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UNOMUR MONUOR

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda/Rwanda

94 JUN -3 13 17

IMMEDIATE

DCMO 09/06/94

CODE CABLE

OUTGOING FAX NO. 841
3 JUNE 1994

TO: MGEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR KIGALI MISC 732	**FROM:** COL ASRAR ACTING CMO UNOMUR, KABALE
FAX NO: (07) 84266	**FAX NO:** 256 486-23816
SUBJECT: UNOMUR PERIODICAL REPORT COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 19 DECEMBER 1993 TO 3 JUNE 1994	

REFERENCE:

A. UNAMIR OUTGOING CODE CABLE NO. CRN 194 AND MIR 1087 DATED 2 JUNE 1994

INTRODUCTION

1. UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION S/846(1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993 THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA/RWANDA (UNOMUR) WAS ESTABLISHED AND ACCORDINGLY UNOMUR STARTED MONITORING THE AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). AS STATED IN THE MANDATE, THE TASKS OF UNOMUR ARE:

A. TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER.

B. TO VERIFY THAT NO MILITARY ASSISTANCE REACHES RWANDA, FOCUS BEING PUT PRIMARILY IN THIS REGARD, ON TRANSIT OR TRANSPORT, BY ROADS OR TRACKS WHICH COULD ACCOMMODATE VEHICLES OF LETHAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ACROSS THE BORDER, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER MATERIAL WHICH COULD BE OF MILITARY USE.

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AIM

4. THE AIM OF THIS REPORT IS TO GIVE A REVIEW OF UNOMUR ACTIVITIES FOR THE PERIOD COVERING 19 DECEMBER 1993 UPTO 3 JUNE 1994 WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON OUR EXTENDED MONITORING ACTIVITIES.

SCOPE

5. THE REPORT WILL COVER THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS:

A. THE POLITICAL ASPECT.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT.

C. OPERATIONAL ASPECT.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS ASPECT.

E. CONCLUSION.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS.

POLITICAL ASPECT

6. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN UNOMUR OPERATIONAL AREA IS USUALLY CALM. THE POPULATION IN KABALE AND KISORO DISTRICTS (UNOMUR OPERATIONAL AREA), IS APPROXIMATELY A MILLION PLUS. IT IS A WELL KNOWN FACT THAT THE MAJORITY ARE OF RWANDESE ORIGIN - WHO FLED THE MASS MASSACRES IN THE LATE 50. MOST OF THEM ARE VERY CLOSE RELATIVES OF THE RPF AND AS SUCH (IN VERY BROAD TERMS), ARE VERY APPREHENSIVE (SENSITIVE) TO UNOMUR ACTIVITIES ALONG THE BORDER AND THEIR SILENT INTERFERENCE, ALTHOUGH COMMON KNOWLEDGE NO ONE TALKS ABOUT IT.

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2. THE MISSION HAS FOLLOWING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMPONENTS:

A. MILITARY STAFF - COMPOSED OF MILOBS FROM:

(1)	BANGLADESH	.....	20
(2)	BOTSWANA	.....	9
(3)	BRAZIL	.....	13
(4)	HUNGARY	.....	4
(5)	NETHERLANDS	.....	10
(6)	SENEGAL	.....	10
(7)	ZIMBABWE	.....	10
(8)	SLOVAKIA	.....	5
	TOTAL		81

B. CIVILIAN STAFF - IT HAS 11 INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN STAFF AND 7 LOCALLY RECRUITED STAFF.

