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TRANSFER OF PEOPLES IN EUROPE, 1939-1942

This Report is based entirely on excerpts from a large manuscript compiled by Dr. Joseph B. Schechtmann, now a member of the Research Bureau on Population Movements, 55 West 42 Street, New York 18, N. Y.

Dr. Schechtmann very generously placed his manuscript at the disposal of the Staff of "H" Project, who have rearranged and edited in part selected passages so that these data will form a complementary Report to "Population Movements in Europe, 1939-1942" by Dr. Eugene Kulischer which appeared as R-5 in this Series.

The selection of the material and the Summary are by Mr. Robert Strausz-Hupé.

Henry Field

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

In selecting passages from Dr. Schechtmann's text, the editors of this Report were guided by their interest in German policies for settling the Ostgebiete, i.e., the Incorporated Polish Provinces.

The first part of the Report deals with the repatriation of German (by definition) elements from areas occupied by the Soviet Union; the second part is concerned with measures for the Germanization of the Ostgebiete.

Dr. Schechtmann's compilation is based on published material: articles from German newspapers and magazines, German law publications, releases by Governments-in-exile, books and articles published in this country and Great Britain, etc. It is in the nature of this source material that the author's efforts were limited to reconciling conflicting evidence and arriving at the closest possible approximation of the facts concerning developments obscured by propaganda and censorship.

What stands out in this survey is the inconsistency of German settlement policies. The German Government did not succeed in reconciling its sedulously prepared, ideology-burdened policy of

Germanization with the exigencies of war economy. The Germans had planned to remove the Polish and Jewish population from the incorporated areas, replacing them with German peasants, professionals, and merchants.

The first step in this program, namely, the expulsion of large numbers of Poles and Jews, was taken ruthlessly and efficiently. Yet when the time came to fill the vacuum so created, it became clear that the Reich could not spare the necessary contingent of settlers. For the centripetal tendencies of German war economy--far from releasing manpower to the conquered territories--demanded a concentration of all available labor forces within the boundaries of the Old Reich.

According to authoritative German statements, 6,500,000 German settlers are the minimum required for securing the Ostgebiete demographically. However, the most optimistic German experts agree that no such mass settlement is even remotely feasible until Germany has won this War. Even they admit that the shortage of labor within the Reich has compelled the suspension of large-scale settlement projects.

Thus, the fallacy of the "Volk ohne Raum" theory is exposed: German experts themselves deemed the settlement of the Ostgebiete the most significant experiment in organizing that additional Living Space of which, allegedly, Germany stands in such urgent need. This experiment has failed.

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TRANSFER OF PEOPLES IN EUROPE, 1939-1942

I. GERMAN REPATRIATION POLICY

1. Administration of Repatriation and Resettlement

A. Within Germany Proper.- On October 6, 1939, Chancellor Hitler delivered his notorious Reichstag speech, which can be considered as the inauguration of the whole repatriation policy of the Third Reich. On the following day, he charged the Reichsfuehrer and Chief of the German Police, Heinrich Himmler, with the "Rueckfuehrung aller endgueltig ins Reich heimkehrenden Auslands-und Volksdeutschen," and the task "of taking such measures as will be required for the Gestaltung of the new German settlement areas."

In this quality Himmler was empowered to make use of the existing administrative machinery. For the direction and performance of all the cooperating Agencies, a special Dienststelle was created: Der Reichskommissar fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, with an office in Berlin.¹ The office of the Reichskommissar Himmler kept himself. Brigadefuehrer Ulrich Greifelt was appointed manager of the Dienststelle. Early in 1940 Greifelt himself outlined the original structure

1. "Umsiedlung und Festigung deutschen Volkstums," Neues Bauerntum, November-December 1939, pp. 294-295.

of the Reichskommissariat, comprising six Hauptabteilungen, as follows:¹

- (a) Planning Division
- (b) Manpower Division
- (c) Claims Division
- (d) Finance Division
- (e) Title and Roads Division
- (f) Settlement Division

In order to fulfill each and every one of its numerous duties, the Reichskommissariat assured the co-operation of a series of institutions:

1. The Reichsstelle fuer Raumordnung, whose task, according to the Koelnische Zeitung (November 21, 1940), was to fill the unpopulated areas in the East by settling German peasants, businessmen and workers, so that as a result a truly German country should arise. This body had prepared, in the Autumn of 1939, plans for dismemberment of conquered Poland and drew the administrative borders of the Government-General and the incorporated area.²

2. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle was charged with the immediate evacuation of the various German minority groups from the respective countries and with the

1. Deutsche Verwaltung, Second January issue, 1940.

2. Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics, The Struggle for Space and Power, New York, 1942, p. 119.

investigation of the possibilities of their settlement. Its office is located in Posen. It is subdivided into twelve departments. The most important of these departments were:¹

(a) The Landabteilung, which had to study the possibilities of land settlement and to choose the appropriate candidates among repatriated Germans. Useful preparatory work in this field was done by the Landraete and the Kreis-und Ortsbauernfuehrer (district and local peasant leaders).

(b) The department for liberal professions (Abteilung fuer freie Berufe), with sub-departments for physicians, chemists, architects, engineers, lawyers, and foresters.

(c) The department for schools and culture.

(d) The department for industry and commerce.

3. The Deutsche Einwandererzentrale, composed of representatives of all the interested organizations and offices, had to take care of the investigation, the first shelter, and the appropriate selection of

1. Peter Carstens, "Aus der Praxis der volksdeutschen Umsiedlung," Neues Bauerntum, April 1941, p. 156.

the repatriates. Dr. Gradman describes this organization as follows:

"Dienststelle des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des S. D. Sie hat die Aufgabe, die behoerdlichen Massnahmen, die bei der Umgliederung der Umsiedler in das Deutsche Reich notwendig sind, vorzunehmen. Sie vereinigt auf diese Weise die polizeiliche Erfassung, die Ausgabe der Ausweise, die gesundheitliche Untersuchung, die Einbuergerung und den Berufseinsatz in einem Arbeitsgang und ueberreicht den Ansiedlungsstaetten wichtige Unterlagen."

Within the frame of the Deutsche Einwandererzentrale there functioned a special commission, delegated by the Statistisches Reichsamt, which scientifically sifted the statistical material.¹ The head office of the Einwandererzentrale was in Berlin, but it had branches in the territory to be colonized, e.g. at Gotenhaven (Gdynia), Posen (Poznan), Litzmannstadt (Lodz) and so on.²

1. Dr. W. Gradman, "Die Umgesiedelten deutschen Volksgruppen," Zeitschrift fuer Politik, May 1941, p. 229.

2. The German New Order in Poland, p. 204.

4. The Volksdeutsche Einwandererberatungsstelle at Posen, with a branch office in Berlin, was charged with the further care (Betreuung) and counselling (Beratung) of the repatriated Germans.¹

5. The financial administration of the repatriation was taken over by the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft m.b.H. Berlin (DUT), which was created in the autumn of 1939.

6. The professional investigation of the repatriates was taken over by the Berufseinsatzstellen. Special departments were created for the investigation of:

- (a) Handicraft and industry
- (b) Agriculture
- (c) Commercial, technical, and liberal professions
- (d) Officials
- (e) Professional women
- (f) Youth
- (g) Sozialrentner

The results of the investigation of each repatriated German were entered on a special card, and an exhaustive vocational Kartei was thus established in Posen. An average of 1,000 persons was investigated daily.

7. The immediate task of settlement was taken over by the Landesarbeitsamt. This office used the above

1. "Umsiedlung und Festigung deutschen Volkstums," Neues Bauerntum, November-December 1939, p. 295.

mentioned Kartei in order to satisfy the manpower requirement. The settlement of members of the liberal professions (physicians, lawyers) was carried out in close cooperation with Aerzte- und Anwaltskammer. In the field of the agricultural settlement the help of the Reichsnaehrstand (Agricultural Estate)¹ was secured, while the Industrie- und Handelskammer and Handwerkskammer cooperated in the settlement of artisans and industry workers. The cooperation of the "competent authorities of the Party" was, of course, permanent and watchful.

8. The notorious Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA) was called upon to play an active part in the "Osterziehung der Reichsgaue fuer den Osten."

A special apparatus was created for the purpose of receiving the arriving repatriated Volksdeutsche.²

1. The Reichsnaehrstand (Agricultural Estate or, literally, Nutrition Estate) was created on September 13, 1933, and represents the entire portion of the Reich population connected with agriculture. It comprises not only all landowners, tenants, cultivators and agricultural workers, but also the wholesale and retail traders in agricultural products and foodstuffs, all food manufacturers (millers, brewers, sugar makers), and all agricultural cooperative societies. (Lewis L. Lorwin, Economic Consequences of the Second World War, New York, 1942, pp. 19-20.)

2. Edmund Beyl, "Soziale Probleme im deutschen Osten," Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, January 1941, No. 30 (130?), p. 28.

9. The National-Sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (NSV) took over the feeding of the repatriates on their arrival and in camps. The same organization was also charged with re-equipment of the houses, "freed" of their Polish and Jewish inhabitants, for the benefit of the volksdeutsche Umsiedler. In cooperation with the German Red Cross, it took care also of the old and sick people among the repatriated, creating several Altersheime.

10. Food delivery service availed itself of the aid of three organizations:

- (a) Hitlerjugend (HJ)
- (b) Bund deutscher Maedchen (BdM)
- (c) National Sozialistische Frauenschaft (NSF)

The last-named organization cooperated with the NSV in the above-mentioned re-equipment of houses expropriated from the Poles and Jews for the benefit of the repatriated Germans.

11. Transport and travel service was taken over by the National Sozialistische Gemeinschaft Kraft durch Freude, through its branch establishment Reisen und Wandern.

In charge of the naturalization of the repatriated Germans was the Dienststelle des Reichsministeriums

des Innern.¹

B. In Polish Territory.- A widely ramified apparatus for the organization and immediate execution of the resettlement work was created also in the Incorporated Provinces themselves. In the Gau Danzig-Westpreussen and in Warthegau, a Polizeifuehrer was assigned to each of the two Governors (Forster and Greiser), who were simultaneously deputies of the Reichskommissariat fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums thus assuring cooperation between both authorities.²

In Warthegau, where the resettlement work progressed particularly fast, the Polizeifuehrer, in compliance with Himmler's orders and in agreement with Governor Greiser (division Siedlung und Umlegung) created a special Ansiedlungsstab (settlement staff) with an office in Litzmannstadt; Kreis-Arbeitsstaeb (district staffs) in single districts were subordinated to the Litzmannstadt staff. Every Arbeitsstab comprised 25 to 40 employees: half of them were practical farmers assigned by the Reichsnaehrstand (created in

1. Hans Krieg, pp. 44-45.

2. Neues Bauerntum, loc. cit., p. 295.

Warthegau on January 10, 1940);¹ the second half included "bewaehrte Kraefte der verschiedenen Partei-gliederungen."

The management of every Arbeitsstab was in the hands of a specialized and experienced SS-Fuehrer, who was assigned for this purpose by the Rassen- und Sied-lungsamt SS. The Arbeitsstaebe were charged, in co-operation with competent governmental offices, with registration of all available Polish farms, with drawing up a detailed farm-map, with investigation of the local nature of the soil and drafting of village sketches, with preparation of the resettlement itself.

In the immediate resettlement work several institutions cooperated.

1. The NSV (National Sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt) took care of the primary necessities in beds, kitchen utensils, etc.

2. The DUT (Deutsche Umsiedlungs Treuhandge-sellschaft) branches carried on administrative, taxation, and financial activities connected with the settlement of the newcomers.

1. "Der deutsche Osten nach einem Jahr," Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft, September 1, 1940, No. 25.

The governor himself, through his office Siedlung und Wirtschaft and the Kulturaemter, provided for supplies of the necessary inventory, of seed corn, of compost, etc. The governor made use of the cooperation of the so-called Bauernsiedlungen (peasant settlements). These organizations were subordinated to his control and were organized for preparing the future settlement of German front-line soldiers. They were now called upon to engage in the above-mentioned activities in the interest of the civilian settlers. Three organizations of this kind operated in Warthegau:

- (a) Bauernsiedlung Hohensalza
- (b) Bauernsiedlung Posen
- (c) Bauernsiedlung Kalisch

The Reich Ministry of Food provided each of these institutions with a capital amounting, in 1941, to 2,000,000 RM.

The administration of the confiscated urban property of the Polish State and of Polish citizens was entrusted to Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, created by a decree of November 1, 1939 (RAZ of November 6, 1939), with a main office in Berlin and six branches (called Treuhandstellen) at Kattowitz, Posen, Zischenau, Suwalki (Polish name), Litzmannstadt, and Danzig.¹

1. The German New Order in Poland, p. 254.

The Treuhandstelle Posen (with a branch in Litzmannstadt) was assigned the task "of putting Polish business under German leadership and mobilizing it for war production."¹ Under the supervision of the Treuhandstelle the following organizations functioned in Posen:

(a) Grundstuecksgesellschaft fuer den Reichsgau Wartheland, in charge of former Polish residential real estate.

(b) Hotel- und Gaststaettengesellschaft m.b.H. Warthegau, in charge of former Polish hotels and restaurants.

A Wohnungs- und Siedlungsgesellschaft m.b.H. was created by the DUT at Posen with a capital of 1,000,000 marks for wohnungspolitische Aufgaben.²

Agricultural and forest estates taken from Polish citizens were managed, until they were assigned to German settlers, by the Ostdeutsche Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft m.b.H. and its supplementary organization, the above-mentioned Bauernsiedlungs-Gesellschaften.³

1. Senator a/D Paul Batzer, "Wirtschaftsaufbau im Warthegau," Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1941, No. 28.

2. "Der Ostraum," Siedlung und Wirtschaft, December, 1939.

3. The German New Order in Poland, p. 203.

The task of the Zentralbeschaffungsstelle (Central Supplies Office) was to make certain alterations in the size of farms intended for Germans, to combine smaller units into larger groups, and to supplement the livestock and equipment.¹

According to available sources, the Party members selected for the resettlement work distinguished themselves by extraordinary devotion to their task. Reporting on the Praxis der Volksdeutschen Umsiedlung and on the enormous and devoted activity of the Arbeitsstaebe, Peter Carstens writes: "We remember with gratitude the many unknown comrades of the SS, SA, NSKK (National Sozialistische Kraftfahrer Korps) and especially the 1,500 students, boys and girls, who volunteered for service in the east and sacrificed one to two semesters."² Their number grew continually. In 1940, the Bund Deutscher Maedchen registered 1,400 volunteers for the work in the East; in 1941 there were already 9,973, and in 1942 the number rose to 10,000.

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1. The German New Order in Poland, p. 204.

2. Peter Carstens, "Aus der Praxis der Volksdeutschen Umsiedlung," Neues Bauerntum, April 1941, p. 156.

The obligation of subsidizing and compensating the settlers was observed scrupulously by the Reich. The reasons for this loyal attitude are to be found not so much in the moral integrity of the leaders of Nazi Germany as in the practical purpose of the whole transfer policy of the Reich. This policy had been inaugurated in order to Germanize the Incorporated Polish Provinces, replacing deported Poles and Jews by German farmers, tradesmen, businessmen and professional men.

The establishment of these German rural and urban settlers was impossible unless they were given a sound economic basis, more or less corresponding to their former economic status. Ulrich Greifelt, Chief of Staff of the Reichskommissars, wrote:

"Es galt ihnen so schnell wie moeglich geeigneten und produktiven Arbeitsplatz zuzuweisen und den Vermoegensausgleich so vorzunehmen, dass er unter Beruecksichtigung der unterschiedlichen Lebensaushaltungskosten fuer jeden Umsiedler eine gerechte Loesung darstelle."

The main form of this subsidy is described by Greifelt as Naturalersatz (compensation in nature), i.e., "the settler is to be given an economic position

which corresponds to the one he left behind."¹

A farmer is thus to receive a farm corresponding in value to the one he formerly held; the shopkeeper, the industrial undertaker, the craftsman are to be similarly compensated; the professional is to obtain a job or a practice corresponding to his former occupation.

Certain amounts were paid in cash only in exceptional cases, or as an additional form of compensation. The Ostdeutscher Beobachter of February 9, 1941, describes the working of this basic principle as follows: "When a German settling in the Wartheland wished to obtain, for example, a sawmill, he will do his utmost to become trustee for the particular sawmill he has in mind. The DUT will assure itself that out of the total wealth he brought with him from his previous Fatherland, which is put to his credit with DUT, there is enough to pay for the sawmill."

Activities connected with financing the transfer and allocating subsidies were concentrated in a central

1. Ulrich Greifelt, "Wirtschaftliche Festigung des deutschen Volkstums," Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft, October, 1941.

institution, the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft m.b.H. Berlin (DUT). The DUT was encharged with:

(a) Liquidation of the immovable property left behind by the German settlers in their former homelands and of all their other interests.

(b) The actual settlement on the land.

2. Criteria for Settling Germans in Poland

A. Attempts to Merge Settlers from all Regions.-

The Germans evacuated from various countries were explicitly promised that they would be resettled in closed Stammesgruppen ("Tribal Groups"). This promise played an important rôle in the decision made by the individual German minorities to leave their homes for the new areas.

Moreover, expediency favored the principle of the closed settlement. This was expressed by von Reichert in an article in the Voelkischer Beobachter of January 5, 1941:

"Wherever a settlement is formed, consisting of a large number of farmsteads situated close to one another, it is colonized by a group of settlers

originating in one neighborhood (Heimatreich). In such cases, individual peasant families have known each other for a long time; they have the same system of work, they follow the same habits, and thus form a closed unity."

This "organic" kind of settlement was in full accordance with the general National Socialist conception.

"Das voelkische Werden in den neuen Reichsgebieten kann fuer die deutsche Gesamtheit nur dann vom wirklichen Gewinn sein, wenn dort wiederum nicht zufaellig zusammengefuehrte, zusammengewuerfelte Masse wesensverschiedener Zellen, sondern wohlgefuegtes und harmonisch in sich ruhendes neues Stammestum aus wesensgleichem Menschentum geformt werden kann."¹

Zoch expressed, however, the conviction of authoritative German colonizing circles when he simultaneously stressed that "without proper safeguards, undesirable developments would result from closed 'Tribal Group' settlements." As a reason for this

1. Wilhelm Zoch, "Landnahme im Dienste der Volksordnung," Neues Bauerntum, December 1940, p. 400.

anxiety he pointed to the danger that a close resettlement of people from the same small community "tended to accentuate particularism, isolation and provincialism--in short, the narrow point of view of the country bumpkin." In order "to eliminate this danger from the very beginning" the following "synthetic" resettlement formula was elaborated:

"Bei der Wahl der hierfuer geeigneten Siedlungseinheit wird man davon ausgehen muessen, diese so zu bestimmen, dass sie gross genug sein soll, um das Gefuehl landsmannschaftlichheimatlicher Verbundenheit zu geben, trotzdem aber zu klein ist, um stammespartikularistische Bestrebungen ueberhaupt nur zu ermoeeglichen."¹

Very significant in this connection is an article appearing in the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten of August 2, 1941, emphasizing that "all the inhabitants of one village in the East hail from the same village in the Reich. The difficulties of an efficient colonization of this kind are staggering for psychological and technical reasons; the new colonists are very touchy and it is necessary to be most patient in

1. Italics are the editor's.

dealing with them."¹

The resettlement policy of the Reich endeavored to take into account and to reconcile all these complicated and contradictory considerations. It is enough to glance at the map published in the Ost-deutscher Beobachter of January 11, 1942, to see that the colonization of the transferred Germans from abroad in the Wartheland strictly followed the above-mentioned "synthetic" formula. Settlers hailing from a certain region are settled, it is true, in compact groups. But these groups are scattered throughout the thirty-eight districts of the resettlement area. None of the "repatriated" regional groups has been transferred--as an entity--to one district or to several contiguous districts.

