

STr. Conf  
Top-Secret

S.S. 05/09

S-0736

Box-6

File-1

OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Dayal, Leopoldville  
Date: 28 November 1960  
No: B-1526

TOP SECRET

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 28 November 1960  
No : B-1525

1. We delivered to Mobutu yesterday at the airport Von Horn's modified letter of protest regarding the outrages against our personnel and theft of vehicles etc. Mobutu has not fulfilled his promise and all we could learn is that the stolen property is being concentrated at one place. I propose therefore to send a letter to Kasa-Vubu enclosing a copy of the letter to Mobutu. (A draft is being cabled separately for your comments.) It is for consideration if the letter should be sent to Kasa-Vubu or, suitably modified, to Bomboko, in case you feel it necessary to repair relations with the Chief of State, and you now consider we can properly address Bomboko.

2. In view of the repeated outrages by the ANC and also the strong reactions in contributing member states to the humiliations and violence meted out to UN personnel, we should consider the question of backing up our unheeded protests by some corrective action. There is understandable indignation and alarm among our staff at the indignities suffered by them and the loss of prestige by the UN. We should therefore consider suspending financial and other forms of aid at points where it could hurt most if such outrages were to recur, as it is intolerable to permit such violations without apology, compensation or deterrent action. Furthermore, such barbaric acts would make recruitment of personnel impossible, it being difficult enough already.

B-1434

TOP SECRET

15 November

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 15 November 1960  
No : B-1433

I received following letter 15 November:

QUOTE

(text attached)

UNQUOTE



GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL  
MINISTRE DE LA JEUNESSE  
ET SPORTS

(r) N° 095/CAB/2.087/VB.-

Au Général RIKEY  
Conseiller Militaire de l'ONU

A LEOPOLDVILLE.-

Réf n° :

Annexe :

Objet :

QUOTE Mon Général,

J'ai l'honneur de rappeler à votre bonne attention le discours officiel du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, dans lequel fut condamné l'Armée-Mobutu.-

Ce faisant, le parade militaire-Mobutu prévu pour le 17 Novembre 1960 à Léopoldville ne peut être compris autrement qu'une provocation des activités illégales de cette armée contre laquelle l'O.N.U. avaient pris des mesures en grande satisfaction de la population de Léopoldville.-

Ces activités de l'armée-Mobutu reconnues telles comme illégales; et son défilé n'est autre chose que la restauration des actes de brigandages et si vous le permettez, votre personnalité ira à l'encontre du rapport de Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur DAYAL.-

Sachant la confiance manifeste du peuple congolais et son estime en l'Organisation des Nations Unies, je vous prie de croire, Mon Général, l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

LE MINISTRE DE LA JEUNESSE ET DES SPORTS

Maurice MPOLO.-

UNQUOTE

B-1450

TOP SECRET

17 November



OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville  
Date: 17 November 1960  
Date: B-1449

It was a good parade and about 2000 troops including a Battery of 105 mm artillery, a Battery of 20 mm anti-aircraft artillery and 7 armoured cars took part. Afro-Asian diplomats were absent. I saw Timberlake but did not see Scott. UN spectators were invited to the dais of honour. There were many spectators but not as many as should turn up on such occasions in spite of the fact that it was a holiday. The troops have returned to their barracks. Detachments from out stations have orders to return.

2. Reur 3503. Since the invitation is from the Commissaires, McDiarmid, Cox and I are not attending. Linner, Olver, and Iyassu for the army, will attend. Von Horn is declining since he is giving a dinner in his house.



B-1519

TOP SECRET

26 November 1960

OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York  
From: Dayal, Leopoldville  
Date: 26 November 1960  
No: B-1517-18

Your 3711 and 3712 to which we have given careful consideration. We agree with your assessment of the repercussions to recent events in Leopoldville.

2. We also agree with your conclusion that we must build up working relationship with Kasavubu and Bomboko leaving it to Linner and his consultants to continue or develop relations with the Commissioners. The difficulties with the Belgians however remain in which respect the situation continues, if anything, to deteriorate. We also feel that too close an association between the Kasavubu-Bomboko group with Mobutu and the ANC would be damaging in the long run. One of the fortunate features of the situation hitherto has been the comparative aloofness between Kasavubu and Mobutu although this may now change.

3. The ANC situation has changed to our detriment. For the first time, there has been a trial of strength and while some among the officers may have been sobered by Kokolo's death, the rank and file are by no means chastened. Rumours about a growing rift, which may result in an explosion between different groups of the ANC, are rife. The Gendarmerie is in a separate grouping of its own and is not kindly regarded by the ANC. Mobutu's position is not what he pretends it to be with his own troops and it is reported that he was threatened by his own troops when he released the UN personnel who were detained in Camp Leo. If the differences within the ANC should result in an outbreak, we could intervene if asked to do so by Mobutu who would certainly be under threat. We have to be fully prepared to meet such a



contingency when it arises and advantage could be taken of the occasion to neutralise in a fairly drastic manner the ANC and particularly its more obstreperous elements.

4. Another disturbing factor is that the ANC is now not only conscious of its strength but it is here in greater strength with the arrival of troops from Thysville reinforced by eight armoured cars. It is therefore essential to build up our strength in Leo which could act as a deterrent. We therefore plan to retain the Malayan special force which is equipped with Ferret scout cars and to reinforce our strength with the Indonesian battalion which is a battle-tested unit and has created a fine impression here. In the new situation which has arisen, we must concentrate our troops in Leo, North Katanga, South Kasai and Stanleyville and withdraw the scattered units from the interior to form sizeable groups at various other important points.

5. In view of the wanton attack on UN troops on 21 November and outrages against UN personnel and ineffectiveness of training programme in instilling discipline or respect for the UN among ANC, there is no reason to immobilise some 200 Moroccan officers and men ostensibly engaged on training programme. Lasmar agrees with us that it would be appropriate to suspend the programme. As we had feared, despite Kettani's insistence, the paracommando training has only served to increase the self confidence and aggressiveness of the force. If you agree, we shall quietly suspend the training programme until there is a change of attitude, and then concentrate on developing discipline rather than fighting strength.

6. There have been fortunately no incidents in Leo today although our vehicles have not yet been returned. Von Horn is sending a formal letter of protest to Mobutu together with a list of cases of misdemeanour and looting by his troops against UN personnel and property.

7. There is no further news from Orientale province although there is a report that some 300 ANC, presumably pro-Lumumba, have found their way there from Kivu.
8. On the night of 21st November, the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires very gallantly came to the scene and assisted in helping to evacuate the wounded to the ambulances by acting as interpreter along with a member of his staff. I have sent him a letter of appreciation.
9. Kasavubu arrives at Ndjili tomorrow and we are going by helicopter to receive him. Von Horn, Linnars, Rikhyes and ourselves have received invitations to dinner with Kasavubu tomorrow which we have accepted with alacrity as it probably betokens an olive branch approach.