3. BY NOW UNOMUR IS EIGHT (8) AND A HALF MONTH IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA. PRIOR TO THE RECENT CRISIS IN RWANDA, WE HAD BEEN MONITORING THE BORDER FROM SABINIO VOLCANO (SQ 8947) IN THE WEST UPTO LUBIRIZI (2360) IN THE EAST BASED ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF RPF ON THE RWANDAN SIDE. WITH THE PRESENT DEPLOYMENT OF RPF UPTO MIRAMA HILL (5183) WE HAVE ALSO EXTENDED OUR ACTIVITIES UPTO MIRAMA HILL BY HAVING A 24 HOURS MANNED OP/CP UNDER TENTS. TO FULFILL THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT WE HAVE NOW SEVEN (7) OPs/CPs MANNED ON 24 HOURS BASIS AS AGAINST TWO (2) OPs/CPs MANNED PREVIOUSLY (TILL EARLY MARCH 1994). OUT OF THE SEVEN (7) OPs/CPs, THREE (3) ARE UNDER PERMANENT STRUCTURE AND FOUR (4) ARE UNDER TENTS. THE INDUCTION OF THREE (3) HELICOPTERS IN EARLY APRIL 1994 HAS ALSO HELPED US ENORMOUSLY IN MAXIMIZING OUR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

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7. ANOTHER CONCRETE FACT IS THAT THE RPF FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE NRA DURING THE UGANDAN BUSH WAR, WHICH DEFEATED OBOTE AND BROUGHT PRESIDENT MUSEVENI TO POWER IN 1986. THEY ARE, IN FACT, "BLOOD BROTHERS' SUCH THAT THE NRA (NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH UNOMUR) CAN DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE - MAY BE CLANDESTINELY - TO SUPPORT THEIR BROTHERS. OTHERS SOURCES STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE RPF HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFACTORILY REWARDED FOR PUTTING MUSEVENI IN POWER THAT IS WHY THEY HAVE THE PRIVILEGE OF CROSSING IN AND OUT UGANDA ANY TIME, ANY WHERE AS THEY WISH.

8. ABOUT THE CURRENT CRISIS IN RWANDA, AT HEART UGANDANS HAVE JUBILITATIONS BUT OUTWARDLY THEY EXPRESS THE SITUATION TO BE THE INTERNAL AFFAIR OF RWANDESE PEOPLE AND THEIR (UGANDAN'S) POINT OF VIEW ARE JUST LIKE ANY NEIGHBOURS AND AS SUCH, VERY CAUTIOUS IN PROJECTING THEIR ENTHUSIASM OVERTLY.

9. OVERALL, THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF BOTH THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, AS WELL AS THE GENERAL PUBLIC TOWARDS UNOMUR IS ACCEPTABLE. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THERE IS ALSO A VERY POWERFUL RPF LOBBY AT ALL LEVELS IN UGANDA. THEIR INFLUENCE AND POWER BASE CANNOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY OR BE IGNORED.

10. ON THE WHOLE THE UGANDAN AUTHORITIES AND THE RPF IN PARTICULAR ARE NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF UNOMUR PARTICULARLY DUE TO THE CURRENT INTENSITY OF OUR OPERATIONAL/MONITORING ACTIVITIES.

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11. UNOMUR IS MADE UP OF TWO COMPONENTS, NAMELY THE MILITARY COMPONENTS AND THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT. LOCAL CIVILIAN STAFF HAS ALSO BEEN RECRUITED TO SUPPORT THE MISSION. THE DETAIL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IS ATTACHED AT ANNEX "A" AND "B" TO THIS REPORT. BY NOW THREE (3) OF THE CONTINGENTS FROM NETHERLANDS, ZIMBABWE AND SENEGAL HAVE BEEN ROTATED AFTER SIX (6) MONTHS TOUR OF DUTY. DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE PRESENT CONTINGENTS ARE AS UNDER:

A.	BANGLADESH	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
B.	BOTSWANA	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
C.	BRAZIL	END OF AUGUST 1993
D.	HUNGARIAN	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
E.	SLOVAKIA	EARLY NOVEMBER 1993
F.	NETHERLANDS	EARLY MARCH 1994
G.	SENEGAL	END OF MARCH 1994
H.	ZIMBABWE	EARLY MARCH 1994

12. THE HQ STAFF HAS BEEN REDUCED TO BARE MINIMUM REQUIRED. PRESENTLY WE ARE HAVING 9 MILITARY STAFF AS AGAINST 14 (TILL MARCH 1994). THIS WAS DONE IN ORDER TO CREATE THE 10TH TEAM FOR THE MISSION AND 7TH TEAM FOR AREA EAST. EACH TEAM CONSISTS OF 6 UNMO'S PROPORTIONATELY DRAWN FROM VARIOUS CONTINGENTS.