Only the transferees from Volhynia and Galicia are concentrated mainly in the eastern districts of Hohensalza and Litzmannstadt, and those from the Government-General in the western district of Posen. The Germans from Bessarabia, Bukovina, Dobrudja and Lithuania, however, are evenly distributed over almost

1. Quoted from Polish News Bulletin No. 94, September 5, 1941.

the whole of the Wartheland,¹ and not one of these districts is being colonized exclusively by one or the other of these regional groups of transferred Germans.

It goes without saying that this kind of resettlement was not accidental. The Gauleiter of the Wartheland, Arthur Greiser, emphasized as early as January, 1941, that:

"Hand in hand mit der Ansiedlung muesste der grosse Prozess der Verschmelzung aller dieser deutschen Staemme zu einer einheitlich ausgerichteten und nach einem Befehl arbeitenden Gemeinschaft gehen."²

Even more explicit in expressing the same basic principle was, a year later, the Ostdeutscher Beobachter, which stated frankly that the distribution and reshuffling of the various groups of settlers was carried out according to a plan, the basic idea of which was "to break up all existing associations and links among the colonists and to prevent the formation of sectarian local groups."

1. Frankfurter Zeitung, July 7, 1942.

2. Arthur Greiser, "Grossdeutsche Aufgabe im Wartheland," Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, January 1941, No. 130.

On the other hand, the very low cultural level of a great proportion of the German settlers, especially those from rural districts of eastern Europe, which was admitted by the Reich publicists themselves, created painful frictions between them and the German colonists from the Reich (Reichsdeutsche) or those families which had lived in the western Polish provinces before their incorporation.

"In the so-called Wartheland a special press campaign has been conducted urging the western Germans to maintain social contact with their eastern 'Volks-genossen.' On the other hand, the arrivals from the east felt apparently at ease only among themselves."¹ This mutual isolation was due also to a certain extent to differences in languages. The newcomers from the east spoke a dialect and were often unfamiliar with standard German. In describing the young Germans transferred from the east, the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of November 3, 1940, bitterly complained: "They speak German very inadequately and write German only indifferently."

1. Joseph Winiewicz, "Results of Germanization in Poland," Free Europe, September 5 and 19, 1941, No. 28.

The Ostdeutscher Beobachter of November 19, 1940, emphasized that "a special effort must be made to teach the children to speak German correctly." In many cases the newly-settled colonists had lost national consciousness, and the Ostdeutscher Beobachter of November 21, 1940, stated: "Not all Germans transferred here from Volhynia have shown the same determination and will to resist. . . . The girls from the Arbeitsdienst meet families of colonists whose German consciousness is almost completely moribund."

B. Avoidance of Contact with Poles.- Any mingling of Germans and Poles in the incorporated area was considered by the Reich authorities as a highly dangerous matter. "In order that this tragedy of 'polonisation' should never be repeated," declared Dr. Kurt Lueck, a high official of the German Administration in the Warthegau, "National-Socialism demands a ruthless separation of the members of the German nation from those of the Polish nation, a separation which recognizes no false sentiments."¹

The second reason for the German national separation policy sprang from a diametrically opposed source:

1. Quoted from The German New Order in Poland, p. 412.

from a firmly pronounced superiority complex. The German Herrenklasse must avoid any personal contact with the surrounding conquered population in order to maintain its dignity and dominating position. The Chief of the Dienststelle des Reichskommissars fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, SSBrigadefuehrer Greifelt, formulated "the decisive principle" of the German policy in the incorporated provinces as follows: "Rassische Scheidung und rassische Auslese" and "reinliche Trennung zwischen deutschem und fremdvoelkischem Blute, die zugestaendnislos durchgeguehrt werden muss."¹

The behavior of the local Germans and those brought from abroad has evidently been unsatisfactory from this point of view, and on September 22, 1940, the Gauleiter of Wartheland, Arthur Greiser, sent to the Higher Command of the Storm Troops (SS) and Police attached to the Reich Governor a very characteristic circular letter "on relations between the German population in the Wartheland and the Poles."

In a speech made in May, 1941, at Posen, Greiser reiterated the same refrain: "Only Germans can own land here and they will be the masters. Poles will

1. "Aufgaben der Festigung Deutschen Volkstums in den neuen Ostgebieten," Siedlung und Wirtschaft, February 1941.

always remain their serfs."¹ Addressing a group of 179 women supervisors of settlers (Umsiedlerbetreuerinnen) in Wartheland in December of the same year Greiser declared, as reported by the Ostdeutscher Beobachter of December 4, 1941, that a part of their activity was to render the Germans in the Wartheland conscious of their position as masters.

The real reasons for this sudden change are revealed in the above-quoted political instruction on the subject of the "German East Policy." "Their (Polish) low standard of needs," states the instruction, "is a means of making themselves 'indispensable' as labor power. It is, however, a danger for the German position in the East, if the social system is founded on foreign elements of population, especially when they multiply like rabbits. The German position in the East can only be regarded as assured if it is based on a broad stratum of German workers and peasants."

The German colonization theorists now began to regard very differently the experiences of the many hundred years of German colonization activities in the various countries of Europe--in the European east and southeast--and to consider them critically. "Nur die Verbindung von Schwert und Pflug koenne ein Land wirklich eindeutschen," wrote Wilhelm Zoch in Neues Bauerntum, March, 1940.

1. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, May 7, 1941.

II. REPATRIATION OF BALTS

1. Repatriation from Estonia

A. Negotiations and Preparations.- According to Article 20 of the Estonian Constitution of 1920, "every citizen is free to determine his own (ethnic) nationality." The group affected by this clause was by no means a small one: The census of 1934 had set the number of Germans in Estonia at 16,346, while the German national "cadastre" listed, in 1936, but 13,345 members.

The Estonian Ministry of Interior had thus to be the sole judge of the status of 3,001 persons, since the Protocol with Germany had provided for no instance of appeal before which the persons affected could discuss the validity of an eventual refusal of a certificate of German nationality.¹ Wives, children, and parents of the persons mentioned in Article I (1a) and in Article I (1b) had eo ipso the right to opt and, eventually, to depart from the country.

All these individual applications were collected

1. In the German-Latvian Treaty, concluded a few weeks later, the Embassy of the Reich at Riga was designated as the sole judge of the status of persons of Latvian citizenship who claimed German nationality without sufficient documentary proofs.

and grouped into one single collective demand (Article I (2)). Immediately following the demand to depart from Estonia, the applicant was deprived of his Estonian identity papers and of his passport for foreign travel. Instead of these, he was given a special certificate bearing the seal of the Ministry of Interior and valid only for departure from Estonia.

As we have said above, the negotiations with the Estonian Government, begun on October 9, had ended in six days with an agreement. On the same date, a Commission arrived from Berlin by air, bringing files, registers and lists--all prepared beforehand--which contained the names of some 6,500 Germans from Tallinn and about 2,700 Germans from Tartu. The first steamer with repatriants¹ (German citizens or stateless, since an agreement with the Estonian Government was necessary prior to evacuation of the Estonian citizens) left as early as October 13. The Germans who had meanwhile opted for repatriation had been grouped in special camps ready for departure. On October 15 the treaty with the Estonian Government was signed, and on October 18 the steamer Utlandshoern left Tallinn with 464

1. This word, coined by Dr. Schechtmann, means "persons in the process of being repatriated." (Ed.)

repatriants, of which over 30 per cent were Reich citizens, and the rest Estonian Germans, mostly from the Province.

B. Method and Rate of Repatriation.- The further tempo of the evacuation can be realized in following up the list of the ships carrying human freight, published in the Revalsche Zeitung.

From Tallinn (Reval):

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Number of Resettlers</u>
October		
18	Utlandshoern	464
19	Der Deutsche	911
21	Oldenburg	964
22	Eider.....	463
24	Sierra Cordoba	1,007
25	Orotawa	590
27	Der Deutsche	996
28	Oceana	815
30	Sierra Cordoba	1,109
November		
2	Der Deutsche	1,131
4	Oceana	863
6	Sierra Cordoba	955
15	---	318
Total		10,586

The above left Estonia by the port of Tallinn alone, on seven ships which made two, three, and even four voyages. Moreover, the Adler had carried away a group of repatriants from the Oesel, and the steamers

Orotawa and Eider had embarked two groups of repatriants in Paernau. The evacuation of the German minority had been completed in twenty-eight days, between October 18 and November 15. On November 30, after the first general census of repatriants, Neue Zuercher Zeitung reported that 11,200 Germans had left Estonia to date. According to the list of persons having lost Estonian citizenship in connection with the repatriation, published in the Estonian Official Gazette, 11,760 repatriants had left Estonia before the end of 1939.

C. Number of Germans Repatriated. - It is not easy to establish the number of Germans who could claim the right to opt for evacuation. As we have already said above, the German-Estonian Protocol provided for a "release" from Estonian citizenship of those persons who, in accordance with Estonian laws, had been inscribed in the "cadastre" register of the cultural self-government of the German voelkische (racial) minority.

We have already stated that the number of Germans included in the German national "cadastre" amounted, in January, 1936, to 13,345 persons. This figure is lower by 3,001 than that given by the general census of 1934

as the number of Germans in Estonia. On the other hand, Burgdoerfer estimated the real number of Germans in Estonia at 20,000. It thus appears that a considerable number of Germans--those who had also been covered by Paragraphs b and c of the Protocol--had not been inscribed in the German national "cadastre."

According to official German data, the number of Germans who had left Estonia amounted to 12,900. If the figures of the census of 1934 are taken as a basis, about 325,000 Germans (19.87 per cent) did not respond to the appeal by the Fuehrer. If, however, the figures of the national "cadastre" are to be relied upon, the number of those who refused to leave was not over 207; finally, if we accept Burgdoerfer's figures, those who stayed behind numbered some 7,000. The first figure appears to us the most reliable of the three. Thus, about one-fifth of all Estonian Germans remained in the country.

This was a heavy blow to the Reich and a dangerous precedent for the future. The Frankfurter Zeitung of November 25 attempted to minimize the number of those "recalcitrant" Germans. To attain its ends, this paper, which but four weeks earlier, on October 29, had estimated the total number of Germans in Estonia

at 20,000 to 25,000, spoke now of only 14,000 Estonian Germans. Those who refused to depart were, according to the paper, "persons who for many years have been staying afar from Germandom and, therefore, have not been carried away with the general flow of repatriation."

2. Repatriation from Latvia

A. Terms of German-Latvian Agreement.- The Latvian-German Treaty, like the German-Estonian Protocol, can be divided into two parts, according to its structure:

- (a) Transfer of persons (Latvian citizens of German nationality).
- (b) Transfer of the property of these departing citizens.

Not unlike the German-Estonian Protocol, the Latvian-German Treaty was a typical treaty of option, in so far as the form goes.

The migration of the German population of Latvia to the Reich was not compulsory from the legal standpoint for all members of the German minority. Every German was individually free in his decision. He

simply was informed of the invitation of the Fuehrer to settle in the Reich and of the consent of the government of the country of his citizenship to "release" him, on certain conditions. It was up to him to decide and act. He was given the right of option; this was a right and not an obligation. He was in no way forced to exercise it. He was not put before a dilemma: to opt either in favor of resettlement in the Reich or against it; to opt for departure from Latvia or against departure. He could choose not to express his opinion, simply to remain silent. His silence would have been eo ipso regarded as a factum concludens, as a decision to abide by his present civil status. His free will could find active expression in but one direction: he could opt for his "release" from Latvian citizenship and for his departure to the Reich. In order to achieve that it was necessary that he "make known his decision before December 15, 1939, to forfeit forever his Latvian citizenship and to abandon his permanent residence in Latvia." (Article I of the basic Treaty.)

B. Method and Rate of Repatriation.- Five days before the scheduled departure of the last transport ship, a number of Germans were not yet ready to leave,

and on December 3 presented the German Ambassador in Riga with a demand to obtain a delay until May 15, 1940. An anonymous letter received by the German Ambassador read:

"One can not ask of all Germans to draw a line under the past in 45 days and to leave their homeland before they first honestly and without nervous strain settle everything. Therefore, a resettlement of 70,000 Germans in 45 days is altogether impossible and beyond everybody's understanding. It has led already to countless tragedies. We hope that a prolongation (of this delay) not only would serve the interests of the Great German Reich but also would suit the Latvian State, and, above all, would help those Germans who for different reasons would otherwise have to stay here."

The repatriation continued at the same rapid tempo, and at midnight on October 15 the number of persons having left Latvia in virtue of the Latvian-German Treaty reached 47,810. Since the total number of repatriants from Latvia did not exceed 48,641, it appears that those who were late on the date set as a limit by the Treaty numbered only about 850. The Soviet author, G. Gertzovich, was therefore guilty of no exaggeration

in asserting that the resettlement of Germans from Latvia had lasted about forty-five days.

The evacuation of the German Latvian farmers had been more complete. The "Fuehrer" of the German farmers in Latvia, V. Sivers, boastfully told a correspondent of the Rigascher Rundschau (December 13, 1939) that: "Not a single peasant remained behind. All have responded to the appeal of the Fuehrer." The repatriated farmers took out 6,000 head of horses, cows, sheep and other livestock, agricultural equipment, household furniture, and fodder. Sivers declared that this unanimity among the farmers had been in considerable measure promoted by the promise that they would be given corresponding farms in the place of their resettlement.

In the middle of February, 1940, the Essener National-Zeitung triumphantly announced that the resettlement of the German minorities from Estonia and Latvia had been completed. About 60,000 resettlers had been carried away from their homelands by means of about one hundred ship cruises. Two hundred and fifty lunatics and 157 criminals figured among this mass of resettlers.

C. Number of Germans Repatriated.- According to the census of 1935, 62,144 Germans lived in Latvia. On the other hand, according to the German official data, 48,641 persons were evacuated in 1939-1940 by virtue of the Latvian-German Treaty of evacuation. A simple subtraction would give the number of those who remained: more than 13,500, or 21.7 per cent. Here one must, however, take into account several complicating factors:

(a) Latvian official data did not coincide with the German data. In his speech delivered on December 20, 1939, the Latvian Minister of the Interior, K. Veitman, had declared that 49,412 Germans (and not 48,641) had left Latvia by sea, by virtue of the Treaty of October 30. This makes a difference of 772.

(b) K. Veitman estimated the number of Germans in Latvia at the moment of evacuation at 54,000 to 55,000, and not at 62,144, as had been shown by the census of 1935. The Latvian Minister explained that the sharp fall in the number of Germans was due to "the high mortality rate among the Germans in Latvia and their increased emigration to Germany in the course of the last five years, after the advent of the National-Socialist régime." He expressed his conviction that not more

than 4,000 or 5,000 persons who "formerly called themselves Germans" had remained in Latvia.

(c) An apparently considerable number of persons who were not of the German (ethnic) nationality had left the country together with the Volksdeutsche, by using the facilities offered by the German evacuation, in order to escape Latvia, which had become unsafe in the sense of a possible bolshevization. Indications pointing to this may be found scattered throughout German and non-German sources.

In her letter dated Lindow-at-Greifenhagen, November 20, and published in Baltenbriefe, "Trauti" wrote to her "dear Aunt Emmy" that "a trend had manifested itself among the Latvians in Riga which was rather surprising. So, for instance, a considerable part of the Latvian intelligentsia attempted to obtain evacuation certificates of the German Baltic Volksgemeinschaft. Only those who were in possession of such a certificate have been regarded by the Latvian authorities as having the right to participate in the resettlement. . . . The Latvian . . . fearing a savage (ungebildeten) Russian occupation of his country, had suddenly seen in a possibly quick departure for Germany the only way out open for him."

"Papi," in her letter dated October 22 and addressed to "my dear Gerhard," also confirmed the rush for the certificates of the German Volksgemeinschaft: "Even the Jews and the Latvians seek them, but they are under a strict control." Despite this control, however, a relatively considerable number of Latvians, Estonians, and Russians, who had special reasons to fear a Bolshevik invasion of Latvia, had used the legal facility which offered itself in order to leave their homeland which had become unsafe. An attentive perusal of the lists of those who had lost their Latvian citizenship in accordance with the Latvian-German Treaty of October 30, published in the Latvian Official Gazette (Valdibas Vestnesis) will be convincing enough evidence that, practically, not only German, but also all anti-Soviet elements had been evacuated from Latvia.

According to the former deputy of the Latvian Parliament and an authority on this question, Professor M. Laserson, the Russian and Latvian names, which are numerous on this list, belong as a rule to those Latvian and Russian (especially Orthodox-Sect) families who were thoroughly assimilated into the German society and adopted the German language and culture. Latvians used to call their thoroughly Germanized kinsmen Kakluvaciesi

(those with the Germans on their neck) or Pusvaciesi (half-Germans). Among the Russians, thoroughly Germanized families, who considered themselves Germans and were regarded as such in the Baltic-German society, often bore such purely Russian-sounding names as Arbuzov, Antipov, Niesodomov or Ivanov.

A National-Socialist reporter, Carlo von Kuegelgen, who wrote an article entitled Der Gang ins Neue Leben ("The March Towards a New Life") for the illustrated magazine Der Volksdeutsche, hinted cautiously at the existence of these categories of the repatriants. After a visit to Riga, he wrote: "One must keep in mind that it has not been an easy matter even to establish who had the right to be resettled. For many mixed marriages had taken place between the Baltic Germans and the Estonians and between the Baltic Germans and the Latvians, especially in the course of the last decades."

Thus, there were many of alien origin who by their education and culture had become part of Deutschtum. These elements could have been regarded as German from the viewpoint of their culture and of their way of living, but of course they were not Volksdeutsche in the racial sense of the word, and this meaning of

Volksdeutsche had been prevalent ever since racial ideology had become the official doctrine of the Reich.

The Treaty concluded with Latvia on October 30, 1939, dealt with the evacuation of the Volksdeutsche only. In delivering Volksgemeinschaftskarten which granted the right of evacuation to these culturally assimilated but racially alien elements, German institutions in Latvia most certainly were guilty of violating the official doctrine of the Reich as well as the letter and spirit of the Treaty with Latvia.

According to all data at our disposal, we can say that out of the total number of 78,500 Germans in the Baltic, nearly 61,500 had left; about 17,000 Germans remained (21.7 per cent). Pravda gave a figure close to this in declaring that the Soviet-German agreement of January 10, 1941, aimed at repatriation to the Reich of the 17,000 Germans who had remained in Latvia and Estonia after the evacuation of 1939-1940.

The presence of such a considerable percentage of "recalcitrant" Germans was characteristic of the first repatriation experiments of the Reich: In the southern Tyrol, 81,620 Germans (36.8 per cent) stayed behind out of the total of 266,985 who were entitled to opt for

repatriation.

By contrast--as will be shown elsewhere--the number of those willing to leave was, in the course of all other evacuation operations, not only invariably higher than the official data concerning the size of the German population, but also than the number of Germans computed by the local German leadership and even than the figures supplied by German statistics.

3. General Observations

A. On the Process of Repatriation.- At first, an attempt was made to build up the entire organization of the evacuation upon a purely voluntary basis. But according to a report by the Riga correspondent of the London Times, the voluntary system did not produce the expected results. A mobilization was decreed:

"All males between 20 and 26 were summoned for compulsory service until the end of the transportation. A similar order called up all doctors under 60, lawyers under 65, and nurses under 49.

