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As promised.

Un abrazo

*Luciano**Wry FC
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PRESS RELEASE

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

**USUN PRESS RELEASE #74-(94)
MAY 6, 1994**

**THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY
ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Clinton Administration's Policy on
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations

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Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. This policy review has resulted in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). The President signed this directive, following the completion of extensive consultations with Members of Congress. This paper summarizes the key elements of that directive.

As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review", the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces remains to be prepared to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping can be one useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose direct threats to our national security. Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth.

The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and improvement:

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support -- both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops.
 - To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations, with the most stringent applying to U.S. participation in missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.
2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves.
 - To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and proposes a number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN peace operations.
3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations.
 - The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However, as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves

American security interests, just as American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War, including in Operation Desert Storm.

- The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less like it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.

4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations.

- The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace operations and directs U.S. support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and command and control capabilities.

5. Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations.

- The policy directive creates a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the Department of Defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve U.S. combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are involved. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant military component.
- The State Department will retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York.

6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peace operations.

- The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President believes U.S. support for and participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term with the bipartisan support of Congress and the American people.

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Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations

Introduction: The Role of Peace Operations¹ in U.S. Foreign Policy

Serious threats to the security of the United States still exist in the post-Cold War era. New threats will emerge. The United States remains committed to meeting such threats.

When our interests dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and win wars, unilaterally whenever necessary. To do so, we must create the required capabilities and maintain them ready to use. UN peace operations cannot substitute for this requirement.

Circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the UN can be an important instrument for collective action. UN peace operations can also provide a "force multiplier" in our efforts to promote peace and stability.

During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to multilateral peace operations only in the few cases when the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. In the new strategic environment such operations can serve more often as a cost-effective tool to advance American as well as collective interests in maintaining peace in key regions and create global burden-sharing for peace.

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which could spill across international borders) and the collapse of governmental authority in some states are among the current threats to peace. While many of these conflicts may not directly threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is significant. The UN has sought to play a constructive role in such situations by mediating disputes and obtaining agreement to cease-fires and political settlements. Where such agreements have been reached, the interposition of neutral forces under UN auspices has, in many cases, helped facilitate lasting peace.

UN peace operations have served important U.S. national interests. In Cambodia, UN efforts led to an election protected by peacekeepers, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and the end of a destabilizing regional conflict. In El Salvador, the UN sponsored elections and is helping to end a long and bitter civil war. The UN's supervision of Namibia's transition to independence removed a potential source of conflict in strategic southern Africa and promoted democracy. The UN in

¹For simplicity, the term peace operations is used in this document to mean the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts.

Cyprus has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO allies. Peacekeeping on the Golan Heights has helped preserve peace between Israel and Syria. In Former Yugoslavia, the UN has provided badly-needed humanitarian assistance and helped prevent the conflict from spreading to other parts of the region. UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq, coupled with the peacekeeping operation on the Kuwait border, are constraining Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors.

Need for Reform

While serving U.S. interests, UN peace operations continue to require improvement and reform. Currently, each operation is created and managed separately, and economies of scale are lost. Likewise, further organizational changes at UN Headquarters would improve efficiency and effectiveness. A fully independent office of Inspector General should be established immediately. The U.S. assessment rate should be reduced to 25%.

Since it is in our interest at times to support UN peace operations, it is also in our interest to seek to strengthen UN peacekeeping capabilities and to make operations less expensive and peacekeeping management more accountable. Similarly, it is in our interest to identify clearly and quickly those peace operations we will support and those we will not. Our policy establishes clear guidelines for making such decisions.

Role in U.S. Foreign Policy

UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support. Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.

While the President never relinquishes command of U.S. forces, the participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations can, in particular circumstances, serve U.S. interests. First, U.S. military participation may, at times, be necessary to persuade others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests. Second, U.S. participation may be one way to exercise U.S. influence over an important UN mission, without unilaterally bearing the burden. Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose to provide unique capabilities to important operations that other countries cannot.

In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving U.S. objectives. If U.S. participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom Up Review), we would place our national interest uppermost. The U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our most significant interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations must,

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therefore, be placed in proper perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

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The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in UN operations. We will provide information about U.S. capabilities for data bases and planning purposes.

It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations. Instead, this policy, which builds upon work begun by previous administrations and is informed by the concerns of the Congress and our experience in recent peace operations, aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective. Congress must also be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping.

* * * *

I. Supporting the Right Peace Operations

1. Voting for Peace Operations

The U.S. will support well-defined peace operations, generally, as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives, an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a firm budget estimate. The U.S. will continue to urge the UN Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous, standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations.

The Administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation:

- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
 - International aggression, or;
 - Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence;
 - Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.

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- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 8
- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.
- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.

In addition, using the factors above, the U.S. will continue to scrutinize closely all existing peace operations when they come up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In appropriate cases, the U.S. will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the costs of certain UN operations. The U.S. will also consider voting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions.

ii. Participating in UN and Other Peace Operations

The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given peace operation. In addition to the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:

- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;

- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshalled;
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

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Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:

- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.

Any recommendation to the President will be based on the cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.

II. The Role of Regional Organizations

In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peacekeeping capabilities.

When regional organizations or groupings seek to conduct peacekeeping with UNSC endorsement, U.S. support will be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria, including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewal mandates.

With respect to the question of peacekeeping in the territory of the former Soviet Union, requests for "traditional" UN blue-helmeted operations will be considered on the same basis as other requests, using the factors previously outlined (e.g., a threat to international peace and security, clear objectives, etc.). U.S. support for these operations will, as with other such requests, be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and established UNSC criteria.

III. Reducing Costs

Although peacekeeping can be a good investment for the U.S., it would be better and more sustainable if it cost less. The Administration is committed to reducing the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs to 25% by January 1, 1996, down from the current rate of 31.7%. We will also inform the UN of Congress's likely refusal to fund U.S. peacekeeping assessments at a rate higher than 25% after Fiscal Year 1995.

The Administration remains concerned that the UN has not rectified management inefficiencies that result in excessive costs and, on occasion, fraud and abuse. As a matter of priority, the U.S. will continue to press for dramatic administrative and management improvements in the UN system. In particular, the U.S. is working hard to ensure that new and on-going peace operations are cost-effective and properly managed. Towards this end, the U.S. is pursuing a number of finance and budget management reforms, including:

- immediate establishment of a permanent, fully independent office of Inspector General with oversight responsibility that includes peacekeeping;
- unified budget for all peace operations, with a contingency fund, financed by a single annual peacekeeping assessment;
- standing cadre of professional budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing countries, to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans;
- enlargement of the revolving peacekeeping reserve fund to \$500 million, using voluntary contributions;
- Required status of forces/mission agreements that provide preferential host nation support to peacekeeping operations;
- prohibit UN "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations;
- revise the special peacekeeping scale of assessments to base it on a 3-year average of national income and rationalize Group C so that higher income countries pay their regular budget rate.

Moreover, the U.S. will use its voice and vote in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations to contain costs of UN peace operations once they are underway.

IV. Strengthening the UN

If peace operations are to be effective and efficient when the U.S. believes they are necessary, the UN must improve the way peace operations are managed. Our goal is not to create a global high command but to enable the UN to manage its existing load more effectively. At present each UN operation is created and managed separately by a still somewhat understaffed UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As a result, support to the field may suffer, economies of scale are lost, and work is duplicated. Moreover, the UN's command and control capabilities, particularly in complex operations, need substantial improvement. Structural changes at UN Headquarters, some of which are already underway, would make a positive difference.

A. The U.S. proposals include the reconfiguration and expansion of the staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to create:

- Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and preparation for new and on-going operations;
- Information and Research Division linked to field operations to obtain and provide current information, manage a 24 hour watch center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments;
- Operations Division with a modern command, control and communications (C3) architecture based on commercial systems;
- Logistics Division to manage both competitive commercial contracts (which should be re-bid regularly on the basis of price and performance) and a cost-effective logistics computer network to link the UN DPKO with logistics offices in participating member nations. This system would enable the UN to request price and availability data and to order materiel from participating states;
- Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going peace operations and disseminating information within host countries in order to reduce the risks to UN personnel and increase the potential for mission success;
- Small Civilian Police Cell to manage police missions, plan for the establishment of police and judicial institutions, and develop standard procedures, doctrine and training..

B. To eliminate lengthy, potentially disastrous delays after a mission has been authorized, the UN should establish:

- a rapidly deployable headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new missions;
- data base of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that nations could provide for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
- trained civilian reserve corps to serve as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management, and execution of UN peace operations;
- modest airlift capability available through pre-negotiated contracts with

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commercial firms or member states to support urgent deployments.

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C. Finally, the UN should establish a professional Peace Operations Training Program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel.

D. Consistent with the specific proposals outlined above, the U.S. will actively support efforts in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly to redeploy resources within the UN to enable the effective augmentation of the UN DPKO along the lines outlined above. In addition, the U.S. is prepared to undertake the following, primarily on a reimbursable basis:

- detail appropriate numbers of civilian and military personnel to DPKO in New York in advisory or support roles;
- share information, as appropriate, while ensuring full protection of sources and methods;
- offer to design a command, control, and communications systems architecture for the Operations Division, using commercially available systems and software;
- offer to assist DPKO to establish an improved, cost-effective logistics system to support UN peacekeeping operations;
- offer to help design the database of military forces or capabilities and to notify DPKO, for inclusion in the database, of specific U.S. capabilities that could be made available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. U.S. notification in no way implies a commitment to provide those capabilities, if asked by the UN;
- detail public affairs specialists to the UN;
- offer to help create and establish a training program, participate in peacekeeping training efforts and offer the use of U.S. facilities for training purposes.

V. Command and Control of U.S. Forces

A. Our Policy: The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.

There is nothing new about this Administration's policy regarding the command and control of U.S. forces. U.S. military personnel have participated in UN peace operations since 1948. American forces have served under the operational control of foreign commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I, World War II, Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its inception. We have done so and will continue to do so when the President determines it serves U.S. national interests. 13

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military personnel have begun serving in UN operations in greater numbers. President Bush sent a large U.S. field hospital unit to Croatia and observers to Cambodia, Kuwait and Western Sahara. President Clinton has deployed two U.S. infantry companies to Macedonia in a monitoring capacity and logisticians to the UN operation in Somalia.

B. Definition of Command: No President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces. Command constitutes the authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration. The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field. The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate.

C. Definition of Operational Control: It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of command) to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, factors such as the mission, the size of the proposed U.S. force, the risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement will be carefully considered.

Operational control is a subset of command. It is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President, and assign tasks to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. Within the limits of operational control, a foreign UN commander CANNOT: change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.

D. Fundamental Elements of U.S. Command Always Apply: If it is to our advantage to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a UN commander, the fundamental elements of U.S. command still apply. U.S. commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher U.S. military authorities, as well as the UN commander. Commanders of U.S. military units participating in UN operations will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law, or are outside the mandate of the mission to which the U.S. agreed with the UN, if they are unable to resolve the matter with the UN commander. The U.S. reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever actions

it seems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered. 14

There is no intention to use these conditions to subvert the operational chain of command. Unity of command remains a vital concern. Questions of legality, mission mandate, and prudence will continue to be worked out 'on the ground' before the orders are issued. The U.S. will continue to work with the UN and other member states to streamline command and control procedures and maximize effective coordination on the ground.

E. Protection of U.S. Peacekeepers: The U.S. remains concerned that in some cases, captured UN peacekeepers and UN peace enforcers may not have adequate protection under international law. The U.S. believes that individuals captured while performing UN peacekeeping or UN peace enforcement activities, whether as members of a UN force or a U.S. force executing a UN Security Council mandate, should, as a matter of policy, be immediately released to UN officials; until released, at a minimum they should be accorded protections identical to those afforded prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention III (GPW). The U.S. will generally seek to incorporate appropriate language into UN Security Council resolutions that establish or extend peace operations in order to provide adequate legal protection to captured UN peacekeepers. In appropriate cases, the U.S. would seek assurances that U.S. forces assisting the UN are treated as experts on mission for the United Nations, and thus are entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities and are subject to immediate release when captured. Moreover, the Administration is actively involved in negotiating a draft international convention at the United Nations to provide a special international status for individuals serving in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under a UN mandate. Finally, the Administration will take appropriate steps to ensure that any U.S. military personnel captured while serving as part of a multinational peacekeeping force or peace enforcement effort are immediately released to UN authorities.

VI. Strengthening U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations

Peace operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. They are no longer limited to the interposition of small numbers of passive, unarmed observers. Today, they also include more complex and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives.

The post-Cold War world has also witnessed the emergence of peace enforcement operations involving the threat or use of force. These missions have been considerably more challenging than traditional peacekeeping operations, yet the U.S. and the UN are only now beginning to change sufficiently the way they manage peace operations. The expansion of peacekeeping operations without a commensurate expansion of capabilities has contributed to noticeable setbacks. If the U.S. is to support the full range of peace operations effectively, when it is in our interests to do so, our government, not just the UN, must adapt.

It is no longer sufficient to view peace operations solely through a political prism. It is critical also to bring a clear

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² Lead responsibility refers to the coordination of interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an on-going peace operation. The lead agency will chair the interagency working group (IWG) established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions.

account within DOD established to pay UN assessments. Once such an account is established, DOD may receive direct reimbursement from the UN for contributions of goods, services, and troops to UN peace operations."

The Administration will submit legislation to Congress creating a new peacekeeping assessment account for DOD and implementing the shared responsibility concept. The legislation will stipulate that, in all cases, the agency with lead responsibility for a given operation will be responsible for assessments associated with that operation.

Since peace operations are neither wholly military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they manage U.S. support for peace operations.

In all cases, State remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York. DOD is responsible for military assessments and activities. NSC facilitates interagency coordination.

B. Reimbursements from the UN: Under the shared responsibility policy, and the proposed accompanying legal authorities, DOD would receive and retain direct reimbursement for its contributions of troops, goods and services to the UN. An important advantage will be to limit any adverse impact on DOD Operations and Maintenance funds, which are essential to U.S. military readiness. As our draft legislation stipulates, the U.S. will seek full reimbursement from the UN for U.S. contributions of troops, good and services. The U.S. will first apply reimbursements against DOD incremental costs. Any remaining excess after the Services have been made whole would be credited to DOD's proposed peacekeeping account when it is a DOD-led operation or to State's CIPA account when it is a State-led operation. The President may choose to waive UN reimbursement only in exceptional circumstances.

C. U.S. Funding of UN Peace Operations: In the short term, the Administration will seek Congressional support for funding the USG's projected UN peacekeeping arrears. Over the long run, we view the shared responsibility approach outlined above as the best means of ensuring improved management and adequate funding of UN peace operations. Moreover, the Administration will make every effort to budget for known peacekeeping assessments and seek Congressional support to fund, in the annual appropriation, assessments for clearly anticipated contingencies.

D. U.S. Training: The Armed Services will include appropriate peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance training in DOD training programs. Training U.S. forces to fight and decisively win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training priority.

VII. Congress and the American People

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To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the American people must understand and accept the potential value of such operations as tools of U.S. interests. Congress and the American people must also be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations.

Traditionally, the Executive branch has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more numerous, complex and expensive. The Clinton Administration is committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize communication and consultation on these important issues. Specifically, the Administration will:

- Regularize recently-initiated periodic consultations with bipartisan Congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S. forces, including possible deployments of U.S. military units in UN peace operations.
- Continue recently-initiated monthly staff briefings on the UN's upcoming calendar, including current, new, and expanded peace operations.
- Inform Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated votes in the UNSC on new or expanded peace operations.
- Inform Congress of UN command and control arrangements when U.S. military units participate in UN operations.
- Provide UN documents to appropriate committees on a timely basis.
- Submit to Congress a comprehensive annual report on UN peace operations.
- Support legislation along the lines of that introduced by Senators Mitchell, Nunn, Byrd and Warner to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions.

* * * *

Conclusion

Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states--crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests. This policy is designed to impose discipline on both the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security.

Bureau du Porte-parole

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

UNAMIR NR 95-47

4 octobre 1995

DISPARITION DE M. MANASSE MUGABO

M. Manassé Mugabo, journaliste à Radio-MINUAR et responsable de la section en Kinyarwanda, a quitté son domicile le 19 août 1995 à sept heures pour se rendre en Ouganda par le poste frontière terrestre de Gatuna. Depuis cette date, M. Mugabo n'a plus donné signe de vie, aussi bien auprès de sa famille que de son employeur, la MINUAR.

