

Subject Files of the Office of the Force Cmdr. - Mel. Lufb. Branch
4101 Project "Yellow Knife" - Port Francoqui Incident

26/4/1961-6/6/1961

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UN ARCHIVES

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RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

MIL INFO 5/A/3.4 ✓

6 JUN 61

CHIEF LOGISTIC OFFICER

Losses due to PORT FRANQUI Incidents

1. Reference your HQ ONUC (LOGS) 138/2 of 5 Jun 61.
2. The list of arms and ammunition lost by the Ghanaian Contingent as reported to us is attached hereto.

okw
(Björn Egge)
Lt-Col

Chief of Military Information

MKK/kp

Distribution:

Chief of Staff

Chief Administrative Officer

RESTRICTED

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ANNEX 1
TO MIL INFO 5/A/3.4
TO LOSSES - PORT
FRANCOI INCIDENTS
DATED 6 JUN 61

RIFLES

	<u>BUTT NO</u>	<u>REGD NO</u>
1.	231	4598
2.	234	4719
3.	235	4704
4.	237	4585
5.	253	4492
6.	257	4741
7.	259	4588
8.	273	4720
9.	279	4651
10.	287	4758
11.	292	4409
12.	303	4600
13.	306	4672
14.	307	4370
15.	327	4844
16.	225	1024
17.	224	0907
18.	222	0905
19.	246	4716
20.	270	4413
21.	252	4621

STERLINGS

1.	24614
2.	23978
3.	24635
4.	23349

<u>LMG</u>	1.	A-9088
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<u>VEREY PISTOL</u>	QTY 1
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<u>GRENADES</u>	QTY 144
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RESTRICTED

S/A/3. 4

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 138/2

5 June, 1961

To : Chief Administrative Officer
From : Chief Logistics Officer
Subject: LOSSES DUE TO PORT-FRANCOUI INCIDENTS
Info : Chief of Staff
Chief of Military Information ✓

Reference your confidential inter-office memorandum dated 2 June, 1961.

1. The list of arms and ammunition lost by the Ghanaian Contingent at Port-Francoqui is still awaited from Chief of Military Information.
2. HQ Ghana Brigade was however requested, vide our letter of even number dated 20 May 61, copy endorsed to you, for the required information. A copy of their reply received is attached for your information.
3. Board of Inquiry proceedings, referred to in paragraph 1 of the attached letter, have not been received so far. HQ Ghana Brigade is being expedited.

(Signature)
(N N MADAN) Lt-Col
Chief Logistics Officer

MILITARY INFORMATION		
SEEN	Initial	Date
OC		
GS02	<i>olms</i>	<i>7 June</i>
I (A)		
I (B)		
I (C)	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>6.6</i>
I (D)		

The UN Forces
HQ GHANA Bde,
Luluabourg
KASAI - CONGO

Subject: Losses of Stores at
PORT FRANCOIS

BDE/LULU/437/1/Q

24 May 61

HQ ONUC (LOGS)

L E O.

Reference your 138/1 of 20 May 61.

1. Thank you for the sentiments expressed in para one of your letter.
2. A Brigade Board of Inquiry has been completed. The proceedings and opinion of the Brigade Commander will be forwarded very shortly.
3. Detailed lists of losses have been sent Survey and Property Division HQ ONUC and ORD DEPOT GHANA Army ACCRA for pricing. Similar lists, which may or may not be priced at the time, will be forwarded with the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.

Sd/ E.T. TEDMAN
Brig,
Comd, GHANA Bde

Copy to: Survey and Property Division HQ ONUC

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE
PRIORITY

SVC Service	FFFF Routine	SSSS Priority	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorité Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

5/A/3.4

N R

CODE CONFIDENTIAL

Address(es)

GHANA BRIGADE LULUABOURG

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

GLO 184 STOP CARTWRIGHT FROM MARRIOTT STOP YOUR DO BDE/2/5/1
OF 27 MAY 61 STOP THE STATEMENT OF DE PINA IS CONSIDERED VERY
GUARANTEES
IMPORTANT STOP PLEASE DO NOT GIVE ANY ~~GUARANTEES~~ THAT HE WILL
NOT BE CALLED AS EVIDENCE IN PROPOSED UN INQUIRY OR CONGOLESE TRIAL
STOP AND END

Imp. Sarlat 10085

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by : Capt Marriott

Authorized : *K. Marriott*

Date : 29 MAY 1961

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SECGEN
FROM: ~~MACEOINXXXXXXXXXX~~ LINNER MACEOIN
DATE: 29 MAY 1961
NO: ONUC

The following account of happenings at Port Francoqui on 27/29 April was given to the Ghana Brigade Hq. at on 27 May 1961. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~We have the name of the source and his profession and address at Port Francoqui but in order to safeguard his security we will keep his identity undisclosed until further notice:

"About lunchtime on 27 Apr he heard of trouble brewing between the ANC and the Ghana troops. He asked the Congolese civilians what was happening and they told him that the ANC wanted to disarm the Ghana troops.

"The evening was calm.

"About 1000-1100 hrs next morning the police and ANC advised him and other shopkeepers to close their shops. He did so and a short time later he heard shooting. On asking the civilians what was going on they replied that when the Ghana soldiers first arrived in Port Francoqui they killed two ANC and now the ANC were going to kill them. They added that about 30-40 had been killed.

"The shooting stopped around 1400 hrs and he heard that an ANC officer had been called from Luluabourg to sort out the situation.

"It was late afternoon on the 28 that a policeman came and asked The Source if he could borrow his truck and driver to clear away the dead bodies of the Ghana soldiers.

"The Source leant his truck, which was blue 3-1/2 ton Chevrolet, and his driver who is called. . . .

"Later on The Source saw the ANC loading bodies into this truck, he was not sure of the number because he was watching from a house some distance away but it was about 20 - 30.

"That evening was calm and there was no shooting.

"The next morning ~~XXXXXX~~ (29 Apr) he saw Ghana soldiers returning from the bush on hearing a bugle call."

The Source would not give any opinions on the cause of the trouble and throughout the interrogation information had to be "dragged" out of him.

This information will be submitted to investigating authorities in due course.

27 May 1961.

AN ACCOUNT OF HAPPENINGS AT PORT FRACQUI ON 27-29 APR GIVEN TO BDE IO
BY MR ANTONIO JULIO MARTINS DE PINA A BAKER OF ETABLI-MOTINHO, PORT-FRANCOI.

About lunch-time on 27 Apr he heard of trouble-brewing between the ANC and the GHANA troops. He asked the Congoles civilians what was happening and they told him that the ANC wanted to disarm the GHANA troops.

The evening was calm.

About 1000-1100 hrs next morning the police and ANC advised him and other shopkeepers to close their shops. He did so and a short time later he heard shooting. On asking the civilians what was going on they replied that when the GHANA soldiers first arrived in PORT-FRANCOI they killed two ANC and now the ANC were going to kill them. They added that about 30-40 had been killed.

The shooting stopped around 1400 hrs and he heard that an ANC officer had been called from LULUABOURG to sort out the situation.

It was late afternoon on the 28 that a policeman came and asked Mr DE PINA if he could borrow his truck and driver to clear away the dead bodies of the GHANA soldiers.

Mr DE PINA leant his truck, which was blue $3\frac{1}{2}$ ton Chevrolet, and his driver who is called XAVIER.

Later on Mr DE PINA saw the ANC loading bodies into this truck, he was not sure of the number because he was watching from a house some distance away but it was about 20-30.

That evening was calm and there was no shooting.

The next morning (29 Apr) he saw GHANA soldiers returning from the bush on hearing a bugle call. *W*

Mr DE PINA would not give any opinions on the cause of the trouble and throughout the interrogation information had to be "DRAGGED" out of him.

Finally I should make it clear, that any mention of his name and of his assistance to us may have a detrimental effect upon his future in PORT-FRANCOI

R.W. Moore 2/L.T.
(R.W. MOORE)

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

out
410/1

MIL INFO 3/D

26 MAY 61

FORCE COMMANDER

Terms of Reference - Boards of Inquiry

1. Reference your request on terms of reference for boards of inquiry.
2. The convening authority should provide a board of inquiry with written terms of reference containing full and specific instructions as to:
 - a. The investigation to be undertaken:

"To investigate and report upon the incident at PORT FRANCOU where United Nations troops were engaged by other forces."
 - b. The information required:
 - (1) The board will record sufficient evidence to support all the findings required to determine:
 - (a) The cause of engagement;
 - (b) Injuries and death;
 - (c) Loss or damage to UN property.
3. Detailed terms of reference on boards of inquiry will follow.

ORM/pjo


(BJORN EGGE)

Lt-Col

Chief of Military Information

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COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

23 MAY 61 ✓

MIL INFO S/A/B. 4

Force Commander

COURT OF ENQUIRY, Port Francqui

1. Military Information Branch is keeping records of all major incidents involving UN and ANC troops. The PORT FRANQUI incident on 27 April has not been sufficiently covered to give all the facts necessary for a review of the actual happenings.
2. It is suggested that a Court of Enquiry be held in order to establish all possible facts pertinent to the PORT FRANQUI incident. This will also be of importance to the next-of-kin of the deceased, as they must have a legal document equal to a certificate of death or assumption of death. The Court of Enquiry proceedings would serve as a useful basis for such documents.
3. It is suggested that the Chief of the Observer Group, Col. MOLLERSVARD, be appointed President of the Court of Enquiry.

(BJORN EGGE)

Lt-Col

Chief of Military Information

cc: DCOS

MILITARY INFORMATION		
SEEN	Initial	Date
OC		24/5
GS02	ORW	22/5
I (A)	SW	24/5
I (B)	AL	24/5
I (C)	HT	27/5
I (D)	ST	28/5

S/A/3.4

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 138/1

20 May,

1

HQ Ghana Brigade, Luluabourg

Chief Logistics Officer

Losses of ONUC as well as Unit owned equipment due to the Port Francqui incident

INFO: Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Chief of Military Information ✓
Senior Ordnance Officer
Senior Supply and Transport Officer

1. In view of the unfortunate loss which your formation has suffered in terms of men and material, I did not think it proper to bother you earlier concerning the details of your losses.
2. By now you will have had more than a fair idea of these details. I shall, therefore, be grateful if you will supply me with a complete list of arms and ammunition lost by your detachment at Port Francqui, and also of other stores, Unit owned as well as ONUC property that may have suffered a similar fate.
3. You will appreciate the importance of this information and, therefore, I should be supplied with all the details concerning this matter. These are urgently required by the UN Property, Survey and Claims Board for further action.

[Signature]

(NN MADAN) LT-COL
Chief Logistics Officer

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 607-Rev
Dated: 13 May '61.

To:- Chief Administrative Officer.
From:- Chief Movement Control Officer.
Info:- Chief Logistics Officer.
Senior Ordnance Officer.
Movement Control Bulaboughe: Ref his Signal No MCL 183
dated 12 May '61.
Movement Control Port Franquet.

Subject:- OFFICE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL.

1. Jeep Willys 4x4, Plate No. 2262 and one typewriter, Olivetti, Lexicon 80 machine No. 2783508 were lost by the Movement Control team at Port Franquet during the recent clashes.
2. Out of the above the jeep has been recovered without the spare wheel and the typewriter is still not traceable.
3. It is therefore requested that this loss of one spare wheel complete and the typewriter be placed before the Property Survey Board for write off.
4. An early action will be appreciated.
5. Senior Ordnance Officer (S/O) With a request that a spare wheel complete and a typewriter - English key board, be issued to Movement Control Port Franquet under intimation to this office.

1. No action.
2. File in Port Franquet Incident Case

Wiley
25/5

Major
Offg Chief Movement Control Officer
(S/MC 183)



INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

5/A/3/4

CONFIDENTIAL

19 May 1961

(1)

TO : Lt. Col. Bjorn Egge, Chief of Military Information
FROM : S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer
SUBJECT : Port Francqui Incident

1. Thank you for your note No: MIL INFO 5/A/3.4 dated 19 May 1961 concerning the Port Francqui incident.

2. I should be most grateful if the list of arms and ammunition lost by the Ghanaian Contingent at Port Francqui is forwarded by you to the Chief Logistics Officer so that it is taken into account at the time the Survey Board is held upon the equipment owned by the Ghana Contingent.

