

AMIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS

13 AUG-19 OCT 1994

MISCELLANEOUS

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 116

FILE 5

ACC. 1998/0283

Ops Branch
HQ UNAMIR

19 Oct 94

8600-18/249

SDO 21/10

5000.15(G3 Plans)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER NO 01 TO OPERATION ORDER NO 20

Reference:

A. HQ UNAMIR 5000.1 dated 6 Oct 94.

SITUATION

1. General. As given in Reference A.
2. Specific. The population movement figures across Rwanda's borders are notoriously inaccurate and inconclusive. The number of routes, the patchy coverage of crossing points and the variety of reporting sources contribute to an overall statistical base which is, at best, imprecise, and more likely, erroneous. UN and UNAMIR planning is constrained by the poor quality of this information. This Fragmentary Order directs commanders to adopt more precise and independent methods, as a basis for statistical comparison.

MISSION

- 3 To monitor population movement across the Rwandan borders with Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.

EXECUTION

4. General Outline. Sector Commanders of Sectors 1,2,3,4 and 5 are to establish border monitoring posts at all identifiable crossing points with Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.

Tasks. Sector Commanders are to:

- a. Identify all crossing points within their Sectors which fulfil any one of the following criteria:
 - (1). Are capable of wheeled traffic.
 - (2). Are well used by people moving on foot.
 - (3). If situated on water, are suitable landing sites for boats carrying over 20 people.
- b. Man these crossing points from 0600 to 1900 hrs daily, utilising MILOBs or infantry as appropriate.

c. Keep an accurate record of people crossing in both directions, to include the following:

- (1). No of adults.
- (2). No of children.
- (3). Vehicles by type.

d. Report these figures to HQ UNAMIR, as part of the Daily SITREP.

e. Maintain local statistical records of population movement.

6. Statistical Analysis. On receipt of the Daily SITREP figures from each Sector, SO2 G2 MilInfo is to incorporate them into the UNAMIR Daily SITREP and report them at the daily FC's Briefing as follows:

- a. Total inflow from each country.
- b. Total outflow from each country.
- c. Net gain/loss.
- d. Comparison with previous day's figures.
- e. On a weekly basis, comparison with previous week's figures.
- f. Any items of special interest.

7. Database. SO2 G2 MilInfo is to maintain a database of all figures collated from Sector sources, and provide access to those UNAMIR personnel who require to use it for planning purposes.


8. MILOBs. Sector Commanders may utilise MILOBs or infantry under command, as required, to fulfil the mission.

9. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Timings. Sector Commanders are to meet the following timings:

- (1). Identification of crossing points - by 21 Oct 94.
- (2). First date of monitoring - 23 Oct 94.
- (3). First report to HQ UNAMIR - by 2359 hrs 23 Oct 94.

10. Command and Signal. Normal methods of reporting are to be carried out by Sector Commanders. Should an inflow/outflow of special significance occur, Sector Commanders are to report the matter to HQ UNAMIR immediately.



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FC

Distribution:

External:

Action:

List C Serials 31-39

Information:

List A less Serial 7

List B serials 13-15 and 18

TAC +10

G2 Cell
HQ UNAMIR

19 Oct 94

G2/1000

10/249 9870-1
SDO 21/10

See Distribution

MILINFOSUM FOR THE PERIOD 180600-190600B OCT 94

1. SUMMARY The situation throughout the country remains calm.
2. MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES/DPS

a.

CROSSING POINT	INTO RWANDA	OUT OF RWANDA
SECTOR 1		
SECTOR 2	98	
SECTOR 3		
SECTOR 4A		
SECTOR 4B		
SECTOR 4C	168	
SECTOR 5	408	
TOTAL	674	0 REPORTED

3. MISCELLANEOUS INCIDENTS

- a. The RWANDA/BURUNDI border in Sector 4C was described as calm on the Rwandan side. Firing was heard on the Burundian side and an unspecified number of Burundian soldiers were seen deployed on their side of the border.
- b. The RPA advised that there is an increasing security threat along the southern border with BURUNDI and that raids are becoming more common. The extent of the raids was not commented upon.
- c. A Voice of America radio broadcast on 18 Oct 94 spoke of increased tension and interfactional violence in the North of BURUNDI.
- d. Automatic gun fire was heard to the E of KIBUNGO between 1500 and 1600 hrs on 18 Oct 94. MILOBs are investigating the incident.
- e. A French Canadian priest from RUYENZI (GR 8132) was murdered in his home on the night of 17/18 Oct 94. The priest was reported to have had his hands tied behind his back and to have been beaten with a hammer. Medicines, money and household goods were taken but his car was not. The priest was named as Fr Claude SIMARD. The priest An investigation by the local Gendarme officer from BUTARE has concluded that theft would not appear to be the motive for the murder.

f. No reports have been received to confirm or deny the reports yesterday that Zairian troops had begun to mass on the border with UGANDA.

3. FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES.

a. RPA the RPA continued to conduct patrols and mount road blocks throughout the country.

(i) MILOBs reported that RPA troops cordoned off NDABA displaced persons camp (GR 4572) in order to keep the people in place for an address by the local RPA Bn Comd. The people refused to assemble and at 1150hrs RPA troops opened fire, wounding 4 people. The population of the camp were then forced to leave by the RPA and moved away in a Westerly direction towards KIVUMU (GR 5673).

(ii) GHANBATT report that a man was arrested and detained for interrogation by the RPA on 17 Oct 94. The arrest took place in KABOKOBA in Sector 2 and the man's crime was to have made an offensive statement to an RPA soldier during an argument.

(iii) During a meeting between the RPA and TAC HQ the RPA expressed concern at the reluctance of the population of DP camps to leave and return home. TAC HQ explained that the problem was in part the making of the RPA and that they had an image problem which they had to address.

(iv) The RPA claim to have informants in the camps who report that NGOs are asking questions beyond their remit. Specifically, medical people were inquiring what had happened in the camps overnight. The RPA were assured that the NGOs are acting solely for humanitarian reasons.

(v) 22 RPA prisoners were being escorted from GISOVU (GR 2952) to KIBUYE (GR 2771) when the vehicle they were travelling in broke down. 18 Prisoners escaped and 4 were shot while trying to escape.

b. FRGF

(i) In the BUKAVU area the FRGF are reported to be still recruiting young men from the camps and also to be conducting reconnaissance of the border using the cover of boys collecting wood.

