

UNAMIR

G3 OPERATIONS / PLANS

2-28 DEC 1994

OPERATION OVERTURE, OPERATION RETOUR AND
OPERATION HOPE

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

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ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 135

FILE 4

ACC. 1998/0283

DCOS OPS
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UNAMIR
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POST-OPERATION REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND TASKING OF THE UNAMIR MP COMPANY IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION HOPE AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE HANDLING OF DETAINEES DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE OPERATION

INTRODUCTION

1. The Requirement. Para 3 of OpO No 21 provided the UNAMIR MP Company with the following grouping and tasking for Op HOPE (or Op OVERTURE as it was known until the afternoon of D-1):

- a. Gp. Provide 15 dets.
- b. Tasks.
 - (1) Route marking - to be completed by 132000B Dec 94.
 - (2) Traffic control.
 - (3) Establish, secure and man detainee screening/holding facilities by 140600B Dec 94 in church area on obj 2. [Note: Early briefings suggested that between 200 and 400 detainees would be processed.]
 - (4) Provide guides in the assembly area.

In addition, it was decided that the Force PM should be located in Tac HQ in Kibeho during the Op to provide assistance and advice in the G1 staff environment and to support the administration of detainees. A further unwritten but unavoidable task was the maintenance of police duties - albeit on a restricted scale - in Kigali.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to examine the conduct of Op HOPE from the perspective of the Military Police employed on it, the support they received and its bearing on the handling of detainees, and to make recommendations.

SCOPE

3. This report may be criticized for its length and detail but it is written primarily for the benefit of DCOS Sp (des) whose background knowledge of Op HOPE will be, per force, incomplete: it is designed to highlight failings in the G1/G4 area which should be corrected in the planning of any similar Op in the

future. Rather than give its recommendations in a consolidated paragraph at the end, the report links them with its narrative so that their context is clear.

SITUATION

4. Available Resources.

a. Personnel. The UNAMIR MP Company is a newly formed unit drawn from several nations. Its strength on D-Day was 28 soldiers (8 x Canadians, 9 x Nigerians, 11 x Tunisians) and 4 misemployed MILOB and staff officers, including the Company Commander and 2 others from MP backgrounds and one non-MP employed as the unit administrative officer. No submission was made for a reduction in the requirement for 2-man "MP Dets" because, until a few days before the Op, it was anticipated that an additional 12 x Ghanaian MPs would be available. In the event, however, they did not materialize in time to participate in Op HOPE.

Afternote: The 12 x Ghanaians reported on 20 Dec.

b. Vehicles. The current vehicle strength of the MP Company is 5 vehicles; 1 x Land Cruiser, 1 x minibus and 3 x pickups. Such a small scaling of indigenous transport is a severe constraint on normal day-to-day police work and limits the employability of MPs because without transport they can neither provide routine patrols nor respond to emergencies. The lack of mobility so limits the work that can be done by the unit that the recently-arrived Tunisian contingent was, in effect, redundant: a decision had been made to billet it with TUNBATT until it was called to Kigali to prepare for Op HOPE on D-4.

c. Other Equipment. As a UN-sponsored unit rather than as a formed unit provided from a single army, the unit lacks the resources that might normally be expected to support an immediate deployment into the field. It was for this reason that a concerted effort was required to provide the unit - within a period of 10 days from its first warning of the Op on Sat 3 Dec - with the equipment that was thought to be needed for the 4 specified tasks; a detailed submission was made for the AdminO, a copy of which is attached at Annex A.

OUT-TURN

5. General. Despite its limited manpower, the UNAMIR MP Company achieved all the tasks that it was given:

a. The 2 designated routes were signed and additional signing was placed within the DP camps as the Op progressed. It was fortunate that it was decided not to refer to Op OVERTURE on the traffic signs because the decision to rename the Op came too late for any redrawing of the signs.

b. Traffic control was provided during the deployment of forces.

c. A detainee handling facility was established, secured and maintained for the duration of the Op but it must be noted that the number of detainees handled was far below the level expected; less than 50 materialized - perhaps because the plan had been compromised - rather than the 200 to 400.

d. Guides were provided and traffic was marshalled in the assembly area. This task was complicated by a late change in the order of march but it was completed satisfactorily, nonetheless.

6. Route Signing and Traffic Control.

a. Signs.

(1) An order was placed through CSS for the production of 500 signs with pickets and 200 with holes for suspension from ties or nails. In the absence of NATO or other standard signs and in the short time available for their procurement, it was decided to produce these signs locally, fabricating them of half inch plywood and 3" square timber pickets. In the lack of any stencil kits, the marking of signs was achieved using paper, photocopied with route details and with further on-site amplification with fibre tip pens.

(2) Result. Pickets were initially provided without sharpened points and it took considerable effort - including, ironically, the provision of personal cash for the purchase of machetes - to have them sharpened in time for the operation; the last signs were made during the morning of D-1. This late delivery was unsatisfactory in that it reduced the confidence of MP commanders that they would achieve their task; notwithstanding this reservation, success was achieved and there were no reports of local people tampering with signs.

(3) Recommendation. A stock of signs - either locally procured according to the Op HOPE specification, or, preferably, of a NATO or other military standard (because hard ground limits the speed at which locally procured stakes can be inserted and their bulk limits the number that can be transported in a limited fleet of vehicles) should be stored by the MP Company. Good weather prevented any degradation in the quality of signs during Op HOPE but future provision must allow for torrential rain: small clear plastic bags should be provided as weather-proof covers in the event that stapled paper sheets have to be used for the indication of routes.

b. Traffic Control. Traffic control depends on mobility and good communications - with an ideal scaling of one radio and vehicle for each pair of MPs (less those in Company HQ, for whom the scale may be slightly lower). Under normal circumstances, the UNAMIR MP Company has neither with the result that special provision was required in both areas.

(1) Vehicles. Despite the clarity of the entry in the draft AdminO, no additional pickup trucks were provided until H-18 - and this only after the intervention of the PM who was told by G4 Tpt at this late hour that that branch was not the controlling authority for pickup trucks. Subsequently, vehicles were provided (by the CTO), but the low number (6) severely limited the flexibility of operations of the MP Company and caused the overloading of some vehicles.

(2) Radios. The provision of 6 additional Motorola hand-held radios was arranged by the Force Signals Officer - collected by the MP Company from the UNAMIR Sector Tac HQ in Butare. This arrangement sufficed (although the lack of battery charging facilities remained a limiting factor) but there can be no guarantee that the UNAMIR MP Company can deploy rapidly unless it is provided with sufficient radios.

(3) Recommendation. It is recommended that the UNAMIR MP Company is provided with:

(a) Not less than 25 four-wheel drive pickups or Land Cruiser equivalent vehicles, each fitted with a Motorola radio - on the basis that the strength of the unit will reach about 70 in early Jan 95.

(b) A guaranteed issue of at least 2 x 4-ton trucks for the movement of its own stores whenever it is required to deploy into the field.

The unit cannot be regarded as fit for its role until this scale is achieved.

7. Detainee Handling. The handling of detainees was the raison-d'être of Op HOPE and had the potential of becoming headline news; it should, therefore, have been conducted with great efficiency. It did not turn out in this way, however and the day was saved through improvisation, the lack of media attention and the small number of detainees that materialized.

a. The MP Detainee Processing Centre (MP DPC).

(1) Design. The MP DPC was intended to be a secure, tented and segmented enclosure surrounded by concertina wire and provided with feeding, watering

and lavatorial facilities for detainees. It was to be lit at night using generators and to have a photocopier to ensure the availability of documentation.

(2) Out-turn.

(a) Security and Shelter. In the event, the MP DPC was established in a wicker-walled former aid agency feeding station because the NICOY engr element which had been tasked with building the facility arrived without any defence stores or tentage. The need to maintain the facility through the night demanded some enhancement of wicker barriers so plans were made to surround it with concertina wire - which was flown in by helicopter. NICOY engr met the helicopter and collected the wire but reported that they could not deploy the wire because they had no heavy duty gloves. The unsatisfactory result of this situation was that the detainees were moved into a disused brick-built but de-roofed church for the night.

(b) Latrines. The way in which the issue of portaloos was arranged illustrates the poor G4 support to MP tasks on Op HOPE. The subject - including the need for a drainage truck to support the portaloos - was included in discussion with CSS immediately after the first warning of the Op and included in the draft at Annex A. Inexplicably, it was edited out of the final AdminO but liaison with BMS confirmed that issue could be expected. During the morning of D-1, the PM was approached by a member of the BMS department to arrange transport for the portaloos; contact was made with G4 transport and a vehicle sent to collect them from the airport. Later, word came that the driver had not been able to collect them because they were full and needed cleaning. Although the order was given for this action to take place, nothing further was heard of the portaloos and they never arrived at the objective. Notwithstanding this observation, the experience gained on this op suggests that in future such operations, portaloos are not needed and that a simple latrine with hessian screens should be provided.

(c) Hard Furniture. The story regarding the need for folding beds, chairs and tables at the MP DPC was very much the same as for portaloos; despite mention in the AdminO, they never materialized at Kibeho.

(d) Eating and drinking utensils. The need for

eating and drinking utensils for detainees remained, at least, in the final issue of the AdminO but they never arrived at the objective.

(e) Polaroid Cameras. Following mention of polaroid cameras in the AdminO, a few were issued to the MP Company. Film - which was also mentioned - was not.

(f) Evidence and Detainee Handling Equipment. The need for bags, labels and plasticuffs was discussed at length with CSS before the Op and mentioned in the AdminO; they were not issued.

(g) Electrical Equipment. No lighting, generator sets or photocopier arrived at the MP DPC despite their mention in the AdminO.

A loud hailer was issued.

b. Interpreters. The RPA failed to provide the interpreters that had been promised; this meant that detainees could not be questioned effectively and, in some cases, their identities could not be determined with certainty. (Some carried more than one set of identity papers.)

c. Liaison with civil authorities. CIVPOL failed to provide MPs with the liaison service detailed at paragraph 3b(11) of the OpO; this meant that confusion was created in the process of handing the detainees to the civil authorities and the process took much longer than planned - despite there being no screening of detainees by UNAMIR:

(1) Wed 14 Dec. The plan called for detainees to be handed to the Public Prosecutor (PP) in Gikongoro but he could not be found and Butare-based RPA officers denied his existence. UNAMIR was required, therefore, to retain the detainees overnight.

(2) Thu 15 Dec.

(a) Although it was within Rwandan law in the absence of a PP and - for this reason only - approved by ICRC, action to hand the detainees to the Gendarmerie in Butare on Thu 15 Dec failed to meet either UNAMIR policy or adequate protection for the detainees. It was, therefore, aborted and UNAMIR became compelled to retain the detainees for a second night. Although brought in belatedly, UNHRC field officers were of great assistance in the process of identifying and liaising with the PP in Gikongoro - with whom they were able to arrange a handover on Fri 16 Dec.

(b) Detainees had to spend a second and unplanned night in the custody of the MP Company which, as discussed above, was not given the resources for their care and protection. With the detainees being in Butare, assistance was sought from the Sector Tac HQ but declined by the commander on the grounds that his site was unsuitable - despite it being a secure brick built establishment with all necessary services and it being able, later that night, to host an unscheduled visit by about 20 Swedish lorry drivers. The consequence was that, after some debate with the commander of the Ghanaian supply platoon site who also felt unable to assist, the detainees were transferred to the Malawian contingent compound in Butare where they spent the night on 2 flat bed trucks surrounded by concertina wire and illuminated by truck headlamps. Feeding was achieved using time-expired ration packs cooked by their MP custodians.

(3) Fri 16 Dec. The handover of the detainees took place over a 5-hour period on Fri 16 Dec. It was decided to handover all 44 rather than a screened group because, by this stage, their names had been recorded by the Gendarmerie and it was considered that the greatest level of long-term protection could be achieved if they were placed in the custody of the PP rather than be released into a potentially hostile community ahead of any clearance by the civil authority.

The result was that detainees spent much longer in UNAMIR hands than had been planned and improvisation was needed throughout. Notwithstanding the delay, media attention came only in the form of a single BBC radio correspondent who arrived unannounced at Gikongoro prison during the handover process.

d. Legal Advice. The presence of the Australian Contingent legal officer during the period in which the detainees were collected was of immense importance. He was instrumental in the release of a number of detainees against whom the evidence was tenuous in the extreme but the need for further consultation in Kigali caused him to leave Tac HQ early on the first evening. The separation - and the lack of secure one-to-one communications between HQ UNAMIR and the tac HQ in Kibeho meant that the plan devised in Kigali could not be implemented on the ground and the detainee situation became complicated by the local decision to hand the detainees to the Gendarmerie. A NICOY legal officer was present for some of the time but did not seem to contribute a great deal.

e. Medical Support. Although the need for a medical

officer was mentioned in the Detainee Handling Plan (Annex D to the OpO) this was, perhaps, buried too deeply in the paperwork and not reflected under any medical headings in the OpO.

f. Detainee Transport. Great difficulty was experienced in obtaining the 4 x minibuses initially requested for the transport of detainees between the MP DPC and the PP's office and, in the event, it was neither required because the expected arrangements broke down nor suitable because of the type of roads. Experience has shown that trucks need to be dedicated to this task.

g. Recommendations. The future planning of an operation such as Op HOPE requires:

(1) Logistic Coordination. The production of a detailed AdminO is a nugatory effort if it is neither read or implemented. A succession of coordinating conferences are required to address:

(a) Recognition of the needs of UN units. The needs of units - especially UN-sponsored units which have less indigenous logistic capability than national contingents - must be recognized early. Those with the high-profile role of handling detainees must be given priority.

(b) A detailed outloading plan. The location of stores must be made known to those who have to take charge of them. An outloading plan must be devised to ensure that all stores shipped out of Kigali do, in fact, arrive at their objectives.

(c) Feeding and watering of detainees. Provision must be made for the feeding and watering of detainees by a support unit because the availability and role of MPs rules out reliance on them for the preparation of food for detainees.

(d) A Logistic Reserve. A plan such as Op HOPE is reliant on acceptance and approval by UNAMIR of humanitarian standards that might not be available from the local representatives of the Rwandan government and, in particular, the RPA and the Gendarmerie. UNAMIR must build in, therefore, a significant reserve for the unexpected including the capacity to transport, feed, water, guard and shelter at least as many detainees as it expects to handle for not less than 3 nights.

(e) Dedicated Detainee Transport. W i t h o u t dedicated transport, the MP company cannot perform its detainee handling function; trucks

must be allocated for the task - taking, if necessary, a higher priority than the concurrent movement of UNAMIR troops back to barracks.

(2) The permanent presence of a military legal officer. The permanent presence of a military legal officer should be made available to support commanders in the field when they are handling large numbers of detainees. Such an officer should:

(a) Ensure that military commanders feel properly briefed from a military perspective and to allow them to make informed decisions about the handling of detainees.

and

(b) Complement and assist the work of HRFOR field officers - whose capabilities in support of a military operation are described below.

(3) Liaison with the civil authorities. From the experience gained on Op HOPE, it is clear that if UNHRFOR field officers are not better placed than CIVPOL, they are at least more willing to advise military commanders on the capabilities, limitations and characteristics of local judiciary and gendarmerie. They need to be consulted early in the planning stages of a major operation and assist in constructing a plan for the handover of detainees in close liaison with a properly appointed PP. They should, ideally, supply an LO to Tac HQ. The importance of the work in the legal/humanitarian area is summarized in the following sentence, spoken by a PP after the conclusion of Op HOPE:

"If all we had to go on was the word of an RPA soldier, then the arrest should not have taken place."

That Rwandan law is based on the French accusatorial system and not familiar to many members of UNAMIR makes it essential - despite any risk to security - that close cooperation with the appropriate PP is established and that high standards of evidence are achieved.

(4) Medical Officer. The OpO must reflect the requirement for a medical officer:

(a) To be present throughout the collection and processing of detainees.

(b) To be on call subsequently for as long as detainees are in military hands.

SUBSEQUENT HANDLING OF THE DETAINEES

8. We are not yet in a position to learn all the lessons relating to the handling of detainees because the PP in Gikongoro has yet to fully research the crimes alleged to have been committed by the detainees - and every one of them is still detained. Immediate conclusions from Op HOPE, however, are that:

- a. PPs can be expected to demand high standards of evidence; UNAMIR cannot take chances or rely on the word of RPA soldiers who will not give their names.
- b. Statements of evidence must be recorded from the soldiers who participate in the detention of Rwandans and the fullest details possible must be recorded of those who made an allegation.
- c. Statements of evidence must be recorded from soldiers who find evidence in the conduct of a search. Their commanders must be fully and properly briefed on the methods to be used and on the standards required.
- d. Detainees must be asked to identify their property and be given an opportunity to claim/deny ownership, signing (or marking with their fingerprints) their statements to that effect. This requires good and impartial interpreters.
- e. Troops must be thoroughly and specifically briefed on the evidence that they are seeking and the loose mention of "traditional weapons" should be avoided because most Rwandans have reasonable cause to own a single machete and/or a single axe as agricultural implements. Such single items can only be used as evidence - and properly confiscated - if a witness certifies that they have been used as weapons.
- f. Detainees that are identified to the Gendarmerie can expect to be incarcerated for a significant number of days as an absolute minimum and, if handed to the Gendarmerie, cannot necessarily expect fair treatment. The UNAMIR policy of handing persons only to PPs is undoubtedly correct but this should depend on acceptance by a UNAMIR legal officer that they have been accused of genuine offences and that there is some substance to the allegations.
- g. Time must be allowed in any future detainee handling plan for the screening of suspects.
- h. ICRC and HRFOR personnel must agree in advance to a handover of the detainees and be present thereat: the word of one or the other, alone, is insufficient.
- i. A senior RPA officer needs to be cognizant of the handover and should sign the handover certificate; this acts as a measure of protection for the PP and confirms the RPA's acceptance of action by the civil authority.

j. If, in future exceptional circumstances, UNAMIR finds itself handing unscreened suspects (or persons that are thought by UNAMIR not to have been implicated in serious crimes) to the Rwandan civil authority, it should appoint a selected officer to monitor the handling of categories of detainees and their subsequent disposal by the PP to ensure that a proper legal process is in train.

CONCLUSIONS

9. It is not for the Military Police to judge whether or not Op HOPE was a success and whether or not its aims were achieved but the number of persons taken into custody was a fraction of that expected and the quality of evidence against them seems thin; certainly, no firearms or explosives can be directly attributed to a detainee. The arrangements that were made for their handling - and the handling of the evidence relating to them - were inadequate for the number that were received and need to be vastly improved in any subsequent operation of similar intent.



M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

Annex:

A. Op OVERTURE - Draft entries for the AdminO.

Distribution:

Action:

DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp (des)
CSS

Information:

CO Force MP Coy
AUSMED Legal Officer

ANNEX A TO
FPM/5
DATED 21 DEC 94

OP OVERTURE - DRAFT ENTRIES FOR THE ADMINO

PERSONNEL

Detainees. The correct handling of detainees is a critical component of Op OVERTURE and is, therefore, covered in the OpO. The following stores are required:

a. Polaroid cameras. A minimum of 12 cameras (with film) for the authentication of evidence, to document finds and to ensure that any damage caused in the searching of dwellings and vehicles is accurately and fully recorded. One camera is to be issued to each infantry company; the remainder (including a reserve for issue to infantry companies) are to be held by the MP Company.

b. "Plasticuffs". It is estimated that up to 2,000 plasticuffs will be required - including a significant reserve for the release and re-cuffing of individuals.

c. Bags for the collection and handling of evidence. Any evidence and personal property collected will need to be safeguarded and transferred to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC). It is to be placed in bags and taken by the soldier who collects it to the DPC where it will be documented and labelled by MP personnel. There is a requirement, therefore, for 2,000 heavy duty plastic bags (or sandbags if none better are available) and luggage labels:

(1) Bags. Bags are to be issued to:

(a) Infantry coys: 200 to each.