3. By a copy of this memorandum I am asking the Chief Logistics Officer to obtain information to the extent possible of other Contingent or ONUC property and equipment which was lost at Port Francqui. All this information will then have to be reported to the United Nations Property Survey Board for action.

namis

cc: Chief Logistics Officer
Secretary, Property Survey Board

(2)

MILITARY INFORMATION		
SEEN	Initial	Date
OC		20/5
GS02	<i>ahw</i>	<i>h</i>
I (A)		
I (B)		
I (C)		
I (D)		

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

MIL INFO 5/A/3.4

19 MAY 61


CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

Port Francoqui Incident

1. Since the last week of March 61 tension existed in Port Francoqui area. There have been several cases of intimidation and beating of BALUBAS/BAKURAS and the local LULUA tribe. On 26 April, the Minister of Interior of the Provincial Government visited the area under the UN protection. He is reported to have made strong speeches against the ANC. As a result of this and other reasons, which may not be dealt with in detail here, certain major incidents took place on 27 and 28 April 61, between the ANC/locals and UN Ghana troops and other UN elements in the area of Port Francoqui. As a result of these incidents a large number of casualties took place among the UN troops. The latest known figures are:

a. Known dead:	Officers - NIL ORs - 2
b. Missing, presumed dead:	Officers - 2 ORs - 4
c. Missing, fate not known till 19 May 61:	Officers - NIL ORs - 34
d. Known safe:	Officers - 2 ORs - 57

2. In these above incidents large number of arms, ammunition, vehicles and other UN stores were lost. The list of arms and ammunition lost by the Ghana regiment is held by us. Details of other items lost are not available with us.


(BJORN EGGE)

Lt-Col

Chief of Military Information

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UN Forces,
HQ 2 GHANA INF BDE
Luluabourg - KASAI
C O N G O

HQ UN FORCES IEO

BDE/2/5/1

MAY, 1961.

Subject: PORT-FRANCOIS INCIDENT

Ref your GLO 133 of 031451 Z May.

1. We do not consider that we shall obtain any useful report of events from the Administrator at PORT-FRANCOIS. A recent visit by a staff officer of this HQ showed that the Administrator was only too anxious to do nothing to prejudice his position in the eyes of the local ANC.
2. We attach a copy of the report written by the Minister of the Interior whose visit precipitated the incident. We have just received this report. With it we endorse a copy of the Chief UNO Civilian Officer's comments on the report which are pertinent.

MILITARY INFORMATION		
SEEN	Initial	Dtd
OC		
CSGT		
I (A)		
I (B)		
I (C)		
I (D)	<i>SR</i>	19/5

[Signature]
COL,
HQ 2 GHANA INF BDE LULU
(R.H.L. CARTWRIGHT)

Luluabourg, May 11, 1961

Mr. J.D.R. Kelly, Assistant to the Special Representative, Leopoldville
Mr. A.C. Gilpin, Chief Civilian Officer, Luluabourg

Dear Mr. Kelly,

I enclose copy of a report dated April 29 by the Minister of the Interior, Mr. A.KENGSELE, regarding the events in Port-Francqui, together with an English translation. We received this only yesterday.

Our difficulty in establishing the facts about Port-Francqui is that no witnesses are prepared to come forward publicly as they fear reprisals by the ANG.

This is evident also in Mr. KENGSELE's rather scanty report. There are, however, a few points in his report which make me think that perhaps he expects us to read between the lines. These are :

- i) The explicit reference to "jail" in the first paragraph of page 2 of the English translation.
- ii) The fact that both references to "first shots" having been fired by UN are based on hearsay from ANG soldiers.
- iii) The reference to some "wounded" in the second paragraph on page 2 which conflicts with the reference, in the same paragraph, to arms having been laid down without resistance.
- iv) The reference to "the murder" in the fourth paragraph on page 2 which does not seem to tie in with the rest of the report.

Yours sincerely,

cc: Ghana Brigade

MINISTER OF INTERIOR'S REPORT
ON HIS OFFICIAL TRIP TO PORT-FRANQUI

Copies to :

- Head of State Of Central Kasai
- Minister of Justice
- ONU Representative
- Commandant de Moulet (Démolé)
- Major MULAMBA
- President of National Assembly

Luluabourg.

The 26th of April 1961 at 2.00 in the afternoon,

We Athanase KENGLE, Minister of Interior, have boarded a United Nations helicopter for Port-Francqui. The voyage being official, the Port-Francqui Administrator as well as the UN Officer there were informed.

Accompanied by MULAMBA Edmond, C.D. D.A. of Kasai, at present in Luluabourg, we arrived at the airfield of Port-Francqui where we noticed the presence of UN Officers and five soldiers of the National Army. They saluted us with much discipline and a UN Officer took us in a vehicle to Hôtel Palme. Adjutant MUAMBA and some soldiers of the National Army came to take us to their camp. The time fixed for this was 7.00 p.m. They went to their camp to prepare our lodging.

It was 7.00 p.m.; no-one came; we waited impatiently until 10.30 p.m. Being tired, we went to bed. At 11.00 p.m. Adjutant MUAMBA, accompanied by some soldiers, came to fetch us; but as it was late, we told them to go back and they agreed.

On the morning of April 27, the Administrator and a group of Congolese came to take us from the Hotel to the "Territoire". The above mentioned introduced us to his personnel. We entered his office and I asked him what was wrong. M. MULUMBA Edmond, as special secretary, took note of his remarks. A few minutes later, a white UN Officer engaged in a discussion with a soldier of the National Army; this concerned the fact that the ANC soldiers were not happy about the presence of white officers in the "Territoire". Previously, these latter used to drive them away from the Hotel. I came out and told them to be quiet and they listened to me. Another Officer came and engaged in a similar discussion with the ANC soldiers; the attitude of these latter to the others was no better. I retired to the Complice to rest whilst giving order to all the soldiers to go away.

./..

Ten minutes later, I heard a shot from Hotel Palme. When the ANC soldiers heard that, they took me and MULAMBA to their camp and, to tell the truth, not to JAIL. They went to the spot from which the explosion came and it proved to be a white Officer who had shot at a ANC soldier but unsuccessfully.

To avoid lengthy discussions, those of the National Army asked their UN friends to drop their arms without resisting. These latter laid down their arms; on the spot all UN Officers were arrested except for two doctors. Among those arrested, some were wounded and taken to hospital for immediate care.

On April 28, 1961, about 10.00 a.m., a shot was heard from the direction of Mweka; we could not distinguish what it was. A little later, shots were repeated everywhere. A National Army soldier came to tell me that UN troops coming from Mweka had fired on them killing a sergeant and a corporal and that they had fired back.

Commandant de MOULET (Démolé) and a UN Colonel arrived. A sergeant came to take us, MULAMBA and me and a white UN Officer from whom I had been separated at the time of the murder, and we went to the camp.

When we arrived, the ANC soldiers, not being able to bear the presence of this white UN Officer, put us in JAIL for 15 minutes, but Commandant de MOULET (Démolé) let us out to go and see with him what had exactly happened.

With my own eyes, I saw four corpses; two of the ANC and two Ghanaians.

After investigation, Commandant de MOULET (Démolé) left us there to spend the night.

On April 29, 1961, an "AIR BROUSSE" plane came at 9.30 a.m. to take us to Luluabourg.

I swear on my honor that I do not know the number of Ghanaians killed.

Port-Francoqui, April 29, 1961

Minister of Interior,

A. KENGLE

CONFIDENTIAL

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMEE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE
STAFF

Leopoldville, 8 May 1961

No. 1033

Subject: Report of incidents between the Company
of Gendarmerie at Port Francqui and
United Nations troops

To: His Excellency the President of the Republic of the Congo
The Minister of National Defence
The Minister of Foreign Affairs

For Information: The Supreme Commander of the United
Nations ~~in~~ Forces in the Congo

Yours Excellencies,

I have the honour to submit a report of the incident that took place at Port Francqui between the troops of the Armée Nationale Congolaise and those of the Blue Helmets.

Chief of Staff

(signed) KIEMBE, M.
Lieutenant Colonel.

STATEMENT BY Company Sergeant-Major KALUNGA

Immediately following the arrival of the Minister of the Interior and the Commissaire of the District of Kassai, the pilots showed a paper to the Ghanaian captain, who was there as is usually done. While the captain read, the chief sergeant of the Post interrogated the strangers and these replied that one of them was the Minister and the other the Commissaire of the District. The sergeant then asked what the object of their voyage was. They replied that they had come in order to contact the ANC stationed at Port Franqui. The sergeant then replied: You are the Minister and the Comdistrict and you arrive here without any prior notice. Why is that? The Minister said: It is because we were in too much of a hurry. The sergeant told them: Wait until I have telephoned to the camp to have them come and fetch you in a car. While he was telephoning, the Ghanaian captain asked the strangers to get into his jeep and they left and the sergeant in turn notified the company sergeant-major that they had left without saying anything. The company sergeant-major immediately notified the A.T. and they both went to the hotel where the Ghanaians were housed. There they found the two arguing with the military of the ANC who had followed them. The A.T. asked who were these gentlemen, because he, too, did not know. They answered that one of them was the Minister and the other was the Comdistrict. Why did you come here without notifying us? asked the A.T.. The answer was the same as before. Yes, said the A.T., and why are you under the protection of the United Nations? They answered that the Ghanaian captain told him that they are under his protection to prevent the ANC from killing us. The Comdistrict then immediately said that it was not possible to argue much and that you should know that if you continue to act as you do towards us, we will request another army to replace you because we do not have need of an army such as yours.

The company sergeant-major asked him what would be the Army that you would have replace us? He answered that do you not see these people who are looking at you? He made a sign to the Ghanaian troops who were there. When the ANC military heard this, they became nervous and ^{the} discussion became increasingly animated. The A.T. told them that it was time to stop arguing because you are the authorities, he added. I will arrange for a house for you and you will leave the United Nations to where the ANC military will have a guard of honour, and ~~the military~~ ^{they} refused entirely saying that under no conditions could they leave the United Nations. On the other hand, they declared that they will return tomorrow to the territory for the conference. They agreed and each one went back to his place.

In the morning, the military authorities and the A.T. met in the territory and they sent a car to fetch them, and the car returned empty saying that they could under no conditions go to the territory and they requested the local authorities to join them at the hotel to discuss whatever they wanted. The A.T. and the company sergeant-major went to the hotel and asked them whether they had come to contact both the ANC and the United Nations; and why do you want us to have this contact at the seat of the United Nations and in the presence of other people? We must go to the territory, or else nothing will be done. If we must go to the territory, we must have a United Nations escort said the Ghanaian captain, otherwise the Minister and the Comdistriet will not leave the hotel. In view of difficult situation, the local authorities agreed to a squad of the United Nations commanded by the same captain and everyone went to the territory.

All authorities having come in to the conference, the captain took the jeep and left for SOCOPELOLE, where his second squad (original says "Pl"). A few minutes after they came back and he ordered the squad that was in the escort to take a defensive position. First sergeant Lotafe of the ANC entered the room and said: You are still arguing and you do not see what is going on outside? The Ghanaians are getting ready to attack you.