5. ASSESSMENT

a. The population of NDABA DP camp was reported to have doubled over the course of the last 2 weeks due to a growing mistrust of the RPA by the local population. In attempting to defuse the situation by holding a meeting in the camp the RPA miscalculated the level of hostility towards them. When news of this incident spreads

throughout the area the RPA can be expected to encounter increased hostility and mistrust from other DP camps. A complete change of approach will be needed by the RPA if they are to prevent the downward spiral of mutual mistrust, hostility and murder from gathering momentum.

b. The report of continuing FRGF recruitment from camps in the BUKAVU region does not come as a surprise. This combined with the reported reconnaissance in the area is an indicator that the FRGF do not consider the war to be over and intend to resume operations.


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Distribution:

External:

Information:

TAC HQ
MILOB GP HQ
BRITCON
CANCON
AUSMED
GHANBATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
MALAWICOY
ZAMBATT
TUNBATT
NICOY
CIVPOL

Internal:

Information:

FC
DFC
UNDP (Attn Mr G Le Claire)
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
FMO
G3 Plans

Tac HQ

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.45(G3 PLANS)

To: List A
List B

5/249 9525-1
9820-1
500 21/10

From: DCOS Ops

Info: SO2 Legal AUSMED

Date: 18 Oct 94

Subject: UNAMIR CONDUCT, DRESS AND WEAPON CARRIAGE POLICY

Reference: Draft 5000.45(G3 Plans) attached.

1. Please find enclosed the UNAMIR Conduct, Dress and Weapon Carriage Policy in Draft.
2. The legal content has been cleared by SO2 Legal AUSMED.
3. Addressees are asked to provide written comment on the document by Close Of Play Mon 24 Oct 94, after which a nil return will be assumed.

J ARP
Col
DCOS Ops

5000.45 (G3 Plans)

See Distribution

DRAFT

FORCE ROUTINE ORDER NO XX**UNAMIR CONDUCT, DRESS AND WEAPON CARRIAGE POLICY**

References:

- A. Force Routine Order No 12 - Commander's Policy on Alcohol.
- B. Status of Mission Agreement.
- C. UNAMIR Driving Regulations.
- D. UNAMIR Standing Operating Procedures.

GENERAL.

- 1. This document states the current UNAMIR policy on conduct, dress and the carriage of personal weapons. It will be updated from time to time, and must be read in conjunction with current ROE and Security Alert Measures (SAMs).
- 2. This document supersedes Reference A.
- 3. All members of UNAMIR are required to be aware of this policy. Contingent Commanders/Commanding Officers (or those appropriate commanders in the Chain of Command) are to ensure that their personnel are fully briefed on the contents of this document, are kept current on any reviews which might take place, and that personnel rotating into Rwanda are briefed on arrival.

CONDUCT

- 4. Image. All personnel in Rwanda represent their units, their countries and the UN. Considerable effort must be expended to ensure that the best possible image is conveyed to the local population and civilian agencies with which they may come in contact. Personnel are particularly reminded that they should:
 - a. Adhere to all local laws which have been enacted by the legitimate government.
 - b. Deal courteously and politely with those with whom they come in contact.
 - c. Avoid any source of conflict in which a dispute might develop.
 - d. If employing Rwandan personnel, provide fair and honest terms of service.
- 5. Behaviour. UNAMIR personnel should be aware that their behaviour can affect the success of the UN mission. Many hours of patient work can be eroded by one thoughtless act; the efforts of many can be undone by the poor behaviour of a few. All personnel should be reminded to act maturely and professionally at all times, whether in or out of uniform. This should particularly apply to:

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- a. Driving. UNAMIR personnel must drive carefully and use the road with courtesy. They are to adhere to Reference C.
- b. Alcohol. Personnel are reminded that their behaviour must not be impaired by alcohol. All personnel must be briefed on UNAMIR alcohol policy, which is described in more detail below and whose tenets are:

- (1). No drinking and driving.
- (2). No driving for four hours after consuming alcohol.
- (3). No drinking when in the possession of weapons.
- (4). No drinking to excess.

DRESS & BEARING

6. Deportment. All personnel are to ensure that their deportment meets the highest possible standards. A smart, well-groomed alert appearance and a helpful and positive demeanour are essential elements of this.
7. National Uniform. National uniform is to worn in accordance with Part 8, Section 6, of Reference D.
8. Ballistic Helmet/Body Armour. UN covers are to be worn on ballistic helmets and body armour, where ordered.
9. Webbing. Policy on the wearing of webbing, or its equivalent, and rucksacks it to be ordered by Commanding Officers/Contingent Commanders. Personnel are to wear and carry personal equipment sufficient to fulfil the mission.
10. Wearing of Uniform on Duty. All UNAMIR personnel are on operations and considered to be on duty at all times in Rwanda. Under the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), Reference B, UNAMIR personnel who are not wearing uniform carry minimal authority and may not be fully protected under the terms of the Agreement. UNAMIR military personnel are only permitted to wear civilian clothes in the following circumstances:
 - a. Within the confines of a unit or Mess location which is guarded by armed guard(s).
 - b. When invited to the **private residence of a named individual**, for which permission to visit has been granted by an individual's Commanding Officer.
 - c. In a public place, at the discretion of their Contingent Commanders/Commanding Officers.
 - d. When carrying out organised sports or PT.

CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS

11. MILOBS. Under Article VI of the UN Convention, defined in Reference B, MILOBS are described as "experts". They do not carry weapons and further policy, described below, on the Carriage of Weapons, does not apply to them.

12. Principle. As UNAMIR military personnel are on duty at all times, and as they have been issued with weapons for their own protection, or the protection of those whom they have a duty to protect, the principle to be applied is that UNAMIR military personnel will carry weapons at all times. Current ROE and Security Alert Measures (to be issued) will further dictate the readiness of UNAMIR personnel. This policy does not apply to medical and religious personnel. The protection of those personnel will be as directed by the Contingent Commander/Commanding Officer.

13. Exceptions. The occasions on which military UNAMIR personnel do not carry weapons are as follows:

- a. When consuming alcohol.
- b. When in civilian clothes.
- c. When leaving Rwanda - see Other Countries (below).

14. Consumption of Alcohol & Carriage of Weapons. UNAMIR personnel are not to consume alcohol when carrying weapons. Alcohol may only be consumed in the following circumstances:

- a. In a unit location or Mess which is guarded by armed guard(s).
- b. In a private residence.
- c. In a public place, (such as a bar, hotel or restaurant) at which personal protection must be provided - see Personal Protection (below).

15. Personal Protection. UNAMIR military personnel must receive Personal Protection whenever they attend a social function, at which they consume alcohol. On other occasions, they will be armed and in uniform, and able to protect themselves. Personal Protection, which must include the provision of communications (eg Motorola), during the period of the social function will be exercised as follows:

- a. In a unit location or Mess, where it will be provided by armed guard(s). This
- b. En route to/from a private residence. While personnel are visiting a private residence, their security is considered to be at a higher level than in a public place.
- c. En route to/from **and in** a public place.
- d. When carrying out organised sports or PT outside an area which is under guard.