M. Mugabo était en congé officiel depuis le 15 août. Il devait reprendre son poste de travail le samedi, 31 août. Dès le lundi 2 septembre, contact a été pris avec l'épouse de M. Manasse qui a en effet confirmé être sans nouvelle de son mari depuis le 19 août. Le 10 septembre, la MINUAR a informé les autorités rwandaises des faits en sa possession par note verbale adressées au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Les moniteurs des droits de l'homme ont également été informés le 12 septembre. L'épouse de M. Manassé a de son côté informé la gendarmerie nationale. Des agents des services de sécurité ont rendu visite au responsable de radio MINUAR pour s'informer sur le cas de M. Manassé dans le cadre de l'enquête en cours.

Aujourd'hui, 45 jours après sa disparition, nous demeurons toujours sans nouvelle de M. Manassé. Agé de 32 ans, M. Manassé est un journaliste professionnel qui travaille à Radio MINUAR depuis un an. Il est père d'une petite fille de 3 ans.

Pour de plus amples informations, contacter le bureau du Porte-parole: tél. 84266 poste 11065 ou 11031.



Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-47

4 October 1995

DISAPPEARANCE OF MR. MANASSE MUGABO

Mr. Manasse Mugabo, the journalist in charge of the Kinyarwanda section at Radio UNAMIR, left his house on August 19, 1995 at 7 a.m. to travel to Uganda through the border post at Gatuna. From that day, Mr. Mugabo has shown no sign of life either to his wife or to his employer, UNAMIR.

Mr. Mugabo had been on official leave since August 15. He should have returned to work on Saturday August 31. On Monday September 2, his wife was contacted. She told UNAMIR she had had no news of her husband since August 19. On September 10, UNAMIR informed the Rwandan authorities of the above facts through a note verbale addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. UN human rights monitors were informed on September 12. The wife of Mr. Mugabo alerted the national gendarmerie. Agents of the security services have visited the head of Radio UNAMIR to assure him the case of Mr. Mugabo was being investigated.

Today, 45 days after his disappearance, we are still without news of Mr. Mugabo. 32 years old, Mr. Mugabo was a professional journalist who had worked at Radio UNAMIR for one year. He is the father of a three-year-old daughter.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11065 or 11081.



Bureau du Porte-parole

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

UNAMIR NR 95-46

4 octobre 1995

OUVERTURE DE TROIS CENTRES DE DETENTIONS AU RWANDA

Le Président de la République du Rwanda et le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies ont l'honneur d'annoncer l'ouverture de trois centres de détentions construits en réponse aux problèmes de surpeuplement extrême des prisons de Rwanda. La cérémonie d'ouverture sera commémorée au nouveau centre de détention de Nsinda le **jeudi 5 octobre 1995**.

La population carcérale du Rwanda se monte actuellement à 52 000 pour une capacité de 12 500. Le manque d'espace, de nourriture, d'évacuation d'eau et de conditions sanitaires adéquates ont encouragé un taux de mortalité élevé et propagé des maladies tel que la dysenterie, la pneumonie, et les lésions de pieds. Les trois sites, Nsinda, Nyanza et Onatracom vont augmenter la capacité carcérale de 11 000 personnes pour une nouvelle capacité totale de 23 500. L'ouverture des centres soulagera donc les conditions critiques des détenus qui sont toujours en attente de jugement pour crime de génocide.

Alors que le site permanent de Nyanza aura une capacité de 1 000 et celui du site provisoire d'Onatracom aura une capacité de 5 000, Nsinda, avec une capacité de 5 000, sera le plus grand site de détention ouvert au Rwanda. Sa construction aura exigé une collaboration importante entre le Gouvernement, les Nations Unies et le Comité International de la Croix Rouge avec l'appui de la Communauté Internationale. Les travaux de construction de Nsinda sont le résultat de la collaboration entre le Programme de Développement des Nations Unies (PNUD) et le Ministère de la Justice, responsables de la construction du mur de périmètre, de l'électrification et de l'installation des mesures de sécurité. Le CICR a installé les dortoirs, les installations sanitaires, les cuisines et le dispensaire. La Mission des Nations Unies d'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), le Département d'Affaires Humanitaires des Nations Unies (DHA) et le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l'Homme ont offert un appui logistique ainsi que les groupes électrogènes. Le travail de coordination et de supervision s'est opéré sous la responsabilité du Ministère de la Justice de la République Rwandaise. Tous travaux ont été exécutés par des entrepreneurs Rwandais, employant des ingénieurs civils Rwandais et utilisant des matériaux procurés au Rwanda.

Les premiers détenus transférés seront ceux qui se trouvent actuellement dans l'enceinte du site existant de Nsinda, qui contient 900 personnes, pour une capacité de 100. Un nombre d'autres détenus seront transférés progressivement des autres sites surpeuplés. L'ouverture d'autres nouveaux sites provisoires suivra celles de Nsinda, Nyanza, et Onatracom dans les semaines à suivre.

Pour de plus amples informations, contacter le bureau du Porte-parole: tél. 84266 poste 11065 ou 11081.



Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-46

3 October 1995

OPENING OF THREE DETENTIONS CENTRES IN RWANDA

The President of Rwanda and the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General are pleased to announce the opening of three detention sites built in response to the extreme overcrowding in Rwanda's prisons. The opening ceremony will be commemorated at the new expanded detention centre of Nsinda on Thursday 5th October 1995.

Rwanda's prison population currently stands at approximately 52,000 for an intended capacity of 12,500. Lack of space, food, adequate drainage and sanitary conditions have created high death rates resulting from dysentrie, pneumonia and foot lesions due to swelling. The three completed sites, Nsinda, Nyanza and Onatracom will almost double Rwanda's existing capacity by together providing space for an additional 11,000 detainees, raising total capacity to 23,500. The opening of the centres will thus bring relief to the critical conditions for detainees who are all still waiting to be tried for crimes of genocide.

While the permanent extension to Nyanza is providing a capacity of 2,800 and the temporary site of Onatracom has a capacity of 5,000, Nsinda, with a capacity of 5,000 is the largest semi-permanent detention centre to be opened in Rwanda, requiring the greatest investment and coordinated work by the Government, United Nations and the International Committee for the Red Cross with the financial contribution of the International Community. Construction work at Nsinda has been a collaborative effort between United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of Justice, responsible for constructing the perimeter wall, electrification and ensuring security measures are met, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) who installed living quarters, sanitary and kitchen facilities. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) providing logistical support whenever necessary and power supplies. The overall coordination remained the responsibility of the Republic of Rwanda's Ministry of Justice. All work undertaken on the site was carried out by Rwandan contractors using local civil engineers and drawing on construction materials available within Rwanda.

The first detainees to be transferred will be from the existing site, currently holding 900 detainees for an intended capacity of 100. Detainees will then be transferred progressively from other congested centres. The opening of other sites will follow that of Nsinda, Nyanza and Onatracom within the following weeks.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11065 or 11081.



Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-44

23 August 1995

SMOOTH RECEPTION FOR ZAIRE-EXPULSED RETURNEES

The Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, stated this morning that the operation to receive the refugees forcibly repatriated from Zaire is going on smoothly and without any incident on the Rwandese territory. Ambassador Khan was briefing the press after his visit to Gisenyi yesterday, 22 August 1995, which enabled him to make an on-spot assessment of the situation. He explained that an inter-agency crisis management cell had been set up at the border to coordinate with the Rwanda Government so that the inflow of returnees is met under safe and humane conditions. Another cell has been established in Kigali to coordinate the inter-agency response.

The Special Representative was glad to observe that the situation was manageable, thanks largely to the good cooperation between UNHCR, UNAMIR, UNICEF, WFP and IOM, which are helping the Rwanda Government with the required logistics and supplies to receive the returnees.

From Saturday 19 August to Tuesday 22 August, about 9,000 refugees had been repatriated from Zaire: 4,000 from the Mugunga Camp, near Goma, via Gisenyi, and about 5,000 from camps near Bukavu coming in via Cyangugu. Between 20,000 and 25,000 refugees in the Bukavu area have been forced out of the camps. In Gisenyi, the returnees are searched at the border and quickly transported to a transit camp 22 km inland, where they are expected to undergo screening for about four days. Ambassador Khan stressed that the screening exercise should take a short period to avoid turning the transit camps into camps for the displaced.

On the issue of prisons, the Special Representative explained that the Nsinda prison expansion project was nearing completion, with a new capacity to accommodate 5,000 detainees. The project is jointly sponsored by UNAMIR, UNDP, HCHR and ICRC. Five new facilities - a bus terminal and four warehouses - are also to be turned into detention centres to alleviate congestion in Rwanda's over-crowded prisons. He recalled that there are about 51,000 prisoners in 13 prisons that were initially meant to accommodate about 17,000 inmates. At the same time, however, there is urgent need to rehabilitate the judiciary system so that innocent suspects can be released through the due process of the law.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.

RWANDA POUR TOUS

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info ED
SPA
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31-8-95

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE**CRISE RWANDAISE**

Considérant la crise institutionnelle qui secoue le Rwanda, crise politique consécutive à la cessation de fonctions du Premier Ministre et de la démission subséquente du Gouvernement en date du 28 Août 1995

L'association RWANDA POUR TOUS reste très préoccupée par cet événement grave qui secoue le sommet de l'Etat Rwandais

Vu que cette crise survient au même moment où la tension politique monte entre le Rwanda et le Zaïre, tension qui a conduit au rapatriement forcé et à l'insécurité accrue des réfugiés rwandais depuis le 19 Août 1995,

Vu qu'il faut à tout prix éviter l'escalade de la violence, RWANDA POUR TOUS en appelle à toutes les forces sociales, militaires et politiques, pour qu'en pareilles circonstances, elles fassent preuve de retenue et affichent au contraire la plus grande sérénité afin de garantir la sécurité des personnes tant à l'intérieur du pays qu'aux frontières dans les camps de réfugiés.

RWANDA POUR TOUS interpelle particulièrement les autorités rwandaises à faire preuve de sens politique et celui de l'intérêt national en mettant à profit ce moment de crise pour négocier et régler définitivement les problèmes essentiels tels que la question des réfugiés, la proposition d'un projet politique viable pour tous les Rwandais ainsi que la mise en chantier des discussions sur les réformes institutionnelles susceptibles de garantir l'Etat de droit et les libertés fondamentales pour tout un chacun.

Pour tous ces objets de grande inquiétude liés à la question des réfugiés et au processus politique, RWANDA POUR TOUS en appelle une fois de plus à la communauté internationale, plus particulièrement aux Nations Unies, au Facilitateur et aux Pays Observateurs du processus de Paix d'Arusha, pour qu'ils usent de tous les moyens et utilisent l'occasion extraordinaire qui s'offre afin d'amener au dialogue les acteurs politiques et sociaux rwandais concernés par lesdits enjeux.


RWANDA POUR TOUS se tient à la disposition de toutes les bonnes volontés qui s'exprimeront en faveur d'un rapprochement sincère pour œuvrer avec eux à la recherche de solutions viables au conflit rwandais.

Fait à Lausanne, le 29 Août 1995.

Pour le comité de coordination

James GASANA

NKIKO NSENGIYIMANA





INFORMATION NOTE

TO: All Media

DATE: 21 August 1995

FROM: The Office of the Spokesman, UNAMIR *AD*

SUBJECT: Press Briefing

1. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, will hold a press briefing on Wednesday, 23 August 1995 at 11 a.m.
2. All the media, official and private, printed and audio-visual, national and international are welcome.
3. The meeting will take place in the Briefing Room on the ground floor of UNAMIR Headquarters (Hotel Amahoro).

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11081 or 11066.



UNAMIR-MINUAR

Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

*File
then Release*

UNAMIR NR 95-43

5 August 1995

**THE KAMEMBE SHOOTING INCIDENT BETWEEN RPA AND
MALAWI SOLDIERS**

On 4 August 1995, there was a shooting incident near Kamembe market in Cyangugu Prefecture, in which two UNAMIR Malawi soldiers were injured by RPA soldiers. Subsequently, high tension arose between the Malawi Company and the RPA in the area.

From the investigation carried out, the following facts emerged:

- A Malawi Company soldier committed a traffic offence near Kamembe market.
- After being stopped and ordered to report to the nearby Gendarmerie, the Malawi soldier sped away and further committed another offence by breaking through the road-block at the Kamembe check-point.
- Pursuit was given from the Kamembe market by the RPA and Gendarmerie personnel, who, after the Malawians stopped their run-away vehicle, shot at close range two Malawi soldiers. A pistol shot hit one of the soldiers on the hand, while an AK-47 shot hit another Malawian on the left thigh.
- The situation was escalated by the arrival of heavily armed Malawi reinforcements both on the scene of the incident and at the local Gendarmerie Headquarters.
- After several hours of rising tension, the Military Observers (MILOBs) in the area defused the situation by sending back the Malawi reinforcements to their base at Shagasha, while negotiating the release of the arrested Malawian and their vehicles. This was achieved and the injured soldiers were taken to Gihundwe Hospital where they underwent surgery to remove the bullets. They are in stable condition.

The incident is indeed regrettable. There is, on the one hand, unacceptable conduct by some UNAMIR personnel, and, on the other hand, excessive use of force by the RPA. However, this should not affect the positive co-operation between the RPA and UNAMIR, which are partners for peace in Rwanda.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-42

1 August 1995

AUSTRALIAN UNAMIR PERSONNEL ASSAULTED

A group of five UNAMIR personnel from the Australian Medical Corps garrison (AUSMED) was today at 09:20 a.m. assaulted by RPA soldiers, on the apparent suspicion that the UNAMIR landrover carrying the group had tried to cut into an RPA escort of the presidential motorcade. The AUSMED vehicle was en route from its garrison to Kigali International Airport. The Australians were arrested and subjected to verbal and physical abuse. Two of them sustained injuries.

Thanks to the intervention of an RPA Major, the Australians were set free and their impounded vehicles as well as weapons released. The unfortunate incident was a serious violation of the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) signed between the United Nations and the Rwanda Government. However, according to initial findings, the incident arose from the over-zealousness of some RPA soldiers and was not a case of pre-meditated assault.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



INFORMATION NOTE

TO: All Media

DATE: 24 July 1995

FROM: The Office of the Spokesman, UNAMIR

SUBJECT: Press Briefing

1. Major-General Guy C. Tousignant, OMM, CD, UNAMIR Force Commander and Acting Chief of the Mission, will hold a press briefing on Tuesday 25 July 1995 at 11:00 a.m.
2. All members of the press, national and international, are welcome to attend.
3. The meeting will take place in the Briefing Room on the ground floor of UNAMIR Headquarters at Hotel Amahoro.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



NOTE D'INFORMATION

A: Tous Média

DATE: 24 juillet 1995

DE: Bureau du Porte-parole, MINUAR

OBJET: Séance d'information

1. Le Major Général Guy C. Tousignant, OMM, CD, Commandant de la Force de la MINUAR et Chef ad intérim de la Mission, donnera, mardi 25 juillet 1995 à 11h, une conférence de presse à l'intention des médias publics et privés, nationaux et internationaux.

2. Cette séance d'information se déroulera dans la salle de briefing au rez-de-chaussée du siège de la MINUAR à l'Hôtel Amahoro.

Pour de plus amples informations, contactez le bureau du Porte-parole:
tél. 84266, poste 11075 ou 11124 ou 11066.



UNAMIR-MINUAR

Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-39

21 July 1995

SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES US DEMINING PROGRAMME FOR RWANDA

The Security Council Committee on the Rwanda arms embargo held its third meeting on 19 July and approved a request from the United States to supply demining explosives to Rwanda.

The Committee was established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, which declared an arms embargo on the then Rwanda Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

The embargo on the Rwanda Government has been maintained in subsequent resolutions that renewed the UNAMIR mandate on 30 November 1994 and on 9 June 1995.

Following bilateral arrangements for a demining assistance programme in Rwanda, the US Government requested the Security Council to waive part of the embargo in order to allow American supply of explosives and related materials for demining operations throughout Rwanda.

The approval follows the unanimous decision of the Security Council on 17 July 1995 through resolution 1005 (1995) to grant the US request, subject to the authorization of the Committee set up to monitor the arms embargo imposed on Rwanda.