The company sergeant-major went out and found all the Ghanaians in a position of defence. The company sergeant-major asked their chief, the captain, to withdraw his men, but the captain did not wish to do so and answered that he had received orders to protect the Minister and that was all. The company sergeant-major re-entered the room and asked the Minister to leave the Ghanaians before continuing their discussion. The Minister went out and asked the Ghanaians to follow him and they followed him to the hotel. The Minister returned to the conference after a few minutes and the same squad arrived and again took a defensive position. The first entered again and said that we do not wish to see the United Nations here any more, since we, the ANC, are here to insure the security of our authorities. The United Nations has no business here. Soon after the number of ANC military kept increasing. The A.T. left the room at the same time as the captain who asked the company sergeant-major in a threatening tone: What do you want? I would like your military to leave their position and go back to the hotel where they were. The A.T., furious, supported the decision of the company sergeant-major and the captain held the A.T. by the collar of his shirt telling him that it was he who brought discredit on the ANC military and that you may leave the room. When the BATSHIALAWO saw this, he also grabbed the captain by the collar of his shirt. [Since they were unarmed, the Ghanaian sergeant-major said: Let us do nothing among ourselves because we are all blacks and it is not our business because these are English

(white officers) who command us. It is they who endanger our lives. They want us Africans to fight between us. Even if they see us talking to you, they tell us not to keep contact with you because you are undisciplined. If you want to kill them you must kill them yourselves not us. When the company sergeant-major heard that he freed all the soldiers and black NCOs, leaving the European officers in the box. He confiscated all their arms. He placed a squad at the barrier, because he knew that the captain would have requested reinforcements either at Mweka or at Lulusburg. He gave the assignment that as soon as the enemy arrives, you will stop them without shooting and notify me immediately. An hour later the first armed vehicle from Mweka arrived at the barrier. The ANC gives him the sign to stop and it stopped. An ANC soldier approached to see who they were, but he saw no one, because they were inside and everything was closed and he said that I saw no one, and just at the moment when the soldier was giving the message, the second armoured vehicle arrived, made a half turn and opened fire. Immediately five trucks arrived, the men descended and immediately started to shoot. A concentrated fire was directed on the ANC, and the ANC responded to the fire. Two men of the ANC were killed, they were sergeant-major ZANGAPAI and corporal BAYENGA-MWIZI. The Ghanaians then were pushed back and the company sergeant-major ordered a cease-fire and then controlled his troops. Result: two dead and three missing. After the exchange of fire, [the captain, wanting to turn around to see who had grabbed him, his shirt tore and he said: Sergeant, we have immediate business. However, the lieutenant, assistant chief of the Ghanaians, started to change the position of his men in order to open fire. The company sergeant-major was in his shirt sleeves ~~gixingxaxdaxa~~ and gave the command over to his second-in-command sergeant KWAMBA, requesting him not to open fire before the Ghanaians did so. The company sergeant-major left for the camp

and alerted his entire ~~company~~ company and then placed it in position giving the order not to open fire until the United Nations did so. Returning to the territory, the company sergeant-major found his second-in-command and the latter told him that I have pacified everything and everybody has gone back to their billets. Yes, but I want to send a patrol at any cost to see if everything is peaceful. He appointed sergeant-major MBETO and several men in a jeep. The patrol, after having made several rounds, arrived at the SOCOPESTOLE, where the Ghanaian captain had gone to at the start of the conference. They were all in position and when they saw the ANC jeep they started to shoot, sending two volleys. After three minutes the sergeant returned quickly to notify his chief that two rounds had been discharged at him. It is then that the company sergeant-major angered gave his company the order to disarm the troops of the United Nations stationed at Port Francoqui. One section, that remained at SOCOPESTOLE, seeing the approaching ANC who came to disarm them, also fired one volley and the combat sergeant-major shouted in a loud voice: Do not shoot my men, we will disarm this section. In this confusion they were all disarmed and arrested.

When the military who were in the camp heard the firing, and in order to avoid being attacked from the rear, they started to attack all the Ghanaians who were disarmed and imprisoned. All fled into the forest. After the attack the combat sergeant-major picked up seven Ghanaian dead including one captain and two lieutenants. Two who fled were then taken to the combat sergeant-major who gave them food and drink. One day later the missing started to come out of the forest. Up to now and officially forty-six men plus three Europeans have been accounted for. According to the combat sergeant-major he does not know whether there are any more in the forest.

STATEMENT BY Major RADU ENVOY OF THE CHIEF EM

He declares, I think, according to the information received the ~~cause~~ ~~subject~~ of this incident was the arrival of the Minister and the Comdistriet at Port Francqui. If they had notified the ANC military of their arrival, or had they spent the night as the A.T. had advised them, nothing of this would have happened. It is therefore these two authorities who are responsible for the bloody incident at Port Francqui. When I toured the villages where the troops were located, I picked up three Ghanaians in the bush, three Ghanaians were brought to me by Lieutenant PIBWE. He had guarded them as prisoners. One Ghanaian was brought to me at Port Francqui by a villager.

The summary up to now is	45
	+ 6
	+ 3 Europeans
Total	54 men recovered.

STATEMENT OF CORPORAL TSHIBANGA A.

I was located at barrier No.1 when the first armoured car arrived. The villagers warned us to be careful because the Ghanaians were arriving. They had two armoured cars and five trucks. At 0815 hours two armoured cars arrived and each placed itself on one side of the road. I approached him and asked him to come down. He refused bluntly and their European officer fired two volleys from the machine gun. We threw ourselves down and crawled to the forest. Then the NCO in charge of the squad gave us the order to fire and it is then that the serious attack took place from 0815 to 0905 hours, the time when they scattered. On the spot after the attack I saw Ghanaians and Congolese. The squad was commanded by sergeant MWAMBA.

MWEKA. DECLARATION OF SERGEANT-MAJOR MASONDIYA AND OF THE A.T.

Here we have had no disorder. We saw the troops that were here leave and did not know where they were going. We received a telephone call saying that there was an attack at Port Francqui and we barred all the roads as well as the flying ~~fix~~ field. The six Ghanaians who remained are still there with their arms. Nobody touched them. They live as usual and the accountant of the territory NGOLOSHAMBA, Pierre states the same.

DOMBONGO. DECLARATION OF LIEUTENANT PLEWE

My assignment was to block the passage between Mweka and Port Francqui. One day the Ghanaian patrol tried to go through our block to go to Mweka. They opened fire on us and we returned their invitation and after the attack we picked up one dead, a Ghanaian officer, and we took three prisoners who are now ~~at~~ at our Staff in Musenge. They are all in good health. Having learned that the Ghanaians came from Port Francqui to go to Mweka and that they had been at PEMBEYANGO and that they were afraid of us or of our block we delegated two military men in ~~sixty-sixth~~ civilian clothes to tell them that we had ceased firing.

BAMU I arrived at PEMBEYANGO to interrogate them and the Ghanaians told me that they had received a letter and that the carriers of the letter had already gone back.

This is the report of the incident at Port Francqui between our troops and the United Nations

(signed) KIMBE, M.
Lieutenant Colonel
Chief of Staff of the ANU

ANC HEADQUARTERS,
LEOPOLDVILLE
8 MAY 61

TO General S. MacEoin, Force Commander United Nations.
FROM: General Mobutu

Sir,

On behalf of the Officers and men of the Armee Nationale Congolaise I wish to tell the United Nations, whose high representative you are here in the Congo, of the grief we feel over the events which have occurred at Port Francqui.

In spite of the noble grandeur of the United Nations, guardian of the universal peace, the antagonism which has arisen between certain elements of the Congolese National Army and the Ghanaian troops working for your organisation has led to a fatal conflict. We still do not know the main reasons for this, but I can assure you that this antagonism is far from universal.

It is our wish that the United Nations may accomplish its mission in the Congo in the best possible way.

In order to avoid a recurrence of such incidents and because we are working towards the same goal: peace in our country and peace in our hearts, it is our ardent wish that a lasting cooperation between the UN and ourselves may be brought about, based on equity and justice.

MILITARY INFORMATION

SEEN	Initial	Initial
OC		
GS02	ohms	Shm
I (A)	u	3/1
I (B)	ah.	3/4
I (C)		
I (D)		

We ask you, Sir, to convey to the families of the soldiers who died at Port Francqui our sincerest condolences.

Signed J. Mobutu General
Commandant En Chef Armee Nationale Congolaise.

Asst. Mill Info	
Asst. Mill Info	
Asst. Mill Info	
Chief Mill Info	
« SEEN »	Initial
Date	

RESTRICTED

MIL INFO ~~5/1/A~~
8 May 1961.

Seen by FC
Thanks
H 8/5.

Prepared by Major O.R. Monette,
Military Information

LIAISON VISIT 6 MAY 1961

LULUABOURG - BAKWANGA

1. POWERS OF WRITE OFF. The local Commander has no powers of write off and the only administrative method of writing off material is by appointing a local board of inquiry. Recommendations are forwarded to Headquarters LEOPOLDVILLE for approval. These procedures have resulted in creating administrative delays.
2. MISSING EQUIPMENT - PORT FRANCQUI. Attached as Annex 1 is list given by the GHANA Headquarters.
3. ARRANGEMENTS - PORT FRANCQUI. To ensure a more efficient co-operation at PORT FRANCQUI, Colonel KIEMBE, the Chief of Staff of the Armée Nationale Congolaise, directed that the local Commander be removed immediately.
4. LETTER OF REGRET ON INCIDENT PORT FRANCQUI. General MOBUTU has had a special letter of regret prepared for the Force Commander. It will be presented today.

RESTRICTED

ANNEX 1
TO MIL INFO 5/A
DATED 6 MAY 1961

2 GR WPNS MISSING AT PORT FRANCOU

RIFLES

<u>BUTT NO</u>	<u>REGD NO</u>
231	4598
234	4719
235	4704
237	4585
253	4492
257	4741
259	4588
273	4720
279	4651
287	4758
292	4409
303	4600
306	4672
307	4370
327	4844
225	1024
224	0907
222	0905
246	4716
270	4413
252	4621

21

STERLINGS

REGD NO

24614
23978
24635
23849

4

LMG

REGD NO

A 9088

VEREY PISTOL

QTY 1

GRENADES

QTY 144

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

MIL INFO 5/1/A
8 May 1961

Prepared by Major O.R. Monette,
Military Information

LIAISON VISIT 6 MAY 1961

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QTY 1

GRENADES

QTY 144

DATE :- 6 May 61

RESTRICTED

Luluabourg, 6 May 1961

Jacobsen.

5/4/5/4

Republic of the Congo,
National Army,
Gendarmerie,
Kasai.

To the Representative of the United Nations,
Luluabourg.

Sir;

the Officers and men of the Armée Nationale Congolaise,

On behalf of (my unit and my personnel) I wish to tell the United Nations, whose high Representative you are here in ^{the Congo} (Kasai), of the grief we feel over the events which have occurred at Port-Francqui.

In spite of the noble grandeur of the United Nations, guardian of universal peace, the antagonism which has arisen between certain elements of the Congolese National Army and Ghanaian troops working for your organization has led to a fatal conflict. We still do not know the main reasons for this, but I can assure you that this antagonism is far from universal.

It is our wish that the United Nations may accomplish its mission in the Congo in the best possible way.

In order to avoid a recurrence of such incidents, and because we are working towards the same goal: peace in our country and peace in our hearts, it is our ardent wish that a lasting cooperation between the UN and ourselves may be brought about, based on equity and justice.

We ask you, Sir, to convey to the families of the soldiers who died at Port-Francqui our sincerest condolences.

(signed) L. Mulamba
Major

REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
DEPARTEMENT DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
ARMEE NATIONALE

5/0/3/4

Au Commandant Suprême,
Forces des Nations Unies,
LEOPOLDVILLE.

Mon Général,

Au nom des officiers et hommes de l'Armée Nationale Congolaise, je tiens à informer l'Organisation des Nations Unies dont vous êtes, ici au Congo, le haut représentant, de l'affliction que nous ressentons suite aux événements qui viennent de survenir à PORT-FRANCOIS.

Malgré la Noble Grandeur de ce qu'est l'Organisation des Nations Unies, gardienne de la paix universelle, l'antagonisme né entre des éléments de l'Armée Nationale Congolaise et des troupes ghanéennes agissant au sein de votre organisation s'est soldé par un conflit meurtrier. Nous n'en connaissons pas encore les raisons majeures et je vous assure que cet antagonisme n'est nullement généralisé.

Nous désirons que l'Organisation des Nations Unies accomplisse au mieux sa mission au Congo.

Pour éviter le renouvellement de tels faits et parce que nous poursuivons un but identique, à savoir la Paix de notre Patrie et la Paix de nos Coeurs, nous souhaitons ardemment qu'il naissse entre Elle et Nous une collaboration permanente, équitable et juste.

Nous vous prions, mon Général, de transmettre aux familles des soldats morts à Port-Francois nos très respectueuses condoléances.

