

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

File

To : Mr. Linner, *fk*
Gen. Yacob, Leopoldville.
From : Acting Secgen, New York.
Date : 23 November 1961.
No. : 8241

SECRET

Reference ONUC 6803 and 6822.

1. Ethiopian representative reports strong expression of concern by his government about prospect of their troops being involved in fighting in Kindu. They specifically request that Ethiopian troops not repeat not be employed in any attempted round-up of ANC to capture those involved in the atrocity.
2. What are specific orders which have been given to ONUC troops at Kindu ?
3. Is it likely that round-up operation would be undertaken despite apparently considerable numerical advantage enjoyed by ANC ?

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. Yacob.

*has been replied
by ONUC 6837
24
X1*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : LINNER, YACOB
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 23 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8239.

Reference L-97.

Have asked Italian mission to confirm visit of Italian Minister of defense and Chief of Staff Italian Air Force. In case they arrive, every assistance should be rendered.

We are informed that Italian military would like to withdraw their contingent, whereas their Foreign Minister would like them to remain. We hope Yacob, Morrison and you will succeed in convincing Italian VIPs that there should be no withdrawal, stressing importance of their contribution to ONUC and excellent service rendered by the Italian Air Force. Such a withdrawal would be a serious blow to our air transport capabilities.

The Italian mission suggested informally, that to persuade their Government to sustain their contribution we should further involve them in ONUC operations. Although we were considering elimination of deputy Air Commanders appointment, we would be willing to agree to an Italian being appointed. Seward is also considering using Air Italia for charter.

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

ETAT PRIORITE

IMMEDIATE

To : LINNER, Leo

From: BUNCHE, New York

Date: 23 November 1961

No : 8233

Immediate Linner, Yacob:Italian Defence Minister reaching Leo 23 November.

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To : LINNER, Leo
From : O'BRIEN, New York
Date : 22 Novembre 1961
No : 8218

Return date now uncertain in view Security Council postponement.

Please inform Ivan Smith.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : LINNER *fi*
FROM : A/SECGEN
DATE : 22 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8217.

Bomboko this afternoon requested me to ask you to advise Adoula that the foreign minister's continued presence here will be necessary until SECCO completes its current consideration of Congo question. Since his presence will be helpful I endorse his request and suggest you act on it if you consider it feasible to do so.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : LINNER *h*
FROM : ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 22 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8216.

Reference L-110.

I took this matter up directly with Bomboko. He was uninformed about the proposed purchases of aircraft for training purposes as considered in L-26, L-86 and our 8068. It was made clear to Bomboko that it would compromise positions and create problems if Central Government should buy fighting aircraft in open market and hire non-Congolese crews to fly them. We put stress on political inadvisability and did not raise question of right or law. Bomboko agreed on political unwisdom and that all acquisitions by Central Government of aircraft and personnel to man them should be through UN in context of training assistance. He is speaking with his prime minister by telephone tonight and has said that he will advise him to the above effect.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY. *5*

To : Mr. MacFarquhar, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Gardiner, New York.
Date : 22 November 1961.
No. : 8214

SECRET

Reference ONUC 6762 observe your letter to Klutznick deals only with paragraph 1. Presume you intend discuss paragraph 2 with ONUC. In view of your previous consideration of text do not intend to take any action here.

cc. Mr. MacFarquhar.
Mr. Linner. *✓*

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

TO : LINNER, Leo
FROM : BUNCHE, New York
DATE : 22 November 1961
No : 8213

1. SECCO met morning and afternoon 21 November to discuss three-power draft resolution. Discussion at first hopeful was later marred by sharp exchanges between United States and USSR. Their main difference concerned attempt by us to broaden scope of draft resolution to include regions other than Katanga. After making minor concessions both hardened their positions and despite appeals by Ceylon, Turkey, Liberia and especially Congo, they refused to soften.

2. At end of afternoon meeting it became clear that if SECCO proceeded to vote USSR would veto main U.S. amendments and once these amendments had fallen Three-power draft resolution would not obtain necessary seven votes. Therefore on proposal by U.S. and Liberia meeting adjourned until Friday afternoon 24 November.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : LINNER, YACOB, Leopoldville

h

From : BUNCHE, New York

Date : 22 November 1961

No. : 8211

Tanganyika External Relations wish to be informed of arrival of UN plane carrying court of inquiry personnel inquiring into the UN Italian C-119 crash and evacuating survivors. Please arrange to get all diplomatic clearances in this connection directly through UK Embassy, Leopoldville and keep us informed.

INCOMING CLEAR

ROUTINE

To : ONUC, Leopoldville
From : FIELDSEV, New York
Date : 22 November 1961
No. : 8205

With reference to ONUC 5459 and document S/4940 Add.5 paragraph 3, confirm by cable that Karl Erik Rosen, a member of the Swedish contingent to ONUC, was assigned as member of the crew on the Secretary-General's plane which crashed 18 September.

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner & Yacob *fr*
From : Mac Eoin
Date : 22 Nov. 61
No : 8200

SECRET

Belgian mission inform that UN Commander at Albertville is willing to provide protection to Filtisaf staff employees. Approximately 1400 in all, if additional troops are made available. If such a statement has been made, we fail to understand this as according to your reports our troops in Albertville have the situation under control and therefore need for additional troops should not arise. In any event, our heavy commitments elsewhere would not permit of further reinforcements for Albertville.

We would like maximum assistance provided to civilian needs in order to resume normal life and permit resumption of industrial and other economic activities in Albertville.

Copy sent to F.C. for action

22
x1

Incoming code cable

Priority

SL
File
P22
X1

To : Yacob
From : Bunche
Date : 22 nov 61
No : 8199

SECRET

Ref. our 8165.

Unistates mission now informs that USNS Blatchford will depart
capetown 24 november. ETA Matadi 29 november, ETD Matadi for Lagos 30.

Incoming code cable

File
h
D 22
xi
Priority

To : Jacob
From : Bunche
Date : 22 nov 61
No ; 8198

SECRET

Unikingdom authorities inform that floods in Tanganyika have interrupted air fuel supply to Uganda. Therefore only 50% of normal needs can be supplied at Entebbe. Unations flights should reduce refuelling at Entebbe to absolute minimum.

c.c. Mr Linner

File

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner *SL*
From : Bunche
Date : 22 Nov 61
No : 8197

SECRET

Do you have any information about present whereabouts and activities of Gizenga ? One rumor heard here is that he is trying to organize a new party.

Reply sent on 23 XI

Q

File
Q22
K1

Incoming code cable

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : Linner, Yacob
From : Bunche
Date : 22 Nov. 61
No : 8196

82

SECRET

Ref. I-91.

Do the proposals contained in para 2 have the concurrence of the acting force commander ?

Have a copy for action

Q

Incoming code cable

Priority

File
Q22
xi

SECRET

To : Jacob
From : Bunche
Date : 22 nov 61
No : 8195

Ref. your 6733.

Confirm totals for airframe and engine technicians. Confirm that UN servicing personnel will still be doing the first and second line maintenance on C-47 aircraft. Rikhye will meet 22 november with representatives of missions to discuss possibility of an all scandinavian contingent. If this not possible will try as stated our 8111 of 17 november . Reference your 6595 14 november. Repeat numbers and types of fitters.

c.c. Mr Linner

Incoming code cable

Priority

h
File
22
XI

To : Yacob
From : Mac Eoin
Date : 22 Nov. 61
No : 8194

SECRET

Ref. ONUC 6766.

I fully endorse arrangements made by you. Please inform Brigidaire Hamid that I very much hope that he accepts new arrangements and that you will receive his fullest cooperation.

c.c. Mr, Linner

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To : LINNER, Leo
From : BUNCHE, New York
Date : 21 November 1961
No : 8193

1/ Niger Permanent Representative has submitted to me a complaint concerning failure of a ONUC plane to contact Kano or Niamey when flying over Niger territory as follows: "L'appareil C.46 immatriculé HP 324 des Nations Unies, pilote Pomeroy, parti de Kano le 1er octobre à 17 h 25, n'a contacté ni Kano ni Niamey pendant tout son voyage. C'est seulement à 15 h 37 que Kano a reçu son arrivée à Idriss et NKR l'a transmise.

Comme pour les cas précédents, je vous prie de bien vouloir intervenir auprès des autorités compétentes pour que les observations nécessaires soient faites à cet équipage et pour que des consignes soient strictement données par le responsable de ces vols à tous ses appareils."

2. I answered him 21 November as follows: "Je prends note de la réclamation concernant l'équipage de l'appareil C.46 immatriculé HP 324 des Nations Unies. Soyez assuré que nous prendrons toutes les mesures nécessaires pour que de tels incidents ne se renouvellent pas."

3. Would appreciate your urgent action on subject.

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Dumontet
From : Macfarquhar
Date : 21 Nov 61
No : 8185

SECRET

For Frasca.

Your 6717 Lenaert informs us your instructions carried out. Bradbury fifth shipment retained in Brussels and held Cencorubank's vault. Bankionale proposes hold further shipments in its own vault avoiding transfer and costs. Lenaert equires whether you agree latter point.

c.c. Mr Linner

INCOMING CLEAR

To : LINNER, Leopoldville

h

From : O'BRIEN, New York

Date : 22 November 1961

No. : 8180

Please relay to Ivan Smith Elisabethville. Flying Rome on Monday 27th and booked on to Eville via Usumbura on 29th. Advise House-guest and also that consultations witch-doctor satisfactory.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner. *h*
From : A/SecGen.
Date : 21 Nov 1961.
No. 8179.

