWASUANA FRAFRA
"18154579		Pte	JOE GRUNSHIE
"18154829		Pte	AKASIA BUILSA
"18155133		Pte	GARIBA CHOKOSI
"18155202		Pte	PETER TONGO
"18155556		Pte	MICHAEL GRUNSHIE
"18154217		Pte	ATUA BEDIAKO
"18153256		Pte	AWUNI KANJARGA
"18153873		Cpl	YAW SINTIM FREMPONG
"18153955		Pte	KWASI CHOKOSI
"18154557		Pte	OBIRI MANTE
"18154608		Pte	CHARLES DZOWORNU
"18154831		Pte	KWAME SISSALA
"18155197		Pte	BUKARE KANJARGA
"18155206		L/C	AHMED DRAMANI
"18155562		Pte	MUNOR TETTE
"18153961		Pte	ALI CHOKOSI
" 54751		Pte	MAMA ATTIPOE - S & T
"18154189		Pte	YAKUBU FRAFRA
"18152522		Pte	MUSA MOSHIE
"18153446		Pte	EMMANUEL NUNOO

GC 18154408 Pte Atia FRAFRA, having been duly sworn states:-

I am a member of 'A' Coy, and was stationed in PORT FRANCOU on the 26 April. After the happenings on the 27 April, when the ANC disarmed us, I with the rest of the Coy was in the billet area. Early in the morning of the 28 April, we were told by the ANC to move our kit into one room. Whilst I was moving mine, the ANC guards started shooting at us and we all started to run. I ran into the Coy Office and hid with three others in the roof. At about midday I looked through a ventilation shaft and saw Cpl Issaka Baz, Cpl Kurabila Frafra and Pte Musa Moshie come out of the bush. A jeep with some ANC with an LMG appeared and ANC appeared to be telling the three Ghana soldiers to move into one of the houses. The whole party then passed out of my sight and then I heard a burst of firing coming from that direction.

I stayed in the roof with the three others, until about midday on 29 April, when the CSM Ali Seibu came to find us.

QUESTIONED BY THE BOARD

Q 1. Did you see any bodies of Ghana soldiers?

A 1. NO.

(Sgd) _____

18154408 Pte Atia FRAFRA.

GC 18155565 Pte Adjetey DOKU, having been duly sworn states:-

I am a member of 'A' Coy, 2 Ghana R, and was stationed at Port Françqui on the 26 April 61. After the incidents on the 27 April, when the ANC disarmed us, I was with the rest of the Coy, in the billet area. The next day, the 28 April, at about 0900 hrs, the ANC, told us all to move into the Coy office buildings, as they wanted to move into the rest of the buildings. I was in the cockhouse, when there was a shot and we all ran. Someone, who was behind me was shot, I saw him fall, but I do not know who he was. I ran with another soldier and hid near the hotel. The firing stopped about 1700 hrs, though I heard one or two shots afterwards. Then the CSM Ali Seibu came and shouted for us to come out. That night we slept in the ANC Camp.

The following morning, the 29 April, the ANC posted me and Pte Boye Dagarti on the railway line to stop our people from MWEKA attacking us. Later we returned to the ANC camp, where I saw three dead bodies on a truck. I do not know who they were, as I did not see their faces. Later I saw another soldier lying outside 2 Pl house, but I do not know who it was. Later in the day I went to the airport and came back to LULUABOURG on an aircraft.

(Sgd) _____

18155565 Pte Adjetey DOKU

GC 18152333 Pte Nilo DAGARTI, having been duly sworn states:-

I am a member of 'A' Coy 2 Ghana R, and was stationed at Port Francqui on the 26 April. After the incidents on the 27 April, when the ANC disarmed us I with the rest of the Coy was in the billet area. Early in the morning, at about 0800 hrs 28 April, I heard firing from up the road. Soon after an ANC NCO, came and ordered us to get together in the area of the Coy office. When we got there I saw there were groups of ANC all round us. They told us to move towards 3 Pl house, and when we moved too slowly they started to fire. I ran away and hid in the bush with three others. At about 1730 hrs I heard the CSM Ali Seibu saying we could come out. I decided to go out and see if it was safe, when I found it was I called out the other three. We were then taken back to the ANC camp and were not troubled again.

QUESTIONED BY THE BOARD:

Q 1. Did you see any bodies of Ghana soldiers?

A 1. Yes. I saw three dead Ghana soldiers on a civilian truck near the ANC camp, at approx 0800 hrs 29 April. One of the bodies I definitely identified as GC 18154608 Pte Charles DZOWONU. I could not recognize the other two.

(Sgd) _____

GC18152333 Pte Nilo DAGARTI

GC 18153587 Pte Nicholas LORSO, having been duly sworn states:-

I am a member of 'A' Coy, 2 Ghana R, and I was stationed at Port Francqui on the 26 April. On the 27 April, at about 1230 hrs I was in the Coy office area when the ANC arrived in force and disarmed me, Cpl Kofi Grunshie, Capt Ralph, Lt Brown and the LR driver. They beat Lt Brown, knocked Capt Ralph to the ground and beat him. I tried to help but the ANC, dragged me away and pointed an LMG at me. Capt Ralph had a cut from a bayonet on his neck. Capt Ralph and Lt Brown were then put in a LR and driven away. I never saw them again.

The ANC then went off towards the hotel, and I joined the rest of my comrades in the Coy houses. Nothing more happened for the rest of the day or that night.

At approx 0900 hrs, next morning the 28 April, one ANC drove us and told us all to move into, one room, as the ANC wanted to move into the other houses. A bit later, another ANC told us to fall in as the Coy Comd wanted to speak to us. I did not fall in as I did not trust him. No 2 and 3 Pl started to fall in, and then I saw an ANC Sgt Major fire two shots from an SMG, and then many ANC started to fire from the bushes, with LMGs. Everybody, started to ran away. I did not see anyone hit or fall down. I ran into the bush by the river where I met four of my comrades. We hid there until dark, when we moved out of Port Francqui.

(Sgd)

18153587 Pte Nicholas LORSO

455028 Lieut RJB HEARD, having been duly sworn states:-

I am the Intelligence Officer of 2 Ghana R, stationed in LULUABOURG. On the 28 April, I flew to Port Francqui in a Beaver ac with the Commanding Officer, Lt Col NA Aferi to investigate incidents that were reported to have taken place. After discussions with the ANC, they reported that there were two bodies of Ghanaian soldiers. They took us to see them. Both were lying on their backs, and I definitely identified one to be GC 18153446, Pte Emmanuel NUNOO of 'A' Coy. I think the other one was GC 85138 Pte BRAIMA FULANI, but I am not sure. Both bodies appeared to have been shot in the back. Lt Col NA Aferi, asked if we could remove the identity discs, but permission was refused. I saw no other Ghanaian body, and later I returned to LULUABOURG.

(Sgd) _____

Lieut RJB HEARD

2/Lt RW MOORE having been duly sworn states:-

I am the Bde Intelligence Officer of HQ 2 GHANA INF BDE; I produce to the board an unsigned statement given by CSM AABERG of the Swedish Movement Control Section at PORT FRANCOUI to 2/Lt D. MONTAGUE of 2 GHANA R at the UN Hospital, LULUABOURG on 30th April 1961.

The statement was not taken on oath.

(Sgd) _____

2/Lt RW MOORE

COPY

UNSIGNED STATEMENT BY CSM AABERG
SWEDISH MOVEMENT CONTROL SECTION PORT FRANCOU

(Taken at UN Hospital LULUABOURG by 2/Lt MONTAGUE 2 GHANA R on
30 Apr 61)

Thu 27 Apr 61 arrested at 1300 hrs at hotel with SWEDISH 2/Lt and another CSM, Capt RALPH and two Officers arrested in town whilst driving a Jeep trying to find out what the noise was about. At 1300 hrs they took all the prisoners to a house. Coy Comd had wound in the head (not bullet wound). They took away their weapons and personal effects.

Six BELGIAN BCK men and two MINISTERS were already there. They were allowed to sit on the verandah. The ANC gave no physical violence. Instead they had a pistol which they threatened the officers with. They also showed them what they would do to them with a bayonet.

Everyone seemed to be suffering from shock. SWEDISH Lt was lying on the ground and could not speak.

At 1700 hrs ANC took RALPH, Lt BROWN, SWEDISH Lt and CSM AABERG to hospital for treatment. CSM was given two shots of MORPHIA, the remainder aspirins. They stayed overnight. Fri 28 Apr at 1100 hrs shooting heard (may have come from BCK). ANC came and took them out, removed shoes and shirts. SWEDISH Lt was struck on the head with a butt of a gun. They tied their hands to one another. Then told to walk and stopped when they reached the edge of the bush. (See plan) 5 ANC and policemen were 5 minutes later they untied the other SWEDISH CSM (who joined us en-route) and told him to walk. He had walked 5 yards when there was one shot fired by the policeman. The party heard a cry but did not see what had happened because of the corner. Another shot was heard. CSM AABERG was untied told to walk, he saw the ANC were not ready to fire so he ran into the bush. Capt RALPH shouted "Good Sgt Maj, run away". They fired six or seven shots. The first one was definitely at him, he heard it go by.

He ran for 2 hours then lay down.

At 1300 hrs he heard soldiers looking for him and they were shooting into the bush. At one time they were not more than 10 metres away. When it was dark he ran again. Shots were heard during the night and possibly from natives as he was near a village. During the night it rained so he managed to drink a little.

Sat 29 Apr he arrived at the river's edge at night and waited for daylight so he could see where he was. He found he was near the pumping station. He walked along the bank closer to station then lay in the grass. Later he walked to the Mess, saw ANC there so hid in the grass on the other side. A GHANA soldier was also hiding there. He was an OR driver. The GHANA soldier told him that the ANC were shooting GHANA soldiers the night before (Friday night) and he believed he was the only one left.

The ANC saw the CSM so he shot up into a palm tree and was not seen. Then a policeman came along and sat under the tree. Something fell off the tree the policeman looked up, saw the CSM but did not fire. The CSM then ran to the river and swam across. The police fired 5 shots after him. Police on the other side saw him but did not fire. He stayed in the water for 3 hours. They couldn't find him and he heard them say it was a Ghana soldier. They searched in a motor boat and a rowing boat.

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The CSM got out on the far side of the river. An ANC Sgt saw him and tried to persuade him to come back CSM said "NO". The Sgt gave him a cigarette and told him there was a GHANA officer so he followed the Sgt and met an officer but he was not a GHANAIAN.

The plane had gone. CSM was taken to ANC camp with other GHANA soldiers. Throughout the night they wanted to kill him but the GHANA soldiers said "NO". CSM ALI SEIBU tried to help him because he was so nervous. He recommends him. CSM SEIBU told GHANA soldiers to stay with AABERG and talk to him.

ADDITIONAL POINTS

1. He was never molested.
2. He lost everything including 14,500 Frs and Camera.
3. He was fed evening 29 Apr and morning 30 Apr.

PORT FRANQUI INCIDENTTOLD BY LT P.R. RICHARDS GAMSEVENTS LEADING TO INCIDENT

UNOC Forces moving into Palm Hotel (Abandoned by owners) which had been the only bar in town. Congolese being repulsed at hotel bar by (British) Ghana Officers while Belgians were served with drinks, and entertained at the Offrs' Mess. 2 Ministers arriving at Port Francqui without prior notice. Ministers receiving UNO protection, and staying with UNO at the hotel. ANC thought that ministers had arrived to attack ANC under aid of UN. The Swedish officer had hung an unknown flag outside the hotel which greatly annoyed the Congolese.

I arrived at Port Francqui on Wed at 1600 hrs with Congolese Ministers. At Airport ministers received bad reception by undisciplined Congolese troops. They drove to the hotel with UNO.

At Palm Hotel at 1800 hrs the ANC again became abusive and demanded why the ministers had been given UNO protection and why they had come to Port Francqui at all. They left after a long and heated discussions. No further incident that night. ANC threatened European Officers. Thu after sick parade I went to Congolese Hosp and to town at 0900 hrs without any trouble. I returned to the Offrs' Mess for breakfast. At 1000 hrs I again went to town but my progress was prevented by very angry Congolese troops. I went to HQ. There the CO, Capt RALPH had received an assault, and had his shirt torn after enquiring about the welfare of Congolese ministers who left the hotel at 0800 hrs to have discussion with ANC. The situation was tense, there was a lot of noise in the town and the OC told me to go back to the hotel and stand by my MRS.

At the hotel 1145 hrs Congolese troops appeared in great numbers, many of them carrying 2 to 3 weapons which they take from the Ghana Troops. They entered the hotel without much opposition and by force of numbers quickly disarmed the Ghana Troops. After assaulting the European present who they thought were Ghana Offrs, myself, and 3 Swedish movement control offrs, took us prisoners. Ghana ORs not assaulted and urged us to go with ANC. While they were escorting me to the other prisoners I told them I was a doctor and they allowed me to go free with Ghana ORs; I went back to the hotel and I talked to the Ghana ORs and to a Polish Civil doctor who also lived here. All the ANC went away. Later the ANC returned to search the place, they thought ammo was stored there. They again arrested me but when I told them I was a doctor they released me. They ignored the civilian doctor. So in my own interest I took off my uniform and put on civ clothes.

The ANC came to the hotel several times that day but were friendly on all occasions. They prevented the Ghana ORs with goat for supper. At 1800 hrs ANC arrived in a car and asked me to inspect their prisoners. Capt RALPH, Lt BROWN and 3 Swedish movement control offrs Lt SCOTT and the 2 ministers. Capt RALPH, Lt BROWN and 2 Swedish offrs were in the European hospital and were cared for by NUNS who lived there. Lt SCOTT and Swedish WO I and 2 ministers were at the ANC HQ. All were in good condition, apart from cuts and bruises.

Next day Friday at 0800 hrs all the Ghana ORs were fit and they brought me some chop to the hotel where I stayed the night. Most of the Ghana ORs spent the night at Coy HQ. Relations with ANC appeared good.

- 2 -

At 0800 hrs there was shooting. I think it lasted about 30 mins, from MWEKA Coy.

At 0830 hrs ANC Sgt arrived at the hotel in car. He said to me a patrol had attacked Port Francqui and would I (accompanied by Pte MOSHIE who spoke good French) go to explain the following to the leader of the Ghana Patrol:-

- (a) All Ghana soldiers were un-armed, any shooting would injure them.
- (b) To tell the patrol to bring an African Offr to speak with the ANC leaders concerning the purpose of the missing 2 ministers. They wouldn't co-operate with the British Offr because all Europeans were obviously Belgians and working to restore Belgian imperialism. For this reason the officers had been arrested, and when the trouble was over and they had been able to speak with a Ghanaian offr these offrers would be released and the Ghana troops would have their weapons back.

At the hotel, Lt SCOTT was also in the ANC car, which was decorated by a Red Cross back and front and had 2 un-armed ANC present; Lt SCOTT was left at prison and had collected the administrator. We then travelled all around Port Francqui including the Harbour and ANC kept telling all the ANC we met of our mission and not to shoot us.

