

[2 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1002

BOX 183

FILE 5

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FROM : A/COS *[Signature]* 3000.10(OPS)
TO : MILITARY & CIV PERSONNEL
INFO : SRSG
MA TO FC
MA TO DFC
SUBJECT : MORNING BRIEFING FOR
TUESDAY 07 NOV 95

- 1. All are informed that above briefing will not come on rather there will be FC's briefing to the UNA - USA visiting team from 0800 - 0830 hrs same day.
- 2. All are to note.

DFC's OFFICE

SEEN STAMP

APPT	SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
DFC	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Date]</i>	
MA			
ADC			
CC			

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THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY (NRA)

1. (U) UGANDA'S NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY (NRA) HAD ITS GENESIS IN THE GUERRILLA FORCE WHICH TOOK POWER IN UGANDA IN 1986 UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF YOWERI MUSEVENI, WHO LATER BECAME THE COUNTRY'S PRESIDENT. IN FIGHTING WHICH CONTINUED UNTIL 1993, THE NRA FOUGHT AGAINST AND DEFEATED SEVERAL OTHER RIVAL INSURGENT MOVEMENTS IN A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO STABILIZE THE COUNTRY. SINCE THEN THE NRA HAS BEEN IN THE PROCESS OF DOWNSIZING AND RESTRUCTURING. TODAY, ONLY ABOUT 20 PERCENT REMAIN FROM THE ORIGINAL NRA. THE REMAINDER ARE MOSTLY FORMER SOLDIERS FROM DEFEATED RIVAL INSURGENT GROUPS WHICH ACCEPTED A GOVERNMENT OFFER OF AMNESTY AND AN INVITATION TO JOIN THE NRA. THERE IS NO RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE NRA, BUT PARAMILITARY FORCES ARE OFTEN USED TO REINFORCE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. THE ROLE OF THE NRA IS TO MAINTAIN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF UGANDA AND TO ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY.
2. (C) THE NRA TOTALS ABOUT 51,000 PERSONNEL, AND COMPRISES GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS. THESE FORCES ARE AUGMENTED BY AN 800-MEMBER PARAMILITARY FORCE CALLED THE POLICE GENERAL SERVICE UNIT.
3. (C) THE ARMY IS THE LARGEST COMPONENT IN THE NRA WITH APPROXIMATELY 50,000 PERSONNEL. IT IS COMPOSED OF FOUR DIVISIONS. EACH DIVISION IS COMPRISED OF THREE BRIGADES OF THREE BATTALIONS EACH. THERE IS ALSO AN ARTILLERY REGIMENT AND A MECHANIZED REGIMENT. THE ARMY ALSO PROVIDES A 1000-MEMBER ELITE PROTECTION UNIT TO SAFEGUARD THE PRESIDENT. MOST OF THE ARMY'S EQUIPMENT IS SUPPLIED BY NORTH KOREA, LIBYA OR THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. AMONG ITS KEY EQUIPMENTS ARE 53 TANKS AND 46 ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS.
4. (C) THE NAVAL COMPONENT IS ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 400 PERSONNEL LOCATED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON LAKE VICTORIA. IT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANTI-SMUGGLING OPERATIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION. MAJOR EQUIPMENTS INCLUDE TWELVE PATROL BOATS FROM YUGOSLAVIA.
5. (C) THE 800-STRONG AIR COMPONENT IS ALMOST ENTIRELY EQUIPPED WITH HELICOPTERS. THERE MAY BE A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF OLDER GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT BUT THESE MAY NO LONGER BE OPERABLE. TWO FIXED-WING LIGHT AIRCRAFT PROVIDE THE NRA WITH LIMITED TRANSPORT CAPABILITY.

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6. (C) NRA OPERATIONAL READINESS IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY DEFICIENCIES IN SEVERAL AREAS INCLUDING FUNDING, EQUIPMENT INVENTORY AND SERVICEABILITY, TRAINING, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL. OVERALL CAPABILITY TO TRANSPORT FORCES OVER GROUND OR BY AIR IS MINIMAL. THESE DEFICIENCIES COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH LOW LEVEL INSURGENCY ACTIVITY ONGOING IN NORTHERN UGANDA ALONG ITS BORDER WITH SUDAN. FURTHERMORE, THE NRA HAS ONLY A MARGINAL CAPABILITY TO PROJECT MILITARY FORCE BEYOND ITS BORDERS.

7. (U) IN A WARNING DIRECTED TOWARDS THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THE FORMER RWANDAN REGIME, PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS PLEDGED MILITARY SUPPORT TO RWANDA'S GOVERNMENT. MGEN KAGAME, RWANDA'S VICE PRESIDENT AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AND 4000 OF THE ORIGINAL RPA WERE MEMBERS OF THE NRA AND FOUGHT FOR MUSEVENI. IT WAS FROM BASES INSIDE UGANDA THAT THE RPA WAGED AN INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FORMER RWANDESE GOVERNMENT. UGANDA HAS SHARPLY CRITICIZED KENYA'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO OPERATE IN THAT COUNTRY.

8. (U) UNAMIR G2 COMMENT. THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE FORGED A UNIQUE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN UGANDA AND RWANDA. IN FACT, UGANDA'S INFLUENCE CAN BE SEEN IN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVE TO REHABILITATE EX-FAR SOLDIERS, WHICH CAN BE COMPARED TO THE NRA'S AMNESTY PROGRAMME FOR REBEL SOLDIERS. RWANDA SORELY NEEDS SPONSORS TO BOTH DEFEND AND PROMOTE ITS INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THE NRA CANNOT RISK BECOMING INVOLVED IN A WAR BETWEEN RWANDANS. RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES ARE JUST TOO LIMITED. MOREOVER, REBEL FORCES IN THE NORTH WOULD BE QUICK TO SEIZE UPON ANY OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY A SOUTHWARD SHIFT OF UGANDAN ARMY TROOPS. IF PUT TO THE TEST, UGANDA'S PLEDGE OF MILITARY SUPPORT MAY SIMPLY TURN OUT TO BE A PAPER TIGER.