SECRET

Referebce L-83.

Time for this may well come but it would seem to us to be premature at present juncture. Therefore, we do not authorize it.

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To :LINNER, Leo
From :BUNCHE, New York
Date : 21 November 1961
No : 8178

1. SECCO met afternoon 20 November and continued discussion Three-Power draft resolution.

2. Chile stated that while he did not overlook and would condemn rebellious movements in other parts of the country, he considered Katanga secession as most perturbing element of Congo crises. Katanga secession, he said, was work of minority instigated and aided from abroad and UN should take all necessary measures to stop foreign intervention and particularly eliminate political advisers, military personnel and mercenaries. However, he added, UN should not give up efforts to promote conciliation and negotiation among Congolese. He listed three urgent tasks for UN:

- (i) strengthen Central Government and provide it with means to maintain unity and integrity;
- (ii) prevent civil war and
- (iii) contribute energetically to complete evacuation of political advisers, military personnel and mercenaries.

While agreeing with draft resolution in general, he objected to paragraph 10, which he said could open door to unilateral actions.~~stop~~. He expressed hope co-sponsors would take into account observations made during debate, particularly those by United States, Turkey and self.

3. Ecuador noted there was general agreement on need to maintain sovereignty, unity and integrity of Congo, support Central Government and provide it with means to exercise sovereignty and maintain unity and integrity. To this end all foreign interference in Katanga should be stopped and mercenaries eliminated. He held no new mandate was required to assist in maintenance law and order since SECGEN was already empowered to provide military and technical assistance to the Central Government to that effect. It sufficed to strengthen existing mandate to eliminate foreign interference and mercenaries. However, he would vote for any resolution aimed at strengthening Central Government and eliminating foreign influence and mercenaries provided it conformed with Charter spirit and UN requirements.

4. Liberia pointed out that there had been no official information on alleged secessionist activities by Gizenga. However, in order to allay fear expressed by certain

Delegations that too much emphasis was laid on Katanga, co-sponsors had revised paragraph 8 of draft resolution to read: "declares that all secessionist activities against Republic of Congo are contrary to Loi Fondamentale and SECCO decisions and specifically demands that such activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith."

5. United States announced his Delegation had submitted amendments to draft resolution. There are seven. Thereupon, on proposal by United Kingdom meeting adjourned until Tuesday morning 21 November.

6. United States amendments (S/4989) would:

i. revise fifth preambular paragraph to read: "deploring all armed action and secessionist activities in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, including specifically those carried on with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a 'sovereign independent nation,' "

ii. add thereafter two new preambular paragraphs: "noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against UN personnel" and "recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,"

iii. revise operative paragraph 2 to read: "further deprecates all armed action against United Nations forces and personnel and against the Government of the Republic of the Congo";

iv. revise operative paragraph 4 to read: "authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the UN command, and mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961;"

v. Add new paragraph 6 as follows: "6. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo to neutralize, where necessary to prevent their use for military purposes against the United Nations, the Republic of the Congo, or the civilian population, aircraft and other weapons of war which have entered the Congo contrary to its laws and UN resolutions;"

vi. Add a new paragraph 11 after original paragraph 9 as follows: "11. Requests the Secretary-General to assist the Government of the Republic of the Congo to reorganize and restrain Congolese armed units and personnel to assist the Government to develop its armed forces for the tasks which confront it;"

vii. Add new penultimate paragraph 13 as follows: "13. Further authorizes the Secretary-General to take all/^{such} steps in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council as he considers necessary, including those of negotiation and conciliation, to achieve the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo".

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Gen. Yacob, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 21 November 1961.
No. : 8177

SECRET

File
Q 21
x1

fr

Ref ONUC 6692. Ghana has offered to provide one company late November and increase its contribution to one battalion late January. Advance party for company of about 20 men will arrive on PanAmerican airways from Accra shortly. ETA will be notified from Accra. We are trying to have main body of company, approximately 110 men, lifted by RAF. If this is not possible, will arrange commercial charter airlift about 30 November.

cc. Gen. Yacob.

Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To : LINNER, Leo
From : BUNCHE, New York
Date : 21 November 1961
Nº : 8167

Following note verbale dated 16 November 1961 received from Permanent Representative of Belgium:

"Le délégué permanent de la Belgique présente ses compliments au Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et se référant à sa note du 9 novembre dernier, relative aux dommages causés à Elisabethville du fait des événements de septembre au Katanga, a l'honneur d'ordre de son Gouvernement, de lui faire la communication suivante.

Ladite note conclut que toute réparation d'un préjudice que pourraient avoir subi des particuliers du fait des hostilités en septembre au Katanga doit être adressé aux Autorités provinciales katangaises dont l'O.N.U. estime que la responsabilité est incontestable. Le Secrétariat général estime que la situation créée à la ville et à l'aéroport d'Elisabethville a été le résultat d'attaques déclenchées délibérément contre les forces de l'O.N.U. par les troupes katangaises conduites et poussées par du personnel militaire et des mercenaires noncongolais et que l'action des forces de l'O.N.U. ne revêt dès lors qu'un caractère de légitime défense.

Le Gouvernement belge ne partage pas ce point de vue. Sans vouloir procéder ici à l'examen critique du rapport Linner, on peut relever, à titre d'exemple, l'inexactitude des attaques formulées à propos de coups de feu tirés du Consulat général de Belgique. Les dommages causés aux locaux du Consulat général, d'où aucun coup de feu n'est parti, ne peuvent pas plus que d'autres être considérés comme des contre-mesures défensives.

En ce qui concerne les dommages subis par la Société Sabena, le Gouvernement belge considère que rien ne justifie que des forces de l'O.N.U. maîtresses de l'Aéroport, aient pillé les installations hôtelières et le magasin de frêto où se trouvaient des marchandises à transporter par avion, puis se soient appropriées d'une partie de matériel roulant et d'équipements technique. Une lettre envoyée le 27 septembre par la Sabena à l'O.N.U.C. Léopoldville donne le détail des déprédations constatées. Ces actes de pillage ne peuvent être justifiés parce que des opérations étaient en cours à Elisabethville et on ne voit pas à quel titre les Autorités katangaises pourraient être tenues pour responsables

de déprédations dont les Forces de l'O.N.U. se sont rendues coupables au détriment d'une société privée dont le Gouvernement belge se doit de défendre les légitimes intérêts. C'est pourquoi les Autorités belges renouvellent leur demande de procéder à une évaluation contradictoire des dégâts, pertes et vols subis à l'intervention des Forces des Nations Unies qui occupaient l'Aérodrome d'Elisabethville.

Le Délégué permanent de la Belgique saisit cette occasion de renouveler au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies les assurances de sa très haute considération."

Following note verbale in reply dispatched to Permanent Representative of Belgium today:

"Le Secrétaire général par interim de l'Organisation des Nations Unies présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies et, se référant à sa note D.412 A/N.S.2488 du 16 novembre 1961 relative aux dommages causés à Elisabethville du fait des événements de septembre au Katanga, a l'honneur de lui faire la communication suivante.

Le Secrétaire général par interim regrette que le Gouvernement belge conteste le fait, qui lui a été exposé dans la note verbale du 9 novembre, que la situation créée à la ville et à l'Aéroport d'Elisabethville a été le résultat d'attaques déclenchées délibérément contre les forces de l'ONU par les troupes katangaises conduites et poussées par du personnel militaire et des mercenaires non congolais. Les rapports du fonctionnaire chargé de l'ONUC et les notes du Secrétariat adressées au Représentant permanent ont nettement établi que l'action des Forces de l'ONU ne revêt dès lors qu'un caractère de légitime défense.

Quant aux locaux du 'Consulat général' de Belgique, le Secrétaire général par interim regrette que ceux-ci aient été endommagés pendant les hostilités. Il a toutefois l'honneur de se référer à la lettre que le Sous-Secrétaire aux Affaires politiques spéciales a adressée au Représentant permanent en date du 13 octobre, d'où il ressort que les troupes des Nations Unies installées dans le bureau de poste n'ont pas cessé, pendant plusieurs jours, d'essuyer des coups de feu tirés de l'immeuble dont la Mission belge occupe deux étages. La Force des Nations Unies, en état de légitime défense, ne pouvait que riposter. Les troupes des Nations Unies avaient l'ordre de ne pas tirer sur les fenêtres de la Mission belge et se sont conformées de leur mieux à ces instructions,

mais, particulièrement au cours de combats de nuit, il était manifestement impossible de ne pas endommager les locaux consulaires proprement dits.

L'ancien Consul général de Belgique, Monsieur Henri Crener, tout en niant qu'aucun coup de feu soit parti des étages occupés par le Consulat général, a reconnu -ce qui est d'ailleurs un fait notoire- que des tirailleurs ont maintenu le feu contre les positions de l'ONU en tirant, surtout la nuit, du bâtiment où se trouvent les locaux du Consulat général de Belgique.

Il n'est pas exact que des forces de l'ONU aient causé les dommages dont se plaint la Société Sabéna. Le fait est que, pendant les événements quelques centaines de réfugiés, parmi lesquels des blessés, ~~saxsont~~ ont afflué à l'Aéroport, après des sévices commis par la Gendarmerie katangaise contre une partie de la population environnante. Les Forces de l'ONU, obligées à se défendre contre les attaques, aériennes et autres, des mercenaires, n'ont pas pu maintenir une surveillance complète des réfugiés et il est possible que certains d'entre eux se soient livrés à des déprédations, toutefois, comme la présence des réfugiés fut le résultat direct de la politique de haine inter-tribale menée par les Autorités katangaises, l'ONU ne peut prendre aucune responsabilité pour les conséquences de cette situation.