(b) The MP Coy: the remainder, both for the processing of evidence and to act as a reserve for redistribution to infantry coys.

(2) Labels. Labels are to be issued to the Force MP Coy.

e. Paper proformae. Locally produced proformae - examples of which are included with the OpO - will be needed for the documentation of searches and detainees; the requirement is:

(1) Search Proformae: 200 to each infantry coy.

(2) Detainee Proformae: 1,000 to the Force MP Coy.

If one is available, a photocopier (with, say, 4 reams of

paper) should be issued to the Force MP Coy for the local production of additional forms should the need arise.

f. Tentage and accommodation.

(1) For detainees. It is anticipated that up to 400 detainees will be processed during the 48 hrs of Op OVERTURE. It is not anticipated, therefore, that accommodation will be needed for more than 50 detainees at any one time. Four 20-man tents have been allocated - providing room for sufficient separation and segregation of detainees.

(2) For MP personnel.

(a) Up to 24 MPs will deploy on the Op and will require sleeping accommodation; six 4-man tents are required.

(b) Additionally, sleeping bags (say, 8) will be required for the MPs of some nations.

(c) Lanterns are required; 1 per 4-man tent.

(3) Furniture. The following stores are required:

Folding tables:	16
Folding chairs:	50
Camp beds/cots:	40

These stores are primarily for use by detainees and their processing rather than for UNAMIR personnel.

(4) Portaloos. Apart from any requirement at Tac HQ and other UNAMIR Op OVERTURE sites, the provision of portaloos (together with the necessary servicing) will be essential for the dignified processing of detainees at the MP DPC. They should cater for an equivalent permanent population of up to 60.

(5) Hessian Screen. Hessian or equivalent screening (to a length of up to 20 metres) will be required to seclude search and interview areas.

(6) Loud Hailer. A loud hailer (with batteries if necessary) is needed by the Force MP Coy.

(7) Eating and drinking utensils. Eating and drinking utensils are required for the provision of meals and drinks to detainees; 50 sets are required.

g. Concertina wire, gloves and pickets. Up to 1,000 metres of concertina wire will be needed together with sufficient pickets (say, 100), wire ties, cutters and sledge hammers and gloves as necessary.

CO Force MP Coy is to appoint a suitable supervisor to receive and account for the stores issued to the MP DPC for Op OVERTURE: all such stores are to be returned on the closure of the facility.

ROUTE SIGNING

The traffic control plan will be determined in detail after the recce process. It is anticipated that the following will be required for the signing of 2 x main routes, 7 x company-sized concentration areas and routes to the DPC.

- a. 500 x signs with pickets - to be locally produced.
- b. 200 x signs with holes and wire ties - to be locally produced/procured.
- c. 5 x stencil kits and paint for the marking of signs by MP route signing teams. The paint is to be of a colour that contrasts with the material used to make the signs.

TRANSPORT

For the Force MP Coy. The Force MP Coy does not currently have sufficient transport for its personnel and requires, therefore, augmentation to allow deployment, the completion of route signing and the subsequent maintenance of routes - whilst using its current complement of vehicles to continue to provide police duties in Kigali. The minimum requirement is for 8 x Four-runners or equivalent to be issued for the duration of the Op.

For Detainees. Transport for the movement of detainees will be handled in 2 stages:

From the point of arrest to the DPC. Under arrangements made by units conducting arrests. They are to consider the need for the dignified handling of detainees and ensure that transport is of an acceptable quality.

From the DPC to the PP's Office. Four minibuses with drivers will be required, with MP escorts, to provide a shuttle service between the DPC and the PP's office.

ENGR

Erection of wire and tentage. Engr sp is required for the establishment of the MP DPC - specifically, the erection of tentage and concertina wire. Engrs and the CO of the Force MP Coy are to liaise as necessary to ensure that it is positioned as required.

Route Maintenance. Bad weather may give rise to problems with the 2 x main routes, in particular. The ability to place fascines may be required, should any minor bridges be washed away.

Generator and lighting. The DPC will need to be lit at night.

RATIONS AND WATER

Detainees. It is essential for the success of Op OVERTURE that detainees (of which up to 400 are expected to pass through the DPC, each staying for between 2 and 4 hours) are treated with civility; they are to be provided with dry rations and drinking water on demand.

OASZYUW UCCVVDH0423 3460839-SSSS--UCCVVDA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 120839Z DEC 94

FM SECTOR 5 KABALI//TUNBATT//

TO UNHQ KIGALI//DFC//

INFO UNHQ KIGALI//G3 PLANS/OPS//

BT

SECRET TUN638

SUBJ: OPERATION OVERTURE

1. TUNBATT WILL MOVE TODAY TO BUTARE. 260 TROOPS, 17 VEHICLES INVOLVED. WE REMIND THAT TROOPS HAVE TO GET LEAD FOR FLACK JACKET. OTHER WISE THEY WON'T BE ALLOWED TO GO INTO THE DPS CAMPS.

BT

41 ISSUED by CSG

#0423

Received 12-12-1994 10:23:36

② G3 Ops 2

Msg to Tunbatt - Secret - from FC.

"Threat analysis indicate danger to troops is low. Wearing of fragmentation protective vest is a precautionary measure against ~~accidental~~ ^{machetes and} discharge of UXO, grenades, etc. Protective lead inserts assist in providing an increased ^{of protection} measure against high velocity projectiles, ~~as~~ bullets. At this time that type of violence is not anticipated. Please confirm your intentions on my arrival this ~~at~~ evening."

Actioned
JHunt
G3 OPS 2
13/12

such

3000.15

For info FHQ
G3 OPS2
14/12

UN SECRET

TO: HQ MILOBS GROUP, KIGALI

FROM: HQ SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

DATE: 11 DEC 94

SUBJECT: DETAILED REPORT ON ACTIVITIES IN KIBEHO AND NDAGO DPCs

GENERAL

1. Two MILOBS teams from this sector were tasked to establish a presence in the above camps and to monitor various activities as per tasks given. A report on the situation in the camps, as requested vide Para 3 (d)(3) of your Warning Order dated 07 Dec 94, is given in succeeding paragraphs.

LOCATION AND LAYOUT

2. KIBEHO DPC covers approx 5 KM sq and extends northwards to NYACYONDO (4910) and southwards towards NDAGO. It comprises approx 100,000 DPs. The camp is divided into sub camps with no visible boundaries - 32 communes in all, based on where the DPs have originated. The population is concentrated around the 2 commercial centres in the area. There are three vehicle entry and exit points.

ORGANISATION

3. The Chef de Camp is M. FABIEN MUTAGANDA, whose antecedents are as yet unknown. Each commune has its own chief.

4. Two commercial centres exist within the camp where considerable small scale business activities have been observed.

ACTIVITIES

5. DPs move freely in and out of the camps in daylight hours in search of firewood and to buy/sell goods. Movement appears to commence at 0500 and ceases around 2100-2200.

6. Daytime concentration has been noticed at the medical facilities, commercial centres and relief distribution points.

7. It is significant to note that food distribution takes place on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays each week. DPs appear to commence concentrating for this from the early hours of the morning. Actual distribution commences at 0800. In view of the impending ops on 14 Dec 94 (Wednesday) this factor may have some importance.

8. RPA. RPA conduct routine patrols in the camp and occasionally arrest suspected criminals. One platoon each is located at NYANGE

UN SECRET

UN SECRET

(5307) and BANGA (5507). On the night of 08/09 Dec at approx 2150^h, 3 DPs were injured in an alleged assault by some RPA personnel. It is reported that the RPA personnel were attempting to extort money.

RUMOURS

9. Routine, mundane rumours appear to be in circulation and DPs seem to believe that their security can only be guaranteed in the camps.

10. Significantly, a rumour is also afloat that the camps will be cordoned, searched and possibly destroyed by the RPA by 12 Dec 94.

NGO ACTIVITIES

11. There appears to be no significant change in the activities of NGOs in the camps. Offices/establishments of IOM, ICRC, OXFAM, MSF, GOAL, AICF, UNICEF, CARITAS and MERLIN are located within the camps. Most NGO personnel work at the camps by day but retire to GIKONGORO by 1500 h.

12. It appears that some NGOs are aware of the impending operation by UNAMIR on 14 Dec 94. The NGOs have been seeking advice on whether to continue their activities on this date or not. No comments were offered by our teams in response to these queries.


ASSESSMENT

13. In view of the rumours circulating among the DPs and the information on the impending ops available from NGOs, security of the op appears to have been compromised.

14. Troops to task ratios for different communes within the camps need to be assessed based on detailed recce which takes into account the flow of DP concentration in different areas during the day.

15. Timings for the commencement of the ops may need review since movement in and out of the communes appears to commence fairly early.

16. It is recommended that an aerial recce by officers up to coy comd level and selected MILOBS be conducted prior to the ops.



S.A. Hasnain
Lt Col
Comd Sect 3

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Page 1 of 10

Copy No **6** of 7

HQ AS MSF
UNAMIR II
Kigali, RWANDA

101200B Dec 94

OPS 611-1-1

OPORD AUSMED 05/94 : DEPLOYMENT OF A CCP GP TO SPT HQ UNAMIR OP
OVERTURE - DEC 94

- References :
- A. Map series Z 721, Ed 1, BUTARE, 1 : 50 000
 - B. AUSMED E3L/I4O OPS 1026 of 091130Z Dec 94 - WNGO
 - C. HQ UNAMIR OPORD No 21 dated 8 Dec 94

1. Situation.

a. OPFOR. (Int to brief in detail)

- (1) Threat elms in KIBEHO and NDAGO camps incl Interhamwe, other militia, FRGF and bandits.
- (2) Threat elms maintain a progaganda campaign against RPA and actively dissuade IDP's from returning home.
- (3) Rwandan authorities have been subjected to mob violence on previous occasions when entering IDP camps in Sector 4A.
- (4) Threat elms likely to carry traditional weapons, (machettes, thuwis, arrows etc) and grenades. SA possible.
- (5) RPA will participate in op by providing two battalians for an outer cordon and LO's to Pl level with UNAMIR Search Teams.

b. Fr.

- (1) Specific orbat for OP, based on Tac HQ and the following units:
 - (a) Tunbatt HQ + 2 Rifle Coys;
 - (b) Ethiobatt HQ + 2 Rifle Coys;

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Page 2 of 10

- (c) Ghanbatt HQ + 2 Rifle Coys;
- (d) Frafbatt Coy;
- (e) Zambatt Coy;
- (f) Nicoy Pl (+);
- (g) 20 MILOB teams;
- (h) CANSIG HQ and dets for radio comms;
- (i) 15 MP dets;
- (j) CIVPOL det;
- (k) HAC det; and
- (l) Two UH helo.

- (2) A/FC intent is to clear the criminal elements of KIBEHO and NDAGO IDP camp in order to provide a secure environment which will encourage DP repatriation. This plan is to secure two 'release points' outside the camps on each MSR, by 0230hrs, move troops to the release points, then on H hr, have subunits move to their respective objectives. Objectives will be searched thoroughly and all weapons confiscated. Suspected criminals will be ident and moved to a detainee cage, where CIVPOL, MP's, ICRC and UNHCR can deal with the suspects. Once obj have been cleared, they will be piquetted while subsequent obj are approached.
- (3) The OP will be coord by a Tac HQ located in old KIBEHO School and sustained from the GHANIAN Supply Pl loc BUTARE.

c. Civ.

- (1) Camps figures vary but generally believed to be 70 000 Hutus.
- (2) NGO agencies working in the camps have been informed. They include MSF, AICF and CARE.

d. Atts/Dets.

- (1) in DS CA Sig Det (veh and pers).
- (2) In Spt UH helo for AME tasking.

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2. Mission. AUSMED CCP Gp to provide medical support to HQ UNAMIR OP OVERTURE.

3. Execution.

a. Gen Outline. CCP Gp will be a self sufficient sub unit providing:

- (1) Level Two medical care - two resus crews and a 10 litter holding capability.
- (2) AME crew located at KIBEHO with the helo, by day.
- (3) Motor ambulance evacuation means forward to CAP and rearward to BUTARE, as required, by night.
- (4) Medical screening to the detainee cage.

b. Gp. See Annex A.

c. Tasks.

- (1) Provide Level Two facility with two resus bays.
- (2) Be prepared to step resus facy forward.
- (3) Provide air and motor ambulance evacuation means. Air to be coordinated by Tac HQ and M93.
- (4) Provide medical screening to detainee cage.
- (5) Be responsible for security of all fixed installations, vehs and personnel.
- (6) Maintain comms link with AS0.

d. Coord Instr.

- (1) Timings:
 - (a) No move before 121330 B Dec 94;
 - (b) Complete in Assy Area NLT 121700 B Dec 94;
 - (c) Move Assy Area to Release point LAW Movt Plan (TBI); and
 - (d) CCP Gp est vic AICF facy on obj 2 secure.

- (2) Con Measures:
 - (a) Routes - Pri is Red route, Alt is Green route.
 - (b) Locs:
 - (i) Assy Area - BUTARE Stadium GR 049 126;
 - (ii) CCP loc - AICF facy vic GR 502 071;
 - (iii) AME LZ - GR 502 072;
 - (iv) Release point (Red route - CCP FUP) - GR 839 095;
 - (v) Tac HQ loc - GR 502 074;
 - (c) OOM. CCP Gp follows CIVPOL Det on Red route.
- (3) ROE. State Yellow.
- (4) OFOF. No change.

4. Admin and Log.

- a. Gen. The CCP group is to deploy with sufficient stores and consumables to be self sufficient for the operation. The force will rec resup from Ghanaian Log Pl in BUTARE. Resup on demand basis.
- b. Rats/Water. Deploy with five days CRP (three on the man, two in vehs). 2,000l of potable water to be carried on wheels. All troops to deploy with 6 water bottles or equivalent.
- c. POL. CCP (+) deploy with 600 l of liesel (packaged).
- d. Defence Stores. Limited to concertina wire/rolls of barbed wire on vehicles and ttrs. Additional aval at Ghanbatt Sup Pl.
- e. Ammo. Deploy with SOP scales. Rifle Pl to carry:
 - (1) Pers wpn 150 rds.
 - (2) F89 800 rds.
 - (3) Smk Gren 6 per inf section.
 - (4) Para illum 4 per inf section.

- (5) Trip flare 3 per inf section.

f. Medical.

- (1) Supplies. Deploy with nine days holdings. Resup through G4 Med HQ UNAMIR.
- (2) Holding Policy:
 - (i) CAP - nil.
 - (ii) CCP (+) - 24 hours.
- (3) SOP Malaria precautions to be strictly observed.
- (4) Evac:
 - (i) Fwd to CAP's controlled by CCP (+) HQ.
 - (ii) Rear to AUSMED, by CASEVAC, req to 0A.
 - (iii) M93 will regulate cas movt out of AO.

g. Repair/Recovery. EMEFIX to 0A. Info to AS0.

h. Dress. Marching order with blue helmets and AS iss Flak jackets. UN ID card to be carried. Baseball caps to be worn when helmets are not ordered.

5. Comd and Sig.

a. Comd Status. CCP (+) in direct support of Tac HQ and remaining under comd AUSMED.

b. Rpts and Returns.

- (1) Daily to M93 through 0A:
 - (a) Medical SITREP;
 - (b) Casevac, as required; and
- (2) SITREP to AS0 daily by NLT 2000 hrs.

c. Sigs. (Net Diagram at Annex C)


- (1) CCP is C/S C on OP net.

SECRET

Page 6 of 10

- (2) CCP is C/S AS1 on AUSMED Con Net.
 - (3) Ambulance C/S are AS1A, AS1B and AS1C on internal CCP means.
 - (4) Motorola C/S remain no change.
 - d. Nicknames and Codewords. See Annex B.
6. OPSEC. This OPORD is downgraded to RESTRICTED from 140800 b Dec 94

Ack Instr: Ack.




S.C. GOULD
MAJ
ADMIN COMD

- Annexes:
- A. Gp
 - B. Nicknames and Codewords
 - C. Net Diagram - OP OVERTURE

<u>Distribution:</u>	Copy No
CO Diary	1
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OC Med Coy	3
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HQ UNAMIR (For Ops and FMO)	6-7

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Page 8 of 10

ANNEX B TO
AUSMED OPORD 05/95
DATED 101200 B Dec 94

Nicknames and codewords

NICKNAMES

1. The following nicknames will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Nickname</u>
Assy Area	Paper Tiger
Release Point Red Route	Jungle Juice
Release Point Green Route	Cow Leg
Tac HQ (OP OVERTURE) loc	Open Door
Casualty Collection Point	Soft Bed
Screening and Holding area	Big Brother
<u>Report Lines</u>	
Report Line No 1	Mango Grove
Report Line No 2	Apple Pie
Report Line No 3	High Ball
Report Line No 4	Happy Home
Report Line No 5	Iron Lady
Report Line No 6	Last Stand
Report Line No 7	Low Loader
Report Line No 8	Little Girl
Report Line No 9	Table Lamp
Report Line No 10	Good Hope

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Page 9 of 10

Report Line No 11

Shoe Polish

Objectives

Obj	1	Hungry Bear
Obj	2	Rocking Horse
Obj	3	Active Edge
Obj	4	Snow Ball
Obj	5	Artic Breeze
Obj	6	Flying Arrow
Obj	7	Long Shot
Obj	8	Flat Cap
Obj	9	Rummy Punch
Obj	10	Red Sox
Obj	11	Short Stop

CODEWORDS

2. The following seven Codewords will Be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Codeword</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>To be issued by:</u>
Hunter	Advance (H Hour)	Tac HQ (OP OVERTURE)
Scatter	Commence Search	Tac HQ (OP OVERTURE)
Basket	Move to second OBJ	Tac HQ (OP OVERTURE)
Flower	All Obj Searched	Tac HQ (OP OVERTURE)
Helmet	Cordon in position	RPA
Baboon	Move to Assy Area	Tac HQ (OP OVERTURE)
Bingo	End of OP OVERTURE	Tac HQ (OP OVERTURE)

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
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NET DIAGRAM - OP OVERTURE

ANNEX C TO
AUSMED OPORD 05/94
DATED 101200B DEC 94

NOTES:

1. FORCE COORD NET
2. AUSMED COORD NET
3. CCP CONTROL NET
(VHF TO C/S 12A, 12B, AND 12C
ACTIVATED ON REQUEST)



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Copy No. 3 of 6

Tactical Headquarters
BUTARE

OPS/22

12 December, 1994

See Distribution:

APPRAISAL OF OP RETOUR AFTER THREE DAYS

Reference:

A. 3000.15 (Ops) dated 21 Dec 94.

BACKGROUND

1. A new concept to lure Internal Displaced Rwandese back to their communes was launched under a new name on 29 Dec 94 christened 'OPERATION RETOUR'.

2. Operation Retour was intended to ginger mass movement of Internal Displaced people (IDP) back to their communes in dignity and safety. In order to facilitate this, a lot of effort was made to ensure that displaced people go home freely. Consequently, new outfits were created, prominent are:

- a. On the spot registration.
- b. Way station.
- c. Open relief centres.
- d. Awareness campaign in the camps and the communes.