(J. MOBUTU)
Général
Commandant en Chef
Armée Nationale Congolaise

REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
DEPARTEMENT DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
ARMEE NATIONALE

5/7/374

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Forces des Nations Unies,
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Général
Commandant en Chef
Armée Nationale Congolaise

Luluabourg, 6 May 1961

Republic of the Congo,
National Army,
Gendarmerie,
Kasai.

To the Representative of the United Nations,
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On behalf of my unit and my personnel I wish to tell the United Nations, whose high Representative you are here in Kasai, of the grief we feel over the events which have accured at Port-Francqui.

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We ask you, Sir, to convey to the families of the soldiers who died at Port-Francqui our sincerest condolences.

(signed) L. Mulamba
Major

ohw

51A/3/4

REPORT BY OPS STAFF OFFICER
ACCOMPANYING FORCE COMMANDER ON
VISIT TO LULU AND BAKWANGA: 6 MAY 61

Initial	Date
Asst. Mil Info	17.5.61
Asst. Mil Info	
Asst. Mil Info	

1. PORT FRANCOU INCIDENT. Final summary of casualties GHANA Brigade.

a. Known safe	2 offrs	57 ORs	} 42
b. Missing	- offrs	34 ORs	
c. Known dead	- offrs	2 ORs	
d. Missing presumed dead	2 offrs	4 ORs	

2. GENERAL COMMENTS

- A civilian in PORT FRANCOU reported seeing 16 or 17 soldiers being machine-gunned.
- There is an unconfirmed report that 4 Europeans and 26 Africans bodies were thrown into the river.
- At this stage Ghana Brigade assumes that all those unaccounted for have been murdered in cold blood.
- Search has been discontinued as far as Ghana troops are concerned. Liberian troops in PORT FRANCOU will continue search and enquiries.

3. RE-DEPLOYMENT OF GHANA BRIGADE. It is intended to concentrate all forces in KASAI so as to reach the following final dispositions:

2 Ghana R (less one coy)	LULUABOURG
One coy 2 Ghana R	MWEKA
4 Ghana R (less one coy)	LAC MUKAMBA
One coy 4 Ghana R (less one pl)	MWENE-DITU
One platoon 4 Ghana R	KELE
LIBERIANS	TSHIKAPA
LIBERIAN Reinforcements	PORT FRANCOU

4. PROGRESS IN RE-DEPLOYMENT

- By 6 May following posts had been evacuated:
PEBEANGU
DIMBELENGE
KABINDA
LODJA

b. Posts still occupied on 6 May 61:

LULUABOURG
BAKWANGA
MWEKA
LAC MUKAMBA
KELE
KASHIA
LUPUTA
MWENE DITU
BENE DIBELE

c. Liberians occupy the posts

PORT FRANQUI
TSHIKAPA

5. GENERAL COMMENTS

- a. Force Commander has requested that Ghana troops remain in LUPUTA/KASHIA until new troops can be provided for these places.
- b. MWENE-DITU, LUPUTA and KASHIA hold the demarcation line between the Baluba and KANIOKAS apart from being also on the railway. Certain guarantees have been given to the KANIOKAS hence the need to retain these posts if possible.

6. PRIORITY TASKS IN KASAI. The priority tasks which the Ghana Brigade has set itself in KASAI, and which they are confident they will be able to continue when re-deployed are as follows:

- a. Railway. Keeping the railway functioning is a major problem. Some stations are difficult to operate because of crowds of refugees. It is planned to have joint Liberian/ANC train guards from PORT FRANQUI to MWEKA and Ghana train guards from there on. At MWENE DITU LULUA train drivers etc change over to BALUBA. Ghana troops are therefore retained at these vital places.
- b. Roads. In order to get coffee and rice to LULUABOURG from LODJA, LUSAMBO and KABINDA the roads to these places must be kept open. It is considered that this will be possible by strong patrols from the strengthened post at LAC MUKAMBA. Similarly the road SOUTH to LUIZA, in order to get coffee up to LULU, must be kept open. Liberians will remain in TSHIKAPA so that the mines

there can continue to operate.

- c. Centres of Possible Tribal Conflict. Tribal conflict is likely at any time at DIMBELENGE, MWEKA and KAMPONDA. Two of these places are evacuated in the new deployment plan but are NOT far removed from greatly strengthened UN posts.
 - d. LODJA. The importance of LODJA is that it is on the road to STANLEYVILLE. It is to be suggested to the ANC that they establish a post in this town already evacuated by Ghana Brigade.
 - e. BAKWANGA. Apart from Ghana troops the following elements are also located in BAKWANGA:
 - (1) AUSTRIAN Hospital. The work of this hospital is coming to an end and they are already under orders to move.
 - (2) TEACHERS. There are 13 European teachers working in the town. Their contracts end next month.
 - (3) WHO. There are 3 or 4 doctors working in the area. It is considered that these could function from LAC MUKAMBA.
 - (4) FOOD RELIEF. It is proposed to sell the transport involved to the KALONJI government. Food would then be brought only to LAC MUKAMBA and handed over there to KALONJI authorities. On the other hand the FAO people may NOT leave BAKWANGA.
 - f. As can be seen the major change in the re-deployment is the evacuation of BAKWANGA. This town is considered militarily insecure. It is further considered that all the work previously done here can be done from the more secure post at LAC MUKAMBA. There is NO electricity at LAC MUKAMBA and almost all elements stationed there will be under canvas.
7. POLITICAL. The acting Brigade commander reports that the anti-Kalonji movement is gaining ground. There are NO ministers in the government and the situation is approaching chaos.

8. CONTAINMENT KALONJI FORCES. The final re-deployment, with the strong post at LAC MUKAMBA to the NORTH of KALONJIS STATE and with the three towns of MWENE-DITU, LUPUTA and KASHIA occupied to the SOUTH are considered to be sufficient to contain KALONJIS FORCES if they attempt to move SOUTH or NORTH.

120300Z

K. O'BRIEN

Comdt

cc: Force Commander
DCOS
COO
Mil Info -
Logs
Pers (Mil)

from 5 May 61

SUMMARY OF CAS - PORT-FRANCOU

A	Known Safe	-	2+57	} 42.
B	Missing	-	0+34	
C	Known Dead	-	0+2	
D	Missing Pre- sumed Dead	-	2+4	

* SEEN *	Initial	Date
Chief MH Info		
Asst. MH Info		
Asst. MH Info		
Asst. MH Info		

LIST ALFA

KNOWN SAFE IN LULUABOURG

AS AT 06.0700

	Lt P. RICHARDS	GAMS
	2/Lt A. SCOTT	
85976	Pte ALASAN MOSHIE	
85954	Sgt ISAKA MOSHIE	
18155565	Pte ADJETEY DOKU	
82505	" YAYA BAZ	
3631	" MATHEW LAWER	
4623	" WILLIAM GANU	
3971	" FRANCIS GAMFI	
3984	" BOYE DAGARTI	
4802	Sigmn J. ASTANGAH	GSR
4040	Pte EMMANUEL ANKUMAH	
4906	" ABUDU GRUMAH	
80012	Cpl GRUMAH	
84240	Pte KONKOMBA	
3860	" FRAFRA	
4843	" FRAFRA	
5200	" KOROPARAGA	
44645	" KABRE	
85392	" KANJARGA	GAMS
3877	" DAGOMBA	
5651	Sigmn TETTEH	GSR
5402	Lcpl ADJEI	GAMS
6183	Pte BATCHAH	"
5192	Cpl AVORNYO	
74085	Ssgt ISSAKA	
75435	WO II ALI SEIDU	
79842	Cpl MARTYE	
84118	Lcpl GRUMAH	
2333	Pte DAGARTI	
2430	Pte ABOPATA	
2831	" SI SSALA	
4408	" ATTIA	
73637	" DAGARTI	
80867	" AFFUM	
84298	Sgt GAKPETOR	GAES
84125	Cpl KISSI	GSR
6181	Pte AFEKU	GAMS
84379	Cpl GRUNSHIE	
5178	Pte ACHAMPONG	
85153	" KANJARGA	
5177	" BANDA	
2179	" RENE O LOUIS	
4046	" KWESI AMANIE	GEME
84625	Lcpl SARI BAZ	
85388	Pte YAKUBU LOBI	
85948	Lcpl MAMA HAUSA	
3570	Pte AWUNEY KUSASI	
3587	" N. LORSO	
3603	" ADAMA KANJARGA	
74854	" SEIDU CHOKOSI	
85133	" SAMBAPA MAMPRUSI	
4577	" YIMBA DAGARTI	
4024	" AWUNEY KANJARGA	
2483	" BUKARE KADO	
4427	" LORSO B.	
4482	" KOFI DAGARTI	
4990	" KANJARGA T.	
81448	Lcpl MAMADU BASARE	Bde Def Pl

57

LIST BRAVO - MISSING

AS AT 04 1700

GC 14734 Sgt SEIDU GRUNSHIE
 79212 Cpl HARUNA
 85401 " LORSO
 2176 Pte FULANI
 2396 Lcpl GRUMAH
 2837 " HAUSA
 3274 PTE BUILSA
 3576 " GRUNSHIE
 3913 " GRUMAH
 4426 " ASAWASUANA
 4579 " GRUNSHIE
 4829 " AKASIA
 5183 " CHOKOSI
 5202 " TONGO
 5556 " GRUNSHIE
 4217 " BEDIAKO
 82769 " BUSANGA
 85138 " FULANI
 39322 " KONKOMBA 2 Bde-DOMIONGO
 3256 " KANJARGA
 85366 " KONKOMBA
 3873 Cpl FREMPONG
 3955 Pte CHOKOSI
 4557 " MANTE
 4608 " CHARLES DZOWORNU
 4831 " KWAME SISSALA
 5197 " KANJARGA
 5206 " DRAMANI
 5562 " MUNOR
 78544 " FRAFRA
 84751 " MAMA ATTIPOE S&T
 3961 " CHOKOSI
~~84448 Lcpl BASARE~~ 2 Bde - DOMIONGO
 54313 Pte BASARE " "
 85970 Lcpl BABA JOLLY

34

LIST CHARLIE

KNOWN DEAD AS AT 04 1700

81393 Pte DUTY BEMOBA
18153446 " EMMANUEL NUNOO

NOTICAS 1881G of 281636

LIST DELTA

MISSING PRESUMED DEAD

AS AT 04 1700

	Capt T.G. RALPH	{437144}
	Lt A.P.G. BROWN	{445802}
4189	Pte YAKUBU FRAFRA	
74854	" ISSAKA BAZ	
48601	Cpl KURIBIL FRAFRA	
2522	Pte MUSAH MOSHIE	

LIST ALFAKNOWN SAFE IN LULUABOURG

AS AT 050700

	Lt P. RICHARDS	GAMS
	2/Lt A. SCOTT	
85976	Pte ALASAN MOSHIE	
85954	Sgt ISAKA MOSHIE	
18155565	Pte ADJETEY DOKU	
82505	" YAYA BAZ	
3631	" MATHEW LAWER	
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44645	" KABRE	
85392	" KANJARGA	GAMS
3877	" DAGOMBA	
5651	Sigmn TETTEH	GSR
5402	Lcpl ADJEI	GAMS
6183	Pte BATCHAH	"
5192	Cpl AVORNYO	
74085	Ssgt ISSAKA	
75435	WO II ALI SEIDU	
79842	Cpl MARTYE	
84118	Lcpl GRUMAH	
2333	Pte DAGARTI	
2430	Pte ABOPATA	
2831	" SI SSALA	
4408	" ATTIA	
73637	" DAGARTI	
80867	" AFFUM	
81298	Sgt GAKPETOR	GAES
84125	Cpl KISSI	GSR
6181	Pte AFEKU	GAMS
84379	Cpl GRUNSHIE	
5178	Pte ACHAMPONG	
85153	" KANJARGA	
5177	" BANDA	
2179	" RENE O LOUIS	
4046	" KWESI AMANIE	GEME
84625	Lcpl SARI BAZ	
85388	Pte YAKUBU LOBI	
85948	Lcpl MAMA HAUSA	
3570	Pte AWUNEY KUSASI	
3587	" N. LORSO	
3603	" ADAMA KANJARGA	
74854	" SEIDU CHOKOSI	
85133	" SAMBAPA MAMPRUSI	
4577	" YIMBA DAGARTI	
4024	" AWUNEY KANJARGA	
2483	" BUKARE KADO	
4427	" LORSO B.	
4182	" KOFI DAGARTI	
4990	" KANJARGA T.	