16. Level of Personal Protection. Commanding Officers/Contingent Commanders are to determine the level of Personal Protection afforded. Communications must be provided throughout these activities. Some examples of the minimum level of protection required

are, as follows:

- a. In a unit location or Mess, sufficient protection to provide adequate security.
- b. En route to/from a private residence, an armed driver.
- c. En route to/from a public place, an armed driver, and an armed person who remains with the group/person throughout the duration of their stay. For simplicity, an armed driver could carry out both functions.
- d. For sports or PT, the minimum level of acceptable protection is:
 - (1). Personnel are to be in pairs.
 - (2). Communications (eg Motorola) are to be carried.
 - (3). Details of the route and the anticipated period of absence are to be given to gate sentries or other UNAMIR personnel in a position to respond to an emergency.

OTHER COUNTRIES

17. Conduct. The conduct of UNAMIR personnel in Other Countries, such as Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, must be impeccable. UNAMIR personnel represent the Mission abroad in Africa and only the highest standards will be accepted.

18. Legal Position. UNAMIR has no special legal relationship with Other Countries in the region. Any alleged offence committed by UNAMIR personnel abroad will be dealt with under the civil law of that country and may lead to prosecution by the civil authority. Individuals from UNAMIR who find themselves in such a position should contact their national consulate, embassy or High Commission immediately. They should also contact the UN representative in that country.

19. Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). It is hoped that MOU can be signed with the governments of Other Countries in the region, to cover the contingency of legal proceedings being conducted against UNAMIR individuals. COMASC is asked to make SO2 Legal available in order to draft MOU in consultation with Other Countries' governments.

20. Dress. Under certain circumstances, UNAMIR personnel are on duty in Other Countries. When on duty, UNAMIR personnel are to wear uniform in accordance with Paragraphs 6 and 7 above.

21. Carriage of Weapons. UNAMIR personnel are not permitted to carry weapons abroad. Personnel who are going abroad must be afforded Personal Protection to their point of departure, and on return to Rwanda, from their point of return. Should it become necessary to authorise the carriage of weapons to Other Countries, HQ UNAMIR will issue appropriate instructions. Personnel departing Rwanda on duty, CTO or leave will ensure the security of their personal weapon through the Commanding Officer/Contingent Commander.

SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS FOR SOCIAL ACTIVITY, WEARING OF UNIFORM
AND CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS

22. To ensure clarity, a summary of the major restrictions on social activity will be of assistance:

a. Unit Location/Mess.

(1). Civilian clothes may be worn.

OR

(2). Uniform may be worn.

(3). Armed guard(s) required.

b. Private Residence.

(1). Civilian clothes may be worn.

OR

(2). Uniform may be worn.

(3). Commanding Officer's permission required.

(4). Personal Protection required en route to/from residence. If alcohol is not consumed, an individual (dressed in uniform and carrying a weapon) may provide his/her own Personal Protection.

(5). Personal Communications required.

c. Public Place.

(1). Uniform or civilian clothes may be worn, at the discretion of the Contingent Commander/Commanding Officer, except for those providing Personal Protection, who must be in uniform.

(2). Personal Protection must be provided to/from the public place and for the duration of stay of the unarmed personnel. Individuals who do not consume alcohol may provide their own Personal Protection.

(3). Personal communications required.

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Distribution:

External:

Action:

List D

Internal:

Action:

List A

List B

CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS

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- b. When in civilian clothes.
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- c. En route to/from **and in** a public place.
- d. When carrying out organised sports or PT outside an area which is under guard.

16. Level of Personal Protection. Commanding Officers/Contingent Commanders are to determine the level of Personal Protection afforded. Communications must be provided

② File
63

UN RESTRICTED

①

22 Jul 94

SECTION 9:
OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NO. 02
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

PART 1

Amendment
10 Sep 94 done.
Q

1. The conduct of military operations is controlled and regulated by the provision of international and national law, conventions and precedence. In the case of a United Nations (UN) conducted operation, it is the responsibility of the UN to set the parameters within which UN Forces will operate. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the means by which the UN can provide to commanders at all levels the political and legal direction and guidance on the use of Force by UN personnel. ROE are drafted by the Force Commander, but are approved by the UN and may only be changed with UN authority.

2. These UNAMIR ROE are provided for UN Forces operating under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 June 1994, which states in paragraph 4 that:

"... the consolidated mandate of UNAMIR includes the following:

- (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
- (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations; and
- (c) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire;..."

Paragraph 5 of the resolution particularly recognizes that:

"UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief."

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Replaced by
new issue.
6 Oct 94

3. UNAMIR is a peacekeeping force without commitment to either party in the Rwandese civil war. Under the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement and the UN Security Council Resolution mandates, UNAMIR has a commitment to all parties to assist them to achieve peace. Impartiality is the key and all UNAMIR's actions must be aimed at ensuring the furtherance of this objective. However, circumstances could arise where the use of force by UNAMIR personnel would be necessary and justified.

PART 11

DEFINITIONS

4. The following key definitions must be clearly understood by all personnel in UNAMIR:

a. Force. The use of physical means to impose one's will. Military force is the use of the physical means provided by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of troops under unified command to achieve the same end and generally implies the potential to use significant levels of violence.

b. Self-Defence. The use of force to protect:

- (1) oneself and the personnel in one's unit,
 - (2) other UNAMIR military or civilian personnel,
 - (3) non-UNAMIR humanitarian aid personnel,
 - (4) displaced persons, refugees and civilians in sites or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces, or
 - (5) other UN-authorized military or civilian personnel,
- against a hostile act or hostile intent, where there is no other choice or time for deliberation.

c. Hostile Act. A hostile act is an attack or other use of force against those entities listed in paragraph 4.b. above.

d. Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is the threat of the imminent use of force against those entities listed in paragraph 4.b. above.

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- e. Minimum Force. The minimum degree of authorized force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.
- f. Collateral Damage. Damage to persons or property adjacent to, but not part of an authorized target.
- g. Non-deadly force. Any physical means of forcing compliance that does not pose a risk of death or serious bodily harm to the individual against whom the force is directed. This is usually through the use of physical force short of the use of firearms or other deadly weapons. Examples include: pushing and lesser forms of striking or hitting, and physically or mechanically restraining persons. Warning shots are non-deadly force, even though they involve the use of firearms.
- h. Deadly Force. This is the ultimate degree of force. Deadly force is that level of force which is intended or is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm regardless of whether death or serious bodily harm actually results.