OPERATIONAL ASPECT

13. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE - UNOMUR HAS DEVELOPED FOLLOWING CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BASED ON ONE MAIN HQ - AT KABALE AND TWO AREA HQS AT KISORO AND KABALE:

CODE CABLE

A. TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER BY PHYSICALLY DEPLOYING STATIC OBSERVATION POSTS/CHECK POINTS (OPs/CPs) AT THE TWO MAJOR CROSSING POINTS AT KYANIKA, GRID RJ049520 AND KATUNA, GRID SP012428 ON A 24 HOUR BASIS. SECONDARY CROSSING POINTS ARE AT BIGAGA, GRID RJ907364, LUBIRIZI, GRID SP259619, KAFUNZO, GRID SP083478, KASHEKYE (SQ 8860) AND MIRAMA HILL (SQ 5183).

B. TO MOUNT RANDOM VEHICLE MOBILE PATROLS DURING DAY AND NIGHT TO COVER AREAS/ROUTES WHICH REQUIRES SURVEILLANCE.

C. TO MOUNT FOOT PATROL DURING DAY AND NIGHT COVERING AREAS/TRACKS WHICH CANNOT BE MONITORED BY MOBILE PATROL BUT REQUIRES TO BE SURVEILLED.

D. TO CARRY OUT AERIAL DAY PATROLS BY INSERTING UNMO'S BY HELICOPTER ON TO DOMINATING FEATURES WHICH PROVIDES GOOD OBSERVATION OF THE BORDER AREAS/ROUTES LEADING TO THE BORDER.

E. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE BORDER AREAS/ROUTES LEADING TO THE BORDER PARTICULARLY BY COMMANDERS AND STAFF.

14. DEPLOYMENT - THE BORDER STRETCHES FOR APPROXIMATELY 170 KM FROM SABINIO VOLCANO IN THE WEST TO MIRAMA HILLS IN THE EAST. ABOUT 120 KM OF THE BORDER FROM SABINIO VOLCANO TO LUBIRIZI (UNDER RPF CONTROL) WHICH USED TO BE UNOMUR AOR TILL APRIL 1994. BUT PRESENTLY THE AOR HAS EXTENDED UPTO MIRAMA

CODE CABLE

HILLS. THE AREA HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO(2) - AREA EAST AND AREA WEST. AS OF 03 JUNE 1994, UNOMUR IS DEPLOYED AS GIVEN IN ANNEX "C".

15. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS - UNOMUR CONDUCTS ITS OPERATIONS THROUGH VIGOROUS PATROLLING OF THE WHOLE STRETCH OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA. THESE PATROLS ARE CARRIED OUT IN VARIOUS FORMS:

A. STATIC OPs/CPs

(1) THERE ARE SEVEN (7) PLACES WHICH ARE OCCUPIED AND MANNED ON 24 HOURS BASIS.

OPS/CPS		DATE OF MANNING	REMARKS
(A)	KYANIKA	27 NOVEMBER 93	PERMANENT STRUCTURE
(B)	KATUNA	13 NOVEMBER 94	PERMANENT STRUCTURE
(C)	LUBIRIZI	11 APRIL 94	PERMANENT STRUCTURE
(D)	KASHEKYE	11 APRIL 94	UNDER TENTS
(E)	BIGAGA	2 MAY 94	UNDER TENTS
(F)	MIRAMA HILLS	14 MAY 94	UNDER TENTS
(G)	KAFUNZO	3 JUNE 94	UNDER TENTS

(2) THE FIRST 3XCP/OP ARE HAVING PERMANENT STRUCTURES. ONE TEAM PERFORMS THE DUTY FOR A WEEK AND THEN ROTATED.

(3) THE REMAINING 4XCP/OP ARE UNDER TENTS. ONE PATROL OF 2XUNMOS ALONGWITH ONE NRA SOLDIER PERFORM DUTIES FOR 24 HOURS AND THEN ROTATED BY ANOTHER PATROL FROM THE SAME TEAM.