The National-Socialist organizations in Latvia were not intended to become resettlement bodies. When, however, the Fuehrer issued the call to (this)

Volksgruppe, they became those organs which enabled a frictionless realization of that tremendous organizational task. Shoulder to shoulder with the men and women there stood also boys and girls who acted not only as messengers and auxiliaries but bore a direct responsibility in the field of supplies, in the commissions of planning and of clearing."

The feeding of several hundred passengers who came back unexpectedly was organized with the same speed and accuracy. The machinery worked impeccably.

The ports of destination were Danzig, Stettin, Koenigsberg, and Gotenhaven (Gdynia). On certain days as many as four thousand evacuees arrived in Danzig-Langfuhr. Fritz Gerlach summarized the evacuation work in the following lines, published by Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik: Forty-one steamships carried 62,000 Baltic Germans and 293,000 cubic meters of luggage. They traveled 121,000 maritime miles, which amounts to five and one-half times the earth's circumference. Three hundred thousand to 350,000 square meters of floor were required for the storage of the luggage brought by the evacuees. The steamers also carried 1,600 horses, 400 head of cattle, 580 pigs, 370 sheep and 950 crates of poultry.

B. On the Germans Repatriated.- Among the duties of the reception machinery was also that of a careful inquiry as to the personal status of every new citizen of the Reich, with regard to his age, sex, social and economic position, etc. The results of this inquiry into the composition of 61,500 German evacuees from Latvia and Estonia, who came to the Reich in 1939-40 were published in the beginning of 1941 and disclosed some interesting data on the repatriated Baltic group:

(a) The percentage of old people was uncommonly high. Persons aged 65 constituted 14.1 per cent of the total number of the Estonian evacuees and 10.3 per cent of the Latvian evacuees. It must be recalled here that the corresponding percentage in Germany did not exceed 7.5 and was as low as 3.8 for the Galician repatriants and 3.5 for the repatriants from Volhynia.

(b) There was a very low percentage of children between the ages of one and fourteen. Among the evacuees from Estonia this percentage was 15.2 and among those from Latvia, 13.4. The percentage of children of the same age-group among the Russians in Latvia was 30; it was 22 for the Latvians and 18 for the Latvian Jews. In Germany, the percentage of children was 21.4. The percentage of children among other repatriated

groups was considerably higher. It was 37.7 among the Volhynian Germans, 28.9 among the Galician evacuees, 33.3 among the repatriants from the Polish Government-General, and reached 31.7 among the Germans from Bessarabia.

The causes of these phenomena were of a varied character. Wirtschaft und Statistik, published by the Statistischer Reichsamt, emphasized that:

"The two Baltic groups belonged in their former homeland to the refined upper class which, as a rule, is poor in children, but is also in better condition as regards the mortality rate. . . . Since 1905, the male population of the two German Baltic Volksgruppen suffered from tremendous war and revolution losses and, after the World War, the existing national and economic pressure accounted also for the losses through emigration."

Dr. W. Gradmann attempted to explain the more favorable age composition of the Latvian German evacuees by the fact that:

"In the years preceding the World War (1), a number of German peasants from other parts of Russia settled in Latvia. The peasant settlement of Hirschenhof is a well-known example of this. These

peasant settlers accounted for a slightly different demographic-political structure of the Latvian German Volksgruppe."

(c) A very high percentage of evacuees consisted of women. There were 34,000 women and 27,000 men: 1,276 women to 1,000 men. In Germany, the corresponding figures are 1,000 and 1,053.

This disproportion may be explained, on one hand, by the above-mentioned considerable loss in the male population as a result of war and revolution, and on the other hand by the well-known rule that women are more numerous in the advanced age-groups.

(d) A very low percentage of the repatriated population consisted of agriculturists, and the urban professions were preponderantly represented. The peasants and other persons having agricultural professions formed but one-fifth (20.7 per cent) of the evacuees from the two Baltic countries, while they formed 65.9 per cent among the repatriants from Volhynia, 81.7 per cent among the evacuees from Bessarabia, 65.6 per cent among the Galician repatriants, etc. The Baltic groups thus occupied the last place among all other repatriated German minority groups. On the other hand, as regards individuals employed in industry and trade, they

figured in the first place among all other repatriated Volksgruppen, with 30.5 per cent occupied in industry and related professions, and with 31.6 per cent listed as tradesmen or artisans. These groups formed but 2.9 per cent of the Volhynian evacuees; 2.2 per cent of the Bessarabian evacuees; 7.3 per cent of the German repatriants from Northern Bukovina, 20.2 per cent of the evacuees from the industrial Narev district, and even in the Reich itself they formed but 10.4 per cent. The German evacuees from the Baltic countries also held first place with regard to the number of persons in public service, i.e., 16.1 per cent, as compared with 0.9 per cent among the Volhynian evacuees and 1.8 per cent among the Bessarabian repatriants. The evacuees of Northern Bukovina, with 11.0 per cent listed as officials, approximated the Baltic group.

(e) The group of so-called "non-professionals with independent means," formed by rentiers, inmates of old-age institutions, and those receiving assistance, was also uncommonly large: 10.4 per cent of the entire number, while even in Germany it did not exceed 8.9 per cent and was as small as 2.0 per cent among the Volhynian evacuees and 1.1 per cent among the Galician repatriants.

(f) As a result of the above-described unfavorable age and sex composition of the Baltic evacuees, the percentage of Erwerbspersonen (wage-earners) among them was but 48.8 per cent, compared with 49.5 per cent in Germany, 55.0 per cent among the Volhynian Germans, 55.6 per cent among the evacuees from the Polish Government-General, 57.1 per cent among the repatriants from Galicia, etc.

From the viewpoint of the colonization interests and plans of the Reich, a resettlement group of such age, sex and professional composition represented a serious and involved problem. Its specific professional composition required special measures in order to ensure its stability amid the new conditions of life in the annexed Polish Provinces.

The evacuees from Latvia and Estonia were directed to the western Polish Provinces incorporated into the Reich. An overwhelming majority (50,000+) of the evacuees was settled in the Warthegau, some of them were settled in the Gau Danzig-Westpreussen; 3,500 persons were classified as unfit for successful colonization in Poland.

Some authors¹ asserted that Baltic Germans were also settled on a large scale in Bohemia and Moravia on lands expropriated from the Czech farmers. This assertion is certainly a mistaken one. In so far as it is possible to ascertain, Baltic Germans were never colonized in Czechoslovakia.

4. Results of Sovietization of Baltic States

A. Further Repatriations.- During the evacuation of 1939, over one-fourth of the Baltic Germans did not respond to the Fuehrer's appeal and remained in Latvia and Estonia. After the sovietization of these countries, a tacit agreement was reached among all affected parties--the Reich, the Soviet Union, and the remaining Germans--to the effect that the latter should also be evacuated. However, a formal agreement remained to be concluded to this end with the Soviet Government.

Official negotiations had begun on September 23, 1940, almost one and one-half months after the incorporation of Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet Union. Unlike the former negotiations, which were

1. Eugene B. Erdely, Germany's First European Protectorate, London, 1941, p. 241; and Karl Loewenstein, Hitler's Germany, New York, 1942, p. 230.

conducted separately, in Riga with the Latvian Government, and in Tallinn with the Estonian Government, the pourparlers with the Soviet authorities were conducted in Riga only and covered the two Baltic Republics. The Soviet Government delegation was headed by V. B. Bochkarev; the German delegation by F. Beneler.

The object of these negotiations was thus presented by Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik:

- (a) Complementary resettlement of Volksdeutsche from Latvia and Estonia.
- (b) Settlement of the question of the compensation claimed by the earlier resettlers from the Baltic countries.

5. In the New Homeland

A. Distribution and Adjustment.-- Polish towns were the first to be "cleaned up" of Poles and Jews. The explanation of this privillegium odiosum was given in the foregoing chapter: the Reich needed, badly and urgently, a "living space" for some 70,000 Baltic Germans. The transfer of this German minority to be "repatriated" confronted the Reich authorities with a complicated and peculiar problem.

At first glance the settlement of this group presented an especially difficult and hard task. Already on October 10, 1939, when the Reich made the first move in its repatriation game, the Berlin correspondent of the Netherland newspaper Telegraaf stressed in a cable to his paper that the overwhelming majority of Baltic Germans to be repatriated belonged to the intellectual classes--people whom it is impossible simply to transplant to the former Polish Corridor and to treat as peasants.¹

This observation touched one of the most delicate problems the Reich's repatriation policy had to solve in connection with the transfer of the Latvian and Estonian Germans. In these two countries the German minority constituted a townsfolk par excellence: 88 per cent of the Latvian and 80 per cent of the Estonian Germans lived in cities. Among the 61,509 repatriated Baltic Germans, the ratio of persons occupied in agriculture was only 20 per cent, while among those evacuated from Volhynia it reached 85.9 and among those transplanted from the Government-General 81.1 per cent.²

1. Telegraaf, October 10, 1939.

2. Wirtschaft und Statistik, First January number, 1941.

It seemed that the resettlement of tens of thousands of unassuming peasant families on farms deserted by escaping or deported Poles was a relatively easy and simple undertaking, whereas, on the other hand, it would be much more difficult and complicated to provide occupation in accordance with their abilities for tens of thousands of highly qualified townsfolk.

In reality, however, the task was simple. Only six months after the beginning of the repatriation of the Balts, Heinrich Himmler, head of the whole repatriation program, was able to state that "die Einordnung der Balten schnell vor sich ging."¹

This was an expression of the usual official opinion. The specific circumstances artificially and ruthlessly created by the German authorities in the annexed Polish territories enabled Himmler's colonization apparatus to realize this "miraculous achievement."

The next, and the most important, phase was the settlement of the Balts.

In order to provide useful information relative to the professional abilities of the transferred people, a special Baltic German Immigration Advisory

1. Reichsverwaltungsblatt, June 8, 1940.

Bureau for the care of returning Germans (Balten-
deutsche Beratungsstelle) was created in Posen under
the direction of the leader of Latvian Germans, Dr.
Erhard Kroeger. The task of this institution was not
so much to give individual advice to those transferred
as to cooperate with the competent Government bodies
charged with the installment of the Balts.

We possess accurate information as to the geo-
graphic distribution of the transferred Balts in their
new resettlement area. Official German sources state
that in May, 1940, six months after the beginning of
the evacuation, about 63,000 Germans evacuated from
Latvia and Estonia were settled in the annexed Polish
Provinces; more than 51,000 of them were in Warthegau
and 11,000 in Gau Danzig-Westpreussen.¹ At that time,
1,500 Baltic Germans were in central Germany in train-
ing or in military service, and were to be settled on
the former Polish land at a later date; 3,500 people
were classified as unlikely to make successful colonists
in Poland.² The distribution of the Balts in the single
districts of the Gau Danzig-Westpreussen was never re-
vealed. At the beginning of 1942, the Balts settled in

1. Reichsverwaltungsblatt, June 3, 1940.

2. Litzmannstaedter Zeitung, May 17, 1940.

the Warthegau were distributed as follows:¹

<u>Place</u>	<u>Number</u>
Inowraclaw County.....	12,682
Posen Province.....	27,613
The Litzmannstadt area.....	<u>10,360</u>
Total.....	50,655

The overwhelming majority, more than two thirds of the settled Balts, remained in the towns. According to the statement made in June, 1940, by Himmler the following were settled:

<u>Place</u>	<u>Number</u>
Posen.....	29,000 (45%)
Litzmannstadt (Lodz).....	8,200
Gotenhaven (Gdynia).....	2,800
Kalisch.....	2,000
Bromberg (Bydgoszcz).....	1,800
Gnesen (Gnieszna).....	1,700
Leslau (Plock).....	1,300
Lissa (Leszno).....	1,200
Hohensalza (Inowraclaw)....	1,200

Smaller groups were settled in smaller towns of the "Former Middle Poland."²

The settlement of these townsfolk did not present any serious difficulties, taking into account the

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1. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, January 11, 1942.
 2. Reichsverwaltungsblatt, June 8, 1940.

thorough "preparatory work."

Describing the schedule of deportations, The German New Order in Poland emphasizes that "in practice everybody was deported from the towns and villages, whether rich or poor, intellectuals, workers, or peasants; but during the first few weeks special attention was given to the intellectuals."

Of the Latvian Germans 88 per cent were townsmen and of the Estonian, 80 per cent. Among them professionals were strongly represented: 270 physicians (in percentage six times more than in the Old Reich), 270 teachers, 256 lawyers and judges, 55 university professors (0.2 per cent of the whole Volksgruppe; ten times more than in the Old Reich), 370 pharmaceutical chemists, 100 dentists, 700 nurses. It was urgently necessary to get jobs for these people. The fastest and simplest method was the forcible expulsion of the corresponding Polish and Jewish elements from their positions in the towns, in order to replace them by the arriving Balts and, thus, to fill the "vacuum."

Under such circumstances it was, of course, not a very complicated task to settle thousands of Baltic German professionals without any delay. The former holders of intellectual positions were evicted literally

overnight. However, the needs of the population that they served remained essentially unchanged. On the other hand, the new German administration urgently needed thousands of qualified officials for the numerous newly-created offices. The combination of these two elements permitted the relatively easy settling of a great part of the Baltic Germans.

"Ingenieure, Aerzte und Lehrer waren in den neuen Reichsgauen willkommene Mitarbeiter, die vom ersten Tag ihrer Ankunft an ihren alten Berufen taetig sein konnten."¹

The Aerzte-und Anwaltskammer cooperated in this field with the official Landesarbeitsamt² and the above-mentioned Baltendeutsche Beratungsstelle at Posen.³

About 270 Baltic Germans registered as practising physicians, and promptly obtained jobs. Five hundred were employed as teachers, while the number of registered teachers did not exceed 270. However, of the 370 pharmaceutical chemists only 200 found jobs, while 190 engineers, 16 architects, 45 university lecturers,

1. Edmund Beyl in Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, January 1941, p. 28.

2. Hans Krieg, p. 54.

3. Rigasche Rundschau, December 13, 1939.

and 67 foresters were easily settled, mainly in the Wartheland.¹ A great number of the Balts became employees in government offices, 2,000 of them at the Reichspost in Warthegau alone;² in Lodz the germanized municipality alone required 400 officials.³

However, many repatriated Baltic Germans passed through a relatively long period of uncertainty as regarded their vocational future and had to wait for settlement at a Sammellager. In many Baltenbriefe we read of mental strain and the need for patience and courage.

Letters by evacuees were, in the beginning, full of complaints concerning neglected professional qualifications. This disappointing news naturally had a discouraging influence upon those Volksgenossen who had not yet left for the eastern territories.

By May, 1940, Baltic Germans had been allocated 3,000 industrial or commercial enterprises and 1,000 artisan's workshops.⁴ A year later, in Warthegau alone

1. Fritz Gerlach, Auf Neuer Scholle, p. 13.

2. Ibid., p. 19.

3. "Der Balteneinsatz in Lodz," Ostdeutscher Beobachter, February 15, 1940.

4. Litzmannstaedter Zeitung, May 17, 1940.

the number of industrial and commercial enterprises taken over by the Balts reached 4,000; the number of independent workshops diminished, however, to 700.¹

It should be noted that the Baltic Germans were in a privileged situation in comparison with other transferred German minorities. Of 7,748 credits granted by the Reich, amounting to 27.51 million Rentenmarks, which the DUT (Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-gesellschaft m.b.H.) allotted to the Germans transferred from the Baltic States, South Tyrol, Volhynia, Galicia, and the Narew area during the first year of its activity, 6,138 credits (almost 80 per cent) amounting to 17.56 million (about 64 per cent) were awarded to the "Baltic sector." In addition, the Balts were granted 281 purveyance credits (Anschaffungskredite) amounting to 1.73 million Rentenmarks.²

The arrival of Baltic Germans wrought a revolutionary change in the appearance of the important Polish towns, which were "cleansed" of a great part of their Polish and Jewish inhabitants. As early as

1. Fritz Gerlach, op. cit., p. 13.

2. "Die finanzielle Regelung der Umsiedlung," Neues Bauerntum, April 1941, p. 172.

February, 1940, a Polish report¹ on the first period of deportations from western Poland, related that:

"The Baltic Germans who have been brought to Poznan give the town a peculiar tone and appearance; wearing as a rule high elk-skin boots and fur caps, they are noisy and arrogant in the streets and public squares. But they are particularly arrogant when they take over the dwellings and undertakings assigned to them after the Polish owners have been deported."

A German author² also gives us a picture of change:

"Man begegnet in Posen auf Schritt und Tritt Maennern und Frauen aus dem Baltenland...Der Hotelinhaber, das Maedel hinter dem Postschalter, die Verkaeuferinnen in diesem, Treuhaender in jenem Geschaeft, der Apotheker drueben, der Arzt dort an der Ecke, Beante und Angestellte in der Verwaltung, viele Handwerker, mehrere Schriftleiter, Treuhaender grosser Fabriken, einige Lehrer - alle sind baltendeutsche Umsiedler...."

1. The German New Order in Poland, p. 176.

2. Fritz Gerlach, op. cit., p. 19. In 1939, not more than 3 per cent of the population of Posen was German, according to Friedrich Lange, Ostland Kehrt heim, Berlin, 1940, p. 55.

Reports emanating from German quarters are not unanimous as to the time it took to settle the Baltic peasants in their "new homeland." Hans Krieg asserts that "verhaeltnismassig am schnellsten hat sich der Einsatz der Bauern vollzogen."¹ Edmund Beyl stresses, on the other hand, that while artisans, physicians, and teachers have found occupation from the first day of their arrival, "it was more difficult to place farmers, who had to wait for the freeing of their farms."²

There was no lack of ready-made farms available for the installation of the few thousands of Baltic peasants; tens of thousands of Polish farmers were dislodged "because of their anti-German behavior."³ It is also to be taken into account that the Baltic Germans arrived when the accumulated stock of confiscated Polish farms was still immense and not yet earmarked for distribution.

Most serious proved the task of adjustment to a new environment. The Baltic farmers came to the Polish

1. Hans Krieg, p. 51.

2. Edmund Beyl, "Soziale Probleme im Deutsche Osten," Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, January 1941, p. 23.

3. Herman Priebe, "Die Ansiedlung baltendeutscher Bauern im Warthegau," Neues Bauerntum, April-May 1940, pp. 163-165.

western Provinces from a completely different climate, where "starke Niederschlaege und hohe Luftfeuchtigkeit Wiesen und Weiden beguenstigte." Almost every farm possessed a lot of forest land. Fifty-sixty per cent "der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzflaeche waren Dauergrundland, insbesondere Weidenflaechen; der Rest trug Klee gras, Getreide, ein wenig Hackfrucht."

Entirely different agricultural conditions prevailed, for example, in the Warthegau which is a typical dry district, with a continental climate. The spring is dry, the summer is hot; "Grundland ist unter diesen Umstaenden nicht durchzuhalten und Wiesen und Weiden sind wenige." While in the Baltic countries every farm possessed a herd of first-class cattle, the cattle in Poland was far from numerous and, according to A. von Mickwitz, its quality was low. It was a revelation to the Baltic farmers that the horses in the Wartheland can be fed on rye groats (Roggenschrot).¹ They did not possess the necessary experience in managing an estate under entirely unaccustomed soil and climatic conditions. The self-adjustment to the new circumstances was difficult and slow. Troublesome mistakes were unavoidable.