AIM

3. The aim of this write up is to make an appraisal on the operation Retour after three days of its birth.

4. Logistics. Conscious of the need for sound logistic base for such an operation, UNAMIR, all the NGOs and RPA soldiers were involved. Therefore there was enough logistic support. The only deficiency was the construction of Open Relief Centres, however, the need for their use has not arisen.

5. D - Day. The D-Day was 29 Dec 94 and the target camp was Cyanika, all personnel required took part. Initial 32 vehs were made available on 29 Dec 94 with carrying capacity of 1430 IDPs, but only 221 Internal Displaced people turned up and they were accordingly evacuated. The figures so far are:

1 of 4
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Thur
802 OPS
04/1

*Seen, OP RETOUR
will take off once
Relief agencies in
the DP camps are
brought to heel
H1*

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a.	29 Dec 94	-	221
b.	30 Dec 94	-	122
c.	31 Dec 94	-	49

6. Reasons for Poor Showings. Agreed that enormous paper work has been done, contrary to expectations, only few IDP were informed about the operation and the entire camps were poorly motivated. The result is that only few people turned up and they were mostly women and children. The poor showing could also be attributed to:

- a. Poor organised campaign in the camps.
- b. Exclusion of some vital UN agents in the campaign.
- c. The large presence of armed RPA soldiers in the camp.
- d. All eggs were put in one basket.
- e. Poor understanding of behavioural attitude of the Displaced People by the planners.
- f. Inflexibility of the plan.
- g. Incomplete facilities at the supposed 12 ORCs (Open Relief Centres).
- h. Planned food distribution in the same camp to coincide with OP RETOUR.

7. Suggestions. In order to revitalise the plan, a new approach to the plan could entail:

- a. Real awareness campaign in the camps. The residents should be involved and should know the duration in which the operation will last in their camps.
- b. Use of Public Address System to sensitise the IDPs.
- c. A minimum of three (3) camps should be targeted at a time. Cyanika as the main camp with two subsidiary camps from different axis.
- d. Rigidity should be avoided in executing the plan.
- e. Emphasis should be shifted to real practical work. Personal/Staff contact as opposed to much paper work.

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- f. Encouragement of more secured communes by the RPA. Unconfirmed report indicates that the RPA are very aggressive in the communes. This fear must be allayed by all means.

CONCLUSION


8. In conclusion, I will like to emphasise that although the three days operation of OP RETOUR failed because the field work was inadequate and directed at probably wrong targets. It was also not wide enough as to attract a large audience.

9. The inflexible nature of the plan made it impossible for the executors to diversify which resulted in wastage of manpower.

RECOMMENDATION

10. It is recommended that:

- a. The present tempo should be increased.
- b. The campaign should be intensified to attract wide audience, the use of loud speakers should be encouraged.
- c. Armed, aggressively looking RPA soldiers in the camp should be reduced during loading of IDPs.
- d. Guarantee of more security in the communes.
- e. More coordination among the UN Agents and NGO should be encouraged.
- f. More camps should be targeted simultaneously.
- g. Food distribution in the camps should ^{be} seize, especially in the target camps during evacuation period.
- h. More aggressive use of radio broadcast (Radio Rwanda) to sensitise the IDP.


H OSAE-ADDAE
Col
Chief Operations Officer

UN SECRET

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5 - 6

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HQ SECTOR 3
GITARAMA

28 Dec 94

SEC3/OPS/7
See Distribution

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS - OP RETOUR

References:-

1. UNAMIR 300.15 OPS dated 23 Dec 94.
2. UNAMIR 300.15 OPS dated 21 Dec 94.
3. MILOBS GP HQ Security Instrs - OP RETOUR dated 26 Dec 94.

SITUATION

1. Presently approx 3 million Rwandese have been displaced from their homes. Around 1.1 million are in the refugee camps in Zaire and the rest in Displaced Persons Camps (DPCs) in Rwanda. Most of these DPCs are concentrated in the SW of Rwanda in Sector 4. These have been used as operating bases by former govt militia elements to carry out attacks in Rwanda. The former govt aims to ensure the continued existence of the DPCs and refugee camps to prevent integration of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees back into Rwandese society. By this it hopes to deny legitimacy to the present govt and retain its hold over the majority population.

2. The return of the IDPs and refugees to their homes will help to break the hold that the former govt has over them and assist in the normalisation of the situation in Rwanda.

3. OP RETOUR in essence, therefore, aims at the voluntary return of IDPs and refugees across the border to their home communes. The initial effort of the op will be concentrated on the IDPs in the Gikongoro DPCs to motivate the IDPs to return to their home communes. The target communes for the initial return of IDPs are principally in the Prefectures of Gitarama, Butare and South Kigali. The target communes of Sector 3 initially are Ntongwe, Murama, Masango and Kigoma in Sub Sector 3B and Nyakizu, Kigembe, Gishamvu and Runyinya in Sub Sector 3A.

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4. Concept of Ops . The ops, which are supported by the RPA, Govt officials and NGOs, would initially aim at an information campaign to create conditions in the target DPCs to sufficiently motivate IDPs to return to their homes, while simultaneously gearing up the target communes to receive the returnees. Once the homeward movement of the DPs commences, the security and administration of their transit movement has to be ensured. An acceptable security environment has to be created in the home communes in conjunction with the RPA, to ensure that returnees feel sufficiently secure to remain in their homes and continue reintegrating back into the fabric of their original society.

5. The intention is to wean away the IDPs from the aid that they are receiving at the DPCs to prevent them becoming aid dependent and motivate them to return to their original livelihood. On return the IDPs are, as far as possible, to reoccupy their original homes. In the event of there being disputes over ownership of property, the IDPs are to be given material assistance by the Open Relief Centres (ORCs), set up in each target commune by the NGOs, until resolution of the dispute or allotment of alternative property by the Bougemestre. The ORC, however will not function as another DPC. It will only assist in every way to reintegrate the IDPs and help them to commence earning their livelihood, while providing minimal subsistence aid for the acutely needy persons.

6. With the successful movement of IDPs, it is expected that the refugees in the neighbouring countries may also feel encouraged to return. At a certain stage of the op the movement of IDPs and refugees can thus be expected to become simultaneous. The movement may also not remain restricted to target communes and the Sector should be prepared to handle a situation where almost all communes have a segment of returnees.

7. UNAMIR is making arrangements to marshall the IDPs at the various DPCs, register them and transport them by UNAMIR transport resources. Once the movement becomes enlarged, it is expected that a number of IDPs, belonging to some segments of Sector 3, may commence returning on foot. For the IDPs returning to distant areas or transiting through Sector 3 AOR, an Overnight Way Station (OWS) is being established at Butare, as a transit facility. The security of the OWS, ORCs and the transiting convoys has to be catered for. MILOBS Teams and Formed Troops are to escort the convoys upto the terminal communes.

MSN

5. Sector 3 Milobs and Formed Troops will assist in the provision of an acceptable security environment along the transit routes and in home communes lying within Sector 3 AOR, in conjunction with the resources of the RPA.

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EXECUTION

6. General Outline. The ops will be conducted in three phases:-

- (a) Phase 1. The preparation of the home communes.
- (b) Phase 2. The safe movement of IDPs to ORCs/ home communes.
- (c) Phase 3. Establishment and reintegration of IDPs in their home communes.

Grouping and Tasks.

7. Milobs. All phases.

- (a) Monitor target communes.
- (b) Liaise and coordinate between ORC, local authorities and IDPs.
- (c) Escort IDP convoys from DPCs to ORC /home communes in conjunction with RPA and formed troops.
- (d) Provide liaison between RPA and formed troops.

8. Civpol.

- (a) Assist in commune security in all phases.
- (b) Be prepared to investigate specific incidents as and when reported.

9. Malicoy.

(a) Phase 1.

- (i) Grouping. No change.
- (ii) Tasks. No change from present tasks.

(b) Phase 2.

- (i) Grouping. No change.
- (ii) Tasks.

(aa) Continue deployment of a pl at Ruhango, Ntongwe and Masango for security of these communes.

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4

(ab) Deploy a pl minus at Murama for the security of the commune.

(ac) Earmark a sec from Kabgayi pls for executing escort duties for upto two convoys on a regular basis.

(ad) Earmark Ruhango pl for RRF when DP convoys transit through AOR.

(ae) Be prepared to side step one section each from Ntongwe and Kabgayi to take over responsibility of Ruhango pl once the same is committed on RRF tasks.

(c) Phase 3.

(i) Grouping. No change.

(ii) Tasks. No change from present tasks.

10. Malawicoy.

(a) Phase 1.

(i) Grouping. No change.

(ii) Tasks. No change from present tasks.

(b) Phase 2.

(i) Grouping. No change.

(ii) Tasks.

(aa) Continue deployment of a pl less a sec each at Runyinya and Kigembe communes.

(ab) Deploy a two secs at Nyakizu for the security of the commune.

(ac) Earmark a sec from Butare pl for executing escort duties for upto two convoys on a regular basis.

(ad) Earmark a pl from Butare as RRF when DP convoys transit through AOR.

(ae) Be prepared to side step one section each from Kigembe and Nyakizu to take over responsibility of Butare pl once the same is committed on RRF tasks.

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(af) Ensure security of Gishamvu commune through active patrolling.

(ag) Provide one sec for security duties at the OWS at Butare at all times.

(c) Phase 3.

(i) Grouping. No change.

(ii) Tasks. No change from present tasks.

Coord Instrs

11. Liaison. Establish liaison with RPA to coordinate security measures of the target communes.

12. Route Recce. Carry out route recce to the target communes including time and distance details for RRF tasks.

13. RRF. The RRF pl should be prepared to move at 15 mins notice. The AOR of the RRF pls are:-

(a) Malicoy. Entire Gitarama Prefecture including Nyabsindu, Muyira and Ntyazo commune under Butare Prefecture.

(b) Malawicoy. Communes under Butare Prefecture excl Nyabsindu, Muyira and Ntyazo communes.

14. D Day. 29 Dec 94.

15. Orders for deployment will be given later. Sub units must be prepared to deploy within 24 hrs of warning.

ADM AND LGS

16. Rations. Present system of supplies will continue. MRE will be taken only during emergencies or disruption in regular supplies. RRF pl will always be self contained for 48 hrs.

17. Transport. Suitable redistribution of transport to be made to ensure that at least one light veh and two heavy vehs are available to every pl deployed in communes. RRF pl to be provided with two vehs. Over and above this, two vehs will be earmarked for escort duties and will be located at the coy HQ.

18. Medical. Existing medical cover will continue. RRF pl leaving location on tasks will carry medical rep.

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
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COMD AND ELECTRONICS

19. Communication will continue on the existing channels. Malicoy cdr will additionally be on communication on Sector HQ channel. Base stns at Murama and Nyakizu have been bid for and will be established. The RRF pl will carry two radio sets. Every escort team to carry one set on Sector HQ channel.

20. Comn Channel. Channel 13 (Sector HQ).



S A HASNAIN
Lt Col
Sect Cdr

Distribution

Milobs Gp HQ
FHQ (OPS) ✓
Malawicoy
Malicoy
Sector 3A
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HQ GHANBATT 2
GIKONGORO
28 DEC 94

GH/014/G(OPS)

See Distribution

SUBJECT : SECURITY INSTRUCTION - OP RETOUR

References:

- A. Z723 Sheet 40 BUTARE, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- B. Z723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- C. Z723 Sheet 17 KIGALI, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- D. Z723 Sheet 23 GITARAMA, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- E. Z723 Sheet 26 KINBUNGU, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- f. 3000 15/1/OPS dated 21 Dec 94

1. GENERAL

a. The recent conflict in RWANDA has resulted in the displacement of approximately 3 million people from their homes. It is estimated that 1.1 million are refugees in GOMA and BUKAVU refugees camps in ZAIRE and 1.9 million are displaced persons within RWANDA. Most of these DPs are concentrated in camps in the SW of the country in Sector 4.

b. The return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes will assist in the normalisation of RWANDA.

c. In other that both the Refugees and DPs can return, there needs to be assurances that their home communes are safe. OP RETOUR has accordingly been planned to provide the required secure environment for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their home communes. The initial effort of OP RETOUR will be concentrated on IDPs in the prefecture of GIKONGORO to Home Communes principally in the Prefectures of GITARAMA, BUTARE and South KIGALI.

2. MISSION. To assist in provision of acceptable security environment in support of OP RETOUR in Sectors 4A (s) and 2.

3. EXECUTION

a. General Outline. Ghanbatt will ensure provision of security in three phases supported by RPA/officials of the Government and NGOs.

SECRET

(1) Phase I

- (a) The preparation of Home Communes.
- (b) Information Campaign in target camps.
- (c) The establishment of conditions in the camps, which are conducive to voluntary vacation.

(2) Phase II

- (a) Processing of IDPs through registration, screening and searching procedures in marshalling areas.
- (b) The safe movement of IDPs to ORCs/Home Communes.

(3) Phase III Establishment of IDPs in their Home Communes.

b. Gp and Tasks.

(1) A COY. GP - Nil

(a) Phase I

- i. Prevent intimidation and harassment of IDPs in camps by extremists within your sub sector.
- ii. Enhance confidence amongst the Camp population.
- iii. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

(b) Phase II

- i. Provide Security at Marshalling areas in tgt camps in your Sub Sector, in consultation with RPA and UNREO.
- ii. Provide Security to OWS loc within your Sub sector.
- iii. Provide escort of a half section str for each convoy from the IDP Camps to the destination communes/ORCs.
- iv. Maintain presence in tgt camps within your Sub sector during the period when they are being vacated.

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vi. Assist UNHCR and other UN Agencies in the organisation of marshalling areas within your Sub sector.

vii. Liaise with the RPA and other relevant local auth in your Sub sector.

(c) Phase III. No change.

(2) B COY

(a) Phase 1

i. Gp. Nil

ii. Tasks

aa. Provide Security of a Sect str for Home Communes/ORCs located within your Sub sector. ie. Kanenze, Gashora and Ngenda.

bb. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

(b) Phase 11

i. Gp. Nil

ii. Tasks

aa. Provide an RRF of P1 str when any convoy is transiting through your Sub sector.

cc. Liaise with the RPA and other relevant local auth in your sector in Sp of OP RETOUR.

(c) Phase III

i. Gp. Nil

ii. Task. Reduce the conditions for violence in Home Communes within your Sub sector during the Community reintegration process.

SECRET

(3) C COY

(a) Phase 1

- i. Gp. Nil
- ii. Task. Bn Reserve.

(b) Phase 11

- i. Gp. No change.
- ii. Task. Provide an RRF of pl str when a convoy is transiting through your Sub sector.

(c) Phase 111. No change.

(4) D COY

(a) Phase I

- i. Gp. Nil
- ii. Tasks.
 - aa. Prevent intimidation and harassment of IDPs in camps by extremists within your sub sector.
 - bb. Enhance confidence amongst the camp population.
 - cc. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

(b) Phase 11

- i. Gp. No change
- ii. Tasks.
 - aa. Provide security at tgt camps in your sub sector.
 - bb. Provide security at Marshalling area in tgt camps within your sub sector.

SECRET

cc. Provide security to OWS located in your sub sector.

dd. Provide escort of half section str for each convoy from the IDP camps to destination Communes/ORC.

ee. Provide an RRF of pl str when any convoy is transiting through your sub sector.

ff. Maintain presence in tgat camp within your sub sector during the period when they are being vacated.

gg. Assist UNCHR and other UN Agencies in the organisation of marshalling areas within your sub sector.

ii. Be prep to rft A Coy.

(c) Phase 111. No change.

(5) HO COY

(a) Phase 1

i. Gp. Nil

ii. Tasks

aa. Provide security of a sect str for ORC loc at Sake GR 4354.

bb. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes.

(b) Phase 11

i. Gp. Nil

ii. Tasks

aa. Provide an RRF of pl str when any convoy is transiting through your sub sector.

bb. Provide security of a sect str for Home Commune/ORC loc at Sake.

SECRET

cc. Liaise with the RPA and other relevant local auth within your sub sector.

(c) Phase 111. Reduce the conditions for violation in Home Communes within your sub sector to include projected A COY sub Sector in Sect 2 during the Community reintegration process.

c. COORD INSTRS

(1) Timings

(a) D-Day - 29 Dec 94.

(b) 29 Dec 94 to 12 Jan 95 - Move from CYANIKA camp (Sector 4AN).

(c) 02 Jan 95 to 17 Jan 95 - Move from RUKONDO camp (Sector 4AN).

(d) 12 Jan 95 to 23 Jan 95 - Move from KIZI, KINAZI, MUSANO, KANYINA, NYASISUYA, KARAMBI, BUHORO, GISUNZA and NYAMIRA camps.

(e) 17 Jan 95 to 01 Feb 95 - Move from KIBEHO camp (Sector 4AS).

(f) 27 Jan 95 to 06 Feb 95 - Move from NDAGO camp (Sector 4AS).

(g) 06 Feb 95 to 10 Feb 95 - Move from MUNINI camp (Sector 4AS).

(h) 10 Feb 95 to 14 Feb 95 - Move from KARANA camp.

(i) 14 Feb 95 to 16 Feb 95 - Move from BUSANZE camp (Sector 3A).

(j) 16 Feb 95 to 20 Feb 95 - Move from MUSABEYA camp.

(k) 27 Jan 95 to 26 Feb 95 and beyond - Move of refugees.

(l) Modifications. The schedule is subject to modifications.

(m) Daily Timings. Daily timings for the schedule will be promulgated locally.

SECRET

(2) Schedule. See Annex A.

(3) ORCs. The first twelve ORCs to be established for the target camp at CYANIKA and which will be fully operational by D - 3 are in the Communes of:

- (a) South KIGALI -NGENDA, GASHORA, KANSENZE.
- (b) BUTARE - RUNYINA, GESHMAVU, KIGEMBI, NAKIZU.
- (c) GITARAMA - NTONGWE, MASANGO, MURAMA, NIGOMA.
- (d) KIBUNGU - SAKE.

(4) Movement. Initial movement will be by vehicles. At later stages of the move, as momentum increases and as camp populations have shorter distances to travel, much greater movement on foot will take place. Movement will be coordinated by WFP with ION and UNAMIR transport support.

(5) Special Instrs

- (a) Camps security to commence by 28 Dec 94.
- (b) OWS and ORCs will be secured by 28 Dec 94.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

a. Tpt. UNAMIR and other UN Agencies' tpt assets will be polled to support Op RETOUR. Tac HQ Butare will be resp for coordination.

b. Feeding

- (1) UNAMIR Pers. Coys are to be self-contained for feeding.
- (2) IDPs. The feeding of IDPs will be coordinated by UNREO at the Commune level. Food distribution to IDPs for a two week period will be effected in conjunction with WFP/CRS/ICRC targeted distribution.

c. Ammunition. As per SOPs

d. ROE. State GREEN. See Annex for other legal issues.

e. Dress. Normal.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Bn HQ(Tac). Bn HQ(Tac) at Gikongoro will coordinate all Unit activities in sp of Op RETOUR.


SECRET


d. Bn HQ(Main). Bn HQ(Main) at Kibungo will coordinate Ops in Sector 2.

c. Communications. Existing communications will be utilised. Additional requirements will be addressed as necessary.

d. Convoy Escort. The BSO will provide each escort with radio communication.