At about midday I heard some shooting again in the town. We had travelled so far telling all the soldiers of our mission that we ran out of petrol. It was then 1230 hrs. The ANC Sgt said it was too late and the Ghana patrol had returned. I was deposited, with Pte MOSHIE at the hospital and locked in a room. As we were dropped at the hospital I saw the 4 European officers from the European hospital wearing pyjamas being escorted along the road by armed Congolese wearing grey uniforms, and peaked caps. The Swedish movement control officer was bleeding badly I asked if I could help him but ANC Sgt told me all were going to be shot and my help would be of no avail. They were moved into a field opposite the hospital tied together with rope and later marched further down the road. About 5 minutes later I heard 12 shots from the direction.

Pte MOSHIE and I remained in the room about 1300 hrs we heard some noise and 2 shots close by. Pte MOSHIE said he saw the body of 2 Ghana soldiers been carried to the hospital.

Some Congolese hospital staff brought some food and told us that all the Ghana soldiers and offrers had been shot in reprisal of 2 ANC killed that morning. Later we were told that UNOC plane to which I had heard earlier with an African offr and some Europeans had landed.

At 1600 hrs I saw the UNOC jeep and party arrived. I went to join them but the ANC prevented me. Fortunately the UN party found us and we all travelled to the Airport and returned to LULUABOURG.

During my entire visit I did not see a Ghana OR assaulted by ANC, and relations seemed cordial as witnessed by the presentation of a goat by the ANC for chop for Ghana OR. However when I left the prisoners, they also seemed to be adequately cared for and there were good relations with ANC.

Lt RJB HEARD having been duly sworn states:-

I am the Intelligence Officer of 2 GHANA R. I produce to the Board an unsigned statement, not taken on oath, given to me by MOHD BELLO, UN interpreter at MWEKA.

(Sgd) _____

Lieut RJB HEARD

STATEMENT BY MOHD BELLO - UN INTERPRETER MWEKA

I was given a pass to visit my wife in Port Francqui. When my leave had finished I went to the station to catch a train to Mweka. On 27th April I was waiting at the station. At 1400 hrs 15 armed ANC arrived at the station and disarmed the 8 GHANAIAAN soldiers there. The soldiers were then arrested and taken away. I too was arrested because I was wearing my UNO arm band. About half way to the ANC camp I was released. I stayed near the camp that night. The next day at about 1520 hrs I saw ANC shooting at Ghana soldiers, who were running away. I did not see any Police firing. About half hour later I saw ANC take 18 bodies to the river. I then returned to the station and stayed there.

On 1st May I saw the body of 1 European Officer floating down river. I did not see the face, but the colour of the hair I thought that it was Capt RALPH.

(Signed) _____

UN INTERPRETER
(MOHD BELLO)

464427 2/Lt DJ DOBBS, having been duly sworn states:-

I am a Pl Comd in 'A' Coy, 2 Ghana R. On the 28th April, I and my pl was part of a UN mobile coln, proceeding to Port Francqui to aid UN Forces there, who having trouble with the ANC. On reaching the outskirts of Port Francqui, fire was exchanged at an ANC road block. In this exchange, GC 81393 Pte Duty BIMOBA, a member of my pl was fatally wounded by a shot through the chest. When trying to evacuate the wounded, I personally examined GC 81393 Pte Duty BIMOBA with the medical orderly and satisfied myself that he was dead.

(Sgd) _____

2/Lt D. J. DOBBS

2/Lt D. PEATFIELD, 2 Ghana R, having been duly sworn states:-

At approx 0300 hrs 28th April, I and my platoon left LULUABOURG as part of a mobile coln moving to PORT FRANCOU by road, to assist 'A' Coy who were involved with the ANC. The Bde Defence Platoon was part of this mobile force.

At approx 2200 hrs 28th April, our coln reaching the outskirts of DOMIONGO, where we were halted by a road block. Capt Hiney and I went forward and were starting to remove the block when two ANC appeared and spoke in TSHILUBA. We could not understand and Capt Hiney replied in French that we were going to pass through DOMIONGO. As we walked back to the vehs, we were fired at from various positions to our front and our flanks. We returned fire and started to move slowly forward with the troops on foot by the side of the vehs. Fire was exchanged for approximately one hour, during which time we continued to advance in bounds through another road block. Firing died down and Capt Hiney gave the order to embus. Before moving we checked the vehs and found the two rear trucks empty. Capt Hiney and I then doubled back down the road shouting for the missing men to muster on the road. Many appeared from the side of the road where they had been taking cover. We then moved back to the vehs, embussed and moved off.

About five miles over we stopped and had a muster. Eight men were found to be missing, some of whom were members of the Bde Defence Pl.

(Sgd) _____

2/Lt D. PEATFIELD

GC 19480 Cpl Hassan BAZ, having been duly sworn states:-

I am an NCO in the 2nd Bde Defence Platoon. On the 28 April 61, I with the rest of the pl were part of force moving by road to Port Francqui from LULUABOURG. GC 54313 Pte Basare and GC 39322 Pte Konkomba were part of this pl.

At approx 2300 hrs, 28 April, the force made contact with the ANC, and a lot of firing took place. After about 30 minutes, the firing died down and we were told to enbus by an officer. We moved off and about twenty miles on the road, we stopped and I made a roll call. I found three soldiers missing, two of whom were GC 54313 Pte Basare and GC 38322 Pte Konkomba. To the best of my knowledge they are still missing.

(Sgd) _____

GC 19480 Cpl Hassan BAZ

LOSSES SUSTAINED BY OC 2 GHANA REGT 27/28 APRIL 1961

AT PORT FRANQUI, PEBEANGU, DOMIONGO AND MWEKA.ANNX INational Stores

Part Number	Designation	Qty	Price			Total		
			£	S	D	£	S	D
BB 7796	Pistols Signal	2	60	0		6.	0.	0.
FA I0626	Brushes Flat Paint GS I"	I	2	6		0.	2.	6.
I0627	Brushes Flat Paint GS 2"	I	3	0		0.	3.	0.
	Scissors Tailors	I	8	0		0.	8.	0.
	Padlocks SS 1.1/2"	II2	3	6		2.	2.	0.
	Nets Garnished Woodland 14 x 14	I	57	0		2.	17.	0.
	Nets Garnished Woodland 24 x 24	I	127	-		6.	7.	0.
	Flags Ghana 6 x 3	I	20	0		1.	0.	0.
JA 0066	Axes Hand	I	8	0		0.	8.	0.
0072	Axes Pick 4.1/2 Heads	12	5	6		3.	6.	0.
0074	Axes Pick 4.1/2 Helves	12	4	3		2.	11.	0.
5558	Lamps HPP	I	75	6		3.	15.	6.
I2I59	Lamps Hurricane	24	6	0		7.	4.	0.
I320	Shovels GS	4I	9	3		18.	19.	3.
JB I0I40	Containers Cooking 6 Gall	3	72	-		10.	16.	0.
I0531	Containers Portable 1.1/2 Gall	3	30	0		4.	10.	0.
I0532	Containers Carriers Web	I	38	-		1.	18.	0.
I0700	Containers Water 4.1/2 Gall	42	17	6		36.	15.	0.
III34	Cookers Portable NO. 3	I	44	6		2.	4.	6.
I2440	Insulators Cooking 6 Gall	4	122	-		24.	8.	0.
JB I270I	Pans Fry Large	2	45	6		4.	11.	0.
I2600	Kettles Camp Oval	2	13	6		1.	7.	0.
I2756	Stands Cooking 3 Container	1	38	6		1.	18.	6.
KC 5028	Pillows Stretcher Amb.	5	104	-		26.	0.	0.
KE 2524	Funnel Oil	1	4	-		0.	4.	0.
8227	Matchets 15" Blades	88	5	6		24.	4.	0.
3513	Matchets 15" Sheaths	69	13	8		47.	3.	0.
4I20	Pourers Oil	1	8			0.	0.	8.
8639	Sprayers Knapsack	1	210	-		10.	10.	0.
072I	Bowls Hand	1	8	6		0.	8.	6.
I329	Choppers Meat Butchers	1	11	3		0.	11.	3.
3023	Knives Cooks 6"	4	4	6		0.	18.	0.
3024	Knives Cooks 9"	3	4	9		0.	14.	3.
3032	Knives Open Tin	3	1	11		0.	5.	9.
34I0	Machines Mince Large	1	57	-		2.	17.	0.
4666	Sieves Cooks 16" 14 Mesh	1	7	9		0.	7.	9.
NIV	Typewriter Imperial 15"	1	37	15	0	37.	15.	0.
OS 420 MR	Binoculars Prismatic	1	20	10	0	20.	10.	0.
WA I020	Cutters Wire Folding	3	9	6		1.	8.	0.
7176	Gloves Wiring prs	4	11	0		2.	4.	0.
I0I22	Sandbags Proofed	300	97	-		14.	11.	0.
			(100)					
III92	Tapes Tracing 100 yds Rolls	10	27	6		13.	15.	0.
			(roll)					
VC 7709	Cases Map No.	5	2	2		0.	10.	10.
5630	Compasses Prismatic	1	114	0		5.	14.	0.
I0026-37	Watches Wristlet	4	81	0		16.	4.	0.
YI I066	Megaphones	4	9	9		1.	19.	0.
Y3 3536	Torches Hand	17	5	3		4.	9.	3.
CD II26	Bags Shoemakers Filled	1	17	0	0	17.	0.	0.
CN 0960	Frogs Cutter Wire Folding	4	4	6		0.	18.	0.
I008	Guards whistle	4	2	3		0.	9.	0.

Capt (QM) JA MOLAND, 2 Ghana R, having been duly sworn states:-

I am the Quartermaster of 2 Ghana R. I produce to the Board AFB 293, AFH 1179 and 3113, showing items of stores, clothing and equipment issued to 'A' Coy and attached personnel PORT FRANCOU as at 28th April 61. I must state that stores which have subsequently been recovered were checked in the presence of the CQMS on the 15th May 61, and from the results of that check I produce AFG 998, showing deficiencies of:

a. National Stores.

b. UNO Stores.

Prices are not available, but application has been made for the costing of the stores.

(Marked 'B' and attached).

(Sgd)

Capt (QM) JA MOLAND

Part Number	Designation	Qty	Price			Total		
			£	S	D	£	S	D
I980	Whistles Inf	4		2	/8	0	10	8.
GA 02I50	Haversacks Shell Dressing	2		22	/6	2	5	0.
CD 0543	Laces Leather prs	214	0	0	.4	3	11	4.
	Drawers Collular prs	28		7	/4	10	5	4.
	Socks Worsted prs	25		3	/6	4	7	6.
	Screwdrivers London 8"	1		5	/7	0	5	7.
WA 8043	Plates Stencil Draughtsmen							
	Sets	1	14	4	/-	7	4	0.
OS II797	Protractors RA 6"	1		2	/6	0	2	6.
JA 5666	Tables GS 6'	2		64	/-	6	8	0.
	Bugles Infantry	1		48	/6	2	8	6.
GA 55	Badges Cap GA	117		1	/2	6	16	6.
GA 63	Titles Ghana prs	71		1	/8	5	18	4.
CF 1590-606	Hats Jungle	59		4	/6	13	5	6.
CD 06IO-28	Shoes Canvas	85		8	/7	36	9	7.
CC I288 - 5	Bags Kit	59		9	/9	28	15	3.
CC II5I - 5	Drawers Collular	173		7	/4	63	8	8.
CC 0464	Hosetops Khaki	117		2	/7	15	2	3.
CC 0480	Housewives	58		2	/2	6	5	8.
CC 0400	Puttees Short	117		3	/10	22	8	6.
CC I20I - 9	Shirts KF	184		19	/-	174	16	0.
CC 0709 - 15	Socks Worsted	186		3	/6	32	11	0.
CC 073I	Spoons Dessert	61		1	/1	3	6	1.
CC 090I	Towels Hand	196		12	/0	117	12	0.
CC 0072	Discs Identity	202			6d	5	1	0.
CC 0385	Holdalls	50		1	/5	3	10	10.
CH 2062-65	Overalls Denim Blouses	58	19	10	/0	57	10	4.
	Overalls Denim Trousers	118		16	/6	97	7	0.
CH 265I-6I	Shorts KD	117		15	/5	90	3	9.
	Shorts PT	115		8	/0	46	0	0.
CH 2728-43	Trousers KD	61		17	/6	53	7	6.
KC 0576	Blankets BS	69		23	/11	82	10	3.
CC 008I-84	Anklets Web prs	50		7	/2	17	18	4.
CF I630-47	Berets Blue	67		4	/9	15	18	3.
CD 00035-74	Boots Ankle Prs	116		30	/9	178	7	0.
CC 004I	Brushes Button Brass	61		2	/-	6	2	0.
	Brushes Shoe Blacking	66		1	/6	4	19	0.
CC 0042	Brushes Clothes	63		2	/4	7	7	0.
	Brushes Shoe Polish	60		2	/4	7	0	0.
	Sheets Ground	52		24	/9	64	7	0.
CC 0I77	Forks Table	61		1	/5	4	6	5.
CC 052I - 8	Jerseys Brown	59		14	/2	41	15	10.
	Knives Table	62		2	/7	8	0	2.
KC I82I - 7	Vests Cotton	175		5	/7	48	17	1.
CN 0228	Belts WE	52		6	/8	17	6	8.
	Bottles Water	55		5	/11	16	5	5.
0356 - 7	Braces Normal	102		3	/5	17	8	6.
0576	Carriers Water Bottle	58		2	/9	7	19	6.
0996	Frogs Bayonet	52		1	/8	4	6	8.
I0I8	Haversacks	57		11	/10	33	14	6.
I060	Helmets Steel Covers Cam.	59			8	1	19	4.
I370	Packs WE	36		13	/-	23	8	0.
I493	Pouches Basic	86		9	/9	41	18	6.
	Slings	50		2	/9	6	17	6.
I7I2	Straps Shoulder Left	52		3	/2	8	4	8.
I7II	Straps Shoulder Right	52		3	/2	8	4	8.

