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REPORT

on the

REFUGEE RELIEF OPERATION

from inception (December 1960

to end February 1961

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Summary:

In early December 1960 it was reliably estimated that some two hundred Baluba refugees were dying every day from starvation in the Bakwanga region of the South Kasai. To-day the death rate is down to little above normal. The United Nations, as coordinator of most generous assistance and contributions from all over the world, have arrested the famine and although it is to be regretted that several thousand people died, it is nonetheless gratifying to know that the lives of perhaps a quarter of a million people have been saved.

Dr. E.M. Poulton of the World Health Organisation reported at the end of January: "The severest part of the crisis for the children of this area seems to have passed, at least for the moment. The numerous cases of kwashiorkor reported in December have died or in some instances recovered, and few new cases of severity are now coming to light. However, this favourable trend is entirely dependent on continuation of distribution by U.N.

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of food supplies. If this should fail, within a month the position would return to the conditions of late 1960."

The availability of food supplies and the facilities for their distribution steadily increased until the middle of February. At that time the airlifting of food into the area could be stopped, the intention being to supply the area by road from Luluabourg. However, towards the end of February political developments have placed the operation in some jeopardy. At the time of closing this report no certain solution is in sight.

Sufficient food and trucks are now available to permit a distribution of a 1500 calory diet to a maximum of 300,000 refugees. The first bulk shipment by sea arrived in Matadi on February tenth and was beginning to arrive in Luluabourg by surface by the end of the month. Supplies of enough basic food stuffs are now assured to continue distribution through June 1961 when the situation will be improved by a new harvest.

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Apart from finding, carrying in and distributing sufficient food there were two important elements of the relief programme to be dealt with: medical assistance and the seed programme.

WHO medical personnel have been most active in treating the severe cases of nutritional deficiency diseases. To prevent the outbreak of an epidemic of gastro enteritis as a result of the dangerous overcrowding of the hospitals, particularly in Bakwanga (Disele) and Miabi, a tented hospital was established and was placed under the direction of an Austrian military medical team. These medical measures have in a large part contributed to the rapid improvement in the health of the refugees.

In order to make the refugees self supporting in as short a time as possible, a concentrated effort was made to provide seeds and farming tools of the simple type used locally, to enable maximum sowing by early February for the June harvest. A special F.A.O. team was flown into the area to advise on and supervise the distribution of these seeds. This phase of the operation has now

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been completed and may be considered an outstanding success, even though the results in terms of yield cannot yet be reliably estimated.

At the end of February, then, after some two and a half months' operation the refugees were receiving enough food to meet their essential minimum demands, adequate supplies of food to continue distribution through June were assured, the seeding programme had been successfully completed and the medical services were in operation.

The Problem and its Origins:

The famine conditions in the South Kasai were the result of the influx of an estimated 300,000 Baluba tribesmen fleeing from the North and West of the province in the period October 1959 to August 1960. The reason for the flight was the long standing tribal differences, at times amounting to open warfare, between the two principal tribes in the Kasai province, the Lulus and the Balubas.

Most sources agree that the Lulus, the original masters of the North and West Kasai territories, had become increasingly conscious of the threat of domination by the Balubas who had for some five or six decades been entering the Kasai from the South and East and settling there. Unlike the Lulus, they were receptive to progress and to those who brought it and thus found employment in the territory in ever increasing numbers. Although the Balubas accepted that, in common law, the Lulus owned the land and were the masters, their numerical strength - 550,000 Balubas as against 450,000 Lulus - and the relative importance

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of the posts they held, made them reluctant to submit to the Lulua chiefs.

Some authors hold that there never was any real friction between the two tribes and that the differences were simply fomented by the process of political development in the period 1958-1960. Whatever the cause of the differences may have been, it was the political tensions which caused the issue to become aggravated to the point where, in October 1959, serious, bloody incidents occurred as a result of which the first wave of Baluba refugees, estimated at some 80,000, fled west in the direction of Bakwanga and beyond to Gandajika.

The mutiny of the gendarmerie and the consequent breakdown of government in July and August 1960 provoked the flight of an even larger group of Balubas, this time estimated at some 150,000.

The first group of refugees seem/ to have been able to take at least some of their belongings, a little money and, most important, some seed with them. Moreover they penetrated deeper into the

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South Kasai than the second group, probably because at the time of their flight the 'Baluba State' or the so-called 'Autonomous State of the South Kasai' had not yet been created. They settled in the fertile areas around Gandajika and were soon partly integrated with the existing population. However, the influx of this large number of impoverished refugees imposed a serious strain on the limited resources of the rural economy of the community.

The second and much larger group fled in panic and were often delayed and molested on the way. Almost completely destitute and exhausted they gathered in the area between Lake Mukamba and Bakwanga, and stayed there. The area is notorious for its infertile soil and its lack of surface water and was until then almost completely uninhabited.

Almost immediately a grave problem of food shortage was created, a situation which due to further misfortunes developed into the disastrous starvation of late November and December.