6. Ack.


JK ATTIPOE
Lt Col
Commanding Officer


AY ASSANE
Maj
Operations Officer

AUTHENTICATION:

ANNEXES:

A. OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE.

DISTRIBUTION: COPY NO ANNEX A

External:

Information:

G3 OPS UNAMIR HQ	1	-
UNAMIR TAC HQ BUTARE	2	-
HAC/IOC LN	3	-
ZAMBATT HQ	4	-
MILOBS HQ GIKONGORO	5	-
UNREO INFO CELL	6	-

Internal:

Action:

HQ Coy	7	1
A Coy	8	1
B Coy	9	1
C Coy	10	1
D Coy	11	1

Information:

Bn HQ	12	1
CO	13	1
Ops Cell	14	1
File	15	1
Spare	16&17	2

ANNEX 'A' TO
GH2/014/G(OPS)
DATED 27 DEC 94

OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

S FROM D DAY 29 Dec 94	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
(27,000)												
(50,000)												
500)												
2,500)												
3,000)												
((4,000)												
A (1,000)												
(2,000)												
(3,000)												
(3,500)												
(1,500) (Note 1)												
(75,000) (Note 2)												
55,000)												
(12,000)									43			
(21,000)									43	47		
(9,000)										47-9	1	
A (14,000)										49	53	

these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.

movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR/NICOY/7404.9/G

HQ NICOY
UNAMIR
BYUNBA CAMP
BYUNBA03 OPS
UNAMIR HQ

21 Dec 94


AFTER ACTION REPORT OF OP HOPE

Reference:

- A. Your 3000.15/1 (OPs) dated 16 Dec 94.
1. Attached herewith, find Report on OP HOPE forwarded to you as requested vide Reference A above for your necessary action.
2. Acknowledge receipt.

SI AJIBO
Maj
For Cont Coord

cc
File


Amaj
23 Dec 94

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

REPORT ON AFTER ACTION OF
OF HOPEReference:

A. Your 3000.15/1(OPS) dated 16 Dec 94.

GENERAL

1. The planning and conduct of Op HOPE was generally satisfactory. It is believed that its objectives were achieved despite a few odds that militated against the Op. There are, however a few lapses observed during the op. These will be enumerated in this report in order to enhance future ops.

STRENGTH OF PARTICIPANT FROM NICOY

2. A total of 140 offrs and soldiers participated under NICOY. The breakdown in summary is as shown below:

- a. Offrs - 10 (2 offrs fr MILOB).
- b. Sldrs - 130.

CRIMINALS AND WEAPON CAPTURED

3. The tasks given to NICOY and the role played does not directly warrant having details about criminals. However we assisted in the search of tents within the Tac HQ complex during the Op. Details of criminals and weapons captured are as tabulated below:

Serial	Suspects	Wpns arrested	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.		2 x Sword in Scabbard	
2.		1 x Spear	

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING PLANNING AND EXECUTION STAGES

4. There were no problems encountered during the planning stage as the Op orders was explicit. A few problem NICOY encountered during the execution stage was the lack of adequate preparation at the assy area before troops arrival, and the length of stay therein.

OBSERVATIONS

5. Attitudes of NGOs. The NGOs members seen around displayed an attitude of displeasure for the Op. They were more of spying than contributing to the success of the Op.

11
UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

6. Timing.

a. Assy Area. The time spent in the assay was too long. It thus spelt a period of redundancy as troops wondered about in the city.

b. Improper Coordination. Lack of well coordinated timings led to a long wait of the main body at the Release Point. The leading element of the main body arrived the Release Point by 0315 hours and were required to cross the Release Point by 0430 hours.

7. Logistic Support. The defence stores required for the cages were not provided on time. Ration for day 3 was also issued late.

8. Siegers. Some of the weapons (matchets) seized were believed to be implements used for livelihood. Though dangerous and could be used to kill, matchets should not have been removed from all homes. An exception is suggested in future Ops.

RESCUE LEADERS

9. Generally, the Ops has practice all the participating troops on the following:

- a. Duties at assay area.
- b. Convoy movement (both day and night).
- c. Cooperation and coordination.
- d. Securing and manning of Release point.
- e. Problems of cordon and search.
- f. Escort duties and guards.
- g. General administration for Op of this nature.

CONCLUSION

10. This report is prepared to meet the instructions as contained in Reference A. It is therefore hoped that his submission will meet the requirement of the U. It is to note that the request was received on the 20 Dec 94 hence the late submission.

RECOMMENDATION

11. It is recommended that observations raised in paragraphs 5 - 8 be coordinated, corrected and amended accordingly in order to enhance future Ops.

2
UN RESTRICTED

3000.15/1

D COS OPS

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDAFACT SHEET -- OPERATION HOPE

PA to File
17-12

* Over the last several weeks, there had been an increase in the number of violent acts such as machete killings, attacks, beatings and threats in and around the Kibeho and Ndago camps of south western Rwanda. Although UNAMIR troops are mandated to protect displaced Rwandans in Camps and that they actively patrol these areas, criminal elements monitor UN movement and rarely commit violent acts in our presence.

* UNAMIR therefore decided to be pro-active and disarm and arrest possible criminals by occupying the camps and by conducting a cordon and search operation from 4:30 a.m. wednesday, Dec 14 to 8:00 a.m. on Dec 15, 1994. UNAMIR confiscated over 1 000 war like weapons of all kind and arrested 43 potential criminals, in a non violent fashion. All suspected criminals were interviewed and registered with relevant humanitarian agencies.

* A total of 1552 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda troops, military observers and support staff participated in operation Hope.

Contributing Contingents		Weapons confiscated	
Ethiopia	302	Machetes	810
Ghana	238	Spears	58
Tunisia	202	Axes	190
French African Contingent	134	Bayonets	4
Zambia	161	7.62 rounds	21
Nigeria	140	Magazines	1
India	95	Swords	5
Australia	50	Knives	214
Canada	36	Harpoon	16
Military Observers	79	Sickles	10
Military Police	37		
HQ Staff	21		

Thurmont
630752
19/12

* UNAMIR has reason to believe that some criminals were informed well in advance that this operation was to take place and therefore left the camps prior to our arrival.

* "The operation was successfully completed without any violence. The camps have been cleansed of the intimidatory influence of the extremists", reported the SRSG, Ambassador Shaharyar Khan to UNNY."

* UNAMIR intends to maintain a presence in those two camps in an attempt to create a climate of confidence and security among the displaced and discourage criminals from returning.

Prepared by Captain S. Grenier, UNAMIR Public Affairs Officer

For more information, please contact the UNAMIR military public affairs officer, Capt S. Grenier in Kigali at (212) 963-9574 ext 11123.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

CRN-438
PAGE 1 OF 2
MIR-2797

TO: ANNAN/HANSEN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/DE SOTO, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 15 DECEMBER 1994
NO.: MIR-2797
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN IDP CAMPS

1. Reference your code cable no. 4149 of 14 December.
2. The following is an up-dated report of the sweep carried out by UNAMIR:
 - a) The operation was completed on 15 December at 0810 hours Rwanda time. There was no violence and UNAMIR troops were welcomed by IDP's in the camps.
 - b) About a thousand arms - mainly machetes, spears, and swords were recovered. The earlier report about grenades was not confirmed.
 - c) 47 persons were arrested for criminal activity including murder, looting and armed violence. Of these 4 were released, the remaining 43 are being held by UNAMIR pending registration with ICRC and interrogation by Human Rights Monitors. They will then be handed over to Public Prosecutor.
 - d) Some extremists and perpetrators of violence obviously escaped the net by leaving the camps before the operation started. Nevertheless, the sweep has cleansed the camps of their intimidatory influence. UNAMIR MILOBs and formed UNAMIR troops will maintain a stronger presence in the camps to ensure the extremists do not return.

②
DCos Ops

Back to you

Thank you

CHAE
DAPPO

11123/12/94

2. The following conclusions may be emphasized:

- a) The operation was successfully completed without any violence. The camps have been cleansed of the intimidatory influence of the extremists.
- b) The cleansing of the camps will help in launching Operation Retour more effectively as IDP's would have greater freedom of choice.
- c) The sweep action was taken in consonance with our existing mandate to provide security and protection in the camps and to NGO/Agency representatives. We cannot stand idly by and permit camps to become hotbeds of armed violence. We have shown resolution in dealing with growing violence in the camps.
- d) UNAMIR's mandate does not need to be expanded. We have carried out previous sweeps to clear weapons from certain areas - especially in the wake of French departure from the South West Sector - and we shall undertake similar operations in the future, whenever the need arises.
- e) We have detained suspected criminals in order that they are interviewed and registered with relevant humanitarian agencies, especially ICRC and Human Rights Observers. The suspects would be handed over to the Public Prosecutor thereafter.
- f) The sweep was not a joint operation with PLF.

UNAMIR
94 DEC 15 14 57

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NY
BARIL, MILAD UNATIONS
001 (212) 963-9053

FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN
SRSG UNAMIR
(250) 84265

DATE: 15 DECEMBER 1994

SUBJECT: OP HOPE

1. THE ACTING FORCE COMMANDER OFFICIALLY HALTED OP HOPE THIS MORNING JUST AFTER 0800 HOURS LOCAL AFTER ALL AREAS OF KIBEHO AND NDAGO CAMPS HAD BEEN SEARCHED. OP HOPE WAS EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL WITH NO SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OR CASUALTIES ON ANY SIDE DURING THE OPERATION. RPA PROVIDED 2 BNS AND COOPERATED WELL BY REMAINING AT A DISTANCE IN THE OUTER CORDON AND BY NOT INTERFERING WITH OUR SEARCH IN ANY MANNER. THEY KEPT THEIR ROLE OF IDENTIFICATION AND TRANSLATION AND DID NOT "WITCH HUNT". THE DPs ALSO ASSISTED IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF TWO FRGF SOLDIERS. POPULATION IN THE CAMPS REMAINED CALM AND COOPERATIVE. UNAMIR TROOPS WERE FREQUENTLY WELCOMED WITH SMILES, WAVES AND APPLAUSE.

2. A TOTAL OF 1552 TROOPS PLUS SUPPORT/CONTRACTOR STAFF PARTICIPATED IN OP HOPE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. GHANBATT - 238 ✓
- B. ETHIOBATT - 302 ✓
- C. FRAFBATT - 134 ✓
- D. TUNBATT - 202 ✓
- E. ZAMBATT - 161 ✓
- F. INDBATT - 95 ✓
- G. NICOY - 140 ✓
- H. MILOB - 79 ✓
- I. MILPOL - 37 ✓
- J. AUSMED - 50 ✓
- K. CANSIGS - 36 ✓
- L. UNAMIR HQ STAFF - 21
- M. SUPPORT/CONTRACTOR - UNKNOWN

3. A TOTAL OF 43 SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED AND DETAINED FOR VARIOUS OFFENSES DURING THE SEARCH. FOUR SUSPECTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED AFTER INITIAL SCREENING BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL. ALL REMAINING DETAINEES WILL BE SCREENED

FURTHER TODAY BY UNAMIR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPRESENTATIVES AND EITHER RELEASED OR HANDED OVER TO THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS TEAMS AND ICRC BY TOMORROW EVENING. THE RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE VIEWED THE HOLDING AND PROCESSING AREA AND WAS SATISFIED WITH WHAT HE SAW.

4. DURING THE OPERATION, THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS WERE CONFISCATED:

- A. MACHETES - 810
- B. SPEARS - 58
- C. AXES - 190
- D. BAYONETS - 04
- E. AMMO - 21 X 7.62mm
- F. MAGAZINES - 1 X AK47
- G. SWORDS - 05
- H. KNIVES - 214
- I. HARPOON - 16
- J. SICKLES - 10

CONTRARY TO OUR EARLIER REPORT, THERE WERE NO GRENADES CONFISCATED IN THE CAMPS DURING THE OPERATION.

5. CONCLUSION. THE OPERATION WAS A GREAT SUCCESS LOOKING AT THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS CONFISCATED AND THE NUMBER OF SUSPECTS DETAINED. THE COOPERATION RECEIVED FROM THE DPs IN BOTH CAMPS ENHANCED THE COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION IN GOOD TIME. UNAMIR TROOPS WHO TOOK PART IN THE OPERATION HAVE STARTED MOVING BACK ^{TO THEIR} LOCATIONS AND ARE EXPECTED BACK WITHIN RESPECTIVE SECTORS BY NIGHTFALL TODAY. MILITARY OBSERVERS AND FORMED ELEMENTS OF GHANBATT WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AN ELEVATED LEVEL OF PRESENCE WITHIN THE CAMPS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION AND TO DISCOURAGE THE REINTRODUCTION OF CRIMINAL ELEMENTS. THEIR MORALE IS HIGH.

1 CRC
IRC

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

14 DEC 94

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK BARIL, MILAD UNATIONS 001 (212) 963 9053	FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN SRSG UNAMIR (250) 84265
SUBJECT: OP HOPE	
NUMBER OF PAGES: INCLUDING THE COVER: 1	

1. OP HOPE COMMENCED ON SCHEDULE AT 0430 HRS THIS MORNING. UNITS COMMENCED SEARCH PROCEDURE IN KIBEHO IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL. RPA WAS BEHIND SCHEDULE IN PROVIDING THE REQUIRED LIAISON OFFICERS. POPULATION HAS REMAINED CALM, DISPLAYED NO ANXIETY OR FEAR. SEVERAL CONTINGENTS WERE GREETED WITH WAVES AND SMILES. THUS FAR NO VIOLENCE OF ANY KIND ENCOUNTERED.

2. EFFECTIVE 1300 HRS LOCAL 14 DEC, 27 PERSONS HAD BEEN DETAINED AND APPROXIMATELY 200 BLADED WEAPONS (MACHETE, SABRES, AXES, SPEARS AND BAYONETS) HAD BEEN CONFISCATED. THE MAJORITY OF THESE WEAPONS WERE BURIED AND DISCOVERED WITH THE AID OF METAL DETECTORS. MINOR PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO PROCESSING OF DETAINEES IS BEING ADDRESSED; UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AND ICRC REPS ARE REPORTED TO BE SATISFIED WITH THE PROCEDURES.

3. INITIAL SEARCH WAS SLOW, HOWEVER, DUE TO COOPERATION OF DPS SEARCH IS PROGRESSING RAPIDLY AND ANTICIPATE THAT COMPLETION OF OPERATION HOPE WILL BE AHEAD OF SCHEDULE IF CURRENT PROGRESS CONTINUES. UNAMIR TROOP MORALE IS HIGH.

4. EVEN THOUGH UN AGENCIES AND NGOS HAVE SUSPENDED DISPENSATION OF RELIEF ITEMS, IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THEIR ACTIVITIES RECOMMENCE TOMORROW AT THEIR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. REQUEST HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO NGOS THROUGH UNREO.

UN CONFIDENTIAL
MILOB GP HQ

TO : FORCE HQ (OPS)
ALL MILOB SECTORS

DATE: 21 DEC 94

FROM : DCMO
MILOB GP HQ

REF: 6465/OPS/MILOBS

INFO : FC
DFC/CMO

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - OP HOPE

1. Please find herewith attached an After Action Report on 'OP HOPE' containing 11 pages.
2. This letter may please be down graded to UNCLAS after detaching the contents.
3. Best Regards.

Cpl Andoh
File with
other



MOEEN U AHMED
Col
DCMO

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL
MILOB GP HQ

OP HOPE
AFTER ACTION REPORT

GENERAL

1. Over the recent past, there have been continuous reports of spurts of criminal activities by some threat forces in KIBEHO and NDAGO refugee camps located in Sector 4A. By virtue of these unlawful acts, these threat elements had begun tarnishing the good and noble work of UNAMIR, NGOs and Humanitarian agencies working hand in glove for peace and stability in RWANDA. Therefore, in response to this internal threat, UNAMIR in coordination with RPA, took up the onus to carry out 'OP HOPE' from 14 to 16 Dec 94. It was the maiden operation of such magnitude undertaken by UNAMIR and its outcome truly reinforced an age old ethos of UN, ie "Unity in Diversity".

AIM

2. The aim of 'OP HOPE' was to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements and in that MILOB GP was to remain in a supporting role to the formed troops.

PARTICIPATION

3. A total of 79 MILOBs participated alongside 1473 troops and staff. Also, two RPA battalions took active part in this operation. Acting Force Commander/CMO had established his Tac HQ at KIBEHO and commanded/conducted the operation. His participation on the ground gave impetus to the operation. The details of MILOB participation are as follows:

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- a. HQ MILOB GP. 5 Officers including DCMO.
- b. Sector 1. Total three MILOB teams out of which one team was placed under command Nigerian Company and two teams placed under Sector 3 as reserves located at BUTARE.
- c. Sector 2. Total three MILOB teams; one team under command company ex ZAMBATT and two teams placed under command Sector 3 as reserves located in BUTARE.
- d. Sector 3. Total three MILOB teams besides the Sector Comd and four MILOBs to establish and man the alternate MILOB Tactical HQ at BUTARE. These three MILOB teams were located at KIBEHO and placed under command the MILOB Tactical HQ.
- e. Sector 4A. Total three MILOB teams, all placed under command GHANBATT.
- f. Sector 4B. One MILOB team placed under command company ex FRAFBATT.
- g. Sector 4C. Total three MILOB teams, all under command ETHIOBATT.
- h. Sector 5. Total three MILOB teams all under command TUNBATT.
- j. Sector 6. Total three MILOB teams all placed on one hour's notice at KIGALI.

TASKS OF MILOBS

- 4. The MILOB GP HQ was tasked to establish a MILOB Tactical HQ at KIBEHO, to be co-located with the Force HQ. Also an

UN CONFIDENTIAL

alternate MILOB tactical HQ was to be established and manned at BUTARE. The tasks that were assigned to the MILOBs operating under command contingents included the following:

- a. Perform MILOB tasks assigned by respective contingent commanders.
- b. To monitor all activities and security situation within own area of operation.
- c. To inform MILOB Tac HQ of the situation on the assigned objectives to their force elements.
- d. Continuous reporting on the progress of operations.
- e. Report any violation of human rights.
- f. Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops and NGOs and civil authorities within own area of operations.
- g Submission of SITREP on 12-hour basis.
- h. Maintain post operation presence in KIBEHO and NDAGO camps and report situation.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

5. Mov to Assy Area. The assy area selected was BUTARE. The troops and the MILOBs participating in this operation assembled at BUTARE on 12 Dec 94. The logistics infrastructure catering for rations, water and POL was created at the Assy Area. Marrying up of MILOBs with their respective contingents took place. Selective recce of the objective area was carried out by certain key appointments holders. Confirmatory orders were issued at various

UN CONFIDENTIAL

levels. This phase of the operation passed off smoothly as planned.

6. Mov from Assembly Area to Camp Site. The move from the Assy area to the camp sites (objectives) was carried out over two routes, ie, BUTARE-GIKONGORO-KIBEHO (RED ROUTE) and BUTARE-KIBEHO (GREEN ROUTE), commencing 140015 hrs. The troops arrived at the release point at 140315 hrs. This phase of the operation was carried out smoothly and as per the time plan despite it involving movement of large convoy of vehicles over hilly terrain and during night on approximately 45 kms of unmetalled road.

7. Area To be Searched. The KIBEHO and NDAGO camps put together constituted an area of approximately five square kilometers. The whole area was divided into 11 distinct objectives. The distribution of the objectives for the purpose of the search was done as follows:

- a. TUNBATT - 1 & 3.
- b. GHANBATT - 2 & 8.
- c. ETHIOBATT - 4 & 6.
- d. FRAFBATT - 5 & 9.
- e. ZAMBATT - 7 & 10.
- f. INDIBATT - 11.