1. Hans Krieg, p. 51.

However, the uprooted Baltic German peasants were, in the end, glad to get whatever land they were given. In the Litzmannstaedter Huettenlager, a repatriated Baltic farmer declared frankly: "Gleichgueltig wie gut oder schlecht es ist."¹ By May, 1940, about 2,300 farms of varying acreage in the Warthegau, and 150 farms in the Gau Danzig-Westpreussen were managed by Baltic German peasants; in the Spring of 1941 their number in Warthegau reached 3,000. Very often independent farm holdings were allocated to young peasants who had never managed a farm of their own in the Baltic. In order to create "real peasants" (eigentliche Bauern), the German colonization authorities allotted more than 100 hectares (247 acres) to such new farmers. The average acreage was 21 hectares (51.9 acres).

Approximately one-third of the new farmers were former large Baltic landowners and their sons; the rest were "true peasants."² The official German Litzmannstaedter Zeitung, May 17, 1940, especially stressed that the expropriated Polish estates were distributed among the former Baltic barons with the intention of "compensating them for the harm done to them

1. Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten, May 21, 1940.

2. According to A. von Mickwitz.

by the agrarian reforms in Latvia and Estonia." And this "compensation" was very munificent. In Estonia and Latvia the repatriated Germans possessed about 86,000 hectares (212,500 acres) of land; in their new homes they were given 145,000 hectares (358,295 acres) of confiscated Polish land.¹

According to promises given and in order to avoid the dispersion of the traditional Baltic peasantry, the colonizing authorities of the Reich concentrated the peasants among the Germans repatriated from Estonia and Latvia mainly in the eastern districts of the former Poznan Province. In the Schubin district were settled peasants from Curland;² 300 peasant families from the village of Hirschenhof, who wanted to remain together, were settled in the Gnesen district.³

From the moment of their arrival in Pomerania and Posen until their definite settlement in their new homes, the Baltic Germans were the object of the most intense National Socialist care, "which extended to their spiritual needs and interests."

1. Neue Volkszeitung, October 11, 1941.

2. Hans Krieg, p. 51.

3. According to A. von Mickwitz.

III. GERMAN DEPORTATION POLICY IN CONQUERED POLAND

1. Policy towards Poland before World War II

The territories comprising Pomerania, Posen, and Upper Silesia, which have long been the subject of bitter controversy between Germany and Poland, have belonged alternately to the latter, the former, and then again to Poland; their ethnic composition has repeatedly been changed by colonization and by administrative measures.

Pomerania (Polish: Pomorze), incorrectly called West Prussia;¹ and the "Polish corridor," is a Slavic country. It was seized by the Teutonic order in 1309, recovered by Poland in 1466 and held until 1772, when it was seized by Prussia; about the same time Prussia annexed Posen (Polish: Poznan).

The northern districts of this Polish Province fell to Prussia in 1772; the southern districts were annexed in 1793 and 1795. In 1807, after the Treaty of Tilsit, Posen was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but in 1815 it reverted to Prussia. Upper

1. This name corresponds substantially to the part of historic Pomerania which is called Pommern and remained subject to Poland until 1309, when it was divided between Brandenburg and the Teutonic order.

Silesia (Polish: Slansk) formed, from 1335 to 1745, a part of the Austrian Empire.

Frederick the Great began the forced colonization of the Polish areas which were Prussia's share in the partition, settling peasants from Brandenburg there. During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Prussian policy toward the former Polish Provinces was conciliatory. About 1830, however, Flotwell's Cabinet resumed the experiment started by Frederick the Great, namely, the settling of subsidized German colonists.

After the creation of the new German Empire, in 1871, Bismarck followed a resolutely anti-Polish policy. This policy was so ruthless that the majority of the German Reichstag voted on January 16, 1886, a resolution, introduced by the leader of the Catholic Center Windhorst, stating that the evictions (of Poles) decreed by the administration of the Polish Provinces were incompatible with the best interests of the people of the Reich.¹ This resolution remained, however, without any practical results because the German Reichstag exerted little influence

1. Friedrich Schinkel, Polen, Preussen und Deutschland, Breslau, 1931, p. 176.

upon the Prussian Government. In his famous speech to the Reichstag on February 8, 1872, Bismarck summed up his program for dealing with the Poles in the area and Prussia in the one word: "Exterminate."

In order to accelerate the realization of this policy, the notorious Colonizing Commission (Ansiedlungs-Kommission) was established by the Law of April 26, 1886, for the purpose of buying up Polish land for German colonists, and was endowed with 100 million marks. Later, in 1894, a subsidized Society of the Eastern Marches (Ostmarkenverein, known as the H.K.T. from the initials of its founders: Hansemann, Kennemann, Tiedemann) was created for the promotion of German advance in the East.

The funds at the disposal of the Colonizing Commission were considerably increased, and a special fund of nearly 500,000 marks was to finance a campaign against the Polish middle classes. Bismarck's retirement, in March, 1890, did not change the anti-Polish policy of Prussia. After a short truce under Caprivi's chancellorship (1890-1894), Count Buelow, Bismarck's most zealous successor, in 1904 enacted a bill forbidding Poles to establish new peasant farms on their own soil and in 1908, a law empowering the Colonizing

Commission to confiscate Polish estates.

This anti-Polish policy of Prussia, although occasionally criticized in the Reichstag, was backed by a majority of the German public and by the Emperor. Immense financial means were put at its disposal: from 1866 till 1914, Germany spent 1.3 billion gold marks in order to drive Poles from Posen and Pomerania, and to supplant them by German colonists.¹ The achievements of this ruthless policy, conducted during three decades, lacked results commensurate with the magnitude of the efforts made. The Polish population countered the attack by cooperative credit organizations, in which both the peasants and the middle class of the towns took a prominent share; and soon the Poles succeeded in buying more land than they lost.

During the period between 1862 and 1886, when official pressure was not so strong, 225,000 hectares (556,000 acres) of land were lost by the Poles and only 30,000 hectares (74,000 acres) acquired. However, from 1886 to 1904, Polish holdings showed a net increase of 40,000 hectares (98,840 acres). No more satisfactory was, from the German point of view, the

1. Leon Wassilewski, op. cit., p. 31.

increase in the German population. The census of 1905, it is true, showed that the decrease in the German population in the Eastern Provinces of the Reich had stopped.¹ However, a Nazi author acknowledged in 1940 that the Colonizing Commission had, after thirty years of activity, settled in Posen and West Prussia only about 145,000 Germans, whereas twice that number succumbed to the "Attraction of the West" and migrated to the Rhineland and Westphalia, where higher wages were paid. Despite 145 years of German rule and despite the systematic and pitiless colonization undertaken since 1886, the majority of the population of Posen, of Pomerania, and of a great part of Silesia has remained Polish.

After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to cede to the newly-created Polish Republic most of the Provinces of Posen and West Prussia--a stretch of territory 260 miles long and up to 80 miles in width. Two thirds of the inhabitants of this territory were Poles. After plebiscites favoring the Germans, the East Prussian districts of Marienwerder and Allenstein remained with Prussia.

1. Schinkel, op. cit., p. 206.

After a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, the Council of the League of Nations accepted the recommendations of a special Committee, partitioned Silesia, adjudicated more than half of the people and area to Germany, but gave Poland most of the economic resources. Danzig, with a population almost wholly German, was made a Free City under League control, but Poland was accorded special diplomatic and economic rights.

The transfer of West Prussia and Posen to Poland, with a subsequent division of Germany into two unconnected sections--Germany proper, extending eastward as far as Pomerania, and East Prussia--was justified by the victorious Allies on the ground that "the interests which Germans in East Prussia, who number fewer than two millions, have in establishing a land connection with Germany, are less vital than the interests of the whole Polish nation in securing direct access to the sea."¹

Germany never accepted the loss of these Provinces. The Prussian Landtag on July 21, 1922, passed the so-called Ostmarkengesetz, establishing the Province Grenzmark Posen-Westpreussen. J.F.D. Morrow

1. Walter Consuelo Langsam, The World since 1914, New York, 1937, pp. 114-115, 584.

is certainly right in remarking that the very name of this Province rings out like a challenge "to the territorial settlement effected by the Peace Conference in restoring German West Prussia and Posen to Poland."¹ At the same time the German Government and German political writers charged the Polish Republic with a forcible expulsion of the overwhelming majority of Germans living in the ceded Provinces of Posen and West Prussia, and with the systematic expropriation of the German landowning class. A summary of these accusations is provided by P. W. Oertzen in Das ist Polen, published in Munich in 1939.

During the first ten years of Polish rule the number of Germans in the Provinces of Posen and West Prussia, which amounted to 1,200,000 was reduced to some 350,000; the German land population lost 55 per cent, the town population 85 per cent; about 500,000 hectares (1,235,000 acres) of German-owned land became Polish.² Oertzen and other German publicists attributed this development to a deliberate de-Germanization policy of the Polish Government, quoting a

1. J.F.D. Morrow, The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands, London, 1936, pp. 360, 380.

2. P. W. Oertzen, Das ist Polen, Munich, 1939, p. 211.

series of appropriate statements of leading Polish political personalities. Stanislaus Grabski emphatically declared at a meeting of the Posen Landesverband of the Polish National Democratic Party:

"The percentage of foreigners in Poland is too large. Posen can show us how the percentage of foreigners can be reduced from 14%, or even 20% to 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ %. . . . Polish land is exclusively for Poles."¹

Even more outspoken in this regard was the Polish Prime Minister Witos,² declaring to a delegation of German crown-land tenants:

"It is the highest time that the so-called German of 'Kultur' disappear."

And one of Witos' successors, General Sikorski, late Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-

1. Oertzen, op. cit., p. 217. After Poland's dismemberment, some German authors (e.g., Friedrich Lange, Ostland kehrt heim, Berlin, 1940, p. 55) asserted that the number of Germans driven away from the Polish territory reached "almost two millions." René Martel (The Eastern Frontiers of Germany, London, 1930, p. 142) uncritically accepts the German thesis that "800,000 Germans from Poland have been expelled and 150,000 have had to leave the Corridor."

2. Oertzen, op. cit., p. 213.

exile, stated:

"It is in the interests of all Polish citizens that the process of de-Germanizing the west Polish provinces be completed as rapidly as possible."¹

The former Nazi President of Danzig, now a fervent opponent of the Nazi régime, Herman von Rauschnig, tried to prove in his book Die Entdeutschung Westpreussens und Posens, published in 1930, that as a direct result of this anti-German Polish policy the percentage of German population in Pomerania, which was 42.5 in 1910, decreased in 1921 to 18.7 and in 1926 to 12.5, and that during these sixteen years Pomeranian Germandom lost 72.2 per cent of its number.

The voluntary character of the German emigration is frankly admitted, as late as 1936, by the official National Socialist writer Hans R. Wiese, in a booklet published by Volk und Reich Verlag.² Wiese states that from 1919 to 1922 half of the 1,200,000 Germans in Posen-Pomerellen left the country, and continues:

"Davon ein grosser Teil Beante, denen tatsaechlich nichts anderes als Auswanderung

1. Ernst Otto Thiele, Polen greift an, Breslau, 1938, p. 23.

2. Hans R. Wiese, Auslandsdeutsche Erneuerung, Berlin, 1936, pp. 35-36.

uebriggeblieben war. Ferner ein anderer Teil, dem die Zwangsmassnahmen der polnischen Behoerden jedes weitere Fortkommen im Lande unmoeglich machten. Dann aber auch ein sehr grosser Teil, der schon geringen Schwierigkeiten durch die Abwanderung aus dem Wege ging oder gar einfach aus voelligen Unverstaendnis fuer voelkische Aufgaben und egoistischer Zweckmaessigkeit sich gern der Massenpsychose der Abwanderung nach Deutschland hingab."

Wiese stresses that Germans who offered to stay were considered as "bad Germans":

"Derjenige ist kein aufrechter deutscher Mann, der sich mit der Herrschaft eines fremden Volkes abfindet und unter ihr lebt."

He avows also that purely material advantages have played an important rôle in the German repatriation movement:

"Die Entschaedigung fuer Abwanderungsverluste wurde teilweise so liberal gehandhabt, dass sie schliesslich einen Anreiz zur Abwanderung bot."

The Poles stress that this voluntary evacuation offers the most convincing proof that the Germans in these Provinces "were not people who had deep roots in the Polish soil but had come to it to fulfill their

Germanizing mission; they themselves quickly disposed of their property, recognizing that--in the fact of the emergence of a free Poland--their mission was finished."¹ They were, however, allowed to take all their movable property and sell their real estate.

Much more complicated seems to be the problem of the plight of the German rural population. As a result of thirty years of State-financed and favored colonization, the Germans in 1914 owned in Posen and Pomerania 1,535,000 hectares (3,792,895 acres) of land; in Pomerania alone, according to figures given by Rauschning, 68 per cent of the total land was concentrated in German hands (37 per cent was owned by private German landlords and 31 per cent by public German institutions.²

An unusually great part of this German property belonged to big landowners. It was therefore unavoidable that the Polish agrarian reform of December 28, 1925, should chiefly have affected this German landowning element, providing the German minority and the

1. The German New Order in Poland.

2. "Die polnische Agrarreform in ihren Auswirkungen auf die Entdeutschung von Posen und Pomerellen," Nation und Staat, July-August 1936, p. 633.

Government of the Reich with convenient pretexts for complaining before the League of Nations against the violation of the Minority clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.¹ These complaints were essentially of the same character as the laments of the expropriated Baltic barons in Latvia and Estonia, and transplanted social and economic conflicts onto the national plane.

The Polish liquidation law of July 15, 1920, provided for both voluntary and compulsory liquidation, giving priority to the former, and Polish sources assert categorically that compulsory liquidation was applied to barely 13 per cent of the liquidated properties, comprising about 60,000 hectares (148,460 acres) out of a total of 460,000 hectares (1,136,660 acres). In 1924, an agreement was concluded with the Germans confining the liquidation of property to Posen and Pomerania, Upper Silesia being excluded. In the 1929 liquidation agreement with Germany, the Polish Government renounced a number of the rights conferred on Poland by the Treaty of Versailles.²

1. Articles 92 and 279 of the Treaty of Versailles attributed to Poland the right to liquidate the property of persons who were, till January 10, 1920, citizens of the Reich.

2. The German New Order in Poland.

The problem of the small tenant-farmers, who with the aid of the German Government, had colonized the Prussian Provinces of Poland, presented itself in another light. The Polish Government attempted to evict these colonists, who held the land under special contracts from the Prussian Government, without compensation. The Reich took up the case of her nationals and appealed for redress to the Council of the League of Nations. Poland denied the competency of this body, and the dispute was placed before the World Court in The Hague. The latter upheld the jurisdiction of the Council and handed down an advisory opinion to the effect that Poland must respect the private rights of the German nationals. Consequently, the Warsaw Government eventually agreed to compensate the evicted German farmers.¹

The Germans complained, however, that the proposed compensations in no way corresponded to the real value of the land: the Polish authorities usually paid 25-30 per cent of the market prices.² The Warsaw

1. W. C. Langsam, op. cit., p. 380.

2. Nation und Staat, July-August 1936, p. 637. Robert Turley (Le conflit de demain: Berlin, Varsovie, Danzig, Paris, 1928, p. 165) apparently exaggerates in asserting that "the Polish Government calmly offers to the parties concerned one-eighth or even one-tenth of the real value of their property."

Government encouraged the colonization of the expropriated German lands by Polish settlers from Congress Poland and Galicia.¹

After the above-described Bevoelkerungsverschiebung (population displacement), the German minority in the three eastern voevodships² of Poland (Pomerania, Posen, Upper Silesia) numbered, according to the census of 1931, about 375,000, i.e., 8 per cent of the total population in those parts. In the whole area of these Provinces there was not a single county where the Germans were in the majority. Of a total of sixty-nine counties, there were only three where the German element accounted for more than 25 per cent, and four counties with a German population numbering between 20 and 25 per cent. After the mass emigration of the German urban elements during the first few post-war years, the structure of the German population changed radically in comparison with the pre-war status; nearly three quarters resided in rural districts (only in highly industrialized Upper Silesia 61 per cent of the German population of this Province lived in the towns and 39 per cent in the rural areas).

1. Ernst Otto Thiele, op. cit., p. 25.

2. County.

The German rural population was mostly settled on medium-sized farm-holdings of less than 50 hectares (123 acres) in area; 20 per cent of the farm hands in the western voevodships were Germans. There was, however, also a considerable percentage of larger German-owned farm-holdings and country estates. In the voevodship of Pomerania, the Germans possessed 208,000 hectares (514,000 acres) of land, i.e., 44 per cent of the aggregate acreage of the large estates, 810,433 acres (or 34 per cent) in the voevodship of Posen, and 353,350 acres (88 per cent) in the voevodship of Upper Silesia.¹

2. Reorganization of Conquered Poland

After the military defeat and dismemberment of the Polish State in 1939, the Reich started the administrative reorganization of the incorporated Polish areas in order to create the necessary administrative frame for a new "Bevoelkerungsverschiebung" in a west-east direction on a really unique scale.

1. Minority Affairs and Poland. An Informatory Outline, edited by S. J. Paprocki, Warsaw, 1935, pp. 122-125.

It is asserted that certain numbers of transplanted Bessarabian and Volhynian Germans were settled in the Bohemian-Moravian Protectorate, and that other groups of Volhynian Germans, as well as Baltic German families, were settled in Alsace-Lorraine, along the Maginot Line. There is little evidence to support these assertions. Isolated cases of such resettlement are certainly not excluded, but no significant colonization took place in these countries. The nine transferred minorities were to be resettled mainly in conquered Polish territory.

This territory (73,487 sq. miles, with a population of some 22,225,000) was divided by the Reich authorities into two parts--the Government-General, and the Incorporated Provinces.

A. The Government-General.-- An area of some 37,340 square miles, with a population estimated at 11,485,000, was demarcated as a separate German-controlled territory and originally¹ called: General-Gouvernement der besetzten polnischen Gebiete ("Government-General of the Occupied Polish areas") or simply: Generalgouvernement Polen. On August 18,

1. RGBl. I, Decree of October 12, 1939.

1940, this name was changed and henceforth this area was called only General-Gouvernement or Generalgouvernement des Deutschen Reiches.

The stamps issued in connection with the second anniversary of the creation of the Government-General bore the inscription: The German Reich-Generalgouvernement. In area, the Government-General comprised 23.7 per cent of the Polish State of 1939, and in population 32.5 per cent. When eastern Galicia, ceded in September, 1939, to the Soviet Union, was reconquered in July, 1941, by the armies of the Reich, this territory was solemnly incorporated on September 1, 1941, into the Government-General. The area of the latter was thus increased to 64,000 square miles and its population to 18 million. The Government-General is divided into five districts: Cracow, Warsaw, Lublin, Radom, and Lwow.¹

B. Incorporated Areas.-- An area of 36,117 square miles with a population of some 10,740,000, comprising 23.7 per cent of the area and 30.4 of the population of the Polish State of 1939, was incorporated into the

1. Joseph Winiewicz, The German New Order in Poland, pp. 10, 12. "Two Years of German Occupation of Poland," Free Europe, October 17, 1941.

Reich by a "Decree of the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich governing the annexation and administration of the territories of the East" dated October 8, 1939,¹ which took effect on October 26. These incorporated areas consisted of:

1. The western Polish Provinces of Pomorze (Pomerania: 1,384,500 inhabitants), Poznan (Posen: 2,339,600 inhabitants), and Slansk (Upper Silesia: 1,295,000 inhabitants), which were ceded by Germany to Poland under the Treaty of Versailles.

2. The Polish Districts of Suwalki, Sosnowiec, Bielsko, Biala, Cieszyn, Zywiec, and Wadowice, which never belonged to the Reich.