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For reasons which it is outside the scope of this report to enlarge upon, the Lulus, in the course of the political awakening which eventually led to the Congo's independence in July 1960, became identified with the M.N.C. - Lumumba party, while the Balubas became identified with the M.N.C. - Kalonji party. Mr. Lumumba and Mr. Kalonji having become bitter rivals and opponents the rift between the two tribes became an almost inbridgeable chasm. In August 1960 Mr. Albert Kalonji declared the South Kasai autonomous, first calling it 'l'etat minier' and later 'L'Etat Autonome du Sud Kasai'. The central government of the time, under its premier Mr. Lumumba, despatched troops to Bakwanga in an effort to bring Mr. Kalonji to heel. The result was ruthless terrorisation and even massacre of the Baluba people. Agricultural work was suspended in the region and the diamond mines of Bakwanga which since the July events had been working below capacity, were compelled to cease their activities altogether. The troops of the Congolese National Army lived off the meagre

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resources still existing in the area, and, when they finally withdrew they looted, destroyed and burnt whatever remained in their path. As a result, not only were the peasants' granaries and root stores pillaged but much of the potential harvest was burnt flat.

Thus it was that some 300,000 were deprived of their normal food supplies; by early December some two hundred people were dying daily of starvation.

The First Relief Measures:

United Nations' assistance was first brought to bear on this situation in July and August 1960. The then office of the ONUC Food Coordination^{by} made stubborn efforts to supply basic foods to the refugees. However, this operation was severely hampered by the still continuing hostilities and by the fact that the surface supply route which runs through Luluabourg was frequently blocked by the Lulus. Many times stocks were stolen or trains diverted and pillaged. At the time of the incursion of the National Army troops relief operations were completely interrupted. This situation may be said to have continued through October.

The independent attitude of the Kalonji regime in South Kasai contributed largely to the delay in the re-opening of contacts. The Kalonji government had forcefully separated itself from the rest of the province of Kasai and its uncompromising and even frequently hostile attitude towards any outsider and particularly the U.N., was in a large part the reason for there being no UN civilian or political representation in the South Kasai for a long time.

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Only the U.N. Force was there, first the Tunisians, later the Ghanaians. Both were equally disliked, not to say hated, by Mr. Kalonji and his Government.

It was in October that the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in collaboration with the ONUC Food Coordinator's Office sent a mission to investigate the plight of the refugees in the South Kasai.

On the basis of the mission's report, UNICEF made a first allocation of \$150,000 for emergency food supplies to bridge what seemed at the time the critical gap of the month of December, it being anticipated that food supplies from other sources would then become available.

On 12th November a most alarming report was received from Lt. Thompson, Medical Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Ghana Brigade, stationed at the time at Tshikapa. Upon receipt of this report the Chief of Staff and Dr. Linner, Chief of the Civilian Operations requested the International Committee of the Red Cross to make a rapid tour of inspection in the region, accompanied by such experts as might be available. This tour was made from 16th to 25th November by a mission which included M. Borsinger

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of the I.C.R.C, M. Steufs, Consultant to the Ministry of Health, Dr. Wirtz, member of the medical mission of the Swiss Red Cross and Dr. Baba, FAO nutritionist. The two reports submitted by the mission, M. Borsinger's full description of the situation, and the wealth of *technical* detail and conclusions contained in Dr. Baba's report, constituted a picture which was truly appalling. It was these reports, further buttressed by a report from Lt. Meller, the Ghanaian Medical Officer at Bakwanga, which led Dr. Linner, Chief of the Civilian Operations, with the full support of Ambassador Dayal, to declare the plight of the refugees in the South Kasai to be an emergency situation the relief of which was to be given top priority in UNOC operations.

The Office of the Refugee Relief Coordinator was formed on December 1st, embodying the UNOC Food Coordinator's Office, and Mr. John Grun was appointed as Chief Refugee Relief Coordinator.

Organisation of the U.N. Relief Operation

Already in early December the political difficulties of mounting a U.N. relief operation in South Kasai were apparent. The Kalonji Government had issued a decree creating a Commissariat for Refugees and outlining its functions and responsibilities. The decree also laid down that all assistance, including that from outside sources, was to be channelled through the Government and that none of the contributing organisations was to make any propaganda of any sort. Under the decree, the contributors were permitted to appoint (at their own expense) a representative to sit in the Commissioner's Office and to share jointly in the supervision of the distribution. The distribution itself, however, was to remain entirely in the hands of the Government.

It was clear that some of the regulations in the decree were entirely unacceptable, not only to the United Nations, but equally to other agencies involved in the relief action at that time, particularly the Congo Protestants' ^{Relief} Agency and the Red Cross.

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In order to formulate the terms on which U.N. assistance would be given, as well as to reach agreed estimates of the numbers of people affected and the quantity of food involved, Mr. Grun went to Bakwanga immediately after assuming his duties. He had a number of discussions which culminated in a meeting with Mr. N'Galula, Prime Minister in the Kalonji Government, which, despite certain fundamental differences of approach, produced agreement on a modus operandi that would permit the relief work to proceed.

In the light of later developments, mention should be made here of some of Mr. N'Galula's views.