2 + 56

LIST BRAVO -- MISSING

AS AT 04 1700

GC	14734	Sgt	SEIDU GRUNSHIE	
	79212	Cpl	HARUNA	
	85401	"	LORSO	
	2176	Pte	FULANI	
	2396	Lt	GRUMAH	
	2837	"	HAUSA	
	3274	PTE	BUILSA	
	3576	"	GRUNSHIE	
	3913	"	GRUMAH	
	4426	"	ASAWASUANA	
	4579	"	GRUNSHIE	
	4829	"	AKASIA	
	5183	"	CHOKOSI	
	5202	"	TONGO	
	5556	"	GRUNSHIE	
	4217	"	BEDIAKO	
	82769	"	BUSANGA	
	85138	"	FULANI	
	39322	"	KONKOMBA	2 Bde-DOMIONGO
	3256	"	KANJARGA	
	85366	"	KONKOMBA	
	3873	Cpl	FREMPONG	
	3955	Pte	CHOKOSI	
	4557	"	MANTE	
	4608	"	CHARLES DZOWORNU	
	4831	"	KWAME SISSALA	
	5197	"	KANJARGA	
	5206	"	DRAMANI	
	5562	"	MUNOR	
	78544	"	FRAFRA	
	84751	"	MAMA ATTIPOE	S&T
	3961	"	CHOKOSI	
	81448	Lt	BASARE	2 Bde - DOMIONGO
	54313	Pte	BASARE	" "
	85970	Lt	BABA JOLLY	

0 +35

LIST CHARLIE

KNOWN DEAD

AS AT 04 1700

81393 Pte DUTY BEMOBA
18153446 " EMMANUEL NUNOO

NOTICAS 1881G of 281636

0 + 2

LIST DELTA

MISSING PRESUMED

AS AT 04 1700

	Capt T.G. RALPH	(437144)
	Lt A.P.G. BROWN	(445802)
4189	Pte YAKUBU FRAFRA	
74854	" ISSAKA BAZ	
48601	Cpl KURIBIL FRAFRA	
2522	Pte MUSAH MOSHIE	

2+4

Conference - Gen. MacEoin and Col. Ankarrah, 0915 hrs.
N'Djili 4 May 61

1. Causes

Col. Ankarrah stated following were the causes leading to the Port Francqui incident:

MILITARY INFORMATION			(a)
SEEN	Initial	Date	
OC			(b)
GS02	ohw	15 May	ONUC troops did not fire because they were in small scattered positions. Tried to regroup but too late.
I (A)			(c)
I (B)			Swedish officer hoisted flag on hotel and this annoyed the civilian population.
I (C)	St	16/5	(d)
I (D)			ONUC troops were too friendly with local ANC. The attack was made by reinforcements who came from Luluabourg, by some troops passing through from Leo, by the civil police and by the Jeunesse.

2. Casualties

33 still missing. One came from the bush last night and said he had been with seven others. So far 2 bodies only have been seen and identified. The Sgt who escaped saw the European officers being killed. He said that Capt. Ralph had his fingers cut off before being shot. Col. Ankarrah thinks that a total of 26 may have been killed. The remainder are still in the bush. Of wounded recovered so far all except three have been suffering from gunshot wounds; three only suffering from bullet wounds. Therefore Col. Ankarrah thinks most of the shooting was done by civilians.

3. Liberian Reinforcements - going to Port Francqui today with Bde. Major and ANC officer. Liberians will not live in the ANC camp. They are taking over the Ghanaian accommodation but will maintain more concentrated dispositions. Col. Ankarrah thinks joint patrolling with ANC is possible provided UN troops are in numerical superiority. The ANC in the area are hemp smokers and therefore cannot be relied upon.

4. Future Deployment of Ghanaian Bde.

It is the intention to regroup in not less than coy. strength. Strength of coys: 130. This in Col. Ankarrah's opinion is sufficient to enable them to defend themselves. This will leave no troops in Bakwanga. Col. Ankarrah thinks the onus

for protection of food supply convoy should rest on Kalondji when the convoy comes into his own territory. In Col. Ankarrah's opinion, Bakwanga needs a full Bn.

5. Reason for not using force

Col. Ankarrah's main reason for not using force was in order to allow the establishment of joint patrols to search for disarmed UN personnel who had hidden in the bush.

6. BBC Announcement

The BBC has announced that 26 bodies have been found in the river. This is not so as the area has been searched and no bodies have so far been found. Col. Ankarrah would be grateful if the Force Commander would make an official protest in this connection.

5/A/3/4

Report on rescue flight to Port Francqui, by W/O S.Feron
Swedish Engineer Groups, ONUC, Congo.

After the trouble in Port Francqui on Thursday 27 April? I was ordered on 28 April to fly the Beaver to Port Francqui with a UN negotiating party from the Ghana contingent stationed at Luluabourg. The UN personnel consisted of one Lieutenant-Colonel, Commander of 2nd Ghana Bn., one Lieutenant, one Congolese interpreter and a British flight-trained Ghana captain as co-pilot. It was mentioned in the instructions that a civilian aircraft from air Brusse carrying two ANC officers from Luluabourg would try to land at Port Francqui before us. Their task would be to try to bring the situation in Port Francqui under control and enable us to land. The ANC officers were said to be completely reliable from the UN point of view.

After more than one hour's flight, we passed an emergency airfield, Pebeangu, about 20 km east of Port Francqui, from which very signals were fired. The field was held by Ghana Troops and we landed to investigate the situation there. I remained on board the plane with the engine running, since there seemed to be a general feeling of nervousness and insecurity. When the Ghanaian Officers returned to the plane after a short discussion with the Officer on the spot, we were told that the Ghanaian soldiers that morning had been involved in a gun battle with the ANC in the outskirts of Port Francqui. The casualties sustained by the Ghanaians were one dead and three wounded. They had been forced to withdraw.

After five minutes by plane from Port Francqui we met the Air Brusse plane which had just taken off from there. The pilot was asked about the situation by radio and answered that savage ANC soldiers had taken over and that no UN personnel had been seen

and everything seemed chaotic and tense. Asked about our chances of landing, he strongly advised against it. Capt. Gurney (British Ghana Army) suggested that we continue to the town and airfield to find out what our chances of landing were. At the same time the UN personnel there would know that they had not been forgotten, but that rescue was on the way.

The beaver was flying above its normal altitude for safety reasons, i.e. to avoid being a target for possible firing from the ground. Reconnaissance of Port Francqui was begun around noon and only occasional individuals were seen, which convinced us that the situation was chaotic. After 15 minutes' reconnaissance the altitude had been reduced to 500 meters, but no change could be noticed in Port Francqui. Occasionally one or two soldiers were seen outside the guard house at the airfield. Another 10 minutes' reconnaissance while the altitude was reduced to 300 meters. A private car with a red cross on the roof drove towards the airfield from the ANC camp. The car stopped by the guard-house, which was where the plane had landed earlier, a Congolese soldier jumped out and started to wave with a white flag. The members of the negotiating party (officers) suggested that we land and, since they were willing to take the risk, I landed and taxied the plane to the car with the red cross. The Ghana Officers left the plane and were met by the soldier. Capt Gurney signalled to me to stop the engine. We all went along in the car which was driven to the ANC camp and then to the detention barracks in the centre of the camp. There we met the two ANC officers who had arrived in Port Francqui about 30 minutes ahead of us. Soon we were completely surrounded by

Congolese soldiers; about half of them carried Ghanaian arms and other UN equipment. UN jeeps, trucks etc. confirmed our fears that the UN had ceased to exist in Port Francqui. No trace was to be seen of UN personnel. After a while the ANC soldiers began to take an interest in the sub-machine guns which the Ghana officers had hanging over their shoulders. I had temporarily exchanged my sub-machine gun for a 9 mm pistol, which I kept in my brief-case. The interest soon changed into an attempt at disarming us, but as the British captain quickly gained control over his gun and got ready to fire, half of the ANC force fled and took shelter behind a house nearby. With the balanced situation thus achieved with the weapons at the ready, it was agreed that everyone should remove the cartridges and secure their weapons. A conference was then held in the corridor of the detention barracks, but it was difficult to get a grip of this confused gathering, among other things because everybody had a different story to tell. In accord: the ANC naturally blamed the UN saying that the UN started the shooting, an allegation which is false concerning the UN troops at Port Francqui who according to several witnesses (WHO doctor, British doctor, Swedish W/O) had not opened fire while being disarmed, arrested and subject to other aggression by the ANC. The Ghana Officer was mainly interested in where the UN personnel were. After about one hour a door opened and a British Ghana officer, Lt. Scott came out followed by two ministers from Luluabourg, who in accordance with instructions from Leopoldville had been flown to Port Francqui two days earlier. Lt. Scott did not have his rank and UN badges, but had not been subjected to any greater maltreatment. After another hour's discussion, we went by jeep to the mortuary, where the Congolese wanted to show us their dead soldiers. Only one was to be found.

However, we saw two dead Ghanaian soldiers in the grass outside. They had been shot in the back. The Lt-Col (Comd 2 Ghana Bn) now became aggressive and demanded that he be shown his soldiers, particularly the commanding officers, for whom everybody was concerned, after Lt. Scott's account of the course of events. At that, the driver seemed willing to drive us to a hospital, where he believed the UN personnel were. The British medical officer and his orderly were kept there. The MO, Dr. Richards, said the missing British Officers and two of the Swedes had been taken away to be shot. Dr. Richards had met them and seen them tied together, and as Lt. Boettiger had been covered with blood after maltreatment (fractured skull) Dr. Richards had tried to obtain permission to take care of him and see to his injuries. The answer had been that this would serve no purpose, as they were all going to be shot. The doctor was taken away and heard 10 to 15 shots being fired from the direction where the prisoners were. The Commander (Ghana) insisted that he be taken immediately to the place where the prisoners were detained. The soldier then pressed down hard on the accelerator and we went at break-neck speed in the direction of the river. I asked the survivor, Dr. Richards, what was going to happen and he said he thought we were next in turn to be executed. I argued that we still had two ANC officers with us, but Dr. Richards said that nobody had any control over these savage soldiers. After five minutes' travel at break-neck speed, during which the vehicle almost turned over several times, the Ghana officer managed to persuade the driver to take us to the airfield. The plane had been left unguarded the whole time for known reasons - the UN did no longer exist in Port Francoqui except for the passengers on the

Beaver plane - and it had been stripped of its emergency equipment and UN mail. A quick inspection of the plane showed that no greater damage had been done to it. I started the engine immediately but had to wait for another 15 minutes for the Commander who had a last discussion with the ANC officer. In the meantime the plane was surrounded by a group of soldiers who gesturing with their hands and weapons implied that they would shoot me if I returned to Port Francqui. Dr. Richards had told me earlier that the soldiers were very aggressive towards Swedes and I had removed my Swedish badges and put the UN cap in my pocket. I hid the UN cap, as we had always been seen as Swedish pilots wearing those caps by the soldiers at Port Francqui.

At about 4 o'clock, we were able to take off with 6 passengers, as Dr. Richards and his orderly had now joined us. After about two hours' flight we landed at Luluabourg. The mission had been Successful, as a DC-3 was sent on the Saturday to evacuate disarmed UN personnel. On the Sunday, both the Otter and the DC-3 were sent for the same purpose.