8. Search Operations. The troops commenced simultaneous search of these assigned objectives at 140530 hrs. RPA identification and liaison teams were integrated with the contingent down to platoon level. Force and MILOB Tactical HQ were co-located at KIBEHO and so were Advanced dressing Station under AUSMED and

UN CONFIDENTIAL

Detainee Processing Centre under CIVPOL and MP. Initially the search operation progressed slowly but later on it picked up the right momentum. The MILOB teams with each search party gave a continuous progress of operation over radio. The three MILOB teams earmarked as reserves at KIBEHO were tasked to carry out patrolling on the entire area and monitor the activities in the Detainee Processing Centre. The Force Tactical HQ was constantly kept informed of the MILOBs' reports. The complete operation was carried out with true professional zeal and military finesse which helped prevent any untoward incident. Finally, at 141700 hrs, the search ended on completion of the task. The whole operation resulted in the arrest of 43 potential criminals and confiscation of following weapons:

- a. Machetes - 810.
- b. Spears - 58.
- c. Axes - 190.
- d. Bayonets - 4.
- e. 7.62 rounds - 21.
- f. Magazines - 1.
- g. Swords - 5
- h. Knives - 214.
- j. Harpoons - 16.
- k. Sickles - 10.

9. De-Induction. The de-induction of troops from the camp

UN CONFIDENTIAL

sites commenced at 150800 hrs. Five MILOB teams were left behind for maintaining post operation presence and to monitor the situation.

LESSONS LEARNT

10. A deep peep down memory lane of military history would reveal that many battles have been lost by strong armies just because their commanders ignored the valuable lessons they learnt from their previous battles. During OP HOPE, many important military lessons have been re-validated. The aim here has been to avoid any surgical approach to the retrospection but reviewing to embed certain important military issues involved in this operation which ensured success.

a. Planning and Preparatory Stage.

(1) Need for Detailed Planning. In an operation of this magnitude and that too conducted by a unified force of heterogenous characteristics, there is an over-riding need for planning into greater details. The objective area was quite vast, and therefore divided into 11 parts which automatically called for detailed planning, which was done meticulously.

(2) Intelligence Acquisition. P r o c e s s e d information about the objective much prior to the launching of the operation, is the key to success. Therefore, there is a need to evolve some kind of intelligence acquisition plan long before the launching of intended operation which would ensure coordination of intelligence effort.

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amalgamating force elements of different nationalities with varying shades of training and weaponry into a single mould, enabling them to operate shoulder to shoulder would be by means of a detailed and thorough briefing by commanders at all levels.

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11. Loc of HQ. During 'OP HOPE', the force and MILOB Tactical HQ were located inside the objective area right on the commencement of the operation. It could have invited trouble had there been any retaliation or reaction from the threat forces while the troops commenced the search. It is therefore suggested that the HQ should only be brought inside the objective area once the initial phase is over and a secured area within the objective has been created.

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.65(G3 PLANS)

To: FC

From: OIC Op RETOUR

Info: DFC
COS
DCOS Ops (on return)

Date: 21 Dec 94

Subject: OP RETOUR - UPDATE ON PROGRESSGENERAL

1. This minute seeks to update you on Op RETOUR and the progress that has been made in your absence.
2. In my last briefing, I suggested that it was likely that either planning would continue (if the Government agreed to the Principles of Op RETOUR), or that it would become reactive, if forcible closure of the camps continued. Planning has continued, but at the cost of preparation time; D Day has now been set at 29 Dec 94.
3. This changes a number of things, and poses serious problems in many areas. These are discussed below.

PLANNING

4. We offered the Government an alternative to camp closure, in the shape of a rough plan for vacating camps - attached. It is primarily designed for their consumption, but now that they seem to have tacitly accepted it, we have to try to achieve the deadlines. We are thus working on achieving some results on 29 Dec, and building up thereafter.
5. Planning has been hampered by a poor database (as yet only partially complete) and the fact that camp closures shifted camp populations, throwing out all the figures. This can not be rectified and current figures are only a best guess. Nonetheless we have been able to identify Open Relief Centres (ORCs) for the first two camps, and work is now progressing to have them open by the deadlines set. A list of ORCs is also attached.

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OPEN RELIEF CENTRES.

6. The ORC concept has not been widely accepted. Some Prefects and Bourgmestres have said that they do not want ORCs. UNHCR is uncomfortable with some of the ideas. It is clear to most players, however, that ORCs are necessary and a simple, no-nonsense ORC will be required in the priority Communes. This will be a place where shelter materials and seeds and tools will be distributed and administrative support provided, for instance for the resolution of property disputes. Food will be distributed across Communes and not at ORCs. Security support in the shape of a permanent UNAMIR presence, to augment Gendarmerie and RPA resources, during at least the early stages of reintegration, will be required.

7. Identification of later ORCs is now under way. These details will be promulgated as soon as they are available.

8. UN agencies and NGOs are generally very positive about ORCs. Many have agreed to shift emphasis directly from their camps to ORCs, and that is excellent news. Others are reluctant to leave their camps, unless the population voluntarily leaves, to the last man. The prevailing view is that, de facto, camps will be "closed", since the International Community has accepted the concept of Op RETOUR, and people will not go home unless there are demonstrable reasons for them to do so. I hope this common resolve will continue.

IOC

9. The IOC has not got off the ground. Attendance is desultory, tardy and without continuity. It is impossible to plan properly without commitment. Without UNAMIR and UNREO staff, there would be no permanent presence, and Christmas leave has reduced this to a minimum. The initial idea of having a "humanitarian headquarters" has not come to fruition, and will not, in my view, unless there is a full-blown disaster. This lack of coordination is the biggest threat to Op RETOUR, and there seems to be no way to neutralise it. We just have to soldier on!

10. Plans to move the IOC to the Ministry of Rehabilitation have not made evident progress. Mr Kent insists that the move is just around the corner, but it seems unlikely that the infrastructure will be ready for some time. Frankly, the only people available to orchestrate the Ministry project, and move the IOC into it, are too busily involved in crisis management, to spare the subject any thought.

SECURITY PLAN

11. The UNAMIR security instruction is about to be distributed. The security element of Op RETOUR is probably its most fundamental aspect, and the one most likely to succeed. The relevant COs have been briefed by me. There will be a coordination conference at HQ UNAMIR on Tue 27 Dec 94. Coordination on the ground will be effected by UNREO Butare and Gikongoro, and their coordination meeting is on 26 Dec.

ROLE OF TAC HQ

12. Tac HQ has a major coordinating role in Op RETOUR. Op HOMEWARD uses Tac HQ as a meeting place and it is intended to continue and to develop this method during Op RETOUR.

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Tac HQ will provide the location and support for UN Agencies and NGOs to coordinate at their daily meetings, and will pass information on the operation both up and down the chain of command.

TRANSPORT PLAN

13. The transport plan has been well staffed. UNAMIR has brigaded first line transport, and is scheduled to offer up 36 TCVs. With those buses and trucks available from IOM and UNHCR, the total lift capacity per day will be no greater than 2000, and more likely 1500. This is a severe limiting factor on the operation. If Cyanika and Rukhondo camps contain 100,000 and 70% are prepared to leave, it would still take at least 2 months to clear them both, the total time we have allotted to the IDP phase. It is important that we play this long with the Government, whilst trying to improve the transport resources. Current plans to achieve this are:

- a. Restructure the UNAMIR fleet using UNOSOM vehicles. Over 280 are on order, but if they do arrive, this may take some time.
- b. Request the allocation of a transport unit from UN sources. SRSG has requested that DKPO provide us with a transport company/squadron with integral command and control, for a 3 month period from 1 Feb 95. Informally, several countries have expressed an interest in this task.
- c. Look at local alternatives. The EC may offer the funds to buy 60-70 vehicles for Op RETOUR. IOM are currently negotiating with them to progress this.

INFORMATION PLAN

14. Information is a very weak element in the overall plan. There are three areas of interest:

- a. Campaign. UNREO have taken a useful initiative and have despatched 4 information teams to Gikongoro, to visit all camps, and impart general information on OP RETOUR, without disclosing the schedule. The teams consist of representatives from the Ministries of Rehabilitation, Interior, Justice and Defence, UNREO, UN Agency and NGO staff, with MILOB support. Although only on a small scale, this is the best we can do, and initially, we have to hope that it will work. It is important that UNAMIR troops on the ground continue to encourage the people to go home.
- b. Radio. The potential of radio has not been developed properly, as follows:
 - (1). Radio Rwanda have offered 2 X 15 minute slots per week to UNHCR, to support the Op RETOUR campaign. Apart from their timing, at 0715, they are clearly insufficient to meet the need. UNHCR blows hot and cold about whether it wants its message to go out on Government radio.
 - (2). UN Radio has still not been granted a licence. That they need this to help encourage the people to go home, and that the Government will not grant it, without receiving assistance in other areas, is fairly typical of the coordination obstacles evident elsewhere in Op RETOUR. We have asked that UNREO

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pressure the Government to move this one quickly, so that we can start to have an impact in the camps. I doubt that they will be successful.

c. Media handling. There is still nobody to take on this critical and sensitive task. I asked SRSGs spokesman to do it, and he has demurred. I see no alternative to tasking Capt Grenier to lead on this, when he returns from leave on 6 Jan 95. He is happy to take the job on, but it is a lot of responsibility and he needs some top cover. The "expert", which we have been promised for 4 weeks, has still not arrived from UNICEF. There is potential for serious embarrassment here, unless we can present a professional and coordinated approach to the press.

CONCLUSION


15. We have been forced into a less-than-ideal situation by the Government's insistence on closing the camps immediately. We have been able to buy some time at the expense of planning and coordination. We will probably not be able to maintain the schedule we have offered, and a strategy for dealing with this eventuality must be evolved now.

16. The operation will start slowly, and will in effect, be on Op HOMEWARD scales, with the following improvements:

- a. Good security in the camps, on the routes home and in the Home Communes.
- b. A truncated RPA searching and screening process, leading to a more efficient, less threatening move home.
- c. Provision in the Home Communes to provide support for the people, including administrative support on the resolution of land disputes. This support will be shifted from the camps.

17. The speed at which the operation gains momentum will be dictated by the success of initial operations, an increase in the transport fleet, and an improvement in the information campaign.

18. Despite the apparently insurmountable obstacles, many of the humanitarian staff are very confident that the operation will go well.



T A P MULLARKEY
Lt Col
OIC Op RETOUR

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MILOB GP HQ

TO : FORCE HQ (OPS)
ALL MILOB SECTORS

DATE: 21 DEC 94


FROM : DCMO
MILOB GP HQ

REF: 6465/OPS/MILOBS

INFO : FC
DFC/CMO

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - OP HOPE

1. Please find herewith attached an After Action Report on 'OP HOPE' containing 11 pages.
2. This letter may please be down graded to UNCLAS after detaching the contents.
3. Best Regards.


MOEEN U AHMED
Col
DCMO

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MILOB GP HQ

OP HOPE
AFTER ACTION REPORT

GENERAL

1. Over the recent past, there have been continuous reports of spurts of criminal activities by some threat forces in KIBEHO and NDAGO refugee camps located in Sector 4A. By virtue of these unlawful acts, these threat elements had begun tarnishing the good and noble work of UNAMIR, NGOs and Humanitarian agencies working hand in glove for peace and stability in RWANDA. Therefore, in response to this internal threat, UNAMIR in coordination with RPA , took up the onus to carry out 'OP HOPE' from 14 to 16 Dec 94. It was the maiden operation of such magnitude undertaken by UNAMIR and its outcome truly reinforced an age old ethos of UN, ie "Unity in Diversity".

AIM

2. The aim of 'OP HOPE' was to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements and in that MILOB GP was to remain in a supporting role to the formed troops.

PARTICIPATION

3. A total of 79 MILOBs participated alongside 1473 troops and staff. Also, two RPA battalions took active part in this operation. Acting Force Commander/CMO had established his Tac HQ at KIBEHO and commanded/conducted the operation. His participation on the ground gave impetus to the operation. The details of MILOB participation are as follows:

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- a. HQ MILOB GP. 5 Officers including DCMO.
- b. Sector 1. Total three MILOB teams out of which one team was placed under command Nigerian Company and two teams placed under Sector 3 as reserves located at BUTARE.
- c. Sector 2. Total three MILOB teams; one team under command company ex ZAMBATT and two teams placed under command Sector 3 as reserves located in BUTARE.
- d. Sector 3. Total three MILOB teams besides the Sector Comd and four MILOBs to establish and man the alternate MILOB Tactical HQ at BUTARE. These three MILOB teams were located at KIBEHO and placed under command the MILOB Tactical HQ.
- e. Sector 4A. Total three MILOB teams, all placed under command GHANBATT.
- f. Sector 4B. One MILOB team placed under command company ex FRAFBATT.
- g. Sector 4C. Total three MILOB teams, all under command ETHIOBATT.
- h. Sector 5. Total three MILOB teams all under command TUNBATT.
- j. Sector 6. Total three MILOB teams all placed on one hour's notice at KIGALI.

TASKS OF MILOBS

- 4. The MILOB GP HQ was tasked to establish a MILOB Tactical HQ at KIBEHO, to be co-located with the Force HQ. Also an

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alternate MILOB tactical HQ was to be established and manned at BUTARE. The tasks that were assigned to the MILOBs operating under command contingents included the following:

- a. Perform MILOB tasks assigned by respective contingent commanders.
- b. To monitor all activities and security situation within own area of operation.
- c. To inform MILOB Tac HQ of the situation on the assigned objectives to their force elements.
- d. Continuous reporting on the progress of operations.
- e. Report any violation of human rights.
- f. Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops and NGOs and civil authorities within own area of operations.
- g Submission of SITREP on 12-hour basis.
- h. Maintain post operation presence in KIBEHO and NDAGO camps and report situation.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

5. Mov to Assy Area. The assy area selected was BUTARE. The troops and the MILOBs participating in this operation assembled at BUTARE on 12 Dec 94. The logistics infrastructure catering for rations, water and POL was created at the Assy Area. Marrying up of MILOBs with their respective contingents took place. Selective recce of the objective area was carried out by certain key appointments holders. Confirmatory orders were issued at various

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levels. This phase of the operation passed off smoothly as planned.

6. Mov from Assembly Area to Camp Site. The move from the Assy area to the camp sites (objectives) was carried out over two routes, ie, BUTARE-GIKONGORO-KIBEHO (RED ROUTE) and BUTARE-KIBEHO (GREEN ROUTE), commencing 140015 hrs. The troops arrived at the release point at 140315 hrs. This phase of the operation was carried out smoothly and as per the time plan despite it involving movement of large convoy of vehicles over hilly terrain and during night on approximately 45 kms of unmetalled road.

7. Area To be Searched. The KIBEHO and NDAGO camps put together constituted an area of approximately five square kilometers. The whole area was divided into 11 distinct objectives. The distribution of the objectives for the purpose of the search was done as follows:

- a. TUNBATT - 1 & 3.
- b. GHANBATT - 2 & 8.
- c. ETHIOBATT - 4 & 6.
- d. FRAFBATT - 5 & 9.
- e. ZAMBATT - 7 & 10.
- f. INDIBATT - 11.

8. Search Operations. The troops commenced simultaneous search of these assigned objectives at 140530 hrs. RPA identification and liaison teams were integrated with the contingent down to platoon level. Force and MILOB Tactical HQ were co-located at KIBEHO and so were Advanced dressing Station under AUSMED and

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Detainee Processing Centre under CIVPOL and MP. Initially the search operation progressed slowly but later on it picked up the right momentum. The MILOB teams with each search party gave a continuous progress of operation over radio. The three MILOB teams earmarked as reserves at KIBEHO were tasked to carry out patrolling on the entire area and monitor the activities in the Detainee Processing Centre. The Force Tactical HQ was constantly kept informed of the MILOBs' reports. The complete operation was carried out with true professional zeal and military finesse which helped prevent any untoward incident. Finally, at 141700 hrs, the search ended on completion of the task. The whole operation resulted in the arrest of 43 potential criminals and confiscation of following weapons:

- a. Machetes - 810.
- b. Spears - 58.
- c. Axes - 190.
- d. Bayonets - 4.
- e. 7.62 rounds - 21.
- f. Magazines - 1.
- g. Swords - 5
- h. Knives - 214.
- j. Harpoons - 16.
- k. Sickles - 10.

9. De-Induction. The de-induction of troops from the camp

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sites commenced at 150800 hrs. Five MILOB teams were left behind for maintaining post operation presence and to monitor the situation.

LESSONS LEARNT

10. A deep peep down memory lane of military history would reveal that many battles have been lost by strong armies just because their commanders ignored the valuable lessons they learnt from their previous battles. During OP HOPE, many important military lessons have been re-validated. The aim here has been to avoid any surgical approach to the retrospection but reviewing to embed certain important military issues involved in this operation which ensured success.

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As a spin off, UNAMIR has earned a better rapport with the RPA and also earned the confidence of local populace, which is definitely a positive sign for all future operations. MILOBs are looking forward for such operations in the future.

MOEEN U AHMED

Col

DCMO

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OP RETOUR

RETURN OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

OUTLINE PLAN

Chief Clerk
File
Adt. Maj.
21 Dec 94

GENERAL

1. Phase 1 of Op RETOUR (the planning phase) is drawing to a close. The Outline Plan for Phase 2 is attached. This is the phase which relocates the IDP population, mainly concentrated in the Prefecture of Gikongoro, to their home Communes, principally in the Prefectures of Gitarama, Butare and South Kigali.
2. Much of the detailed work has yet to be completed on the format of the move. However, the Task Force is confident that it will be able to achieve the necessary timings. They are based on a "poor case" scenario and it may be feasible to improve on them significantly, if the security environment is improved to provide confidence for the people to walk home.
3. Throughout Op RETOUR, the Government's total endorsement of the guiding Principles has to be assured. These are at ~~Annex A.~~ ^{Appx}

PROGRAMME

4. People will be encouraged to leave the IDP camps in line with the schedule at ~~Annex B.~~ ^{Appx}

PREPARATION

5. Way Stations. It is intended to use Cyanika Camp as the first Way Station in the Operation. This will negate the need to construct a special facility early on, allowing concurrent work to construct Way Stations in other areas, to continue. Cyanika will also be used as the Way Station for Rukhondo Camp.
6. Open Relief Centres. The location of the first Open Relief Centres (ORCs) has been determined. ORCs will be activated in time for them to have a positive impact on the resident Commune population, before the first IDPs arrive. NGOs and agencies which currently serve the camps will be actively encouraged to shift their resources to ORCs, as the Operation progresses and camp populations dwindle. A list showing ORC management responsibility, derived from camp population figures, is at ~~Annex C.~~ ^{Appx} A fuller description of the role of ORCs is at ~~Annex D.~~ ^{Appx} Sectoral responsibilities are shown at ~~Appex E.~~ ^{Appx} The first twelve ORCs, to be established and fully operational by D-3 are in the Communes of:

South Kigali:	Ngenda, Gashora, Kanzenze	2nd batt
Butare:	Runyinya, Geshamvu, Kigembi, Niakizu	Malamin
Gitarama:	Ntongwe, Masango, Murama, Kigoma	Mohi
Kibungo:	Sake	Sector 2 cdh.

} Sect 3 cdh.

7. Water & Sanitation. Priority work on water and sanitation deficiencies in the Communes has already begun. Water assets will be required from Agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR in order to meet immediate needs, while water and sanitation systems are being re-introduced.

SECURITY

8. The details of the security plan will now devolve from the Outline Plan. A strong presence will be created during the periods when camp populations are being encouraged to leave, in order to prevent intimidation. Escorts will be required for road moves and route security for movement on foot. Additionally, ORCs will require a security presence, in order to protect the population, and the commodities in the ORCs. Security

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will be provided using complementary assets from the RPA, the Gendarmerie and UNAMIR.