First and foremost, Mr. N'Galula complains that the United Nations have been too tardy with their assistance; he claims that he discussed the matter with the Secretary-General personally in July 1960, and pointed out what would happen if the United Nations did not intervene, but no attention was paid to his warnings. Secondly, he emphatically dislikes the U.N. force. He maintains that the South Kasai is a well regulated

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State needing no supervision or control from anyone. The 'criminal inactivity' of the Tunisian troops at the time of the 'Lumumba invasion' had, he says, planted a lasting hatred in the hearts of the Balubas for all that ~~was~~^{is} U.N. Moreover, the Tunisians had now been replaced by the Ghansians, the policy of whose national Government is communist in Mr. N'Galula's view and contrary to the interests of the Congo at large and those of the South Kasai in particular. In contrast, Mr. N'Galula had no complaint against the Specialized Agencies of the U.N. 'such as UNICEF and WHO', nor any objection to these organisations being mentioned in connection with the assistance which the South Kasai was receiving. The degree and quality of Mr. N'Galula's prejudice against the U.N. may be judged from his proposal, having finally reorganised the role of the U.N. in the relief operation, that the full title "Organisation des Nations Unies" should be used in all

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communications to the Balubas, and met the abbreviation "ONU" which had become a 'dirty word' among his people, who had already 'spontaneously' developed a number of songs, used while pounding manioc, adversely reflecting on ONU.

However, Mr. Gruen was able, on his first visit, to reach agreement on working principles that were acceptable to Mr. N'Galula. Among the main principles agreed upon were the following:

1. The "Comite de Gestion" as mentioned in the decree would be interpreted as a Coordinating Committee in the full sense of the word, i.e. responsible for the planning of the distribution, as well as for its supervision.
2. The Coordinating Committee would be under the Chairmanship of Mr. N'Galula, and on it would sit apart from the Refugee Commissioner and such other Government representatives as Mr. N'Galula might wish to appoint, one or more representatives of each donor organisation.

3. The U.N. as coordinator of most of the outside assistance and aid was a full and equal partner in the programme. The U.N. desired to take no precedence over the Government but it could not accept that the Government would take precedence over it.
4. The Coordinating Committee would elaborate a distribution plan, determining distribution sectors, main drop off points and final distribution centres.

The physical distribution would be carried out by Government appointed personnel but the donor organisations had the full right to supervise and inspect to satisfy themselves that the donated supplies were being distributed equitably and in accordance with the plans agreed upon. As the U.N. acted as the coordinator for most outside assistance this supervision devolved largely upon the U.N.

5. Supplies were needed as soon as possible. The U.N. would do its utmost to increase its airlift.

The U.N. would airlift supplies donated by voluntary agencies provided these supplies would be available for general distribution and not destined for a specific programme carried on outside that of general relief.

A first full meeting of the Coordination Committee was held at which the principles outlined hereabove were discussed and unanimously agreed to. At this meeting the first steps were taken towards the establishing of a distribution plan and after extensive discussion certain regions were selected as main distribution sectors and the estimated number of refugees they contained agreed upon. These regions and their populations were:

The region of MIABI with approximately	30,000 refugees
HERODE	50,000
TSHINTSHANOU	25,000
KABEYA KAEWANGA	70,000
TSHA-TCHA-TCHA	10,000
TSHIDOMBO	20,000
KAMIDA	12,000
DOMBA	5,000
	<hr/> 230,000 <hr/>

Mr. X. Caballero was appointed as Coordinator for Bakwanga on 21 December and gradually a small staff (Annex) was built up.

It is regrettable that despite Mr. Caballero's splendid and unflinching efforts, it has not yet been possible fully to achieve an organization such as was originally envisaged.

Although it has almost always been possible to maintain a basis of mutual tolerance in working relations, practical development of the programme was frequently hindered by the political circumstances peculiar to the South Kasai.

The local authorities, almost excessively jealous of their newly won independence, demonstrated an attitude, perhaps not uncommon in such circumstances, at times amounting to irrational suspicion and mistrust of any and every outsider. This mistrust was particularly keen as regards the U.N., which appeared to them as an occupying power whose forces had stood by while Balubas were massacred and their farmsteads pillaged by Congolese troops.

In fact, so great was the popular dislike and mistrust of the UN, that in one instance the population refused to make use of water brought to their village in a water truck by the Ghanaian medical officer; they preferred to walk ten miles to fetch their water rather than draw it from a ONUC truck. Needless to say, corrective information or propaganda from the local government could have done much to dispel this mistrust, and it is instructive in itself to observe that no such information was ever forthcoming.