PART 111

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE

APPLICABILITY

5. The ROE stated in this directive apply to all personnel provided by nations participating in UNAMIR under the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 June 1994. These ROE are written in the form of either prohibitions or permissions. Issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Issued as permissions they are guidance to commanders that certain specific actions may be taken if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the mission.

COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITY

- 6. Commanders at all levels are required:
 - a. to have this directive translated and disseminated to every subordinate under their command; and
 - b. to ensure that every subordinate under their command understands the contents of this document.

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AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

7. The use of deadly force for the different types of weapons systems will be authorized as follows:

- a. Force Commander or his Delegate:
 - (1) heavy support weapons (ie rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc); and
 - (2) heavy machine guns or cannons (.50 cal, 20 mm, etc).
- b. in situations which are life threatening to UNAMIR troops, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, soldiers may use the following weapons:
 - (1) medium machine guns (ie FN MAG, M60, etc)
 - (2) light machine guns; and
 - (3) all personal weapons on automatic or single shot fire.
- c. in situations which are not life threatening to soldiers, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, the use of deadly force for the different types of weapons will be authorized as follows:
 - (1) Sector Commanders:
 - (a) medium machine guns (ie FN MAG, M60, etc),
 - (b) light machine guns; and
 - (c) all personal weapons on automatic fire.
 - (2) Battalion Commander down to nco level at scene of a threat:
 - (a) personal weapons for single shot fire.

Note: Commanders should be aware when using weapons of the principles of military necessity and proportionality.

PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF FORCE

8. When an incident occurs that requires the use of force, the following principles will be adhered to:

- a. if possible, negotiation and warnings must be exhausted before any use of force is initiated;
- b. only the minimum non-deadly and deadly force consistent with achieving the immediate aim shall be employed;
- c. except where authorized under paragraph 11, the escalation of force procedures pursuant to paragraph 16 must be exhausted before the use of any deadly force is initiated;
- d. deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all other lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed;
- e. escalation of the level of violence is to be minimized;
- f. collateral damage is to be minimized;

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- g. the use of force in retaliation is prohibited; and
- h. use of force shall be controlled by the on-scene commander and is to cease once the aim has been achieved.

AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE

9. Force may be used as follows:

a. Non-Deadly Force. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use non-deadly force in the following circumstances:

- (1) in self-defence (as defined in paragraph 4.b.) against unarmed aggression;
- (2) against unarmed attempts at infiltration or envelopment of UNAMIR units, compounds or locales;
- (3) when UNAMIR premises are violated in unarmed attempts to steal UNAMIR property or property under the protection of the UN;
- (4) when unarmed attempts are made to abduct or detain UNAMIR civilian or military personnel; and
- (5) when unarmed attempts are made to prevent UNAMIR personnel from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.

b. Deadly Force. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use deadly force in the following circumstances:

- (1) in self- defence (as defined in paragraph 4.b.) against persons committing a hostile act or exhibiting hostile intent;
- (2) to protect from damage or destruction, property or installations belonging to or under the protection of UNAMIR, including protected sites and the means for the distribution and delivery of humanitarian relief:
 - (a) which have been designated by the unit Commanding Officer, in consultation with the Force Commander, as essential to the success of the UNAMIR mission,
 - (b) which justify protection through the use of deadly force, and ,

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- (c) where there is no way to prevent the damage or destruction;
- (3) to overcome armed attempts to prevent UNAMIR Forces discharging its duties, when authorized by the Force Commander;
- (4) to resist armed attempts to disarm, abduct or detain UNAMIR military or civilian personnel;
- (5) to resist armed attempts to compel UNAMIR personnel to withdraw from protection areas they were ordered to occupy by the Force Commander or his delegate; and
- (6) to resist armed attempts to cut off a UNAMIR force.

AUTHORITY TO SEARCH AND DETAIN

10. Authority to stop and Search. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to stop all individuals attempting to enter or who are discovered inside any facilities under UNAMIR protection and to request that the individual submit to a consensual search of himself / herself and his/her vehicle where applicable. Any individual not willing to be searched shall be denied access, escorted from the premises or detained as appropriate. Searches of persons and their property are also authorized for the purpose of security. Such searches may be conducted with the minimal use of force necessary.

11. Authority to Detain. Individuals shall only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display hostile intent or carry out any activity which would require that force be used against them under paragraph 9.

12. Once detained, only minimal non-deadly force is authorized to prevent the escape of a detainee, unless there is a necessity to act in self-defence, in which case minimum force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized. However, if the individuals flee and the threat of their use of force has thus been removed, further force of any kind shall not be employed to apprehend them.

13. Any individual detained shall be turned over as soon as possible to appropriate police authorities as designated by the Force Commander. Any weapons seized from detainees shall be confiscated or rendered militarily ineffective.

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14. Treatment of Detainees. Any individuals detained are not Prisoners of War (PW) under the 1949 Geneva Convention. However, all persons detained will be accorded, as a minimum standard, treatment which would be given to a PW. In almost every case, except where extreme operational exigencies demand, a higher standard will be observed. Since the detention should only be for a minimum period of time, many of the procedures under the Geneva Convention accorded to PWs will be inapplicable.

Note: Detainees shall not be subject to intimidation, deprivation or humiliation. Medical care and the attention of medical personnel will be provided when required. Detainees will be given rations and shelter equivalent to that of UNAMIR personnel.

CHALLENGE AND ESCALATION PROCEDURES

15. Except where a response is required in accordance with paragraph 16, the following procedures are to be followed:

a. Verbal or Visual Warning. Warn the aggressor to stop the activity, which in normal circumstances, should follow the following sequence:

(1) depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given orally, by a sign or by illumination (ie, hand-held red flares, search-lights, etc.). The issuance of a warning should also be passed up the chain of command with continuous Situation Reports;

(2) repeat the verbal or visual warning as many times as is necessary to ensure understanding or compliance;

b. Charge Weapons. If authorized under State B of ROE No.2 (paragraph 16 refers);

c. Warning Shots. If the threat continues, employ aimed warning shots in a safe direction so that there is no danger of personal injury or collateral damage;

d. Non-Deadly Force. If warning shots are ignored, employ minimal non-deadly force;

e. Deadly Force. If minimal non-deadly force is either not feasible or fails, on order and under the control of a superior, minimal deadly force, such as single aimed shots, may be used until the threat is removed;

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- f. Escalation of Deadly Force. Escalatory weapons fire with other weapons systems shall only be on the order of the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 7.