At the Committee's session on 19 July 1995, the Committee adopted its guidelines for internal procedures and decided to convey them to all UN member States.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



UNAMIR-MINUAR

Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-40

21 July 1995

GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPROVES BUDGET FOR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

The United Nations General Assembly approved on 20 July 1995 an appropriation of US\$ 13,467,300 for the International Tribunal for Rwanda. This budget will cover the Tribunal's initial phase through 31 October 1995.

The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia received US\$ 43,991,600 for the period 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1995.

A total budget of about US\$ 270 million has been approved for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

Also approved is the budget for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force and the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters, totalling US\$ 1.177 billion for the period 1 April to 30 November 1995.

In another development, the Assembly deferred to its next regular session consideration of the financing and liquidation of the United Nations Operation in Cambodia and the financing of the United Nations Operation in Somalia.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-38

19 July 1995

REPORT ON SUPPLY OF MATERIEL FOR USE IN RWANDA

In his report dated 9 July 1995 (S/1995/552) on the implementation of the arms embargo imposed against Rwanda and Rwandan factions in neighbouring countries by Security Council resolution 918 (1994), the Secretary-General of the United Nations describes the results of consultations held between his Special Envoy and the countries neighbouring Rwanda on the proposed deployment of United Nations military observers in their respective territories, including at the airfields located in eastern Zaire, to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel. The report states that although Rwanda and Burundi welcomed the proposal, there was strong opposition in some countries to the deployment of United Nations observers.

The report is issued in accordance with resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June which affirmed the Council restrictions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter by resolution 918 (1994) applied to the sale or supply of arms and matériel to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if they were for use within Rwanda. The resolution called upon those States to take steps to ensure that arms or matériel were not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories. It also requested the Secretary-General to consult with the neighbouring governments and to report to the Council on the matter within one month.

The Secretary-General's Special Envoy visited Rwanda and its neighbouring countries from 20 June to 28 June. He found that all countries reiterated their support for efforts to prevent the resumption of armed conflict in Rwanda and stressed the link between stability in Rwanda and the situation in the subregion generally. They showed a growing recognition not only of the gravity of the risks confronting them but also of the need for them to take individual and collective measures to address the dangers. While many took the view that the primary responsibility lay with the Government of Rwanda, there was general acknowledgement of the value of action at the regional level.

The Special Envoy emphasized the Council's concern over increasing reports of military activities that threatened to destabilize Rwanda. All of the neighbouring countries reiterated their support for efforts to prevent the resumption of armed conflict and to ensure the return and settlement of its refugees and to promote lasting reconciliation. They agreed that a broader approach, with the involvement of Rwanda and its neighbours and the support of the international community, would offer better opportunities for a lasting solution to the crisis.

Officials in Rwanda welcomed the proposed deployment of military observers in neighbouring countries but emphasized the need to bring to justice those who had masterminded the genocide in 1994. The Government of Burundi welcomed the Security Council's initiative.

In contrast, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania refused to consider the deployment of military observers in its territory, suggesting instead that the United Nations strengthen its military presence in Rwanda to ensure the safe return of refugees. It stated that the main obstacle to their return was in Rwanda itself.

According to the report, Uganda neither objected to nor showed enthusiasm for the Council's proposal. It stressed that the Council should address the causes of the crisis and identify the countries that were providing support for the delivery of weapons and military training to the former Rwandan government forces.

The Government of Zaire, while expressing support for any effective action that could prevent the destabilization of Rwanda, again denied accusations that it was aiding the former Rwanda government forces with arms and training to enable them to attack Rwanda. It recalled that it had called for an inquiry, under United Nations auspices, to investigate those allegations. It pointed to the millions of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi it had welcomed despite the resentment of its own population.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



Bureau du Porte-parole

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

UNAMIR NR 95-38

19 juillet 1995

RAPPORT SUR LA VENTE OU LA LIVRAISON D'ARMEMENTS ET DE MATERIELS DESTINES A ETRE UTILISES AU RWANDA

Le Conseil de sécurité avait à examiner un rapport du Secrétaire général daté le 9 juillet (S/1995/552) sur l'application de l'embargo sur les armes contre le Rwanda et les factions rwandaises dans les pays voisins, décidée par la résolution 918 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité.

Le rapport décrit les résultats des consultations tenues entre l'Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général et les pays voisins du Rwanda sur la possibilité de déployer des observateurs militaires des Nations Unies dans leur territoire respectif, y compris aux aéroports situés dans l'Est du Zaïre, afin de contrôler la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels. Le rapport note que le Rwanda et le Burundi ont salué la proposition alors qu'une forte opposition existe dans certains pays au déploiement d'observateurs des Nations Unies.

Le rapport était soumis conformément à la résolution 997 (1995) du 9 juin qui soulignait que les restrictions du Conseil imposées au terme du chapitre VII de la Charte par la résolution 918 (1994) sur la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels concernaient des personnes se trouvant dans des Etats voisins si l'objet de cette transaction était l'utilisation au Rwanda aux fins de déstabilisation de ce pays.

La résolution invitait ces Etats à prendre des mesures pour s'assurer que les armements et les matériels n'étaient pas transférés dans les camps rwandais se trouvant sur leur territoire. Elle demandait aussi au Secrétaire général de consulter les gouvernements voisins et de faire rapport au Conseil sur la question un mois au plus tard après l'adoption de la résolution.

L'Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général s'est rendu au Rwanda et dans les pays voisins du 20 au 28 juin. Il a constaté que tous les pays renouvelaient leur appui aux efforts déployés pour éviter la reprise des hostilités au Rwanda et soulignaient le lien entre la stabilité au Rwanda et la situation dans la sous-région de manière générale. Ils ont manifesté une réelle inquiétude non seulement sur la gravité des risques que court la sous-région, mais aussi la nécessité, pour eux, de prendre des mesures individuelles et collectives en vue de redresser la situation et l'empêcher de dégénérer en conflit. Alors que de l'avis général on estimait que la responsabilité principale incombait au Gouvernement du Rwanda, l'intérêt d'une action au niveau régional était généralement reconnu.

L'Envoyé spécial a mis l'accent sur la préoccupation du Conseil de sécurité compte tenu des informations qui, de plus en plus, faisaient état d'activités militaires qui menacent de déstabiliser le Rwanda. Tous les pays voisins ont réitéré leur appui aux efforts pour prévenir la reprise des hostilités et pour assurer le retour et la réinstallation des réfugiés, ainsi que pour promouvoir une réconciliation durable. Ils sont convenus qu'une approche plus large, avec la participation du Rwanda et de ses voisins et l'appui de la communauté internationale offrirait de meilleures opportunités à une solution durable de la crise.

Les responsables rencontrés au Rwanda se sont félicités de l'initiative prise par le Conseil de sécurité en proposant de déployer des observateurs militaires dans les pays voisins tout en soulignant qu'il était indispensable de traduire en justice les instigateurs du génocide de 1994.

Le Gouvernement du Burundi a salué l'initiative du Conseil de sécurité.

En contraste, le Gouvernement de la République unie de Tanzanie a refusé d'envisager un déploiement d'observateurs militaires sur son territoire, suggérant plutôt que l'ONU renforce sa présence militaire au Rwanda pour s'assurer que les réfugiés puissent rentrer chez eux en toute sécurité. Il a noté que le principal obstacle à leur retour se trouvait au Rwanda et non dans les pays voisins.

Selon le rapport, l'Ouganda n'était pas hostile à la proposition du Conseil, mais n'a manifesté aucun enthousiasme. Il a douté de l'efficacité du déploiement proposé et des résultats qu'il permettrait d'obtenir. Ce pays a estimé que le Conseil devrait plutôt se pencher sur les causes de la crise et identifier les pays qui apportent leur concours aux livraisons d'armes aux ex-forces gouvernementales rwandaises et à l'entraînement militaire de ces troupes.

Le Gouvernement du Zaïre, tout en se déclarant favorable à toute action efficace qui pourrait empêcher la déstabilisation du Rwanda, a, une fois encore, vigoureusement rejeté les récentes accusations selon lesquelles il aidait les ex-forces gouvernementales rwandaises en leur fournissant des armes et en assurant leur entraînement pour leur permettre d'attaquer le Rwanda. Il a fait observer qu'il avait demandé la création, sous les auspices de l'ONU, d'une commission internationale d'enquête chargée d'examiner les accusations portées et de clarifier définitivement la situation. Le Gouvernement zaïrois a rappelé avoir accueilli des millions de réfugiés du Rwanda et du Burundi, et ce, malgré le mécontentement de sa propre population.

Pour de plus amples informations, contacter le bureau du Porte-parole: tél. 84266 poste 11075 ou 11124 ou 11066.

Editorial

6.7.95

La reunion sur la table ronde a debute ce matin a kigali. Representants des pays donateurs et membre du gouvernement rwandais vont devoir se pencher aujourd'hui et demain sur les moyens a degager pour aider le rwanda a entamer de maniere decisive la rehabilitation de ses institutions dans presque tous les domaines. institutions, on le sait, tres gravement endomagees, souvent meme carrement detruites, durant la periode de genocide qu'a connu le pays.

Il y a six mois la communaute internationale avait promis au rwanda quelques 700 millions de dollars. Moins du quart de cette somme a ete recu par les autorites de kigali qui ont du assitot en reverser une bonne partie pour payer le service de la dette. Resultat des comptes pour le rwandais ordinaire: la communaute internationale, encore une fois, a promis beaucoup et a delivre tres peu. En verite, cette frustration, il n'y a pas que les rwandais qui la ressentent. Ce sentiment est pareillement partage par tous ceux qui, au nom precisement de la communaute internationale, travaillent ici sur le terrain a aider a retablir la vie.

Mais ainsi sont les regles qui regissent la bureaucratie internationale. Les etats donateurs, qui ont des comptes a rendre, comptent leurs sous. Et c'est bien normal. Ce qui l'est moins,

c'est cette espece de mollesse, cette absence totale de contrainte entre la promesse solennellement faite devant les nations et la concretisation de cette promesse. Il y a ,dans ce fosse, toute la nature des relations internationales qui semble encore obeir au viel adage selon lequel "qui paye commande". Et c'est precisement la que la morale de ces relations est mise a mal. Mais peut etre que la reunion qui a demare ce matin a kigali saura trouver des mecanismes plus efficients ? Il faut dire peut etre .Et beaucoup esperer que cela soit le cas.

056 Received Message

03:20 19/07/95

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.NEWYORK (PKFOD) 19 0325Z
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FROM DPIIDS

OMNIPRESS / UNDEVPRO
ADD/AGOLI-AGBO, DAM/HLA/BAUTISTA, NIC/ROKOSZEWSKI,

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING,

18 July 1995

At today's noon briefing, Ahmad Fawzi, Deputy Spokesman for the Secretary-General, told correspondents that the Secretary-General was on his way to Geneva.

Mr. Fawzi then read out the following statement attributable to the spokeswoman who accompanied the Secretary-General on his official trip to Africa:

It was announced in Addis Ababa today that Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has decided to send Lansana Kouyate, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to Dar-Es-Salam and Nairobi as his Special Envoy to brief the Presidents of the United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya regarding his recent tour of African countries which he just completed.

This morning in Addis Ababa, the Secretary-General had a meeting with the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Kingsley Y. Amoako. They discussed various ECA activities and ways and means to revitalize the Commission in order that it meet the challenge that lies ahead in the twenty-first century; and to serve Africa better, particularly in economic and social development. The Executive Secretary briefed the Secretary-General on the three overriding objectives of his new agenda: first, the need for excellence; second, greater cost effectiveness; and third, effective partnership.

The Secretary-General stopped over in Cairo on his way to Geneva at 2 p.m. Cairo time. He was received by Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, with whom he held consultations for about 40 minutes at the airport.

The Foreign Minister told reporters that he welcomed the United Nations Secretary-General in the context of the ongoing cooperation between the United Nations and Arab countries, adding that they had discussed the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General responded by thanking the Egyptian Foreign Minister. He announced that he would meet this afternoon and tomorrow in Geneva with his military and political experts to discuss the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He will also be in constant contact with officials in New York and elsewhere in order to formulate the

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future plan of action. The Secretary-General added that first and foremost are measures for urgent assistance to the refugees, as well as humanitarian relief. ional help to Africa. (Press Release SG/T/1984)

Mr. Fawzi informed correspondents that a letter from the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), in which he outlined the entire agenda for that Commission, would be available in the Spokesman's office after the briefing.

He went on to say that the Secretary-General would be meeting with his advisers in Geneva. On his arrival there today, he would meet with the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg. Tomorrow, the Secretary-General would be meeting with his Special Representative in the Former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi; the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace Forces, Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier; the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Kofi Annan; Mr. Stoltenberg; and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Sadako Ogata.

On Friday, the Secretary-General would be attending the meeting of the five-nation Contact Group in London, Mr. Fawzi continued. He added that he did not know yet which of the Secretary-General's advisers would accompany the Secretary-General to the meeting.

Mr. Fawzi announced that Mrs. Ogata would be chairing a meeting of the humanitarian issues working group of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. That meeting would take place at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, at 10 a.m. tomorrow. That would be the first meeting the working group has convened since November 1994. It was called for by the High Commissioner in June this year and coincidentally fell at this propitious time. The invitees included all the governments of the countries of the former Yugoslavia and donor governments; some 60 countries were expected to participate in the closed meeting. Mrs. Ogata would hold a press conference at 1 p.m. local time to discuss its outcome.

In another announcement, Mr. Fawzi said that a briefing note regarding statements made today by the Spokeswoman for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) would be available in the Spokesman's office following the briefing. That statement described the situation of child refugees and noted that the plight of the children arriving from Srebrenica was very poor. It stated that UNICEF would begin a vaccination campaign to prevent the outbreak of illnesses or epidemics of children's diseases. The agency was assembling information in cooperation with the UNHCR, as well as the International Committee of the Red State, Mr. Fawzi said the Secretary-General was very concerned about the sentencing of a number of military officers as well as Mr. Obasanjo. The Secretary-General was pursuing the necessary contacts on the matter with the Nigerian authorities.

Regarding a question asked about smoking regulations at Headquarters, Mr Fawzi said the department which dealt with that issue had informed him that a new circular on smoking

regulations would be issued very soon -- perhaps within the next few weeks. The new regulations were expected to be more stringent and specify smoking and non-smoking areas.

Fred Eckhard, of the Spokesman's office, reporting on peace-keeping operations, informed correspondents that the situation in Zepa was deteriorating rapidly as a result of intensive mortar fire by Bosnian Serb forces into the town. Ukrainian peace-keepers continued to man several of their observation posts but were surrounded either by Bosnian Serb forces or, in some cases, by Bosnian Government forces. A second attempt to evacuate over 80 wounded persons from Srebrenica yesterday had been successful. The evacuation was carried out by the ICRC.

He went on to say that United Nations military observers had interviewed a number of Bosnian Government soldiers who had survived a six-day trek from Srebrenica through Serb-held territory to the Tuzla area. The soldiers indicated that some 12,000 people had escaped the besieged enclave on 10 and 11 July. About half of that number had safely reached Government-controlled territory, according to the interviews.

In Gorazde, United Nations peace-keepers had reported that on 16 and 17 July, Government soldiers had stolen, at gunpoint, all their major equipment and weapons, leaving only four trucks. That incident had occurred at the Kiev camp (the local name for that camp) which was occupied by Ukrainian soldiers. When those peace-keepers resisted, their commander was assaulted and shots were fired. No one was injured. The action was being strongly protested to the Bosnian Government and negotiations were under way for the return of the stolen equipment. Those Ukrainian soldiers now had no weapons or ammunition. Regarding Sarajevo, Mr. Eckhard said that the city had experienced low levels of warring faction activities yesterday while Bihac remained active.

On the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), Mr. Eckhard said tension continued to build in Sector East with mortar and small-arms activities in and around Osijek continuing into the night, last night. Troop build-up had been noted in the zone of separation near Osijek. It was roats by the dumping of refuse in the Drava river. Those incidents had now developed into military exchanges.

Mr. Eckhard then announced that Mr. Akashi was in Brussels today at the invitation of the North Atlantic Council. Both Co-Chairmen of the International Steering Committee for the Former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Carl Bildt, were expected to travel to the region -- the former Yugoslavia -- later this week. They would have separate itineraries, and Mr. Stoltenberg would return to attend the meeting in London on Friday.

Mr. Fawzi reminded correspondents that the Committee to Protect Journalists would hold a briefing on Kashmir in the United Nations Correspondents Association (UNCA) club at 2 p.m. today.