(4) WE ARE EXPECTING TO HAVE PERMANENT STRUCTURES FOR KAFUNZO, MIRAMA HILLS AND BIGAGA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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(5) THE MAIN TASKS OF THE CP/OP IS TO OBSERVE AND REPORT MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC TO AND FROM RWANDA.

(6) CHECKING OF LOADS IS ALSO DONE BY UNLOADING THE STORES IF THERE IS ANY SUSPICION.

B. VEHICLE MOBILE PATROLS - THESE ARE DESIGNED TO COVER AREAS AND SECONDARY TRACKS THAT COULD BE USED BY VEHICLES TO FERRY MILITARY EQUIPMENT INTO RWANDA. MORE EMPHASIS (ON THESE PATROLS) HAS BEEN PLACED IN THE AREAS WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY OP/CP BUT REQUIRED TO BE MONITORED.

D. FOOT PATROLS - MOBILE VEHICLE PATROLS HAVE NORMALLY BEEN CONVERTED INTO FOOT PATROLS, AIMED AT GETTING TO PLACES THAT ARE INACCESSIBLE BY VEHICLE - AND TO IDENTIFY ANY FOOT PATHS THAT CROSS INTO RWANDA.

E. AERIAL PATROLS - AERIAL PATROLS ARE CARRIED OUT DURING DAY HOURS BY INSERTING 2XUNMO'S ON A DOMINATING FEATURES ALONG THE BORDER LINE FOR A PERIOD OF 6-8 HOURS. THEIR TASK IS TO OBSERVE THE BORDER AND IN PARTICULAR THE MOVEMENTS ALONG ROUTES/TRACKS LEADING TO THE BORDER.

E. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE PATROL - THESE ARE AERIAL PATROLS CONDUCTED BY COMDS AND STAFF FLYING OVER THE BORDER TO SURVEIL MOVEMENTS ALONG THE BORDER AND ROUTES LEADING TO THE BORDER.

16. COMMUNICATIONS - SO FAR, THERE IS NO SERIOUS PROBLEM WITH COMMUNICATIONS (COMMS) BY TELEPHONE, FAX ETC, BUT VOICE COMMS IS RATHER AN UNDER SCORE DUE TO THE HILLY NATURE OF OUR OPERATIONAL AREA:

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A. HF SETS - ONE HF SET IS INSTALLED AT THE MISSION HQ TO HAVE COMMS WITH KAMPALA.

B. VHF SETS - A TOTAL OF (36) VEHICLES HAVE VHF SETS MOUNTED. THE NET IS OBVIOUSLY CONTROLLED BY THE MISSION HQ. AS EARLIER MENTIONED, BECAUSE OF THE HILLY TERRAIN, DIRECT COMMS IS AT TIMES NOT POSSIBLE AND AS SUCH, A RELAY STATION IS DEPLOYED AS AND WHEN NECESSARY. A REPEATER STATION IS ALSO INSTALLED TO CIRCUMVENT THIS HICCUP. TO AUGMENT THE VEHICLE MOUNTED SETS, A TOTAL OF (49) WALKIE TALKIES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR COMMS.

17. HELICOPTERS - THE MISSION AT LONG LAST GOT THREE (3) HELICOPTERS IN EARLY APRIL 1994. THE INTEGRATION OF HELICOPTERS IN OUR PATROL ACTIVITIES HAS ENABLED US TO MAXIMIZE OUR OPERATIONAL EFFORT. THE HELICOPTER THOUGH HAVE THE DIFFICULTIES OF NIGHT FLYING (ALSO REFER TO OUR FAX NO. 656 DATED 01 MAY 1994 AND NO. 678 DATED 05 MAY 1994) BUT AT THE MOMENT USED FOR FOLLOWING PURPOSES:

A. MEDEVAC

B. TRANSPORTATION OF UNMO'S TO OPs/OPs.

C. ROTATING UNMO'S IN OPs WHICH ARE MANNED ON 24 HOURS BASIS.

D. DROPPING UNMO'S ON DOMINATING FEATURES FOR OBSERVATION.

E. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE PATROLLING.