There was furthermore a strong desire on the part of the local authorities to take all the credit for the relief action themselves. There were moments when ONUC was asked simply to supply the food, medicines and trucks, and have the Government to see to their distribution. Objections were made to the ONUC trucks being white, to their carrying ONUC number plates, even to the ONUC Coordinator flying a UN flag on his jeep. Apart from these perhaps minor incidents, there has been a strong tendency on the part of Mr. Kalonji to see in Mr. Gaballero

very much more than the coordinator of the relief operation in Bakwanga. Mr. Caballero is treated, in fact as a sort of liaison officer in political matters, and in practice, often as a go-between for the UN forces, stationed in Bakwanga. He has not been able to avoid being drawn into discussions on a large number of issues which had nothing whatsoever to ~~xxx~~ do with the relief operation, this despite his insistence that he has nothing to do with these matters. Mr. Kalonji also raised objections to the UN bringing in additional civilian staff to administer the relief programme, and although this has not in fact prevented ONUC from bringing in the people considered necessary, it has always meant overcoming ~~xx~~ stubborn objection and mistrust.

The planes bringing in the food to Bakwanga were, naturally, UN chartered planes. When the local authorities on one occasion tried to board one of the planes in order to search it, it was suspected to be carrying ~~lulus~~, they had to be restrained from doing so by the Ghanaians, which gave rise to an ugly incident which might well have

had very serious consequences. The incident led to a worsening of the relationships between the local authorities and the UN Force, and the plane being engaged in carrying relief supplies, the reflection on the relief operation was unavoidable. When the stocks of food began to increase in Bakwanga as a result of the successful supply operation and airlift and when, about the same time, the tents began to arrive for the tented hospital- it was rumoured among the Balubas that all this had nothing to do with the relief operation, but was in preparation for a move by the UN aimed at disarming the Kalonji army.

This development coincided with the general deterioration of the situation in the Congo, leading to the threat of civil war which the Secretary General reported to the Security Council on 13 February. The deterioration caused the Commander of the Ghanaian forces in Bakwanga to take military precautions in strengthening the defences of his camp, an activity which increased Baluba suspicions further. The working relationship between ONUC and then the local authorities was seriously jeopardised by the issuing of an order by the latter categorically

forbidding any Baluba to have any contact with a Ghanaian or even as much as speak to him, on pain of prison sentences. Since the UN trucks used in the relief operation, driven by Baluba drivers, were at that time parked, refuelled, and maintained in the Ghanaian compound, the effect of this order on the operation was to sharply reduce distribution.

Despite countless difficulties of this nature, most commendably smoothed over by Mr. Caballero, but always at great expense of time and effort, some progress was made nevertheless in the organisation of the distribution. But the rate of distribution of food to the refugees has not been maintained at the necessary level. Only on two days in February did it rise above the target of 80 tons per day and over the last eight days of February the average rate of distribution was 40.4 tons per day. Despite the remarkable improvement in the health of the community, this rate cannot be regarded as sufficient. As is said elsewhere, (see "Sud Programme"), the food situation was helped by the December harvest,

but the small stocks of food from that source are now consumed and the refugees must now live entirely on the relief programme. It is essential, therefore, that the organization of distribution is improved and the rate maintained at an average which the FAO nutritionist now advises should not fall below 80 tons per day.

Reception and Storage

While the airlift continued the food and other supplies arriving at Bakwanga airport were unloaded directly on to trucks and transported to the warehouses. These are located inside the Hibeke' compound and the company has agreed that their own security force should keep a permanent guard on the storage site. Storage space for some 1000 tons of supplies is available- free of charge.

In the early days of the operation unloading and storage were handled by the Ghana troops of the U.N. Force stationed at Bakwanga, an infantry Field Squadron of Engineers under the command of Major Wright. The very considerable amount of work put in so efficiently and enthusiastically by the Ghanaians is deserving of the very highest commendation, particularly in view of the often offensive attitude adopted towards them by the local authorities. It was the deterioration of this attitude to the point of hostility which eventually forced the Ghanaians to withdraw their men to purely military work and the unloading and storage was then taken over by local labour, supplied and theoretically, paid by the local authorities. The assistance given by the non-commissioned officers of the military supply unit at the airport and at the warehouses has also been a very valuable contribution.

Distribution

As far as distribution is concerned, three main groups or distribution networks were visualised from the beginning, in accordance with the need.

1. the top priority group consisting of those needing and/or receiving medical supervision and care in hospitals and dispensaries;
2. the 'vulnerable group' amongst the refugees, i.e. the expectant mothers and children;
3. the remainder of the refugee population at large.

The regular supplying of food in adequate quantities to hospitals and dispensaries was given first priority. If this seems to be pointing the obvious, it should be recalled that in early December there was a time when Misbi hospital with its upwards of 1000 patients had not received any food for several days. This particular work was made the responsibility of the members of the Congo Protestant Relief Agency who deserve high praise for their devotion to this task and for long days of dogged hard work they put into it.

Unfortunately resistance built up against the C.P.R.A. workers. They were accused by the Kalonji Government of making religious propaganda while distributing food, charges that have never been adequately substantiated.