A correspondent asked what had happened to the weapons which had been confiscated from the Bosnian Government forces in Srebrenica, and whether air strikes would be used as part of

the defence of Zepa. Mr. Fawzi said he could not respond to the first part of the question at this time; he would answer later. In response to the correspondent's question whether air strike would be used as part of the defence of Zepa, Mr. Eckhard said he would not predict what would happen. The risks and the limitations of air power were well known. "Without anticipating how it would play out, we would wait to see how the local commanders would respond", he added.

Asked if any civilians were left in Srebrenica, Mr. Eckhard said there were still a small number of civilians there, including some who work for the United Nations and for non-governmental organizations.

Questioned about the statistics of civilians and refugees in Srebrenica when that town was under siege in 1993, Mr. Eckhard said that a refugee population of about 42,000 was a 1993 estimate. Those statistics had to be used with care as it was very difficult to obtain reliable figures, given the circumstances.

Asked about the men who had been separated out and taken away by the Serbs in Srebrenica, Mr. Eckhard said the United Nations did not know their fate. For the present, the Organization was demanding access to them but those demands had not been met by the Bosnian Serbs. He was not able to give the number of men who had been detained. Today, the UNHCR in Geneva had given some statistics, based on numbers provided to them by the Government, of 29,400 arrivals from Srebrenica and 13, 000 persons missing.

Stating that the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muhamed Sacirbey, had said yesterday that his Government did not intend to renew the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate after 1 November, a correspondent asked what was the procedure for that kind of action on the part of the Member States and what was the United Nations reaction to such statements. Mr. Eckhard said such a request would have to be made officially by the relevant Government. That had not yet happened in the case of Bosnia. Peace-keeping operations were deployed at the invitation of the host government or the parties to a conflict. Withdrawal of the invitation in the case of Bosnia would represent a serious development which the Security Council would have to address.

Responding to a reference to the recent case of Croatia, Mr. Eckhard said that prior to the UNPROFOR mandate being extended by the Security Council last time, approaches had been made to the Council, in succession, by the Croatian Government, the Bosnian Government and the Government of The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Each had asked for some revisions in the mandate -- with a threat by the Croatian Government not to permit the extension of the mandate if their concerns were not met. Their concerns were met and three separate mandate were approved on 31 March.

END OF PART 1 OF 2
DISSEMINATION UNIT/DPI

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.NEWYORK (PKFOD) 19 0325Z

-AGBO, DAM/HLA/BAUTISTA, NIC/ROKOSZEWSKI,

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING,

18 July 1995

PART 2 OF 2

Mr. Fawzi then announced that the Security Council would meet at 3.30 p.m. today to discuss a letter from the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which he requested an emergency meeting of the Council to discuss the situation in Zepa.

Asked if the United Nations was in touch with the personnel of non-governmental organizations and United Nations personnel in Srebrenica who could verify that atrocities had taken place there, Mr. Eckhard said communications with the enclave had been difficult. There had been jamming of UNPROFOR radio communications with United Nations personnel there. Reports of human rights abuses and atrocities that had been made by people who had escaped from the enclaves were subject to verification by human rights investigators.

A correspondent asked if the Ukrainian peace-keepers would be withdrawn. Mr. Eckhard said the United Nations first wanted their weapons to be returned to them; they were very vulnerable without them. The action against them was unjustifiable even though one could understand the emotional state of people in that area. For the present, there was no intention to withdraw the peace-keepers from Gorazde or Zepa.

Asked for more details on the assault of the commander in Gorazde, Mr. Eckhard said he did not have all the details because of the problems of communication he referred to before. However, he understood that the commander had been taken hostage; there was some distracting fire while peace-keepers were there at present.

A correspondent asked Mr. Eckhard if his statements yesterday about the limitations of the use of air power reflected his personal view or was a United Nations position. Mr. Eckhard said the Secretary-General's views on that matter could be found in the various reports he had made to the Security Council on the subject of safe areas and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Questioned about the existence of photographs of Dutch peace-keepers having drinks with the Bosnian Serb military commander, General Ratko Mladic, and the reaction of the UNPROFOR command to such photographs, Mr. Eckhard said he had not seen the photographs being referred to.

The Secretary-General would return to Headquarters next week, Mr. Fawzi told a correspondent who inquired about the Secretary-General's itinerary.

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A correspondent asked for more details about the military status of the Ukrainian peace-keepers in Zepa. Mr. Eckhard said some of their observation posts were on the confrontation line and some in the interior. As mentioned in yesterday's noon briefing, the Serbs had surrounded one observation post, threatening the Ukrainians in the event of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air attacks. Today, it was reported that the Government forces which surrounded other observation posts had made threats against the Ukrainians "in the event that there were no air attacks".

Note: In yesterday's briefing, the first line on page 2 should read: "...been mandated by a Security Council mission report (document S/1995/163) of 28 February."

END OF PART 2 OF 2
DISSEMINATION UNIT/DPI

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Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-37

18 July 1995

**SECURITY COUNCIL PERMITS SUPPLY OF EXPLOSIVES TO BE USED
FOR DEMINING OPERATIONS IN RWANDA**

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council on 17 July 1995 unanimously decided to permit the supply to Rwanda of explosives intended exclusively for demining programmes, subject to the prior authorization by the Committee set up to monitor the arms embargo imposed on that country.

By adopting resolution 1005 (1995), the Council decided that the supplies could be delivered notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994), which forbade the sale of all types of arms or related matériel to Rwanda.

Text of draft resolution (S/1995/580)

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, and 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995,

Noting with concern that unexploded land-mines constitute a substantial hazard to the population of Rwanda, and an impediment to the rapid reconstruction of the country,

Noting also the desire of the Government of Rwanda to address the problem of unexploded land-mines, and the interest on the part of other States to assist with the detection and destruction of these mines,

Underlining the importance the Council attaches to efforts to eliminate the threat posed by unexploded land-mines in a number of States, and the humanitarian nature of demining programmes,

Recognizing that safe and successful humanitarian demining operations in Rwanda will require the supply to Rwanda of an appropriate quantity of explosives for use in these operations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Decides that notwithstanding the restrictions imposed in paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994), appropriate amounts of explosives intended exclusively for use in established humanitarian demining programmes may be supplied to Rwanda upon application to and authorization by the Committee of the Security Council established by resolution 918 (1994).

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



Bureau du Porte-parole

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

UNAMIR NR 95-37

18 juillet 1995

**LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE DECIDE D'AUTORISER LA LIVRAISON AU RWANDA
D'EXPLOSIFS DESTINES AUX PROGRAMMES DE DEMINAGE A DES FINS HUMANITAIRES**

A la suite de consultations informelles, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté à l'unanimité le 17 juin 1995 la résolution 1005 (1995) concernant la présence de mines terrestres non explosées au Rwanda. Aux termes de la résolution, le Conseil décide que, notwithstanding les restrictions imposées au paragraphe 13 de la résolution 918 (1994), les quantités voulues d'explosifs exclusivement destinés aux programmes de déminage entrepris à des fins humanitaires pourront être fournies au Rwanda pourvu que des demandes à cet effet aient été présentées au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 918 (1994) et que celui-ci y ait accédé.

Texte du projet de résolution (S/1995/580)

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Rappelant ses résolutions 918 (1994) du 17 mai 1994 et 997 (1995) du 9 juin 1995,

Notant avec préoccupation que la présence de mines terrestres non explosées fait courir un danger considérable à la population du Rwanda et constitue un obstacle à la reconstruction rapide du pays,

Notant également que le Gouvernement rwandais est désireux de s'attaquer au problème des mines terrestres non explosées et que d'autres Etats sont disposés à aider à la détection et à la destruction de ces mines,

Mettant l'accent sur l'importance qu'il attache aux efforts visant à lever la menace que les mines terrestres non explosées font peser dans un certain nombre d'Etats, ainsi que sur la nature humanitaire des programmes de déminage,

Considérant qu'il faudra, pour assurer la sécurité et le succès des opérations de déminage menées à des fins humanitaires au Rwanda, que les quantités voulues d'explosifs soient importées dans le pays,

Agissant en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies,

Décide que, notwithstanding les restrictions imposées au paragraphe 13 de la résolution 918 (1994), les quantités voulues d'explosifs exclusivement destinés aux programmes de déminage entrepris à des fins humanitaires pourront être fournies au Rwanda pourvu que des demandes à cet effet aient été présentées au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 918 (1994) et que celui-ci y ait accédé.

Pour de plus amples informations, contacter le bureau du Porte-parole: tél. 84266 poste 11075 ou 11124 ou 11066.

130 Received Message

04:56 13/07/95

95 JUL 13 06 05

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.NEWYORK (PKFOD) 13 0500Z
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FROM DPIIDS

OMNIPRESS / UNDEVPRO
ADD/AGOLI-AGBO, DAM/HLA/BAUTISTA, NIC/ROKOSZEWSKI,

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING 12 JULY 1995
FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

PART 1 OF 2

Ahmad Fawzi, Deputy Spokesman for the Secretary-General, began today's noon briefing by informing correspondents that the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, Major-General Franklin van Kappen, would join him today to provide an update of the military situation on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly around Srebrenica.

Mr. Fawzi told correspondents that Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had left Athens at the conclusion of his three-day visit to Greece to begin his visit to Africa. Prior to his departure from Athens, he had spoken to the press regarding the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Referring to the transcript of that press briefing which had been made available to correspondents this morning, Mr. Fawzi said that the Secretary-General had pointed out that the Security Council was calling for the withdrawal of the Serb forces from Srebrenica.

He went on to say that the main problem in Srebrenica was that of the refugees. There were over 30,000 refugees in Potocari and 7,000 to 8,000 on their way to that town from the north. In Srebrenica, the Dutch battalion was carrying out invaluable humanitarian work. Supplies for one to two days at most were available and, as a result, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had made a request for convoys to go into the area. In addition, there were about 90 wounded civilians who were being cared for by the Dutch medics in Potocari.

Talks were ongoing between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the parties to the conflict in order to decide what could be done about the huge number of refugees currently in Potocari and those flowing into Potocari, Mr. Fawzi continued. An update from Zagreb, received just before the start of the noon briefing, had informed that about 40 Bosnian Serb trucks carrying Srebrenica refugees left Potocari this afternoon for Government-controlled territory where international agencies would assist with their care. The

international community must announce that publicly.

While the resolution mandated the Secretary-General to use all available resources to restore Srebrenica's status as a safe area, the representative of the Russian Federation said, that did not include the option of using force. United Nations forces could not and should not undertake actions which would make them party to the conflict. Such a step would jeopardize the operation in Bosnia as well as all peace-keeping operations.

The representative of the United States said the Secretary-General must have the right to use the resources available to him, in consultation with the relevant contributors. The UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia, supported by the rapid reaction force, whose full and speedy deployment was supported by her country. The United States was prepared to provide airlift and other logistical support for that force.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Croatia, France, Italy, Indonesia, Oman, Nigeria, Germany, China, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Argentina and Honduras.

The meeting which began at 1:05 p.m., was adjourned at 2:28 p.m.

END OF SUMMARY

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 1004

"The Security Council,

"Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,

"Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

"Gravely concerned at the deterioration in the situation in and around the safe area of Srebrenica, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the plight of the civilian population there,

"Gravely concerned also at the very serious situation which confronts personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and a great number of displaced persons within the safe area at Potocari, especially the lack of essential food supplies and medical care,

"Paying tribute to the personnel of UNPROFOR deployed in the safe area of Srebrenica,

"Condemning the offensive by the Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of Srebrenica, and in particular the detention by the Bosnian Serb forces of UNPROFOR personnel,

"Condemning also all attacks on UNPROFOR personnel,

"Recalling the Agreement for the demilitarization of Srebrenica of 18 April 1993 (S/25700, annex) by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb party, and regretting that it has not been implemented in full

by either party,

"Stressing the importance of renewed efforts to achieve an overall peaceful settlement, and the unacceptability of any attempt to resolve the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by military means,

"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces cease their offensive and withdraw from the safe area of Srebrenica immediately;

"2. Demands also that the parties respect fully the status of the safe area of Srebrenica in accordance with the Agreement of 18 April 1993;

"3. Demands further that the parties respect fully the safety of UNPROFOR personnel and ensure their complete freedom of movement, including resupply;

"4. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces immediately and unconditionally release unharmed all detained UNPROFOR personnel;

"5. Demands that all parties allow unimpeded access for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international humanitarian agencies to the safe area of Srebrenica in order to alleviate the plight of the civilian population, and in particular that they cooperate on the restoration of utilities;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General to use all resources available to him to restore the status as defined by the Agreement of 18 April 1993 of the safe area of Srebrenica in accordance with the mandate of UNPROFOR, and calls on the parties to cooperate to that end;

"7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter."
Action on Draft

The text was adopted unanimously as resolution 1004 (1995).

END OF SUMMARY AND RESOLUTION
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04:57 13/07/95

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.NEWYORK (PKFOD) 13 0501Z

BI-AGBO, DAM/HLA/BAUTISTA, NIC/ROKOSZEWSKI,

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

12 JULY 1995

FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

PART 2 OF 2

He emphasized that the action taken by the United Nations was not that of "taking up its skirts and running". The peace-keepers had actually tried to stop the Bosnian Serbs but that action had to be taken with very lightly armed forces. "I would like to correct the idea in the media that the United Nations ran. We really tried -- to the maximum extent of our leash -- we really tried to stop them. But you must realize that we are there not on a war-fighting mission; we are there as peace-keeping troops."

A correspondent asked if the use of force had been excluded as an option to restore the status of the safe area. Major-General van Kappen said the wording of the Security Council's draft resolution on the action to be taken on the safe area was "to use all the available resources". That allowed for any option to be used. However, what was of greatest importance was the safety of approximately 27,000 refugees in a congested area, intermingled with Dutch troops and surrounded by Bosnian Serbs. They had to be taken out of the area in the safest possible way. "The safest way to get them out is to negotiate our way out." If fighting were to start in such a congested area, in such a confused situation, the collateral damage would be horrendous.

Was there some kind of cooperation between the United Nations and the Serbs to evacuate the refugees? Major-General van Kappen reiterated that the situation was very confused. What the United Nations was dealing with was what was referred to as "the fog of war" -- a very confused situation in which the information was sometimes very sketchy and sometimes contradictory. However, based on the information available, the negotiations between General Mladic and the United Nations battalion commander had resulted in the extraction of at least one convoy of refugees. Asked how many Bosnian Government forces were left in Srebrenica, Major-General van Kappen said that there were still some Government forces in the enclave but he had no idea if they were still fighting. When asked what action was being taken to protect the remaining safe areas, he said very few options were left. In Zepa, there was only one Ukrainian company -- a very small force. In Gorazde, there were more

troops but they were in a very exposed position. The troops would be protected to the best extent possible.

Asked what role he foresaw for the rapid reaction force, he said that its role was not precluded but, at this stage, the force was not completely operational. One also had to take into account the factors that would accompany its deployment. If it were brought to the area by air, they would have to be flown in by helicopters and that would require a massive air defence suppression. Such action would escalate the situation further. The preference was to negotiate with the Serbs. The areas in question were already at the mercy of the Serbs and they needed to take account of the humanitarian needs in the area -- the existence of women and children and injured people.

Asked for casualty figures, Major-General van Kappen said he had none. The Dutch battalion had suffered one dead and one injured and the rest of the soldiers had minor injuries. There were civilian casualties, but he was unsure of the figures.

Questioned about the meaning of the reference in the draft resolution being considered by the Security Council regarding the resources which were available within the mandate of UNPROFOR, Mr. Fawzi said that the Secretary-General had said, once the resolution was adopted, he would consult with his military advisers and commanders in the field on the resources needed to deal with the present situation. It was quite clear that, with the existing resources on the ground today, it would be impossible to take on such a massive task of restoring the status of safe area to Srebrenica.

A correspondent asked about the possible fate of the safe areas of Zepa, Gorazde and Sarajevo. Major-General van Kappen said shelling and troop movement had been reported near Zepa. He reiterated that the small Ukrainian company in Zepa would stay as long as it was possible to stay and protect the population there. However, that company would not be able to ward off a massive assault by the Serbs. The United Nations would have to wait and see what the Serbs' intentions were.

Asked further if that would represent a failure by the United Nations in the safe areas, Major-General van Kappen said he would not consider it a failure. He reminded correspondents that the UNPROFOR had been in the safe areas for two reasons: the Security Council had mandated them; but they had also been negotiated between the two warring factions. The Serbs had recognized the enclaves. They had now decided to disregard them and invade them and the United Nations was unsure what they wanted.