In Lieu of AF G 998

LOSSES SUSTAINED BY OC 2 GHANA REGT 27/28 APRIL 1961AT PORT FRANQUI, PEREANGU, DOMIONGO AND MWEKA.ANNX 2UN Stores

Designation	Qty	Unit Price	Total Frs.
Ration Float Balance (2050 frs)			2050
Wireless Receivers National (595591)	1	US\$ 36.00	
Wireless Receivers Murphy (46804)	1	" 36.00	
Wireless Receivers Phillips (1435)	1	7463 CF	
Flags UNO (5' x 3')	1	US\$ 7.00	
Loud Hailer	1	3350 CF	
Buckets 13"	6	55 "	
Tubs Wash Oval	5	140 "	
Brooms Bass Heads	4	45 "	
Brooms Bass Handles	4		
Brushes W.C.	3	25 "	
Bowls Washing	11	65 "	
Brushes SHU	5	30 "	
Pots Cooks Large	1	650 "	
Guns Flit	4	35 "	
Filters Water	1	1200 "	
Wireless Receiver Large	1	US\$115.00	
Grammophone	1	2358 CF	
Records	150	125 CF	
Boxes Record	6	200 "	
Iron Tilley Paraffin	1	82 "	
Ludo Sets	1	£0.3.10	
Draughts Sets	1	2200 CF	
New Testaments	6	500 "	
Charcoal Pressing Irons	5	150 "	
Fans Table Electric	2	1750 "	
Blackboards School	1	400 "	
Baton IS	40	40 "	
Facepiece AG Respirator	16	3300 "	
Haversacks AG. Respirator	10	3300 "	
Bags Light AG. Respirator	1	30 "	
Ointment AD	2	35 "	
Cots Camp	111	615 "	
Sheets CS	14	54 "	
Record Player	1	US\$ 21.40	
Brushes Sweeping	7	35 CF	
Brushes Sweeping Handles	10	10 "	
Blankets UNO	304	140 "	
Shirts UNO	70	105 "	
Trousers UNO	70	155 "	
Pillows	12	35 "	
Pillows Slips	12	22 "	
Darts Sets	3	£0.6.6.	US\$.91
Racquets Badminton	4	US\$ 2.95	
Nets Badminton	1	175 CF	
Volley Balls	2	189 "	
Nets Volley Ball	2	175 "	
Berets Blue UN	66	US\$.93	
Badges Cap UN	66	" .4961	

Part Number	Designation	Qty	Price			Total		
			£	S	D	£	S	D
1731	Straps Supporting	100	1/1			5.	8.	4.
	Tins Mess	30	5/5			8.	2.	6.
	Bottles Oil	62		6d		1.11.	0.	
	Pullthroughs	51		9d		1.18.	3.	
PL 7984	Microphone H/Gear Assy	1	86/-			4.	6.	0.
20I26	Telephone Hand set	1	70/6/0			3.10.	6.	
	S.S. HF 15	1	180.0.0.			180.	0.	0.
A3 - IO550	AE Loading Unit	1	12/10/0			12.10.	0.	
A2 - IO544	Bracket AE loading Unit	1	15/2			0.15.	2.	
A3 - 7986	Morse Key with Knee Strap	1	3/10/2			3.10.	2.	
A3 - 638I	Aerial Dipole with Winder	2	3. 3.8.			6.	7.	4.
A2 - 7982	Quarter WAOE Aerial	2	24/6			2.	9.	0.
A2 - II235	AE Vertical 8 ft	1	63/6			3.	3.	6.
MDZ 4	Accumulator Exide	36	35/9			64.	7.	0.
	Cases Carrying AE 8 ft	2	30/0			3.	0.	0.
ZA 29006	Remote Control No.1	1	130/-			6.10.	0.	
ZA 29007	Remote Control NO.2	2	83/-			8.	6.	0.
	32986 Microphone NO. 16 A	2	40/6			4.	1.	0.
	28656 Key and Plug Assy No. 19	1	64/-			3.	4.	0.
ZA 2I5I4	Head Gear Assy No.10	2	86/-			8.12.	0.	
	27294 Satchel Signal	3	29/-			4.	7.	0.
	28365 Lamps Operator No. 6B	2	16/-			1.12.	0.	
	28I20 Cases Carrying A Red No. 5	5	23/-			5.15.	0.	
	27098 Aerial Vertical 14 ft	3	56/-			8.	5.	0.
ZA 26800	Aerial Vertical 4 ft No. 2	1	34/6			1.14.	6.	
	26286 Aerial Vertical 4 Ft No.1	5	24/6			6.	2.	6.
	27624 Aerial 100 ft No. 5	3	43/6			6.10.	6.	
WB I940	Bulbs 12V	3	7/6			1.	2.	6.
ZA 30505	Brackets Insulated No. 1	1	4/6			0.	4.	6.
	30504 AE Base No. 23	1	33/-			1.13.	0.	
	I4I72 AE Base No. 10	1	22/6			1.	2.	6.
	II603 Carriers Bty No. 7	1	106/3			5.	6.	3.
	2996I AC Vertical 32 Ft No. 1	1	29/10/0			29.10.	Q.	
FA I4I25	Hammer Engineers 802(a)	1	2/9			0.	2.	9.
ZA 27098	AE Vertical 14 Ft No.1(b)	1	55/-			2.15.	0.	
ZA 29554	Adapters No.1 Antonnac Red	1	10/6			0.10.	6.	
ZA 29336	Bags AC Gear	1	42/6			2.	2.	6.
	29830 Bags Canvas 13 insx5.3/4 ins	1	7/0			0.	7.	0.
	295I6 Pegs Antonnac Red	10	2/11			1.	9.	2.
	4444 Insulators Chain Small	8	1/9			0.14.	0.	
	534I Reamers Antonnac Reds	2	10/-			1.	0.	0.
	29557 Stay Plate & Stay Assy No.2	2	36/-			3.12.	0.	
	4452 Insulators WT 'B'	1	1/7			0.	1.	7.
2957I	Stay tightness small	2	9d			0.	1.	6.
	Bty 6 V 85 AH	6	8/8/0			50.	8.	0.
	Lamps Electric	1	7d			0.	0.	7.

Part Number	Designation	Qty	Price			Total		
			£	S	D	£	S	D
	Extinguisher fire	1)	18/0			0.18.	0.	
	Gauge Pressure	1)	3/3			0.3.	3.	
	Jack Lifting C/W Handle	1)	60/0			3.0.	0.	
	Starting Handle	1)	10/0			0.10.	0.	
	Roll tool kit	1)				0.15.	9.	
	Screw driver	1)				0.3.	7.	
	Spanner adjustable	1)				0.5.	9.	
	Gauge pressure	1)				0.3.	3.	
	Pump tyre	1)	3 TON 42 GA 04			2.17.	0.	
	Jack Lifting C/W Handle	1)				3.0.	0.	
	Starting Handle	1)				0.10.	0.	
	Wheel brace	1)				0.14.	0.	
	Spare Wheel 7.50x16	1)				8.13.	2.	
	Roll tool kit	1)				0.15.	9.	
	Screw Driver	1)				0.3.	7.	
	Spanner adjustable	1)				0.5.	9.	
	Gauge pressure	1)				0.3.	3.	
	Pump tyre	1)	3 TON 42 GA 16			2.17.	0.	
	Jack Lifting C/W Handle	1)				3.0.	0.	
	Starting Handle	1)				0.10.	0.	
	Wheel Brace	1)				0.14.	0.	
	Tyre pump	1)				2.17.	0.	
	Tommy bar	1)				0.4.	1.	
	Pliers side cutter	1)				0.3.	0.	
	Grease gun	1)	1/2 TON L/R 25 GA 32			0.7.	6.	
	Jack Lifting C/W Handle	1)				0.10.	0.	
	Lever tyre	1)				0.2.	7.	
	Gauge pressure	1)				0.3.	3.	
	Wheel brace	1)				0.14.	0.	
	Roll tool kit	1)				0.15.	9.	
	Screw driver	1)				0.3.	7.	
	Spanner adjustable	1)				0.5.	9.	
	Gauge pressure	1)	1/2 TON L/R BDE S & T			0.3.	3.	
	Pump tyre	1)	26 GA 86			2.17.	0.	
	Jack lifting C/W Handle	1)				1.10.	0.	
	Starting Handle	1)				0.10.	0.	
	Wheel brace	1)				0.14.	0.	
	Rifles LIAI	5	53/0/0			265.	0.	0.
	Bayonets	48)	3/15/0			180.	0.	0.
	Scabbards Bayonets	48)						
	Magazines	106	13/-			68.18.	0.	
	Cleaning Kits	80	5/6			22.	0.	0.
	Sterlings M/C Carbine	4	21/10/0			86.	0.	0.
	Slings Carbine	12	2/6			1.10.	0.	
	Bayonets	36)	3/15/0			135.	0.	0.
	Scabbards Bayonet	36)						
	Magazines	118	11/6			67.17.	0.	
	Boxes Magazine	19	26/6			25.	3.	6.
	Boxes Small Parts	19	10d			0.15.	10.	
	Clearing Plug	7	19/-			6.13.	0.	
	Tools Combination	7	3/2			1.	2.	2.
	Holdalls Bren	7	35/-			12.	5.	0.
	Wallets Bren	7	39/-			13.13.	0.	

Part Number	Designation	Qty	Price			Total		
			£	S	D	£	S	D
	Slings Bren W/2 Hooks	12	11/9			7.	1.	0.
	Magazines Bren	95	18/6			87.	17.	6.
	Brushes Cleaning Cyl Bren	19	5 1/4			0.	8.	9.
	Brushes Cleaning Magazine Bren	19	6 1/2			0.	10.	4.
	Extractors	7	4/7			1.	12.	1.
	Mops Rod Clean Cly Bren	7	1/2			0.	8.	2.
	Rods Clean Cly Bren	7	10 1/2			0.	6.	3.
	Springs Pin Firing	7	3 1/2			0.	2.	1.
	Springs Post Piston	7	1/6			0.	10.	6.
	Springs Stay Extractor	7	8 1/2			0.	5.	0.
	Stays Extractor	7	2/6			0.	17.	6.
	Cans Oil MG MK.III	7	5/6			1.	18.	6.
	Bags Officers Camp Kit	4	42/-			8.	8.	0.
	Bedsteads Camp	4	59/-			11.	16.	0.
	Baths Camp	4	25/-			5.	0.	0.
	Buckets Water canvas	4	5/3			1.	1.	0.
	Boxes Stationery Field	1	62/-			3.	2.	0.
	Chairs Camp	4	77/6			15.	10.	0.
	Sheets Ground	4	24/9			4.	19.	0.
	Valise Officers	4	89/6			17.	18.	0.
	Valise Officers Straps Sets	4	60/0			12.	0.	0.
	Blankets GS	8	30/9			12.	6.	0.
	Nets Mosquito	4	40/-			8.	0.	0.
	Pillows Feather	4	8/3			1.	13.	0.
	Basins Alum 1 1/4"	4	6/-			1.	4.	0.
	Cartridges Drill 7.62 mm	800	27/0/0			21.	12.	0.
			(1000)					
	Lanyards Green	110	1/7			8.	14.	2.
	Toolkits Woodworkers Basic	1	19.14/3			19.	14.	3.
	Toolkits Eqpt Repairers	2	23/10/9			47.	1.	6.
	Machines Grinding Hand	1	25/-			1.	5.	0.
	Tonor Saw	1	21/-			1.	1.	0.
	Toolkit Veh Mech and A.A., A & B Vehicle Supp	1	9/15/0			9.	15.	0.
	Cartridges 7.62 mm	15915	27/0/0			429.	14.	2.
			(1000)					
	Cartridges 9 mm	7000	14.10.0.			101.	10.	0.
			(1000)					
	Cartridges 1" III "J"	65	48/6			13.	2.	6.
			(12)					
	Cartridges 1" Signal Rod	30	45/-			5.	12.	6.
			(12)					
	Cartridges 1" Signal Green	24	45/-			4.	10.	0.
			(12)					
	Grenades Hand No. 36	105	4/9			24.	18.	9.
	Wls Stores No.62 (Complete)	2	155/ 0/0			310.	0.	0.
	Wls Stores HF 15	5	180/ 0/0			900.	0.	0.
	Telephones L/J	1	14/15/0			14.	15.	0.

464392 MAJOR WNW BAKER, (GAMS) having been duly sworn states:-

I am the Senior Medical Officer of HQ 2 Ghana Inf Bde. I produce to the Board GAFG 998, in respect of Medical Stores and equipment on charge to the RAP, PORT FRANCOU, which as the result of the incident on 28th April, 61 are now deficient.

(Marked 'C' and attached).

(Sgd) _____

MAJOR WNW BAKER

STATEMENT OF LOSS, DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION OF FIELD
MEDICAL COY MEDICAL EQUIPMENT - PORT FRANCOU.

Designation	Qty	Rate			Net Loss		
		£	S	D	£	S	D
Battery Dry Cell	I	I.	6.		I.	6.	
Bath Eye Glass	I		3.			3.	
Bowls Lotion 2"	I	8.	0.		8.	0.	
Bowls Lotion 6"	I	9.	0.		9.	0.	
Dressing Tray 10 x 8 x 2	I	19.	0.		19.	0.	
Forceps Artery - Dunhill 5"	5	II.	3.		2.	16.	3.
Forceps Artery Spencer Well	2	2I.	6.		2.	3.	0.
Forceps Artery Dressing Bryant	I	I3.	6.		I3.	6.	
Forceps Artery Dissecting toothed	I	I2.	0.		I2.	0.	
Forceps Tongue - Corbould	I	23.	6.		23.	6.	
First Aid Haversack Empty	4						
Gag Mouth - Ferguson	I	60.	0.		60.	0.	
Inhaler - Huggison	I	IO.	6.		IO.	6.	
Kidney Dish	I						
Probe	I	2.	6.		2.	6.	
Pliers Wire Cutting	I	8I.	6.		8I.	6.	
Bed Pans	I	20.	0.		20.	0.	
Bottles Hot water	I	5.	3.		5.	3.	
Boxes Stationary	I	60.	0.		60.	0.	
Bowl Plastic	2	6.	0.		I2.	0.	
Buckets Plastic	I						
Brushes S.H.U.	I	3.	0.		3.	0.	
Brushes Nail	I	2.	0.		2.	0.	
Brushes Sweeping I2"	I	8.	0.		8.	0.	
Blankets Stationary	I4	30.	0.		2I.	0.	0.
Cup Plastic	2	2.	0.		4.	0.	
Cans Jerri	I	IO.	6.		IO.	6.	
Cups Breakfast	20	9.	IO.		9.	16.	8.
Camp Table	2	64.	0.		6.	8.	0.
Camp Folding Table	2	I57.	0.		IO.	14.	0.
Cloth Medicine	2	3.	0.		6.	0.	
Cloth Distinctive	I	3.	0.		3.	0.	
Camp Kits Complete	I						
Containers Kerosene	I	I5.	0.		I5.	0.	
Dressing Box complete	I						
Dishes Soup	I	2.	0.		2.	0.	
Forks Table	2	4.	6.		9.	0.	
Chair Camp Canvas	I	35.	0.		35.	0.	
Hand Towel T. C.	5	6.	0.		30.	0.	
Kettle Camp	I	42.	3.		42.	3.	
Knives Table	I	4.	0.		4.	0.	
Knives Cook	I	6.	7.		6.	7.	
Lamps H.P.	I	75.	6.		75.	6.	
Lamps Hurricane	I	I.	2.		I.	2.	
Lamps High Pressure	I	75.	6.		75.	6.	
Medicine Glass	I	8.	6.		8.	6.	
Matchets	5	5.	0.		25.	0.	
Net Camouflage	I	I23.	0.		I23.	0.	
Openers Tin	I	I.	6.		I.	6.	
Pad - Locks I.1/2"	I	5.	0.		5.	0.	
Saucers Plastic	2	2.	9.		5.	6.	
Saucers Breakfast	20	I.	6.		30.	0.	
Screw Driver	I	8.	0.		8.	0.	
Shovels G.S.	2	II.	0.		II.	0.	
Sheets Tents Ground	3	24.	0.		72.	0.	
Stove Oil Wickless	I	40.	0.		40.	0.	
Stretchers Ambulance	7	60.	0.		420.	0.	