F. AERIAL RECCE.

G. TRANSPORTATION OF VIPS FROM KAMPALA TO KABALE AND BACK.

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18. SECURITY - THE SECURITY SITUATION IN UGANDA IN GENERAL, IS NOT CERTAIN. AT THE MOMENT, THE HQs CPs/OPs AND EVERY MILOBS' RESIDENTIAL PLACE(S) ARE GUARDED BY THE NRA ROUND THE CLOCK. THE UN COLOURS THEMSELVES ARE ALSO AN AID TO SECURITY. THE NRA ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY TO OUR PATROLS.

19. RELATIONSHIP WITH NRA - THE LIAISON WITH NRA WERE USUALLY ALRIGHT. BUT IN THE RECENT PAST, SINCE WE HAVE INTENSIFIED OUR ACTIVITIES THE ATTITUDE OF NOT SHOWING DESIRED COOPERATION WERE NOTICED. SOME OF THE INSTANCES ARE GIVEN BELOW:

A. NOT PROVIDING ESCORTS AS REQUIRED FOR PATROLS ALWAYS AND EVERY TIME.

B. NOT ALLOWING US TO MONITOR AREAS WHICH ARE WITHIN OUR MANDATE.

C. UNUSUAL DELAY IN ALLOWING US TO MONITOR MIRAMA HILL (ALSO REFER TO OUR CODE CABLE MIS 619 OF 9 MAY 1994).

D. HARASSING OUR UNMO'S WITHOUT ANY VALID REASON (ALSO REFER TO OUR UNOMUR OUTGOING FAX NO. 814 OF 29 MAY 1994).

20. RELATIONSHIP WITH RPF - RPF DEPLOYED ON THE RWANDA SIDE OF THE BORDER ARE USUALLY UNCOOPERATIVE AND AT TIMES HOSTILE. THIS IS MANIFESTED BY THEIR FIRING AT OUR HELICOPTER AT MIRAMA HILL. A REQUEST WAS MADE THROUGH NRA AND UNAMIR (MILOB MULUNDI) TO HAVE A LIAISON MEETING BETWEEN RPF AUTHORITY MANNING THE BORDER AND ACTING CMO WAS ALSO NOT HONOURED AS YET.

21. UGANDA'S SUPPORT FOR RPF - THERE EXISTS A HARMONIOUS COOPERATION BETWEEN RPF AND UGANDAN GOVERNMENT AS EVIDENT FROM UNINTERRUPTED MOVEMENTS OF FOOD STUFFS AND MEMBERS OF RPF TO UGANDA (REFER TO OUR DAILY

SITREPS TIME TO TIME). THERE IS NO DIRECT OR CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF TANGIBLE MATERIAL MILITARY SUPPORT TO RPF BY UGANDA THROUGH OUR AOR. HOWEVER, WE STRONGLY SUSPECTS, POSSIBLE MILITARY SUPPORT FROM UGANDA DURING THE PERIOD FROM MID APRIL TO 13 MAY 1994 THROUGH MIRAMA HILL/KAGITUMBA BORDER CROSSING (ALSO REFER TO OUR CODE CABLE NO. MISC 619 OF 09 MAY 1994).

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS ASPECT

22. ADMINISTRATION - THE OVERALL ADMINISTRATION (ADMIN) OF UNOMUR RESTS WITH THE SENIOR ADMIN OFFICER (SAO) WHO IS A CIVILIAN AND PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UN. THE COOPERATION AND ATTITUDE OF CIVILIAN STAFF TOWARDS MILITARY COMPONENT ARE REMARKABLY GOOD. THE SALIENT ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION ARE GIVEN BELOW:

A. PERSONNEL - UNOMUR HAS A TOTAL OF EIGHTY ONE (81) PERSONNEL WHICH INCLUDES 78 MILOBS AND THREE (3) MEMBER MEDICAL TEAM.

B. CHANGE OF COMMAND - THE PREVIOUS ACTING CMO, COL MATIWAZA OF ZIMBABWE REPATRIATED TO OWN COUNTRY ON COMPLETION OF TOUR OF DUTY IN EARLY MARCH 1994. THE PRESENT ACTING CMO COL ASRAR FROM BANGLADESH IS PERFORMING THE DUTIES FROM 26 FEBRUARY 1994.