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51A/314

SEEN	Initial	Date
Chief MU Info	MB	10/5
Asst. MU Info	ohu	15/5
Asst. MU Info	OT	16/5
Asst. MU Info		

ONUC HQ

3 May 61

REPORT ON INCIDENT AT PORT FRANCOQUI

Situation prior to incident

1. Since the 28th of March there had been a number of cases of intimidation and beating of Baluba railway employees along rail line Port Francoqui-Mweka by Lulusa tribesmen. In reprisal, on 10th of April, an organised gang of Balubas raided the village of Malu-Malu and burnt it to the ground.
2. The incident at Malu-Malu was investigated by UN and also by ANC/Police but independently. The ANC/Police arrested some 75 Balubas accused of being responsible for the attack. The group was imprisoned at Port Francoqui.
3. Following the attack on Malu-Malu a large number (some 300) of the Lulusa minority evacuated Port Francoqui.
4. The situation remained very tense along the rail line and many reports were received to the effect that a large tribal war was imminent in the area of Mweka-Mushange. The opposing tribes being on one side, the Bakubas and Balubas, and on the other side the Lulusa.

Visit to Port Francoqui of Minister of Interior on 26 April

5. To ease the tension in the lower Kasai area, the Minister of Interior in the Provincial Government offered UN to proceed to Port Francoqui if transportation could be made available, to him.
6. In his speech to the people of Port Francoqui the Minister is reported to have accused the ANC of being anti-Lulusa as most of the garrison was composed of Balubas, Bakubas and Bangalas. He further added that the ANC instead of being a deterrent to trouble they were the cause. The Minister is supposed to have said that if their attitude does not change they would be disarmed by UN troops. The Minister also praised the work of UN troops in Kasai.

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7. The ANC felt hurt because the Minister's movements were under UN escort. They believed that UN troops (Ghana) were partial in the present tribal conflict. Their interest being the protection of Lulus whom were supporters of Lumumba's MNC party.

Sequence of Events

8. Following are the main events given in a chronological order:

(a) 27 Apr 61

- (i) At 1210 hrs a signal was received at Bde HQ Luluabourg informing that trouble had occurred with ANC Garrison at Port Francqui. The OC of 'A' Coy 2 Ghana Rifle stated that his coy had been placed at the "Stand to" but otherwise the situation was calm.
- (ii) At approx 2330 hrs the information was received by telephone from Mweka that all UN troops at Port Francqui had been disarmed. This information came from a Ghana soldier who succeeded in getting away on the train.
- (iii) Shortly before 2400 hrs the Ghana Bde Comd decided on sending the following force to investigate the situation:
 - (1) From Mweka - one platoon and one recon detachment (Ferrets)
 - (2) From Pebeangu - one platoon
 - (3) From Luluabourg - two platoons plus Bde HQ Defence platoon.

(b) 28 Apr 61

- (i) The elements from Luluabourg left at 0230 hrs and were to join remainder of force as quickly as possible.
- (ii) The elements from Mweka and Pebeangu reached the outskirts of Port Francqui at approx 0800 hrs where the ANC has set an ambush. The casualties to

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own troops were: one dead and three wounded. The ANC casualties were thought to be at least two dead. The force then withdrew to Pebeangu.

- (iii) Immediately following this engagement the ANC proceeded in assembling the UN troops in Port Francoqui to shoot them in reprisal for casualties suffered in clash on the outskirts of town. UN troops were all disarmed.
- (iv) The Commander of ANC Central School at Luluabourg, Comdt Demole, agreed to go to Port Francoqui to investigate. He travelled by Air Brousse aircraft and was followed by CO of 2 Ghana Rifle in a UN Beaver aircraft.
- (v) On arrival at Port Francoqui CO 2 Ghana Rifle found the local ANC very agitated in spite of presence of Comdt Demole. Release of Lt Richards, 2/Lt Scott and Pte Rene Louis was secured. Two dead Ghana soldiers were seen. The CO was not allowed to visit the Ghana camp area. He returned with the impression that grave casualties are to be expected as a result of reprisal shooting. He also learned that Movement Control personnel (Swedes) had been taken away by the Territorial Police and had been killed.
- (vi) Early afternoon there was intense ANC activity in Luluabourg. This was preceded by the usual total exodus to African towns of all Congolese civilians. ANC set up barriers at all entrances to Luluabourg and sent three extra platoons to cover the airfield. Reinforcements at airfield had with them mortars and anti-aircraft guns. All this took place because of the news of Mr Tshombe's arrest. The situation returned to normal after explanation given by Bde Comd to Maj Mulumba the "Commandant de la Place".

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- (vii) At a conference during the evening Maj Mulumba expressed regret for incident at Port Francqui and the behaviour of ANC at Luluabourg. He explained the behaviour was due entirely to fear of arrival of UN reinforcements and consequent UN reprisals. The ANC troops did not in fact behave badly during this period and did not enter town centre or African township except for infrequent well behaved patrols.
- (viii) Later in the evening Maj Mulumba returned with the news that some Ghanians soldiers had come back from the bush and were at Port Francqui. He agreed that a UN aircraft could be sent on 29 April to bring them to Luluabourg.

(c) 29 Apr 61

- (1) The elements from Luluabourg as described in sub-paragraph 8.a.(iii) above reached Febeanga. They had been ambushed at Bomioango during evening of 28 April. Eight soldiers were missing from this encounter.
- (ii) Again in the morning the ANC reestablished their road blocks in Luluabourg.
- (iii) During the morning a conference was held at Luluabourg and the ANC agreed on the following:
- (1) Ghanian troops at Port Francqui would be replaced by Liberian troops.
 - (2) All weapons and equipment taken from UN would be returned.
 - (3) An aircraft would go to Port Francqui to evacuate the Ghanian soldiers.
 - (4) All extra ANC troops in Luluabourg would return to their camp and road blocks would be removed. All necessary steps would be taken to restore situation to normal.

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- (iv) In the afternoon a DC3 with on board one Ghana officer, a bugler, and an ANC officer went to Port Francoqui. They returned at 1700 hrs with 10 soldiers and with the information that a further 30 were awaiting to be evacuated.
- (v) At 1700 hrs the situation was back to normal in Luluabourg.
- (vi) At 1700 hrs Comdt Badu of ANC and Maj Bouffard from ONUC HQ Leopoldville arrived at Luluabourg with the mission to assist in restoring the situation to normal.
- (vii) In the evening a conference was held during which the Ghana Ede Comd gave an account of what had happened in Port Francoqui. Comdt Badu pointed out that the ANC side of the story must also be heard. For this he requested that the ANC Commander at Port Francoqui be ordered to report to Luluabourg soonest. This was agreed upon and a UN aircraft was made available to fetch him. It was then decided that another meeting would be called on his arrival.

(d) 30 Apr 61

- (i) During the course of the day 31 Ghana soldiers were brought back from Port Francoqui by two UN aircrafts; a DC3 and an Otter.
- (ii) To ensure that no interference is made to the proposed move of the UN force from Pebeanga to Mweka, a joint visit was agreed to be made on 1 May to Domongo and Bulongo, where ANC had troops garrisoned. It was hoped that a further joint visit could be arranged to Port Francoqui and that the search for the missing UN personnel could be organised. This joint visit could also negotiate the return of all UN arms, vehicles and equipment.

(e) 1 May 61

- (i) In the morning a meeting took place at the airport at Luluabourg where we were informed by Comdt Badu that the Commander of 9th Gendarmerie En had received orders

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not to hand over UN weapons and equipment. To this the Ghana Bde Comd said if weapons and equipment are not returned he would order his men to go and get them and use whatever force is necessary. Comdt Badu explained that his mission was to restore relations between UN and ANC and that he would send a wire to clarify the situation. A wire was also sent to ONUC HQ explaining the situation and requesting that either General Mobutu or Col Kiembe be made aware of the developments.

- (ii) After the meeting the planned joint visit to Domongo and Bulongo took place.

(f) 2 May 61

- (i) At approx 1130 hrs Col Kiembe, the ANC Chief of Staff, accompanied by Maj Monette from ONUC HQ arrived at Iulubourg from Leo. It was immediately agreed that a joint team would go to Port Francqui to study the situation. The group was quickly organised. On the ANC side were: Col Kiembe, Maj Kulumba, Comdt Demole. From the UN were: Col Ankra, Maj Beaffard, Maj Monette, Lt Donkou and six of his drivers. The party left for Port Francqui at 1200 hrs.

- (ii) The ANC Chief of Staff had already agreed that all personnel, weapons and equipment would be returned to UN. To this end, on arrival at Port Francqui, Col Kiembe issued appropriate orders. All ANC soldiers assembled at their camp where a parade was held in honour of their Chief of Staff. He later addressed the troops and answered their questions in Lingala. While at Port Francqui the UN Comd in Kasai and Col Kiembe agreed on the following:
- (1) Liberian troops would replace Ghanians at Port Francqui and would be quartered and work with the ANC.
 - (2) The ANC reinforcements at Port Francqui would return to Iulubourg soonest. UN aircrafts would be made available for this move.

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(3) Liberian troops (Platoon strength) could move immediately into Port Franquai and begin, in close cooperation with ANO, the systematic search for the missing UN personnel.

(4) Details of move of Liberian Company to Port Franquai should be arranged directly with him at Leo.

(5) Lt Dankou and his six drivers would remain behind under the personal responsibility of the ANO Commander of Port Franquai. They would await the arrival of another three drivers and would then proceed to Pebeanga with the eight UN vehicles and all equipment and rations. On arrival of convoy at Pebeanga the whole UN Force would then proceed to Luluabourg.

(6) Take back with them to Luluabourg the UN weapons found at the ANO Camp. The following weapons were brought back:

39 FN rifles

3 LMGs Bren

20 SMGs Sterling

2 Pistols

Were also brought back a large number of ammunition magazines and three wireless sets.

(7) An exchange of Liaison Officers would be made at Luluabourg.

(iii) The party returned to Luluabourg from Port Franquai at 1715 hrs where an ANO guard of honour was inspected by Col Kienbe.

(iv) Col Kienbe, Maj Bouffard and Maj Monette left for Leo at 1745 hrs.

Eye-Witness Account of Incident

9. Attached as annexures are the eye-witness accounts of the incident as seen by the following personnel:

- (a) Annexure 1 - 2/Lt AJ Scott
- (b) Annexure 2 - ~~CSM Ali Seidu~~ DELETED
- (c) Annexure 3 - CSM Asborg

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Casualties

10. Attached as annexure 4 are lists of personnel who were at Port Francoqui at the time of incident. They are divided in four lists as follows:

List A - Known safe	2 & 42
List B - Missing	Nil & 54
List C - Known dead	Nil & 2
List D - Missing presumed dead	2 & Nil

Sketch of Port Francoqui

11. Attached as Annexure 5 is a sketch which shows the locations occupied by UN and ANC in regard to quarters.

Conclusion and Comments

12. It appears that the direct cause for the incident was the speech and attitude of the Minister of Interior during his visit to Port Francoqui on 27 April.

13. The weakness of UN Forces at Port Francoqui resided in the following:

- (a) No system of alert to warn troops against any aggressive action by ANC;
- (b) Troops being quartered in some six different places throughout town.
- (c) UN Garrison being too small in number as compared with ANC (90 vs 300).