It was proposed that this particular work should be divided between the Catholic and the Protestant workers, but this compromise did not work out, because there was a desire, as stubborn as it was obvious, to eliminate the C.P.R.A. from the picture to the maximum extent. This was grossly unjust; the C.P.R.A. were the first to provide relief supplies in the area and no work, however arduous, was too much for them. On the other hand it must be remembered also that already at the very first coordinating committed meeting in Bakwanga it was agreed, upon the insistence of Mr. N'Galula, that the C.P.R.A. would not take part in the actual distribution but would confine itself like all other donors to planning and supervision. That this was not immediately put into practice was for obvious reasons. The Refugee Commissioner's office was far from capable of substituting a satisfactory system for that employed hitherto by the C.P.R.A. And even to day it must be doubted whether the system is as effective as it was earlier on. The stubborn and bigoted refusal to accept and appreciate the truly magnificent effort put in by the Congo Protestant Relief Agency for the good of the refugees must remain one of the sad

chapters of this operation.

The second distribution group, the so-called 'vulnerable group' receives, in addition to the basic diet, a supplementary ration of milk and high protein food. This group is being reached partly by special centres set up by the Red Cross and partly through so-called 'cantines populaires', created by the Refugee Commissioner. The Red Cross Centres distribute mainly milk. While the cantines populaires prepare additional rations of rice and fish, cooked by women volunteers, which are distributed on the spot to the women and children daily at noon. The centres and cantines are supplied at appropriate intervals by U.N. trucks, upon the request of the Red Cross or of the Refugee Commissioner.

The third group, or the remainder of the refugees, receive the standard diet (ref para) To meet these requirements the Refugee Commissioner has organised some 540 distribution points which are located so as to avoid the refugees having to walk excessive distances to get to them. Distribution is made to heads of families, by government appointed

distributors who are controlled by the Committees of Refugees in each location.

The organisation of distribution to the main body of the refugees, who form this third group, has not yet reached the required degree of efficiency. There are still places where food is not reaching the refugees with any regularity. In order to overcome this and to bring much needed system to the distribution attempts have been made to elaborate with the Refugee Commissioner a plan of rotation based on the number of refugees in each location, the distances involved and the total quantities required on a weekly basis so that the much needed regularity can be obtained. Up to the end of February, however, this plan had not been fully adopted.

~~The Financing and Administration of the Programme~~
Supervision

Due to the considerable amount of time which has had to be spent on relations with the local government on general issues, and due also to the difficulties in developing the organisational

structure of the programme, actual supervision carried out by U.N. personnel has been limited. However, such supervision as has been made, has tended to show that distribution is being made equitably. There is, in fact, no reason to believe that any supplies are being diverted into improper channels. The medical and nutritionists' supervision has also revealed that there is room for considerable improvement in respect of the maintenance of a balanced ration.

However, due to the frequent field visits made by the medical personnel, and to the elementary courses of instruction being given to the distributors, there is satisfactory proof that improvement is only a matter of time.

Now that the emergency period is over much greater attention will be concentrated on supervision.

Number of Refugees

The original estimate made in the course of October and November was that there were approximately 100,000 refugees in immediate need in the Bakwanga area. This figure was soon proved to be far below the truth. The estimates collected in the field and agreed upon by all those present at the first meeting of the Coordinating Committee in Bakwanga are given on page

In addition there were concentrations of refugees, not necessarily Salubas in other places such as Gandajika, Mwene Ditu, Tshikapa, Luebo and Charleville. It was felt that the estimated total should be set at 300,000 for planning purposes. This estimate has since been substantiated by the census of the refugee population undertaken by the authorities, which, although only partially completed, corroborates the original estimates. By the end of December 1960 twenty two of the thirty six communes in the area had been reviewed and showed a total of 282,300 refugees, all of whom in the opinion of the refugee commissioner are in need of relief. The numbers of refugees in the other fourteen communes are known to be relatively small.

Basic Ration

The basic programme forese^{es} the provision of a supplementary diet to a maximum of three hundred thousand people. The basic ration as recommended by Dr. Raba, the FAO nutritionist, is the following:

	<u>Grammes</u>	<u>Calories</u>	<u>Protein</u>
Rice or maize flour	300	1080	21-27
Dried Fish	60	156	24
Palmoil	30	264	-----
	-----	-----	-----
	390	1500	45-51

Quantity of Foods required

Theoretically, the basic ration and the estimated number of refugees require the food to be moved into the area and distributed, at the following rates:

	<u>Day</u>	<u>Week</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>6 mths</u>
maize or rice	90 tons	630 tons	2,700 t.	16,200
dried fish	18	126	540	3,240
palmoil	9	63	270	1,620
	-----	-----	-----	-----
	117	819	3,510	21,060
	-----	-----	-----	-----

The refugees could not become self-supporting until the next harvest, in May, and only then if they could gather a full harvest, for which the saving would have to be completed by the first week in February. The basic need; therefore, was for food for six months, and for seed and tools.

The quantities of food tabulated above were taken as the maximum requirement. For purposes of planning vehicle and airlift requirements, the target rate of food distribution, to be reached by the end of January, was set at 70 tons per day.

The Supply Problem

ONUC was faced with a triple problem:

- a. that of obtaining food of the required kinds in the required quantities, by purchase or donation;
- b. that of getting the food to the area at the required rate, starting at once.
- c. distributing the food at the required rate.