Dans ces conditions, le Secrétaire général par interim ne peut que maintenir la position qu'il a exposé dans sa note du 9 novembre, dans laquelle il déclarait ne pouvoir consentir à une évaluation commune, ou contradictoire, de dommages dont l'ONU ne saurait accepter la responsabilité, et indiquait, par ailleurs, que toute demande en réparation d'un préjudice que pourraient avoir subi des particuliers ou des sociétés du fait des attaques menées contre l'ONUC et contre les positions tenues par l'ONUC en vertu de son mandat, doit être adressée aux Autorités provinciales katangaises.

New York, le 18 novembre 1961"

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Gen. Yacob, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 21 November 1961.
No. : 8166

SECRET

File
D
21
X

fi

Reference ONUC 7585.

Control Tower for Ethiopian jets will arrive Leo 24 November on regular USAF supply flight. Canadian personnel for this Tower will arrive Leo 24 November on North Star flight.

cc. Gen. Yacob.

Mr. Linner. ✓

*Air Commodore informed.
He had already been told.*

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

File

To : Gen. Yacob, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 21 November 1961.
No. : 8165

SECRET

82 *4*

Reference ONUC 6660 and our 8078.

USNS Blatchford's departure from Capetown postponed 48 hours. Ship will arrive Matadi 27 November. ETD Matadi for Lagos 28.

cc. Gen. Yacob.

Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

To : Dumontet, Leopoldville.
From : MacFarquhar, New York.
Date : 20 November 1961.
No. : 8157

SECRET

File
Q 21
x1

Sc

For Frasca.

Your ONUC 6717. Message communicated to Lenaert.

cc. Mr. Dumontet.

Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner,
Gen. Yacob, Leopoldville.
From : Acting SECGEN, New York.
Date : 20 November 1961.
No. : 8155

SECRET

Reference ONUC ⁶⁶⁷¹ ~~6671~~ 6708 and L-66.

1. Authorization is given to employ UN jet aircraft in aerial action against any Congolese troops which are endangering the lives of UN troops by actually attacking them or by moving directly against them with hostile intent. Such action is to be taken only as a last resort and should be limited to those measures clearly necessary to the defence of ONUC troops and other personnel. No action of this kind is to be ordered, however, without prior warning in ample time, to the authorities concerned. Due care should be exercised to avoid casualties among non-involved civilians.

2. The caution implicit in this authorization is underscored by your para 3.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓

Gen. Yacob.

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To : LINNER, Leo
From : BUNCHE, New York
Date : 21 November 1961
N° : 8154

Your L-28, 29, 72 and ONUC 6661, 6684. Following note verbale dispatched today to Permanent Representative of Belgium:

"Le Secrétaire général par interim de l'Organisation des Nations Unies présente ses compliments au Représentant permanent de la Belgique et, se référant à la note verbale D.2458 du Représentant permanent, en date du 10 novembre, a l'honneur de lui communiquer ce qui suit au sujet de la situation existant à Bukavu.

En ce qui concerne les problèmes de sécurité qui se posent ou pourraient encore se poser par suite de mouvements de troupes, les représentants de l'ONUC déploient tous leurs efforts, en coopération avec les autorités congolaises, pour assurer le respect des droits de l'homme et le maintien de l'ordre public.

Le Colonel Kisemba, dont l'arrivée à Bukavu est mentionnée dans la note du Représentant permanent, a signé avec les dirigeants du Gouvernement provincial un accord par lequel il s'est engagé à veiller à ce que les mesures de sécurité prises à la frontière du Ruanda ne donnent pas lieu à des abus. Les personnes dont on constaterait que les papiers ne sont pas en règle se verraient refuser l'entrée mais ne seraient pas détenues. Il a aussi été convenu que l'on mettrait fin immédiatement aux mauvais traitements infligés à des personnes non congolaises.

M. Miruho, Président de la Province, s'efforce de faire procéder sans délai aux mouvements de troupes envisagée, afin d'assurer une prompte évacuation de Bukavu par les troupes de l'ANC.

Les autorités civiles et militaires de l'ONUC font tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour aider les autorités congolaises à rester maîtres de la situation. Elles ont jusqu'à présent réussi à éviter tout incident grave.

New York, le 20 novembre 1961"

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To : LINNER, Leo
From : BUNCHE, New York
Date : 20 November 1961
Nº : 8153

Your L-47, 73. Following note verbale dispatched today to Permanent Representative of Belgium:

"Le Secrétaire général par interim de l'Organisation des Nations Unies présente ses compliments au Représentant permanent de la Belgique et, rappelant la note verbale du Représentant permanent Nº U.2468 du 14 novembre 1961 et sa propre note de même date sur la même question, a l'honneur de se référer à l'exposé de la situation à Albertville qui figure dans le rapport du fonctionnaire chargé de l'ONUC (S/4930/Add.13, Section D).

Après que la situation se fut aggravée, comme l'indiquent les paragraphes 21 et 22 de ce rapport, à la suite des événements mentionnés dans la note du Secrétaire général par interim en date du 14 novembre, les fonctionnaires de l'ONUC ont organisé de nouvelles évacuations d'étrangers vers Usumbura et accordé protection à ceux qui demeuraient dans la ville. Parmi les personnes évacuées le 14 novembre figuraient 27 employés non Congolais de la FILTISAF et leurs familles, soit 65 personnes au total. Dix-sept autres employés de la FILTISAF se seraient offerts à rester à Albertville sous la protection des Nations Unies.

Les derniers rapports indiquent que la sécurité dans la ville s'est sensiblement améliorée grâce aux efforts incessants des fonctionnaires de l'ONUC, travaillant en coopération avec les représentants du Gouvernement Central. L'ONUC a posté des agents de police en armes dans les locaux de la FILTISAF et les patrouilles dans le secteur ont été doublées. S'il n'a malheureusement pas encore été possible d'assurer la reprise sans restrictions des activités normales, car vouloir assurer une protection complète dans de telles conditions amènerait à immobiliser plus de troupes des Nations Unies que l'on ne peut en distraire tant que l'ONUC ne^{se} sera pas mieux acquittée des autres responsabilités pressantes qui lui incombent à Albertville touchant le rétablissement et le maintien de l'ordre public.

New York, le 20 novembre 1961"

INCOMING CODE

SECRET

PRIORITY *gvl*

To: LINNER, YACOB, LEO *fx*
From: BUNCHE, MACEOIN, NEW YORK
Date: 20 November 1961
No. 8152.

Reference L-69 and L-82.

Italian Foreign Minister made a strong demarche for inclusion of an Italian National on commission of inquiry. Gen MacEoin indicated that there was precedent for this and idea was strongly endorsed here. Therefore, Italian Foreign Minister has been given formal assurance by Secretary General that this will be done, which was the reason for MacEoins 8140 to Yacob. This assurance must be fulfilled. Gen MacEoin would have preferred a straight UN military inquiry. Attaching an Italian Civilian from ONUC will not repeat not fulfill the promise made. Must therefore request that an Italian officer from ONUC be added to UN nominees to commission and Adoula be informed accordingly. Please confirm action taken. This commission should be set up quickly and if the Central Government does not respond, we should establish an exclusively UN commission. Adoula may be informed that it has been the practice to include a National of same country as victims on such commissions, as in case of Port Francqui and Matadi inquiries.

Dist Dr. Linner
Gen. Yacob.

*I have a copy for discussion
on 20.11. at Cabinet.* *Q*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

File

TO : LINNER *82*
FROM : A/SEC GEN
DATE : 18 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8147.

Reference para 7 of L-63 and L-64.

1. Has there been any report from Eville on these broadcasts ?
2. Is it possible to obtain a translation of the monitoring of these inflammatory broadcasts in Lingala from Central Government information service ? Would be useful to have full text.

" 3. Such activity is clearly a flagrant breach of cease-fire agreement and leads inevitably to question whether clear warning should not be given to Katangese authorities that if such broadcasts continue, UN shall have to consider taking steps to stop them. Views of you and Smith on this would be appreciated. "

*Sent to Eville (1 and 3)
Para 2 being investigated
by Harman Ho.*

*19
X.*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : LINNER, YACOB
FROM : A/SEC GEN
DATE : 18 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8146.

Reference ONUC 6671 and L-66.

1. Is there any indication known to you of actual movement of ANC reinforcements from Stan or Kasongo to Kindu or is this merely an assumption that such move is likely ?

2. How would " endangered " be interpreted ? Would mere movement out of Stan or Kasongo suffice to " endanger " ?

3. Has consideration been given to possible effect of such aerial action by UN against ANC elements on ANC throughout Congo ? Could it create a wave of hostility against UN troops throughout Congo and endanger our position in many places ?

4. There is some division of opinion here on efficacy of strafing on troop movements, and on likely reaction among congolese. Withholding authorization you request, therefore, pending receipt your answers to my questions and further study here.

*For Commander's office is
preparing draft reply.*

*D 19
X*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

File
PRIORITE

TO : LINNER *SL*
FROM : A/SEC GEN
DATE : 18 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8145.

Reference L-65.

I agree with Khiary that it would be inadvisable for him to accompany Sendwe on tour of North Katanga. As to sending someone else from ONUC, your reason in favour is understood but I am not at all sure that it would be strong enough to overcome obvious objections to a direct UN association with a political action that is purely internal.