By virtue of the above-mentioned Decree of October 8, 1939, the Reichsgau (Reich District) Posen, comprising Posen and the adjacent territory of Central Poland as far as the Vistula on the northeast, was established; by a Decree of January 29, 1940,² the Reichsgau Posen was renamed Reichsgau Wartheland; it included the regencies of Hohensalza (Inowracław), Posen, and Kalisch (Kalisz). The same Decree of

1. RGB1. I, p. 2042.

2. Ibid., p. 251.

October 8 created the Reichsgau Westpreussen, comprising Polish Pomerania; the former Free City of Danzig (of which the autonomous status had been abolished by a Decree of September 1, 1939¹); and adjacent German counties. By a Decree of the Fuehrer and Chancellor dated November 2, 1939 (?),² it was renamed Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen.

The Katowice district of Polish Silesia was, on the strength of the Decree of October 8, attached to the German Province of Silesia. Later, in January 1941, this great Province was divided into two parts:

1. Gau Niederschlesien with old German districts of Breslau and Liegnitz.

2. Gau Oberschlesien, including the former German Oppeln district, the Polish voevodship of Silesia, the adjacent districts taken from the Province of Kielce (Sosnowiec, Bedzin, Dabrowa, Górnica) and the border districts of the Province of Cracow (Chrzanów, Javorzno, Trzebinia, Oswiecim, Biala, Żywiec and Wadowice).

The district of Cielchanow in the northern part of central Poland was, by the Decree of October 8

1. RGBl. I, p. 1547.

2. Ibid., p. 2135.

renamed Zischenau and incorporated with Gau Ostpreussen; incorporated with Ostpreussen was also the northern corner of Poland with the towns of Suwalki and Augustow.

The final organization of the Incorporated Polish Provinces is thus for the present as follows:

(a) Reichsgau Wartheland. Residence: Posen.

Gauleiter: Arthur Greiser (former President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig)

Area: 17,000 square miles.

Comprises Posen and the adjacent territory of central Poland as far as the Vistula on the northeast.

Includes 3 districts: Posen, Hohensalza, Kalisch.

Population: 4,700,000. Density of population (1942): 253.5 per square mile.

Ethnic composition (1942): Poles: 3,900,000; Germans: 800,000; Jews: 150,000.

(b) Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen. Residence: Danzig.

Gauleiter: Wilhelm Forster (former Gauleiter of the Free City of Danzig).

Area: 15,020 square miles.

Comprises Polish Pomerania, the former Free City of Danzig, and adjacent German counties; it includes the towns of Gdynia, Bydgoszcz, Grudziadz, Torun, Lipno, and Rypin.

Population (1939): 2,300,000.

(c) Reichsgau Oberschlesien.

Gauleiter: Fritz Bracht.

Area: 8,108 square miles.

Includes the former regency of Oppeln, the whole Polish voevodship of Silesia, the coal basin of Sosnowice-Dabrowa, and a slice of the voevodship of Cracow.

Population: 4,200,000.

Seventy-five per cent of the population is Polish.

(d) Reichsgau Ostpreussen.

Area: 20,360 square miles.

Includes the old German Gau of East Prussia, the newly annexed Polish district of Ciechanow, and the towns of Suwalki and Augustow.

Population: 3,600,000 (including about 350,000 in the district of Ciechanow).

In extent the incorporated areas comprise 23.7 per cent of the total territory of the Polish State of 1939, and in regard to population, 30.4 per cent. Polish estimates in 1939 gave the Polish section of the population as amounting to 92 per cent in Posen, 91 per cent in Pomerania, and 93 per cent in Silesia. At the outbreak of the war the Germans in these Provinces comprised barely 6 per cent of the total population. Of the population of 10,740,000 more than 9,500,000 were, in 1939, Poles and 600,000 Germans.¹

1. The German New Order in Poland, pp. 11, 143.

Speaking not only of the Incorporated Polish Provinces, but also of the whole "great new Ostraum, extending from the Baltic to the Carpathian Mountains," Dr. Carl Hartwich¹ acknowledges that it contained only 875,000 Germans, of whom 518,000 were farmers.

The conclusion that the Reich drew from this situation was twofold:

- (a) The Polish and Jewish element must be forcibly dislodged.
- (b) German colonists must be settled on the soil en masse.

The prerequisite for the realization of the first part of this conclusion was a mass deportation of Poles and Jews; the second part presumed a mass transfer of German settlers from outside. Both measures were carried out by the Reich on a large scale.

In dealing with both of these categories, we must always bear in mind that available German sources treat each of the four administrative units of the incorporated Polish areas in a quite different manner. There are among them favorites and stepchildren, just as there were among the transferred German groups

1. In Goebbels' Das Reich, January 26, 1941, No. 4.

themselves. The favorite is the Wartheland. This Gau was destined to absorb the overwhelming majority of the repatriated people and was to become a pattern (Mustergau) for the whole resettlement policy.

German sources are expansive in reporting on the progress and achievements of resettlement activities in the Wartheland. They are more reticent about the Gau Danzig-Westpreussen. Upper Silesia and East Prussia (district of Ciechanow-Zischonau) are treated in this connection as genuine stepchildren. The resettlement in the Wartheland is often presented in such a manner that one has the impression that this Gau was the only objective of the whole resettlement activity, and is tempted to commit the classic logical mistake of "pars pro toto." In the following chapters we will often meet this danger resulting from the specific character of the German sources.

3. Mass Deportation of Poles and Jews

On October 16, 1939, began the evacuation of Gdynia, the largest Polish port, with a population of about 130,000, of whom 99 per cent were Poles. The evacuation lasted several weeks; the last of the Poles

were deported from Gdynia on November 15.¹

On October 22 began the deportation from Poznan (Posen), the capital of western Poland and a city of 270,000 inhabitants. At 7:30 a.m. the Field Gendarmerie and the Selbstschutz entered the houses, awakened the sleeping inhabitants and gave them fifteen to twenty minutes to dress. The first victims were the rich Poznan merchants. The keys to the houses from which they were ejected were handed in by the gendarmes at the office for transfer of population, the Umsiedlungsamt, Rozana Street. From October 22 onward, Poles and Jews were deported almost every night. By the end of February, 1940, the number of exiled Poles was about 70,000, and after that it grew considerably. The methods employed in the deportations were various: one day all the lawyers, for example, were deported; the next day the deportations affected particular streets, no matter what the profession of their inhabitants; the third day Germans returned to the method of selecting professions, and deported, for example, engineers.²

1. The German New Order in Poland, pp. 180 ff.

2. Ibid., pp. 160, 175 ff.

Similarly, in November and December 1939, and in the following months, the Polish and Jewish population was deported in large groups from other towns of Posen and Silesia. On November 9, 300 families and on December 3, 150 families were deported from Gniezno, the ancient capital of Poland, a town of 30,000 inhabitants. During the night of November 30, 1,000 families were expelled from Inowracław, a town of Pomerania with 40,000 inhabitants. Thousands of Poles and Jews were deported from Torun, Grudziadz, Chelmno, Leszno, Rawicz, Ostrów, Koscian, Powidz (?), Witkowo (?), Mogilno (?), Wrzesnia, Gostyn, Znin, Swardzecz (?), Krotoszyn (?), Podbielska (?), and many others.

The first to be deported from the towns were the Jews, the Polish intellectual class, the clergy, and the middle class.

The overwhelming majority of the deportees were directed to the Gouvernment-General. Thirty thousand Poles were deported within a month to Cracow alone.¹ A great number of them were deported for labor in Germany. The Frankfurter Zeitung of July 21, 1941,

1. Stanislaw Stronski, "Poland," The Sixth Column. Inside the Nazi-Occupied Countries, New York, 1942, p. 51.

reported the number of Poles deported to Germany as amounting to 873,000. Many Polish citizens were sent to concentration camps, e.g. to Dachau.

The expulsions were regularly accompanied by complete expropriation of the deportees' movable and immovable property. At best, they were allowed to take with them a suitcase of personal belongings weighing from fifty to a hundred pounds.¹ As a rule

1. A typical sample of a German expulsion order is the following extract of a document published by the Polish Review of March 16, 1942:

Commissariat of the Town of Leslau (Wloclawek)
To (Mr.) _____ (Mrs.) _____
For reasons of public security you are being expelled from this territory, with immediate effect. This, also related to members of your family, viz.....

Upon receipt of the present expulsion order you and the persons accompanying you must, within 20 minutes, be ready to travel and waiting in the street at your front door. You must comply absolutely with the orders of the police.

You are allowed to take with you:

- (3) Food for several days.
- (6) Not more than 200 zlotys in Polish currency.
- (7) A suitcase containing indispensable personal effects.

You are forbidden to take away:

- (1) Securities or bonds of any description.
- (2) Valuables in silver, gold, or jewelry.
- (3) Furniture of any kind.
- (4) Livestock (dogs, cats, birds, etc.)

It is strictly forbidden to lock doors and wardrobes and take away the keys.

they were forbidden to take more than one or two changes of underwear. Further, they were allowed to take only one blanket, one overcoat, and so on. Bedding and spare clothes were verboden. There was a special strict order that all jewelry had to be left behind (with the exception of wedding rings, and not always even those), and all other objects of value, particularly bonds, share certificates, etc. Sometimes even the gold frames of spectacles were confiscated. Usually the evacuees were allowed to take only 20 zlotys, in exceptional cases 100 to 200 zlotys. All money in excess of this figure had to be handed over to the officials in charge of the deportations. The evacuees had to leave keys in all the house doors and also those of wardrobes and chests. In a number of cases the deportees were ordered at the last moment to wash up the plates and the kitchen utensils which they were leaving behind.¹

During the first months following the incorporation, the German authorities did not find it necessary to provide any "legal basis" for the expropriation of the Polish and Jewish property in the towns. The

1. The German New Order in Poland, pp. 159, 179 ff.

simplest justification was the necessity of "securing" the property of "absent" (because of deportation) persons. This procedure gave the German authorities the power to liquidate all Polish property, since it was enough to deport the owners of real estate, industrial and commercial undertakings, etc., to bring about a legal situation justifying the confiscation of the property of the Polish citizens and its administration by Germans. In numerous cases they even found it unnecessary to use such indirect methods, and the confiscations took the form of plain confiscation. This fate befell all those institutions and undertakings, whose activities the Germans described ex post as "inimical to Germanism" (deutschfeindlich). The German New Order in Poland cites many examples of such confiscations.

It was not possible, however, to deport all owners of real estate and commercial and other undertakings, or to seize their property on the plea of "anti-German activities." Other methods were, therefore, applied. Already in the very first weeks of German rule, German administrators (Kommissarische Verwalter or Treuhaender), acting under the general direction of the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost were

introduced not only into all the larger enterprises, commercial and industrial, but even into undertakings of small craftsmen. These administrators completely removed the original owners from the direction of their business. The seizure of enterprises and the introduction of a compulsory administration was, of course, equivalent to confiscation, for, according to Polish sources, there was not a single case where any compensation was paid for Polish or Jewish property seized in towns.¹

A certain idea of the volume of urban confiscations is afforded by the proud declaration of the Gauleiter of Wartheland, Greiser, that during the first two years of his governorship (until October, 1941), 120,450 houses containing 436,000 apartments were seized in Warthegau alone.²

Polish governmental sources estimate the number of deportees up to March 1, 1940, at 720,000;³ by December 31 of the same year, according to a provisional estimate of the Polish Government, the number had risen

1. The German New Order in Poland, p. 260.

2. Polish News Bulletin No. 193, October 31, 1941.

3. The German New Order in Poland, p. 200.

to some million and a half.¹

There are no definite German data on the subject. The Reich authorities have never clearly denied Polish data. But on October 8, 1940, Gauleiter Greiser declared that in addition to the flight of Poles before the German armies, only 183,000 Poles had been deported,² probably in Warthegau alone. This assertion is, however, in striking contradiction to Greiser's own communication a year later, quoted above, stating that during his period of government, 120,450 houses containing 436,000 apartments had been seized.³ Admitting that each of these seized apartments probably lodged a very modest average of three persons, it is not difficult to calculate that at least 1,500,000 former Polish and Jewish inhabitants of the 120,450 houses were expelled from their dwellings in Warthegau alone up to October, 1941. To this number an indefinite, but certainly very important number of deportees from the Gau Danzig-Westpreussen and the Gau Oberschlesien is to be added (the population of "cleansed" Gdynia alone amounted to 130,000, of whom

1. The Polish White Book, p. 22.

2. The Bulletin of International News, January 11, 1941.

3. Polish News Bulletin No. 103, October 31, 1941.

99 per cent were Poles).

These mass deportations, carried out in a most ruthless manner during the severest winter months, unavoidably resulted in a high percentage of casualties. Die Weltwoche (Zuerich) of July 31, 1942, in an article on "Deportations to the East," dealing not only with deportations from the incorporated Polish areas, but also with all the numerous cases of deportation, states:

"Die fuer die Transport verantwortliche SS-Dienststelle, die dem Gruppenfuehrer Ferdinand Hiege unterstand, legte nach Abschluss dieser ersten Massendeportation dem SS-Reichsfuehrer Himmeler einen genauestens detaillierten Bericht vor, indem das Erfahrungsmaterial dieser ersten 'Experimente' bereits uebersichtlich verarbeitet war. Der 'Menschenausfall' bei den ersten Massendeportationen betrug nach diesen Berichten bis zu 30 Prozent. Krankheit, Selbstmord, ungenuegende Unterkunftsмоeglichkeiten am Bestimmungsort, Nicht-Anpassung an die neuen Arbeitsbedingungen, Unfaehigkeit zur Umstellung infolge hohen Alters und so weiter wurden fuer diese hohe Verlustzahl verantwortlich gemacht."

These appalling results of the deportation policy did not provoke, however, any revision of the latter. The ruling ideology of the Third Reich in this field has found its most eloquent recent formulation in the words of SS Group-Leader Werner Best, legal adviser of the Gestapo: "The removal of foreign people does not, according to historical experience, conflict with the laws of life, if carried out totally."¹

A kind of general substructure for such measures was, post factum, provided by a Decree of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Field Marshal Goering, issued on February 12, 1940, concerning the Public Management of Agricultural and Forestry Concerns and Lands in the Incorporated Eastern Territories,² and proclaiming that all agricultural and forestry concerns and land situated in the Incorporated Eastern Territories, which on September 1, 1939, was not owned by persons of German nationality were to be publicly "managed." The Decree avoids, it is true,

1. Werner Best, "Grossraumordnung und Grossraumverwaltung," Zeitschrift fuer Politik, June, 1942.

2. Verordnung ueber oeffentliche Bewirtschaftung land- und forstwirtschaftlicher Betriebe und Grundstuecke in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten, RGBl. I, No. 30, October 17, 1940, pp. 90-92.

the expression, "expropriation," using instead that of "taking into possession," but it is clear, the authors of The German New Order in Poland state, that we have to deal here with the actual expropriation of about 450,000 peasant and landowning families, the extent of whose property in land and forests amounted to over 13,000,000 acres.¹ The same source stresses the fact that "Goering's order of February 12, 1940, gave legal form to a situation already existing insofar as large and medium-sized landed estates were concerned; for at the moment when the order was issued, Polish large and medium landowners had already been expelled from their estates."

On February 17, 1941, Goering issued the Zweite Anordnung ueber die Haupttreuhandstelle Ost,² the preamble of which states that:

"Die Erfassung der ehemals polnischer und juedischer Vermoegensobjekte in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten ist abgeschlossen; die notwendigen Rechtsvorschriften sind erlassen."

1. The German New Order in Poland, p. 255.

2. RAZ, March 1, 1941.

The HTO, Goering ordered, would not represent in future an independent body: chiefs of the individual Treuhandstellen of the HTO in the Incorporated Polish Provinces are to be the Reichsstatthalter and Oberpraesidenten, who have the authority to instruct the managers of the Treuhandstellen in accordance with the general program of the HTO and the ordinance of Goering himself. The managers of the Treuhandstellen are to be the chiefs of the Bezirkswirtschaftsaemter of the Reichskommissar fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums. The tasks and program of the HTO remained, however, unchanged. The ordinance announced also the publication of a special instruction concerning the "realization of the former Polish and Jewish property" seized by the HTO.

IV. GERMAN RESETTLEMENT METHODS IN POLAND

1. Preparation and Allocation of Farmland

Speaking at Posen in connection with the second anniversary of the creation of the Gau Wartheland, Arthur Greiser stated that by October, 1941, 337,192 farms comprising 3,116,000 hectares (7,700,000 acres), i.e., 80 per cent of the total area of 3,900,000 hectares (9,637,000 acres) of cultivated land in "his" Gau, had been alienated from their Polish owners.¹

The number of expropriated farms in other parts of the incorporated territories was given officially only for the first six months of the German rule in Poland. Dr. Paul Fribbe, the plenipotentiary of the German Ministry of Agriculture, stated in the Berliner Boersen Zeitung for April 2, 1940, that by that date 3,000 large estates and 200,000 peasant properties had been taken over in the Incorporated Provinces and their administration placed in the hands of individual German settlers.

Recent information, however, is available from Polish sources. The Polish Minister of the Interior,

1. Polish News Bulletin No. 103, October 31, 1941.

Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, announced, in May 1942, that in the Danzig-Westpreussen Province, Poles were expelled from some 35,000 holdings; in Silesia 15,500 peasants were deprived of their holdings amounting to 54,500 acres; and in the Ciechanow district some 18,000 Polish farms were confiscated.¹ In addition, the Germans have confiscated 5,500 larger estates of more than 125 acres. Included was livestock estimated at 1.3 million cattle, 1.4 million pigs, and a half million horses, in Warthegau alone.² No indemnity was paid.

Landowners of German nationality (Volksdeutsche) were fairly numerous in these districts. Volksdeutsche officials, familiar with the soil and with local conditions of agriculture and marketing, were able to take over the administration of the expropriated Polish estates. As early as January, 1940, in the Posen district alone, 70 Volksdeutsche took over the administration of 170,000 Morgen of "orphaned" Polish estates.³ The German authorities soon had at their

1. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, "Germans Destroy Polish Rural Economy," The Polish Review, May 25, 1942, No.20.

2. Bulletin of International News, December 1940, p. 1611.

3. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, January 18, 1940.

disposal numerous agricultural transferees from the Baltic countries, who were accustomed to the managing of large and medium-sized estates.

The problem of transferring the larger estates from Polish to German hands, therefore, did not present great difficulties, either technical or personal, and was carried out in the course of a short time. The task was made even easier by the fact that, as a rule, the German authorities retained the Polish agricultural laborers, who were employed on the estates, and some of the Polish administrative officials. For they were most anxious not to weaken or to jeopardize for a moment the agricultural production of the incorporated provinces; moreover, they hoped to increase the agricultural output, even during the process of "Umbau der Bodenbesitzverhaeltnisse."

According to German sources, more than a half million of these small Polish farms are controlled by the German agricultural trust, Ostland, through German commissioners.¹

In the Autumn of 1941 the agricultural "ownership structure" of the Warthegau was described by the

1. Der Deutsche Volkswirt, August 20, 1941.

Gauwirtschaftsberater Senator a/D Paul Batzer as follows:¹

One-eighth of the cultivated land was "in der Hand volksdeutscher Bauern";

One-eighth was owned by the "volksdeutscher Grundbesitz";

One-fourth was "bewirtschaftet von der Ostdeutschen Landwirtschaft G.m.b.H. im Auftrage des Staates (hauptsaechlich die konfisziierten Wirtschaften polnischer Grossgrundbesitzer)";

One-half is "frueherer polnischer Kleinbesitz."