In early December some food was purchased with money allocated by UNICEF. It soon became clear that these quantities were by no means sufficient to meet the immediate need. During a visit of Dr. Egger, UNICEF Regional Director for Europe and Africa, a second request was made to UNICEF for further funds, to enable ONUC to purchase the basic foods required for distribution through the end of January, by which time ONUC would be able to organize supplies from other sources.

On 23rd December the Secretary General requested the Director of FAO to assume the responsibility of obtaining the food stuffs to meet the famine situation in the Congo. In early January ONUC was visited by Dr. Kesteven of FAO with whom the division of responsibilities between FAO and the Refugee Coordinator's office was worked out.

It was agreed that FAO would obtain the food required for distribution to an estimated 300,000 refugees to provide a daily ration of 1500 calories, starting 1 February 1961 and continuing through June 1961. FAO would endeavour to the maximum to obtain the required supplies and their transportation as donations in kind. All cash and other donations by governments, non governmental organizations, and private persons, intended to assist the relief operation, are to be collected by the United Nations and credited to the UN Congo Famine Relief Fund.

FAO called a meeting on ~~January~~ 18 of the diplomatic representatives in Rome of its member governments and launched an appeal for food and seeds, setting the requirement of food at

10,000 tons of rice
10,000 tons of maize flour
3,200 tons of dried fish
1,200 tons of red palm oil

By the end of February FAO had received donations as follows:

- a) 100 tons of rice from Spain
- b) 100 tons of rice from Vietnam
- c) Rice to the value of about ten thousand Pounds Sterling from Pakistan
- d) 45 tons of milk powder from the Union of South Africa

- e) 6,000 parcels each containing three kilos of miscellaneous foods (e.g. sugar, chocolate) from Morocco
- f) 3 tons of miscellaneous food and rice from Ghana

Mention must here be made of the very valuable help and cooperation received from Mr. John Abbott, who was appointed briefly as FAO Liaison Officer in the ONUC Refugee Relief Coordinator's Office. His assistance, and that given by Dr. Raba, FAO nutritionist, and by the three man team of such experts, during the launching phase of the relief operation, constituted a most valuable contribution by FAO.

At his first press conference, after his inauguration, the new President of the United States announced his Government's intention to provide 10,000 tons of rice for the UN Relief Operation, and an additional 4,000 tons of maize flour, 6,000 tons of maize flour having been pledged earlier. Thus the total foreseen of rice and maize flour for the relief of famine in the South Kasai is fully covered.

ONUC has received donations of dried fish totalling 1,562 tons, which includes 500 tons procured by the League of Red Cross Societies. In addition ONUC has purchased 550 tons. The League has undertaken to provide a further 1,100 tons of dried fish, thus covering the total foreseen requirement of this commodity also.

Red palm oil is available in the Congo. UNILEVER, a large producer, has made a gift of 200 tons, to be delivered at its depot at Port Francqui.

Annexed to this report are detailed statements of:

- a) food, seeds, and agricultural tools purchased by ONUC for the relief operation in South Kasai to 28 February 1961
- b) food received by ONUC in the Congo, as donations in kind, from 1 December 1960 to 28 February 1961
- c) donations of food pledged, showing quantities en route by sea to the Congo, and expected dates of arrival, as at 28 February 1961
- d) Stocks of food in stock in the Congo, at Bakwanga and all other depots, at 28 February 1961.

The Airlift

The airlift is considered to have started 14th December 1960, although a number of sporadic sorties were flown previous to that date. Records of arrivals and departures at Bakwanga were not maintained, however, until the arrival of the ICAG team on 25th December 1960. The four-man team controlled the air traffic and the ground operation in a most efficient manner, no mean task on an airport which was conceived perhaps for a tenth of the traffic, and lacked many of the basic facilities. Now that the main airlift has been terminated, it is gratifying to record that not a single accident occurred at Bakwanga. Only once had the airport to be closed following exceptionally heavy rain (21st January) as it was feared that further use might have permanently damaged the runway, originally designed only for DC 3 type aircraft.

From the 25th of December until the end of February a total of landings were registered at Bakwanga, bringing in a total of well over three million pounds of supplies mainly food, seeds and medical supplies.

(the airlift: page 2)

Almost all the aircraft employed on the relief airlift to Bakwanga were chartered planes under control of the ONUC Air Force. Sorties were made mainly from Leopoldville, (some three hours flight), from Luluabourg, (half an hour's flight), from Kamina, (an hour's flight); and a smaller number of sorties from airports outside the Congo, notably from Luanda in Angola, Garoua in North Camerouns, and Salisbury and Ndola in Rhodesia. There were many practical limitations on the capacity of the airlift - the most obvious being the competing demands of the U.N. Force illustrated by the struggle with C 119 aircraft. The C 119 is the only type of aircraft available to ONUC for the lifting of heavy equipment. Other aircraft like DC 3's, DC 4's, Vikings, etc., are essentially troop carrying craft and useful also for bulk supplies. In the early days of the relief operation, the most urgent need was for a minimum number of large trucks in the distribution area.