Designation	Qty	Rate			Net Loss		
		£	S	D	£	S	D
Sheets	4	20.	0.		80.	0.	
Spoon Serving	I	3.	0.		3.	0.	
Spoon Desert	I	2.	0.		2.	0.	
Valises Officers Stap Set	I	25.	0.		25.	0.	
Washing Basin	I	9.	6.		9.	6.	
Water Containers	2	15.	0.		30.	0.	
Table G.S. Folding	I	64.	0.		64.	0.	
Tea Pot	I	8.	0.		8.	0.	
Urinal Plastic	2	5.	0.		10.	0.	
Tent 160 lbs Complete	2	30.	9.	0.	60.	18.	0.
Pick Axes Halves & Head	2	9.	6.		19.	0.	
Scissors Straight	I						
Scissors Blunt	I	9.	I.		9.	I.	
Scissors Pointed	I						
Splint Knee Thomas	I	3.	13.	0.	3.	13.	0.
Splint Reversible & Stirrup	2						
Singers Tourniquet	I	5.	0.		5.	0.	
Stretcher S.B.	4	60.	6.		12.	2.	0.
Spatula Tongue Forceps	I						
Syringes Hypodermic all glass 2 cc	4	4.	2.		16.	8.	
Syringes Hypodermic all glass 5 cc	4	5.	I.		20.	4.	
Syringe Hypodermic all glass 10 cc	2	6.	8.		13.	4.	
Syringe Hypodermic all glass 20 cc	I	7.	9.		7.	9.	
Syringes I.R. Adaptable	I						
Syringe I.R. Catheter	I						
Sped Eye	I	4.	0.		4.	0.	
Spirit Lamp Metal	I	3.	9.		3.	9.	
Thermometer Clinical	8	2.	6.		20.	0.	

Capt TJ MOYNAN, having been duly sworn states:-

I am the Signals Officer of HQ 2 Ghana Inf Bde. I produce to the Board GAFG 998's listing items of equipment on charge to Bde Signal Troop which were lost during the PORT - FRANQUI incident.

I also produce GAFG 1033 showing all equipment on charge to Cpl. D. KISSI, NCO i/c Signals Det at PORT - FRANQUI.

(Marked 'D' and attached).

(Signed) _____

Capt TJ MOYNAN

STATEMENT OF LOSS, DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION OF
TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

Part No.	Designation	Qty	Rate			Total		
			£	S	D	£	S	D
ZA 27624	Aerial 100 Ft	1	2.	5.	0.	2.	5.	0.
ZA/CAN/00108	Aerial Base	1	1.	5.	0.	1.	5.	0.
0374	Pegs Anchoring	4	2.	10.	0.	2.	10.	0.
00022	Guy Ropes	4	2.	8.	0.	2.	8.	0.
ZA 6292	Satchel Signal	1	1.	11.	6.	1.	11.	6.
ZA/CAN/00034	Masts Tele 20 Ft	1	6.	10.	0.	6.	10.	0.
HF 572I	Hydrometer	1		9.	9.		9.	9.
JA 0228	Boxes Stationery	1	10.	5.	0.	10.	5.	0.
XB 6I4-99-9IO)	Bty 6V 170 AH	8	103.	14.	4.	103.	14.	4.
- I524								
XB 0001/500	Charging Set 500W	1	62.	15.	4.	62.	15.	4.
ZB 6140-101537	Bty 12V 75 AH	2	25.	12.	0.	25.	12.	0.
VC 10034	Watches W/W	1	5.	9.	6.	5.	9.	6.
ZA 46I94	Adapter Unit 'O'	1	9.	11.	9.	9.	11.	9.
ZA 46862	Morse Key	1	2.	10.	0.	2.	10.	0.
YA 9590	Microphone Hand	2	15.	10.	0.	15.	10.	0.
KE 313	Matchet	1		11.	0.		11.	0.
YA 9595	REC. Headgear Assy	2	7.	15.	0.	7.	15.	0.
FA 14255	Hammer Smith 3 lbs	1		9.	0.		9.	0.
	CONN 12 Pt PSU TO SENDER	1						
	CONN 4 Pt BATTERY LEAD							
	TO PSU	1						
C11/1003	CONN 12 Pt SENDER TO							
	ADAPTOR	1						
	CONN 6 Pt ADAPTOR TO							
	KEYING UNIT	1						
ZA 6292	SATCHELS SIGNAL	1						
ZA 00108	BAS ES AERIAL ASSY	1						
ZA 00024	SPIKES GROUND	1						
	Watches W/W No 211	1						
	WSC 11/R210 with all							
	heads	1						
	Adaptor box 'O'	1						
	Key	1						
	Mic Hard	2						
	Rec headgear Assy	2						
	Matchet complete	1						
	Hammer 3 lbs	1						
	AC 100	1						
	AC Base	1						
	Pags Anchoring	4						
	Guy Ripes	4						
	Satchel Signal	1						
	Matts Tele 20'	1						
	Hydrometer	1						
	Boxes Stationery	1						
	Charging S et 500W	1						
	AB 414	1						
	Slidex Pad	1						
	Btys 6V 170AH	8						
	Btys 12V 75AH	2						

GC 84915 WO II Seth ADU, having been duly sworn states:-

I am the RQMS of HQ 2 Ghana Inf Bde. I produce to the Board GAFG 998, in respect of weapons, ammo and clothing and equipment, on charge to GC 54313 Pte Basare and GC 39322 Pte Konkomba of the Bde Defence Pl, and lost with them on the DOMIONGO incident on 29th April 61.

(Marked 'E' and attached).

(Signed) _____

84915 WO II Seth ADU

LOSSES SUSTAINED BY HQ, 2 BDE GP. 27/28 APRIL 1961AT DOMIONGO.ARMS, AMMO., EQPT.

I T E M	Q U A N T I T Y	P R I C E	T O T A L
		£ S D	£ S D
Rifles No. 4	1	21.10. 0.	21.10. 0.
Bayonet Rifle	1	1. 1. 6.	1. 1. 6.
Scabbard Bayonet	1	4. 9.	4. 9.
Guns Machine Bren	1	62. 0. 0.	62. 0. 0.
Mags Bren	2	18. 6.	1.17. 0.
Slings Bren	1	2. 9.	2. 9.
Carts .303 Rounds	106	23. 2. 0. for 1000	2. 8. 9.

PERSONAL CLOTHING OF MEN

Boots Ankle prs.	2	30. 9.	3. 1. 6.
Anklets Web prs.	2	7. 2.	14. 4.
Bags Kit	1	9. 9.	9. 9.
Drawers Cell	5	7. 4.	1.16. 8.
Fork	1	1. 5.	1. 5.
Holdals	2	1. 5.	2.10.
Hosetops Khaki prs.	2	2. 7.	5. 2.
Jersey Pullover	1	14. 2.	14. 2.
Knives Table	2	2. 7.	5. 2.
Blouse Denim	1	19.10.	19.10.
Shirts K.F.	4	19. 0.	3.16. 0.
Shorts PT	4	8. 0.	1.12. 0.
Spoons	2	1. 1.	2. 2.
Shorts K.D.	1	15. 5.	15. 5.
Socks Worsted prs.	3	3. 6.	10. 6.
Towels Hand	5	12. 0.	3. 0. 0.
Trousers KD	2	17. 6.	1.15. 0.
" Denim	2	16. 6.	1.13. 0.
Vest Cotton	4	5. 7.	1. 2. 4.
Puttees Short	3	3.10.	11. 6.
Hats Jungle	2	4. 6.	9. 0.
Covers Steel Helmet	2	11. 6.	1. 3. 0.
Braces Normal	4	3. 5.	13. 8.
Carriers Water Bottle	2	2. 9.	5. 6.
Frogs Bayonet	2	1. 8.	3. 4.
Haversack	2	11.10.	1. 3. 8.
Pack	1	13. 0.	13. 0.
Sling Rifle	1	2. 9.	2. 9.
Strap Shoulder Left	2	3. 2.	6. 4.
" " Right	2	3. 2.	6. 4.
Tins Mess	2	5. 5.	10.10.
HELMET LINNER	2	US\$ 2.25 per unit	US\$ 4.50
SHIRTS CELLULAR UNO	2	" 2.10 "	" 4.20
TROUSERS FIELD UNO	3	" 3.10 "	" 9.30
SIGNS FORMATION UNO	2	" 0.07 "	" 0.14
CAPS FIELD UNO	1	" 0.44 "	" 0.44
SCARF NECK ORs	1	" 0.32 "	" 0.32

Major RF MORGAN, 2 Ghana R, having been duly sworn states:-

I am the 2IC of 2 Ghana R. I hold the Unit PRI and control Canteen account, from which PX goods are supplied to Coys on det. I am also PMC of the Officers Mess, and I control Regimental Sports equipment issues.

I produce to the Board:-

- a. A statement of Account, being a true extract from the PRI canteen Debtors Book, showing the Debit, and Credits of the 'A' Coy Port Francqui account. The final balance shows a total debit of Congo Francs 30,231. Except for a small amount of stock recovered from MWEKA, no monies or stock have been recovered.
(Marked 'F' and attached)
- b. A list of Regimental Sports equipment issued to 'A' Coy, and now deficient. Prices are approximate.
(Marked 'F' and attached)
- c. A list of Officers Mess equipment (Regimental Property), issued to 'A' Coy at Port Francqui, and now deficient. Proof of issue cannot be produced as the issue vouchers had been sent to Port Francqui for signatures.
(Marked 'F' and attached).

(Sgd) _____

MAJOR RF MORGAN, 2 GR

REGIMENTAL PROPERTY
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT

FROM: PRI CANTEEN. 2 GHANA REGT.

TO : 'A' COY (Port Francqui)

DEBITS			CREDITS		
Date	Items	Francs	Date	Items	Francs
9 March	VO. No. 10	9061	22 March	VO. No. 10	4240
18 March	" " 24	2650	22 March	" " 26	270
19 March	" " 25	5426	23 March	" " 31	210
7 March	" " 26	7023	5 April	" " 26	3480
23 March	" " 31	210	11 April	" " 10/25/26/40/32	5255
24 March	" " 32	1163	11 April	" " 10/25/26	5678
26 March	" " 39	2016	13 April	" " 26/50	5970
28 March	" " 40	2640	13 April	" 10/25/32/39/46	6384
31 March	" " 46	2700	21 April	" Containers	760
2 April	" " 50	5036	24 April	" 104	163
2 April	" " 51	972	26 April	" 10/26/30/50/51	6552
5 April	" " 60	1404	7 May	Recovered Stock	1218
5 April	" " 61	140			
6 April	" " 62	4000			
12 April	" " 72	4582			
12 April	" " 73	8000			
14 April	" " 79	1160			
15 April	" " 81	5012			
21 April	" " 89(a)	886			
21 April	" " 94	1300			
21 April	" " 95	28			
26 April	" " 106	4192			
26 April	" " 107	810			
		70411			40180
				Debit Balance	30231
	TOTAL	70411		TOTAL	70411

Certified true extract from the 2 GHANA R, PRI Canteen Account.

19 May 61.
Luluabourg - Kasai
CONGO

R. F. Morgan Major
.....
2nd Bn. The Ghana Regt. of Inf. R

REGIMENTAL PROPERTY

LIST OF SPORTS EQUIPMENT (Regimental Property)
ISSUED TO 'A' COY, 2 GHANA REGT, AND NOW DEFICIENT AS THE RESULT
OF THE PORT FRANCOIS INCIDENT 28 APRIL 61.

ARTICLE	QUANTITY	PRICE (Francs)	TOTAL (Francs)
Footballs	3	189	567
Hockey Balls	4	87	348
Basket Ball	1	294	294
Volley Ball	1	189	189
Hockey Sticks	13	210	2730
Volley Ball Net	1	175	175

Francs 4303

NOTE:

Prices are a low approximation.

Signed...R. F. MORGAN.....Major

19 MAY 61.
 Luluabourg
 Kasai Province
 CONGO.

REGIMENTAL PROPERTY

LIST OF OFFICERS MESS EQUIPMENT (Regimental Property)
ISSUED TO 'A' COY, 2 GHANA REGT, AND NOW DEFICIENT AS THE RESULT OF
PORT FRANCOU INCIDENT 28 APR 61.

ARTICLE	QUANTITY	PRICE (Francs)	TOTAL (Francs)
<u>CHINA</u>			
Plates Dinner	6		
Plates Soup	6		
Plates Breakfast	6		
Plates Side	6		
Cups Tea	6		
Cups Coffee	6		
Saucers Tea	6		
Saucers Coffee	6		
Tumblers 1/2 pint (Glass)	6		
Mugs 1 pint (Glass)	6		
Jug Small (China)	1		
Jug Large (Glass)	1		
Dishes Vegetable (with lids)	2		
Dishes Serving (Medium)	1		
Sugar Bowl	1		
Pepper Pot (EPNS)	1		
Salt Pot (EPNS)	1		
Mustard Pot (EPNS)	1		
Gravy Boat	1		
Tea Pot (Earthenware)	1		
Coffee Pot (Enamel)	1		
<u>CUTLERY</u>			
Knives Table Large (EPNS)	6		
Knives Table Small (EPNS)	6		
Forks Table Large (EPNS)	6		
Forks Table Small (EPNS)	6		
Spoons Table Large (EPNS)	6		
Spoons Table Small (EPNS)	6		
Spoons Soup (EPNS)	6		
Spoons Tea (EPNS)	6		
Spoons Coffee (EPNS)	6		
Knives Fish (EPNS)	6		
Forks Fish (EPNS)	6		
Bread Knife	1		
Butter Knife (EPNS)	1		
Spoons Serving (EPNS)	3		
Carving Set K & F	1		
Gravy Ladle Small (EPNS)	1		
<u>UTENSILS</u>	2		
Roast Pans (Enamel)	2		
Frying Pan Large	1		
Seive	1		
Kettle Large (Aluminium)	1		
Tin Opener	1		
Egg Slice	1		
Sauce Pans Large (Aluminium)	2		
Knife Cooks	1		

ARTICLE	QUANTITY	PRICE(Francis)	TOTAL(Francis)
<u>UTENSILS</u> (contd)			
Fork Cooks	1		
Spoon Cooks	1		
Spoons GS	6		
Rolling Pin Wooden	1		
Bread Board	1		
Steels Sharpening	1		
Boxes Soldier Wooden	2		

TOTAL
Francs

NOTE: Prices have been applied for from ACCRA.