C. LEAVE/CTO - LEAVE AND CTO IS AVAILABLE AS PER PLAN WHICH IS WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE. PRESENTLY MILOBS ARE PROCEEDING ON LEAVE/CTO AS PLANNED, MAINTAINING THAT 25% OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH CAN BE ON LEAVE/CTO AT ANY ONE TIME.

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D. WELFARE - UNOMUR HAS A WELFARE FUND TO PROCURE DUTY FREE ITEMS AND RESALE TO MILOBS. THE FUND ENJOYS A MEMBERSHIP OF 30 MILOBS.

E. MEDICAL - ALL THE MILOBS AND CIVILIAN STAFF ARE IN A VERY GOOD HEALTH CONDITION. THIS IS JUST A FORTUNATE STATE OF AFFAIRS GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE MISSION HAS DEFINITELY INADEQUATE MEDICAL FACILITIES. WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTER OUR CONCERN HAS ALSO EASED OUT.

F. MEDALS - THE MISSION HAS NOW IN POSSESSION OF MEDALS. BUT UNFORTUNATELY BY THE TIME THE MEDALS WERE IN OUR HAND, THREE (3) OF THE CONTINGENTS ALREADY ROTATED. HOWEVER, MEDALS FOR THOSE CONTINGENTS ARE BEING SENT THROUGH UN/NYK.

G. DISCIPLINE - THE OVERALL DISCIPLINE OF THE MILOBS IS QUITE GOOD. HOWEVER, FEW CASES OF MINOR NATURE WERE THERE WHO WERE DEALT LOCALLY.

H. MORALE - THE MORALE OF THE MILOBS IS QUITE SATISFACTORY. THEY ARE NOW BETTER MOTIVATED TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE MANDATE/TASKS.

I. PREPAREDNESS OF CONTINGENTS - IT HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED THAT SOME OF THE CONTINGENTS JOINED THE MISSION WITHOUT REQUISITE BACKGROUND AND PREPARATIONS LIKE:

(1) LANGUAGE SKILLS

(2) DRIVING SKILLS (EVEN WITHOUT KNOWING DRIVING)

(3) WITHOUT PRESCRIBED PERSONAL EQUIPMENT.

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23. LOGISTICS - THE LOGISTICAL BACK UP TO UNOMUR HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. SALIENT ASPECTS OF LOGISTICS ARE GIVEN BELOW:

A. TRANSPORT - THE WHOLE MISSION HAS A TOTAL OF 39 VEHICLES INCLUDING ONE TRUCK, ONE AMBULANCE AND ONE MINIBUS. THESE ARE SHARED AMONGST THE HQ STAFF (BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) AND PATROL TEAMS. ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER IS ALRIGHT BUT THE QUALITY OF THE VEHICLES ARE NOT SATISFACTORY. THE PROBLEM OF SPARE PARTS, BATTERY AND CORRECT PATTERN OF TYRES ARE A CONSTANT ISSUE.

B. CONSTRUCTION OF OP/CP - TILL MARCH 1994 WE HAD ONLY KATUNA AND KYANIKA AS PERMANENTLY CONSTRUCTED OP/CP. IT TOOK LONG TIME AND IN EARLY APRIL WE HAD THE OP/CP AT LUBIRIZI. THE CONTRACT OF BIGAGA/KAFUNZO AND MIRAMA HILLS HAVE BEEN FINALIZED BUT IT WILL USUALLY TAKE TIME TO HAVE THE ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED.

C. SPARES/EQUIPMENT - IT USUALLY TAKES A LONG TIME TO GET SPARES AND ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENTS AVAILABLE IN PLACE. THIS IS DUE TO LONG 'BUREAUCRATIC' CHANNEL WHICH IS REALLY TIME CONSUMING.

CONCLUSION

24. THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNOMUR TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER HAS NEVER BEEN TAKEN HEALTHILY BY UGANDAN IN GENERAL AND NRA AND RPF IN PARTICULAR.