(the airlift: page 3)

The nearest available tracks were in Leopoldville, but it would take twenty days to deliver them by surface means, so priority airlift was requested. The only suitable aircraft was the C 119. They were available but using them to fill the requirements of the relief operation meant that none would be available in the case of a military emergency. There was also the ever recurring problem of refuelling the aircraft, fuel sometimes being not available in the right places, at least not in the quantities required for the heavily increased demands made by the relief operation. Even where fuel was available, refuelling was often excruciatingly slow, as at Luluabourg where it is done by a small hand pump. There was also the problem of getting the aircraft loaded and unloaded fast enough, to take maximum advantage of the charter terms. There were difficulties of maintenance with Charter companies which did not normally operate in the Congo. All these were overcome to a very large extent, thanks to the great effort made by Air Operations and Movement Control alike, to help the relief operation in extremely difficult circumstances.

(the airlift: page 4)

There was one problem, however, which it was impossible for ONUC to solve alone. As the rate of distribution of food rose towards the required levels, it was apparent that food would be moving out of the Bakwanga depot much faster than it could be brought in using the airlift capacity of ONUC alone.

The aim was to distribute seventy tons of food a day, plus, during the latter part of January and the first days of February, seed at the rate of thirty tons a day. This could not be handled with the airlift capacity of ONUC. It was difficult to be precise about the additional airlift required, however, because the procurement of supplies was to a large extent determined by the availability of aircraft to lift them. If 100 tons of groundnut seeds from Gambia (the North Gambia) could be airlifted they were available for purchase. Only by airlift could they be delivered to Bakwanga in time to be sown, so no firm order could be placed until the airlift was certain.

(the airlift: page 5)

This applied to a number of other commodities. If a Scandinavian donation of fish was to be airlifted it would not be necessary to purchase fish in Uganda, but if the purchase had to be made in Uganda, an airlift would be required from there. If an airlift from Luanda (Angola) to Bakwanga was absolutely impossible, seeds available there could be shipped by sea to Matadi and by rail to Leopoldville but in that case they would have to be airlifted from Leopoldville to Bakwanga.

One thing was clear, however. To maintain a daily distribution of 70 tons of food during the period which must elapse before the surface "pipeline" would begin to flow, it would be necessary to purchase and fly in to Bakwanga an additional 700 tons of basic foods. Moreover, ⁴⁷⁵~~450~~ tons of seeds had to be purchased from outside the Congo and flown to Bakwanga.

Two types of aircraft are particularly adapted to the kind of lift that was necessary, namely the C 124 and the C 130, both capable of hauling large loads over long distances and both capable of landing on relatively short runways.

(the airlift: page 6)

The supplementary need was for five aircraft of the C 124 type to haul a quantity of about fifty tons per day for a period of some twenty days. Needless to say, the daily rate of lift was limited by the rate at which aircraft could be loaded at the pick-up points, and the capacity for unloading the arriving aircraft fast enough to make an economical turn-round.

At one point the possibility of obtaining enough aircraft capacity was extremely doubtful and the situation became desperate, for without this additional airlift there was a serious danger of food stocks running out or of the seed programme failing completely.

Then, however, the news was received that the U. S. Government was providing a number of aircraft and that the foodlift was to be combined with the rotating of U.N. troops. The number of aircraft involved was much greater than was required for the fifty tons per day foreseen and a great strain was placed on loading and unloading capacities.

(the airlift: Page 7)

Despite some unforeseen complications the operation was completed most satisfactorily in a matter of days. On their way in from Europe some of the aircraft carried 100 tons of dried fish from Norway. Others dropped down at Cairo and picked up 75 tons of rice, a donation from the UAR Government. These supplies were unloaded at the Kamina airfield (Katanga) which was made the Congo's terminal of operation because of its covered storage and handling capacity. The aircraft thus carried in 100 tons of seed from Garoua in North Cameroun, 70 tons of maize flour and 50 tons of dried fish from Uganda, 400 tons of maize flour and 100 tons of seed from Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia, and 40 tons of tents from Nairobi in Kenya, tents that were urgently needed for the construction of a tented hospital for the more severe cases of starvation in need of medical care. Some of the planes, having repatriated UAR troops, carried back a further gift of rice from the UAR. Some went to Luanda (Angola) to pick up dried fish but were prevented by the uprising which occurred on 4-5 February.

(the airlift: page 8)

The American airlift, which flew two and a quarter million pounds of supplies into the Congo in a matter of days, was a valuable and greatly appreciated contribution to the relief operation.

The Supply Line

Theoretically there are three surface supply routes serving the South Kasai. However, as will be seen, only one was open for the relief operation. Supplies arriving at Matadi, the Congo's only seaport, are carried by rail to Leopoldville, thence by river barge to Port Francoqui, and from there by rail as far as Luluabourg or Mwene Ditu. They must then be hauled in trucks by road to Bakwanga.