Signed. R. F. MORGAN.....Major
PMC, 2 GR Offrs Mess.
(R. F. MORGAN)

Luluabourg
Kasai Province
CONGO.

NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS AND MEN
OF THE GHANA INF BDE. ONUC NOW MISSING AS
THE RESULT OF THE PORT FRANQUI AND DOMIONGO
INCIDENTS ON 28 APRIL
\$

OFFICERS

Captain	T.G. RALPH	(437144)	2 GHANA R
Lieut	A.P.G. BROWN	(445802)	2 GHANA R

OR

GC.	18154189	Pte	YAKUBU FRAFRA	-	2 GHANA R
"	67684	Cpl	ISSAKA BAZABRIMI	-	" "
"	48601	"	KUREBILA FRAFRA	-	" "
"	18152522	Pte	MUSAH MOSHIE	-	" "
"	85138	"	BRAIMA FULANI	-	" "
"	14734	Sgt	SEIDU GRUNSHIE	-	" "
"	79212	Cpl	HARUNA MOSHIE	-	" "
"	85401	"	EMMANUEL LORSO	-	" "
"	18152176	Pte	AMADU FULANI	-	" "
"	18152396	L/C	SEIDU GRUMAH	-	" "
"	18152837	"	HASSAN HAUSA	-	" "
"	18153274	Pte	AKUMAFEKEMA BUILSA	-	" "
"	18153913	"	YAKUBU GRUMAH	-	" "
"	18154426	"	ASAWASUANA FRAFRA	-	" "
"	18154579	"	JOE GRUNSHIE	-	" "
"	18154829	"	AKASIA BUILSA	-	" "
"	18155183	"	GARIBA CHOKOSI	-	" "
"	18155202	"	PETER TONGO	-	" "
"	18155556	"	MICHAEL GRUNSHIE	-	" "
"	18154217	"	ATUA BEDIAKO	-	" "
"	82769	"	BUKARE BUSANGA	-	" "
"	18153256	"	AWUNI KANJARGA	-	" "
"	85366	"	ALI KONKOMBA	-	" "
"	18153873	Cpl	YAW SINTIM	-	" "
"	18153955	Pte	KWESI CHOKOSI	-	" "
"	18154557	"	OBIRI MANTE	-	" "
"	18154608	"	CHARLES DZOWORNU	-	" "
"	18154831	"	KWAME SISSALA	-	" "
"	18155197	"	BUKARE KANJARGA	-	" "
"	18155206	L/C	AHMED DRAMANI KWANDO	-	" "
"	18155562	Pte	MUNOR TETTEH	-	" "
"	78544	"	SUMANI FRAFRA	-	" "
"	18153961	"	ALI CHOKOSI	-	" "
"	85970	L/C	BABAJOLLY LORSO	-	" "
"	81393	Pte	DUTY BEMOBA	-	" "
"	18153446	"	EMMANUEL NUNOO	-	" "
"	84751	"	MAMA ATTIPOE	-	S & T
"	18153576	"	JOHN GRUNSHIE	-	2 GHANA R

GC	54313	Pte	KWESI BASARE	-	2 GHANA BDE
"	39322	"	DENDEN KONKOMBA	-	" "

LULUABOURG
KASAI PROVINCE
CONGO.

FINDINGS OF THE BOARD

1. Personnel

- a. A nominal roll of the missing officers, and other Ranks is attached at Appx 'G'.
- b. The missing personnel disappeared whilst on duty with United Nations Forces, as the result of contact with armed ANC.
- c. Except in the case of three other Ranks, there is no positive evidence that the missing are dead except that three witnesses have stated that they saw some bodies of Ghanaian soldiers.
- d. In the case of the missing officers, it is known that they were in the hands of the ANC, and had been beaten up by them. In addition some evidence has been produced that suggests they were taken from the hospital and shot.
- e. In the case of all personnel missing at Port Francqui it is a fact that:-
 - i. It is 23 days since the incident.
 - ii. They were unarmed.
 - iii. They were subject to deliberate indiscriminate shooting action by the ANC.
 - iv. They were in semi - hostile country.
 - v. They are still missing.
- f. There is little evidence of the fate of the two soldiers missing at DOMIONGO, but it is fact that:-
 - i. They were involved in armed action with the ANC.
 - ii. It is 23 days since they were reported missing.
 - iii. They were in semi - hostile country.
 - iv. They are still missing.

2. Stores

- a. AFG 998 in respect of deficient ONUC and National Stores and lists of missing Regimental property and stores, submitted to the Board are attached at Appx 'B' to 'F'
- b. All missing stores were in fact on charge and in the area of sub-units and individuals involved in the incidents of Port Francqui and Domiongo.
- c. There is no question of negligence.

OPINION OF THE BOARD

1. It is the opinion of the Board that sufficient evidence has been produced to show that the missing officers and men were killed or can be presumed killed whilst on duty with United Nations Forces, and should be classified as follow:-

<u>KILLED</u>		<u>EFFECTIVE DATE</u>
GC 81393	Pte Duty Bemoba	28 April 61
" 18153446	Pte Emmanuel Nunoo	28 " 61
" 18154608	Pte Charles Dzewornu	22 May 61

<u>PRESUMED KILLED</u>		<u>EFFECTIVE DATE</u>
Capt TG RALPH (437144)		22 May 61
Lieut APG Brown (445802)		22 " 61
GC 18154189	Pte Yakubu Frafra	22 May 61
" 67684	Cpl Issaka Bazabarimi	"
" 48601	Cpl Kurebila Frafra	"
" 14734	Sgt Seidu Grunshie	"
" 79212	Cpl Haruna Moshie	"
" 85401	Cpl Emmanuel Lorso	"
" 18153873	Cpl Yaw Sintim	"
" 18152396	Lcpl Seidu Grumah	"
" 18152837	Lcpl Hassan Hausa	"
" 18155206	Lcpl Ahmed Dramani Kwando	"
" 85970	Lcpl Babajolly Lorso	"
" 18152522	Pte Musah Moshie	"
" 85138	Pte Braima Fulani	"
" 18152176	Pte Amadu Fulani	"
" 18153274	Pte Akunafekema Builsa	"
" 18153576	Pte John Grunshie	"
" 18153913	Pte Yakubu Grumah	"
" 18154426	Pte Asamasuana Frafra	"
" 18154579	Pte Joe Grunshie	"
" 18154829	Pte Akasia Builsa	"
" 18155183	Pte Gariba Chokosi	"
" 18155202	Pte Peter Tongo	"
" 18155556	Pte Michael Grunshie	"
" 18154217	Pte Atua Bediako	"
" 82769	Pte Bukare Busanga	"
" 18153256	Pte Awuni Kanjarga	"
" 85366	Pte Ali Konkomba	"
" 18153955	Pte Kwesi Chokosi	"
" 18154557	Pte Obiri Mante	"
" 18154831	Pte Kwame Sissala	"
" 18155197	Pte Bukaro Kanjarga	"
" 18155562	Pte Munor Tetteh	"
" 78544	Pte Sumani Frafra	"
" 18153961	Pte Ali Chokosi	"
" 84751	Pte Mama Attipoe	"
" 54313	Pte Kwesi Basare	"
" 39322	Pte Denden Konkomba	"

2. That all missing ONUC and National Stores listed at Appx B, C, D, E, should be written off.

3. That ONUC should refund the value or make a cash grant towards the cost of replacement of the missing Regimental Property and Stores listed at Appx 'F'.

(Sgd) R.F. Morgan PRESIDENT

(Sgd) E.N.N. Dedjoe MEMBER

DATE 31 MAY 61

(Sgd) R.W. Moore MEMBER

BRIGADE COMMANDER'S OPINION

I agree with the findings and opinion of the Board.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend that the two officers and forty other ranks listed on page 26 of the Board Proceedings should be recorded as having been killed while on duty with United Nations in the CONGO, and that the effective dates should be as shown on page 26 of the Board Proceedings.

I recommend that all ONUC and GHANA National Stores listed at Appendices B, C, D, and E of the Board Proceedings should be written off as a charge against United Nations Organisation.

I recommend that the Headquarters United Nations Organisation should be invited to refund the value of the Missing Regimental Property and Stores which are listed at Appendix 'F' of the Board Proceedings.

6 June 61

(Sgd) Brigadier
Comd GHANA Bde.
(J.E. MICHEL).

FIRST WITNESS

Major C. Sollenberg, Swedish, having been duly sworn states:

I was the Officer in charge of light aircraft detachment at Luluabourg from 10th February to 2nd May 1961. I flew into Port Francqui approximately twice per week during this time and I was thoroughly familiar with the area. I was in Port Francqui on the 23rd April but I saw nothing unusual. One of my pilots, W/O Feron, picked up two Congolese Ministers and a Ghanaian medical officer on the afternoon of 26th April and took them to Port Francqui. I flew the area around Port Francqui on Sunday, 30th April, flying for 3 hours at 200 to 300 ft. but could see nothing, as the jungle is very dense in this area I would only have seen someone if they tried to attract my attention unless they were in the open. I did not see anyone on the railway, the river or the roads nor did the copilot who was with me.

(Sgd)

C. Sollenberg

SECOND WITNESS

Lt. A. Y. Donkor, Ghanaian, having been duly sworn states:

I first heard of the trouble at Port Francqui on the night of the 27th April when men from my company were taken from Luluabourg to reinforce the personnel in Port Francqui. At about 1700 hours on the 28th April I was ordered to go to Port Francqui the next morning. I arrived at Port Francqui at approximately 1030 hours on the 29th April and I took with me one bugler and one ANC Lt. On arrival I found 31 soldiers, all Ghanaians, at the ANC Camp. They had been deprived of their boots and head-dress, some had no shirts and some of them had bruises. I was told that there was one soldier at the hospital so I went there and took him to the airport. He had a gun shot wound in the leg. While I was there I went to the old company HQ, Socopetrole, the port and through the african township with a bugler sounding "fall in". I found 7 more men, Ghanaians. I despatched 9 to Luluabourg leaving 30 behind, in the ANC camp under their Sgt. Major.

On the 30th April I returned to Port Francqui and found that a Swedish Sgt. Major had joined the Ghanaian soldiers in the ANC camp. I again toured the town with the bugler. I sent 31 men including the Swedish S/Major back to Luluabourg that day.

On the 1st May I again returned to the camp with the S/Major Ali Sèidu and the Bugler. I sent S/Major and the bugler around the area to look for more men, and I stayed to check for arms and ammunitions. They found 1 Ghanaian soldier and another at the hospital.

On the 2nd May I again returned to the area in company with Col. Ankrah, the Acting Brigade Commander, 7 drivers and a vehicle mechanic. I remained for the night and at 1630 hours that afternoon I heard that there was one Ghanaian soldier in a village 20 km. from Port Francqui, on the Mweka road. I went in company with one ANC Sgt. and brought him back to Port Francqui. On the way to and from the village I talked on the megaphone to see if I could bring further survivors over. I remained in Port Francqui until 4 May while the vehicles were being made roadworthy. On Tuesday evening, Wednesday morning and Wednesday afternoon I again went through the town calling on the megaphone. Early in the morning of the 4th May I led the convoy from Port Francqui. About 15 km. from Port Francqui I was stopped by one Ghanaian soldier who came out of the bush.

Major Lindeblad asked the witness if he saw any bodies.

He said 'no' "I only saw blood stains on the floor and on clothes and equipment lying about in the billets.

Major Lindeblad again asked if he knew where the 2 British and the 2 Swedish officers were shot. The witness replied:

"I asked where they were shot but got different stories, some saying that they were buried, others that the bodies had been thrown into the river but no one would show either where they were buried or where they were thrown in the river. They did not admit that they had shot them."

Major Morgan asked if they were cooperative.

Witness: Neither the ANC nor the civilians were cooperative. It was only when we arrived at Luluabourg and the Swedish S/Major made his statement that I learned the true story.

(Sgd) A.Y. Donkor Lt.

THIRD WITNESS

W/O Egon Aberg, Swedish, Reg. No. 2533-1-50, born 15 November 1930, having been duly sworn states:-

I and two Swedes, Lt. Bottiger and W/O Liedgen were the Movement Control Team at Port Francqui.

We were living in the Hotel des Palmes and we had our office at the Ghanaian HQ. There had been no special tension before the incidents. There was, as far as I know no strife between the tribes and the relations between the Congolese and UN personnel were good. A few days before the incidents the Ghanaian soldiers had helped the Congolese ANC to search for some missing Congolese individuals. The ANC and Ghanaian soldiers were cooperating with each other. In general things were rather quite in this area. The situation changed due to the visit of two Congolese Ministers on Wednesday, 26 April. The Congolese had arranged road blocks in the morning, before the arrival of the ministers, but the escort took another way to the hotel. Obviously the ANC had got information that these people were supposed to arrive, but apparently had not heard through official channels. The ANC were upset because these two Ministers did not want their protection and they could not understand why they approached UN for protection. On Monday, 24 April, the hotel was given for the UN as HQ. ANC used to go to the bar but after that they were told that the bar was closed. I do not think that this is the reason for their getting upset. The only reason was the arrival of the two Ministers without prior notice and their asking for UN protection instead of the ANC.