Stressing that the Serb action had undermined the United Nations authority and that the safe areas were a failure and an embarrassment, a correspondent asked what was the response of the Military Adviser to the Serb defiance of the United Nations. The Major-General insisted that the action of the United Nations was not a failure. He reiterated the reasons why the United Nations had set up the safe areas. The United Nations was there as peace-keeping forces and it had made the maximum effort in that context. "We did not go in there to fight a war; we went in for peace-keeping."

Mr. Fawzi again emphasized the humanitarian objectives that the Organization was upholding in that area. There were many

positive elements, although there were disasters occurring in other areas.

Asked to explain what was historic about the action taken by the peace-keepers in Srebrenica, Major-General van Kappen said that the fact that the Dutch peace-keepers were given orders to resist the Serbs was historic -- the first time such an order had been given.

When asked if the Ukrainian company in Zepa would be ordered to undertake the same blocking action as the Dutch battalion had done in Srebrenica, Major-General van Kappen said that he hoped that two facts -- that there were troops in that area and that the world was watching -- would be a deterrent. He would not speculate further on events that might occur or action that might be taken.

Questioned about the French Government's position on Srebrenica, the Major-General said he did not think the French would want to retake Srebrenica, even with the use of the rapid reaction force. What would be the purpose of such action?

Mr. Fawzi added that the French proposal would be taken account of by the Security Council which would make the final decision in that regard. Responding to a request for clarification on that issue, the Military Adviser said that the decision on action to be taken in Srebrenica would be made by the United Nations chain of command. A correspondent asked if the bussing of the refugees out of Srebrenica constituted an act of "ethnic cleansing", since those people had been made to leave their homes. The Military Adviser said it could be perceived as such but the intention was to remove seriously wounded and sick civilians to an area where they could be taken care of.

END OF PART 2 OF 2
DISSEMINATION UNIT/DPI

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Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-36

8 July 1995

CLARIFICATION ON UNAMIR CONTAINERS FROM BOMBAY

KIGALI, RWANDA - Ten containers of UNAMIR were shipped on 18 April 1995 from Bombay to Dar-es-Salaam enroute to Kigali. These containers contained ammunition, administrative and technical stores for use by the Force Signal Company, the military contingent from India. The stores arrived at Dar-es-Salaam port on 02 May 1995. After due processing at Dar-es-Salaam, the containers were moved by Messrs Global Containers to Kigali by road on 16 May 1995 in five trucks.

One of the ten containers had two boxes of small ammunitions (7.62 mm BDR and 9 mm ball) weighing approximately 2 tons. This ammunition was required by the Signal Company for self-protection purposes during the discharge of their duties in UNAMIR. The ammunition was mentioned by mistake in the manifest at Bombay as Small Arms Accessories and not as ammunition. The Civilian Administrative Officer of UNAMIR has already clarified this matter in a letter to national authorities in Rwanda.

It is stressed that there were no weapons carried by any of the ten containers. The containers have been thoroughly examined by Rwanda authorities and these facts ascertained. Any other information to the contrary pertaining to this matter is ill-founded and not based on facts.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-35

5 July 1995

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
READY TO CARRY OUT ITS MISSION**

The Judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are ready to carry out the important mission they have been entrusted with by the international community. On 30 June 1995 in the Hague, they concluded the deliberations of their first session by adopting the new Rules of Procedure and Evidence under the chairmanship of Judge Laïty Kama (Senegal).

The Judges also heard the Prosecutor, Mr. Richard Goldstone, and the Deputy Prosecutor, Mr. Honoré Rakotomanana.

The two trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are composed as follows:

Trial Chamber No.1:

Judge Laïty Kama, Presiding Judge
Judge Navanethem Pillay
Judge Lennart Aspegren

Trial Chamber No.2:

Judge William H. Sekule, Presiding Judge
Judge Tafazzal H. Khan
Judge Yakov A. Ostrovsky

Before adjourning the session, the Judges laid down a timetable for their next meetings and decided that one of them should always be in the Hague in October, November and December to review indictments, pending the establishment of the Tribunal in Arusha.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is making an appeal to the international community to do everything in all due haste to overcome the serious financial problems the Tribunal is facing.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda thereby hopes to meet the expectations of the Rwandan people and of the international community to see that those responsible for the crimes committed during 1994 are judged after a fair trial.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



Bureau du Porte-parole

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

UNAMIR NR 95-35

5 juillet 1995

**LE TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNATIONAL POUR LE RWANDA
PRET A ACCOMPLIR SA MISSION**

Les Juges du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda sont prêts à accomplir leur importante mission dévolue par la communauté internationale. Ils ont clôturé le 30 juin à la Haye les travaux de leur première session en adoptant le nouveau Règlement de procédure et de preuve sous la présidence du Juge Laïty Kama (Sénégal).

Les Juges ont également entendu le Procureur, Monsieur Richard Goldstone, et le Procureur adjoint, Monsieur Honoré Rakotomanana.

Les deux Chambres de première instance du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda sont composées comme suit:

Chambre de première instance no.1:

Juge Laïty Kama, Président de la Chambre
Juge Lennart Aspegren
Juge Navanethem Pillay

Chambre de première instance no.2:

Juge William H. Sekule, Président de la Chambre
Juge Tafazzai H. Khan
Juge Yakov A. Ostrovsky

Avant de clôturer leurs travaux, les Juges ont arrêté le calendrier de leurs prochaines rencontres et décidé d'établir une permanence pour les mois d'octobre, novembre et décembre à la Haye pour examiner les actes d'accusation, en attendant la mise en place du Tribunal à Arusha.

Le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda lance un appel à la communauté internationale afin que tout soit mis en oeuvre pour surmonter au plus vite les graves problèmes financiers auxquels est confronté le Tribunal.

Le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda espère ainsi pouvoir répondre aux attentes du peuple rwandais de voir jugés équitablement les responsables des crimes commis au cours de l'année 1994.

Pour de plus amples informations, contacter le bureau du Porte-parole: tél. 84266 poste 11075 ou 11124 ou 11066.



Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-34

28 June 1995

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
BEGAN ITS WORK**

The 11 Judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda unanimously elected Laity Kama of Senegal as President of the Tribunal, and Yakov Ostrovsky of the Russian Federation as Vice-President.

The Tribunal began its work on Monday 26 June with the opening of its first plenary session in the Hague. The Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the Security Council to prosecute persons who committed genocide and other serious violations of humanitarian law last year. It is currently meeting at the headquarters of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but will be based in Arusha, Tanzania, with an office in Kigali.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.

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*The Prime Minister doesn't
depart from his usual
statements on the refugee
question. —*

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Date : 13 June 1995

Page 1 of 3

To : Mr. Joe Sills
Spokesman for the
Secretary-Generalc.c. Mr. J-C Aimé
Mr. S. Sanbar
Mr. J. HughesFrom: Thérèse Gastaut
Director, Information Service
Spokeswoman for the
Secretary-General (Geneva)
Palais des Nations
CH-1211 GENEVA 10
SwitzerlandTel No: (41) 22 - 907.23.00
Fax No: (41) 22 - 917.00.30

Fax No :

SUBJECT: Press conference by the Prime Minister of Zaire

... We are pleased to attach a summary of a press conference given today by the Prime Minister of Zaire, Mr. Kengo Wa Dondo, after his meeting with the High Commissioner for Refugees. The press conference was mainly devoted to the problems created by the presence of Rwandese refugees in Zaire.

Thank you for your attention.

c.c. Director-General, UNOG
Mr. M. de Almeida E. Silva
HCR, 739 81 11✓ c.c. Mr. Shahryar M. Khan
Special Representative of the S-G for UNAMIR, Kigali
FAX NO: 212-963-3090
Mr. Ould Abdallah
Special Sec-Gen's Representative for Burundi, Bujumbura

SRSG

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Not for Distribution or Dissemination

Press Conference by Prime Minister of Zaïre

Kengo Wa Dondo, Prime Minister of Zaïre, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Lunda Bululu, gave a press conference this afternoon at the Palais des Nations in Geneva at which they briefed correspondents on their meeting with Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The Prime Minister said the purpose of his meeting with the High Commissioner had been to tell her about the situation in his country and to ask the United Nations for help. Zaïre had been accused of helping troops of Rwandan or Burundian origin train in preparation for attacks in those countries. He had asked Ms. Ogata to set up a Commission of Inquiry to see whether such troops were training in refugee camps on Zaïrean territory. He had told her that since the Kibeho massacre, the flow of refugees returning home to Rwanda had ceased. Before, some 700 to 1,000 refugees had been returning daily and this flow should be resumed as soon as possible.

A recent report of the Parliament had called for all the refugees to leave Zaïre and had asked the Government to send them back, he said. However, the Government had acceded to the Geneva Conventions and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Refugees which called for voluntary repatriation. The Prime Minister had told the High Commissioner that Zaïre welcomed refugees, but it was now a victim of its own hospitality. Its economy and its environment were in ruins and Zaïre needed help from the international community to ensure that a wave of public opinion in favour of sending the refugees back would not put the Government in an awkward position regarding its international commitments.

A correspondent noted that Zaïre had been accused of allowing weapons to pass from Tanzania to Zaïre and asked how this was done. In reply, the Prime Minister said that the two countries were separated by Lake Tanganyika and had no specific border with Rwanda. If he could find out the specific names of the villages where this alleged arms trafficking was occurring, he could verify these allegations.

Another correspondent noted a certain disparity between the Government's position which respected the Geneva Conventions and the Parliament's position which no longer wanted refugees on Zaïrean soil and asked if Zaïre would forcibly repatriate refugees. Mr. Wa Dondo said it was true that the Government and the Parliament had different positions and that the Government wished to respect the Geneva Conventions. However, if public opinion along with Parliament challenged the Government, then it might fall following a no-confidence motion. For that reason, he had turned to the High Commissioner for Refugees for help.

Asked how the international community could help, he said that until

now the international community had helped the refugees, but had not assisted the host country. The refugees had greater purchasing power in Zaire than Zaireans, they had bought businesses and houses. The local population lived in sub-human conditions while the refugees in nearby camps lived more comfortably. This was leading to frustration and xenophobia, with the result that today, public opinion in Zaire was calling for the expulsion of the refugees. Zaire needed help with its infrastructure to improve life for Zaireans, he added.

Replying to a question on the current situation of the Ebola virus, he said its spread had been halted, although more than 200 deaths had occurred. It was impossible to say what would happen in the future. Other countries had found a few cases and he called on scientists to isolate the virus and create a vaccine.

Asked if it were true that Zaire was planning to detain the leaders of the former Rwandan Government who were engaged in spreading fear, the Prime Minister said that the recent Nairobi Summit had considered how to encourage the return of refugees. He suggested that the present Government in Kigali welcome members of the former Government who had not been involved in the genocide and allow these moderates to step forward. However, this had not happened. It was for the Rwandans, not for Zaireans, to say who was involved in the genocide.

Some of those accused of genocide were now on Zairean territory and the Government had appealed to the United Nations to find them another country of asylum. The Rwandan Government, for its part, had to create an atmosphere of confidence to allow the refugees to return. He had appealed to the Security Council to help ensure that the pendulum did not swing backwards and the genocide begin again. Rwanda should establish a pluri-ethnic Government and army and the international community should help Hutus and Tutsis to live in peace together.

There was no military activity in the camps in Zaire, the Prime Minister said in response to another question and the 1,500 Zairean troops stationed in the camps in response to UNHCR requests, was sufficient. However, a climate of confidence must be established in Rwanda to allow the refugees to return in peace and dignity and the authorities in Kigali had not done this. Mr. Wa Dondo was concerned that the refugees would stay in Zaire and that would not foster the cause of peace. If public opinion and the Parliament forced a no-confidence motion and brought down the Government, then the UNHCR would not be able to continue its work.

* * * * *

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14.6.95

DATE: 13 June 1995

TO: KHAN/TOUSIGNANT UNAMIR Kigali	FROM: ANNAN DPKO New York <i>H. Annan</i>
FAX NO: 3-3090	FAX NO: (212) 963-4879 ROOM S-3727
SUBJECT: SRSG's press conference of 9 June 1995	

TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 4

Please find attached a summary of the press conference given by the SRSG at Headquarters on Friday 9 June 1995, with apologies for the delay. Regards.

SRSG FC

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PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR RWANDA

Shaharyar M. Khan, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rwanda, this morning briefed correspondents on the new mandate for the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which the Security Council was expected to approve today. (The Council, by its resolution 997 (1995), subsequently approved UNAMIR's mandate for a six-month period, until 8 December.)

In considering how the new mandate had evolved, it was necessary to address four points, he said. First, any effort at reconciliation in Rwanda must be based on the return of the nearly 2 million refugees to the country, most of whom were in Zaire, United Republic of Tanzania and Burundi. Efforts must be undertaken to bring about their voluntary return in conditions of dignity and safety.

The Council resolution on UNAMIR would underline the need to continue the process of reconciliation and would cite the Bujumbura Declaration as the basis for the refugees' return, he continued. That Declaration stated precisely what the Government of Rwanda must do; the obligations of countries where the refugees now resided; and what agencies and donor countries must do to facilitate the refugees' return. Their return was an essential to rebuilding stability in Rwanda.

Secondly, there was a need for justice in Rwanda -- immediate justice, he said. Most families had been affected by the genocide, directly or indirectly. The people saw that an "international Tribunal had been established "for the so-called big fish", but felt the process was going too slowly. That was partly because financial support, although forthcoming, had been slow.

There was also a need for justice to be administered at the national level with regard to the 42,000 prisoners now being held, he said. Prison conditions were appalling. Foreign support was required to continue the repair of the national system of justice at all levels, including the gendarmerie, prosecutors and judges. Fifty members of the international community would be arriving soon to begin helping in that process.

While the next two to three months would not see the functioning of a perfect system of justice, it was better to have an immediate, imperfect system in place now, he went on. That was important, not only in view of the 42,000 prisoners, but because of the psychological impact of seeing the process of justice begin. Only when justice was seen as being carried out would it be possible to move forward in the process of reconciliation.

(more)

A third concern was the major problem of cross-border military infiltrations, he said. Guerrilla attempts at blowing up buildings and institutions led the defending force to look suspiciously on the population, which, in turn led to repression and generated a vicious cycle. It was important to discipline all military activities in the camps.

Broadly speaking, there were two types of camps, he said. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had been actively involved with the camps for civilians, which had seen some improvement. However, UNHCR had no involvement in the purely military camps, where military training was taking place. Zaire and Tanzania had asked for international support to help control that process of military training.

Fourthly, there was a need to expedite the disbursement of financial aid, he said. Out of over \$700 million pledged at the round-table in Geneva, only \$69 million had actually been seen, and most of that had been spent on debt-servicing. That left a relatively small amount for a country that had been completely shattered. That, in turn, made it very difficult to encourage refugees to return to a country which could not deliver basic requirements, including, for example, teachers' salaries.

Turning to the subject of the new mandate of UNAMIR, he said there was a need to reflect the changed situation since the establishment of that Mission. At that time, there were two parties contending for power under the Arusha Accords, and the United Nations was to be the arbiter. However, the Accords, though signed, had not taken off. Following the genocide, UNAMIR had sought to protect the innocent -- the non-combatants. On 19 July 1994, a new, sovereign Government had been formed, and the United Nations was now dealing with a single Government, which had stated its responsibility for the protection of its people.

The proposed new mandate envisaged a reduced number of troops, he said. It focused on national reconciliation and on the need for UNAMIR to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees, as well as their rehabilitation and reintegration into home communities. Police and monitors would be retained, and the Mission would provide security to international personnel in the country.

A correspondent asked whether agreement had been reached with the Government of Rwanda, which had wanted small contingents. Mr. Khan said the matter had been satisfactorily resolved, arriving at a figure of 2,330 to be reached within three months of today's expected mandate renewal. Those levels would be further reduced to 1,800 within four months. In addition, the current levels of 320 military observers and 65 civilian police would be maintained.

Asked to comment about the relations between UNAMIR and the Government, Mr. Khan confirmed that those relations had been strained and that there had been non-cooperation. However, at higher levels, there was a spirit of cooperation, and it was hoped that the new mandate would encourage a new era of cooperative relations.

(more)

A correspondent asked about a proposal to station additional peace-keepers in neighbouring countries to monitor arms supplies to the camps. Mr. Khan said the proposal was still alive and was mentioned in the resolution. However, the actual numbers would have to be arrived at in consultations with Tanzania and Zaire.