It would be, however, a mistake to believe that, as a rule, the small peasant estates have been spared. In an article Bauernland im Osten, published in Goebbels' newspaper Das Reich on January 26, 1941, Dr. Carl Hartwich states that by the end of 1940, 23,000 "Umsiedler" families with some 140,000 to 150,000 members had been "directed to farms which

1. "Wirtschaftsausbau im Warthegau," Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1941, No. 23, pp. 1118-1121.

formerly belonged to Polish small farmers (Kleinlandwirte)."

The agricultural areas, which were not destined for immediate distribution among the Umsiedler, were taken over by the six "baeuerliche Siedlungsgesellschaften" which functioned in the "Ostraum." The "Ostpreussische Landgesellschaft" obtained the management of the whole Regierungsbezirk Zischenau with 125,900 small farms and 600 large agricultural estates, amounting to one million hectares (2,471,000 acres) of cultivated land.

The confiscated Polish farms and estates were the object of a speedy but thorough investigation. The so-called Ansiedlungsstaebe began, early in the Autumn of 1939, to survey all the "available" Polish farms, to study the local conditions of the soil, and to prepare the settlement of the Umsiedler. In a short time a "Gesamtaufnahme der zur Besiedlung verfuegbarer Hoefe mit ihrem lebendigen und toten Inventar" was completed; the "wirtschaftliche Grundlage" of every farm was elaborated.¹ Thus the local frame of the

1. Peter Carstens, "Aus der Praxis der volksdeutschen Umsiedlung," Neues Bauerntum, April 1941, pp. 151-152.

settlement was prepared.

Then came the turn of the "planners." Already in December, 1939, the chief of the Reichsstelle fuer Raumordnung charged the Reichsgemeinschaft fuer Raumordnung with: studying the new German East; making planning atlases; research into the conditions for strengthening the German Volkstum; and investigation of the capacity of the new spaces as regards the absorption of German population.¹

Early in 1940, the Reichsstudentenfuehrung der Bundesleitung des Volksbundes fuer das Deutschtum in Ausland created a special Arbeitsgruppe Ostsiedlung, which numbered 320 voluntary members and systematically prepared settlement projects:

"Vorplanung zur Ansiedlung der volksdeutschen Rueckwanderer: Planungskarten fuer die Einsatzstaebe in den Kreisstaedten werden ausgearbeitet, staemmliche Herkunft, voelkische Haltung, landwirtschaftliche Umgebung, Bodenart und Wirtschaftsweise der Rueckwanderer studiert...."²

1. "Der Ostraum," Siedlung und Wirtschaft, December 1939, No. 12. Herstellung von Planungsatlassen fuer den deutschen Ostraum, Untersuchungen ueber die Moeglichkeiten der Staerkung und Befestigung des deutschen Volkstums und der Bildung neuen deutschen Volkstums im deutschen Ostraum, Aufnahmefaehigkeit der Raeume an deutscher Bevoelkerung, usw.

2. Der Volksdeutsche, March 1940.

On the basis of this Vorplanung, the Einsatz-
staebe elaborated their concrete projects for the
settlement of "repatriated" Germans, taking into ac-
count their specific characteristics. This human
material "entstammte Laendern mit gaenzlich ander-
artigen natuerlichen und wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen."¹

In March, 1941, a special exhibition devoted to
the "Planung und Aufbau im Osten" was solemnly inaugu-
rated in Berlin. The exhibition was organized by
order of the Leiter der Dienststelle des Reichskom-
missars fuer die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums,
Brigadefuehrer Ulrich Greffelt.²

A program for the improvement of the confiscated
Polish farms was launched by the Reichskommissar.

Peter Carstens relates that by December 14, 1940,
Bautruppen--operating independently of the Siedlungs-
gesellschaften--had "improved 4,737 farms and made
them habitable." Before the beginning of the Winter
of 1940-41, Bautruppen and Siedlungsgesellschaften

1. George Blohm, "Der Aufbau des Schulungs - und
Beratungswesens in den neuen Ostgebieten," Neues
Bauerntum, January 1941, pp. 11-14.

2. Das Schwarze Korps, March 27, 1941.

"had prepared, for all, a clean and decent little home."¹

2. Number of Germans Resettled: Effects on Agriculture and Industry

The new German farms were also largely supplied with implements, grain, livestock and so on. By the end of 1940, 23,000 German families had settled on 320,000 hectares (790,720 acres) in the Incorporated Provinces, and had received 50,000 tons of grain for sowing and reserves, 8,000 tons of fertilizer, 4,150 large pieces of agricultural machinery, 37,750 medium-sized pieces of machinery, 7,260 small machines, and a large number of implements. The settlers received 29,300 horses and cattle, 42,600 pigs, and large quantities of sheep, poultry, etc.²

These were distributed "in addition to the equipment, reserves and livestock already existing on the farms," i.e., those left by the Polish owners when they were evicted. A small group of 710 German families, transferred from the areas of Pultusk, Narew,

1. Neues Bauerntum, April 1941.

2. Dr. Carl Hartwich, Bauernland im Osten.

and Bug, and settled in the Gau Danzig-Westpreussen, received from the Danzig-Westpreussen Landsiedlung 1,784,000 RM to complete their equipment and to provide for their farms, implements, seed-corn, compost, and fodder; the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft advanced them 760,000 RM for furniture and household utensils. The cost per family was 3,500 RM.¹ The German colonists in the Warthegau were also largely supplied with implements, as can be seen from a report of the Aufsichtsräte der Siedlungsgesellschaften Posen, Hohensalza und Kalisch, in September 1940.²

The already settled "repatriated" German peasants continued, nevertheless, to enjoy the closest attention of the German authorities, who systematically supervised and instructed the agricultural work of the Umsiedler.

The main modification in Polish agriculture introduced by the German colonizing authorities is the shift from grain production to that of root crops, in the

1. "Danzig-Westpreussische Landsiedlung," Neues Bauerntum, April 1941, pp. 172-73.

2. Erich Hientzsch, "Aufsichtsratsitzung der Siedlungsgesellschaften in Reichsgau Wartheland," Neues Bauerntum, September 1940, pp. 326-327.

hope of a substantial increase in the production of fodder for animal consumption and of edible fats, which still represent the most serious food difficulty in German Europe. Large fields of sugar beets have been planted, and the extensive use of chemical fertilizers is projected to increase the production per acre.¹ The German press asserted that the work of the German peasants on the newly conquered land would raise the productivity. Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft (No. 25, September 1, 1940) admitted that as a result of introducing cattle-breeding "the acreage planted to grain may suffer a slight reduction." The magazine, however, assured its readers that "the introduction of intensive farming and machinery would prevent a decrease of grain production and increase the output of dairy farming."

The Germans expelled 1,500,000 Poles and Jews from the Incorporated Territories, replacing them with some 450,000 German colonists. Thus, the reduction in the number of consumers by more than a million souls resulted to no small extent in an increase in the agricultural surplus for export.

1. Foreign Policy Reports, August 15, 1942, p. 146.

Early in 1941, Dr. Carl Hartwich relates in Das Reich that 153 new farms in Regierungsbezirk Kattowitz consisted of an average of 12 small Polish farms.¹ Hartwich designates these larger agricultural undertakings as "model farms." The Zentralbeschaffungsstelle (Central Supplies Office) supervised the consolidation of the former Polish holdings into larger ones, intended for Germans.²

Konrad Meyer sketches the following "ideal picture" of the agricultural structure of the German "New East": Peasant farms of 50 to 310 acres are to constitute two-thirds of the total and to occupy three-fourths of the agriculturally utilized area. The normal size is to be 50 to 100 acres; Grosshufenhoeft--large farms--are to be constituted at the ratio of one Grosshufenhof per seven peasant holdings.³ The "ideal picture" corresponds closely to the Decree of the Reichskommissar fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums of November 26, 1940, according to which

1. Dr. Carl Hartwich, "Bauernland im Osten," Das Reich, January 26, 1941, No. 4.

2. The German New Order in Poland, p. 204.

3. Konrad Meyer, "Neues Landvolk; Verwirklichung im Neuen Osten," Neues Bauerntum, March 1941, pp. 93-98.

"the peasant family holdings of 50 to 100 acres are to constitute the basis of the future land order," while "holdings of 100 to 300 acres will also be created."¹

It corresponds equally to the directives of the Dorfplanung (village planning) which recommended, as a model, the "Einzelendorf" (single village) with a maximum of 300 to 400 inhabitants (about sixty to eighty families).² Accordingly, the Reichskommissar fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums organized, in Spring, 1941, a "Competition for Village Plans in the New East." The participants were requested to draw up plans for a village of 400 to 500 inhabitants, i.e., a village somewhat larger than that mentioned above.³ An editorial in Neues Bauerntum, reporting this competition, deplored the results of this--the first--experiment as showing that German planning in the East is only just beginning. The competition was, however, significant for German planning in this field.

1. "Ansiedlung von Wehrmachtangehoerigen in den neuen Ostgebieten," Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 21, Third issue for July, 1941, p. 790.

2. Konrad Meyer, op. cit., p. 98.

3. "Planung und Aufbau im Osten," Neues Bauerntum, March 1941, p. 89.

Experience showed that even the small-size model farm was too large and too difficult to manage for the peasants transferred from the Slav East. The German peasants from Eastern Europe, settled in former western Poland, were described by the Reich publicists as backward and lousy.¹

The problem of the economic structure of the Incorporated Polish Territories presented for the Reich a perplexing issue. The initial German concept was purely practical: The Reich needed agricultural products, and the incorporated areas had to be organized on a purely agricultural basis. However, this proved not as simple as it had at first seemed, for this approach had to be reconciled with an important principle of the German policy in the "new German East," namely, the task of Germanizing the Incorporated Territories.

The contradiction inherent in this task was formulated clearly by Ministerialdirektor Jarmer of the Reichsstelle fuer Raumordnung. Writing in Rhein und Ruhr, Jarmer stated that the German conquests in the East would be of no permanent advantage to Germany

1. Joseph Winiewicz, "Results of Germanization in Poland," Free Europe, September 19, 1941, No. 49.

unless the former Polish territories were completely Germanized. Should Germany be content to organize the territories in question on a purely agricultural basis, 1,600,000 German settlers would be needed for the purpose. But the density of the German population would be only twenty inhabitants to the square kilometer. For the purpose of completing the indispensable process of Germanization, there must be, however, a density of at least seventy inhabitants per square kilometer, which would thus require 6,500,000 German settlers in Poland.¹

The Incorporated Polish western voevodships had a comparatively dense population; the density of Pomerania was 183 inhabitants per square mile; that of Posen, 208; and that of Silesia, 765.² Polish sources assert that some rural districts of the incorporated area had a density of up to 313 persons per square mile.³

1. Quoted from K.C. Thaler, "Two Few Germans," Free Europe, December 12, 1941, p. 303. According to an estimate by the Reichskuratorium fuer Technik in der Landwirtschaft, a ten year plan for the development of new German farms in the East would cost roughly 12 billion RM. (Joseph Wieniewicz, "Germanization Principles and Methods," Free Europe, September 5, 1941, No. 48).

2. The German New Order in Poland, p. 199.

3. German Failures in Poland, p. 25.

The experience of the first year and a half forced the German authorities to reduce considerably their original bombastic promises "to fill the new German East" with millions of the German Volk ohne Raum. And the Chief of the Hauptabteilung Planung und Boden beim Reichskommissar fuer die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums, Prof. Dr. Konrad Meyer, authoritatively stated, in March 1941, that a population density of eighty to ninety inhabitants per square kilometer in the New East would be an ideal solution of the population problem of that area.¹

In fact, the authorities intended that the New East should be more thinly populated than it had been in the past. In order to reduce the actual density, the authorities deliberately favored the afforestation of formerly agricultural lands. According to Das Reich for December 15, 1940, forest land in the Incorporated Provinces was to be increased from 16 per cent of the total area to 30 per cent. In the district of Zischenau, where the forests comprised only 12 per cent of the whole area, a large-scale program of afforestation was envisaged to increase the

1. Konrad Meyer, "Neues Landvolk; Verwirklichung im Neuen Osten," Neues Bauerntum, March 1941, pp. 93-98.

percentage to 25-30.¹

A further step in this direction was made by Himmler himself in the Spring of 1942, after the visit he paid to Governor-General Frank in Cracow, March 4, 1942. A few days later Himmler published a decree stating that throughout the incorporated territories the population density must not exceed eighty-five to ninety per square kilometer. A previous decree had stipulated that agricultural areas in the annexed eastern territories must not have a population density of more than thirty-five to the square kilometer, meaning that more than 60 per cent of the population of Poland would be forced to live in the towns. This would be possible only if parts of the rural population were forced into the towns.

The towns are classed in three categories:

(1) Small, the population not to exceed 20,000 inhabitants; only craftsmen and farmers to be allowed to settle, producing for local needs only.

(2) Medium, no strictures to be imposed on the population and the profession.

(3) Large, considered as undesirable and to be

1. Dr. Friedrich Wahl, "Bericht ueber Zischenuau," Zeitschrift fuer Politik, July, 1941.

reduced to "normal proportions."¹

In the beginning there was a dearth of information concerning the number of industrial establishments, the scope of production, and the number of workers: military censorship forbade the publication of statistics of this kind. Later, however, this ban was lifted. In an article on "Wirtschaftsaufbau im Warthegau," published in Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, October, 1941, Gauwirtschaftsberater Senator Paul Batzer stated that in the summer of 1941 the following industrial undertakings were working in Wartheland Province:

<u>District</u>	<u>Number</u>
Posen.....	753
Hohensalza.....	338
Litzmannstadt.....	733
Total.....	1,824

The number of workers increased considerably from April 1940 to April 1941:²

NUMBER OF WORKERS

<u>District</u>	<u>April 1940</u>	<u>April 1941</u>
Posen.....	24,285	60,390
Hohensalza.....	14,209	20,794
Litzmannstadt.....	51,169	87,143
Total.....	89,653	168,329

1. Free Europe, May 8, 1942, and the Chicago Daily News, April 8, 1942.

2. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 2, 1941.

Special attention was paid by the Germans to Lodz, the center of the Polish textile industry. On November 9, 1939, Lodz was solemnly included in the Gau Wartheland.¹ On April 4, 1940, the town was re-named Litzmannstadt, after General von Litzmann, who had captured it in 1914.

By February 21, 1941, the German organ Grenzzeitung was able to publish a statement to the effect that the center of the city of Lodz had been completely cleared of Poles and was being reserved exclusively for German settlers. In September, 1940, the total number of Poles deported from the city was estimated at 150,000.² (In 1938, Lodz numbered more than 700,000 inhabitants--more than 450,000 Poles, and about 200,000 Jews.) Up to June 30, 1941, the Treuhandstelle Litzmannstadt had "sold" to the German owners 211 wool spinning factories, 172 knitting factories, and 39 cotton mills.³

Yet there was a considerable labor shortage, and the large-scale population transfers had affected the

1. Der Volksdeutsche, November, 1939.

2. The German New Order in Poland, p. 308.

3. Paul Batzer, loc. cit.

economy of the whole region. The Polish Fortnightly Review of September 15, 1942, states that the Germans considered eliminating Lodz as a textile center by removing its installations or breaking them up for scrap metal, and by deporting its workers to other occupations in Germany.

Steps were taken to carry out this plan. Special commissions were set up which began to close down, liquidate, or combine various enterprises. About 50 per cent of the textile manufactures were removed to Germany. By the Fall of 1941, as revealed by the Berliner Boersen Zeitung of December 11, 1941, of the 108,623 workers employed by the Lodz industry before the war, only 89,000 remained working; the rest, mainly skilled textile workers, one of the basic industrial assets of the city, were deported to the Reich for agricultural labor.¹

According to data more recently published in the Ostdeutscher Beobachter of May 14, 1942, out of 26,000 plants of various industrial branches, registered before the war, only 989 were allowed to work.

1. "The Fate of a Polish City," Polish Fortnightly Review, September 15, 1942. "Life in Nazi-Occupied Poland," Poland Fights, October 24, 1942.

The new register contains two sections. The first is comprised of smaller firms, of which it contains about 920, which are partially retained by their Polish owners. The latter possess, however, only a nominal property title, for the management rests in the hands of appointed German commissars. The second section is comprised of big businesses, mostly corporations, with capital amounting to about 150 million Reichsmarks, and which are exclusively in German hands. The register is not yet complete, but German sources foresee that it will comprise 1,000 businesses in the first section and about 100 in the second.

According to the same sources, more than half of the Polish and Jewish firms in Lodz were taken over by trustees and are managed by Germans.¹

According to the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten, the number of German inhabitants of Lodz had risen, between September 1939 and December 1941, by 60,000. This increase, however, is not wholly due to the arrival of newly transferred Germans from abroad or from the Old Reich. Only 9,000 dwellings, which

1. The Survey of Central and Eastern Europe, published by the Research Staff of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, New York, August, 1942, No. 4.

became "available" after deportation of their Polish and Jewish owners, were put at the disposition of the new arrivals. Assuming that the average German family installed in each dwelling consisted of four persons, we come to the conclusion that some 35,000 transferred Germans were settled in Lodz. The remaining 25,000 belong apparently to that part of the local Lodz population which the German authorities have induced to "recover their Germandom" and to register in the Deutsche Volksliste. This latter number comprises barely 3 per cent of that part of the Lodz population which in pre-war days had declared itself Polish.

From the point of view of settling the transferred German Umsiedler, these German achievements are, however, of minor importance. In Upper Silesia and Cieszyn, only the leading "key positions" were cleared of Poles and taken over by Germans. The highly skilled workers in mines, iron foundries, and factories were found indispensable if the enterprises were to remain in operation and their output was to be maintained.¹

1. Ibid., p. 164.

The number of German Umsiedler absorbed by industry is, therefore, very small; it reflects the small percentage of industrial workers among these transferred German Volksgruppen.

3. Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts

An editorial in the February 1940 issue of Neues Bauerntum states that a sufficient number of artisans registered for work in the cities. This assertion is confirmed by the authors of the German New Order in Poland, who complain bitterly that "even small handicrafts (small-scale economic units as they are) are now almost completely Germanized in the larger towns. Eloquent evidence of this is found in six pages of advertisements in the Christmas issue of the Ost-deutscher Beobachter, 1940, listing 316 firms of small craftsmen, almost exclusively from Poznan."¹ In Lodz, the proportion of German to non-German undertakings in handicrafts had risen by the end of 1941 from 10 to 49 per cent.² A special organization, Handwerkaufbau-

1. The German New Order in Poland.

2. Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten, December 7, 1941.

Ost, was entrusted with the task of restoring workshops "abandoned by the Poles" to a condition in which they can immediately be taken over by new German settlers.¹

Detailed study of German statistics on the actual handicraft situation in the incorporated area leads, however, to an essential revision of these far-reaching conclusions. Firstly, the Germanizing of handicrafts seems to be limited mainly to the few large towns. The above mentioned editorial in Neues Bauerntum openly recognizes this fact, stating that in the villages, particularly in the scattered new German settlements, artisans (chiefly shoemakers, tailors, blacksmiths, building workers, etc.) are still badly needed.² The latest available German sources also dwell on this subject.

In July 1941, the Deutsche Volkswirtschaft announced that the German authorities dealing with colonization planning had decided to reduce the percentage of handicraft undertakings in the Incorporated

1. Jon Evans, The Nazi New Order in Poland, London, 1941, p. 87.

2. "Doerfliches Handwerk im Aufbau des Ostens," Neues Bauerntum, February 1940, pp. 42-43.