Copy given to Khiary

SL
19
81

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : DUMONT~~ET~~ *h*
FROM : MACFARQUHAR
DATE : 18 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8144.

Your ONUC 6642 and 6651 utilisation of counterpart funds
for development will be included in my discussions in Leopoldville.

cc : Linner.

COPY

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITIES

TO : YACOB
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 18 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8138.

52

Reference ONUC 6645.

We have no knowledge of delay of Nigerian rotation or Irish repatriation, nor have US authorities here and in Paris with whom we have checked. Air clearance were granted on 16th and communicated to those concerned. If for any reason airlifts have been delayed, please expedite take off.

cc : Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : LINNER
FROM : A/SEC GEN
DATE : 18 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8137.

Reference L-57.

1. We note with some relief that views set forth in this message are " personal comments " of Englund and are not expression of official attitude. We assume that mere transmission of them by you does not imply their endorsement. We say this because as we tried to make clear in our recent telex exchange, supposition and deduction, however convinced we may be of soundness of conclusions, cannot take place of substance as basis for official action in a matter of this kind.

2. The phrase in para 1 reading " not withstanding the steps so far taken by the superior UN organs " in the context in which it is found is totally incomprehensible to us and we request that it be explained. We would also like explanation of the basis on which the strange new role for the UN can be justified, namely, to build up public opinion against a congelese leader with a view to eliminating him as a politician.

File

TO : LINNER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 18 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8136.

1. Advisory Committee met morning 17 November under Secretary-General's chairmanship. In opening statement Secgen pointed to urgency solving Congo crisis and disclosed tentative plan to eliminate once and for all mercenaries in Katanga, who he said were main problem. In ensuing discussion following questions were raised.

2. Kindu massacre was deplored by Ghana, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Mali. They called for effective measures to prevent recurrence of like incidents or severe punishment of culprits.

3. Referring to allegations made in Secco concerning secessionist movement by Gizenga, representatives of Ghana, Ethiopia, India and Liberia expressed desire to be given more information on subject.

4. With reference to tentative plan disclosed by Secgen, India and Mali agreed with importance of eliminating mercenaries but observed ventral problem was not mercenaries but secession of Katanga. Mali called for closer cooperation between UN force and ANC to settle problem. Nigeria considered pressure should be put on neighbouring countries to prevent return of Mercenaries. In reply to questions put by Tunisia and Liberia, Secgen said present mandate allowed him to implement tentative plan and ONUC had means to implement plan effectively although time factor was important.

5. Composition and policy of UN force was also raised by a number of members. Ethiopia and Nigeria pointed to danger sending small units of say 250 men to isolated spots... Ethiopia called for more men and better equipment for force. India did not think troops insufficient and described ONUC unsuccesses to inadequate military instructions, lack liaison between Headquarters and fields and inadequate transport facilities. He criticized particularly conduct of operation during September fighting.

6. Finally, lack of intelligence was again raised. Nigeria and Mali urged Secgen to give attention to question.

Copy given to Khany

Q 19
X

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To : LINNER, Leo
From : BUNCHE, New York
Date : 18 November 1961
Nº : 8132

Reference our 8131 Tshombe's message to SECGEN of 14 November reads:

"Le Président du Katanga présente ses compliments au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies et par le présent télégramme, au nom du Gouvernement, du Parlement et du Peuple katangais, réaffirme l'existence du Katanga comme nation souveraine et indépendante, ainsi que sa volonté expresse de parvenir par des moyens exclusivement pacifiques au règlement des problèmes en cours. Un an d'indépendance de facto ainsi que les récents événements ont prouvé à suffisance les sentiments de liberté et de justice qui guident les actions du peuple katangais. En outre, le monde a dû constater la faillite de toutes les formules proposées jusqu'à présent pour régler le problème katangais. Enfin le Gouvernement du Katanga, malgré le refus par le Gouvernement de Léopoldville d'accepter les toutes récentes propositions qui lui ont été faites en vue d'une union économique, douanière, monétaire et militaire garantissant par ailleurs l'autonomie politique du Katanga, demeure partisan de la négociation pour régler la question. Le Katanga, à l'exemple de toutes les nations démocratiques, se réclame du principe sur lequel se fonde l'existence même des Nations Unies, selon lequel, tous les peuples et toutes les nations ont le droit d'autodétermination, notamment le droit de déterminer librement leur status politique, économique et culturel. Le Katanga a la fierté de déclarer dès à présent, et publiquement, qu'il s'engage à respecter les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies. Le Président du Katanga remercie vivement par avance le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies pour l'attention qu'il voudra bien réserver à la présente communication et pour les mesures qu'il voudra bien prendre en vue d'en informer les Etats Membres -

Moïse Tshombé

Président du Katanga "

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To : Linnér, Léo
From : Bunche, New York
Date : 18 November 1961
No : 8131

1. SECCO met afternoon 17 November and continued discussion on threepower draft resolution.
2. Belgium, replying to USSR charges, denied Belgian officials had intervened in recent events in Katanga and Belgians at Consulate had killed UN troops. He would welcome impartial international investigation of facts contained in ONUC report that he refuted. He stated that he had made great effort to meet UN demands and comply with UN decisions and would continue to do so. He added Belgium categorically opposed secession of Katanga. While he shared view that UN should not fail in Congo, he considered maintenance of order should be left to Central Government assisted by UN. He still believed negotiations were right road to take regarding Congo and UN should assist in bringing about negotiations. Para
3. India stated that it would be wrong to concentrate on mercenaries alone because Katanga secession was essential problem. Referring to September operation, he wanted to know from SECGEN why UN Force had failed, what circumstances caused ONUC to call off its action and to what extent ceasefire and its implementation were consistent with UN objectives. As to suggestions regarding conciliation, he recalled UN had promoted conciliation by several resolutions but certain Congolese leaders had refused to cooperate and had sought military solution. Conciliation, he held, could not be made at expense of sovereignty and unity of Congo. Turning to draft resolution, he observed all it asked for was implementation of UN objectives and it was only fair to give new SECGEN full authority to act. He hoped SECCO would not end discussion without a decision to support ONUC and would adopt draft resolution unanimously.
4. Turkey said his Delegation stood for unity, territorial integrity and independence of Congo and resolutely opposed all secessionist activities in Katanga, Orientale or elsewhere. He considered main effort ONUC should be to eliminate all foreign interference in all forms including mercenaries. ONUC should also do everything possible to bring about Congolese conciliation. Turning to draft resolution he stated he was in agreement with all its provisions except wording paras four and ten. He further observed that draft was dated 14 November and therefore did not take into account events which had occurred since that date.

5. UK after refuting allegations by Ethiopia that UK or Rhodesian authorities helped Tshombe's cause, stated that his Government supported UN policy in Congo and stood for united Congo. It was opposed to secessionist activities, foreign interference and attempt to impose solution by force. Solution Congo problem should be based on reconciliation to be brought about peacefully and by negotiation. Regarding draft resolution, he said that while he agreed with many of its provisions, he had objections on two points. Firstly it was directed too exclusively to Katanga problem; its terms should be made broad to deal with all secessionist activities. Secondly para 4 was too loosely drafted and its application might inflame situation; UK was in favour of removal mercenaries but not at cost of bloodshed.

6. After Ethiopia and Congo spoke in reply to points raised, Belgium took floor again. In second statement he admitted it was impossible for Central Government to negotiate with Tshombe on basis latter's message to SECGEN (reaffirming Katanga as sovereign and independent nation) but observed that negotiations could be sought on other bases.

7. On proposal US who wanted more time for consultation regarding "language draft resolution" meeting was adjourned until Monday afternoon.

Incoming code cable

1) Lwille
2) File
MOST IMMEDIATE
Q
18
XI
52

To : Dumontet
From : Macfarquhar
Date : 18 Nov 61
No : 8127

SECRET

Your ONUC 6654 public law 480 title one agreement. We received documents from Americans only this afternoon with inquiry whether we had any objection to their signing agreement with Government of Congo tomorrow. They do not require simultaneous signature agreement with Unations. Latter differs from draft we suggested to them in august and we are likely to suggest amendments. Thus memorandum of understanding between Unations and United States cannot repeat cannot be signed at present.

We have so advised State department who are in no hurry about this part of the transaction. We have told them we have no objection to their going ahead with the signing of the agreement with Congo tomorrow but we have also pointed out to them that the provision in the accompanying letter for conversion of two per cent of proceeds needs prior approval of monetary council. They will advise Embassy accordingly.

c.c. Mr Linner

Incoming code cable

Priority

File
D 18
XI

To : Jacob
From : Bunche
Date : 17 Nov 61
No : 8111

82

Ref. proposed reduction of C-47 squadron to ten aircraft and thirteen crews. Will ask Ethiopia to provide one crew, Brazil and scandinavian bloc each to provide six crews plus all the servicing personnel. Advise immediately how many servicing personnel by trade are required so the missions can be contacted.

c.c. Mr. Linner

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

To : LINNER, Leo
From : BUNCHE, New York
Date : 17 November 1961
Nº : 8110

Following Note Verbale dispatched today to Permanent Representative of Belgium:

"Le Secrétaire généra; par interim de l'Organisation des Nations Unies présente ses compliments à M. le Représentant permanent de la Belgique et, comme suite à la note verbale S.2455 du 9 novembre, a l'honneur de se référer au rapport du fonctionnaire chargé de l'opération des Nations Unies au Congo sur les incidents de Luluabourg (document S/4940/Add.13, Section B).

