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TOUR d'HORIZON

30-31 MAR 1982

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MJS/GLS/vms
30 March 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. MIDDLE EAST

- Expression of concern about the aftermath of 25 April Sinai withdrawal. Is Camp David process coming to an end? Do the Palestinian autonomy talks have a chance? Increasing need for a broader-based negotiating process, possibly preliminary moves in the direction of a comprehensive settlement.
- While there is no general framework for discussions, the United Nations remains the only forum where all concerned can sit together, and this should be utilized. Security Council as potential framework for dealing with situation in all its aspects, if all parties exercised necessary restraint.
- In two most dangerous areas in the Middle East, i.e., Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights, presence of United Nations peace-keeping forces contributes in a crucial way to what stability there is.
- Expression of concern over deteriorating situation in occupied West Bank, and over possible Israeli moves in the area.

2. LEBANON

- Cease-fire is holding.
- However, tension in the area continues and is not unaffected by West Bank events. Israeli leaders have for weeks publicly indicated possibility of massive military action in the event of "provocation".
- UNIFIL has to aim at fulfilment of its mandate as called for by the Security Council resolution with object of proceeding to its full deployment to the international border. The 1,000 man increase authorized by the Security Council will, it is hoped, facilitate a gradual "filling of the gap" along the Litani River between the East and West contingents. This, however, would require discussion with and full co-operation by the Israelis. Since the "gap" provides a convenient location for direct military moves without the restraining element of UNIFIL interposition, prospects of agreement on this are uncertain.

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- UNIFIL to continue efforts to facilitate extension of Lebanese Government authority and personnel in the South. This, however, is fraught with severe complications in view of internal situation in the country.

3. GOLAN HEIGHTS

- UNDOF is functioning very effectively, and there are no military problems at this time.
- However, situation of Druze population is unsettling; Druze continue to oppose attempts to be given Israeli identification papers. Israelis have stopped regular Druze family meetings.

4. UNRWA

- the Agency still needs \$13.6 million to maintain its school programme (340,000 school children) until the end of the year;
- (if asked, you may wish to know that US contribution last year was \$62 million; EEC, \$62.5 million; Arabs, \$18.7 million. This year, US \$67 million; EEC, \$61.5 million; Arabs, \$10.6 million. More Arab contributions are expected. Of the countries you will visit, Italy generously doubled its 1981 contribution (to \$1-1/2 million); Austria has only given \$132,000 (less than last year); Switzerland has given \$4.7 million (about the same); Yugoslavia, \$25,000 (token contribution each year).
- political consequences of UNRWA failure would greatly increase tension in the area.

5. CYPRUS

- Intercommunal talks are making slow but methodic progress. Secretary-General's Evaluation has proved to be a useful and very flexible method for giving shape and direction to the negotiations.
- It is important to expedite the talks on the constitutional aspects, and to broaden their scope to encompass the territorial aspect, Varosha, etc.
- The talks are the best and, in any case, the only available negotiating process.
- Internationalization is being sought by Greece and by the Cyprus Government, on the grounds that the talks have failed to make substantial progress. However, there is no evidence that internationalization would be accepted by the Turkish side, that it would produce results more effectively, or that it would bring about the withdrawal of Turkish troops. In fact, it may almost certainly result in a suspension of the talks.

6. NAMIBIA

- Efforts would evidently have to continue by all concerned, especially to proceed from Phase I to Phase II.
- 18/19 March meeting of the Western Five in London: they will try once again to convince SWAPO to accept electoral system formula, although the Five appear to be flexible on their original two-votes/one-man proposal. Separate trips to Front-Line States and South Africa by some of the Five will start in early April.

7. IRAN/IRAQ

- No progress on Palme visit in February.
- The Iranians made gains on the battlefield and seem to believe that they can win militarily if the Iraqis do not withdraw voluntarily. The Iranians are not willing to negotiate before an Iraqi withdrawal.
- Iraq is also not ready for any concession on the central issue: Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. For obvious reasons they are not willing to withdraw before agreement is reached on negotiations.
- UN keeping in touch with the Islamic Conference and the Non-aligned mediation groups. We understand that their efforts have been not much more successful.
- The positive development is that arrangements for the visits of relatives of prisoners of war will be finalized through the ICRC.