OPENING FIRE WITHOUT WARNING OR ESCALATION

16. The only circumstance under which it is permissible to use deadly force without warning or escalation is if an armed attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that even a moments delay could:

- a. lead to death or serious injury to UNAMIR personnel or to other UN-authorized military or civilian personnel;
- b. lead to death or serious injury to persons who are under the protection of UNAMIR; or
- c. lead to the immediate damage or destruction of UNAMIR property in the circumstances described in paragraph 9.b.(2).

PROCEDURE DURING FIRING

17. Any use of firearms as a means of applying deadly force, shall be aimed fire, ie, fired at the centre of the visible mass of the target. Fire must be controlled and will not be indiscriminate. Automatic fire and firing of support weapons will only be used as a last resort and only as authorized under paragraph 7. Fire for effect will only continue as long as it is necessary to achieve the immediate aim.

Through fire control orders, the commander on the scene will indicate and control the fire, preferably directed at the leaders or instigators of the threat. Regular situation report will be forwarded through the chain of command.

18. Whenever possible, each escalation in the use of force should be authorized by the chain of command of UNAMIR. A request in clear by radio for authorization to fire can have a calming effect on its own. Permission to use higher level of force must be obtained from the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 7. The on-scene commander is responsible for assessing the situation and taking action appropriate to the situation.

PROCEDURE AFTER FIRING

19. After firing, commanders should ensure the following actions are taking.

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a. Medical. Any wounded, including those fired upon by UNAMIR personnel will be given first aid, if such an action can be done without further endangering the lives of UNAMIR personnel.

b. Recording. Details of the incident will be recorded, including:

- (1) date, time and place of firing;
- (2) unit and personnel involved;
- (3) the events leading up to the firing;
- (4) why UNAMIR personnel opened fire;
- (5) who or what was fired on;
- (6) the weapons fired; and
- (7) the apparent results of the firing.

c. Reporting. The above information and the current situation will be reported through the chain of command to Force HQ ATTN Force Commander and Chief Operations Officer.

PART 1V

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

20. Rule No. one: Authority to Carry Arms

- a. State A: No authority; and
- b. State B: Authority granted to carry weapons.

21. Rule No. Two: Status of Weapons

- a. State A: Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.
- b. State B: Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.

22. Rule No. Three: Response to Hostile Intent or Hostile Act without the Use of Fire

- a. State A: Observe and report but will withdraw in order to preserve own force.

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- b. State B: Stay in place. Make contact and establish liaison with opposing force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.
- c. State C: Observe and Report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.
- d. State D: Observe and Report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means. Demonstrative use of fire is authorized.
23. Rule No. Four: Disarmament of Paramilitary Personnel or Civilians
- a. State A: No authorization granted.
- b. State B: Authorization is granted. In doing so, use minimum force and escalate to include use of deadly force if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authority at the earliest opportunity.
24. Rule No. Five: Intervention and Warning Shots AMENDMENT
10 SEP 79
- ~~BETWEEN~~ WARRING FACTIONS
- a. State A: Intervention [^] is prohibited.
- b. State B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process.
25. Rule No. Six: Control of Weapons Systems
- a. State A: Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.
- b. State B: Designated activity in the presence of the forces in conflict is permitted but will be specified by the following notes:
- (1) Man (type of system);
 - (2) Prepare (type of system);
 - (3) Move (type of system); and
 - (4) Fire (type of system).

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26. There are three ROE states that may apply in any given sector in Rwanda. These states are GREEN, YELLOW and RED and are described on UNAMIR Levels of Readiness/Alert pages in the directive subsequent to Annex A. In normal circumstances, the ROE status shall be GREEN.

NOTE: Changes in the normal status of the ROE for UNAMIR Forces as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or his delegate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status of the ROE for their sectors, if authorized by the Force Commander or his delegate. Contingent Commanders will inform or, if necessary, seek approval from national authority for the change in status.

PART V

CONCLUSION

27. The aim of this directive is to provide guidance to commanders and soldiers at all levels in the use of force. However, no definitive direction can be created that can detail every possible course of action for every possible situation. It is critical and mandatory that all members of UNAMIR understand these ROE and apply them to any and all situations that develop requiring the use of force.

28. Amendments to this directive will be issued as required and as approved by the UN.

29. This directive will be classified UN RESTRICTED.

Annex:

Annex A Aide-Memoir for Members of UNAMIR

UN RESTRICTED

AMENDMENT
10 Sep 94

UNAMIR RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
AIDE MEMOIRE
DATED 22 JUL 94

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL MEMBERS OF
THE UNAMIR MILITARY COMPONENT
REGARDING OPENING FIRE IN RWANDA**

1. You are to avoid the use of force, if it is possible to do so, and your conduct must cause the least possible concern, fear or danger to the local population.
2. Your immediate commander will order any change in the states of weapon readiness. While your commander will normally issue the order to open fire, you have the right to use appropriate force in self-defence to protect yourself and those it is your duty to protect. Whenever possible a warning should be given before opening fire (see over).
3. If you have to use force, you must only use the **MINIMUM FORCE** necessary. **MINIMUM FORCE** normally involves the following sequential actions:
 - a. open display of weapons.
 - b. verbal warning.
 - c. barring access to the point being protected.
 - d. physical restraint.
 - e. warning shots.
 - f. pointing weapons, and
 - g. firing weapons.

WARNINGS

4. **WARNING BEFORE FIRING.** Whenever possible a warning should be given before firing. The warning should be given in a loud clear voice in ENGLISH/FRENCH or KINYARWANDA:

STOP-HANDS UP/ ARRETEZ LEVEZ LES MAINS/
HAGARARA, AMABOKO HEJURU

(PAUSE)

STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/ ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE/
HAGARARA, CYANGWA BAKURASE

A - 1

5. **FIRE AFTER WARNING.** After warning you may fire on a person in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm only if:

a. the person is carrying a dangerous weapon (e.g. firearm, improvised firing device or machete); AND

b. you believe the person is about to attack you, your unit, or any person it is your duty to protect; AND

c. the person refuses to stop when called upon to do so; AND

d. you believe there is no other way of stopping the person.

6. **FIRE WITHOUT WARNING.** You may fire without warning on a person in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm only if that person:

a. has used or is using a fire arm or other dangerous weapon against you, your unit or persons it is your duty to protect; OR

b. is carrying what you believe to be a dangerous weapon, AND is clearly about to use it, AND you believe that there is no other way to protect yourself, your unit, or the persons it is your duty to protect.

7. If you have to fire, you must account for all rounds expended in an after action report submitted in writing to your immediate commander.