Ten minutes after the arrival of the Ministers at the hotel, the ANC came to the hotel in a truck, there were about 20 of them armed. They surrounded the hotel. At the hotel there were also about the same number of armed Ghanaians. Nothing happened between the Ghanaians and the ANC. Three ANC individuals went to the hotel to talk with the Ministers. They were allowed to do so and they had the talk in the vestibule. Capt. Ralph and a British Lieutenant were present. I do not know what the ANC wanted of the Ministers but I think that they asked them to come to their camp and be under their protection. However the Ministers stayed at the hotel and the ANC went back. The Swedish Lt. Bottiger hung the BCK flag on the balcony. The purpose of this was to get the flag dry. The ANC thought that it was a Belgian flag and got angry. They asked the UN personnel to take down the flag but the UN personnel refused. During the talk with the Ministers I was asked to go downstairs. The ANC asked me and the other UN people to leave together the Hotel and Port Francqui. They thought that we were Belgians and asked us to go back to our own country. I tried to explain that we were Swedes but the ANC insisted that we should leave. They thought that only the Swedes were Belgians - not the British officers. I and Liedgen were standing at the balcony and Bottiger in a balcony closeby. The flag had hung from one of the balconies since before the Ministers arrived. The ANC left but they said that they would come back at 0900 next morning to take the hotel by force. Nothing more happened on this day, Wednesday the 26th April. About noon the next day, Thursday 27th April, I heard some trouble from the Ghanaian HQ about 300 metres away. This was noise of shouting. The British officers, Capt. Ralph and Lt. Brown went to the HQ by jeep to find out what was happening and I and the other Swedes stayed at the hotel. The British officers did not come back to the hotel again. I heard that they had been arrested on their way to the HQ. I got this information from the British Officers when I met them later. I next saw ANC troops marching through the square between the HQ and the hotel. They went towards the English Officers mess. After a while they came to the hotel. There were about 100 men, armed. This happened about half an hour after the British Officers had left. The ANC surrounded the hotel, they spoke to the Ghanaian guard, they were about 20 or 25 strong still armed, and said that they only

wanted to have the white officers. In the hotel there were 3 Swedes, one English Doctor and one Polish Doctor. Some of the ANC came in the hotel and up to the second floor and arrested us. They brought us down to the lounge. There we met an ANC officer. Lt. Bottiger told the officer that we belonged to UN Movement Control and the officer took us into the dining room. It seemed that the officer wanted to help us but a lot of ANC soldiers came and took us (the three Swedes) by force. The ANC officer protested but the ANC did not obey him. He had no command over his troops. This officer had one star on his shoulder. The ANC took us to the garden and tore our caps and epaulettes off. The English doctor was released. ANC took us (3 Swedes) to the car parked outside the hotel. Before we entered the car Lt. Bottiger was hit with a rifle butt on his forehead over the right eye. It did not seem to be a severe blow. I cannot explain why they actually hit Bottiger. He did not fall to the ground and I could see no blood stains. They took us to a house about 200 metres from the Ghanaian HQ and placed us on the balcony. The 3 British officers, Capt. Ralph, Lt. Brown and Lt. Scott and 6 Belgians (BCK people) were also there. After a while the 2 Congolese Ministers were also brought in. We were not beaten in the balcony. However I saw that Capt. Ralph had a wound on the top of his head which was bleeding. Lt. Brown was also wounded on his forehead. The Congolese medical assistant put some clips and a bandage on Capt. Ralph's wound and washed Lt. Brown's wound. Then ANC troops arrived and had with them weapons belonging to the Ghanaians. Obviously they had disarmed some Ghanaians by that time. When we left the hotel the Ghanaian guard still had their weapon. Lt. Bottiger was lying on the floor in a daze. As far as I remember Bottiger at this time had not been struck again. We asked for medical treatment and two nuns were brought to the house to take care of Bottiger. The nuns said that Bottiger should be taken to the hospital and they took him to the BCK hospital. I myself fainted and fell to the ground and hit my head. I cannot understand the reason for this as I was not struck. I remember being taken to the hospital while half conscious and that they took care of me. I stayed there until the following day together with Lt. Bottiger, Capt. Ralph and Lt. Brown. An ANC guard was outside the hospital. Nothing special happened before the morning of 28 April when I woke up from the sound of shooting outside. After a few minutes 5 or 6 ANC soldiers entered the hospital and took me away together with Bottiger, Capt. Ralph and Lt. Brown. Lt. Scott was not in the hospital nor was W/O Liedgen. The ANC were in a hurry, I succeeded in putting on my trousers but Capt Ralph went in his pyjamas. Just outside the hospital Bottiger received a second blow with the rifle butt on the left side of his head. It was a severe blow and he bled profusely. Bottiger could walk at first but after a few moments he had to be held up. When we had walked some distance we were ordered to sit down on the ground and were tied together by our left hand with a length of rope between each of us, I to the left then Capt. Ralph, Lt. Bottiger and Lt. Brown. When this was done we proceeded and passed the Congolese hospital. The English Doctor was standing outside, Bottiger wanted to go to the Doctor to be treated for his bad wound but the ANC said that this was of no use. They did not say that they were going to shoot us. When we had walked about 25 metres along this route we saw Liedgen coming with an ANC soldier. They put Liedgen with us but did not tie him. The ANC then noted that Bottiger and Liedgen had their shoes on and they made them take their shoes off and throw them away. Then there was a lot of discussion among the ANC but I could not understand what they said because they were speaking in their native language. We proceeded on and passed the Portuguese bar where we turned to the left. We continued on this road until we came to a road block where we left the main road and were halted close to the road. There was high grass and we were about 10 to 20 metres from the bush and the jungle beyond. There were 4 or 5 soldiers with us and one civil policeman. All were armed with rifles. Liedgen who was not tied with the others was told by the policeman to walk ahead along the path and the policeman aimed his rifle at Liedgen. Liedgen turned

round, saw the policeman and shouted "don't shoot" and proceeded on down the path and the policeman fired one shot. I could not see Liedgen at the time. I heard him shout. I heard the policeman shoot a second time but I did not see this as at the same time an ANC soldier asked me to go the same way. I saw that he was loading his gun and I took the chance and I ran between the ANC soldier and the policeman into the deep grass and then to the bush. The ANC fired at me and I heard the shots near me but was not hit. I kept running deeper into the bush and as a result of this I do not know what happened to the others. In the afternoon I heard some ANC soldiers in the bush nearby talking and shooting. I laid down in the jungle until dark. I walked through the jungle all night and in the morning came to the Kasai river. I wanted to see the English doctor as I had been cut by the high grass and went to the vicinity of the English Officers mess but I saw there ANC soldiers and policemen, and so returned to a spot near the river where I could hide but some policemen saw me and they began hunting for me. I jumped into the river and while I was in the water about 30 metres from the policemen one policeman fired 5 shots at me but did not hit me. I swam to the other side of the river and saw an ANC soldier standing there and he told the police where I was and they started looking for me in a motor boat. I stayed under the water near the bank coming up for air periodically. I remained for about 3 hours when the boat went away. I then got out on to the bank and about half an hour later a gendarme Sgt. came and asked me to follow him and said that he would give me food. I told him to stay away from me but he replied that the Ghanaian colonel was at the airport and would take me back. I then followed him. When we came to the other side of the river I saw many ANC soldiers and told him that he was a liar and wanted to jump in the river but then I saw some Ghanaian soldiers and followed him. He took me to the ANC camp where I was given dry clothes and food. I stayed there overnight with the Ghanaian soldiers.

(Sgd) _____

E. Aberg

At the request of the Board Aberg produced a sketch showing the scene where the British and Swedish officers stood when he saw them for the last time, see Appendix 'H'.

FOURTH WITNESS

Dr. Leszek Aleksandrowicz having been duly sworn states:

I am a doctor employed with the WHO. I was employed at the Congolese hospital at Port Francqui from 28th March until the 29th April. The last time I saw the British officers with the Ghana force or the Swedish Movement Control team, was in the afternoon of Thursday the 27th at siesta time. When the troubles broke out in Port Francqui on the 28th, I was on the veranda of my room in the Hotel des Palmes and I noticed the commotion in the street below. Soon after 2 Congolese soldiers came up to my room and wanted to take me away but I told them I was a doctor and one of the Congolese soldiers remembered I had operated on his brother and permitted me to remain in my room in the hotel where I was joined by doctor Richards. Dr. Richards and I remained in my apartment overnight and the next day about 0800 hrs a jeep with a white flag and a Congolese soldier and someone in white suit arrived and took Dr. Richards away. I remained in the hotel until 1600 hrs, during this time I saw 4 Ghana soldiers in a room which had been prepared as a surgery, they were obviously hiding there and very frightened. About 1530 I phoned an employee of the Congolese hospital and told him I was in the hotel with 4 Ghana soldiers and asked him to assist us. Shortly after 3 or 4 Congolese arrived from the hospital and took my baggage and myself to the Congolese hospital. The Congolese who came to rescue me would not take the Ghana soldiers with them at the time as they were too frightened but after they took me to the hospital I saw the Ghana soldiers being taken to the military camp by Congolese soldiers and I later saw these same Ghana soldiers in Luluabourg so they were obviously saved.

I did not see any bodies after the incident either of European or Ghanaian personnel.

(Sgd) _____

L. Aleksandrowicz

The Board decided that the following should be included in the proceedings:-

- a. Port Francqui Incident - Summary of Events, Appendix 'I'
- b. Confirmatory notes of conference held by Col. C.F.O. Breeze at HQ 2 Inf Bde Luluabourg Appendix 'J'.

Appendix 'I'

PORT FRANCGUI INCIDENT - SUMMARY OF EVENTS27 Apr 61

1. Signal DTO 271210 from OC 'A' Coy 2 GHANA R giving details trouble with ANC and stating Coy "stood to" but sit "calm so far".
2. 272330 hrs 2 GHANA R received report from MWEKA that all UN troops PORT FRANCGUI disarmed.
3. CO 2 GHANA R consulted Bde Comd who approved Pl 2 GHANA R at MWEKA with Recce Det MWEKA move to PORT FRANCGUI to investigate, picking up Pl (less) at PEBEANGU. Comd also instructed further force of two pls from 2 GHANA R plus Bde HQ Def Pl under Capt 2 GHANA R move from LULU.

28 Apr 61

4. Force from LULU departed 0230 hrs.
5. MWEKA force ambushed approx 0800 hrs on arrival outskirts PORT FRANCGUI. Casualties one dead three wounded. ANC cas thought at least two dead. Force withdrew to PEBEANGU.
6. Comdt DEMOLE ANC LULU left for PORT FRANCGUI by AIR BROUSSF followed by CO 2 GHANA R in BEAVER.
7. CO 2 GHANA R found local ANC very agitated in spite of presence DEMOLE. He eventually secured release of 2/Lt SCOTT, Lt RICHARDS and Pte RENE LOUIS. Saw two GHANA OR dead. Was info GHANA Tps had been disarmed on 27 Apr 61 and that there had been shooting in their camp area since brush with further UN force on MWEKA road. Was not allowed to see GHANA Camp area. Returned with impression grave cas to be expected as a result reprisal shootings.
8. Early afternoon intense ANC activity in LULU preceded by usual total exodus to African towns of all Congolese civilians. ANC set up barrier at all entrances to LULU and sent three extra platoons to cover airport, with mortars and antiaircraft guns.
9. Evening conference with Major MULUMBA ANC. He expressed regret PORT FRANCGUI incident and behaviour ANC LULU. Explained behaviour due entirely to fear of arrival UN reinforcements and consequent UN reprisals. ANC troops did not in fact behave badly during this period and did not enter town centre or African township except for infrequent well behaved patrols.
10. MULUMBA returned later in the evening with news some GHANAIANS Soldiers returned from bush in PORT FRANCGUI and aval collection by air 29 Apr.

29 Apr 61

11. Force from LULU eventually reached PEBEANGU having been ambushed 282200 - 2300 at DOMIONGO by ANC presumably from MUSHENGE. Eight soldiers missing from this encounter.
12. Conference with ANC LULU am. As a result agreed return all eqpt, stores, arms, and vehs taken at PORT FRANCGUI. Asked PORT FRANCGUI be reoccupied by LIBERIANS as feared

- 2 -

reprisals if reoccupied by GHANAIS. Extra troops removed from LULU Airport and rd blocks raised. LULU calm restored.

13. Comdt DEMOLE returned with news 25 GHANAIS now awaiting evac in PORT FRANCQUI.
14. DC3 departed with ANC Offr and Lt DONKOR 2 GHANA R with bugler. Returned with 10 soldiers and list of further 30 awaiting evac.
15. Comdt BADU rep of ANC Chief of Staff LEO and Major BOUFFARD HQ ONUC arrived from LEO.

30 Apr 61

16. DC3 and OTTER brought out 30 GHANA ORs left from 30 Apr plus one extra who had arrived from bush.
17. Conf ANC 2000 hrs. Agreed joint visits 1 May 61 to DOMIONGO and BULONGO to ensure no interference move of PEBEANGO force to MWEKA. Hoped for further visit joint team to PORT FRANCQUI to arrange further search ground/air for still missing and return all arms vehs and eqpt.

Appendix 'I'

PORT FRANQCUI INCIDENT - SUMMARY OF EVENTS27 Apr 61

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CONFIRMATORY NOTES OF CONFERENCE HELD BY
COL. C.F.O. BREEZE AT HQ 2 INF BDE LULUABOURG
2 MAY 61.

Summary of Events

1. Own tps at PORT FRANCOU totalled 4 offrs and 89 ORs of A Coy 2 GHANA R. CONGOLESE consisted of the normal garrison of approx 100 Gendarmarie and 90 armed civil police. There were in addition approx 100 ANC who arrived 21-24 Apr as rfts to deal with tribal fighting and some 100 supposedly unarmed ANC waiting for barges to LEOPOLDVILLE.
2. For some days previous to the incident there had been friction between own tps and ANC over the Coy Comd's intention to take over the local Hotel just vacated by BCK tenants. On 26 Apr the sit worsened when ANC objected to the arrival of the KASAI Minister of Interior and Acting President under UN protection.
3. A Conference was held on 27 Apr when it appears the Minister also decided he did NOT now require UN protection. Coy Comd was manhandled when he investigated this.
4. The sit immediately worsened and a mixed mob of ANC, Police and armed civilians surrounded the main camp area which only contained approx 20 men over an area approx 200 yards by 60 yards and disarmed them as those at the western end were attempting to fall back and conc in the Coy Office Area. The same sort of thing happened at the Hotel where was the next largest det of about 20 and at the various static gds and rd blocks throughout the town. These gds varied from 1 man at the pump house to 1 and 7 at the Airstrip. The Officers and the SWEDISH MC team were beaten and locked up. The soldiers were left to themselves after being disarmed.
5. One soldier from a train gd escaped to PEBEANGU with news. As a result the 2 GHANA R pl and Recce Sqn det at MWEKA set off to investigate picking up enroute the half pl at PEBEANGU. They arrived at PORT FRANCOU about 0800 hrs 28 Apr where they were ambushed receiving cas of one killed three wounded. They appear to have killed two ANC. They then withdrew to PEBEANGU.
6. The ANC in PORT FRANCOU then appear to have opened fire on the unarmed GHANAIAI soldiers who took refuge in the bush. We have received one unconfirmed report that a party of 16 or 17 were rounded up and shot. Others were shot individually as discovered. Two British offrs a SWEDISH offr and SWEDISH CSM were almost certainly taken out and shot while one SWEDISH CSM escaped.
7. A further column of three pl str left LULU at 0230 28 Apr. They were ambushed at DOMIONGO about 2200 hrs presumably by ANC from MUSHENGE. Eight men were missing as a result of this encounter of which five have since been recovered.
8. Comdt DEMOLE arrived at PORT FRANCOU by Air Brusse about 1230 on 28 Apr. There seems to have been NO firing after this. Lt Col AFERI arrived about 1315 hrs. He saw two dead GHANAIAIS and collected two offrs incl the MO and one OR. He was NOT allowed to visit the camp area.
9. Since then the force at PEBEANGU has remained in SITU. Cas as at 0800 hrs 2 May are 41 missing, 2 dead and 2 offrs 1 OR missing presumed dead. An unconfirmed report states that a CONGOLESE civilian saw 30 bodies thrown into the river on the afternoon of 28 April. A total of 2 offrs and 54 OR have been recovered.

Herewith reports of the incident submitted by the
Chief of Staff, Armee Nationale Congolaise, and the Minister of
Interior, Kasai Province.

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMEE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE
STAFF

Leopoldville, 8 May 1961

No. 1033

Subject: Report of incidents between the Company
of Gendarmerie at Port Francqui and
United Nations troops

To: His Excellency the President of the Republic of the Congo
The Minister of National Defence
The Minister of Foreign Affairs

For Information: The Supreme Commander of the United
Nations Forces in the Congo

Your Excellencies,

I have the honour to submit a report of the incident that
took place at Port Francqui between the troops of the Armée Nationale
Congolaise and those of the Blue Helmets.