Le Secrétaire général par interim déplore les actes de violence et de brutalité qui ont été commis à Luluabourg pendant la nuit du 1er au 2 novembre 1961, au cours de laquelle des troupes de l'ANC, refusant d'obéir à l'officier qui les commandait, ont appréhendé des civils non Congolais, notamment des Belges.

Comme il est dit dans le rapport, les perquisitions se sont tout d'abord déroulées sans incident fâcheux; des officiers de l'ONUC se sont assurés que les civils, au nombre de 300 environ, étaient amenés à l'hôtel Pax et relâchés assez rapidement après vérification d'identité. Chaque fois qu'ils ont reçu des appels à l'aide, les officiers et le personnel civil des Nations Unies ont pris sous leur protection les personnes qui craignaient d'être molestées.

Le Secrétaire-général par interim regrette que, du fait de l'obscurité, le personnel de l'ONUC n'ait eu aucun moyen de savoir qu'un groupe de 30 à 40 soldats, dans une certaine zone, s'était livré à des dérèglements et avait commis des atrocités. On ne saurait méconnaître que les membres d'une force employée à maintenir l'ordre public ne peuvent jamais garantir que tous les crimes seront prévenus. D'un autre côté, les représentants de l'ONUC demandent instamment que les coupables reçoivent le châtiment qu'ils méritent, et les autorités congolaises enquêteraient actuellement à cette fin sur les incidents en question.

Les autorités de l'ONUC ont également fait des démarches pour obtenir que les restrictions imposées à la délivrance des visas de sortie fussent rapportées. On signale que toutes les personnes qui désirent quitter Luluabourg peuvent désormais le faire sans difficulté.

New York, le 17 novembre 1961 "

End.

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner
From : Bunche
Date : 17 nov 61
No : 8109

£ → 70 Q

SECRET

Ethiopian representative has informed me that his government may be sending to Stanleyville a high ranking Official to use his good offices toward reconciliation of Adoula-Gizenga. Nothing more is known.

*I have taken a copy
for discussion.*

*Q 18
X1*

*sent to England for info
translation given to Khimay*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Mr. Hanakawa

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER *SE*
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 17 NOV 1961
NUMBER : 8107.

SECRET

Further your 2568.

Observer Federal Republic Germany informed us today
his government has instructed its mission at Leopoldville
to cooperate in repatriating Wiltowski to West Germany.

Have given her with a copy

18
11

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

TO : LINNER, Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE, New York
DATE : 17 November 1961
Nº : 8104

Para one. SECCO met afternoon sixteen November. Statements on threepower draft resolution were made by Ceylon, USA, UK, China and USSR.

Para two. After berating Spaak for attacking UN officials and paying tribute to devotion of these officials, Ceylon replied to some of his criticisms on draft resolution. He observed that ONUC had been able to establish lists of mercenaries and would have no difficulty in identifying and eliminating them if given power to do so. He also observed that UN had tried to effect conciliation, even to point of appeasement, and that draft resolution would not prevent Tshombe from going to Leo to negotiate if he wanted to. Draft resolution would not ask SECGEN to go to war, but only to use requisite measure of force to implement mandate.s It would strengthen UN and facilitate conciliation. He asked Belgium to cooperate with UN and respect territorial integrity and independence of Congo. Finally he expressed shock at massacre of Italian crew in Kindu, pointed to necessity of taking effective measures to restore law and order in all parts of Congo and called for urgent adoption of draft resolution.

Para three. US, referring to Gizenga's open defiance of Central Government and massacre of Italian crew in Kindu, expressed concern over worsening situation and welcomed SECGEN's stated determination to restore order. He said US fully supported unified Congo and adamantly opposed secession Katanga. But he observed that secessionist move in Orientale was even graver and should be prevented. He considered present mandate reasonably adequate but intentions ONUC often frustrated and suggested SECGEN should be given more responsibility, be allowed to take vigorous action on mercenaries and hasten retraining of ANC. Turning to threepower draft resolution, he considered it constructive but not fully sufficient for it laid emphasis on one aspect of question in detriment to others. He considered further consultations were essential. Finally he announced his Delegation's intention to submit own draft resolution.

Para four. UK expressed concern over deteriorating situation in Albertville and Kindu, particularly shocking massacre of Italian crew, and asked Secretariat to keep SECCO closely informed of further developments. He cautioned against concentrating

attention on difficulties in one part of Congo and forgetting other parts. Main emphasis for UN action, he considered, should be on pacification and conciliation, but he was not yet in position to decide on course of action.

Para five. China considered while draft resolution dealt adequately with foreign interference, it should also contain appeal for conciliation and request SECCO to ensure its implementation. He reminded SECCO Charter forbade interference in domestic affairs and UN should avoid participation in civil war.

Para six. USSR then took floor to make preliminary observations. After expressing shock at massacre of Italian crew, he stated that Katanga was center of foreign interference, and facts indicating direct interference in Katanga by Belgian civilians, officers and mercenaries had never been refuted. He derided Spaak's suggestion concerning conclusion of agreement between ONUC and Tshombe to facilitate implementation of A-2. He rejected Spaak's view that it would be difficult to identify mercenaries, citing from document S/4790 list of mercenaries and description of manner in which they were recruited. Regarding US's reference to secessionist movement in Stanleyville, he observed there was no evidence on subject and hinted it was an attempt to draw SECCO's attention away from main issue of Katanga. Draft resolution, he said, dealt with that main issue and proposed decisive measures to achieve unity, although it did not mention real culprits. Despite this weakness, his Delegation would support it.

Para seven. France, Congo, Liberia, Chile and Ecuador associated themselves with expressions of shock and condolences regarding massacre of Italian crew. Referring to allusions to secession movement led by Gizenga, Liberia observed SECCO had no information on subject and would welcome such information from Secretariat.

Para eight. Discussion to resume Friday afternoon 17 November.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner,
Gen. Yacob, Leopoldville.
From : A/SECGEN, New York. *SL*
Date : 17 November 1961.
No. : 8101

SECRET

Reference L-53.

We agree to the move of 35 Ethiopian battalion from Bunia to Goma to replace Malayan Recce Regiment which is to move to Kindu. We would appreciate Brigadier Hamid's appraisal as basis for comment on number of troops required for Kindu.

MacEoin has seen this cable.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. Yacob.

No action until
Hamid arrives.

SL 17
xi

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville. *SL*
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 17 November 1961.
No. : 8100

SECRET

1. When you last considered question of signing the long since agreed text of the status agreement you felt that the then expected early return of Bomboko to Leopoldville made it preferable for you to wait to sign on his return rather than with the prime minister without the foreign minister. This seemed proper as a matter of protocol since it was with Bomboko also and not only Adoula that the Secretary-General was about to sign in September.

2. Election of the Acting Secretary-General and continued presence of Bomboko in New York raise the question whether it might not better serve to eliminate further undesirable delays if they proceeded to sign here. Before taking this up with Bomboko, however, we think it might be well for you to clear with Adoula that this procedure meets with his approval. If it does not, we would have no objection to your arranging for prompt signature by the prime minister and yourself in Leopoldville.

3. Please advise. We can prepare fair copies here as we have carbon of text Secretary-General was to sign.

*will check this with
legal advisors and
prepare reply. 17 x*

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

TO : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 16 November 1961

Nº : 8087

Addendum 13 circulated 16 November Text as follows:

"A. Report on action by troops of the Government of the Republic of the Congo in the Kasai-Katanga border area and on hostilities involving Gendarmerie units in the Province of Katanga

1. This report concerne the action undertaken in the Kasai-Katanga border area by troops of the Government of the Republic of the Congo under the command of General Mobutu, and the hostilities which broke out when that action, described by the Government as a police operation, was resisted by Gendarmerie units under the control of the Katanga Provincial Government.

2. The Central Government's operation was launched from bases in Kasai. ONUC Headquarters knew of fairly large ANC troops movements, centring in the Luluabourg and Luputa areas, towards the end of September, but was not aware of the real intentions of the ANC command or of the precise dates when ANC units actually entered Katangese territory.

3. While United Nations observers were dispatched to the scene, they were unable to cross into Katangese territory or to establish at first hand the depth of ANC penetration into the province. Similarly, although there were unconfirmed reports of numerous aerial bombardments by Katanga-based aircraft, ONUC observers witnessed only two incursions into and bombings of Kasai by such aircraft. Reports on the hostilities were issued variously by the Government, General Mobutu and the Katanga Provincial Authorities.

4. Mercenaries may have been involved in this operation on the Katangese side, but none was actually seen by United Nations observers. It can be assumed with virtual certainty, however, that the Katanga-based aircraft were manned by non-Congolese personnel, since it is known that there are no Congolese pilots to fly such craft. It may be noted in this connexion that, according to ONUC reports 237 persons, chiefly mercenaries, covered by the provisions of paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961: remain in Katanga; 388 Sukh persons have been evacuated,

including 317 Belgians. The twelve military officers attached to the Belgian "Consulate" in Elisabethville have likewise booked passage to leave the Congo.