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25. THE LAST THREE MONTHS MUCH EFFORT HAS BEEN PUT IN TO CHANGE THE MENTALITY OF THE UNMO'S TO CREATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE OF THE PATROL ACTIVITIES UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS WITHOUT MUCH COMFORT.

26. THE QUALITY OF THE PATROLLING IN THE BORDER AREA HAS BECOME MORE SPECIFIC AND IS STILL INCREASING.

27. THE REDUCTION OF MISSION HQ STAFF TO CREATE AN ADDITIONAL TEAM HAS HELPED IN MAXIMIZING OUR EFFORT IN INCREASING THE PATROL CAPACITY. MORESO HQ PERSONNEL IS ALSO INVOLVED IN CARRYING OUT PATROLS.

28. THE LONG AWAITED ARRIVAL OF THE HELICOPTERS HAS CONSIDERABLY CONTRIBUTED TO A MORE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF MONITORING.

29. THE EFFECT OF OUR EFFORT HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN DIMINISHED BY REQUISITE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM BECAUSE OF REASONS AS MENTIONED ABOVE: ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AS, OFF THE ROAD TIRES, SUFFICIENT SPARE PARTS, NECESSARY ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT ETC. COULD NOT OR NOT ON TIME BE ACQUIRED. CONSTRUCTIONAL ACTIVITIES WERE FREQUENTLY DELAYED.

30. WITH THE CHANGING SITUATION IN RWANDA AND PRESENT LEGITIMACY OF RPF, THE PURPOSE OF MONITORING THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER IS GRADUALLY LOSING ITS VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION.

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31. AS THE RENEWED MANDATE PERIOD IS GOING TO TERMINATE ON 23 JUNE 1994, UNOMUR HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MONITORING THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER VERY EFFECTIVELY AT LEAST DURING THE LAST 3 MONTHS.

RECOMMENDATIONS

32. THE JUSTIFICATION OF UNOMUR TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER IS LOSING DUE TO THE CHANGED SITUATION IN RWANDA, AS SUCH IT WILL BE LOGICALLY NOT CORRECT TO EXTEND THE MANDATE PERIOD FROM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

33. SHOULD THE MISSION BE CLOSED, IT IS RECOMMENDED:

A. TO REPATRIATE THE FOLLOWING CONTINGENTS WHO HAVE COMPLETED MORE THAN 6 MONTHS IN THIS MISSION:

		NO. OF MILOBS	DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THE MISSION
(1)	BANGLADESH	20	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
(2)	BOTSWANA	9	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
(3)	BRAZIL	13	END AUGUST 1993
(4)	HUNGARY	4	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
(5)	SLOVAKIA	5	EARLY NOVEMBER 1993
	TOTAL	51	

B. TO ABSORB THE FOLLOWING CONTINGENTS EITHER IN UNAMIR OR ANY OTHER UN MISSION (SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF COUNTRY CONCERN) WHO HAVE JOINED THIS MISSION IN EARLY MARCH 1994

(1)	NETHERLANDS	10
(2)	SENEGAL	10
(3)	ZIMBABWE	10
	TOTAL	30

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C. UNOMUR'S PRESENTLY HELD ASSETS SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO UNAMIR. CONVERSELY, AUTHORITY MAY CONSIDER MAINTAINING A SMALL LOGISTIC LIAISON OFFICE AT KABALE WITH SOME ESSENTIAL (SKELETON) CIVILIAN STAFF. THIS WILL FACILITATE (THE SMOOTH FLOW OF) ALTERNATE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR BY ROAD FROM UGANDA.

34. SHOULD THE MISSION'S MANDATE PERIOD BE EXTENDED, FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS MAY BE CONSIDERED:

A. AVIATION OFFICER OF A MISSION SHOULD NECESSARILY BE FAMILIAR WITH ORGANIZING AND CONTROLLING OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS AND SPEAK FLUENTLY THE LANGUAGE OF THE AIRCRAFT CREW. THE AVIATION OFFICER SHOULD BE A QUALIFIED OPERATIONAL HELICOPTER OFFICER (AIR MOBILE, SPECIAL FORCES ETC.), NOT A NORMAL UNMO. THIS APPOINTMENT SHOULD BE A DESIGNATED APPOINTMENT.