How many people were involved in the cross-border infiltrations and how often did they occur? a correspondent asked. Mr. Khan said that over the past six months, the infiltrations -- mainly from Zaire, and not Tanzania -- had been increasing. Earlier, there had been raids involving banditry, such as attacking and taking cattle. Now, however, they were more of a military nature and had become more organized. In the western region, at the frontier between Rwanda and Zaire, there were almost daily incursions, which were clearly part of a campaign.

Asked if the numbers involved were in the thousands or the hundreds, Mr. Khan said they were small groups. It was "very much a guerrilla type of activity", with small groups raiding and then returning.

A correspondent said there were reports that France had been funding those groups in Zaire and asked if the issue had been raised with the Government of France. Mr. Khan said he had absolutely no evidence that France or any other country was funding such activities, either in Zaire or in Tanzania. However, money was available to those groups, and it was being spent at arms bazaars worldwide.

Asked to speculate on the source of that money, Mr. Khan said that when members of the former Government had left the country, they had taken all of its liquid assets with them. Beyond that, he could not speculate on who might be assisting them.

In response to another question, he confirmed that the new mandate would put greater emphasis on humanitarian rather than security aspects of the Mission. The mandate was based on consultations within the Security Council, of which Rwanda was a member. Negotiations between the United Nations and the Government had made it possible to present a "dish" to the Council. Emphasis would now likely be placed on protecting Rwandan citizens and encouraging the safe return of the refugees, in conditions of dignity and fairness. For that purpose, UNAMIR needed a certain visible presence.

* * * * *

MEMORANDUM

To: Force Comd
MGen Tousignant

From: Force PAO
Lt(N) Page

Date: 13 June 95

Subject: Transcript of MGen Kagame Press Conference

1. Sir. Today's press conference was attended by local and three international media (Reuters, The New Yorker and Frontline News). Kagame didn't make a statement, but simply responded to questions as follows (salient points only):

a. Ref rearming of FRGF in Zaire, he said:

I have spoken with the government and told them that this does nothing to preserve their own security let alone ours and that they must work together to find a solution to this problem.

b. Ref the Rwandan government not accomodating the return of refugees, he said:

We are doing everything possible to have them return, but a small group is intimidating the rest to stay outside the country to act as shields for them. What can we do that we haven't done? People tell us to reconcile while they are still trying those who committed war crimes fifty years ago in Germany, but we africans are just supposed to forget - even trees (which are cut down) have more rights to the international community to Rwandans (which are cut down). We are interested in prosecuting only those who are the authors of the genocide, the others who are simple and confused killers can be helped to show what they did was wrong - there is hope for them and we want them back. But, the authors of the genocide will face punishment including the death penalty.

c. Ref the fact that Rwanda needs the refugees back to help with the crops, he said:

We want them back not to work, but because it is their right to live in Rwanda and our responsibility to bring them back. To encourage them we must prosecute and see justice done to those responsible for the genocide, then we can talk of reconciliation - this is the best way to move forward. But as we have seen in the past, we cannot rely on the international community to do this - that would be a mistake.

d. Ref the fact that the Directeur de Cabinet for the Prime

Minister is said to have fled the country saying that he can no longer act as a mere observer to the RPA as they terrorize innocent locals and that the current government is no better than the former, he said:

He's a man running from the problem and therefore can't be sincere and if he really wanted to help the situation he wouldn't run. Furthermore, what is he guilty of that he has to run away from Rwanda - maybe he helped in the genocide. There are problems here, but its because we've inherited a bad situation that has built up over 30 years, so now we have to fix the problem but it can't be done overnight. Running away from a problem is no solution unless you are guilty.

e. Ref his agenda at the upcoming OAU Summit, he said:

He will stress the feeling of betrayal Rwanda has felt even by its African brothers who now provide refuge for those guilty of murdering one million people, but no one bothered to ask them what they did in the genocide. This is contrary to the spirit of the OAU and he will request the assistance of Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire to alleviate the problems of finding the authors of the genocide as well as helping convince the refugees to come back to Rwanda.


f. Ref the disparity in punishment between the International Tribunal which is going after the authors of the genocide (no death penalty) and the Rwandan judicial system which is going after the mere actors of the genocide (death penalty), he said:

Yes, there is a disparity, but even a life sentence is better than someone going free for what they have done and at least they will be held accountable for their actions. We will do our best to deal with people fairly, as I hope the International Tribunal will do also, however, I won't be surprised if the Tribunal doesn't find anyone guilty of anything.

g. Ref the new mandate changing the focus from peacekeeping to confidence restoring, he said:

It is an academic question which could be debated for days whether or not UNAMIR can or should assist with confidence restoring of the Rwandese. I don't think that it's their role or that they can do it or should do it. The Rwandese people can build up their own confidence, and should do so, without UNAMIR. However, we had to make compromises with the UN so we said, okay, fine, you can try to restore our confidence (laughs). There are negative aspects of UNAMIR being here such as the fact that with their previous security/protection role, even a common thief could steal, then run to UNAMIR and get protection just by saying that he was being oppressed because he was a Hutu and UNAMIR would protect such a thief turning a simple problem into a political one. Also during the anniversary of the genocide some UNAMIR soldiers passed the rumour that there would be a revenge genocide, so that people would run to them to seek protection. This was only done by them to justify their existence here in Rwanda and is another negative aspect of the previous security/protection role that UNAMIR had. But, at the same time,

there are positive things about UNAMIR and we want them to be around still to help out with rehabilitation, reconstruction, reporting back to the international community, etc, so there is some good still in having UNAMIR in Rwanda.


Lt(N) Kent Page
Force PAO
11124





INFORMATION NOTE

TO: All Media

DATE: 6 June 1995

FROM: The Office of the Spokesman, *AD* UNAMIR

SUBJECT: Press Briefing

1. You are cordially invited to a press session between the United Nations system information officers and the media on Wednesday 7 June 1995 from 11:00 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.
2. The meeting will take place in the briefing room on the ground floor of UNAMIR Headquarters (Amaho Hotel).

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.

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FOR RWANDA

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The Council resolution on UNAMIR would underline the need to continue the process of reconciliation and would cite the Bujumbura Declaration as the basis for the refugees' return, he continued. That Declaration stated precisely what the Government of Rwanda must do; the obligations of countries where the refugees now resided; and what agencies and donor countries must do to facilitate the refugees' return. Their return was an essential to rebuilding stability in Rwanda.

Secondly, there was a need for justice in Rwanda -- immediate justice, he said. Most families had been affected by the genocide, directly or indirectly. The people saw that an International Tribunal had been established "for the so-called big fish", but felt the process was going too slowly. That was partly because financial support, although forthcoming, had been slow.

There was also a need for justice to be administered at the national level with regard to the 42,000 prisoners now being held, he said. Prison conditions were appalling. Foreign support was required to continue the repair of the national system of justice at all levels, including the gendarmerie, prosecutors and judges. Fifty members of the international community would be arriving soon to begin helping in that process.

While the next two to three months would not see the functioning of a perfect system of justice, it was better to have an immediate, imperfect system in place now, he went on. That was important, not only in view of the 42,000 prisoners, but because of the psychological impact of seeing the process of justice begin. Only when justice was seen as being carried out would it be possible to move forward in the process of reconciliation.

(more)

Rwanda Briefing

- 2 -

9 June 1995

A third concern was the major problem of cross-border military infiltrations, he said. Guerrilla attempts at blowing up buildings and institutions led the defending force to look suspiciously on the population, which, in turn led to repression and generated a vicious cycle. It was important to discipline all military activities in the camps.

Broadly speaking, there were two types of camps, he said. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had been actively involved with the camps for civilians, which had seen some improvement. However, UNHCR had no involvement in the purely military camps, where military training was taking place. Zaire and Tanzania had asked for international support to help control that process of military training.

Fourthly, there was a need to expedite the disbursement of financial aid, he said. Out of over \$700 million pledged at the round-table in Geneva, only \$69 million had actually been seen, and most of that had been spent on debt-servicing. That left a relatively small amount for a country that had been completely shattered. That, in turn, made it very difficult to encourage refugees to return to a country which could not deliver basic requirements, including, for example, teachers' salaries.

Turning to the subject of the new mandate of UNAMIR, he said there was a need to reflect the changed situation since the establishment of that Mission. At that time, there were two parties contending for power under the Arusha Accords, and the United Nations was to be the arbiter. However, the Accords, though signed, had not taken off. Following the genocide, UNAMIR had sought to protect the innocent -- the non-combatants. On 19 July 1994, a new, sovereign Government had been formed, and the United Nations was now dealing with a single Government, which had stated its responsibility for the protection of its people.

The proposed new mandate envisaged a reduced number of troops, he said. It focused on national reconciliation and on the need for UNAMIR to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees, as well as their rehabilitation and reintegration into home communities. Police and monitors would be retained, and the Mission would provide security to international personnel in the country.

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Asked to comment about the relations between UNAMIR and the Government, Mr. Khan confirmed that those relations had been strained and that there had been non-cooperation. However, at higher levels, there was a spirit of cooperation, and it was hoped that the new mandate would encourage a new era of cooperative relations.

(more)

In response to another question, he confirmed that the new mandate would put greater emphasis on humanitarian rather than security aspects of the Mission. The mandate was based on consultations within the Security Council, of which Rwanda was a member. Negotiations between the United Nations and the Government had made it possible to present a "dish" to the Council. Emphasis would now likely be placed on protecting Rwandan citizens and encouraging the safe return of the refugees, in conditions of dignity and fairness. For that purpose, UNAMIR needed a certain visible presence.

参 考 书 目



out 3701

TO: MS. F. BARRILLON-POMES DPA, UNATIONS, NEW YORK, USA	FROM: ISEL RIVERO, SA/SRSG UNAMIR, KIGALI RWANDA
FAX: 212 963 4037	FAX: 212 963 3090
CLEARED BY:	DATE: 05 JUNE 1995
SUBJECT: VPs PRESS CONFERENCE - 2 JUNE 1995	

Attached please find a transcript of the Vice-President's
Press Conference.

Regards.

* * * *

SA/SRSG

2 June 1995

A Press Conference was held today by General Kagame, Vice President and Minister of Defence of Rwanda at the Ministry of Defence, to give his views and through him the views of the Government on the recent report by Human Rights Watch.

QUESTION: A question was asked by a reporter concerning the Human Rights Report which suggested that UNAMIR's new mandate should cover the refugee camps in Zaire. Since the Rwandan government wanted a reduction in UNAMIR's troops, he wondered what the Vice-President thought about that suggestion.

KAGAME: Well my view on that is that first of all we have requested the UN to create a force that can go to these camps both in Zaire and Tanzania primarily to separate these groups, the militias and the former government forces from the rest of the population in the camps. Here we are looking at the possibility of the easy return of the refugees once they are freed from the influence of these groups that have been keeping them outside even many times by force. Well at first it seems that it was a good idea by the UN. They turned out later to say that they would not be able to create, there was no country willing to provide a force and they did not have the resources so they resigned it to leaving that task to the UNHCR and the host government forces to be the ones to deal with the questions. But here they are not dealing with the question of separating these groups they are only dealing with the question of simply stabilizing the situation in the camps perhaps for the convenience of the Non-governmental Organizations or other agencies working within the camps not really solving the problem of separating these groups. To us that remained a big problem, there was a lot lacking in terms of dealing with the specific problem of dealing with refugees the way you deal with refugees, give them the liberty, give them the freedom to make a decision to come back to the country and isolate these other criminal groups so they can be dealt with in terms of bringing them to courts of law, to be able to hold them accountable for the crimes they committed in the country. So we still think this was the best thing to do. There is absolutely no good reason why inside Rwanda there should be a force of 5,600 troops. Because you see here they have chosen to be in a place that is secure, which means it is in a place that has less problems that actually requires their presence in terms of providing security. So they should be doing that in the camps. This is where the problem is. The problems we have here are the responsibility of the Government and the Government institutions. They shouldn't be the ones to deal with such problems. And I think just out of logic that you would simply remain with a small force if any force at all inside the country to simply play the monitoring role, the role to observe and inform the international community what is happening on the ground in Rwanda. But I don't find them responsibility for UNAMIR in terms of protection inside the camp because problems are created by the military why you have now a problem of the military

training, regrouping, receiving arms. They are doing it with a lot of freedom and I wonder how the international community can miss the opportunity to be informed about this, to look at this, to deal with this kind of situation and simply keep focussing inside Rwanda where the people, the Government in the country can deal with the problems we have. But all we need is just support to enable us to carry out our responsibilities. So I think it's important that UNAMIR realizes or UN realizes that there is more work to do in the refugee camps outside Rwanda than inside the country. This is my feeling about it.

QUESTION: Noting that the Human Rights Watch report stated that the UN should tighten their resolution concerning the arms embargo against Rwanda. The Vice President was asked if he did not think that the Government and the Ministry of Defence should defend the Rwandese people?

KAGAME: Well that is true. It seems these days we live in a world where logic doesn't serve any purpose. First of all there was an embargo on Rwanda which was passed in May during the time we were fighting. Here it made sense because the idea was to prevent the escalation of fighting, perhaps of killing. But here really the killings were done by people who were armed with the machetes, not mainly with guns. So even putting an embargo did not really serve very useful purpose. But at least the idea was that and it made sense. So after the war when genocide was stopped, up to now there is still an arms embargo on Rwanda. Again, this is a different situation that does not call for an arms embargo on the country of Rwanda. But secondly it does not make sense because we have people outside Rwanda who are being armed free. They are being armed through the host countries, who've wished to do so. So the arms embargo in effect has not really served the purpose. So those who are keeping an arms embargo on Rwanda should see this. That it's not simply talking about an arms embargo that matters, it's effectiveness that matters. So it clearly has not served its purpose. And it has really been unfair on top of that to keep an arms embargo on Rwanda because the situation inside the country is totally different from that which was used to impose an arms embargo on the country. So maybe the international community, the UN has got to review the whole thing. So to come to your point certainly it creates problems for us. We are not able to equip our soldiers, we are not able to train them properly, we are able to carry out our responsibilities because we have our hands tied by this embargo. We've got to deal with the problems we have in a different way. We've got to face it the hard way but this does not mean in any way that we are not capable of handling the situation properly. We are certainly in a position to deal with the situation in a manner than cannot run this country into chaos even with the threat from outside.

QUESTION: Replying to a question as to why the Government of Rwanda was not arresting people suspected in last year's genocide, the Government of Belgium was doing, Mr. Kagame said:

KAGAME: Well first of all it's good that the Belgian Government has done that. They have done the right thing. Maybe they should do more. They should even go ahead and do the same event to the people who are inside the Belgian soil (?). They have issued an for Bagasora who may be in Zaire or Cameroon but they also have people in Belgium who should be arrested I think in connection with the genocide that transpire in Rwanda. But they have done a good thing, at least we should recognize that. Maybe they should also set an example for other countries to do the same. As regards to why Rwanda hasn't done that I inform you that we still have a lot of problems. In our justice system there are lots of inadequacies. There is a lot lacking in terms of appreciating exactly what should be done. I imagine it will take a bit of time before we put things in order but as you know we haven't even been able to try those who we have already arrested, let alone issuing arrest warrants to people who are outside the country. But some discussions are going on. We are trying to put our house in order as far as the judicial process is concerned. So we hope soon the Minister of Justice will be able to come out with something that satisfies the people of Rwanda in terms of meeting the justice requirements as regards bringing those responsible for the genocide to.....In effect there is a problem. There is a problem and we think we shall have to discuss it and look into the matter and collectively we should be able to help the Minister of Justice to deal with the immense problems we are faced with in a situation where they have no means, they have no magistrates. Perhaps even the lack of vision on the part of individuals that have different responsibilities. But as you know we are in a process of really rebuilding the country not only in terms of its infrastructure but also in terms of making people understand the history of these problems we have and how to deal with them.

QUESTION: A journalist stated that according to the Human Rights Watch report various countries were accused of helping the militia of the former government in Zaire. In light of information held by the Vice President, and in light of the denial of France and South Africa, what was he doing to investigate the situation?