5. The United Nations Force Commander has transmitted the information on these matters which is set forth below. (C) Ground force movements (I) Forces under the command of General Mobutu. Between 21 September and 1 October, one battalion from Thysville and one from Leopoldville were air-lifted to Luluabourg, where they joined a third ANC battalion already stationed in the Kasai provincial capital. The latter battalion proceeded by road to Luiza, completing the move by 13 October. On 20 October, General Mobutu confirmed radio and press reports of a clash between the leading elements of this force and Gendarmerie troops inside the Katanga border on the Katanga road. On 31 October, ANC Headquarters reported this force to be 30 kilometres inside Katanga. On 6 November, however, General Mobutu stated that this unit had not in fact moved into Katanga and was still intact. On 13 October, the two battalions from Thysville and Leopoldville commenced a move by rail from Luluabourg to Luputa near the Katanga border. ANC Headquarters reported the move complete by 15 October. Reports from Brigadier Goulson, United Nations Commander at Luluabourg, indicated that by 25 October some probing attacks by both sides had taken place and that some ANC casualties had been evacuated to Luluabourg. On 31 October, ANC Headquarters reported that its force was 60 kilometres inside Katanga along the road to Kaniama. However, it is said that air attacks allegedly accounting for the retreat of this force on 2 November, took place in the general area of Tshisamba, about 10 kilometres inside Katanga. (II) Forces under the command of General Lundula. It was also reported that a detachment of picked soldiers from the Stanleyville area was to make up a new unit for a move on Katanga from the North. The first element, air-lifted by chartered air Congo planes, landed in Kindu on 24 October. By 4 November, this force had grown to 54 officers and 1,887 other ranks. On the same date, it was confirmed by the United Nations Malayan unit at Kindu that the move by rail and road to Kasongo, near the Katanga border, had commenced. On 6 November, only 905 ANC troops remained in Kindu. The troops at Kindu were not engaged in the recent military operations, which took place only along the Katanga-Kasai border. The continuing move towards the Northeastern part of North Katanga could indicate, however, that operations inside Katanga are contemplated in this area. The strongest garrison of the Katanga Gendarmerie there is at Kongolo. (B) Katanga aerial activity several air attacks are reported to have taken place in the area of

operations, and those which were actually witnessed by ONUC have been reported in paragraph 6 of the report of the Officer-in-Charge (S/4940/Add.12). Other attacks by Katangese aircraft were reported by the ANC to have taken place on 22, 27, 28 and 31 October, but ONUC is unable to confirm them independently. Again, on 2 November, the ANC commander at Luluabourg, Colonel Ndjoko, reported that a Katangese airplane which had come from the direction of Kaniama had dropped approximately 42 small bombs on an ANC column at Tshisamba, near the border put inside Katangese territory. This, too, is unconfirmed. On 3 November, the United Nations commander in Kasai Province reported that he had visited Luputa by helicopter to verify the reports of aerial activity. He was unable to go further because the government troops at Tshisamba had withdrawn into Kasai territory, leaving no government troops on the Katanga side. He reported that information on the air attacks was confused; raids might have been carried out by two DC-3's and two lighter type aircraft which dropped some 40 small bombs. This attack is said to have been followed up by an air-drop of parachutists using two DC-4 aircraft. Many non-Congolese soldiers are said to have taken part in this move. One ANC company was reported dispersed with all contacts lost. ~~xxxxReport concerning the events in x~~
~~Luluabourgxx~~

B. Report concerning the events in Luluabourg.

6. During the night of 1-2 November, ANC troops in Luluabourg undertook a house-to-house search for a clandestine radio transmitter rumoured to have been used for the benefit of the Katanga Gendarmerie. About 300 non-Congolese nationals were reported to have been detained for questioning, but they were soon released. The ANC Commander in Luluabourg, Colonel NDJOKO, was known to have been opposed to this operation, but to have been forcibly prevented by his officers from halting it. Nevertheless, it began in an orderly manner; a Nigerian officer visited the central area, together with an ANC officer, and reported that there had been no untoward incidents by 0330 hours.

7. Later in the night some calls for assistance were received, whereupon ONUC officers and civil staff proceeded to the scene and offered protection to persons who feared molestation. At that time there had been no reports of serious mistreatment.

8. In the morning hours it became known, however, that a group of 30 to 40 ANC soldiers had become disorderly in one area. WHO reports indicate that 8 women were raped, and that one woman suffered a spine injury when she jumped from a window to escape attackers.

9. Thereupon, ONUC forces redoubled their efforts to afford all possible help

and protection to the foreign population of the town. With the assistance of the ONUC commander and civilian representative, Col. Ndjoko succeeded in confining the ANC troops to camp and restoring calm. Joint guards were established at places where about 200 foreigners had sought refuge, and joint patrolling of the town was instituted.

10. During the night of 2-3 November, UN forces offered protection to a number of non-Congolese families as a precautionary measure, but the night passed without incident.

11. In view of an incipient exodus of persons of European origin, the Provincial Authorities imposed restrictions on the granting of exit visas, but ~~there~~ they were cancelled after vigorous representations by UN officials. All persons who wished to leave were subsequently reported doing so without difficulty. Some Belgian women in responsible positions, particularly the social welfare officers, have nevertheless chosen to remain at their posts.

12. The danger of panic among foreign nationals was reported acute on 4 and 5 November, in anticipation of the arrival of a trainload of troops returning from the Katanga border area. Upon their arrival in Luluabourg on 5 November, 132 of their number, described as mutineers, were disarmed by the Nigerian troops. The United Nations Commander, Brigadier Goulson, acting on the request of Col. Ndjoko, arranged for their immediate transport to Leopoldville by United Nations aircraft. Thirty-eight others, mostly NCO's, remained in Luluabourg until further orders.

13. Among the Congolese, fears have tended to mount dangerously in connexion with recurrent unconfirmed rumours of impending raids by aircraft of the Katanga Gendarmerie. Should such air raids occur, they would be countered by United Nations air action as indicated in the report of the Officer-in-Charge (S/4940/Add.12, Section (C)).

14. Further disturbances were reported during the evening of 9 November: some 180 ANC troops in Luluabourg threatened to use force to prevent being sent to Leopoldville, where they thought they would be punished for the recent events. The ANC Commander explained to them, however, that only those found guilty of misconduct would be transported to Leopoldville, whereupon the trouble subsided. Exaggerated reports of this incident increased tension in town, and some of the non-Congolese population gathered in the Nigerian brigade area for safety.

C. The situation in Stanleyville.

15. Vice-Premier Gizenga was granted a one week's leave of absence by the Council of Ministers of the Republic to settle his domestic affairs, and left for

Stanleyville on 4 October 1961. He has not returned. On 19 October, the Orientale Provincial Assembly adopted a vote of censure against President Manzikala, and elected in his place Losala Simon. Mr. Manzikala, who had been placed under house arrest, sought and was granted United Nations protection. On 30 October, members of the Jeunesse MNC were reported causing disturbance in this city; the United States Consul was assaulted in his hotel. Law and order was restored on the personal intervention of General Lundula. On 31 October, Mr. Gbenye, the Minister of the Interior of the Central Government, arrived in Stanleyville for a three-day visit. On 11 November, General Lundula arrived in Leopoldville for conferences with members of the Central Government. On 13 November he pledged allegiance to the President of the Republic.

D. The situation in Albertville.

16. In the Northern part of Katanga, the predominant element in the population is the Balubas, who, in general, oppose Mr. Tshombe. Balubakat elements have been exerting a growing influence in a number of localities. One of the Vice-Premiers of the Central Government is Mr. Sendwe, who is the President of the Balubakat Political Party.

17. Problems of the maintenance of law and order in connexion with the activities of Baluba Jeunesse groups and other uncontrolled elements have arisen in some places.

18. This problem has been particularly serious in Albertville and nearby towns, where disorderly groups, describing themselves as "Jeunesse" but who in reality were intent on pillage, have roamed the area, molesting Congolese and non-Congolese alike. On 10 November, officials of certain Albertville enterprises requested UN protection for the evacuation to Usumbura of the wives and children of their staff. Protection was immediately accorded and boats left at 1400 and 2000 hours.

19. The ONUC representatives reported that the situation as of the evening of 10 November was tense but in hand. Local pro-Tshombe and pro-Sendwe (Conakat and cartel) leaders alike were co-operating in calming the population, and members of the Police Force as well as Gendarmerie officers, announced their allegiance to the Central Government and their readiness to help maintain order.

20. In the meantime, Stanleyville ANC elements from Bukavu crossed the Kasanga line, and occupied Bendera. One non-Congolese was wounded during this move; he was evacuated by United Nations aircraft. The ANC Commander, Captain Mika, expressed regret at this incident, and assured ONUC civilian and military representatives of his desire to co-operate in the maintenance of order in Albertville.

21. The first ANC contingent reached Albertville from Bendera on 13 November, but was dissuaded from entering the town by the ONUC representative and Mr. Mwamba Ilunga Prosper, a Balubakat leader. On the next day discussions were held with the ANC officers with a view to quartering the ANC in a former Gendarmerie camp and keeping them out of the centre of Albertville. The ANC moved into the camp, but half an hour later armed soldiers appeared in town and began to loot homes, steal private vehicles and indiscriminately threaten and arrest civilians, both Congolese and non-Congolese. They also set up road-blocks at several points where they demanded money from persons wishing to pass.

22. ONUC officials organized additional evacuations of foreigners to Usumbura and accorded protection to those remaining in the city. ANC demands to take over the guarding of the docks were rejected. The ANC Commander was told on 15 November of the grave consequences to which his troops' behaviour might give rise, bringing the Government of the Republic into disrepute in the eyes of the population. Captain Mika again firmly promised to maintain order, and eventually brought in four ANC soldiers bound as prisoners on charges connected with their behaviour in the town. The ANC Commander also agreed to withdraw all his troops to camp and to forbid them to enter Albertville with their arms. He further undertook to return all stolen vehicles to ONUC Headquarters for return to their owners.