MOVEMENT

9. Initial movement will be carried out by vehicle. Earlier camps on the schedule have large populations beyond easy foot travelling distance, and these will be transported by bus and truck. At later stages of the move, as momentum increases and as camp populations have shorter distances to travel, much greater movement on foot is envisaged.

INFORMATION

10. A coordinated information plan will be directed at the IDP population as a whole, as well as focusing more specifically on the next camp on the schedule. Information will be impartial and will concentrate on confidence-building, using feedback from the Home Communes.

TIMESCALE

11. The timescale, as shown at ^{Appx} Annex A is self-explanatory. Using this methodology, changes to the schedule and improvements in targets, can be adjusted with relatively little effort. The aim is to develop a flexible programme capable of alteration. The arrival of a large fleet of UN vehicles (expected before the beginning of Feb 95), and progress on refugee repatriation, are likely to be significant milestones in the forward movement of the schedule.

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
REFUGEE PHASE

13. The Refugee phase of Op RETOUR, Phase 3, is expected to begin during Phase 2. Work is already in hand to develop Welcome Centres for returning refugees. The structure and function of the Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) will be expanded to adapt to this requirement and the methodology employed on Phase 2 will be enhanced accordingly.

Kigali, 8 December 1994

Annexes:

- A. Guiding Principles.
- C. Open Relief Centre Management Responsibility.
- D. Open Relief Centres - Method of Operation.



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BUTARE COMMUNES						
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		KIBEHO	11904	AICF		
		RWAMIKO	493	ICRC/SCF		
		RURAMBA	99	ICRC/SCF		
		BIVUMU	313			
		MUNINI	200	ICRC		
		BOHORO	343	ICRC		
		NDAGO	7069			
TOTAL			20875			
HUYE	26776	KIBEHO	5959		X	
		RWAMIKO	587			
		RURAMBA	489			
		BIVUMU	178			
		MUNINI	47			
		BOHORO	149			
		NDAGO	653			
TOTAL			8062			
KIBAYI	44956	KIBEHO	556			
		MUNINI	54			
		NDAGO	8			
TOTAL			618			
KIGEMBE	48966	KAMANA	337		X	
		KIBEHO	4871			
		RWAMIKO	8			
		BIVUMU	77			
		MUNINI	1188			
		BOHORO	361			
		NDAGO	5002			
TOTAL			11844			
MARABA	39689	KAMANA	807			
		KIBEHO	860			
		RWAMIKO	297			
		RURAMBA	293			
		BIVUMU	156			
		BOHORO	126			
TOTAL			2539			
MBAZI	27492	KIBEHO	6311		X	
		RWAMIKO	453			
		RURAMBA	249			
		BIVUMU	131			
		MUNINI	238			
		BOHORO	57			
		NDAGO	532			
TOTAL			7971			
MUGANZI	36276	KIBEHO	481			
		NDAGO	11			
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		RWAMIKO	115			
		RURAMBA	170			
		BIVUMU	97			
		MUNINI	184			
		BOHORO	374			
		NDAGO	1594			
TOTAL			8470			
MUYAGA	35077	KIBEHO	2030			
		RWAMIKO	36			
		RURAMBA	62			
		BIVUMU	5			
		MUNINI	150			
		BOHORO	165			
		NDAGO	696			
TOTAL			3144			
MUYIRA	42974	KIBEHO	6211		X (PRI 1)	
		RWAMIKO	658			
		BIVUMU	353			
		MUNINI	134			
		BOHORO	465			
		NDAGO	2413			
		CYANIKA	2574			
TOTAL			12808			
NDORA	29588	KIBEHO	1997			
		RWAMIKO	18			
		BIVUMU	27			
		MUNINI	97			
		BOHORO	80			
		NDAGO	119			
TOTAL			2338			
NGOMA	32953	KIBEHO	4492			
		RWAMIKO	295			
		RURAMBA	80			
		BIVUMU	64			

		MUNINI	238		
		BOHORO	306		
		NDAGO	1161		
	TOTAL		6656		
NTYAZO	55079	KIBEHO	5899	X(PRI 1)	
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		RURAMBA	86		
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		MUNINI	4592		
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		RWAMIKO	66		
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		NDAGO	504		
	TOTAL		3007		
RUNYINYA	29050	KIBEHO	20314	X	
		RWAMIKO	4991		
		RURAMBA	3835		
		BIVUMU	75		
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		RURAMBA	140		
		BIVUMU	44		
		BOHORO	160		
		NDAGO	799		
		CYANIKA	1595		
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		RWAMIKO	86		
		RURAMBA	123		
		BIVUMU	29		
		BOHORO	272		
		NDAGO	534		
	TOTAL		2337		
SHYANDA	40647	KIBEHO	4584		
		RWAMIKO	15		
		RURAMBA	177		
		BIVUMU	50		
		MUNINI	24		
		BOHORO	229		
		NDAGO	1900		
	TOTAL		6979		
TOTAL	764485		188849		

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GITARAMA COMMUNES						
BULINGA	36382					
GITARAMA		KAMANA	232			
		RURAMBA	74			
		BIVUMU	25			
		NDAGO	158			
KAYENZI	39351					
KIGOMA	61468	KIBEHO	365		X	
		RWAMIKO	4			
		BOHORO	209			
		NDAGO	4			
MASANGO	50316	NDAGO	12		X	
MUGINA	41229					
MUKINGI	38248	NDAGO	30			
MURAMA	40882	NDAGO	4		X	
MUSAMBIRA	45771					
MUSHUBATI	64258					
NTONGWE	73198	KIBEHO	746		X(PRI 1)	
		RWAMIKO	30			
		MUNINI	124			
		NDAGO	31			
		CYANIKA	895			
NYABIKENKE	51450	RWAMIKO	4			
NYAKABANDA	46209					

NYAMABUYE I	79852	NDAGO	10		X	
RUNDA	45940					
ROTOBWE	35480					
TABA	54469					
TAMBWE	47308				X	
TOTAL	851811					

COMMUNE KIGALI COMMUNES	PRE WAR POP	ORIGIN CAMP	CAMP POP	CAMP NGO	ORC	ORC NGO
BICUMBI	98456	KIBEHO	388		X(PRI 1)	
		BOHORO	47			
		CYANIKA	699			
BUTAMWA	33875					
GASHORA	75719	KAMANA	1716		X(PRI 1)	
		KIBEHO	4200			
		RWAMIKO	11			
		RURAMBA	29			
		BIVUMU	320			
		MUNINI	1878			
		NDAGO	2398			
		CYANIKA	2658			
GIKOMERO	53238					
GIKORO	52239					
KANOMBE	53497	RWAMIKO	6			
		BOHORO	66			
KANZENZE	98952	KAMANA	728		X(PRI 1)	
		KIBEHO	1055			
		RWAMIKO	23			
		RURAMBA	36			
		BIVUMU	95			
		MUNINI	178			
		BOHORO	190			
		NDAGO	359			
		CYANIKA	1231			
MBOGO	32051					
MUGAMBAZI	46985					
MUSASA	33186					
NGENDA	114193	KAMANA	3934		X(PRI 1)	
		KIBEHO	20882			
		RWAMIKO	512			
		RURAMBA	116			
		BIVUMU	242			
		MUNINI	4382			

		BOHORO	732			
		NDAGO	8611			
RUBUNGO	45474	CYANIKA	9233			
RUSHASHI	38258					
RUTONGO	54574	RWAMIKO	3			
		BOHORO	5			
SHYORONGI	44887	RWAMIKO	3			
TARE	38635					
TOTAL	914219					

BUTARE COMMUNES	GRID	POPULATION 1991
GISHAMVU	QT9904	37676
HUYE	RT0214	26776
KIBAYI	RS1898	44956
KIGEMBE	RS0496	48966
MARABA	QT9721	39689
MBAZI	RT0517	27492
MUGANZI	RT1807	36276
MUGUSA	RT1825	38171
MUYAGA	RT2425	35077
MUYIRA	RT2039	42974
NDORA	RT1411	29588
NGOMA	RT0312	32953
NTYAZO	RT2031	55079
NYABISINDU	RT0339	36999
NYAKIZU	QS9196	50241
NYARUHENGERI	RT0903	34002
RUNYINYA	QT8207	29050
RUSATIRA	RT0830	43779
RUHASHYA	RT0425	34094
SHYANDA	RT1117	40647
TOTAL		764485

KIGALI COMMUNES		
	GRID	POPULATION 1991
BICUMBI		98456
BUTAMWA	SC6975	33875
GASHORA	SC9256	75719
GIKOMERO	SC8294	53238
GIKORO		52239
KANOMBE	SC8681	53497
KANZENZE	SC7762	98952
MBOGO	RU3104	32051
MUGAMBAZI		46985
MUSASA	RT1697	33186
NGENDA	SC7344	114193
RUBUNGO	SC8584	45474
RUSHASHI	RU1708	38258
RUTONGO		54574
SHYORONGI	RT3094	44887
TARE	RU2309	38635
TOTAL		914219
KIGALI VILLE COMMUNES		
	GRID	POPULATION 1991
KACYIRU	SC7586	56966
KICUKIRO	SC7981	57423
NYARUGENGE	SC7585	120083
TOTAL		234472

GITARAMA COMMUNES	GRID	POPULATION 1991
BULINGA	RT0079	36382
KAYENZI	RT1789	39351
KIGOMA	RT1149	61468
MASANGO	QT9654	50316
MUGINA	RT2767	41229
MUKINGI	RT0510	38248
MURAMA	RT0048	40882
MUSAMBIRA	RT1773	45771
MUSHUBATI	RT0271	64258
NTONGWE	RT2456	73198
NYABIKENKE	RT0792	51450
NYAKABANDA	RT0096	46209
NYAMABUYE I	RT0870	79852
RUNDA		45940
ROTOBWE	RT1280	35480
TABA	RT2283	54469
TAMBWE	RT1052	47308
TOTAL		851811

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OP RETOUR

RETURN OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

OUTLINE PLAN

GENERAL

1. Phase 1 of Op RETOUR (the planning phase) is drawing to a close. The Outline Plan for Phase 2 is attached. This is the phase which relocates the IDP population, mainly concentrated in the Prefecture of Gikongoro, to their home Communes, principally in the Prefectures of Gitarama, Butare and South Kigali.
2. Much of the detailed work has yet to be completed on the format of the move. However, the Task Force is confident that it will be able to achieve the necessary timings. They are based on a "poor case" scenario and it may be feasible to improve on them significantly, if the security environment is improved to provide confidence for the people to walk home.
3. Throughout Op RETOUR, the Government's total endorsement of the guiding Principles has to be assured. These are at **Annex A**.

PROGRAMME

4. People will be encouraged to leave the IDP camps in line with the schedule at **Annex B**.

PREPARATION

5. Way Stations. It is intended to use Cyanika Camp as the first Way Station in the Operation. This will negate the need to construct a special facility early on, allowing concurrent work to construct Way Stations in other areas, to continue. Cyanika will also be used as the Way Station for Rukhondo Camp.
6. Open Relief Centres. The location of the first Open Relief Centres (ORCs) has been determined. ORCs will be activated in time for them to have a positive impact on the resident Commune population, before the first IDPs arrive. NGOs and agencies which currently serve the camps will be actively encouraged to shift their resources to ORCs, as the Operation progresses and camp populations dwindle. A list showing ORC management responsibility, derived from camp population figures, is at **Annex C**. A fuller description of the role of ORCs is at **Annex D**. Sectoral responsibilities are shown at **Annex E**. The first twelve ORCs, to be established and fully operational by D-3 are in the Communes of:

South Kigali:	Ngenda, Gashora, Kanzenze
Butare:	Runyinya, Geshamvu, Kigembi, Niakizu
Gitarama:	Ntongwe, Masango, Murama, Kigoma
Kibungo:	Sake

7. Water & Sanitation. Priority work on water and sanitation deficiencies in the Communes has already begun. Water assets will be required from Agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR in order to meet immediate needs, while water and sanitation systems are being re-introduced.

SECURITY

8. The details of the security plan will now devolve from the Outline Plan. A strong presence will be created during the periods when camp populations are being encouraged to leave, in order to prevent intimidation. Escorts will be required for road moves and route security for movement on foot. Additionally, ORCs will require a security presence, in order to protect the population, and the commodities in the ORCs. Security

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will be provided using complementary assets from the RPA, the Gendarmerie and UNAMIR.

MOVEMENT

9. Initial movement will be carried out by vehicle. Earlier camps on the schedule have large populations beyond easy foot travelling distance, and these will be transported by bus and truck. At later stages of the move, as momentum increases and as camp populations have shorter distances to travel, much greater movement on foot is envisaged.

INFORMATION

10. A coordinated information plan will be directed at the IDP population as a whole, as well as focusing more specifically on the next camp on the schedule. Information will be impartial and will concentrate on confidence-building, using feedback from the Home Communes.

TIMESCALE

11. The timescale, as shown at Annex A is self-explanatory. Using this methodology, changes to the schedule and improvements in targets, can be adjusted with relatively little effort. The aim is to develop a flexible programme capable of alteration. The arrival of a large fleet of UN vehicles (expected before the beginning of Feb 95), and progress on refugee repatriation, are likely to be significant milestones in the forward movement of the schedule.

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Kigali, 8 December 1994

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
OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
CYANIKA (27,000)												
RUHKONDO (50,000)												
KIZI (2,500)												
KINAZI (2,500)												
MUGANO (3,000)												
KANYINYA ((4,000)												
NYASISUYA (1,000)												
KARAMBI (2,000)												
BUHORO (3,000)												
GISUNZA (3,500)												
NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
KIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2)												
NDAGO (55,000)												
MUNINI (12,000)									43			
KARANA (21,000)									43	47		
BUSANZE (9,000)										47-9		
MUSABEYA (14,000)										49	53	

Notes:

1. All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.
2. From D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

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ANNEX A

PRINCIPLES FOR SETTLING THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Stability, security and development are objectives of tantamount importance to the people of Rwanda, their Government and the international community. Fundamental to these objectives is the return of hundreds of thousands of Rwandese who are displaced within their own nation. Towards this specific goal, the Government with the support of the international community will intensify its efforts to settle the displaced in an expeditious and humane manner. In pursuing this immediate goal, the Government and the international community are determined to ensure that the principles set out below will underpin all their efforts:

Immediate Objectives

1. The immediate objective of the Government and international community is to have the internally displaced people of Rwanda return home with dignity and in conditions of safety and security.
2. In ensuring that these immediate objectives are upheld, it is agreed that there be:
 - i. Total Political Endorsement. All plans established to support the IDP operation will have the full support and active cooperation of the Government of Rwanda;
 - ii. No Enforced Camp Closure. Camps will not be forcibly closed. That said, an environment in which the people are motivated to leave voluntarily will be created;
 - iii. Initial Operations to Create Confidence. It is essential to build confidence amongst the displaced population and momentum in the operation. Therefore from the very outset full attention must be given to ensuring success along these lines;
 - iv. Secure Environment. Conditions in the Home Communes will be established to create a secure environment and provide essential social services which attract people home from the camps;
 - v. Confidence Building. Confidence building measures, primarily concerning security and information dimensions, will be essential;

vi. Impartial Information. Information promulgated as part of confidence building measures must be impartial;

vii. Return in Safety. All effort must be made to ensure that people return in safety. While ensuring this principle, the Government maintains the right to bring to justice, consistent with the due process of law, those accused of perpetrating genocide;

viii. Cooperation. The success of the operation will require the full cooperation of all contributing organisations, within the scope of their mandates;

vi. Flexibility. All plans developed to support the settlement of IDPs must be flexible and lend themselves to modification. Mechanisms must be in place to ensure that any adjustments take place in a way that fulfills the aforementioned principles both at the policy and implementation levels.

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MUGINA	41229					
MUKINGI	38248	NDAGO	30			
MURAMA	40882	NDAGO	4		X	
MUSAMBIRA	45771					
MUSHUBATI	64258					
NTONGWE	73198	KIBEHO	746		X(PRI 1)	
		RWAMIKO	30			
		MUNINI	124			
		NDAGO	31			
		CYANIKA	895			
NYABIKENKE	51450	RWAMIKO	4			
NYAKABANDA	46209					

		BOHORO	732			
		NDAGO	8611			
		CYANIKA	9233			
RUBUNGO	45474					
RUSHASHI	38258					
RUTONGO	54574	RWAMIKO	3			
		BOHORO	5			
SHYORONGI	44887	RWAMIKO	3			
TARE	38635					
TOTAL	914219					

ANNEX C OPEN RELIEF CENTRES

1. The concept of Open Relief Centres (ORC) has been established to address the fundamental concerns of Internally Displaced Persons and the recipient communities, ensuring the re-integration of IDPs while maintaining the security and dignity of both groups. The ORC is a temporary place where displaced persons on the move and other returnees as well as locals in vulnerable conditions can freely enter or leave and obtain essential relief assistance in a relatively safe environment.
2. Open Relief Centres will be set up in accordance and in phase with local conditions and requirements in Rwanda. The ORC, are transit points, in the home communes, for IDP's returning to their homes. They are to facilitate immediate re-integration, through the provision of basic food items, seeds and construction materials, and by increasing confidence in law and order in the home communes. At the same time Quick Impact Project will promote rehabilitation of the country, at the communal level.
3. Material assistance provided through the ORC's in the home communes is aimed at re-integration, and will be phased out; dependency must be avoided.
4. The actors in setting up Open Relief Centres will be UNHCR (set-up and protection), WFP (food), UNICEF (water and sanitation), WHO (health), UNAMIR (security), UNHCR (protection), NGOs and local authorities. Each ORC will be managed by a designated NGO or UN Agency. Information gathering and dissemination will come under the responsibility of UNREO. Overall coordination will take place in the context of the Integrated Humanitarian Operations Centre framework, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Rehabilitation.

ORC components

a. Food distribution

Food needs are best covered by food (for work) programmes, distributions of food or rations at the commune level. Sustained direct distribution at the ORC-site should be avoided so as to not have concentration of foodstuffs at one location nor provide an incentive for people to stay at the ORCs. One-off distribution to IDPs for a two week period will be effected in conjunction with WFP/CRS/ICRC targeted distributions. (half rations/250grms/person/day).

Once IDPs leave the ORCs for their homes, they should be absorbed to the ongoing food, seeds and tools, distributions in the communes.

b. Temporary shelter

Ideally, ORCs would be considered a temporary solution limited in time (3-10 days), while the local authorities find an acceptable temporary, or preferably durable solution for those whose homes are either occupied or need repairs. It will be forbidden to build huts at the ORC's. Construction materials will be made judiciously available in the vicinity of the ORC to targeted populations in order for people to instantly work on rebuilding their houses. For planning purposes, plastic sheeting for one out of four families will be made available in each ORC.

c. Health

Ideally people in transit at the ORCs needing medical assistance should be referred to the health system in place at the commune level. Where such structures are inadequate NGOs or the appropriate UN Agency will be given the responsibility of supplying such services.

d. Water and sanitation

Access to a water source or water availability will be one of the criteria to determine the ORC location. These should be simple latrines; For planning purposes 1 pit latrines per 50 IDPs.

e. Transport

It is considered advisable to have transport facilities available at the ORCs, for people who cannot reach their secteur on foot (distance too big, disabled persons etc.).

f. Protection

Protection is one of the key issues of the ORCs. The protection role will be taken care of by UNHCR and UNHR in close collaboration with local authorities. It is considered important to register the IDPs on arrival to the centre, so as to monitor further events. UNHCR/UNHR or ICRC in principle will ensure presence in each of the ORCs.