Chief of Staff

(signed) KIEMBE, M.
Lieutenant Colonel.

STATEMENT BY Company Sergeant-Major KAIJUNGA

Immediately following the arrival of the Minister of the Interior and the Commissaire of the District of Kasai, the pilots showed a paper to the Ghanaian captain, who was there as is usually done. While the captain read, the chief sergeant of the Post interrogated the strangers and these replied that one of them was the Minister and the other the Commissaire of the District. The sergeant then asked what the object of their voyage was. They replied that they had come in order to contact the ANC stationed at Port Francqui. The sergeant then replied: You are the Minister and the Comdistrict and you arrive here without any prior notice. Why is that? The Minister said: It is because we were in too much of a hurry. The sergeant told them: Wait until I have telephoned to the camp to have them come and fetch you in a car. While he was telephoning, the Ghanaian captain asked the strangers to get into his jeep and they left and the sergeant in turn notified the company sergeant-major that they had left without saying anything. The company sergeant-major immediately notified the A.T. and they both went to the hotel where the Ghanaians were housed. There they found the two arguing with the military of the ANC who had followed them. The A.T. asked who were these gentlemen, because he, too, did not know. They answered that one of them was the Minister and the other was the Comdistrict. Why did you come here without notifying us? asked the A.T. The answer was the same as before. Yes, said the A.T. and why are you under the protection of the United Nations? They answered that the Ghanaian captain told him that they are under his protection to prevent the ANC from killing us. The Comdistrict then immediately said that it was not possible to argue much and that you should know that if you continue to act as you do towards us, we will request another army to replace you because we do not have need of an army such as yours. The company sergeant-major asked him what would be the Army that you would have replace us? He answered that do you not see these people who are looking at you? He made a sign to the Ghanaian troops who were there. When the ANC military heard this, they became nervous and the discussion became increasingly animated. The A.T. told them that it was time to stop arguing because you are the authorities, he added. I will arrange for a house for you and you will leave the United Nations to where the ANC military will have a guard of honour, and they refused entirely saying that under no conditions could they leave the United Nations. On the other hand, they declared that they will return tomorrow to the territory for the conference. They agreed and each one went back to his place.

In the morning, the military authorities and the A.T. met in the territory and they sent a car to fetch them, and the car returned empty saying that they could under no conditions go to the territory and they requested the local authorities to join them at the hotel to discuss whatever they wanted. The A.T. and the company sergeant-major went to the hotel and asked them whether they had come to contact both the ANC and the United Nations; and why do you want us to have this contact at the seat of the United Nations and in the presence of other people? We must go to the territory, or else nothing will be done. If we must go to the territory, we must have a United Nations escort said the Ghanaian captain, otherwise the Minister and the Comdistrict will not leave the hotel. In view of difficult situation, the local authorities agreed to a squad of the United Nations commanded by the same captain and everyone went to the territory.

All authorities having come in to the conference, the captain took the jeep and left for SOCOPEPETROLE, where his second squad (original says "Pl"). A few minutes after they came back and he ordered the squad that was in the escort to take a defensive position. First sergeant Lotafe of the ANC entered the room and said: You are still arguing and you do not see what is going on outside? The Ghanaians are getting ready to attack you.

The company sergeant-major went out and found all the Ghanaians

in a position of defence. The company sergeant-major asked their chief, the captain, to withdraw his men, but the captain did not wish to do so and answered that he had received orders to protect the Minister and that was all. The company sergeant-major re-entered the room and asked the Minister to leave the Ghanaians before continuing their discussion. The Minister went out and asked the Ghanaians to follow him and they followed him to the hotel. The Minister returned to the conference after a few minutes and the same squad arrived and again took a defensive position. The first entered again and said that we do not wish to see the United Nations here any more, since we, the ANC, are here to insure the security of our authorities. The United Nations has no business here. Soon after the number of ANC military kept increasing. The A.T. left the room at the same time as the captain who asked the company sergeant-major in a threatening tone: What do you want? I would like your military to leave their position and go back to the hotel where they were. The A.T., furious, supported the decision of the company sergeant-major and the captain held the A.T. by the collar of his shirt telling him that it was he who brought discredit on the ANC military and that you may leave the room. When the BATSHIALAWO saw this, he also grabbed the captain by the collar of his shirt. Since they were unarmed, the Ghanaian sergeant-major said: Let us do nothing among ourselves because we are all blacks and it is not our business because these are English (white officers) who command us. It is they who endanger our lives. They want us Africans to fight between us. Even if they see us talking to you, they tell us not to keep contact with you because you are undisciplined. If you want to kill them you must kill them yourselves not us. When the company sergeant-major heard that he freed all the soldiers and black NCOs, leaving the European officers in the box. He confiscated all their arms. He placed a squad at the barrier, because he knew that the captain would have requested reinforcements either at Mweka or at Luluabourg. He gave the assignment that as soon as the enemy arrives, you will stop them without shooting and notify me immediately. An hour later the first armed vehicle from Mweka arrived at the barrier. The ANC gives him the sign to stop and it stopped. An ANC soldier approached to see who they were, but he saw no one, because they were inside and everything was closed and he said that I saw no one, and just at the moment when the soldier was giving the message, the second armoured vehicle arrived, made a half turn and opened fire. Immediately five trucks arrived, the men descended and immediately started to shoot. A concentrated fire was directed on the ANC, and the ANC responded to the fire. Two men of the ANC were killed, they were sergeant-major ZANGAPAI and corporal BAYENGA-MWIZI. The Ghanaians then were pushed back and the company sergeant-major ordered a cease-fire and then controlled his troops. Result: two dead and three missing. After the exchange of fire, the captain, wanting to turn around to see who had grabbed him, his shirt tore and he said: Sergeant, we have immediate business. However, the lieutenant, assistant chief of the Ghanaians, started to change the position of his men in order to open fire. The company sergeant-major was in his shirt sleeves and gave the command over to his second-in-command sergeant MWAMBA, requesting him not to open fire before the Ghanaians did so. The company sergeant-major left for the camp and alerted his entire company and then placed it in position giving the order not to open fire until the United Nations did so. Returning to the territory, the company sergeant-major found his second-in-command and the latter told him that I have pacified everything and everybody has gone back to their billets. Yes, but I want to send a patrol at any cost to see if everything is peaceful. He appointed sergeant-major MBETO and several men in a jeep. The patrol, after having made several rounds, arrived at the SOCOPEPETROLE, where the Ghanaian captain had gone to at the start of the conference. They were all in position and when they saw the ANC jeep they started to shoot, sending two volleys. After three minutes the sergeant returned quickly to notify his chief that two rounds had been

discharged at him. It is then that the company sergeant-major angered gave his company the order to disarm the troops of the United Nations stationed at Port Francqui. One section, that remained at SOCOPEPETROLE, seeing the approaching ANC who came to disarm them, also fired one volley and the combat sergeant-major shouted in a loud voice: Do not shoot my men, we will disarm this section. In this confusion they were all disarmed and arrested.

When the military who were in the camp heard the firing, and in order to avoid being attacked from the rear, they started to attack all the Ghanaians who were disarmed and imprisoned. All fled into the forest. After the attack the combat sergeant-major picked up seven Ghanaian dead including one captain and two lieutenants. Two who fled were then taken to the combat sergeant-major who gave them food and drink. One day later the missing started to come out of the forest. Up to now and officially forty-six men plus three Europeans have been accounted for. According to the combat sergeant-major he does not know whether there are any more in the forest.

STATEMENT BY Major BADU ENVOY OF THE CHIEF EM

He declares, I think, according to the information received the cause of this incident was the arrival of the Minister and the Comdistrict at Port Francqui. If they had notified the ANC military of their arrival, or had they spent the night as the A.T. had advised them, nothing of this would have happened. It is therefore these two authorities who are responsible for the bloody incident at Port Francqui. When I toured the villages where the troops were located, I picked up three Ghanaians in the bush, three Ghanaians were brought to me by Lieutenant PIBWE. He had guarded them as prisoners. One Ghanaian was brought to me at Port Francqui by a villager.

The summary up to now is	45
	+ 6
	+ <u>3</u> Europeans
Total	54 men recovered.

STATEMENT OF CORPORAL TSHIBANGA A.

I was located at barrier No. 1 when the first armoured car arrived. The villagers warned us to be careful because the Ghanaians were arriving. They had two armoured cars and five trucks. At 0815 hours two armoured cars arrived and each placed itself on one side of the road. I approached him and asked him to come down. He refused bluntly and their European officer fired two volleys from the machine gun. We threw ourselves down and crawled to the forest. Then the NCO in charge of the squad gave us the order to fire and it is then that the serious attack took place from 0815 to 0905 hours, the time when they scattered. On the spot after the attack I saw Ghanaians and Congolese. The squad was commanded by sergeant MWAMBA.

MWEKA. DECLARATION OF SERGEANT-MAJOR MASONGIYA AND OF THE A.T.

Here we have had no disorder. We saw the troops that were here leave and did not know where they were going. We received a telephone call saying that there was an attack at Port Francqui and we barred all the roads as well as the flying field. The six Ghanaians who remained are still there with their arms. Nobody touched them. They live as usual and the accountant of the territory NGOLOSHAMBA, Pierre states the same.

DOMIONGO. DECLARATION OF LIEUTENANT PIBWE.

My assignment was to block the passage between Mweka and Port Francqui. One day the Ghanaian patrol tried to go through our block to go to Mweka. They opened fire on us and we returned their invitation and after the attack we picked up one dead, a Ghanaian officer, and we took three prisoners who are now at our Staff in Musenge. They are all in good health. Having learned that the Ghanaians came from Port Francqui to go to Mweka and that they had been at PEMBEYANGO and that they were afraid of us or of our block we delegated two military men in civilian clothes to tell them that we had ceased firing.

BADU I arrived at PEMBEYANGO to interrogate them and the Ghanaians told me that they had received a letter and that the carriers of the letter had already gone back.

This is the report of the incident at Port Francqui between our troops and the United Nations.

(Signed) KIEMBE, M.
Lieutenant Colonel
Chief of Staff of the ANC

MINISTER OF INTERIOR'S REPORT
ON HIS OFFICIAL TRIP TO PORT - FRANQUI

Copies to:

- Head of State of Central Kasai
- Minister of Justice
- ONU Representative
- Commandant de Moulet (Démolé)
- Major MULAMBA
- President of National Assembly

Luluabourg.

The 26th of April 1961 at 2.00 in the afternoon, We Athanase KENGELE, Minister of Interior, have boarded a United Nations helicopter for Port-Francqui. The voyage being official, the Port-Francqui Administrator as well as the UN Officer there were informed.

Accompanied by MULAMBA Edmond, C.D. D.A. of Kasai, at present in Luluabourg, we arrived at the airfield of Port-Francqui where we noticed the presence of UN Officers and five soldiers of the National Army. They saluted us with much discipline and a UN Officer took us in a vehicle to Hotel Palme. Adjutant MUAMBA and some soldiers of the National Army came to take us to their camp. The time fixed for this was 7.00 p.m. They went to their camp to prepare our lodging.

It was 7.00 p.m.; no-one came; we waited impatiently until 10.30 p.m. Being tired, we went to bed. At 11.00 p.m. Adjutant MUAMBA, accompanied by some soldiers, came to fetch us; but as it was late, we told them to go back and they agreed.

On the morning of April 27, the Administrator and a group of Congolese came to take us from the Hotel to the "Territoire". The above mentioned introduced us to his personnel. We entered his office and I asked him what was wrong. M. MULUMBA Edmond, as special secretary, took note of his remarks. A few minutes later, a white UN Officer engaged in a discussion with a soldier of the National Army; this concerned the fact that the ANC soldiers were not happy about the presence of white officers in the "Territoire". Previously, these latter used to drive them away from the Hotel. I came out and told them to be quiet and they listened to me. Another Officer came and engaged in a similar discussion with the ANC soldiers; the attitude of these latter to the others was no better. I retired to the Complice to rest whilst giving order to all the soldiers to go away.

Ten minutes later, I heard a shot from Hotel Palme. When the ANC soldiers heard that, they took me and MULAMBA to their camp and, to tell the truth, not to JAIL. They went to the spot from which the explosion came and it proved to be a white officer who had shot at an ANC soldier but unsuccessfully.

To avoid lengthy discussions, those of the National Army asked their UN friends to drop their arms without resisting. These latter laid down their arms; on the spot all UN Officers were arrested except for two doctors. Among those arrested, some were wounded and taken to hospital for immediate care.

On April 28, 1961, about 10.00 a.m., a shot was heard from the direction of Mwaka; we could not distinguish what it was. A little later, shots were repeated everywhere. A National Army soldier

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came to tell me that UN troops coming from Mweka had fired on them killing a sergeant and a corporal and that they had fired back.

Commandant de MOULET (Démolé) and a UN Colonel arrived. A sergeant came to take us, MULAMBA and me and a white UN Officer from whom I had been separated at the time of the murder, and we went to the camp.

When we arrived, the ANC soldiers, not being able to bear the presence of this white UN Officer, put us in JAIL for 15 minutes, but Commandant de MOULET (Démolé) let us out to go and see with him what had exactly happened.

With my own eyes, I saw four corpses; two of the ANC and two Ghanaians.

After investigation, Commandant de MOULET (Démolé) left us there to spend the night.

On April 29, 1961, an "AIR BROUSSE" plane came at 9.30 a.m. to take us to Luluabourg.

I swear on my honor that I do not know the number of Ghanaians killed.

Port-Francqui, April 29, 1961

Minister of Interior,

A. KENGLE

The Board having studied these reports consider that nothing of value would be gained by obtaining further statements from Congolese sources.

The Board considered proceeding to Port Francqui to make investigations on the spot. After consultation with the Chief of Staff and Chief of Military Information, the Board decided that a visit to Port Francqui would be unwise as it was likely to cause tension and create new incidents, as it would be impossible to make the local authorities understand the reason for the Board's visit. Also a visit there could cause trouble to the Liberian troops now stationed there.

In view of the above and as enough evidence has been produced, the Board decided not to visit Port Francqui.

A sketch of Port-Francqui is submitted to the Board (see Appendix 'K').


The way the officers took from BCK hospital to the road block is marked with a red line.