23. United Nations representatives have received instructions to take effective measures for the maintenance of order in the event of a recurrence of the disturbances. Mr. Kalume Joseph, who had been installed as District Commissioner, has been granted United Nations protection.

E. Recent events in Kindu.

24. On 11 November 1961 two C-119 aircraft from Kamina carrying scout cars for the Malayan contingent arrived at Kindu. The arrival time of the aircraft and the nature of their cargo had been communicated in advance to the local ANC. The 13 Italian air crew members proceeded to the Officers' mess, about 2 kilometres away, where there were only 2 Malayan officers and a few other ranks, the remaining Malayan troops being on duty at the airfield. Sixty ANC troops from Stanleyville, supported by an additional 200, thereupon surrounded the mess and looted it. The air crew members were taken prisoner, beaten and removed to Kindu prison. About 20 shots were fired, but there were no casualties. The ANC confiscated all weapons at the mess.

25. Shortly thereafter, ANC troops demanded that the two armoured cars should be surrendered to them. When this was refused, they surrounded the airfield itself, where the Malayan camp is situated. There were 206 Malaysians at the field, and 300 ANC troops, with about 664 more ANC nearby in Kindu. The ANC strength at the airfield had grown to 700 by 13 November. The water supply to the field was cut off.

26. The commander of the Malayan battalion promptly entered into negotiations with the ANC Commander, Colonel Pakassa, with a view to securing release of the airmen, removal of the besieging ANC troops, and return of the confiscated weapons and mess properties, including money. A combined UN-ANC guard was placed at the aircraft and the scout cars. Colonel Pakassa was unable to solve the other problems, however, and professed to have little control over his troops. He sent telegrams to Mr. Gizenga and General Lundula asking them to come to Kindu.

27. From Leopoldville, General Lundula promptly sent a senior staff officer to Kindu. He was accompanied by the UN Chief of Military Operations, and ANC Liaison Officer and a Malayan Liaison Officer. The party flew by UN aircraft, arrived at Kindu at mid-day on 13 November, and began negotiations with the ANC Commander.

28. From Stanleyville, Mr. Gizenga is said to have left for Kindu by automobile on 11 November.

29. In the course of the negotiations with Colonel Pakassa, the special mission from Leopoldville was informed that the air crew were being held on suspicion of being spies on behalf of the Katanga Provincial Authorities, but they were safe and well looked after. The ANC Commander said, however, that he had no authority to release the men, and that he could not guarantee the safety of any UN official even if permitted to visit them. He refused to acknowledge the authority of Major Dawe, General Lundula's envoy, on the ground that he had come from Leopoldville and was therefore subject to suspicion. While Colonel Pakassa appeared amenable to the eventual withdrawal of the ANC guard from the UN aircraft and cars he stated that no UN aircraft would be allowed to fly over Kindu.

30. On 14 November Colonel Pakassa informed UN officials that the thirteen Italian prisoners had escaped. On the same day General Lundula, the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Gbenye, and thirteen other officials flew to Kindu. They joined in conference at the airfield with Colonel Pakassa and the ONUC representatives.

31. At the conference, the UN presented the following demands:

(A) every effort was to be made to find and bring back the Italian

crewmen who were alleged to have escaped;

- (B) UN aircraft, armoured cars and other property were to be returned;
- (C) All ANC troops in and near the airfield were to be withdrawn; and
- (D) all culprits responsible for the incident were to be severely punished.

32. General Lundula issued orders that all the UN demands should be met and that Colonel Pakassa should implement them after pacifying his troops. He and Mr. Gbenye directed that the culprits should be sent to Stanleyville for disciplinary action.

33. It was apparent that the ANC in Kindu were hostile to the Lundula-Gbenye group; Mr. Gizenga had arrived in Kindu but did not attend the conference at the airfield. Immediately after the conference, when an Air Congo DC-4 aircraft landed at the field, General Lundula and his party boarded it and flew to Stanleyville. The General promised, however, to return to Kindu on 15 November, which he did, with a party of five ANC officers.

34. At another conference with Colonel Pakassa in the presence of Brigadier Hamid, the UN Commander, and ONUC Civilian Representatives, the ANC Commander stated that no further information was available concerning the allegedly escaped Italian crew members. After vigorous protests by the UN officials, General Lundula repeated his previous day's orders and directed Colonel Pakassa to submit a detailed report on the entire incident. The General undertook to have the culprits flown to Stanleyville for punishment.

35. After hours of waiting and a good deal of prodding: Colonel Pakassa produced a report in which he stated that no information was available on the "escape" of the 13 men. At the same time it was noted that ANC troops had in fact withdrawn from the airfield save for the normal complement of 25 men. They were, however, reported concentrating again near the former Malayan officers' mess 2 kilometers away. The 2 United Nations aircraft and the 2 armoured cars were returned to ONUC custody.

36. Later in the day, United Nations representatives who had just come to Kindu in connexion with the incident, secured the following information on the actual happenings from three reliable persons who were at the scene or nearby. According to these sources, the Italian crew members who were captured at the Malayan mess were brutally beaten, dragged to trucks and brought to Kindu prison, where they were immediately shot and then cut to pieces by the soldiers; pieces of the bodies were distributed to the large crowd that had gathered to watch the massacre, and some parts of the bodies were also flung at non-Congolese who were present. Two mutilated bodies were dragged through the main street of Kindu and exhibited until 12 November. All the remains of the bodies were then thrown into the river.

37. Photographs of the massacre were taken by one local non-Congolese. Soldiers later forced entry into the residence of a WHO physician and threw part of a hand on his table amid insults.

38. The names of the victims are:

Officers: Major Amedeo Parmeggiani

Captain Giorgio Gocelli

2nd Lieut. Onorio de Luca

" " Giulio Garbati

" " Francesco Remotti

Non-commissioned officers:

M/SGT. Nazareno Quadrumani

M/Sgt. Silvestro Possenti

M/Sgt. Martano Marcacci

M/Sgt. Francesco Page

M/Sgt. Filippo di Gioranni

M/Sgt. Nicola Stigliani

M/Sgt. Armando Fabi

M/Sgt. Antonio Mamone.

39. In immediate response to the first cabled word of the incident on 13 November, the Acting Secretary-General authorized the use of United Nations jet aircraft to lift the siege, even to the extent of strafing to disperse the besiegers, if the ONUC command would consider this to be necessary and helpful. It was emphasized, however, that in this context the safety of the besieged personnel must be the primary consideration. Concern that United Nations aerial activity over Kindu might provoke the rebellious Congolese troops to further assault or even execute the prisoners who, it was hoped, were still alive, was a major deterrent to such action by the commanding ONUC officers.

40. When the actual events became known, the United Nations Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville despatched a letter to the Central Government emphasizing the gravity of the crime, demanding the immediate arrest of the ANC commander at Kindu and requesting the establishment of a joint investigating committee to arraign the remaining culprits. It was further demanded that all suspects should be tried and those found guilty severely punished.

41. In the letter the Government was further informed of the military measures, including sealing-off of the Kindu area and disarming of the ANC troops there, that would be taken by ONUC to ensure apprehension of all suspects and assist in the efficient

discharge of the functions of the proposed joint committee. ONUC resources and strength would be used fully. The Acting Secretary-General has directed that these measures be carried out with the utmost vigour and expedition.

42. The Acting Secretary-General has conveyed to the Government of Italy his profound regrets and condolences."

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Dumontet, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. MacFarquhar, New York.
Date : 16 November 1961.
No. : 8084

SECRET

Your ONUC 6642 utilization of counterpart funds for development being urgently examined here. Has Frasca had opportunity of comment on ministers letter ?

cc. Mr. Dumontet.

Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

TO : LINNER, Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE, New York
DATE: 16 November 1961
No : 8082

Following Note Verbale from Mission of New Zealand dated 14 November received today:

"The Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to document S/4940/Add.1 containing Annexes to a report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations operation in the Congo, relating to the implementation of paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. It will be recalled that Annex III contained a report of the United Nations Representative in Elizabethville on progress, as of 8 September 1961 in the evacuation of non-Congolese personnel in the Katanga Gendarmerie. The New Zealand authorities have noted that in Section P of this annex reference is made to one person of New Zealand nationality who is listed as ^{missing}~~quater~~ ~~UNISEWING~~. No information is, however, available to them concerning the identity of this person.