B. ON ARRIVAL, MORE ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THE CHECKING IN OF PERSONNEL:

(1) THEIR SPECIFIC MILITARY FUNCTIONAL SKILLS

(2) THEIR (ENGLISH) LANGUAGE SKILLS

(3) THEIR PRESCRIBED PERSONAL EQUIPMENT (AS PER THE GUIDANCE OF MILITARY OBSERVERS ON ASSIGNMENT)

(4) VEHICLE DRIVING SKILLS.

C. IN CASE OF AN UNSATISFACTORY RATING OF (ONE OF) THE ABOVE MENTIONED ASPECTS THIS SHOULD BE REPORTED THROUGH THE MISSION'S HIGHER ECHELON TO THE NATIONAL COUNTRY AND UN/NYK WITH THE REQUEST/ADVISE FOR IMMEDIATE REPATRIATION AND REPLACEMENT.

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D. THE BALANCING OF APPOINTMENT ON THE BASIS OF NATIONALITY SHOULD GET LESS EMPHASIS THAN THE POSSIBILITIES OF APPOINTMENT ON THE BASIS OF SKILLS, EXPERIENCE AND BACKGROUND. CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES SHOULD BE INFORMED ON THIS WELL IN ADVANCE AND MADE AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF SENDING LESS QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.

E. IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL ARE FLUENT IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE MISSION.

F. MORE RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE DELEGATED TO, IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE, SAO UNOMUR TO MAKE THE LOGISTICAL SYSTEM MORE FLEXIBLE, ADEQUATE REACTING, LESS BUREAUCRATIC AND TIME CONSUMING.

35. BEST REGARDS.

ANNEXES:

A. ORGANIZATION OF UNOMUR (MILITARY COMPONENT)

B. ORGANIZATION OF UNOMUR (CIVILIAN COMPONENT)

C. DEPLOYMENT OF UNOMUR

UNOMUR ORGANIGRAM
Military Staff



UNOMUR CIVILIAN STAFF



(V) VACANT
LOCAL STAFF



MAP NO. 3778.1 UNITED NATIONS
APRIL 1993

▲ Constructed House
△ Tent

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNOMUR, KABALE
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 28 October 1993
NUMBER: 2089

SUBJECT: **Integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR**

Reour Cables 1978 and 2040 on the above, please find attached copy of self-explanatory memorandum from the Office of Legal Affairs. We fully share the views expressed in this memorandum. Regards.

Read over phone to GEN. DALLAIRE
29 OCT.-93 12.30LT.

Position explained by Dr Kalia.

CMU 009 P2/2

United Nations Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERBUREAUX

TO: Mr. Iqbal Riza
Assistant-Secretary-General
for Peace-Keeping Operations

DATE: 22 October 1993

REFERENCE:

THROUGH: S/C DE:

FROM: Carl-August Fleischhauer
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
The Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: Integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 8 October 1993 on the above-captioned subject, in which you requested our legal opinion on the following:

a) How would the Security Council's decision to integrate UNOMUR into UNAMIR affect the status of UNOMUR and its mandate under resolution 846 (1993)?

b) Whether the integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR would require a revision of the SOMA concluded between the UN and Uganda?

c) Whether the integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR can proceed as mandated by the Security Council, given the objection which Uganda has made to the integration?

2. The integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR is an internal UN administrative measure, therefore, in our opinion it does not affect the status of UNOMUR and its mandate under Security Council resolution 846 (1993).

3. Because the mandate and status of UNOMUR remain unchanged no need arises to revise the Exchange of Letters on the privileges and immunities of UNOMUR which was entered into between the UN and Uganda. Consequently, the objection made by the Government of Uganda does not seem to be well founded. Nevertheless, out of deference to Uganda's expressed objection the integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR which, in any case, is planned to occur in phases should be delayed until consultations between the UN and the Government of Uganda to allay Uganda's objections will have taken place.