KAGAME: What I can tell is that when you learnt about the arms supplies to the refugees in Zaire and elsewhere, we brought this to the attention of the international community to the UN. Even to the countries that are being alleged to have the responsibility of allowing such arms shipment into their countries for these refugees. This is what we tried to do. But the fact that some people are denying any responsibility does not really mean they have no responsibility over this. In any case I don't expect anybody to just come up and say, yes, I am the one who has been supplying arms. They expected the responses that everybody is going to deny having a hand in doing that. But the fact is that arms have been flowing into Zaire. They must be coming from somewhere. Whether the governments are directly involved or not they still have responsibility in the sense that even if these are private companies that are doing it they must

be doing it on their territories. So they must have responsibility to deal with such situations that originate from their territories. It doesn't matter whether it is a private company operating from France or from South Africa or from elsewhere, it still is the responsibility of these governments to make sure that these companies don't do so. So I think somewhere there lies the responsibility. So we can still go farther and work out the details as regards who has the responsibility, and how the governments that have been mentioned can help to deal with the situation but for sure I think they must do something. Not only are they contravening the arms embargo resolution that was passed by the UN, they are also causing problems for the country of Rwanda and for the whole region. Because I think the situation that may develop out of these arms shipments and then subsequent use of them to destabilize our country we have spill overs in other countries in the region. I am sure it works in nobody's interests.

QUESTION: Asked if the government forces were able to defend the country in case of attack, and pursue the attackers from the former government wherever they may be, Mr. Kagame stated:

KAGAME: Well, what we can say here is that we have the capacity to deal with the problem. How we deal with the problem is a different matter, whether it involves hot pursuit or something else. That will come when the problem unfolds. But you have the liberty, you have the capacity to respond appropriately to any such threat should it become a reality. We have the capacity, we have the freedom to operate appropriately in response to anything that will come out of the situation. So that will involve a lot of options.

QUESTION: General Kagame responded to a question about The European Community's announcement yesterday that they were considering resuming development aid to Rwanda which was frozen after the Kibeho killings, and that resumption of aid would depend on the consequences that would come from the findings of the Investigating Committee. The Vice President was asked what were the consequences taken by the government as a result of that report.

KAGAME: Well I think there are many things to look at for us even before that report came out, we were already carrying out our own investigation to find out if they are any individuals who acted contrary to the instructions that were given to them at the time of the operation to close the camps. And we are soon coming out with the conclusions of our investigations maybe in a week and if the responsibility lies on the shoulders of anybody then they will be held accountable. But this is as far as the Government and the Government forces are concerned. But I think in the report they also talked about the responsibility of the NGOs, they also talked about the responsibility of UNAMIR. So I would like to ask those presenting such views to whom they are going to handle that side. We also would like to have somebody handle the other side.

UNAMIR that were also equally implicated as far as having responsibilities was concerned.

QUESTION: A journalist stated that after the victory on the battle field last year the RPA was the only organized body left in Rwanda and was therefore left in charge of running the country. Now that things were slowly going back to normal, did the Vice President think that the RPA should concentrate on purely military duties and return to their barracks:

KAGAME: Well you more or less describe the situation the way it is. I think the RPA initially had responsibility to fight the forces that were here killing the people of Rwanda. We have been in the process of trying to restore total normalcy and establish civil administration and I think we've gone a long way in doing that. The military is remaining only in terms of the security where depending on the threats that still hang outside, from Zaire, from Tanzania. We still our soldiers operatingin different areas, in the communes, to deal with the problem of the situation, to deal with more or less even covering the vacuum that was created by this transition, where in some areas there was not any civil administration based at the local level. You would find troops operating in such areas but mainly for the purpose of keeping security in the area and as we restore the local administration, and as we deal with the security problems in the entirety, it is well understandable that as long as the threat is reduced then the army continues to confine itself to its specific duties of national defence and security. Where there have been overlaps it's because either there has been a vacuum or it's because of the security problem that drags them into carrying out such responsibilities. But on the biggest part, I think the has been restored, and the civil and local administrations are being established and have been established, so the reverse kind of situation is really taking place, but that will depend on how fast we can deal with the security aspect that is likely to emanate from outside the country.

QUESTION: The Vice President was asked if there was any pressure from the international community to grant a general amnesty to most of the population who participated in the acts of genocide.

KAGAME: Well I think they have, whether you call them pressures or misunderstandings or simply misrepresentation of our own situation. The international community has certainly had in some cases the approach that is not compatible with the kind of situation that we have in our country. To give you an example there have been all sorts of suggestions of saying release from prison women and children who murdered. You see they simply go on those sentiments that so and so is a woman so it doesn't matter whether she killed 100 people, maybe she should be released from prison because she is a woman. We have had this kind of suggestion from the international community. We have of course had disagreements as to what comes first, whether it is

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reconciliation or whether it is justice. Our view is that reconciliation does not simply come about without certain factors being in place to contribute to that. And these factors are actually that people must see justice being done and that will ease the conscious of reconciliation. You cannot simply tell the people who are agrieved, seriously agrieved in the case of Rwanda to just reconcile with murderers. I think you would try the murderers and then the process of reconciliation ... in other cases. So there have been misunderstandings, I think to some extent we even think there has been a situation where people have become unreasonable. Maybe they think in the situation of Rwanda having lost one million people doesn't really mean much, something you can just forget and move forward. And I think the people of Rwanda will have the right to think that this is an insult. It's an insult in the sense that we value the lives of our people as much as other people value the lives of their people. I was even giving an example to some people recently when they had been pushing that argument of reconciliation, it seems that you cannot unite Hutus and Tutsis, you know they are so simplistic in their thinking. They think the question is the Hutu and the Tutsi, they've never seen the problem as being political. They've never seen the problem as being a mismanagement of the political affairs of the country that has really brought about this kind of situation. And I was giving them an example why do they think it is easy to forget about the killings that were carried out in Rwanda, yet people are commemorating incidents of situations of this nature that took place 50 years ago. So this is why I get the reading that actually people think our lives are worthless, theirs mean a lot. That's why they come around and tell us forget the lives of people that were lost here hundreds of thousands. So I think it's our mistake, maybe we shouldn't over rely on what other people can do for us. We should not over rely on the international's solutions to our problems. We should be the ones to be at the forefront in doing all that we can to solve our problems. And then the international community can simply play a supportive role. But if we want them to solve our problems, surely they'll come here and tell you to forget what happened. They'll say, a million people is nothing, just forget them. So it's up to us to know how to go about the problem and then arrest the supporters.

QUESTION: Members of the Government are not united in the issue of reconciliation and the granting of general amnesty. Would you comment on that.

KAGAME: My views have been very clear, I am being very clear to you now. Let somebody in the government who thinks differently come out very clear and tell us what he thinks. But as long as nobody comes out to present different views from what I am presenting, people have reason to believe that we are united. Other than that we may be assumed to be divided. ... If there is anybody in the Government who thinks the justice is the first thing to be carried out in order to have reconciliation, they should come out and put it forward.

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING FAX 3877
MIR NO: 1963
MISC NO:

TO: MR. IQBAL RIZA UNHQ, NEW YORK	FROM: ISEL RIVERO SA/SRSG, UNAMIR KIGALI
FOR: AMBASSADOR S.K. KHAN SRSG, UNAMIR	
AUTHORIZED BY:	DATE: 3 JUNE 1995
FAX NO: 212 963 6460	PHONE: 212-963-3582 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
SECTION: OSRSG, UNAMIR, RWANDA	
SUBJECT: <u>VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE - 2 JUNE 1995</u>	

This is the first part of the Vice President's Press Conference. As soon as the second part is transcribed, I will fax it to you.

Best regards.

Conférence de presse du Général Kagame

A la question de savoir comment il a reçu le dernier rapport de Human Rights Watch, le Général Kagame a répondu, je cite : " Nous n'avons pas été surpris par ce rapport, parce que nous savions déjà que les anciennes forces gouvernementales parmi les réfugiés rwandais se trouvant dans les camps au Zaïre et en Tanzanie procédaient aux entraînements militaires et recevaient des armes de certains pays avec l'objectif d'attaquer le Rwanda. Nous avons informé les autorités Zaïroises et Tanzaniennes. Puisque cela est maintenant confirmé par d'autres sources, nous espérons que ces pays prendront des mesures appropriées pour mettre un terme à ces préparatifs. Les pays cités par ce rapport devraient aussi arrêter d'armer ces réfugiés; dans le cas contraire, ils devraient savoir que ce n'est pas seulement le Rwanda qui subira les conséquences de la guerre, mais aussi ses pays limitrophes et même toute la région entière. Fin de citation.

Est-il vrai que ces réfugiés rwandais qui veulent attaquer le Rwanda ont des complices à l'intérieur du pays ?

Cela est bien possible mais je n'ai pas encore d'éléments qui me permettent de confirmer ces informations, a précisé le Général Kagame. Il a rappelé toutefois que le Gouvernement a le pouvoir et les prérogatives de poursuivre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de tels actes. Nous ferons une enquête à ce sujet. Cependant, je dois indiquer qu' en général il n' y a pas de quoi s'inquiéter et que la sécurité est bien maîtrisée sur tout le territoire du pays, a rassuré le Vice-président rwandais.

Est-ce que le Gouvernement rwandais n'a-t-il pas en quelque sorte une responsabilité dans les préparatifs d'attaque contre le Rwanda, sinon comment expliquer que l'actuel ambassadeur du Rwanda au Zaïre est connu comme l'un des fondateurs de la milice Interahamwe ?

Le Général Kagame a répondu qu'il n'était pas informé des relations entre le nouvel ambassadeur du Rwanda au Zaïre et les Interahamwe mais espère que si cela était vrai, l'ambassadeur aurait changé et se serait désolidarisé des miliciens.

A la question sur la collaboration entre les réfugiés rwandais et le Palipehutu du Burundi, le Général Kagame a indiqué qu'il avait reçu plusieurs informations sur la collaboration entre les Interahamwe et le Palipehutu dans les attaques qu'ils mènent contre leurs pays. Il a aussi signalé que parmi les personnes qui s'étaient infiltrées récemment dans la région de Cyangugu en provenance du Zaïre étaient des personnes qui ont été identifiées comme des Burundais. Cette question sera examinée avec les autorités burundaises pour résoudre les problèmes de sécurité à la

frontière commune, au cours de la visite que le Ministre des affaires étrangères et le premier ministre rwandais doivent effectuer au Burundi, a ajouté le Général Kagame.

Un journaliste a demandé au Général Kagame de commenter sur le problème des autorités qui sont accusées de protéger les Interahamwe, et à titre d'exemple, le Bourgmestre de la commune de Musambira qui a arrêté plusieurs Interahamwe et qui a été arrêté lui-même ?

Le Général Kagame a précisé qu'il n'était pas sûr qu'il ne s'agissait pas de rumeurs, mais que si cela était vrai, c'était un problème qu'il fallait résoudre au plus vite.

A la question de savoir ce qu'il en était des informations selon lesquelles des véhicules de la MINUAR auraient été interceptés avec des chargements d'armes et de munitions non enregistrées, le Général Kagame a indiqué que les gendarmes avaient intercepté 7 ou six camions de la MINUAR avec des chargements de munitions non-enregistrées et que la MINUAR avait ensuite produit des documents attestant que ces chargements étaient bel et bien les leurs. Les gendarmes poursuivent encore leur enquête pour en savoir plus et la population sera informée des résultats de l'enquête.



PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-32

26 May 1995

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ELECTS SIX JUDGES OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

The United Nations General Assembly elected on 24 and 25 May 1995 in secret balloting the judges who would serve in the trial chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Elected were:

- Navanethem Pillay of South Africa,
- Laity Kama of Senegal,
- T.H. Khan of Bangladesh,
- Lennart Aspegren of Sweden,
- Yakov A. Ostrovsky of the Russian Federation,
- William H. Sekule of Tanzania.

The Tribunal consists of the following:

- two trial chambers, each made up of three judges;
- a five-judge Appeals Chamber, appointed by the President of the Tribunal;
- a Prosecutor, who will be responsible for investigating and prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law; and
- a Registry which will be responsible for administering and servicing the Tribunal.

The six judges are elected for terms of four years on a full-time basis. Their team will be reinforced by the members of the Appeals Chamber for former Yugoslavia, who will also serve as members of the Appeals Chamber for Rwanda.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



INFORMATION NOTE

TO: All Media

DATE: 22 May 1995

FROM: The Office of the Spokesman/UNAMIR

SUBJECT: Press Briefing

1. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan, will hold a press briefing on Wednesday, 24 May 1995 at 11 a.m.
2. All the media, official and private, printed and audio-visual, national and international are welcome.
3. The meeting will take place in the Briefing Room on the ground floor of UNAMIR Headquarters (Hotel Amahoro).

Note:

A press briefing is held at the same venue every other Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Rwanda will occasionally invite a residing or visiting official to address the press.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



NOTE D'INFORMATION

A: Responsables de l'Information
Système des Nations Unies, Kigali

DATE: 22 mai 1995

DE: Porte-parole, MINUAR *Ad*

OBJET: Rencontres avec le RSSG et Réunions de Presse

1. Ce mercredi 24 mai 1995, de 10h15 à 10h55, le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire général, l'Ambassadeur Khan s'entretiendra avec les responsables de l'information du système des Nations Unies au Rwanda.

2. A 11h00, ce même jour, l'Ambassadeur Khan se prêtera aux questions des journalistes pendant une heure environ.

3. L'attention particulière des responsables de l'information du système des Nations Unies au Rwanda est appelée sur le calendrier des rencontres avec le RSSG et des réunions de presse, qui se présente comme suit:

- Mercredi 24 mai:

- 10h15 à 10h55 : rencontre avec le RSSG
- 11h00 à 12h15 : conférence de presse du RSSG.

- Mercredi 31 mai:

- 11h00 à 12h15 : rencontre d'information entre les responsables de l'information du système des Nations Unies et les média.

- Mercredi 7 juin:

- 10h15 à 10h55 : rencontre avec le RSSG
- 11h00 à 12h15 : conférence de presse du RSSG.

- Mercredi 14 juin:

- 11h00 à 12h15 : rencontre d'information entre les responsables de l'information du système des Nations Unies et les média.

N.B.

La réunion d'information avec le RSSG et la conférence de presse de celui-ci alterneront les mercredi avec les points de presse des responsables de l'information avec les média.

Pour de plus amples informations, contactez le bureau du Porte-parole: tél. 84266, poste 11075 ou 11124 ou 11066.



TO: All Information Officers of the
UN System in Kigali

DATE: 16 May 1995

FROM: Ismaël A. Diallo, Spokesman *AD*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Press Sessions

1. As proposed by some Information Officers of UN agencies, UNAMIR is happy to launch press sessions for all UN Information Officers in Kigali.
2. These sessions are to start on Wednesday, 17 May, 1995 at 11:00 a.m. on a fortnightly basis, but may become weekly if the demand so dictates.
3. All Information Officers of the UN system will be offered an opportunity to talk about activities of their respective agencies and to answer questions from journalists and other interested parties who may attend these sessions.
4. The session this Wednesday will be preceded by a meeting with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Khan, at 10:15 a.m., to which you are invited.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman: Tel. 84266, ext. 11075 or 11066.



A: Tous les fonctionnaires de l'information
du système des Nations Unies, Kigali

DATE: 16 mai 1995

DE: Ismaël A. Diallo
Porte-parole *AD*

SUJET: Invitation aux réunions de presse

1. Comme cela a souvent été suggéré, la MINUAR se propose d'organiser des réunions d'information à l'intention de tous les responsables de l'information des Nations Unies à Kigali.
2. Les réunions se tiendront un mercredi sur deux, la première ayant lieu ce mercredi 17 mai 1995 à 11 heures; elles pourraient toutefois devenir hebdomadaires en cas de besoin.
3. Les fonctionnaires de l'information auront ainsi l'occasion de rendre compte des activités de leurs institutions respectives et de répondre aux questions des journalistes qui seront conviés à ces réunions.
4. La réunion de ce mercredi 17 mai sera précédée d'une rencontre avec le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général, l'Ambassadeur Khan, à 10h15, réunion à laquelle vous êtes cordialement invités.

Pour plus d'informations, prière de s'adresser au Bureau du Porte-parole, téléphone 84266, poste 11075 ou 11066.

UNITED NATIONS
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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR PR-95.29

02 May 1995

Kigali, RWANDA - Some media reports have cited UNAMIR as the source of allegations that the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) exhumed and took away some bodies from Kibeho Camp.

UNAMIR denies categorically being the source of such information.

The position of UNAMIR on the recent Kibeho incidents has been duly communicated through earlier press releases and other official channels. That position remains unchanged.

Note to editors: For more information, please contact Ismael Diallo, UNAMIR Spokesperson in Kigali Telephone (212) 963-3582 or (250) 84266, ext. 11075.