22 Jul 94

UNAMIR LEVELS OF READINESS/ALERT

SL	STATUS	UNITS/HQ	ACTION
1	GREEN	ALL	1. Normal activities 2. ROE: Rule 1-Status B,Rule 2-Status A, Rule 3-Status B, Rule 4-Status A, Rule 5- Status A, Rule 6-Status A.
2	YELLOW	<div>HQ</div> <div>UNITS</div> <div>ALL</div>	1. Planning for next higher status commences. 2. Liaison increased. 3. VIP visits postponed. 4. No leave granted except on compassionate grounds 1. Precautionary Stage. 2. Double sentries. 3. Night movement restricted. 4. Test shelters. 5. Stand To/Local Alarm practice. 6. No leave granted except on compassionate grounds. 7. Back up comms/units/wpns. 8. Reserves put on 3 hrs notice to move. ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status B, Rule 3-Status C, Rule 4-Status A, Rule 5-Status A, Rule 6-Status A.

22 Jul 94

3	RED	HQ	1. General Alert. 2. VIP visits cancelled. 3. No leave granted. 4. Emergency movements only. 5. Special Sitreps to UNHQ. 6. Civilian evacuation if the situation warrants.
		UNITS	1. Troops in defensive positions. 2. Troops in Stand To positions. 3. Reserves put on one hour notice to move. 4. No leave granted. 5. Troops on duty outside to wear flak jackets.
		ALL	ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status B, Rule 3-Status D, Rule 4-Status B, Rule 5-Status B, Rule 6-Status B.

SCENARIO DRIVEN LEVELS OF READINESS/ROE

SCENARIO	DESCRIPTION	STATUS
1	Sentries - UNAMIR Installations	Red
2	Normal Movement Between Business locations	Green
3	Routine Patrols	Yellow
4	Escorted Convoys (NGO's, VIP's etc.)	Red
5	Hostile Barriers	Red
6	Extraction	Red
7.	Deployment of Reserves	Red
8.	Protection of UNAMIR Installations	Red
9	Individuals under UNAMIR protection	Red
10	Observation Posts	Red
11	UN Controlled Checkpoints	Red

AIDE MEMOIRE - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

RULE ONE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS

STATE A: No authority granted.

STATE B: Authority granted to carry weapons.

RULE TWO: STATUS OF WEAPONS

STATE A: Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.

STATE B: Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.

RULE THREE: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT WITHOUT THE USE OF FIRE

STATE A: Observe and report but will withdraw in order to preserve own forces.

STATE B: Stay in place. Make contact and establish liaison with opposing force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.

STATE C: Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.

STATE D: Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means. Demonstrative use of fire is authorized.

RULE FOUR: DISARMAMENT OF PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL OR CIVILIANS

STATE A: No authorization granted.

STATE B: Authorization is granted. In doing so, use minimum force and escalate to include use of deadly force if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authority at the earliest opportunity.

RULE FIVE: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS

STATE A: Intervention is prohibited.

STATE B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process.

RULE SIX: CONTROL OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

STATE A: Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.

STATE B: Designated activity in the presence of the forces in conflicts permitted but will be specified by the following notes:

- (1) Man (type of system)
- (2) Prepare (type of system)
- (3) Move (type of system)
- (4) Fire (type of system)

①
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TAC HQ 008
BUTARE.

② SDQ
Kous
PH (873) 151 383 020086
UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch

8600-1

To: See distribution
From: Force Commander
Date: 10 September 1994
Subject: FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 9: OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE
NO. 02
Reference: Operational Directive No. 2 dated 22 Jul 94

1. In order to simplify and clarify the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement, effective forthwith paragraphs 7, 24 and 26 are to be amended as follows:

A. AMEND PARA 7 TO READ:

"AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

7. The use of deadly force for the different types of weapons systems will be authorised as follows:

a. Force Commander or His Delegate:

(1) heavy support weapons (i.e. rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc.); and

(1) heavy machine guns or cannons (.50 cal, 20 mm etc.).

b. In situations which are life threatening to UNAMIR troops, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, soldiers may use the following weapons:

(1) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M60, etc.)

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(2) light machine guns; and

(3) all personal weapons on automatic or single shot fire.

c. In situations which are not life threatening to soldiers, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, the use of deadly force for the different types of weapons will be authorised as follows:

(1) Sector Commanders:

(a) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M 60, etc.),

(b) light machine guns; and

(c) all personal weapons on automatic fire.

(2) Battalion Commander down to NCO level at the scene of a threat:

(a) personal weapons for single shot fire.

NOTE: Commanders should be aware when using weapons of the principles of military necessity and proportionality."

B. AMEND PARA 24 AS FOLLOWS:

"Rule No. 5 Intervention and Warning Shots

a. State A: Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.

b. State B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process."

C. AMEND PARA 26 AS FOLLOWS:

"26. There are three ROE states that may apply in any given sector in Rwanda. These states are GREEN, YELLOW and RED and are described on UNAMIR Levels of Readiness/Alert pages in the directive subsequent to Annex A. In normal circumstances, the ROE status shall be GREEN.


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NOTE: Changes in the normal status of the ROE for UNAMIR Forces as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or his delegate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status of the ROE for their sectors, if authorised by the Force Commander or his delegate. Contingent Commanders will inform or, if necessary, seek approval from national authority for the change in status."

2. Contingent Commanders of all contributing nations are also directed to obtain the appropriate national authority and concurrence for these amendments in order to achieve uniformity among all UNAMIR personnel.

3. Furthermore, Contingent Commanders are directed to ensure that all subordinate personnel are properly briefed and that ROE aide-mémoires are amended accordingly.



Guy C. Tousignant
Major-General
Force Commander

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Information

External

CAO

All Sectors
All Batt's
All Conts Comds
HAC
MILOB HQ

Internal

DFC
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
TAC HQ
G3 OPS
G3 PLANS
G1 CMPO
G3 ENGR
G3 AIR OPS

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TAC HQ
BUTARE

OPS/

DECEMBER, 1994

See Distribution:

OP HOMEWARD
OUTLINE PLAN FOR EVACUATION
OF IDP CAMPS IN SECTORS 3 AND 4
FROM 1 - 31 DEC 94

Reference:

A. UNAMIR HQ Ops dated 301715Z Nov 94.

B. Maps

- (1) Birambo Sheet 22 Edition 1:50,000
- (2) Gisagara Sheet 41 Edition 1:50,000
- (3) Gikongoro Sheet 31 Edition 1:50,000
- (4) Butare Sheet 40 Edition 1:50,000
- (5) Akanyaru Sheet 43 Edition 1:50,000