(C. BOUFFARD) Major
Operations Officer
HQ ONUC

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Annex 1 to
Report GBJC HQ
3 May 61

REPORT ON THE TROUBLE AT PORT-FRANCOQUI
OF THURS. APR 27 BY LIEUT. SCOTT. OC 3 PL A COY

1. The trouble started on Wed, 26 Apr, when the Minister of Interior landed. The ANC guard at the Airport, knowing nothing of his visit, threatened to shoot him as a spy. He was taken under UN protection to the hotel.
2. ANC followed him to the hotel. A long discussion followed between Capt Ralph, the Minister and the two Adjutant chefs, in charge of ANC. They asked:-
 - a. For the Minister's credentials.
 - b. Why he had UNO protection
 - c. Why UN troops were occupying part of the Hotel des Palmes.It was decided to discuss these matters at 1000 hrs on Thu Apr 27.
3. The discussion, between the Minister, Administrator and two Adjt Chefs was held behind closed doors in the Adm Centre. The Minister stated he no longer required UN protection and UN escort was told to leave, or be disarmed. In trying to discover the trouble Capt Ralph was manhandled but released.
4. Capt RALPH then said the Minister no longer required protection. His escort could be stood down. He ordered a stand to. I with the CSM detailed the soldiers available in camp to their stand to positions. Lt BROWN had already taken a strong escort to reinforce the hotel.
5. After the positions had been detailed movement of ANC was reported EAST of the QM stores. Two ANC came down the road and put their arms down to parley. I spoke with them having put down my weapon. They said "CONGO was for the CONGOLESE. We should lay down our arms and leave PORT-FRANCOQUI to them". I replied we had come to help and must therefore stay where we were. They left. I then gave orders that if they advanced down the road we would fire if they insisted on coming nearer than two trees about 25 yds from our positions. Only the soldiers in the forward positions would have heard this order.
6. I was then returning towards the Coy office when I heard shouting and saw a large crowd of approximately 150 ANC advancing, NOT from the MWKA road to the EAST, but from the side road from the NORTH out flanking our positions. The soldiers nearest were already pulling back I heard the CSM shout, "They have passed us on the left." I judge that the rush from that direction could NOT be stopped from our present position. I therefore ordered the soldiers to retire to the Coy office area. I told those soldiers hidden from the ANC by hedges to retire as slowly as possible meanwhile making signs to the ANC to keep their distance. When we arrived in the Coy office area the ANC were about 10 yds behind us. Our soldiers around the Coy office were all standing up and not in fire positions. Already

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- other ANC were advancing from our rear at the WESTERN side of the Coy office. At this stage we were rushed from all directions and disarmed. I was taken away after beating. I did NOT see Capt RALPH or Lt BROWN until later when they were brought into the building in which I was under guard. They had been badly beaten.
7. Later the SWEDISH Lt and two SWEDISH CSMs were brought in having also been beaten. About two hours later RALPH, BROWN and two of the SWEDISH were taken to hospital. I was allowed to visit them with the remaining SWEDISH CSM that evening. RALPH and BROWN were in good heart and being well treated.
 8. On the morning of 28 Apr an ANC Sgt Major drove me to see the soldiers briefly. Later I heard firing (about 0800 hrs) and was taken to a small room with the SWEDISH CSM. Soon afterwards I was taken in a car to pick up the MO to form medical and parley party. However on passing the house of the visiting Minister I was dropped off.
 9. I was later taken with the Minister to a Gendarmerie cell from which I was later released when Lt Col AFERI arrived.
 10. From 0800 hrs till about 1200 hrs there was very intermittent firing, some single shot some bursts automatic.

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*copy given to
Swedish Liaison
18 May 61 open*

Annex 3 to
ONUC Report
3 May 61

To: Swedish Liaison Officer, Lt Col Arne Ugglå
From: WO/3 Egon Aberg
Subject: STATEMENT OF HAPPENINGS AT PORT FRANCOU AND OF APRIL 1961

Sir,

24/4. Cable to UN representative Port Francou (which was in fact Boettiger and Ralph) from ONUC Leo M. Fournier telling that two ministers were to arrive on Wednesday and were to be protected by UN. They were to be lodged at Hotel des Palmes Port Francou which was entirely taken over by UN. There lived 2/Lt Scott, 3 Swedes, one British doctor, one Polish doctor and about 20 Ghana ORS. No Congolese. All Luluwa personnel had left Sunday.

26/4. In the morning ANC put up roadblocks between Airfield and town and Ghana answered by setting up roadblocks between harbour and town. At around noon the two ministers arrived and were met at Airfield by Capt Ralph and Lt Boettiger and an UN escort of 1 + 3. They were driven across airfield and bypassing the roadblocks they were taken to the hotel.

At about 1300 hrs a truckload of ANC commanded by an ANC-officer surrounded the hotel and wanted to speak to the ministers. After chat in the lobby the ANC withdrew but doing so they caught sight of a BOK flag hanging on a balcony and were very annoyed. ANC declared that they were to come back next day and take the hotel by force at 0900 hrs. The hotel was guarded by 3 UN-sentries.

The Swedes noticed that tension rose in town and expected something to happen in the near future.

27/4. In the morning one ANC-officer and some men arrived at the hotel and wanted to talk to the ministers, who escorted by UN under Capt Ralph went to the Congolese Camp. UN-escort returned but Capt Ralph stayed on for a while with the ministers. After a while Capt Ralph returned in his own car, his shirt having been damaged. Shortly afterwards the ministers were brought back by the ANC. At about noon the UN-soldiers took up positions in the hotel building on the balcony around the groundfloor and first floor.

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Assembled in the hotel were 3 British officers, 1 British and 1 Polish doctor, 3 Swedes and around 25 UN ORS.

At about 1300 hrs there was some noise around the 300 meters distant HQ and the 3 British Officers went there by car and got arrested on the way. Before going Ralph told Boettiger to take command and not shoot unless in danger. About 150 ANC now surrounded the hotel. The ANC shouted at the Ghana troops that they did not want them but the white ones. ANC entered the hotel, took out the 3 Swedes and a British doctor from the yard. The doctor immediately released. When the ANC officer in command heard that the Swedes were Movement Control people the Swedes were taken into the hotel again but the ANC-soldiers took them out again and took away their UN-berets and stripped them of their insignias and took all their personal belongings from them. The Swedes were forced into a Land-Rover, at this moment Boettiger got a severe blow in his head by a rifle-butt. They were taken to an ANC building some 250 meters away and were put on the veranda. There they met with the 3 British officers, who were in rather bad shape having been beaten like Boettiger. At the balcony were also six Belgians from BCK. After a while the two ministers arrived and were first placed at the balcony but soon brought to another room. Two ANC-soldiers now gave first-aid to Capt Ralph, a British Lt and Lt Boettiger. Soon Boettiger lay down on the floor conscious but shocked. Aaberg fainted after some hours and fell on the stone floor and got hurt in his back-head. After about three hours Capt Ralph, Lt Brown, Lt Boettiger and Aaberg were taken to the BCK-hospital where they were well treated by white staff. Lt Scott and W/O Liederen were left behind on the balcony.

28/4. At around 1100 hrs shooting was heard around the hospital. Five ANC took Capt Ralph, Lt Brown, Lt Boettiger and W/O Aaberg out. Ralph in pyjamas, the others in trousers. Just outside the hospital Boettiger got a heavy riflebutt-blow and got his skull fractured and bled heavily and barely managed to walk. Two nuns were also taken out. They now walked some 200 meters over to the Congolese hospital where they sat down and were tied together. Aaberg's right arm to Capt Ralph's right arm to Lt Boettiger's right arm to Lt Brown's right arm. They walked and turned right towards the Portuguese bar. Halfway and

over the open grass the party was joined by 30 Liedgren guarded by a Congolese police or gendarm. Liedgren was not tied together with the 4 others. Having passed the Portuguese bar they stopped behind a roadblock and stood in order from left to right Liedgren, Aaberg, Ralph, Roettiger and Brown. Liedgren now was ordered to walk a small path leading into the bush. Just before he got out of sight he turned and seeing the police, rifle in shooting position, Liedgren shouted "Don't shoot". After that Liedgren went out of sight and the police shot the first round and Liedgren yelled. At that moment Aaberg was ordered by his ANC-guard to loosen himself from the rope and to walk the same way as Liedgren. Aaberg, however, now observed that his ANC-soldier started to load his rifle, took his chance, and passing between his guard and Liedgren's police fired his second round after Liedgren. Capt Ralph now shouted to Aaberg "good sergeant-major, run away." Aaberg ran for some 20 meters into the bush and threw himself on the ground. Some 5 shots now were fired after Aaberg and he heard some more shots being fired but not in his direction. When Aaberg heard voices nearing he went up and ran further into the bush.

He hid in the jungle and was the whole time hunted. Some shots now and then.

29/4. Saturday morning he went to Officer's Mess to call on doctor, but saw ANC and Police there when he was hiding in the grass.

Saturday afternoon hid near river, was observed by Police and he climbed a palmtree to hide himself. Jumped from palmtree, ran down to river, jumped in, got shot at 5 shots, swam to other side, saw Police there, hid in the weeds in river, searched by one motor-boat and one canoe. Three hours in water. Police disappeared. Police-sergeant found him and told him to come out. He was taken to Congolese Camp. Brought up with 20-25 Ghanaians in Commandant's house overnight. Food and beer given to him.

Sunday UN DC-3 took him to Luluabourg.

Leopoldville May 4 1961

WC/1

Egon Aberg

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Annex 4 to
Report ONUC HQ
3 May 61

The UN Forces,
HQ GHANA Inf Bde,
LULUABOURG,
KASAI - CONGO

BDE/LULU/295/2/A

Subject:- CASUALTIES -
PORT FRANCOIS
INCIDENT

1 May 61

Principal Secretary (A)
Ministry of Defense
Burma Camp
A C C R A

1. Att are lists of pers at PORT FRANCOIS divided into categories as in Para 3. All are pers of 2 GHANA R, except for attachments, whose Corps are marked against their names.

2. Lists are incl personnel involved in ambush at DOMIONGO and where marked "FOUND", their names have been given by ANC to this HQ. They are still held by ANC.

3. SUMMARY

List A - Known Safe 2+42

List B - Missing Nil+54

List C - Known Dead Nil+2

List D - Missing presumed dead 2+NIL

4. These lists will be referred to in all future amendments.

Col.
COMD, GHANA INF BDE,
(R.J. BADDLEY).

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Report of Rescue Flight to Port Francqui
by W/O S. Peron, Swedish Engineer Groupe,
ONUC, Congo

After the trouble in Port Francqui on Thursday 27 April, I was ordered on 28 April to fly the Beaver to Port Francqui with a UN negotiating party from the Ghana contingent stationed at Luluabourg. The UN personnel consisted of one Lieutenant-Colonel, Commander of 2nd Ghana Bn., one Lieutenant, one Congolese interpreter and a British flight-trained Ghana captain as co-pilot. It was mentioned in the instructions that a civilian aircraft from Air Base carrying two ANC officers from Luluabourg would try to land at Port Francqui before us. Their task would be to try to bring the situation in Port Francqui under control and enable us to land. The ANC officers were said to be completely reliable from a UN point of view.

After more than one hour's flight, we passed an emergency airfield, Pebeangu, about 20 km east of Port Francqui, from which VHF signals were fired. The field was held by Ghana Troops and we decided to investigate the situation there. I remained on board the plane with the engine running, since there seemed to be a general feeling of nervousness and insecurity. When the Ghanaian officers returned to the plane after a short discussion with the officer on the spot, we were told that the Ghanaian soldiers that morning had been involved in a gun battle with the ANC in the outskirts of Port Francqui. The casualties sustained by the Ghanaians were one dead and three wounded. They had been forced to withdraw.

About five minutes by plane from Port Francqui we met the first Brussels plane which had just taken off from there. The pilot was asked about the situation by radio and answered that savage ANC soldiers had taken over and that no UN personnel had been seen. Everything seemed chaotic and tense. Asked about our chances of landing, he strongly advised against it. Capt. Gurney (British-Ghanaian) suggested that we continue to the town and airfield to find out what our chances of landing were. At the same time the UN personnel there

would know that they had not been forgotten, but that rescue was on the way.