Local residents as well as IDP's having returned to their homes, can contact the local authorities and the ORC in case of security problems in their home areas, including tensions over house occupation etc. In such cases admission and emergency shelter may be granted on a case by case basis. Solutions will then be found by, and in cooperation with the local authorities, including the gendarmerie or army as required.

The local authorities have at all times access to the ORC's in order to promote confidence etc.

The ORC's should not be a sanctuary for persons having committed crimes. Local law enforcement agents, including army personnel if duty authorized, can enter the ORC to arrest persons, if it can be demonstrated that substantiated suspicions against such persons exists. Arrests can in principle only be made in the presence of UN or ICRC official unless there is an emergency situation (risk of escape, genuine threat to the security of others, etc. The law enforcement agents will sign, at the ORC, for any arrest made, and family members, the ICRC and the UNHCHR will have access to the person concerned.

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ

Date : 20 Dec 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : DAILY SITREP COVERING 200600B DEC - 202200B DEC 94

1. SITUATION

a. GENERAL. THE SITUATION WAS RELATIVELY CALM DURING THE PERIOD.

b. BORDERS

(1) GATUNA, TABAGWE AND KAGITUMBA BORDER POSTS WERE OPENED TO ALL TRAFFIC DURING THE PERIOD.

(2) RUSUMO BORDER POST (RWANDA/TANZANIA) REMAINED OPENED TO ALL TRAFFIC DURING THE PERIOD.

(3) RUSIZI BORDER POST IN SECT 4C WAS OPENED TO TRAFFIC.

(4) GISENYI BORDER POSTS WERE CLOSED TO UNAMIR PERS.

2. FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES

a. POLITICAL. RPA LOCAL COMD AND OPINION LDRS ADDRESSED THE PEOPLE OF RAMERA DURING THE PERIOD.

b. MILITARY

(1) RPA

(a) RPA CONDUCTED DAY AND NIGHT FOOT AND MOBILE PATROLS AND MOUNTED SNAP ROAD BLOCKS IN MAJOR TOWNS AND VILLAGES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

(b) RPA CONTINUED THEIR RECRUIT TRAINING AT KIBUYE DURING THE PERIOD.

e. SECTOR 4A - GIKONGORO

(1) THE SECTOR WAS REPORTED CALM DURING THE PERIOD.

(2) MILOBS INVESTIGATED THE THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VEH AT GIKONGORO BY SUSPECTED ARMED RPA TROOPS. INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY.

(3) MILOBS PATROLLED RWANDA-BURUNDI BORDER, NDAGO, MUNINI, KAMANA AND BUSANSE DPs CAMPS. PATROLS REPORTED THAT 300 NEW DPs ARRIVED AT THE CAMPS TODAY DUE TO CONTINUOUS HARASSMENT BY RPA AT BUTARE. THIS HAS CREATED FEAR AND PANIC AMONG THE DPs WHO INTENDED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES.

f. SECTOR 4B - KIBUYE

(1) THE SECTOR WAS REPORTED CALM DURING THE PERIOD.

(2) MILOBS ESCORTED 289 DISPLACED PERSONS TO KIGALI.

g. SECTOR 4C - CYANGUGU

(1) SITUATION REPORTED CALM IN ALL PARTS OF THE SECTOR.

(2) RPA CMDR OF RWESERO SUB PREFECTURE MAJOR KILINDI VISITED THE MILOBS AT NYAMASHEKE.

(3) 305 RETURNEES ALL JEHOVAH WITNESS RELIGIOUS SECT CROSSED FROM ZAIRE INTO RWANDA.

h. SECTOR 5 - GISENYI

(1) THE SECTOR WAS REPORTED CALM DURING THE PERIOD.

(2) MILOBS PATROLLED GISENYI AND BORDER POSTS, RUHENGARI AND CYANIKA (7153), NYARUTOVU (7718), TARE (9109), MUTURA (3123), MUTOVU (2930), SHYRONGI, MUNDEDE UNIVERSITY AND OTHER AREAS WITHIN THE SECTOR. SIT REPORTED CALM IN AREAS PATROLLED.

(3) PATROLS REPORTED THAT ABOUT 14 DPs REPRESENTING MORE THAN 700 DPs WHO LEFT THE GITARAMA AREA AND DISPERSED IN THE NEMBA COMMUNES WENT TO 4TH COY LOC AND ASKED FOR PROTECTION AND FOOD. THEY COMPLAINED OF CONTINUOUS HARASSMENT BY THE RPA IN THE GITARAMA AREAS.

i. SECTOR 6 - KIGALI

(1) THE SITUATION IN KIGALI CITY AND KIGALI RURAL REMAINED CALM.

(2) SECTOR MILOBS ESCORTED 2 X B&R TRUCKS TO BUSOGO AND GISENYI.

4. HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

a. IN SECT 1, NGARAMA HOSPITAL TREATED ABOUT 220 OUT-PATIENTS DURING THE PERIOD. 240 PATIENTS WERE ALSO ON ADMISSION AT THE HOSP.

b. SECTOR 1 MILOBS REPORTED THAT ABOUT 20,000 RETURNEES AT MUVUMBA WERE IN DARE NEED OF FOOD.

c. SECT 4B MILOBS ESCORTED 289 DPs FROM NYAMISHABA DPs CAMP TO KIGALI DURING THE PERIOD.

d. THERE WERE 72 RELATIVES OF SICK DPs AT MURURU CAMP MED CENTRE. THEY WERE OCCUPYING THE FORMER CAMP SITE.

e. 372 AND 24 DPs WERE EVACUATED FROM THE KIBEHO AND NDAGO DPs CAMPS RESPECTIVELY ON 19 DEC WHILE 30 DPs WERE EVACUATED FROM THE NDAGO CAMP TODAY 20 DEC 94.

f. UNHCR TRANSFERRED ABOUT 700 59/60 RETURNEES FROM NYAMIRAMIHIGO TRANSIT CAMP NEAR GISENYI TO MUTURA AREA FOR RESETTLEMENT.

g. ABOUT 4,000 DPs WERE LOCATED AT NTONGWE CAMP. ICRC DISTRIBUTED FOOD IN CAMP ONCE A MONTH.

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h. NTONGWE (9757), NYAMABUYE, MUCUBURA (6146) DPs CAMPS IN SECT 3 WERE REPORTED TO HAVE LACKED DRINKING WATER AND MEDICINE. LOCAL AUTHORITIES ALSO REQUESTED FOR UNAMIR ASSISTANCE FOR REPAIRS OF ROADS AND BRIDGES IN THE COMMUNES.

i. UNHCR, IOM, AND CANADIAN VEHS EVACUATED 240 AND 47 DPs FROM KIBEHO AND NDAGO CAMPS RESPECTIVELY.

j. MALICOY TREATED 18 AND MALAWI COY 24 LOCAL PATIENTS DURING THE PERIOD.

k. 2 X MALAWICOY VEHS ASSISTED IN FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN MUYIRA AND NYABISINDU COMMUNES DURING THE PERIOD.

5. **CIVILIAN AFFAIRS.** A DELEGATION FROM KANGOMA, RUTTANGO SOUS PREFECTURE CALLED ON MALICOY TO OFFER THANKS FOR INSTILLING CONFIDENCE AND SENSE OF SECURITY AMONG DPs IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE.

6. **LOGISTICS.** NTR.

7. **MISC.** NTR.

b. **DETAILS OF BORDER CROSSING**

(1)	<u>AREAS</u>	<u>INFLOW</u>	<u>OUTFLOW</u>
(a)	<u>SECTOR 1</u>		
	UGANDA	NTR	NTR
(b)	<u>SECTOR 2</u>		
	(i) TANZANIA	NTR	NTR
	(ii) BURUNDI	NTR	NTR
(c)	<u>SECTOR 3</u>		
	BURUNDI	821 (16-19 DEC)	NTR
(d)	<u>SECTOR 4A</u>		
	BURUNDI	NTR	35(20 DEC)

(e) SECTOR 4B

ZAIRE	NTR	NTR
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(f) SECTOR 4C


(i) BURUNDI	NTR	NTR
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(ii) ZAIRE	410 (20 DEC)	NTR
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(g) SECTOR 5

UGANDA	123 (20 DEC)	NIL
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ZAIRE	361 (20 DEC)	NIL
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TO : UNAMIR HQ
FROM : GHANBATT HQ
DATE : 18 DEC 94 GH2/014/G(OPS)
SUBJECT: REPORT ON OPERATION OVERTURE

References:

- A. OP ORDER 21 dated 8 Dec 94.
- B. OPO 1 dated 12 Dec 94.

1. GHANBATT took part in OPERATION OVERTURE/HOPE as part of UNAMIR Force to get rid of criminals, weapons, ammunition and explosives out of the DP camps in KIBEHO and INDAGO and its surrounding areas (Ref A refers).

2. In specific terms GHANBATT was tasked to clear the criminals in UNAMIR objectives 2 and 8 (KIBEHO and NDAGO Camps) to enable DPs live in peace and go back to their home communes with 2 x Coys and Bn HQ.

AIM

3. The aim of this report is to show how GHANBATT conducted its operation and make recommendations.

SCOPE

4. The report will cover the following:
- a. Pre-ops preparation.
 - b. Arrest and seizures.
 - c. Problems/Experiences.
 - d. Conclusion.
 - e. Recommendation.

PRE OP PREPARATIONS

5. Pre-op preparations included issuing of op orders, detailing of men and rehearsals. All these were completed by 12 Dec 94.

6. Strength. GHANBATT was asked to use 2 x coys and Bn HQ. A and D coys were used reinforced by HQ, B and C Coys. In all 277 personnel both civ and military took part. The breakdown were as follows:

- a. Military - 240 all ranks.
- b. MILOB Sector 4A - 12
- c. Zambatt Drivers - 1 & 8

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- d. Local Interpreters - 6
- e. RPA LOs - 2 & 8

7. Objectives. UNAMIR objectives for GHANBATT were obj 2 & 8 at KIBEHO and NDAGO DP Camps.

8. In addition one Coy was to serve as a blocking force at NDAGO/MUNINI area. These were reconnoitred and posns selected for occupation on D Day.

ARREST/SEIZURES.

9. By 0430 The cordon was in position and by 0530 the search started on objective 2 KIBEHO DP Camp. The search of objective 8 started at 1400 hrs and ended by 1500 hrs.

10. The following arrest were made:

a. KIBEHO

(1) Munyakiadzi Joseph for possessing mil boots and knife.

(2) Kabiligi Forstin identified as former RGF by RPA rep.

(3) Yisaba Juvernal for threatening to kill a family after the op.

b. NDAGO. There was one arrest on suspicion. However UNAMIR MP set him free for lack of evidence. The suspect returned to NDAGO.

11. In addition to the arrest 25 machetes and one dagger were seized. Both arrested persons and the seized items were handed over to the UNAMIR MP at KIBEHO PW cage.

PROBLEMS/EXPERIENCES

12. Transportation. It was difficult for GHANBATT to transport its pers from B and C Coys locs - sector 2 to join A and D Coys in sector 4A because all vehs sent to Kigali workshop for repairs and servicing had been retained for lack of spare parts and types. However ZAMBATT came to GHANBATT's aid with 8 TVCs to convey tps to BUTARE and exercise area and back.

13. Acquisition of spares and tyres in time can help to ease tpt problems facing GHANBATT now.

14. Size of objectives. It was realised that the objectives for GHANBATT was too large for a normal coy to cordon and search. Though it was managed in future there should be more forces for

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cordon and search of this nature.

15. Surprise. From all indications it was realised that the op lost complete surprise because it appears the NGOS managed to inform the DPs at the camps because some of them tried to find out what was going to happen to the DPs at the camps and even from GHANBATT. Members of ICRC for example did.

16. Feeding. The initial assessment of participating tps was 251 but on D - 1 instructions was received that we should employ our own Interpreters, But on D - Day we realised that Zambatt att pers were also to be fed by us. This made it impossible to feed all the participating pers with 251 compo ration issued by Sup Pl for two days.

REACTIONS OF DPs

17. From all indications the DPs at various camps were happy about the aims and objectives of the ops given the harassment, murder, threats and intimidations suffered at the hands of the Threat Force elms. It may be a welcome exercise to conduct such exercise from time to time until the bad elements within the camps are driven away.

CONCLUSION

18. In spite of the observations raised the op can be said to be very successful for its psychological and moral effects on the people at the camps. A repetition of its kind in future can help ease the tension and fears created by the criminals in the DP Camps.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19. From the above experiences it is recommended that:

- a. Efforts to acquire spare parts and tyres are expedited for repairs and servicing of vehs to be passed out to GHANBATT to ease tpt and administration of tps.
- b. There should be more tps involved to make cordon and search ops more effective.
- c. During the planning of future ops more deceptive plans be introduced to cover the real aims and objectives.
- d. As and when necessary such ops be conducted to get rid of the criminals from the DP camps to enable DPs live in peace and return to their home communes as soon as possible.

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Maj

for Commanding Officer

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UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
Kigali

08th Dec 94

3000.15 (OPS)

See Distribution

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER NO 21

Reference:

- A. Z723 Sheet 40 BUTARE, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- B. Z723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO, Ed 1, 1:50,000

1. SITUATION.

a. Both KIBEHO and NDAGO camps have Threat Force elements (Interahamwe/FRGF/Bandits) amongst the population. They have been responsible for acts of harassment, intimidation, theft and murder both within the camps and in the areas surrounding the camps.

b. Threat Forces have also been responsible for the spreading of false RPA propaganda within the camps and actively dissuading refugees from returning to their home communes. It is possible that they have a significant following as a result of this propaganda.

c. It is considered likely that the Threat Force elements have access to small arms and grenades in addition to traditional wpns such as machetes and similar implements.

d. The Rwandese government authorities have been subjected to mob violence in the past when they have entered refugee camps.

e. Recent reported incidents affecting the KIBEHO and NDAGO area include:

- (1) Ghanbatt found 3 hand grenades during a search of KIBEHO camp on 20 Nov.
- (2) It is alleged that a suspected FRGF soldier was shot dead by the RPA in the KIBEHO area on 25 Nov.
- (3) On 28 Nov at 1130 am, DP's killed two bandits at NDAGO, apparently for stealing food.

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(4) Two bandits were killed in NDAGO camp on the night of 28/29 Nov.

(5) On 3 Dec unidentified bandits threw a grenade and attacked DP's in KIBEHO with machetes, seriously injuring 7 people.

(6) Over 50 killings have been allegedly attributed to bandits, criminals or Militia in a 15 km radius of these camps.

2. **MSN.** To clear the criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO DP camps in order to establish a secure environment which will encourage DP repatriation.

3. **EXECUTION**

a. **GENERAL OUTLINE.** UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in co-ordination with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at KIBEHO. A single UNAMIR Coy will be inserted at NDAGO as a blocking force. A two pl support/reserve element will be loc at KIBEHO. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be completed by 12 Dec 94.

b. **Gp and Tasks.**

(1). **Tunbatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two Inf coys.

(ii) In Sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In Sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In Sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 1, 3 and 11 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

SECRET

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objectives onto each cleared obj with inf section each.

(2) **Ethiobatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two Inf coys.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Secure Force Release point (Green Route) with one pl.

(ii) Clear objectives nos 4 and 6 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(iii) Arrest criminals.

(iv) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs onto each cleared obj with inf sect each.

(3) **Ghanbatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) Bn HQ and two coys.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison Team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Establish preliminary presence in the camps in conjunction with MILOBS forthwith.

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(ii) Provide a blocking force of one infantry coy in general area NDAGO/MUNINI.

(iii) Clear objectives nos 2 and 8 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(iv) Arrest criminals.

(v) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(vi) Maintain post op presence in the camps with coy less a pl until relieved by ZAMBATT.

(4) **Frafbatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep inf coy.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team.

(iv) In Sp one interpreter per inf pl and one in coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 5 and 9 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(5) **Zambatt.**

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep inf coy.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per inf pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team each.

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(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one at Coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Clear objectives nos 7 and 10 in that order, of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ii) Arrest criminals.

(iii) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

(6) **Nicoy.**

(a) Gp.

(i) One Indep Coy less two pls.

(ii) In sp one RPA liaison team per pl.

(iii) In sp one MILOB team.

(iv) In sp one interpreter per inf pl and one at Coy HQ.

(b) Tasks.

(i) Secure Force Release Point on Red Route.

(ii) Act as force reserve/security element under command Tac HQ.

(iii) Act as force RRF with one pl.

(iv) Construct and provide security for detainee cage at area of church building on obj 2.

(v) Be prepared to on order:

(aa) Clear objectives of unauthorized weapons, equipment and stores.

(ab) Arrest criminals.

(ac) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objs into each cleared obj with inf section each.

SECRET

(7) **MILOB HQ.**

- (a) Gp - Provide up to 20 MILOB teams.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Establish preliminary presence in Camps forthwith.
 - (ii) Conduct liaison between Tac HQ, UN Agencies, NGOs, local authorities and monitor proceedings.
 - (iii) Maintain post operation presence in the Camps with 5 MILOB teams.
 - (iv) Estb MILOB Coord HQ coloc with Tac HQ.

(8) **AUSMED.**

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Estb cas clearing post at KIBEHO.
 - (ii) Estb/mov cas clearing post at NDAGO on order.
 - (iii) Arrange treatment and evacuation of cas.
 - (iv) Conduct medical screening of detainees.
 - (v) Provide internal security.

(9) **CANSIGS.**

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Estb and man Tac HQ.
 - (ii) Provide comd, con, security and max tpt resources for Op Homeward originating at Kibeho camps.
 - (iii) Prepare comm plan to include allotment of frequencies, codewords, nicknames and allocation of eqpt.

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(10) **MP COY(-)**.

- (a) Gp - Provide 15 dets.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Route marking (To be completed by 132000B Dec 94.
 - (ii) Traffic control.
 - (iii) Establish, secure and man detainee screening/holding facilities by 140600B Dec 94 in church area on obj 2.
 - (iv) Provide guides at assy area.

(11) **CIVPOL**

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Monitor detainee screening procedure.
 - (ii) Establish liaison with Government judicial authorities.

(12) **CLO**.

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Maintain constant liaison with RPA.
 - (ii) Provide one interpreter to each pl size elm and all unit and subunit HQs.
 - (iii) Supervise the execution of the Liaison Plan.

(13) **G4** - Augment first line tpt resources to transport troops, detainees, rations and water.

(14) **HAC**.

- (a) Gp - No change.
- (b) Tasks.
 - (i) Coord efforts of NGOs in affected camps.

SECRET

- (ii) Determine destination communes of IDPs.
- (iii) Coord Op Homeward with UN agencies and NGOs.
- (iv) Coord UNHCR and Human Rights monitoring of screening / holding facilities.

(15) **RPA**.

(a) Gp.

- (i) Two RPA Bns.
- (ii) RPA liaison teams to each pl size elm and all levels of HQ.
- (iii) 60 security pers (alloc 2 per LO).

(b) Tasks.

- (i) Provide outer cordon at camps at KIBEHO and NDAGO.
- (ii) Arrest and disarm escapees and escort same to UNAMIR cage for screening.
- (iii) Provide liaison and security teams.
- (iv) Identify criminals/wanted persons.
- (v) Conduct screening process under UN supervision.
- (vi) Escort detainees from cage to designated detention facility under UN supervision in the company of Human Right monitors.
- (vii) Provide post ops security in the area.