8. AFGHANISTAN

- Visit of your Personal Representative to the area beginning around 10 April with the objective of making progress towards negotiations, initially through the intermediary of the Personal Representative.
- Agenda: withdrawal of foreign troops, non-interference in internal affairs, international guarantees, refugees.
- A positive development is the changed attitude of Iran to the UN. For the first time the Personal Representative will be able to visit Teheran. However, Iran is not expected to join the negotiations yet (empty chair).
- No illusions about an early solution; the main thing is to start the negotiating process.

9. SOUTH EAST ASIA

- Mr. Ahmed has just completed his mission to the area. The ASEAN countries remain committed to Vietnamese withdrawal and Kampuchean self-determination but are flexible on modalities. They are taking a different tack from China and agree that Vietnam's security concerns must be taken into account.
- ASEAN countries prepared to consider a limited conference of regional countries and 5 Permanent Members.
- Vietnam's principle concern is to find a modus vivendi with China.
- China believes that conditions for a political settlement are not yet right.

10. POLAND

- Pressure on human rights in that country will continue (reference to your continuous meetings with Polish Ambassador).

11. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

- International economy continuing to undergo wide and deep crisis. Affects all groups of countries.
- An important aspect of crisis is erosion in multilateralism, which could worsen situation still further.
- UN can help put development co-operation on a new footing by:
 - i) providing framework for North/South negotiations;
 - ii) direct support through its operational activities.
- Necessity for progress on global negotiations. They have reached difficult stage. Last attempt at end of March by Director-General Ripert to produce compromise came close to success, but now little movement likely before September.
- More flexibility needs to be shown by all sides in the process.

12. ARMS LIMITATION

- Talks in Geneva to be continued despite other problems.
- Very important for the forthcoming second special session of the GA to adopt a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament. The first session achieved agreement on principles and machinery, now we need a general framework

and agreed programme of action. Very much hope that remaining problems on time-frame and specific measures can be ironed out in Geneva in next few weeks.

- Other main objective of second special session is to launch World Disarmament Campaign. Aim is to harness growing world public support for disarmament in a productive and objective manner, under aegis of the UN.

NL/CP - Readt
Trip file

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CONFIDENTIELLE

FP/os
Le 31 mars 1982

NOTE POUR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL

1. MOYEN-ORIENT

- Préoccupation au sujet des suites du retrait du Sinaï, prévu le 25 avril. Est-ce la fin du processus entamé à Camp David ? Les discussions sur l'autonomie palestinienne ont-elles une chance d'aboutir ? Besoin croissant d'un processus de négociations sur une base plus large, avec la possibilité de mouvements préliminaires en vue d'une solution intégrale
- Puisqu'il n'existe pas de cadre général pour que des discussions aient lieu, l'ONU constitue l'unique forum où toutes les parties intéressées peuvent s'asseoir ensemble. Ceci devrait être exploité. Conseil de sécurité comme cadre possible pour traiter de la situation sous tous ses aspects, si toutes les parties faisaient preuve de la modération nécessaire.
- Dans les deux régions plus dangereuses du Moyen-Orient, c'est-à-dire le sud-Liban et les hauteurs du Golan, la présence des forces de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies contribue de façon cruciale à la stabilité qui peut y exister.
- Préoccupation au sujet de la situation qui se dégrade en Cisjordanie et de la possibilité de mouvements israéliens dans cette région.

2. LIBAN

- Le cessez-le-feu est observé.
- Cependant, la tension dans cette région persiste et est affectée par les événements de Cisjordanie. Les dirigeants israéliens, depuis quelques semaines, font publiquement allusion à la possibilité d'une action militaire massive en cas de "provocation".