Appendix 'K'

Annex 5 to
Report ONUC HQ
3 May 61

- | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|
| A | - | Harbour |
| B | - | Hotel |
| C | - | Officers Mess |
| D | - | HQ |
| E | - | Portuguese Bar |
| F | - | Petrol Depot |
| G | - | ANC Camp |
| H | - | Congolese Hospital |
| J | - | Airfield |
| K | - | BCK Hospital |
| L | - | Roadblock |
| M | - | Ghana Canteen |
| N | - | Sergeants Mess |
| O | - | Ghana Soldiers |
| P | - | Ghana Houses |

Note: Sketch not to scale



FINDINGS OF THE BOARD

1. Port Francqui in Kasai Province close to the border of Leopoldville Province and on the Kasai river, is an important centre in the Congo transportation system. Port Francqui is the terminus of the railway Bas Congo Katanga (BCK) which runs to Elizabethville in Katanga and is the point at which traffic is transferred from barges on the Congo-Kasai river systems to rail for onward transportation. Outside of air transportation it is the only transportation system of any importance between Leopoldville and Elizabethville. It is therefore most important to have UN troops stationed at Port Francqui to maintain order and security and to supervise the movement of UN freight and food relief to the famine districts in South Kasai.

2. At the time of the incidents, one Coy of 2 Ghana Regiment, which totalled 4 officers and 89 other ranks and a UN Movement Control Team consisting of one Swedish officer and 2 Swedish warrant officers were stationed at Port Francqui. The commanding officer of the Ghana troops was Capt. T.G. Ralph and the second in command was Lt. A.P.G. Brown. The Chief of the Movement Control at Port Francqui was Lt. C.W. Bottiger and his assistants were warrant officers L.H. Liedgen and E. Aberg. The Ghana troops were deployed at various locations in the town with about 20 soldiers guarding the Headquarters, about 20 soldiers at the Hotel des Palmes, and other parties guarding the pump house, Socopetrole, the power house, the docks and the airfield. The Congolese troops consisted of one garrison of about 100 ANC and gendarmes and 90 armed civil police. In addition at this time there were also another 100 ANC in Port Francqui ostensibly on a special mission to deal with tribal fighting in the area. There were also about 100 unarmed ANC soldiers in transit at Port Francqui enroute to Leopoldville.

3. The relation between the ANC, gendarmerie and police and Congolese civilians on one side and the UN personnel on the other was before the incident much the same as in other parts of the Congo and there appeared to be no special tension. Reasonable cooperation appeared to have been established between the ANC and the UN force. Friction first arose when UN took over the hotel and closed the bar to ANC personnel and civilians but this did not seem to have caused any serious change in relations. The display of the BCK flag from one of the balconies of the hotel also excited the ANC soldiers, but it also does not seem to have been a major factor in the events that followed. The event which seemed to provide the spark which led to the killing of UN personnel on the 28th April 1961, was the arrival in Port Francqui on 26th April, without prior notice, of two Congolese officials, the Minister of the Interior and the Commissaire of the District of Kasai, and their subsequent demand for UN protection.

4. The following course of events has been established: Two Congolese Ministers arrived at approximately 1600 hrs on Wednesday the 26th April and at their request were given UN protection. This angered the local ANC who had not officially been given prior warning that they were coming. From some unofficial source however they had had news of the impending visit and as the result had erected a road block between the Airfield and the town. The Ministers with UN escort avoided the road block by taking another route and proceeded to the Hotel des Palmes. Soon after their arrival approximately 20 ANC approached the hotel which was guarded by about the same number of Ghanaian soldiers. Some representatives of the ANC were permitted to enter the hotel to have discussions with the Ministers. Apparently they tried to persuade them to come under ANC protection and come to the ANC camp. The Ministers however preferred to remain in the hotel and the ANC departed. At that time the BCK

- 2 -

house flag was hanging on the balcony of the hotel. This for some reason apparently annoyed the ANC. Next morning, Thursday the 27th April, ANC began to disarm the Ghanaian soldiers, commencing with those stationed at the Ghana HQ. Hearing the noise of shouting, Capt. Ralph and Lt. Brown left the hotel in a vehicle to investigate. They were stopped and arrested by the ANC on the way. Shortly after another party of ANC went to the hotel and arrested Lt. Bottiger, W/O Liedgen and Aberg and the Ghana medical officer Lt. Richards. The latter was released when he told the ANC he was a doctor. In the hotel an ANC officer tried to protect the Swedes but the ANC did not obey him and brought them outside and put them into a vehicle. Before entering the vehicle Lt. Bottiger was struck over the right eye with a rifle butt. They were then driven to a house to which Capt. Ralph and Lt. Brown had already been taken. Capt. Ralph had a wound on the top of his head and was bleeding. Lt. Brown also had received a blow on the forehead. Bottiger was lying on the floor semi-conscious, Aberg who had not been hit fainted and hit his head on the floor. All of them were taken for medical treatment to the BCK hospital. On the evening of the 27th April, information was received at MWEKA, that Ghana troops in PORT FRANCQUI had been disarmed. Acting on this information HQ Ghana Bde LULUABOURG, sent re-enforcements by road to PORT FRANCQUI. On the morning of Friday the 28th April, the Ghanaian re-enforcement party reached the outskirts of PORT FRANCQUI, where they were involved in a clash with ANC who had established a road block. As the result of this clash Ghanaian troops sustained one killed and three wounded and probably two ANC were killed. As the result of the clash other ANC in PORT FRANCQUI began to shoot all Ghanaian soldiers in the town who had already been arrested and disarmed. Many Ghanaian soldiers were killed. Some however managed to escape to the bush. While this murder was taking place four or five ANC went to the BCK hospital and again arrested Capt. Ralph, Lt. Brown, Lt. Bottiger and W/O Aberg and took them from the hospital. Outside the hospital Lt. Bottiger again received a severe blow on his head which bled profusely. The party were taken to a place close to a road block approximately 200-300 metres away. Lt. Bottiger could walk at first but after a short distance he had to be assisted. The party were halted and they were tied together by their left hands with a length of rope between each of them. W/O Aberg on the left then Capt. Ralph, Lt. Bottiger and Lt. Brown. As they moved off again W/O Liedgen with one ANC joined them. W/O Liedgen was not tied. They arrived at a place just off the road near a road block, and were put in a line with W/O Liedgen on the left. A civil policeman was standing in front with the ANC to the side and rear. W/O Liedgen was told to walk along a path which led into high grass. As the policeman aimed his rifle W/O Liedgen turned and shouted 'don't shoot'. He then proceeded and the policeman fired one shot at W/O Liedgen who was then out of view of Aberg but he heard him cry out. W/O Aberg was at this time told to untie himself. When he saw that the policeman was loading his rifle he took his chance and fled. As he ran he heard a second shot towards W/O Liedgen. W/O Aberg could not see W/O Liedgen so he cannot say whether he was killed. He continued to run and so could not give any more evidence as to the fate of the rest of the party.

5. The Board approves the findings and the opinion of the Ghana Board of Enquiry of the 17th May 1961 concerning killed and presumed killed, Ghanaian military personnel as shown on pages 27 & 28.

6. Concerning the fate of Lt. Bottiger and W/O Liedgen the board is of the following opinion: Both 2/Lt Bottiger, Carl Wilhelm and W/O 3 5-20-53 Liedgen, Lars Thorsten, are missing presumed killed whilst on duty with the United Nations Forces.

In both cases the presumption of death is exceedingly strong since a witness saw two shots fired at short range at W/O Liedgen and there is little doubt Lt. Bottiger who probably already had a fractured skull was treated likewise. The fact that it is now 85 days since the event and no trace of either has been found, leaves no alternate to the presumption of death, on the 28th April 1961 in both cases.

7. Beginning on Saturday the 29th April, careful searches were carried out for several days with patrols and buglers and several Ghanaian soldiers were found. Reconnaissance was also carried out by air by planes distinctly marked with UN in capital letters during the days immediately following the incident. The bodies of two Ghanaian soldiers were found at Port Francqui. The fact that no trace was found of the bodies of the personnel still missing can be attributed to the bodies being disposed of by the Congolese probably by being thrown into the river. It is not considered that any further search would be likely to result in locating any of the missing personnel or their bodies.

8. The Board cannot establish particulars of people wounded or injured or the nature and extent of their wounds and injuries. Nor can the Board establish more concerning casualties sustained by the ANC and or Congolese civilians or the cause of such casualties other than those inflicted during the clash in the morning of the 28th April at the outskirts of Port Francqui when 2 ANC soldiers were killed.

9. As far as damage or loss to equipment and stores held by the Ghanaian troops is concerned, the Board agrees with the findings and opinion of the Ghanaian Board of Enquiry. As far as damage and loss to equipment and stores held by the Swedish personnel is concerned, these are listed at Appendix 'L'. The Board recommends that the damaged UN equipment, and stores should be written off. The Board also recommends that the United Nations Organization be invited to reimburse Swedish Government and the personnel concerned for the loss of unit and personal property.

10. As has already been stated, the main cause which initiated the events was the arrival, without prior notice to the local Congolese Authorities, of the two Congolese officials, the Minister of Interior and the Commissaire of the District of Kasai on Wednesday the 26th April and their demand for UN protection. The basic reason that such terrible events could follow such a seemingly small cause for friction was the lack of discipline among ANC, to such a degree that their officers and NCOS (non commissioned officers) had no control and they were in fact an armed mob.

(Sgd) _____
(H.W.C. STETHEM) COLONEL (Signature)
PRESIDENT

(Sgd) _____
(R.F. MORGAN) MAJOR

(Sgd) _____
(B. LINDEBLAD) MAJOR

MEMBERS

Signed at
LEOPOLDVILLE CONGO
this twentysecond day of
July 1961

Appendix 'L'

Loss of UN Equipment, held by Movement Control Team
Port Francqui.

One typewriter, Olivetti Lexikon 80
machine No. 2783808

One spare wheel of Jeep Willys
4 x 4, Plate No. 2262

UN beret blue	3
UN cap blue	3
UN helmet plastic	3
UN helmet	3
UN scarf	3
Indian uniform pairs	6

Appendix 'L'

Loss of Swedish Unit Equipment held by Serg. 2533-1-50
Aberg Egon Arne Leopold.

		<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Price each</u> <u>Sw.cron.</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Sw.cron.</u>
Trousers, short, khaki	pairs	2	14:35	28:70
" long "	"	2	19:-	38:-
" " m/39	"	1	52:-	52:-
light material				
Belt, plastic w. buckle		1	3:50	3:50
" with buckle		1	3:-	3:-
Towels		2	2:75	5:50
Padlock		2	1:-	2:-
Extra sole	pair	1	0:40	0:40
Coat, tropical, khaki		2	33:-	66:-
Drawers, short	pairs	3	3:50	10:50
Map case		1	8:-	8:-
Trunk (off. and NCO) big		1	70:-	70:-
Cap m/39, diagonal		1	7:25	7:25
Kitbag		1	7:87	7:87
Pyjamas:				
Trousers	pairs	2	7:-	14:-
Jacket		2	9:-	18:-
Coat, tunic m/39 light				
material		1	102:-	102:-
Shirts m/52		1	13:-	13:-
" khaki, long sleeves		3	18:25	54:75
"		2	16:35	32:70
Light boots, UN	pair	1	36:-	36:-
Shoes, black	"	2	39:-	78:-
Neck tie m/39		2	2:25	4:50
Sun glasses w. case	pair	1	23:-	23:-
Stockings	pairs	3	4:-	12:-
" 3/4 long	"	4	5:-	20:-
Socks	"	3	2:50	7:50
Jersey, sport		2	2:50	5:-
Overcoat m/51		1	101:-	101:-
National badge		3	0:45	1:35
Service insignia		2	1:30	2:60
				<u>828:12</u>

Appendix 'L'

Loss of Swedish Equipment held by 2/Lt 28-09-09

Bottiger Carl W.

		<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Price each</u> <u>Sw.cron.</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Sw. cron.</u>
Extra soles, plastic		2	0:40	0:80
Drawers		3	3:50	10:50
Boots	pairs	2	38:-	76:-
Handkerchiefs		4	0:35	1:40
Pyjamas		2	16:-	32:-
Stockings	pairs	4	4:-	16:-
Towels		4	3:90	15:60
Auditory protection		1	0:50	0:50
Chains to ID plate		1	0:30	0:30
Eating implements		1	3:-	3:-
Kitbag		1	7:25	7:25
Kigbag with padlock		1	17:10	17:10
Sewing materials		1	3:50	3:50
Plates		2	1:75	3:50
Belt w. buckle		1	3:-	3:-
Belt m/52		1	4:-	4:-
Low shoes	pair	1	39:-	39:-
Long trousers m/39	"	1	52:-	52:-
Caps m/39		1	7:25	7:25
Socks	pairs	3	2:80	8:40
Shirts m/52		2	13:-	26:-
Neck tie m/39		2	2:25	4:50
Neck tie holder m/52		1	0:20	0:20
Coat tunic m/52		1	102:-	102:-
Overcoat m/51		1	101:-	101:-
Gym trousers	pairs	2	3:50	7:-
Gym Shoes	"	2	5:50	11:-
Gym Sweater		2	2:50	5:-
Shoulderstrap, uniform	"	2	1:70	3:40
Shoulderstrap, shirt	"	2	0:06	0:12
Belts for off. and NCO		1	18:-	18:-
Swimming short		1	3:50	3:50
Trousers, khaki	pair	1	18:50	18:50
Coat, tropical		1	33:-	33:-
Belt m/39		1	3:-	3:-
1 Pistol m/40 No. 4998		1	240:50	240:50
				<hr/> 877:82

Appendix 'L'

Loss of Swedish Unit Equipment held by Serg. 5-20-53
Liedgen Lars Torsten.

		<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Price each</u> <u>Sw.cron.</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Sw.cron.</u>
Trousers, short, khaki	pairs	2	14:35	28:70
" long "	"	2	19:-	38:-
" long, light material m/39	pair	1	52:-	52:-
Belt, plastic w. buckle		1	3:50	3:50
" with buckle		1	3:-	3:-
Towels		2	2:75	5:50
Padlock		2	1:-	2:-
Extra sole	pair	1	0:40	0:40
Coat, tropical, khaki		2	33:-	66:-
Drawers, short	pairs	3	3:50	10:50
Map case		1	8:-	8:-
Trunk (off. and NCO) big		1	70:-	70:-
Cap m/39, diagonal		1	7:25	7:25
Kitbag		1	7:87	7:87
Pyjamas:				
Trousers	pairs	2	7:-	14:-
Jacket		2	9:-	18:-
Coat, tunic m/39 light material		1	102:-	102:-
Shirts m/52		1	13:-	13:-
" khaki, long sleeves		3	18:25	54:75
"		2	16:35	32:70
Light boots, UN	pair	1	36:-	36:-
Shoes, black	pairs	2	39:-	78:-
Neck tie m/39		2	2:25	4:50
Sun glasses w. case	pair	1	23:-	23:-
Stockings	pairs	3	4:-	12:-
" 3/4 long	"	4	5:-	20:-
Socks	"	3	2:50	7:50
Jersey, sport		2	2:50	5:-
Overcoat m/51		1	101:-	101:-
National badge		3	0:45	1:35
Service insignia		2	1:30	2:60
Pistol m/70 No. 28202		1	240:50	240:50
				<u>1078:62</u>

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Flutta S. Morris



1. Liedgren and the way he took
2. Aberg and the way he took
3. Ralph
4. Backtign
5. Brown
6. Policemen who shot at Liedgren
7. ANC-soldiers