NEWS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR. 95.28

25 April 1995

KIGALI, RWANDA -- The following statement, attributable to the Spokesman of the Secretary-General, was issued on 23 April 1995.

The Secretary-General has learned with shock and horror of the indiscriminate killing of thousands of unarmed civilians, including women and children, in a camp for internally displaced persons at Kibeho, Rwanda. He condemns this action in the strongest terms and demands an immediate end to these atrocities. The Secretary-General has decided to despatch this week an envoy to Kigali to deliver a personal message to the Government.

Note to editors: For more information, please contact the Office of the UNAMIR Spokesman, telephone 84266 extension 11075, 11066 or 11124.

UNITED NATIONS
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NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NEWS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR-95.27

April 23, 1995

Kibeho Camp Situation Update

KIGALI, RWANDA -- The UNAMIR Force Commander, Maj.-Gen. Guy Tousignant visited the Kibeho Camp and Butare today. He met with Ministers of the Rwandese government, officers of the Rwandese Patriotic Army monitoring the situation and representatives of various UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations. After taking a more scientific count of the number of deaths, the figure has been revised to approximately 2,000. The number of wounded and injured is estimated at more than 600.

The Australian Medical team has been in operation throughout the day treating casualties at the camp and has been assisted by Zambian Company soldiers in triage assessments. The Zambian soldiers have also provided humanitarian assistance to those in need and also provided sanctuary to approximately 250 abandoned children at their location inside Kibeho Camp.

UNAMIR military observers have been providing escort to internally displaced persons as they make their way to their home communes. UNAMIR vehicles continue to be available to assist in the transport of these people. Medical centres and relief way stations have been set up along the route to provide assistance as required.

It should be noted that throughout the events of the past few days, and particularly in the incidents of yesterday, that while in extremely difficult situations, Zambian soldiers inside the camp did not fire a single shot.

Presently it is estimated that a few thousand people remain inside a compound within the camp and do not wish to leave.

Note to editors: For more information, please contact Ismael Diallo, UNAMIR Spokesperson in Kigali at (212) 963-3582, ext 11075 or the UNAMIR Military Spokesperson, Lt(N) Kent Page at (212) 963-3582, ext 11124.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NEWS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR-95.26

April 23, 1995

Kibeho Camp Situation Update

KIGALI, RWANDA -- As of dawn this morning, April 23, 1995 UNAMIR troops on the ground at Kibeho camp have counted an estimated 3,000 4,000 dead and hundreds wounded and injured.

UNAMIR troops have been conducting triage in order to best assist with the medical situation on the ground. The Australian Medical team is presently in operation at the camp and is being augmented. The international medical community is rallying medical support in theatre and is making arrangements for the reinforcement of outside medical assets.

UNAMIR troops are also providing shelter for approximately 250 orphaned children who are in the sanctuary of the Zambian Company location at the camp.

UNAMIR vehicles are being made available again today to assist in the transport of those in need in the other internally displaced person camps at Ndago, Kamana and Munini.

At this point, it is reported that there are several thousand people still at the Kibeho Camp located near the Medicins Sans Frontieres location.

Rwandese Patriotic Army soldiers have been observed burying the bodies of victims killed in the camp.

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Note to editors: For more information, please contact Ismael Diallo, UNAMIR Spokesperson in Kigali at (212) 963-3582, ext 11075 or the UNAMIR Military Spokesperson, Lt(N) Kent Page at (212) 963-3582, ext 11124.

PRESS RELEASE

KIBEHO

The Special Representative of the Secretary General to Rwanda has expressed his profound shock and grave concern at the heavy death toll and large numbers of injured at the internal displaced persons camp located at Kibeho in south-western Rwanda. He has particularly condemned the killing of unarmed civilians attempting to flee from the camp and has stressed that the United Nations has consistently advised against the use of force to resolve humanitarian situations.

The incidents that led to today's tragedy began before noon on 22 April 1995 when some IDP's attempted to break out of the RPA cordon around the camp. While attempts were being made to control this break out, other points of the cordon were breached resulting in a large number of IDP's fleeing the camp. The RPA resorted to firing, to control the break-out and as a result, a large number of IDP's were killed and wounded. The situation was partially controlled by 14.00 hours local time but a further outbreak was reported at 17.00 hours local time with heavy retaliatory firing by RPA.

The SRSG discussed the tension in the camps with the Vice-President and Minister of Defence Gen. Kagame on 21 April and again on 22 April. Also on 22 April, the SRSG and the UNAMIR Force Commander Gen. Guy Tousignant held an emergency meeting with the Rwandese Chief of Staff Col. Sam Kaka at which they expressed their deep shock and concern at the loss of life and emphasized the need for a peaceful approach. They urged the Government to adopt urgent measures to alleviate the massive suffering of the people in the camps by providing greater space, humanitarian assistance and way-stations for IDP's who decide to walk to their communes. They informed the Chief of Staff that over 80 vehicles were available to transport the IDP's back to their communes. They underlined the need to take immediate steps for medical aid, humanitarian relief supplies and measures to reduce pressure in the camps in order to avoid further outbreaks of violence and the possibility of epidemic diseases.

UNAMIR has placed all its medical facilities on alert and is transporting the injured by helicopter to emergency medical units in Butare and Kigali. The Australian Medical Support Group, also part of UNAMIR, is fully deployed to attend to the injured. Elements of the Zambian battalion deployed in the camps have remained in their positions and are assisting in providing security, particularly to women and children who have sought sanctuary with them.



COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

12 avril 1995

LE REPRESENTANT SPECIAL DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL ANNONCE L'ARRIVEE PROCHAINE DE MAGISTRATS POUR LES TRIBUNAUX RWANDAIS

Les cérémonies commémoratives marquant le premier anniversaire du génocide, l'agrandissement des prisons, la remise en état du système judiciaire national et l'ouverture des écoles secondaires : tels ont été les grands sujets abordés par le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général, l'Ambassadeur Shaharyar Khan, à sa conférence de presse hebdomadaire du mercredi.

Après avoir rappelé que les cérémonies du déclenchement de la tragédie ont ravivé la douleur des Rwandais, mais aussi la profonde émotion ressentie par la communauté internationale, le Représentant spécial a déploré qu'au cours des manifestations organisées hier en face du Siège de la MINUAR, des voies officielles se soient élevées, parmi les manifestants, pour fustiger l'action de la MINUAR. Il faudrait, a-t-il dit notamment, que les discours prononcés par le Président et le Vice-Président du Rwanda demeurent les lignes directrices qui guideront le pays sur la voie de la normalisation. La MINUAR, a souligné M. Khan, est ici pour aider les Rwandais, et seulement pour cela.

Abordant la question des prisons surpeuplées et du système judiciaire actuel, le Représentant spécial a indiqué qu'une opération vient de démarrer, en coopération avec les autorités rwandaises, pour 'décongestionner' certaines prisons et améliorer les conditions de détention. De plus, une action est en cours pour agrandir certains centres pénitentiaires.

Parlant du système judiciaire rwandais, M. Khan a estimé, après avoir rappelé que le premier procès avait commencé, qu'il est important que les tribunaux commencent à siéger, même si le système judiciaire n'est pas encore entièrement opérationnel. Il a indiqué par ailleurs que, dans le courant du mois de mai, des magistrats et des experts sont attendus à Kigali pour venir renforcer le personnel judiciaire rwandais. Ces magistrats, a-t-il précisé, viendront en majeure partie de pays africains.

Au sujet de l'enseignement secondaire, le Représentant spécial a indiqué que la MINUAR a contribué activement à l'ouverture de certaines écoles, mais qu'un important travail doit être fait, consistant à réparer des bâtiments, installer l'électricité, assurer la nourriture des élèves pensionnaires.

Répondant à la question d'un journaliste concernant la réconciliation, l'Ambassadeur Khan a souligné que celle-ci, pour être authentique et durable, doit s'opérer à tous les niveaux de la société et, surtout, au niveau du peuple.

Pour plus d'informations, prière de s'adresser au bureau du Porte-parole, téléphone 84264 poste 11075 ou 11066



COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

SG/SM/5611
11 avril 1995

Le Secrétaire général déplore les discours incendiaires prononcés contre la MINUAR

Le porte-parole du Secrétaire général a lu la déclaration suivante :

Le Secrétaire général, M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a été informé par son Représentant spécial au Rwanda qu'une manifestation a eu lieu aujourd'hui près du Siège de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR).

Le Secrétaire général déplore que des discours de nature incendiaire, contenant des allégations complètement sans fondement, aient été prononcés contre la MINUAR et les Nations Unies. Il regrette tout particulièrement que des responsables officiels rwandais aient participé à la manifestation et auraient fait des déclarations malvenues.

Le Secrétaire général lance un appel à toutes les couches de la société rwandaise lui demandant de faire preuve de retenue à cet instant critique, afin de ne pas exacerber davantage les tensions. Le Secrétaire général espère que le Gouvernement du Rwanda fera tout son possible pour que la MINUAR obtienne, à tous les niveaux, la coopération nécessaire pour s'acquitter de son mandat.

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

PRESS RELEASE

In cooperation with the Rwanda Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, UNAMIR, with UNICEF and other UN agencies, has carried out a successful operation to organise the sitting of secondary school admission exams.

About 65,000 primary school pupils took their exams on schedule as a result of a coordinated effort between the UN and the Rwanda Lower Education Ministry, which covered 400 exam centres across the country. Thirty-nine UNAMIR vehicles and a helicopter were used to carry out the operation successfully. For the first time in Rwanda's history, official exam was set in four languages: Kinyarwanda, French, English and Swahili.

The Minister of Primary and Secondary Education, Mr. Pierre Célestin RWIGEMA, met with the Special Representative of the Secretary General on 21st March and congratulated him for the exemplary cooperation. This cooperation represents UNAMIR's continuing support for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda's infrastructure and economy in general.

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21 March 1995

UNITED NATIONS



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21 March 1995

✓ agnes please get copies of the summit communique and also of the
press communique that the military issued (2) on the problem of the
✓ 12 dead in the south. grenier who is the info person in the
military has copies of the press releases. one set of the last
✓ ones should be with our office. the other complete set including
summit communique should be sent by special to randolph kent for
distribution to specialised agencies reps.

thanks

done

isel

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NEWS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR-94.016

January 7, 1995

**UN MEDICAL STAFF RESPOND TO SHOOTING INCIDENT
IN SOUTHERN RWANDA**

KIGALI, RWANDA -- The Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, Maj.-Gen. Guy Tousignant, ordered the deployment of an emergency medical and resuscitation team, a protection element and a military observer group, in response to a significant shooting incident which took place two miles south east of Remera near the Burundi border.

In addition to providing first aid treatment upon arrival, UN Medical staff mostly consisting of Australian and Canadian soldiers evacuated by helicopter six severely injured casualties. The casualties are currently at the Kigali Central Hospital, where Australian and Non Government Organisation medical staff are performing surgery.

Initial reports presently indicate that 12 people have been killed and 36 injured in this latest incident, which took place earlier today.

The United Nations Headquarters was notified of this incident at approximately 9:15 a.m. this morning. Less than 45 minutes after receiving notification, UNAMIR medical staff were on their way to render assistance. The more seriously injured were evacuated from the Runyonbyi camp at approximately 12:30 p.m. and transported to Kigali. Medical staff subsequently remained on site for several hours to provide additional medical assistance.

It is presently unclear who was responsible for this act of violence, but the matter is presently under investigation.

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Note to editors: For more information, please contact the UNAMIR military public affairs officer, Capt S. Grenier in Kigali at (212) 963-9574 ext 11124.



*Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMIR, Kigali*

NEWS RELEASE

Killing of 13 persons in IDP Camp at Busanze

The SRSG Mr. Shaharyar Khan and Force Commander Gen Tousignant had a meeting with Vice President Gen Paul Kagame on Monday 9th January relating to the incident in Busanze camp in which 13 people had been killed. Vice President Kagame has informed SRSG Shaharyar Khan that pending a full inquiry on the incident, three RPA officers had been arrested and a court martial ordered. The officers are the battalion commander, the company commander and the platoon commander.

Vice President Kagame assured the SRSG and the Force Commander that the government remained committed to honouring the agreed policy of supporting Operation Retour and not closing IDP camps by force.



FACT SHEET

THE NUMBERS GAME

UNAMIR

HAS IMMUNISED OVER 60 000 RWANDANS

HAS TREATED WELL OVER 170 000 RWANDAN PATIENTS AND CONTINUE TO TREAT AN AVERAGE OF 200 TO 300 PATIENTS A DAY

HAS TRANSPORTED WELL OVER 45 000 DPS BACK TO THEIR COMMUNES

HAS CLEARED SEVERAL THOUSANDS OF UNEXPLODED MUNITIONS (2 420)

HAS LAUNCHED MINE AWARENESS PROGRAMS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES

IS PROVIDING SECURITY AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS AND ARE PRESENT IN MOST OF THE DP CAMPS IN SOUTH WESTERN RWANDA

IS CONDUCTING DAY CLINICS IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE COUNTRY TO ASSIST THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN RETRAINING

HAS REPAIRED ELECTRIC LINES, BRIDGES, ROADS, INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND WATER SERVICES FOR VARIOUS TOWNS AND COMMUNES

HAS ESCORTED HUNDREDS OF HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOYS

THE FACTS TO SUPPORT THE NUMBERS

The following information is presented as a brief synopsis of the UN involvement in Rwanda. This document will be updated as required and as information becomes available to this office. Please refer to the date below for updates.

Armed interventions:

Canadian soldier at front gate of UNAMIR saved two UNAMIR staff who were held at gunpoint by Drunk RPA soldier

Zambia intervened in Musabeya when RPA opened fire in crowd during market day

Provision of security:

UNAMIR troops provide security on a permanent basis to many establishments such as: UNREO offices, HSF and MSF facilities, Kamembe airport, Factories, ICRC (Ethiopia).

Presence in camps:

UNAMIR troops are present in many DP camps such as: Mururu, Nyagatare, Nyarushishi, Cyimbogo, Kitambo, by (Ethiopia)... In Cyanika, Kaduha, Rukondo, Muko, Musabeya, by (Zambia).

Immunisation:

UNAMIR medical staff conducted an immunisation programme for over 60 000 Rwandan, (various contingents).

Mine clearing:

More than 1 420 mines were cleared in various sectors of the country (British).

More than 500 pieces of unexploded munitions were cleared in the month of August in the Kigali region (Canadian Contingent)

Well over 500 unexploded munitions were cleared in the Byumba area in the last several months (Nigeria)

Mine awareness program is under way in the Byumba area (Nigeria)

Water purification:

Aide to local communities:

UNAMIR troops help the local community by working on farm lands with the locals and by providing assistance to the Shagasha water purification plant, (Ethiopia)..

Day Clinics:

UN medical staff conduct day clinics in various communities. (Australia and Canada in Kibungo)

UN medical staff conduct clinic in Musabeya area (Zambia).

UN medical staff conducted Day clinics in Byumba and Mukono, (British)

Repair of infrastructure:

Help in repairing the damaged electric lines in the Cyangugu area, (Ethiopia).

Helping Rwanda Telephone to restore services throughout the country, (Canada).

Assist several communities in restoring water services, (Canada).

Repaired the bridge at Kanzenze (British). During this operation, Saper Robert Copsey lost the lower part of his right leg after stepping on a TS 50 land mine

Road repair and maintenance in the Kitabi area

Escort of convoys:

Over 48 UNHCR in Cyangugu area, (Ethiopia).

Transport of Rwandans:

Over 19 171 in Cyangugu area, (Ethiopia).

Over 5 000 from South west to home communes (Canada)

Medical:

Statistics for the months of August and September, show that UNAMIR has provided direct medical assistance to over 45 000 Rwandans in the months

Over 1 586 patients in the Cyangugu area, (Ethiopia).

An average of 100 patients per day receive medical treatment from UN troops in the Byumba area (Nigeria)

An average of 20 patients per day receive medical treatment from UN troops in the Kigali area, (Canada).

An average of 34 patients per day receive medical treatment from UN troops in the ???????? area, (Zambia).

Humanitarian:

UN contingent initiatives have resulted in charity drives back in home countries and will soon see delivery of several tons of humanitarian assistance such as medicine, food, clothe, fridges, sewing machines and more to orphanages in Gitarama, Butare, Kigali, Byumba, Kigeme etc (Nigeria, Canada, British)

LAST UPDATE ON.....December 6, 1994