Time Zone used throughout the plan: Bravo

SITUATION

1. Internal displaced people in Rwanda Sectors 3 and 4 are to be assisted to return to their home asp to facilitate quick rehabilitation. The important camps are:

a. North of Butare (3000 and above)

(1)	Rukondo	-	43,000	GR 5538
(2)	Karama	-	21,000	GR 5631
(3)	Cyanika	-	26,018	GR 35630
(4)	Kaduha	-	30,000	GR 4643
(5)	Muko	-	9,000	GR 3840
(6)	Busange	-	9,000	GR 3840
(7)	Muhango	-	4,000	GR 4591
(8)	Bohoro	-	4,220	GR 4621
(9)	Total	-	146,238	

b. South of Butare Camps (3,000 and above)

(1)	Ruramba	-	4,329	GR 4616
(2)	Mudasonwa	-	6,000	GR 4222

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(3)	Nyamigina	-	8,000	GR 4522
(4)	Ndago	-	53,000	GR 5101
(5)	Munini	-	12,000	GR 4800
(6)	Kebeho	-	70,000	GR 5007
(7)	Total	-	<u>163,349</u>	

c. Grand Total 142,018 + 167,549 = 309,569

d. Lift capability daily:

(1)	10M vehs	-	825 (30 Vehs)
(2)	Canadians Vehs	-	200 (6 Vehs)
(3)	Zambian Vehs	-	200 (6 Vehs)
	Maximum	-	<u>1225</u>

e. To lift 309,569 + 1,225 = 253 Days

f. Available working days in Dec 31 - 6 = 25 Days

g. To be carried = 1225 x 25 = 30625

h. Destination - Kigali and Butare Prefectures.

i. Additional veh will be required while some very close to the camps will walk to their homes. Otherwise it will take up to 1 year to complete lifting over 309509 IDP in our AOR.

j. The way station can only take 1000 DP daily at Butare and Kigali (DP are moved daily from other sectors) to Butare and Kigali where they stay overnight before going to their final destinations.

MISSION

2. To assist in moving 30625 IDP from 1 - 30 Dec 94 in AOR.

EXECUTION

3. General Outline. Two phased operations.

a. Phase 1. Mov of DP from 3 Camps in the North - (Rukondo, Cyanika and Kaduha) from 1- 6 Dec.

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- b. Phase 2. Mov of DP from 2 Camps in the south (Ndago and Kibeho) from 7 - 13 Dec 94.
- c. Zambatt
 - (1) Grouping. Nil
 - (2) Tasks. Lift 200 DP every other day from Rukondo, Cyanika and Kaduha Camps to Kigali area and repeat ex in Ndago and Kebeho the following week.
- d. CANSIG
 - (1) Grouping. Nil
 - (2) Tasks. Lift 200 DP every other day from Rukondo, Cyanika and Kaduha from 1 - 6 Dec 94 to Butare area and repeat ex in Ndago and Kibeho the following week.
- e. IOM
 - (1) Grouping. Nil
 - (2) Tasks. Lift 825 DP from 1 - 6 Dec 94 daily at Rukondo, Cyanika and Kaduha to Butare. Repeat the ex the following week at Ndago and Kebeho Camps.
- f. Coord Instrs
 - (1) Coord Conf. Daily at Tac HQ by 1900 hrs except Fri.
 - (2) Sy. Ghanbatt and Zambatt are to provide 1 x pl at each camp on loading day.
 - (2) Start time. 0630 hrs daily.
 - (3) Routes. To be decided daily. Based on ground situation at DP Camps
 - (4) Veh Density. Packets of 2.

ADMINISTRATION

- 4. a. All dvrs issued dry rats. Re-supply later.
- b. Fuelling of vehs at last parade daily.

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COMMAND AND SIGNALS

5. a. All Headquarters remains present loc.
- b. Existing radio will be used.
- c. Maint existing Call Signs.

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To: Distribution List

From: Col H. Osae-Addae, COO, TAC HQ Butare

Date: 29 September 1994

Subject: OPERATION HOMEWARD

References: A. Estimate prepared by LCol P Desnoyers dated 16 September 1994
B. Fragmentary Order to Operation Order No. 18 Op Homeward dated 18 September 1994

Background

1. On 16 September, LCol Desnoyers, newly appointed as Deputy Chief HAC created reference A to take advantage of a temporary surplus of UNAMIR vehs. The intent was to use these vehicles to assist NGO's in the return of IDP's to their homes before the rains render the camps difficult/impossible to support. The stated aim was "to propose a military option to assist relief agencies" in the relocation of IDP's. HQ UNAMIR adopted this proposal and issued reference B two days later. LCol Desnoyers called and chaired a meeting of NGO's and UN agencies at TAC HQ Butare on 29 September at which it was obvious that the civilian attendees had no prior knowledge of the initiative. At subsequent working meetings at TAC HQ it was obvious that the same individuals/agencies were both suspicious and unclear about what was perceived as a military solution foisted on them by UNAMIR: much laborious and repetitive explanation was required to reinforce the concept that UNAMIR was merely to help facilitate their actions. Further, it was obvious that they could not make themselves ready at the speed envisaged in the original estimate.

2. Preliminary meetings were held on 20 and 21 September and working/coordination conferences on 23, 24, and 25 September. Op Homeward began 26 September. Coordination meetings are held at TAC HQ every night except Fridays. They are meant to include all NGO's and UN agencies as well as RPA and Prefecture reps and of course TAC HQ which includes Brit MovCon.

Aim

3. To examine Op Homeward to identify lessons learned and recommend a way ahead.

Factors

4. The factors considered at reference A will be re-assessed in light of practical experience as follows:

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a. Will to Return Home:

(1) Security. The perception of safety is as important as the reality. Rumours of RPA retribution and, at the least, RPA harshness, abound. They come from various sources but share the common feature that they are easier to start than to stop. From the outset TAC HQ has vigorously pursued rumours and dubious/incomplete reports of all natures from all sources but TAC HQ's resources are not equal to the task. The lack of a massive, high-level counter-propaganda campaign is crippling, at best. Further, the NGO's and agencies will have no part of any such campaigns and resist so strongly that it may reasonably be argued that their lack of active support for relocation is perceived by the Rwandese as tacit support of the stay-put attitude. Since UNAMIR assists relief agencies and since the agencies control, in one way or another, the movement, the perception of safety as portrayed by the agencies outweighs the reality;

(2) Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The view from TAC is that the IDP's are already dependent on the relief effort. More to the point, as long as a lack of safety is perceived, the indignity of a refugee camp is the lesser of two evils. It is noteworthy that if the rainy season will reduce/curtail the relief effort to some camps, it will at the same time reduce security within those camps by reducing the hours and randomness of observation by both UNAMIR and the relief agencies. It is argued by some that this is part of the RPA hidden agenda;