C. **COORD INSTR**

(1). **TIMINGS**

- (a) D-2 (12 Dec 94) - Move to Assy Area.
- (b) Ni D-1/D Day (Ni 13/14 Dec 94) - Move to blocking/cordon positions/secure Force Release Points.

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(c) **D Day - 14 Dec 94..**

(i) H-3hrs (0130 hrs) - Outer cordon and blocking force at NDAGO in position.

(ii) H-2 hrs (0230 hrs) - Secure Force Release Points.

(iii) H-1 hr (0330 hrs) - Occupy Force Release points.

(iv) H hr (0430 hrs). Troops to move in tpt to respective objectives and start the search at the earliest under Bn/ coy HQ control.

(v) H+1 hr - Holding/Screening facility established.

(d) D+2(16 Dec 94) - Operation complete.

(e) D+3(17 Dec 94) - Commence redeployment.

(2) **Tfc Control.** Units will ensure that troop carrying vehicles are parked in the objective areas clear of the main axis(KIBEHO - NDAGO road)

(3) **Special Instrs.**

(a) Milob and Ghanbatt continue to increase visibility and presence forthwith to establish mounted and dismounted patrols consisting of 10 teams and coy str, respectively, by 12 Dec 94.

(b) All units to minimize vehs, HQ pers, sp pers and eqpt.

(c) **Safety.**

(i) Outer cordon not to fire toward inner cordon.

(ii) Arrest if possible or necessary. All persons arrested will processed through laid-down procedures.

(iii) Use small arms only outwards and only as last resort under extreme circumstances.

(d) **ROE.** State Yellow.

(i) Rule No 1 (status B). Authority granted to carry weapons.

SECRET

- (ii) Rule No 2 (status B). Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.
- (iii) Rule No 3 (status C). Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.
- (iv) Rule No 4 (status B). Authority granted to disarm Paramilitary Personnel or Civilians.
- (v) Rule No 5 (status A). Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.
- (vi) Rule No 6 (status A). Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.
- (e) Search. Search to be conducted only during hours of daylight.
- (f) Curfew. Curfew will be imposed in both camps during the search and at night (1800 - 0500 hrs) and Bns/Coys will ensure that no DPs are allowed to move out of their shelters during the search of their respective objs.
- (4) Axis of Search. Main road KIBEHO/NDAGO.
- (5) Assy Area. BUTARE stadium GR 049126.
- (6) EOD. All units to be prepared to carry out EOD tasks. Force Engr Offr will coord allocation of explosives and aval mine detectors.
- (7) Recce. Restricted to Coy R Gp level. Min vehs.
- (8) Limit of Search. Southern edge of NDAGO Camp.
- (9) Objectives, Bdrys and Report Lines. Annex A and Annex B.
- (10) Admin Base. BUTARE.
- (11) Routes.
 - (a) Red Route. BUTARE - GIKONGORO - KIBEHO.
 - (b) Green Route. BUTARE - KIBEHO.

SECRET

(12) Order of March.

(a) Red Route. NICOY, GHANBATT, TUNBATT, TAC HQ, CANSIGS, MP Coy, CIVPOL Det, AUSMED, HAC and NGOs.

(b) Green Route. ZAMBATT, FRAFBATT and ETHIOBATT.

(13) Force Release Points.

(a) Red Route. Track Junction GR 839095.

(b) Green Route. Road Junction GR 868077.

(14) Air Plan. Annex C.

(15) Detainee Handling Procedures. Annex D.

(16) Liaison Plan. Annex E.

(17) Communication Plan. Annex F.

(18) Public Info Plan. Annex G.

(19) Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes.
Annex H.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Admin instr will be issued separately by 10 Dec 94.

b. All tps will carry combat rations and water for 48 hrs.

c. Accn in personal shelters.

d. Dress.

(1) Helmets and Flak jackets for all tps involved in search, security and blocking ops to max extent possible.

(2) All ranks must be prepared to operate under all weather conditions.

e. Ammo. All units will carry first line scale of SA ammo.

f. Med.

(1) Cas Clearing Post will be loc in the AICF building on obj 2 for the duration of the op.

SECRET

(2) All troops to carry first field dressing.

5. **Command and Signals.**

a. **Loc of HQ.**

(1) TAC HQ - KIBEHO (Double storey building on obj 2). Tac HQ will open at 140200B Dec 94. MILOB HQ Det coloc with Tac HQ.

(2) Alternate - GIKONGORO (GHANBATT HQ loc).

b. **Control.** One C and C helo will be dedicated to TAC HQ.

c. **Communications.**

(1) Comm plan is attached as Annex F including allotment of frequencies, call signs, codewords and nicknames.


(2) 2 x Motorola and spare batteries will be issued to RPA BHQ for the duration of the op.

(3) 1 x Loud hailer to be issued to each rifle pl.

d. **Press Information.** UNAMIR military Public Affairs Officer will maintain control and direct the press through the operation. All releases will be cleared with either Tac HQ (Overture) or SRSG before going out to the press.

e. OPSEC is paramount.

6. Acknowledge.



HK ANYIDOH
Brig Gen
Acting Force Commander

Annexes:

- A. Sketch showing objectives, bdys and report lines at KIBEHO DP Camp.
- B. Sketch showing objectives, bdys and report lines in NDAGO DP Camp.
- C. Air plan.

SECRET

- D. Detainee Handling Procedures.
- E. Liaison Plan.
- F. Communication Plan.
- G. Public Information Plan.
- H. Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes.

Distribution:

External:

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
GHANBATT	1
ETHIOBATT	2
FRAFBATT	3
ZAMBATT	4
TUNBATT	5
NICOY	6
MILOB GP HQ	7
AUSMED	8
CANSIGS	9
CIVPOL ✓	10
CLO ✓	11
HRL	12
FMO ✓	13
HAC ✓	14
MP COY	15
G3 AIR OPS	16
G4	17
FSO	18
RPA LO	19

Internal:

FC	20
DFC	21
DCOS OPS	22
DCOS SP	23
G3 PLANS	24
G3 ENGRS ✓	25
File	26
Spare	27 - 28


10
SKETCH SHOWING OBS. BUYS AND REPORT LINES
AT KIBEHO CAMP

FO Dated
31 Dec 64
9 Dec 64



04 SKETCH SHOWING OBJ'S, BDYS AND REPORT LINES AT NDAGO CAMP

Op Ord 21
Dated 08 Dec 9



Annex C to
Op Order 21
Dated 08 Dec 94

1. SITUATION. As WNGO dated 05 Dec 94.
2. MISSION. To provide helicopter support for Casevac and Command and Control for Operation OVERTURE.
3. EXECUTION.
 - A. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements. Two Bell 212 helicopters will provide Casevac and C2 support for the operation.
 - B. Group.
 1. Canadian Helicopters.
 - A. Gp.
 - (i) 2 Bell 212 helicopters.
 - (ii) Guarding provided by RPA and TAC HQ for the Forward Air Refuel Point (FARP) at BUTARE AIRSTRIP for day/night operation.
 - (iii) Crews to man 2 helicopters for day operations mounted from the FOB, one of which will include an on board medical team.
 - (iv) A standby crew on 30 mins readiness based at KIGALI, from dusk to dawn.
 - C. Tasks.
 - (1) Helicopter support is to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Grid - 49351050 corresponding to 2 deg 37.1'S and 29 deg 32.7'E. This position will be co-located with a medical coordination team.

DATED 08 DEC 94

PROCEDURES FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCHING OF PERSONS AND THEIR
PROPERTY BY TROOPS EMPLOYED ON OP OVERTURE

GENERAL

1. The way in which detainees are handled by the troops of UNAMIR will be of critical importance to the success of Op OVERTURE in the eyes of NGOs and of the world's media. It is essential, therefore, that:

a. Detainees are handled with the utmost dignity and propriety.

b. Detainees' processing is reliably documented.

c. The troops employed in the task of handling detainees understand that they will be dealing with persons who are suspected of having participated in a range of serious offences but who have not been convicted. The possibility that detainees will not eventually be convicted requires that they are handled with as much sensitivity and respect as possible.

d. Detainees are to be treated sufficiently firmly that no attempt is made to escape or to embarrass the UN.

e. Troops understand that any detainees are under the protection of the UN and that they must be closely guarded against any attempt at revenge or reprisal.

2. CIVPOL is to be used to monitor the process of arrest and transfer to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC) whilst MPs are to be involved in the process of handling detainees thereafter. ICRC, UNHRC and other agencies may be present at any stage in the process and will be requested to be present at the handover of individuals to the Public Prosecutor.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ARREST OF DETAINEES

3. The procedure for the handling of Rwandese and other nationals detained by UNAMIR troops during Op OVERTURE is to be as follows:

a. Having been identified, detainees are to be apprehended as swiftly as possible using the absolute minimum of physical force. Troops are to be reminded of UNAMIR ~~Rules~~ ^{Rules} of Engagement (which allow for the use of deadly force ~~for~~ ^{for} self defence including the protection of detainees ~~but do not~~ extend to the use of deadly force to apprehend a person who is trying to evade capture).

b. Detainees are to be searched to:

(1) Confirm that they are not armed. Any firearms that are collected are to be unloaded and magazines discharged.

(2) Collect, document and safeguard any evidence - including weapons - that may be relevant to a prosecution case.

(3) Collect and document any valuables held by detainees so that UNAMIR is protected against any suggestion that it has been party to theft or looting.

These possessions are to be placed in a plastic bag which is to be taken with the detainee to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC).

SEARCHES OF DWELLINGS AND VEHICLES

4. If a detainee can be associated with a vehicle or dwelling, it, too, is to be searched - an action that will be best conducted in the presence of the detainee if at all possible. The procedure to be adopted is as follows:

a. The condition of the vehicle or dwelling to be searched is to be recorded and a list made of the persons present on the Record of Search (ROS), an example of which is at Appendix 1.

b. Conduct the search, if possible in the presence of the detainee or a relative or other associate, causing a minimum of damage. The location of the search is to be recorded as accurately as possible, using a sketch plan if necessary, either on, or attached to, the ROS.

c. In the event that any material evidence is discovered, it should be photographed in situ. It should then be transferred to a plastic bag for carriage to the DPC.

d. At the conclusion of the search, a description of any damage that was done in its execution should be entered on the ROS and those present at the conclusion of the search should be listed.

e. Any evidence, including the ROS and all photographs that may have been taken, should be transferred to the DPC and passed to the MP officer supervising the custody of the detainee.

BODILY SEARCHES

5. Photography by the Media. Under no circumstances are the media to be allowed to photograph or film detainees in the process of being searched.

6. The Searching of Females. If it is possible, detainees are to be physically searched only by a person of the same sex. If, because a person of the same sex is not available, detainees may be

searched by a member of the opposite sex only in the presence of another person and, preferably, one of a more senior rank than the person doing the searching. Extreme care is to be taken to minimize the risk of an allegation of improper behaviour in this process and to document any complaint or suggestion - by any person - that improper behaviour has occurred.

TRANSFER TO THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

7. Use of "Plasticuffs". Detainees' hands are to be bound behind their backs with "plasticuffs" (either before or after the search procedure, as thought necessary by the senior person present). Care is to be taken that the plasticuffs are not too tight and that the circulation of blood to the hands is not restricted. Subsequently, frequent checks are to be made that the hands of bound detainees are healthy and that the plasticuffs have not been over-tightened, perhaps by one of the detainees in an attempt to embarrass or hinder the UN.

8. Escorting Detainees to the DPC. If necessary, detainees are to be collected in groups (but not allowed to assemble so closely that they can touch or talk with each other) for transport to the DPC where they are to be handed to an MP officer. It is important to ensure that continuity is achieved in the handling of detainees to minimize the chances of an accusation of brutality being made against a UN soldier, his unit or UNAMIR; for this reason, and to ensure that the process is properly documented, detainees must be escorted to the DPC by the soldiers who detained them.

9. Evidence. Any bags containing any items taken from the detainee and any photographs pertaining to the detainee are to be handed to the MP officer. He is to label the items with the details of circumstances under which they were found and the name and UNAMIR ID number of the soldier giving it to him. Any ROS that has been completed is to be passed to the MP officer for retention with the DPR.

THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

10. Perimeter and Segmentation. The DPC is to be surrounded and segmented as necessary with concertina wire with the joint aims of inhibiting:

- a. Any attempt by detainees to escape or to riot.
- b. Unauthorized entry.

The perimeter is to be patrolled to defend against, and deter, any attempt at attack.

11. Accommodation. Detainees are to be provided with covered and secure accommodation (9' x 9' and larger tents are permissible) with adequate heating, lighting, ventilation and seating for their comfort.

12. The Conditions of Detainees. The following rules are to apply:

a. Detainees are to be segregated as much as possible and not permitted to touch or talk.

b. Males and females are to be kept separate except that small children may accompany - and be comforted by - their parents should it be necessary.

c. Plasticuffs may be removed if, in the opinion of the MP officer, the individual is not likely to cause danger to others or to attempt to escape. In the event that the MP officer decides not to release a detainee from plasticuffs or to reapply them for a protracted period, the fact and cause is to be written clearly and in full on the DPR. The conditions of the detainees hands are to be monitored, as described above.

d. Food and drink is to be available for detainees at all times.

13. Photographs. At the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee standing with the soldier who made the arrest and with the officer into whose safe custody the detainee is being passed. The photograph is to show clearly the condition of the detainee at the time of the handover and to identify the persons responsible for him or her. The UN ID numbers, ranks, names and unit of the UN personnel are to be written legibly on the reverse of the photograph together with the place, date and time of the taking of the photograph. In addition, if it is known, the name of the detainee should be written on the reverse of the photograph.

14. Medical Officer. A medical officer is to be present at the processing of all detainees. He/she is to be available to deal with any request for medical attention from a detainee.

15. Searching of Detainees. The detainee is to be searched by an MP and any items recovered in addition to those recovered earlier are to be secured in the same way as before.

16. Detainee Processing Records. A Detainee Processing Record (DPR), of which an example is at Appendix 2, is to be compiled for each detainee. It is to:

a. Record the personal details of the individual, so far as they are known, including name, place date and time of arrest, approximate height and weight, sex, differentiating features and details of any languages known to be spoken.

b. Record the personal details of the soldier who made the arrest and of the witnesses of any searches, should this be applicable.

c. Record the personal details of the MP officer into whose care the detainee passed at the DPC and the date and time of this event, together with any observations made about the condition of the detainee at this stage.

d. Record the details of any bags containing property

removed from the detainee or a vehicle or dwelling with which he was associated in some way.

e. Have stapled to it, photographs taken:

(1) At the time of handover to the MP officer on the detainee's arrival at the DPC.

(2) Show further entries, as necessary, relating to:

(a) Any handover of responsibility of MP officers perhaps resulting from a shift change occurring while the detainee is in the DPC.

(b) The date and time of departure from the DPC.

(c) The condition of the detainee at each handover of responsibility.

(d) The date and time of the detainee's handing over to the Public Prosecutor together with the latter's signature to confirm the transfer of responsibility for the safekeeping of the detainee.

17. Transport to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Detainees are to be collected into groups for transport by a shuttle of minibuses to the Public Prosecutor's Office in Gikongoro with an escort of one MP for each 4 or 5 detainees -who are to have plasticuffs reapplied for the move - and not more than 1 detainee for each 2 seats in the minibus.

18. Departure Documentation. On departing the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee together with the MP officer from whose care he or she is passing and the MP who has been detailed to escort the detainee to the Public Prosecutor. Once again, the details of these individuals are to be recorded on the rear of the photograph and it is then to be stapled to the DPR.

APPENDICES (to which additional pages may be fixed if necessary):

1. Example of a Record of Search (ROS).
2. Example of a Detainee Processing Record (DPR).

RECORD OF SEARCH (ROS) (FIX ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY)

Date and time of start of search:	Immediate supervisor of the search:	Subject of the search (give a description):
	UNAMIR ID No:	Car/truck/house/hut/other:
Location (address or grid reference if known, or draw a sketch map/plan on the reverse of this page or on another page fixed to it):	Condition of property before the search (list features showing obvious damage):	Names and UNAMIR ID numbers of others conducting the search:
Non-UNAMIR persons present during the search:	Reason for the search including name of suspect if known:	Description of any damage done in the execution of the search:
Other comments:	Outcome of search (list any evidence found and removed):	Date and time at the end of the search:
Certified that the information on this page (and any others fixed to it) is true to the best of my knowledge and that all items collected have been dispatched to the MP DPC.	Total number of pages including this one: Signature of search commander:	Date and time of signature:

DETAINEE PROCESSING RECORD (DPR)

Date and time of arrival of the detainee at the MP DPC:	MP officer on duty:	UNAMIR soldier escorting the detainee on his arrival:
	UNAMIR ID No:	UNAMIR ID No:
Name and address of detainee (if known)	Brief description of the detainee (add another page if necessary):	Medical officer on duty and details of any observations/treatment):
Languages known to be understood by the detainee:	Approx Height (in metres) Approx Weight (kg): Male or female? Date of birth or approximate age: Other characteristics:	Signature: UNAMIR ID No:
Subsequent checks of detainee (date & time, with initials of MP officer) incl any handover of responsibility between MP officers:	Requests made by the detainee (with date and time):	Details of UNAMIR MP escort to the Public Prosecutor's office:
		UNAMIR ID No:
Date and time at departure of detainee from the MP DPC:	ICRC and other agency representatives present at handover to the Public Prosecutor:	Public Prosecutor's signature for receipt of the detainee:
		Date & Time:
Certified that the detainee to which this form relates was handed to the Public Prosecutor together with all evidence that could be attributed to his case.	Signature of MP officer: Date & time:	

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTION

ANNEX F
TO OPO 21
DATED 8 DEC 94

NICKNAMES

1. The following nicknames will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Nickname</u>
Assy Area	Paper Tiger
Release Point Red Route	Jungle Juice
Release Point Green Route	Cow Leg
Tac HQ (Op Overture) Loc	Open Door
Casualty Collection Point	Soft Bed
Screening and Holding area	Big Brother

Report Lines

Report Line No 1	Mango Grove
Report Line No 2	Apple Pie
Report Line No 3	High Ball
Report Line No 4	Happy Home
Report Line No 5	Iron Lady
Report Line No 6	Last Stand
Report Line No 7	Low Loader
Report Line No 8	Little Girl
Report Line No 9	Table Lamp
Report Line No 10	Good Hope
Report Line No 11	Shoe Polish

(NICKNAMES CONTIN)

Objectives

Obj 1	Hungry Bear
Obj 2	Rocking Horse
Obj 3	Active Edge
Obj 4	Snow Ball
Obj 5	Arctic Breeze
Obj 6	Flying Arrow
Obj 7	Long Shot
Obj 8	Flat Cap
Obj 9	Rummy Punch
Obj 10	Red Sox
Obj 11	Short Stop


CODEWORDS

2. The following seven Codewords will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Codeword</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>To be issued by:</u>
Hunter	Advance (H Hour)	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Scatter	Commence Search	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Basket	Move to second Obj	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Flower	All Obj searched	Tac HQ (OP Overture)/Units
Helmet	Cordon in position	RPA
Baboon	Mov to Assy Area	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Bingo	End of OP Overture	Tac HQ (OP Overture)

RADIO NET DIAGRAM

1. NET DIAGRAM AS FOLLOWS:



2. FREQUENCIES

A. HF - F1, F2, F3 TBA

B. VHF - F1, F2, F3 TBA

3. ALL COMMS LINKS SHOWN WILL BE MANNED BY THE FORCE SIG SQN USING INTEGRAL COMMS EQPT

4. ALL OTHER COMMS LINKS ARE A BN/COY RESPONSIBILITY