Provinces to a ratio of ten to every thousand inhabitants, while in the old Reich this ratio reaches twenty-three per thousand.¹ Only 10 per cent of the 35,000 handicraft undertakings remained in the Warthegau after the liquidation of 25,000 "inefficient" undertakings as "suitable for being taken over by Germans." This number was later increased from 3,500 to 5,100.

In connection with the second anniversary of the creation of the Wartheland, in October 1941, Gauleiter Greiser stated at a National Socialist demonstration in the Grosses Theater of Posen that 1,152 small handicraft establishments were transferred to German ownership while 3,000 more are administered by German Treuhaender.²

A few months later, in January 1942, Das Reich reported that 4,400 handicraft establishments were administered by German Treuhaender and managed by the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost,³ while 1,100 have been sold

1. "Ansiedlung von Wehrmachtangehoerigen in den neuen Ostgebieten," Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, Third July issue, 1941, pp. 788-790.

2. Polish Feature and News Service, November, 1941.

3. Das Reich, January 18, 1942.

to transferred Germans from abroad, local Volksdeutsche, and Germans from the Reich. Only part of these new owners and Treuhaender were transferred Germans. The Gauwirtschaftsberater Senator Paul Batzer reported , in October 1941, that in the Wartheland 1,781 individual handicraft establishments were allocated to transplanted Germans, and that 268 such establishments were sold to that category of colonists.¹ Apparently only a relatively small percentage of the Treuhaender have proved efficient enough to be promoted to the rank of "full-fledged" owners of the undertakings with which they were entrusted.

Altogether, thus, some 5,000 handicraft establishments came into German hands. The remaining 30,000 are still in Polish hands (all the Jewish handicraft undertakings were expropriated or closed or "Germanized"; Jewish artisans were put into ghettos or forced to work for German war needs). Greiser himself acknowledged in October, 1941, that "several thousand small handicraft establishments still remain in Polish hands" and comforted the audience with the argument that "2,000 of them have been set aside to be taken

1. Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, First October issue, 1941, No. 28, p. 1120.

over at some time in the future by German front-line soldiers."¹

This situation provoked understandable anxiety among the competent Reich authorities. A successful Germanization of the Incorporated Territories is scarcely possible without Germanizing the handicrafts. The Polish News Bulletin No. 108, December 5, 1941, is certainly right in emphasizing that the German policy in the field of commerce and industry at present favors protecting the medium-sized and smaller units owned by individuals, and explains this policy mainly by the intention "of settling as many Germans as possible in the area, and so make it fundamentally German." This "populationist" aspect certainly dictates the efforts of the Reich, started in 1940 and still continuing, to induce artisans from the old Reich to settle in the "new Eastern areas" even now, when the influx of German minorities from abroad has had to be stopped.

To this end a special guaranty trust company was founded early in 1941 for settlers in handicrafts (Buergschaftsgesellschaft fuer Handwerksiedler). Two institutions cooperated in the establishment of this

1. Polish News Bulletin No. 103, October 31, 1941.

company: the Reichstand des deutschen Handwerks (Estate of German Handicrafts) and the Deutsche Zentralgenossenschaftskasse (German Central Cooperative Credit Bank). In connection with the founding of this company, a press conference was held at the end of 1940, at which the leader of German handicrafts, Schramm, and the President of the Cooperative Bank, Dr. Helferich, spoke.

Schramm stated that in the newly-incorporated eastern areas there was then a demand for 60,000 independent craftsmen. The Estate of German Handicrafts had already examined thousands of artisans and certified them as suitable for colonization. The date at which they would be sent to the East would depend on the progress made in preparing these areas for planned colonization.

The German planners were plagued by the inefficiency of the Polish undertakings:

"Von 60,000 bis 80,000 Handelsbetrieben waren hoechstens 10,000 bis 20,000 in einem solchen Zustand, dass man sie als deutsches Geschaefit weiterfuehren kann."¹

1. Osthandel als Aufgabe. Statistische Uebersichten mit Wirtschaftsarchiv, bearbeitet von der volkswirtschaftlichen Abteilung der Dresdner Bank, Berlin, January 1941.

"To make order" in this field the Handelsaufbaugesellschaft Ost was created.

In the single Gaus the achievements in this field differed widely.

The number of commercial undertakings registered by the Treuhandstelle Posen (17,200) and the Treuhandstelle Litzmannstadt (7,500) amounted to 24,700 in the Warthegau alone. Fifteen thousand were Polish and Jewish individual undertakings. Senator Paul Batzer, Wirtschaftsberater of the Gau, in whose article on Wirtschaftsaufbau im Warthegau we found the above quoted information, states categorically that the majority of these undertakings were "dwarf" enterprises and that according to German economic conception, they had to disappear and to make place for German businesses:

"Die vorhandenen polnischen Geschäfte haben um fast die Hälfte vermindert werden zu müssen, um jeden deutschen Einzelhandelskaufmann seinen Arbeitsplatz und seine Existenz zu sichern und um aus dem Einzelhandelbetrieb eine wichtige Zelle deutschen Aufbaues im Warthegau zu machen."¹

1. Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, October 1, 1941, No. 28, p. 1121.

This program was to a great extent carried out. From articles in the Berliner Boersenzeitung of February 21, 1941, and the Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten of February 2, 1941, it appears that some 294 large, 9,000 medium sized, and 76,000 small commercial enterprises were already at that time administered by German trustees. And in a speech made at the second anniversary of the Warthegau's creation, Arthur Greiser stated proudly that while before the War there were 15,000 Polish commercial firms in the Wartheland area, today there are only 10,500; a further 2,500 are to be eliminated, leaving 8,000. Of these, 6,000 are to be German firms, and only 2,000 are to be left in Polish hands. Greiser added that 923 commercial firms had been transferred to German ownership, while another 2,850 were still administered by German Treuhaender.¹

The Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten of December 7, 1941, stated with pride that in Lodz, by the end of

1. Polish News Bulletin No. 103, October 31, 1941. Giving a description of the situation in a small provincial township in the neighborhood of Posen, Das Reich of April 6, 1941, stated: "In the little crowded shops salesmen are still mostly Polish, while the management is already German."

1941, the relation of German to non-German undertakings had been reversed; in 1939, the paper declared, there were only 10 per cent German, today there are only 10 per cent non-German undertakings. A special organization, the Landwaren Handels Gesellschaft (Agricultural Commodity Trading Company) was created for the purpose of eliminating Poles and Jews from village trade. It began operations in Warthegau in March, 1940; in Gau Danzig-Westpreussen in May; and in Gau Ostpreussen at the end of 1941.¹

The large trading combines with headquarters in Berlin or Central Germany were not to be allowed to open branches in the area. The confiscated commercial undertakings, which so far have not transferred to new German owners, are being administered by Auffangsgesellschaft fuer Kriegsteilnehmerbetriebe, a special organization acting "on behalf" of front-line soldiers, who are to be settled in the Warthegau after the War.² German periodicals devoted to economic problems stress that in the incorporated provinces, the prospects for the retail trade are "not very encouraging."

1. Jon Evans, loc. cit., p. 86.

2. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 2, 1941.

"Waehrend das Handwerk in den neuerworbenen Gebieten fast ganz in polnischen Haenden lag, hatte sich der volksdeutsche Einzelhandel mit einer groesseren Zahl von Betrieben erhalten; unter den Umsiedlern sind viele Einzelhandelskaufleute vorhanden, die ihre frueheren Unternehmungen fuer aehnliche in den Ostgebieten vertauschten."¹

A communique published by the HTO in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of December 21, 1940, states that the aim of this institution is "the assignment of the undertakings as soon as possible to responsible owners," and a summary of the report of two year's activities of the HTO, published in the same paper, November 1, 1941, informed the reader that during the intervening period a large number of enterprises for which it had acted as trustee, were sold at "advantageous prices" to Volksdeutsche in Poland or Germans from the Baltic or the Reich. In commenting on the second report of

1. In striking contradiction to this assertion stands the statement of Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft (1940, No. 28) that "bis vor einem Jahr war der Handel total verjudet, so dass z.b. in einer deutschen Stadt in der Provinz noch im Weltkriegs 87 Ladengeschaefte sich noch in deutscher Hand befanden, die spaeter auf drei (!) zusammenschmolzen."

the DUT (Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft), the Voelkischer Beobachter states:

"Es wurde dazu uebergangen, den vorlaeufigen Einsatz der Umsiedler aus den aelteren Sektoren (Estland, Lettland, Volhynien, Masuren, Galizien, General Gouvernement) im Gewerbe und Handel in einen endgueltigen umzuwandeln, welches Ziel vor allem in Westpreussen und Oberschlesien, aber auch im Wartheland gefoerdert werden konnte."¹

4. Failure to Attract Reich Germans

Even the most enthusiastic partisans of the mass repatriation of Germans from abroad never believed that millions of them would "return" in order "to fill the empty Polish areas." The Deutscher Volkswirt of September 27, 1940, acknowledged frankly that:

"Die erstrebte Strukturwandlung des Warthegaues kann selbstverstaendlich nicht allein durch die Ansetzung von Rueckwanderern und die Umgestaltung des volksdeutschen Besitzes erreicht werden. Man rechnet im Wartheland, dass nach Durchfuehrung dieser Massnahmen noch etwa 40,000

1. "Volksdeutsche Umsiedlung in Zahlen," Voelkischer Beobachter, April 3, 1942.

Hoefe fuer die West-Ostsiedlung zur Verfuegung stehen werden."

The German colonization plan, therefore, anticipated the settlement on Polish territory of hundreds of thousands of peasant families from southern Germany. The Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Raumforschung first announced, in January 1940, the idea of transferring some 60,000 families from Baden and 50,000 from Wuerttemberg. A more ambitious project was elaborated by Darre, the Reich Minister of Agriculture. According to his calculations, 400,000 families--at least 2,000,000 people--were to be transferred during 1940 from the Reich, furnished by Baden (60,000 families), Wuerttemberg, Westphalia, the Rhineland and Main districts.¹ It was calculated that 40,000 farmers from southwestern Germany could be placed on farms in Wartheland, in addition to the repatriated Germans from the east, while a further 70,000 would be settled in the frontier districts of Katowice and Ciechanow and in Pomerania.

The announcement of these projects caused great uneasiness among the agricultural population of the

1. Berliner Boersenzeitung, January 10, 1940.

above-mentioned German Provinces and provoked strong resistance on the part of the affected peasants, who showed no wish to be transplanted to the foreign and uncertain East. The projects of organized mass transfers of whole population groups from the Reich were thus abandoned early.

At the end of 1940, the Nazis started a propaganda campaign for the voluntary migration of individual Reich Germans to the "new German East." This propaganda was directed at the younger generation. The Reich Youth Leader Axmann delivered a New Year speech, published by the Thorner Freiheit, in which he proclaimed that the chief task of the year 1941 must be "the development of the organization of Hitler Youth in the Polish areas incorporated with the Reich, and also the development of propaganda for the agricultural profession among the youth."¹ Axmann spread before his young followers a tempting picture of the tasks and of the profits to be gained in the East. Simultaneously, the President of the German Institute of Economic Research, Ernst Wagemann, issued a New Year slogan concerning the East: "Geh nach dem Osten,

1. Quoted from Polish Fortnightly Review, January 15, 1941, No. 12.

junger Mann!" ("Go East, young man").¹ The German press began bombarding the public with elementary geographical facts about the incorporated areas. The leaders of the German colonization policy in the Incorporated Polish Provinces spared no efforts in order to attract German settlers from the Reich.

The Germans transferred from abroad had no choice, and were obliged to settle there. Their number, however, was insufficient for the economic development and Germanization of these areas. Without a mighty stream of settlers, private capital, and the spirit of enterprise, these aims could not be attained, but settlers and capital in the Old Reich, not being forced to go to the East, showed little readiness to heed the appeals of the authorities.

The first step in the policy of voluntary, individual migration was the general exemption of Germans in the Incorporated Polish Provinces from Kriegszuschlag zur Einkommensteuer, granted by the Rundrlass des Reichsministers of July 31, 1940 (Reichssteuerblatt 1940, p. 689) and of September 6, 1940 (Reichssteuerblatt 1940, p. 871). The grant of this

1. Quoted from Supplement to Polish News Bulletin No. 118, February 13, 1942.

privilege was followed shortly by another more important one, namely, the Oststeuerhilfe-Verordnung issued by the Reichsministers of Finance and Internal Affairs on December 9, 1940.¹ In a public lecture at Posen on December 10, Fritz Bernhardt, Under Secretary of State in the Reich Treasury, said:

"In the Eastern incorporated areas Germanism must be strengthened and supported by all means. It is necessary that many of our kinsmen and kinswomen should transfer their homes to these Eastern incorporated areas. It is also urgently necessary that many of our kinsmen should develop enterprises in these areas, either as agriculturists, or as craftsmen, or industrialists, or as members of the liberal professions. The spirit of enterprise and the creation of capital must receive particular support in these areas. The new regulation governing tax exemptions (Oststeuerhilfe-Verordnung) provides machinery for easing living conditions (Lebenshaltung) and for facilitating economic activities (Wirtschaftsfuehrung)."²

1. RGBl. I, 1940, p. 1565.

2. Ostdentscher Beobachter, December 11, 1940.

The main facilities of this first measure granting relief from taxation included complete exemption from the war supplement to the income tax, which amounted to 50 per cent of the basic taxation rates. According to this regulation, Germans who are citizens of the German State (Deutsche Staatsangehoerige) or belong to the German nationality (Deutsche Volkszugehoerige) were, irrespective of the amount of tax, freed from this special surtax, which had been introduced for the period of the war. The taxes paid were to be only two-thirds of the rates paid by citizens of the Old Reich. In addition, the German settlers in the incorporated areas were to enjoy complete exemption from taxation on an income not exceeding 3,000 marks per annum. There was a further exemption of 300 Reichsmarks for each child. There was also a 50 per cent reduction of the citizen's tax (Buergersteuer) on incomes below 25,000 Reichsmarks per annum.

The measure also granted very considerable relief regarding property tax. By previously existing laws, exemption from this tax was granted to all within the boundaries of the German Reich whose property was valued at less than 10,000 Reichsmarks per person (about \$4,030 at the pre-War exchange rate). In the

incorporated areas, property valued at three times this sum was tax-exempt.

Under the existing legislation, a citizen living in the Old Reich with a wife and four children paid a tax on his property less 60,000 Reichsmarks (\$24,200) and 10,000 Reichsmarks (\$4,033) for each member of the family. Thus, if his property was valued at 300,000 Reichsmarks (\$121,000), he paid tax on 240,000 Reichsmarks (\$96,792). If this same German transferred his property to the incorporated areas, that part of his property not subject to tax would be three times as great, i.e., 180,000 Reichsmarks (\$72,534), or only half that which he paid when living in the Old Reich.

On February 20, 1941, a second regulation was issued governing taxation assistance to the East (Zweite Oststeuerhilfe Verordnung)¹ and on November 11, 1941, a third (Dritte Oststeuerhilfe Verordnung).² It extended a great portion of the taxation privileges to the German population of the Provinces of East Prussia and Lower Silesia, to the former Prussian districts of the Province of Danzig-West Prussia, to

1. RGBl. I, 1941, pp. 109-110.

2. Ibid., p. 720.

the districts of Kattowitz and Oppeln and partly to the districts of Breslau, Frankfurt (Oder), Liegnitz and Ratibor. At the same time, "in order to strengthen Germanism and to root German officials more thoroughly in the Incorporated Eastern Provinces," an Erlass des Reichsarbeitsministers ueber Reichszuschuesse fuer Beamtenstaetten, October 7, 1941, was published allowing German officials in the East to obtain an interest-free loan up to 12,000 marks to build their own houses. If the official remained at least eight years in the eastern areas, half of the loan was to be canceled by the State.¹

The results were rather disappointing, and almost every issue of Himmler's organ Das Schwarze Korps stigmatized German nationals unwilling to settle in the "new German East" and become peasants.

The reasons for the failure of the "Go East" propaganda are, however, much deeper and much more

1. Voelkischer Beobachter, November 3, 1941. See also: Dr. Kapp, "Die Verordnung ueber Steuererleichterungen zur Foerderung der eingegliederten Ostgebiete," Deutsches Recht, January 11, 1941, No. 2, pp. 65-67, and May 3, 1941, No. 3, pp. 962-967. See also: "Volkszugehoerigkeit im Rahmen der Ost-Steuerhilfe," Der Deutsche Volkswirt, June 13, 1941, pp. 1304-1305, and Steuerverguenstigungen im Verfahren zur ..., February 1941, pp. 79-81.

complicated than simply the reluctance of average Germans to obey the call of their leaders. They are organically connected with the dominant trends of the German population movement for decades. The German population moved (a) from the rural areas to the towns, (b) from east to west.

"Migration from the rural areas," wrote Das Reich on December 19, 1940, "is an historical phenomenon in Germany which aroused no attention so long as this migration of peoples affected only the actual surplus population. From 1933 onward this phenomenon went much further, and led in rural areas to an actual depopulation which, at the outbreak of the present war, had reached about a million people."

The National Socialist régime was not able to stop this exodus of the rural population. Hitler's inaugural message of 1933 declared that the "back-to-the-land policy" was "the basic principle" of his program. Hedwig Wachenheim, former member of the Prussian Landtag, states, however, that actually the Nazis were interested in agrarian reform only in so far as it promoted self-sufficiency and decreased the need for imports. As soon as their armament program was under way, they began to neglect farm settlement.

In 1934, 4,931 new farms were still created-- approximately the same number as in preceding years.¹ Then the figure dropped rapidly, until it was only 1,456 in 1938 and 798 in 1939; the larger number of these were not in the east, but in other parts of Germany. Landflucht (flight from the land) was continuing. Between 1935 and 1939, the agricultural population of the Old Reich decreased from 20.8 per cent to 18.0 per cent, and the percentage of workers engaged in agriculture and forestry decreased from 23.9 per cent to 26.0 per cent.² The War rather diminished the chances of stopping this Landflucht and of directing the German migration movement back to the rural areas. Doubts were also expressed as to whether the German soldiers would want to settle there after the War.

Professor Bruno Raeucker openly voiced his misgivings in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in December 1940:³ "The farmer back from the war, after

1. Under a program initiated in 1919, completed only after 1927, 57,500 farmers were settled on small and medium-size farms, most of them in the east.

2. Hedwig Wachenheim, "Hitler's Transfers of Population in Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, July 1942, p. 710.

3. Quoted from Polish Fortnightly Review, November 1, 1941.

seeing a bit of Europe, will stay on the land only if rural life affords sufficient opportunities for social advancement." In accordance with the official "general line" of the Reich, he expressed, however, his belief that preparatory work and organization would overcome these difficulties. Hans Blokelman, concerned with the question of agricultural workers in the "new German East," was even less confident. "Probably there will be no difficulty in getting new German farm owners for the land in the East," he wrote in the Ostdeutscher Beobachter of March 21, 1941, "but will it be possible to furnish them with German farm workers also? Otherwise it will not be possible to speak of a genuine Germanization."

Hardly less important were the difficulties connected with the traditional westward direction of the German migration movement. Professor Raeucker laments in his article that "the move westward is one of the characteristics of German internal migration in the nineteenth century and throughout the decades of the twentieth century which lie behind us."