(3) Propaganda. Discussed above; and

(4) Deduction. The IDP's presently lack the will to return home as they perceive themselves better off where they are. This situation must deteriorate with the onset of the rains by which time the task of relocation/support will be more difficult and resources less plentiful. The desire to return home must be injected now if the status quo is to be avoided.

b. Health Conditions. Medical screenings are not always done and are usually cursory at best. They should be considered desirable not mandatory;

c. RPA Verifications. The RPA steadfastly refuse to conduct screenings in camps. To date they have been somewhat intransigent about improving their system to increase throughput. Cooperation is improving in some areas but high-level pressure must be applied to gain full cooperation and maximum efficiency in the verification process. As a start, direction from the RPA Chief LO that the local LO attend all coordination conferences and be available 7/24 (assignment of assistants?), would be most useful;

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- d. Final Destinations. Attendance of the receiving Prefects at coordination conferences is sporadic. Further, their ability to project themselves into the receiving commune/sector either personally or through their subordinates is either lacking or not being pursued aggressively. Prefects must place more emphasis on and effort into the positive reception of returnees: this must include positive control of the RPA garrison;
- e. Road Conditions. The assumption made by LCol Desnoyers remains valid. However, see staging;
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. We have avoided overnight staging where possible. As 90% of the population live away from urban centers, so they also live well off surfaced roads. This means that military-type vehicles are required for both ends of a trip although not necessarily in the middle. Overnighting, therefore, reduces available lift and should be avoided. We have developed alternate methods of providing the essential start-up ingredients;
- g. Mass Population Effect. No impact yet observed as relocation effort is in the hands of relief agencies who will not be seen to encourage return;
- h. Location of Camps. Although most are in Sector 4 as stated, the estimated population is questioned for several reasons. Airborne/satellite sensing devices should be employed to accurately identify the dimensions of the problem including internal migration on a regular and frequent basis;
- j. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. Assumption correct but not necessarily pertinent. See Staging; and
- k. Available UNAMIR Resources. Assumption was optimistic. A more reasonable assumption is 30-50 vehicles.

Other Factors

- 5. Other factors worthy of consideration are:
 - a. Will to Walk. Considered by LCol Desnoyers under Mass Population Effect as the willingness to walk home once the migration had started. This view is not shared by TAC. The Rwandese walked for their lives and, given the degree of support available in the camps, will probably not walk home unless forced to;
 - b. Reception on Return. One aspect overlooked is the return of refugees from previous conflicts. They now live in the homes of the current IDP's and bear a grudge;

- c. RPA Hidden Agenda. The RPA are intransigent to an almost inexplicable degree. Assurances given at national level in Kigali are not translated into action on the ground. One argument advanced is that the RPA are as well-behaved as they are because they know their turn is coming when the rains isolate the camps from prying eyes. This is perhaps reinforced by an often-stated RPA point of view (local) that those in Sector 4 probably have something to hide. The status quo in Sector 4 can thus be perceived as a target of opportunity. While this hypothesis is not necessarily supported, its' potential implication are too great to be overlooked; and
- d. Appropriate Agencies. The initial meeting and the subsequent coordination conference included the agencies from Butare area. It became clear later that the Gikongoro area reps of those agencies must also be included in the operation as they are almost separate entities and communications between different offices of the same agency is not what we are accustomed to in the Army. Including them in the coordination Conferences however is cumbersome and problematic. For the time-being it is sufficient that the Butare rep coordinate with the Gikongoro rep after a TAC HQ conference but this is potentially a weak link. Care must be taken to ensure coordination between different Sector reps of agencies is effected.

Conclusions

6. It is concluded that:
- a. Op Homeward, while disappointing to date, is probably the best available option albeit in a modified form. It enjoys the advantage of being in place so that relief agencies don't have to be reconvinced;
 - b. current UNAMIR capability will achieve at best a limited result;
 - c. the agencies must either positively support Op Homeward or BBGNU resources employed to a much greater degree;
 - d. more UNAMIR resources should be dedicated to counter-propaganda; *investigation of incidents so that rumour quashing can*
 - e. rumour quashing must receive higher priority;
 - f. the RPA must be compelled to effect closer liaison with TAC HQ;
 - g. local civil authorities must be more closely integrated;
 - h. overnighting should be avoided; and
 - j. the number of IDP's must be more accurately identified.

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Options

7. There appear to be three options:
- a. maintain status quo. Op Homeward will, at best, achieve extremely limited results;
 - b. cancel Op Homeward. While this would avoid a very heavy resource bill for minimum return this option is unconscionable; or
 - c. adopt a more vigorous approach to Op Homeward.

Recommendation

8. It is recommended that Op Homeward continue (Option C) with the following modifications:
- a. the relief agencies or the BBGNU be coopted to pursue a vigorous relocation propaganda campaign;
 - b. every effort be made to maximize transport resources, perhaps employing RPA vehicles;
 - c. counter-propaganda be emphasized to include rumour quashing as a high priority;
 - d. the RPA and local civil authorities be directed by their central command to participate fully;
 - e. the number of IDP's be more accurately identified using airborne sensors; and
 - f. TAC HQ continue to conduct Op Homeward focused on Sector 4 and incorporate the other refinements mentioned above.

H. Osae-Addae
Col
Comd TAC HQ

5/6

UN SECRET

UN SECRET

Distribution List

Action

FC
HAC

Information

DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
G3 Plans
G4 Log

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UN SECRET

UN RESTRICTED

REF: 5000.4 (LOG)

KIGALI

13 August 1994

TO : ALL IN-COMING CONTINGENTS


FROM : C PLANS

SUBJECT: INFORMATION PACKAGE FOR IN-COMING CONTINGENTS

1. Below is a table of content on the above-mentioned subject.

SERIAL	ITEM(S)	QUANTITY	REMARKS
1.	RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)	1	
2.	MAP OF AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	1	GRIDED MAPS
3.	KIGALI CITY MAP	1	
4.	ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF RWANDA	1	
5.	DRAFT 2 - HPZ CEASEFIRE DOCUS (PART 1 & 2)	1	
6.	BRIEFING NOTES	1	
7.	OP ORDER NO.16 AND AMMENDMENT	1	
8.	OP DIRECTIVE NO.17	1	
9.	UNAMIR SOPs	1	
10.	LOG INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 AND AMMENDMENT	1	
11.	WEEKLY AND DAILY SITREP	1	

2. Please accept for your information and necessary action.


A. BRIMELOW
Lt Col
C PLANS

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