The Permanent Representative would accordingly be most grateful to receive any information which the Acting Secretary-General may possess or which he may be able to obtain towards identifying the New Zealand citizen referred to in Annex III of document S/4940/Add.1"

Please supply any information you may have as basis for SECGEN's reply.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : LINNER, Léopoldville
From : BUNCHE, New York
Date : 16 November 1961
No. : 8081

Your A-2557. Following note verbale despatched today to Permanent Representative of Belgium :

"Le Secrétaire Général par intérim, de l'Organisation des Nations Unies présente ses compliments au Représentant permanent de la Belgique et a l'honneur de se référer à sa note verbale D.412 A/S.2408 du 4 novembre 1961. La politique de l'ONUC touchant l'évacuation des non-Congolais en application du paragraphe A-2 de la résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité le 21 février 1961 a été exposée dans la note verbale du Secrétariat en date du 25 octobre 1961. Dans tous les cas où l'ONUC a détenu des personnes pour déterminer, par voie d'interrogatoire, si elles étaient sujettes à évacuation, elle a agi en vertu du mandat confié aux Nations Unies par les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et de 1961 l'Ordonnance No. 70 rendue le 24 août/par le Gouvernement congolais, pour l'application de laquelle ce Gouvernement a sollicité l'assistance des Nations Unies. Les intéressés ne faisant l'objet d'aucune poursuite pénale, les questions du droit à un conseil ou de comparution devant un magistrat ne se sont pas posées. l'ONUC est toutefois consciente de ce qu'il faut accorder à ces personnes la possibilité de se faire entendre au sujet de renseignements qui tendraient à indiquer qu'elles tombent sous le coup des clauses d'évacuation inscrites dans la résolution du Conseil de sécurité, et s'assurer que les décisions d'évacuation prises dans

chaque cas sont fondées en fait. Si, en de rares occasions, et sous le coup d'attaques lancées contre les unités des Nations Unies, à l'instigation et sous les ordres de non-Congolais résolus à empêcher l'exécution de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité, la politique déclarée des Nations Unies n'a pas été strictement respectée, toutes mesures voulues ont été promptement prises pour rectifier cet état de choses, et les Nations Unies regrettent les désagréments causés aux intéressés.

Le cas du Dr. Benoît et de M. Kennes peut être cité en exemple. Ils ont été détenus par les troupes indiennes à l'hôpital d'Albertville dans des circonstances qui donnaient à penser qu'ils avaient pu faire le coup de feu pendant les hostilités du 19 septembre 1961. Ils ont été trouvés sur la véranda de l'hôpital qui a été encerclé par les troupes des Nations Unies immédiatement après que les unités indiennes eurent essuyé à partir de l'hôpital le feu d'armes automatiques et d'armes portatives. Le Dr. Benoît avait le coude et le genou écorchés, ce qui laissait supposer qu'il avait tiré en position allongée; des boîtes de balles et des caisses de munitions se trouvaient à proximité des hommes. Dans ces circonstances, les troupes des Nations Unies se sont senties en droit de les appréhender. Elles ne les ont pourtant pas traités en francs-tireurs mais les ont emmenés à Léopoldville pour les interroger. Les explications fournies par le Dr. Benoît et M. Kennes ayant été jugées plausibles et le Dr. Benoît étant médecin, les autorités de l'ONUC ont décidé de les relâcher et ont offert de les ramener à Albertville. Les intéressés ont préféré rentrer en Belgique. Les représentants de la Mission belge de Liaison savaient parfaitement que ce sont les intéressés eux-mêmes qui ont choisi.

Un autre cas d'espèce est celui de M. Micha, qui a été appréhendé et amené à Léopoldville pour y être interrogé. Bien que l'on sût que

M. Micha avait tenu des propos d'une rare violence contre les Nations Unies et cherché à fomenter des troubles, les autorités de l'ONUC ont conclu que les clauses d'évacuation obligatoire inscrites dans la résolution du Conseil de sécurité ne lui étaient pas applicables et elles ont décidé de lui faciliter le retour à Elisabethville, ainsi qu'à sa famille. Elles l'ont mis en garde contre toute poursuite d'activités politiques qui risqueraient de le faire tomber sous le coup de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité. Le tout a pris cinq jours, ce qui ne semble pas déraisonnable étant donné les circonstances.

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Dans le cas de Maître Hermann, le Secrétaire général par intérim tient à signaler, comme suite à sa note verbale du 8 novembre 1961, que la liste de conseillers politiques établie le 3 août 1961 ne comprenait que de l'Administration provinciale katangaise et que cela avait été clairement entendu à l'époque. Maître Hermann n'étant pas au service de l'Administration, le fait que son nom ne figure pas sur la liste n'entre donc pas en ligne de compte. Malgré la demande des autorités provinciales, aucune liste limitative de "conseillers politiques" clandestins n'a été établie en août 1961 ni depuis.

Dans le cas de M. Cremer, le Représentant permanent se rappellera la note verbale du Secrétariat en date du 1er novembre 1961, où il était dit que la Mission belge de liaison était tenue au courant pour ce qui est de sa tentative d'évasion et de sa mort. Le Commandant de la Force des Nations Unies a institué une enquête, et son rapport est attendu sous peu. En ce qui concerne toutefois les circonstances du décès, le Secrétaire général par intérim tient à faire observer d'ores et déjà que, d'après les indications fournies sans délai par le Commandant de la Force, on n'a tiré sur M. Cremer qu'après que celui-ci eût passé outre à une sommation de

s'arrêter, eût continué de s'enfuir malgré un coup de feu d'avertissement tiré en l'air et eût franchi les limites du camp. Dans ces circonstances, il ne semble pas qu'il soit anormal qu'une sentinelle militaire ouvre le feu pour arrêter le prisonnier dans sa fuite. Le Secrétaire général par intérim note cependant que le Gouvernement belge et la Mission belge de Liaison avaient précédemment soutenu que M. Cremer était recherché, et pourrait faire l'objet de poursuites, pour divers crimes et délits. D'autre part, il note que le Chef de la Mission de Liaison et les représentants de l'ONUC étaient arrivés à un accord de principe d'après lequel des dispositions spéciales auraient été prises pour que M. Cremer soit rapatrié à Bruxelles par un vol sans escale. Les représentants belges ont par ailleurs décliné toute responsabilité financière ou autre touchant l'inhumation, se bornant à entrer en rapport avec Mme. Cremer et à informer l'ONUC qu'elle souhaitait que son mari soit enterré selon les rites catholiques à Léopoldville. Il en a été ainsi fait, et l'enterrement a eu lieu en présence de membres des Missions belge et française et de la Croix-Rouge internationale, qui se sont tous déclarés satisfaits des dispositions prises.

En conclusion, le Secrétaire général par intérim tient à donner au Représentant permanent de la Belgique l'assurance qu'il se soucie au plus haut point de voir les droits de l'homme respectés en pareille circonstance et à déclarer qu'il prend actuellement des dispositions pour veiller à ce que les procédures suivies par l'ONUC suffisent pleinement à protéger les intéressés contre des décisions arbitraires ou sans fondement."

Bunche.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville. &
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 16 November 1961.
No. : 8080

SECRET

Your A-2568 and ONUC 6520. As requested, we have pressed observer of Federal Republic of Germany on urgency of evacuation Wiltowski even though there may be technical distinction between his case and other stateless person taken back by West Germany. Observer sympathetic and referring matter to Bonn for decision.

With show this to Neville
No action required pending
further signal from NY

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ROUTINE.

To : Gen. Yacob, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 16 November 1961.
No. : 8078

SECRET

Ref ONUC 6413, 6506, 6553, 6578, our 7761 and 7877.

1. With less than 14 days to go before rotation, we must assume that Nigerians will not replace their brigade HQ and battalion. Although they were urged for a speedy decision, no reply has been received to date. The foreign minister has insisted to us that they cannot.
2. USNS Blatchford will sail from Capetown 20 November. ETA Matadi 25 November offload Nigerian brigade HQ and one battalion, ETD 26 November. Lagos ETA 29 November, ETD 30. If Nigeria agrees to replacements, these will be onloaded for Matadi. ETA Matadi 3 December, ETD 4. In case no replacements, ship will proceed directly to Capetown. It has become necessary to advance ETA Matadi to 25 November in order to have ship cleared from Dar-Es-Salaam before Christmas.
3. Sailing schedule provides for ETA Dar-Es-Salaam 20 December, ETD first voyage to Far East as soon as onloading of Indian and Pakistani surplus troops completed. Would it be possible to arrange lift of these troops ex-Congo so that ship could leave Dar-Es-Salaam 22 December? We would also appreciate a breakdown of these troops, nationality and which units are being repatriated and according to our records you will have a turnover of 48 Indian air personnel in December. Could they be rotated on Blatchford?
4. Ship will arrive Karachi 31 December, ETD 2 January. Bombay ETA 3 January, ETD 4. Ship will proceed right to Port Swettenham, ETA 10 January, ETD 12, with replacements for Malayan brigade HQ and Recce elements. On return voyage ship will arrive Bombay 18 January, onload 2300/2500 Indian replacement troops, ETD 20 January. ETA Dar-Es-Salaam 27 January, off and onload same number of Indian and Malayan troops.

SECRET

5. Second voyage - ETD Dar-Es-Salaam 3 February. Bombay ETA 10 February, ETD 12. Port Swettenham ETA 18 February, ETD 19. We have requested Malaya to have replacements for battalion ready for rotation 18 February in order to be transported on Blatchford's return voyage to Dar-Es-Salaam 19 February. Bombay ETA 25 February, onload remaining part of replacements for Indian brigade. ETD 27 February. ETA Dar-Es-Salaam 6 March. Off and on load same number of Indian and Malayan troops.
6. Third voyage - ETD Dar-Es-Salaam 13 March. Bombay ETA 20 March, ETD 22. Port Swettenham ETA 27 March, ETD 28.
7. All countries concerned informed. It may be necessary to make minor adjustments to this schedule. If you deem it necessary to send movement control detachment to Dar-Es-Salaam, please advise. Please inform which Indian units should be rotated on second voyage so that India can prepare replacements. Will you have sufficient air capacity for this concentrated airlift Congo-Dar-Es-Salaam ? Please advise new timing of Indian and Malayan advance parties and number of personnel involved.

cc. Gen Jacob.

Mr. Linner. ✓