The Beaver was flying above its normal altitude for safety reasons, i.e. to avoid being a target for possible firing from the ground. Reconnaissance of Port Francqui was begun around noon and only occasional individuals were seen, which convinced us that the situation was chaotic. After 15 minutes' reconnaissance the altitude had been reduced to 500 meters, but no change could be noticed in Port Francqui. Occasionally one or two soldiers were seen outside the guard-house at the airfield. Another 10 minutes' reconnaissance while the altitude was reduced to 300 meters. A private car with a red cross on the roof drove towards the airfield from the ANC camp. The car stopped by the guard-house, which was where the plane had landed earlier, a Congolese soldier jumped out and started to wave with a white flag. The members of the negotiating party (officers) suggested that we land and, since they were willing to take the risk, I landed and taxied the plane to the car with the red cross. The Ghana officers left the plane and were met by the soldier. Gurney signalled to me to stop the engine. We all went along in the car which was driven to the ANC camp and then to the detention barracks in the centre of the camp. There we met the two ANC officers who had arrived in Port Francqui about 30 minutes ahead of us. When we were completely surrounded by Congolese soldiers; about half of them carried Ghanaian arms and other UN equipment. UN jeeps, trucks etc. confirmed our fears that the UN had ceased to exist in Port Francqui. No trace was to be seen of UN personnel. After a while the ANC soldiers began to take an interest in the sub-machine guns which the Ghana officers had hanging over their shoulders. I had temporarily exchanged my sub-machine gun for a 9 mm pistol, which I kept in my brief-case. The interest soon changed into an attempt at disarmament, but as the British captain quickly gained control over his gun and got ready to fire, half of the ANC force fled and took shelter behind a house nearby. With the balanced situation thus achieved with the weapons ready, it was agreed that everyone should remove the cartridges and secure their weapons. A conference was then held.

the corridor of the detention barracks, but it was difficult to get a grip of this confused gathering, among other things because everybody had a different story to tell. In accord: the ANC naturally blamed the UN saying that the UN had started the shooting, an allegation which is false concerning the UN troops at Port Francqui who according to several witnesses (WHO doctor, British doctor, Swedish W/O) had not opened fire while being disarmed, arrested and subjected to other aggression by the ANC. The Ghana officer was mainly interested in where the UN personnel were. After about an hour a door opened and a British Ghana officer, Lt Scott came out followed by the two ministers from Luluabourg, who in accordance with instructions from Leopoldville had been flown to Port Francqui a few days earlier. Lt Scott did not have his rank and UN badges, but had not been subjected to any greater maltreatment. After another short discussion, we went by jeep to the mortuary, where the Congolese wanted to show us their dead soldiers. Only one was to be found. However, we saw two dead Ghanaian soldiers in the grass outside. They had been shot in the back. The Lt. Col. (Comdr 2 Ghana Bn) now became aggressive and demanded that he be shown his soldiers, particularly the commanding officers, for whom everybody was concerned, after Lt Scott's account of the course of events. At that, the driver seemed willing to drive us to a hospital, where he believed the UN personnel were. The British medical officer and his orderly were kept there. The MD, Dr. Richards, said that the missing British officers and two of the Swedes had been taken away to be shot. Dr. Richards had met them and seen them tied together, and as Lt Boettiger had been covered with blood after maltreatment (fractured skull) Dr. Richards had tried to obtain permission to take care of him and see to his injuries. The answer had been that this would serve no purpose, as they were all going to be shot. The doctor was taken away and heard 10 to 15 shots being fired from the direction where the prisoners were. The Commander (Ghana) insisted that we be taken immediately to the place where the prisoners were being detained. The soldier then pressed down hard on the accelerator and we were at break-neck speed in the direction of the river. I asked the

survivor, Dr. Richards, what was going to happen and he said he thought we were next in turn to be executed. I argued that we still had the two ANC officers with us, but Dr. Richards said that nobody had any control over those savage soldiers. After five minutes' travel at break - neck speed, during which the vehicle almost turned over several times, the Ghana officer managed to persuade the driver to take us to the airfield. The plane had been left unguarded the whole time for known reasons - the UN did no longer exist in Port Francqui except for the passengers on the Beaver plane - and had been stripped of its emergency equipment and UN mail. A quick inspection of the plane showed that no greater damage had been done to it. I started the engine immediately but had to wait for another 15 minutes for the Commander who had a last discussion with the ANC officer. In the meantime the plane was surrounded by a group of soldiers who gesturing with their hands and weapons implied that they would shoot me if I returned to Port Francqui. Dr. Richards had told me earlier that the soldiers were very aggressive towards Swedes and I had removed my Swedish badges and put the UN cap in my pocket. I hid the UN cap, as we had always been seen as Swedish pilots wearing those caps by the soldiers at Port Francqui.

At about 4 o'clock, we were able to take off with 6 passengers, as Dr. Richards and his orderly had now joined us. After about two hours' flight we landed at Luluabourg. The mission had been successful, as a DC-3 was sent on the Saturday to evacuate disabled UN personnel. On the Sunday, both the Otter and the DC-3 were sent for the same purpose.

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LIST ALPHA

KNOWN SAFE IN LULUABOURG

Lt P RICHARDS GAMB
2/Lt A. SCOTT

85976 Pte ALIASA MOSHIE
85954 Sgt ISAKA MOSHIE
18155565 Pte ANJETSY DOKU
82505 Pte YAYA BARABARANI
18153631 Pte MATHEW LAWER
18154623 Pte WILLIAM GANU
18153971 Pte FRANCIS GANFI
18153984 Pte BOYE DAGARTI
18154802 Signr J. ASTANGAH GSR
18154040 Pte EMMANUEL ANKUMAH
4906 Pte ABUDU GRUMAH
80012 Cpl GRUMAH
84140 Pte KONKOMBA
3860 Pte FRAFRA
4843 Pte FRAFRA
5200 Pte KOROPARAGA
44645 Pte KABRE
85392 Pte KANJARGA GAMB
3877 Pte DAGOMBA
5651 Signr TETEN GSR
5402 L/Cpl ADJEI GAMB
6183 Pte BATCHAH GAMB
5192 Cpl AVORNYO
74085 S/Sgt ISSAKA
75435 WO II ALI SEIDU
79842 Cpl MARTYE
84118 L/Cpl GRUMAH
2333 Pte DAGARTI
2430 Pte ABOPATA
2831 Pte SISSALA
4408 Pte ATTIA
73637 Pte DAGARTI
80867 Pte AFFUM
81298 Sgt GAKPETOR GAMB
84125 Cpl KISSI GSR
6181 Pte AFEKU
84379 Cpl GRUMSHIE
5178 Pte ACHAMPONG
85153 Pte KANJARGA
5177 Pte BANDA
18152179 Pte RENE O LOUIS
40346 Pte KWESI AMANIE GAMB

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LIST BRAVO

MISSING

GC 14734 Sgt SEIDU GRUNSHIE
 67684 Pte ISSAKA BAZ
 74854 Pte CHOKOSI
 79212 Cpl HARUNA
 85401 " LORSO
 2176 Pte FULANI
 2396 L/C GRUMAH
 2522 Pte NOSHIE
 2837 L/C HAUSA
 3274 Pte BUILSA
 3576 " GRUNSHIE
 3603 " KANJARGA
 3913 " GRUMAH
 4182 " DAGARTI
 4189 " YAKUBU
 4426 " ASAWASUANA
 4579 " GRUNSHIE
 4829 " AKASIA
 4990 " KANJARGA
 5183 " CHOKOSI
 5202 " TONGO
 5556 " GRUNSHIE
 4217 " BEDIKO
 82769 " BUSANCA
 85138 " FULANI
 85133 " HAMPRUSI - DOMIONGO
 4024 " KANJARGA - " - FOUND
 4427 " LORSO - " - "
 39322 " KONKOMBA - 1 BDE - DOMIONGO
 48601 Cpl KARIBULA FRAFRA
 84625 L/C SARE BAZ
 85388 Pte YAKUBU LOBI
 85948 L/C NAMA HAUSA
 3256 Pte KANJARGA
 3570 " KUSASI
 3587 " LORSO
 85366 " KONKOMBA
 3873 Cpl FREMPONG
 3955 Pte CHOKOSI
 4557 " MANTE
 4427 " BAKANDE LORSO
 4608 " DZOTONU
 4831 " KWAME SISSALA
 5197 " KANJARGA
 5206 " DRAMANI
 5562 " MUNOR
 73544 " FRAFRA
 84751 " NAMA ATTIPOR - GAMS
 3961 " CHOKOSI
 4577 " DAGARTI - DOMIONGO
 2493 " KADO - " - FOUND
 81448 L/C BASARE 1 BDE - DOMIONGO
 54313 Pte BASARE 1 BDE - "
 85970 L/C BABA JOLLY

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LIST CHAMLIB

KNOWN DEAD

81393 Pte DUTY BEMOBA
18153446 Pte EEMANUEL MUNOO

Notions 18610 of
281636

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LIST DELTA

MISSING PRESUMED DEAD

Captain T C RALPH (437144) —

Lieut A F G BROWN (445802)



BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

5/19/3/4

« SEEN »	Initial	Date
Chief Mil Info		2/18/5
Asst. Mil Info		
Asst. Mil Info		
Asst. Mil Info		

196

A :
De :
Objet :

24/4. Cable to UN representative Port Francoqui (which was in fact Boettiger and Ralph) from ONUC Leo M. Fournier telling that two ministers were to arrive on Wednesday and were to be protected by UN. (They were to be lodged at Hotel des Palmes Port Francoqui which was entirely taken over by UN. There lived 2/Lt Scott, 3 Swedes, one British doctor, one Polish doctor and about 20 Ghana ORS. No Congolese. All Luluapersonnel had left Sunday.

26/4. In the morning ANC put up roadblocks between Airfield and town and Ghana answered by setting up roadblocks between harbour and town. At around noon the two ministers arrived and were met at airfield by Capt Ralph and Lt Boettiger and an UN escort of 1 + 3. They were driven across airfield and bypassing the roadblocks they were taken to the hotel.

At about 1300 hrs a truckload of ANC commanded by an ANC-officer surrounded the hotel and wanted to speak to the ministers. After a chat in the lobby the ANC withdrew but doing so they caught sight of a BCK-flag hanging on a balcony and were very annoyed. ANC declared that they were to come back next day and take the hotel by force at 0900 hrs. The hotel was guarded by 3 UN-sentries.

The Swedes noticed that the tense rose in town and expected something to happen in the near future.

27/4. In the morning one ANC-officer and some men arrived at the hotel and wanted to talk to the ministers, who escorted by UN under Capt Ralph went to the Congolese Camp. UN-escort returned but Capt Ralph stayed on for a while with the ministers. After a while Capt Ralph returned in his own car his shirt having been damaged. Shortly afterwards the ministers were brought back by the ANC. At about noon the UN-soldiers took up positions in the hotel-building on the balcony around the groundfloor and first floor.

Assembled in the hotel were 3 British officers, 1 British and 1 Polish doctor, 3 Swedes and around 25 UN ORS.

X - - -
towards the Portuguese bar. Half way and over the open grass the party was joined by W/O Liedgren guarded by a Congolese police or gendarm. Liedgren was not tied together with the 4 others. Having passed the Portuguese bar they stopped behind a roadblock and stood in order from left to right Liedgren, Aaberg, Ralph, Scottiger and Brown. Liedgren now was ordered to walk a small path leading into the bush. Just before he got out of sight he turned and seeing the police, rifle in shooting position, Liedgren shouted "Don't shoot". After that Liedgren went out of sight and the police shot the first round and Liedgren yelled. At that moment Aaberg was ordered by his ANG-guard to loosen himself from the rope and to walk the same way as Liedgren. Aaberg, however, now observed that his ANG-soldier started to load his rifle, took his chance, and passing between his guard and Liedgren's police made for the nearby bush. At that moment Liedgren's police fired his second round after Liedgren. Capt Ralph now shouted to Aaberg "Good sergeant-major, run away." Aaberg ran for some 20 meters into the bush and threw himself on the ground. Some 5 shots now were fired after Aaberg and he heard some more shots being fired but not in his direction. When Aaberg heard voices nearing he went up and ran further into the bush.

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At ^{Scott}~~Scott~~ and W/O Liedgren were left behind on the balcony.

25/4. At around 1100 hrs shooting was heard around the hospital. Five ANC took Capt Ralph, Lt Brown, Lt Boettiger and W/O Asberg out. Ralph in pyjamas, the others in trousers. Just outside the hospital Boettiger got a heavy riflebutt-blow and got his skull fractured and bled heavily and barely managed to walk. Two nuns were also taken out. They now walked some 200 meters over to the Congolese hospital where they sat down and were tied together. Asbergs right arm to Capt Ralphs right arm to Lt Boettiger's right arm to Lt Browns right arm. They walked and turned right.

.....

He hid in the jungle and was the whole time hunted. Some shots now and then.

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in the weeds in river, searched by 1 motorboat and one canoe. Three hours in water. Police disappeared. Police-sergeant found him and told him to come out. He was taken to Congolese camp. Brought up with 20-25 Ghanaians in Commandant's house over night. Food and beer given to them.

Sunday UN-PC 3 took him to Luluabourg.

AIR MAIL