This migration reached enormous dimensions even before the war of 1914-1918. During the period of 1840-1925, some 917,400 persons emigrated from East

Prussia, 775,000 from Prussian Pomerania, and 866,000 from Silesia, making a total of about 2,560,000.¹ In the course of only 15 years (1910-1925), 178,100 persons emigrated to Western Germany from East Prussia alone, i.e., 8 per cent of the entire population of the Province. This process was not halted after the National Socialists came to power. In the period 1933-1939, states the Koelnische Zeitung, November 9, 1940, some 25,000 people--three-fifths of the entire natural increase--had gone to the west from East Prussia and from those parts of Posen which had been left in Germany. Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia, acknowledges that on the very eve of War, "despite all the measures taken, emigration from eastern Prussia during the years 1937-1938 again reached the average level of the years prior to World War I."² Professor Raeucker believes firmly that this historic trek to the west "will soon be transformed into a movement to the east," and "Germans will again go East as colonists."

1. Grothes Kleines Handwoerterbuch des Grenz-und Auslandsdeutschtums, Munich and Berlin, 1932, p. 247.

2. Das Reich, March 23, 1941.

A. Fallacy of "Volk ohne Raum" Theory.- The alleged "overpopulation" of the Reich turned out to be an illusion. The Reich was incapable of providing even a small part of the "human material" necessary to Germanize the first Incorporated Polish Territories. The January 1941 issue of the official Nazi monthly Odal (Monthly for Blood and Soil) frankly acknowledges this amazing fact in a very instructive article by Rupert von Schumacher entitled "Menschenmangel im erweiterten Lebensraum" (Lack of People in the Widened Living Space).¹ This article deserves special attention. Schumacher jubilantly declares that:

"Das deutsche Volk hat in dem ihm aufgezwungenen Waffengang nicht bloss den Angriff auf seine Lebensrechte abwehren koennen, sondern darueber hinaus die Grundlage allen Uebels--Versailles--zertreten und seine Forderung nach mehr Lebensraum aus eigener Faust loesen koennen.... Zum ersten Mal seit der mittelalterlichen Ostkolonisation hat das deutsche Volk die Moeglichkeit, seinen Lebensraum in unmittelbarem Anschluss an seinen bisherigen

1. Rupert von Schumacher is a well-known Nazi specialist on Auslandsdeutschtum. His recent work, Volk vor den Grenzen, was published in 1939 by the Union Deutsche Verlags-Gesellschaft.

Volksboden bis zu jenen Grenzen auszudehnen, die zur Beseitigung der bisherigen Uebersoelkerungsschwierigkeit vonnoeten sind."

This conquered new living space is to be divided into two different categories: The Fuehrungsraum (leadership space), "where the German people assumes the task of leading other peoples who are being guaranteed an order based on the principles of Mid-European Kultur (General-Government), and the Siedlungsraum (settlement space), destined for the immediate 'Unterbringung des Bevoelkerungszuwachses und Erweiterung der Ernaehrungsbasis.'" The first category (Fuehrungsraum) needs a comparatively small number of Germans for the fulfillment of the "Leadership task," but the second one is organically bound up with the necessity of "mobilizing in a short time a large number of human beings."

But just here begins the difficulty:

"Diese Forderung klingt sehr einfach, fast zu einfach. Sie waere in der Praxis leicht zu erfuellen, wenn unsere Ueberbevoelkerung eine reich agrarische waere, d.h. wenn wir im ganzen Reich gleichmaessig verteilt auf dem Lande einen Ueberschuss an baeuerischer Bevoelkerung besaessen....

Trotz unserer Ueberbevoelkerung hat die Arbeitsintensitaet unserer Wirtschaft nicht nur die Arbeitslosigkeit voellig beseitigt, sondern auch darueber hinaus einen zusaetzlichen Kraeftebedarf entwickelt, der schon im Frieden zu Aushilfsmassnahmen, wie zur Heranziehung betraechtlicher Scharen auslaendischer Arbeiter zwang. Infolge dieses Umstandes stehen wir heute vor einer sehr merkwuerdigen Lage: auf der einen Seite ist somit Deutschland gezwungen, seinen Raum zu erweitern bzw. Menschen in das erworbene Neuland abzugeben, um seine bevoelkerungspolitische Lage zu erleichtern, auf der anderen, d.h. auf der arbeits- und sozialpolitischen Seite kann das deutsche Volk in seinem bisherigen Raum nach dem bisherigen Stand unseres Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgefueges kaum eine einzige Wirtschaftskraft entbehren."

B. Summary.-- Under present conditions, the Reich is incapable of providing "eine Wirtschaftskraft" of its own for the efficient mass colonization of the incorporated areas.

C. Suggestions.-- Schumacher--in full accordance with the traditional National Socialist manner of

treatment of population problems--does not care for "normal ways" toward solving this complicated question. The practical suggestions of his article are certainly not very new and original, and were applied by the German colonization authorities without much success. Admitting that the "overpopulation" of the Reich is only relative, he conceded, by inference, its inability to provide colonists for the new living space.

Von Schumacher's article is of revolutionary importance, for it destroys completely the myth of Volk ohne Raum. Also instructive is Schumacher's conclusion that without deep and organic changes in the economic structure of the Reich, the (alleged) Volk ohne Raum can not be induced to move from the "untenable overpopulated Old Reich" into the "empty incorporated spaces." As reported by the Thorner Freiheit of March 29, 1941, the Reich Bureau for Colonization, after having investigated the problems of finding sufficient people to settle in the incorporated areas, came to the conclusion that the transfer of millions of Germans from the Reich to these areas "would have a bad effect on Reich economy."

On October 30, 1941, an announcement appeared in the Voelkischer Beobachter that German front-line soldiers could now take the preliminary steps toward obtaining a farm on Polish soil. When applying for the allocation, the German soldier must apply for a Neubauernschein (New Peasant certificate) in the requisite department of the county of his origin, the possession of which will give him the right to apply for allocation of a suitable farm. He could then receive the farm after his discharge from the army. In the meantime, a farm would be allocated to each candidate, to be managed on his behalf by the German Administration of Confiscated Property. The size of the farms was to be from 20 to 40 hectares (50 to 100 acres), but in special cases 125 hectares (300 or so acres) could be granted. The new colonists would be able to avail themselves of extensive credit, taxation relief, and various other privileges.

V. FAILURE OF RESETTLEMENT POLICY

1. The Plan Fails

The original aim of the German policy in the Incorporated Polish Provinces, as openly and proudly stated in letters on the subject of German Ostpolitik sent to members of the National Socialist Party, was "to see to it that this space is cleared of foreign population and filled with Germans."¹

Speaking in Bydgoszcz on November 26, 1939, the Gauleiter of Danzig-Westpreussen, Albert Forster, stated unequivocally: "Anyone who belongs to the Polish nation must leave this country."² Shortly before, at a National Socialist Party demonstration, at Torun (Thorn), the same Forster declared:

"Your land is beautiful and fertile, but it lacks men. However, fellow countrymen of yours from every district of the Reich and the Germans from abroad will join you and together with you will open up this fertile land. In a few years not a word of Polish will be spoken here, at Thorn, any longer."³

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1. The German New Order in Poland, p. 152.
 2. Der Neue Tag, November 27, 1939.
 3. Ulmer Tageblatt, October 21, 1939.

A year later, in November, 1940, Dargel, President of the Ciechanów (Zischenau) district of the Gau Ostpreussen, calculated that of the 1,250,000 hectares of land in that area, 750,000 hectares would be assigned as farms to immigrating Germans, and 500,000 hectares of poorer land would be reforested: not one hectare was to be left for a Pole.¹ Not less categorical was in this regard the Wartheland's Governor Greiser in a speech made as late as May 1941 in Poznan:

"Justice and God helped us to conquer this nation (Poland), which will now be destroyed. . . . Our work here is only starting. No Pole in the future will be allowed to own land or a home here."²

Six months later, on November 21, 1941, the Koelnische Zeitung reiterated the promise that "das Land im Osten zu Hundert fuer Hundert deutsch wird und es fremdvoelkischen Besitz dort in Zukunft nicht mehr geben wird."

This far-reaching aim--to "clear" the incorporated Polish areas of the Polish population and to

1. Quoted by Jon Evans, The Nazi New Order in Poland, London, 1941, p. 70.

2. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, May 13, 1941. .

convert these areas by systematic and speedy transfer of German minorities from abroad and of Reich Germans into a "hundred per cent" German land--remained unattained. In this respect, the transfer and resettlement balance sheet drawn up as late as July 2, 1942, by the Danziger Vorposten is very conclusive: Of the 497,795 Volksdeutsche transferred from eastern Europe between the Fall of 1939 and the Spring of 1941, over 100,000 were in various settler camps awaiting resettlement. According to the National Zeitung of Essen, February 1, 1942, there were in Silesia alone about 120 of these camps.

There is little ground to assume that the 20,000 Germans transferred from Bosnia during the Winter of 1941-1942 in accordance with the German-Croat agreement were resettled in the incorporated parts of Poland.¹ The Westdeutscher Beobachter of November 24, 1942, stated, it is true, that the majority of these evacuees arrived at the Lodz settlers' camp. There are, however, no indications that they were settled in this area. The transit camps around Lodz, established in the Winter of 1939-1940 for the Germans

1. Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien, October 30, 1942, and Donau-Zeitung, November 3, 1942.

evacuated from Volhynia, Galicia and the Narew area, were well-equipped and were probably used provisionally as assembly camps, where the Bosnian Germans had to wait for their resettlement. Their temporary sojourn in camps is in no way identical with their final settlement in those areas where they are badly needed for the "strengthening of Germandom."

The Gauleiter of Wartheland, Greiser, stated clearly in a speech at Lodz in December, 1942, that the first stage of the colonization of the Incorporated Polish Provinces through the resettlement of Germans transferred from the East was finished; henceforth, German colonists from the Reich and from overseas would be brought there as settlers.¹ As to the Reich Germans, the Danziger Vorposten of July 2, 1942, frankly confessed that their colonization had been postponed until the end of the War; the only indication as to German colonists from overseas is to be found in the Hamburger Tageblatt of October 15, 1942, reporting that "German settlers from Brazil left Ordensburg Groessinsee for eastern Greater Germany to settle there." Their number could not have

1. Quoted from Biuletin Polski, December 30, 1942.

been important.

The results achieved by the German settlement of the Incorporated Polish Territories as to their ethnic composition can be summarized as follows:

On August 31, 1939, 9,221,000 Poles and about 653,000 Germans lived in these territories, constituting respectively 87.2 and 6.2 per cent of the population.¹ More than a million and a half Poles were expelled to the so-called Government-General, reducing the remaining Polish population to about 7,700,000. On the other hand, some 400,000 Germans transferred from eastern Europe, and 100,000 Reich Germans were settled there by the end of 1942. Therefore, the total number of Germans in the incorporated areas should today be (according to Polish sources) somewhere around 1,150,000; their percentage may have risen, as a result of population transfer, to roughly 12 per cent, while the percentage of Poles fell during the same period to 81.5.² German statistics do not

1. Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, September 1939—June 1941.

2. These figures are, of course, approximate. They have been obtained from Polish authorities in exile by such methods as they were able to apply. See: German Failure in Poland, edited by the Polish Research Centre, London, 1942, p. 18.

differ essentially from the Polish figures. Even in the "exemplary" Gau (Mustergau) Wartheland, according to Gauleiter Greiser's speech delivered at Vienna on May 14, 1942, the actual ethnic composition is as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Number</u>
Germans..... (namely, 250,000 local <u>Volks-</u> <u>deutsche</u> ; 250,000 newcomers from the Old Reich; 300,000 repatriates from the East)	800,000
Poles.....	3,900,000
Jews.....	<u>150,000</u>
Total.....	4,850,000

Practically, this means that even according to official German statistics, after two and one half years of the greatest efforts, all three categories of Germans (Volksdeutsche, Reichsdeutsche, and "repatriated" Germans) constitute no more than 16.5 per cent of the population of this Mustergau.¹ On October 8, 1940, the same Greiser put the number of Germans in Warthegau at 600,000 (including 250,000 repatriated from the Baltic States, from Volhynia, Bessarabia, and elsewhere) as against 3,900,000

1. Frankfurter Zeitung, May 15, 1942.

Poles.¹

Thus, during twenty-one months, the number of "repatriates" increased by only 50,000 and the total number of Germans only by about 200,000; the Polish population remained unchanged. From May until October, 1942, there was no further increase in transferred Germans from abroad. Speaking at Posen on the third anniversary of German rule in Poland, Greiser mentioned again the same 300,000 (62,000 families) who had been settled in Warthegau.² Greiser himself acknowledged, at a meeting of the Fuehrerkorps des Reichsgau Wien, that "the complete Germanizing of the Warthegau will probably still require a relatively long time."³ No more favorable is the situation of the Gau Danzig-Westpreussen, where Gauleiter Forster felt obliged to correct his bombastic promise to eradicate every trace of "Polonism in a few years." This "ten-year plan," he said, could not be realized before the Autumn of 1949.⁴

1. The Bulletin of International News, January 11, 1941.

2. Polish Feature and News Service, November 1942, No. 60.

3. Frankfurter Zeitung, May 15, 1942.

4. Quoted from the Basler Nachrichten, April 13, 1942.

As to the district of Ciechanów (Zischenau) in the Gau Ostpreussen, unverified Polish reports estimate that the percentage of German population has to date not risen above three to the hundred. And as to the Gau Oberschlesien, the study Settlement and Agriculture in the Incorporated Areas of Upper Silesia, published in August of 1942 under the auspices of the HTO (Haupttreuhandstelle Ost) and the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism, states that this Province can absorb not more than 3,000 new German peasant families.¹

This means that the ethnic structure of the "German New East" has not changed considerably. In stopping the colonization work, at least temporarily, the Reich practically acknowledged that the present structure is to be considered as permanent. And at a meeting of the National Socialist Party at Posen on January 30, 1942 (reported in the Ostdeutscher Beobachter, February 1, 1942), it was frankly stated that, in principle, the transfer of population is now completed:

1. "Oberschlesien ruft 3,000 Bauern," Krakauer Zeitung, August 28, 1942.

"Today the Wartheland has again acquired a German aspect. The Poles, who constitute our sole labor power, can now feel reassured, although certain of the German regulations are irksome to them. The German law of life is the highest law. Those who were not amenable were eliminated from the country. Now that the transfer of population has been carried through, the Poles who want to work have an assured future as wards (Schutzbefohlene) of the Reich."

This announcement was not an isolated case. A few weeks later, at a congress of German peasants in the Warthegau, Greiser, turning to the German colonists from the Baltic and elsewhere, indicated that--to a certain degree at least--the colonization process was finished. The question was now entirely one of increasing agricultural production as an indispensable factor of victory. To achieve this end, Polish manpower was to be exploited to the utmost.

The chief of the whole evacuation and resettlement enterprise, Himmler, announced in Boersen Zeitung, August 16, 1942, that in the Fall of 1942 half a million additional Poles would be deported to the East. This threat remained, however, unfulfilled.

The director of the staff of Himmler's Reichskommissariat for the Strengthening of Germanism, Ulrich Greifelt, frankly confessed, in August 1942, that "the true German colonization will start only after the War." He comforted his associates with the hope of the imminent deportation of millions of Poles--an enterprise in comparison with which previous deportations were "merely child's play."

2. Conclusions

The evacuation policy lasted as long as did the need for safeguarding Soviet friendship. It stopped abruptly as soon as this necessity vanished with the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. As to Italy, this necessity, although not so insistent, still exists. As late as the Winter of 1941-42, some 15,800 Germans from the Yugoslav Province of Ljubljana (Laibach), annexed by Italy, were transferred to the Reich. This was the last (and the only) important German transfer since the evacuation of the German remnants from Latvia and Estonia in January-March of 1941.

The Reich "terminated the era of population transfers" because the specific political conditions which had motivated this policy had disappeared with

the end of Soviet-German cooperation.

There are, however, 865,000 (according to some German sources 1,250,000) Germans in Hungary; 128,000 in Slovakia; 90,000 in Romania; 197,000 in Croatia; 150,000 in German-Occupied Serbia. Why did the Reich not inaugurate the transfer of these Volksdeutsche in order to "fill" the Incorporated Polish Provinces with German settlers?

The answer is this: The Reich never intended the evacuation of German minorities from these countries. Germany had been successful in securing a privileged status for its "Trojan Horses" in the satellite states.

The leaders of Nazi policy apparently consider the strengthening of these outposts of Germanism as a task of much greater importance than their eventual transfer to the incorporated areas in order to make this area "one hundred per cent" German. The traditional motives for such a policy were strengthened, in the Fall of 1942, by a new far-reaching idea of creating in southeastern Europe a "second German state."

As reported by the Budapest paper Fueggetlenseg, the center of this state is to consist of the former

Yugoslav Provinces of Bacska and the Banat, and of the part of Transylvania contiguous with the Banat as far as Brasov; western parts of Hungary are also to be incorporated, as well as the part of Croatia called Syrmia; Timișoara (Temesvár) has been selected as the capital of the new German State.

According to Fueggetlenség, it was even planned to create a pure German state, to which end the Hungarians, Serbs, and Romanians living within the prospective borders were to be removed and replaced by German settlers. The most influential promoter of this plan of an "Ersatz-Germany" in southeastern Europe is Bohle, the chairman of the notorious Bund der Auslandsdeutschen.

At a meeting of the Hungarian Parliamentary Party, the Government was asked by many members what basis there was for the rumors of a second German state comprising also portions of Hungarian territory. The Chairman of the Party, Béla Lukács, Minister Without Portfolio, answering on behalf of the Government, failed to tackle the substance of the question.¹

The lack of transferable Germans forced the

1. J. A. Tigram, "A Second German State," The Central European Observer, October 16, 1942, p. 334.

German Government to look for other settlers declared to be of German blood. The famous project of a large-scale colonization of some 3,000,000 Netherlanders in the eastern territories provides for a settlement, not only in the Baltic States and in other parts of German-occupied Soviet territory, but also in the Incorporated Polish Provinces. The first attempts in this direction were made as early as 1941. The Koelnische Zeitung, November 10, 1941, reported that 10,000 Dutch farmers and laborers were being transferred from Holland to Warthegau.

In October, 1941, the foundation stone of a block of homesteads for Dutch artisans was laid at Posen¹ and the Ostdeutscher Beobachter of August 2 and 12, 1942, reported that a settlement of Dutch artisans had already been created in this city between the river Worth and the Berchtesgadener Strasse; the names of the streets had been changed to Amsterdamer, Rotterdamer, Harlemer, Edamer, Utrechter, Groninger Strasse, Hollaenderweg, and so on. On July 11, 1942, the same newspaper reported that young men from Holland and Flanders, as well as from Denmark

1. German Failures in Poland, p. 22.

and Norway, had arrived to take up agricultural work in Warthegau, Danzig-West Prussia and Upper Silesia.

The settlement of Dutchmen in the Incorporated Polish Provinces is certainly not achieving considerable results. The feverish attempts to attract Dutch volunteers for settlement in this area are nevertheless significant in themselves as a symptom of the failure of German efforts to "fill" this area with "pure Germans."

The plight of the 100,000 Germans already transferred from abroad who are still living in camps in Silesia, working as labor columns in the Reich itself instead of being resettled in the incorporated areas, can be explained by the serious labor shortage from which the German war machine is suffering.

At the end of 1941, the number of workers employed in the German industries amounted to 23,900,000--1,000,000 less than in 1939; this in spite of the greater utilization of women (9,400,000 as against 8,300,000 million in 1939), and in spite of the importation of 2,000,000 foreign workers, the employment of school children over fourteen, the over-age workers, and 1,500,000 prisoners.¹

1. Tenth World Economic Survey of the Economic, Financial and Transit Department of the League of Nations, Columbia University Press, 1943.

A considerable fraction of the 100,000 transferred Germans are people able to work, and the Reich authorities view the requirement of the German industrial machine as more urgent than the slow process of Germanizing provinces.