NL/SP - To be
read & checked
Triple. Tour d'horyon
Briefing

- La FINUL doit veiller à ce que son mandat soit rempli, conformément à la résolution du Conseil de sécurité, et doit procéder à son déploiement intégral sur la frontière internationale. On espère que l'addition de 1,000 hommes, autorisée par le Conseil de sécurité, permettra de combler progressivement le "fossé" qui existe le long de la rivière Litani entre les contingents est et ouest. Ceci devrait cependant nécessiter une discussion avec les Israéliens afin d'obtenir leur plein appui. Etant donné que ce "fossé" peut faciliter des mouvements militaires directs sans que la FINUL puisse s'interposer, les possibilités d'accord sur ce point sont incertaines.
- La FINUL continuera de s'efforcer de faciliter la prolongation de l'autorité et du personnel du Gouvernement libanais dans le sud. Mais il y a de graves complications à cause de la situation interne du pays.

3. LES HAUTEURS DU GOLAN

- La FNUOD fonctionne de manière très efficace et il n'y a pas de problème militaire en ce moment.
- Cependant, la situation de la population Druze est inquiétante. Les Druzes continuent de refuser des documents d'identité israéliens. Les Israéliens ont mis fin aux rencontres régulières de familles Druzes.

4. OFFICE DE SECOURS ET DE TRAVAUX DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES REFUGIES DE PALESTINE DANS LE PROCHE-ORIENT

- L'Agence a encore besoin de 13.6 millions de dollars pour maintenir son programme scolaire jusqu'à la fin de l'année (340.000 écoliers sont affectés).
- (si on vous le demande). La contribution des Etats-Unis, l'année dernière, était de 62 millions de dollars ; celle de la CEE, de 62.5 millions de dollars ; celle des pays arabes, de 18.7 millions de dollars. Cette année, les Etats-Unis ont contribué 67 millions de dollars ; la CEE, 61.5 millions de dollars et les pays arabes, 10.6 millions de dollars. On prévoit d'autres contributions arabes. Parmi les pays que vous visitez, l'Italie a généreusement doublé sa contribution de 1981 (de un à un et demi million de dollars) ; l'Autriche n'a donné que 132.000 dollars (moins que l'an dernier) ; la Suisse a donné 4.7 millions de dollars (à peu près la même chose) ; la Yougoslavie a donné 25.000 dollars (contribution symbolique chaque année).

- Les conséquences politiques qu'aurait un échec de l'Office de secours et de travaux des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés de Palestine dans le Proche-Orient augmenteraient considérablement la tension dans cette région.

5. CHYPRE

- Les conversations inter-communautaires progressent lentement mais méthodiquement. L'Evaluation du Secrétaire général s'est avérée être une méthode utile et très flexible pour donner forme aux négociations et les orienter.
- Il est très important d'accélérer les conversations qui portent sur l'aspect constitutionnel et de les élargir afin qu'elles englobent l'aspect territorial, Varosha, etc...
- Les conversations constituent le meilleur processus de négociations (et d'ailleurs le seul disponible).
- La Grèce et le Gouvernement chypriote cherchent à internationaliser le problème sous prétexte que les conversations n'ont pas fait de progrès importants. Rien ne permet pourtant de penser que l'internationalisation du conflit serait acceptée par le côté turc, qu'elle produirait des résultats ou qu'elle aboutirait au retrait des troupes turques. En fait, elle se solderait presque certainement par la suspension des conversations.

6. NAMIBIE

- Toutes les parties intéressées devront évidemment continuer leurs efforts, spécialement pour passer de la Phase I à la Phase II.
- Réunion, les 18 et 19 mars, du Groupe des Cinq à Londres : ils essaieront à nouveau de convaincre la SWAPO d'accepter les formules du système d'élections, bien que les Cinq semblent faire preuve de flexibilité quant à leur proposition originelle de "à chacun deux voix". Des membres du Groupe des Cinq se rendront séparément dans les pays de Première Ligne et en Afrique du Sud, au début du mois d'avril.

7. IRAN/IRAK

- Pas de progrès de la mission Palme en février.
- Les Iraniens ont amélioré leur situation sur le champ de bataille et semblent croire qu'ils peuvent gagner militairement si les Irakiens ne se retirent pas d'eux-mêmes. Ils ne veulent pas négocier avant un retrait irakien.

- L'Irak n'est pas prêt non plus à faire des concessions sur le thème central, c'est-à-dire la souveraineté de l'Irak sur le Shatt al-Arab. Pour des raisons évidentes, ils ne veulent pas se retirer avant d'être parvenu à un accord sur les négociations.
- L'ONU est en contact avec la Conférence islamique et les groupes de médiation des pays non-alignés. Nous croyons savoir que leurs efforts n'ont pas mieux abouti.
- Le point positif c'est que les visites de familles des prisonniers de guerre seront organisées à travers le CICR.

8. AFGHANISTAN

- Visite de votre Représentant personnel dans cette région, qui commence aux alentours du 10 avril et à pour objectif de faire des progrès en vue de négociations, tout d'abord par l'intermédiaire du Représentant personnel.
- Ordre du jour : retrait des troupes étrangères ; non-ingérence dans les affaires internes ; garanties internationales ; réfugiés.
- Un point positif, c'est le changement d'attitude de l'Iran vis-à-vis de l'ONU. Pour la première fois, le Représentant personnel pourra visiter Téhéran. Cependant, on ne s'attend pas encore à ce que l'Iran participe aux négociations (siège vacant).
- Pas d'illusions sur une prochaine solution ; la chose la plus importante est d'entamer le processus de négociations.

9. ASIE DU SUD-EST

- M. Ahmed vient de terminer sa mission dans cette région. Les pays de l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est insistent sur le retrait vietnamien et l'auto-détermination kampuchéenne mais font preuve de flexibilité quant aux modalités. Ils ont adopté une position différente de celle de la Chine et pensent que les préoccupations du Vietnam concernant sa sécurité doivent être prises en considération.
- Les pays de l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est sont prêts à envisager une conférence limitée des pays de la région et des 5 membres permanents.
- La préoccupation de principe du Vietnam est de trouver un modus vivendi avec la Chine.
- La Chine croit que les conditions d'une solution politique ne sont pas encore réunies.

10. POLOGNE

- La situation des droits de l'homme dans ce pays continuera de donner lieu à des pressions (référence à vos nombreux entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur de Pologne).

11. LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS

- Les pourparlers de Genève doivent continuer malgré les autres problèmes.
- Il est très important que la Seconde Session Spéciale de l'Assemblée générale qui s'ouvrira prochainement, adopte un "Programme d'ensemble pour le désarmement". La première session a abouti à un accord sur les principes et le mécanisme, maintenant nous avons besoin d'un cadre général et d'un programme d'action sur lequel on se mette d'accord. Nous espérons beaucoup que les problèmes qui persistent à propos de l'emploi du temps et des mesures spécifiques pourront être résolus à Genève dans les prochaines semaines.
- Un autre objectif principal de la Seconde Session Spéciale est de lancer la "Campagne mondiale de Désarmement". L'objectif est de canaliser, d'une manière productive et objective, le soutien croissant de l'opinion publique pour le désarmement, sous l'égide de l'ONU.

12. SITUATION ECONOMIQUE ET NEGOCIATIONS GLOBALES

- L'économie internationale continue d'être dans une situation de crise globale et profonde. Elle affecte tous les groupes de pays.
- Un aspect important de cette crise est l'érosion du "multilatéralisme" qui pourrait aggraver la situation encore davantage.
- L'ONU peut contribuer à remettre sur pied la coopération en :
 - (1) offrant un cadre aux négociations nord-sud ;
 - (2) offrant un support direct à travers ses activités opérationnelles.
- Besoin de progrès sur les négociations globales qui ont atteint un stade difficile. La dernière tentative faite par le Directeur général, M. Ripert, à la fin du mois de mars, pour aboutir à un compromis, a presque réussi, mais maintenant on ne peut s'attendre à du mouvement avant Septembre.
- Il faudrait que tous les participants à ce processus fassent preuve de plus de flexibilité.