Supplies arriving at Lobito in Angola, would go by rail to Elisabethville, capital of the Katanga province, and then north, through Kamina, to Mwene Ditu or Luluabourg and thence by road transport to Bakwanga. Supplies arriving at Dar Es Salaam on the East Coast of Africa would go by rail to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika across the lake by barge to Albertville and then by rail to Kamina and thence to Mwene Ditu or Luluabourg. Both the railway from Elisabethville through Kamina to Luluabourg and the one from Albertville to Kamina, run through country which has been the scene of persistent guerilla fighting as a result of which these railways have practically

(supply line: page 2)

ceased to operate. Hence, entry through the point of Matadi was the only feasible route but even this is beset by difficulties, although so far none of them has proved insurmountable. In detail the surface route inland to Bakwanga consists of 200 miles of rail to Leopoldville, 490 miles by river barge as far as Port Francqui, 200 miles by rail to Luluabourg and thence 150 miles by road to Bakwanga, a total of 1,000 miles into the interior. There are two weak links in this chain: Fort Francqui which has seen several civil disturbances, and Luluabourg, which is the capital and heart of Lulua country, and therefore an unfortunate ~~choice~~ of location for a railhead for relief supplies being given to their tribal enemies, the Balubas. The only alternative would be to rail the supplies through to Mwene Ditu, formerly the administrative seat of the Kanioka tribe but now included in the Kalonji state of the South Kasai. However, the railway between Luluabourg and Mwene Ditu runs through rebel infested country and must be considered largely unreliable.

(supply lines: page 3)

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(supply line: page 3)

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Road Transport

The full use of the supply line, however, depended on the availability of a sufficient number of trucks to haul some eighty to a hundred tons of food a day from Luluabourg to Bakwanga along a bad road, crossing en route the Kalonji 'frontier' at Lake Mukamba and naturally, sufficient trucks in the Bakwanga area to deal with the final distribution.

After much negotiation with the Supply Services, in competition with the needs of the military side of ONUC, a fleet of vehicles was in place, which at 28 February consisted of:

17	Mercedes 5-ton trucks
31	Bedford 3.7-ton trucks
10	Bedford 3.7-ton trucks (in very poor condition)
16	Assorted types 1 to 1½-ton pickups
6	Jeeps
8	Jeep station wagons

An important contribution towards solution of the transport problem was the assignment of a Pakistani transport unit to be responsible for the convoys between Luluabourg and Bakwanga.

The journey between Luluabourg and Bakwanga cannot be made at night for security reasons and the condition of the road makes it impossible to complete a round trip in one day. The load-carrying capacity of the fleet detailed above is insufficient, therefore, to lift 80 to 100 tons a day by convoy and also to distribute a like quantity daily. An additional ~~xxx~~ thirty-two Bedford~~x~~ 3.7-ton trucks were obtained towards the end of February and at the end of the month were en route by river and rail to Luluabourg.

The Health Problems

The hospital dispensary facilities in the "Etat Autonome du Sud Kasai" as they existed in early December 1960 are summarized in Annex ;.....

From this it will be noted that the official health services dispose of no qualified medical doctors. These services are carried out - sometimes very ably - by "assistants médicaux" of which there are a total of nine.

The total population of the South Kasai is at present estimated at some one and a half million.

There were in early December 1960 four medical doctors in the area, though not in government service.

Forminière, the mining company, employed two doctors at the Company Hospital. A third doctor belonging to Formulac (Formation Médicale de l'Université de Louvain) and temporarily unable to join his normal duty station at Kalenda, started a dispensary for Kwashiorkor cases in a former school, assisted by the religious sisters who had also fled from Kalenda following serious disturbances in October. The dispensary which at one time contained over 200 cases has now been discontinued, the patients having been transferred to the pediatric ward of the

Forminière hospital at Disale. A Protestant missionary doctor at Bibango bring the total of doctors in the entire area to four.

The first problem to be faced was that of bringing the advanced cases of Kwashiorkor and starvation under medical care and supervision. To that end WHO, around the middle of December, made available an expert medical nutritionist who was joined a little later by three ^{more} ~~men~~ medical doctors.

Through frequent field visits they succeeded in bringing much needed medical advice to the many dispensaries where cases were being treated. As the early stages of the programme it was extremely difficult to get the serious cases to hospital or even within reach of controlled feeding facilities owing to lack of transport. However, towards the end of January UNICEF allocated vehicles arrived and from then onwards it was possible progressively to bring all of the most severe cases to hospital.

The position at the time of closing of this report is that no known severe cases of Kwashiorkor remained outside hospital and cases with oedema had become uncommon. The country was still full; however, of emaciated children beginning the long process of convalescence. The maintenance and improvement of

this position remains dependant on the continuation of the distribution of food and milk.

Upon the request of Ambassador Dayal Colonel Kapoor, Senior Medical Staff Officer, also made a tour of inspection of the area in early December to investigate in what way the military medical personnel could be of assistance. Upon his return Colonel Kapoor submitted a report in which he strongly warned against the dangers arising out of the very bad over crowding at the hospitals particularly at Dakwaga and Miabi. Colonel Kapoor pointed out that due to the shocking sanitary conditions the danger of an epidemic of gastro enteritis was very real. If such an epidemic should occur more lives might well be lost to that disease than had, in fact, ever been lost to Kwashiorkor. Colonel Kapoor recommended that tented hospitals for some 1500 patients should be established around the two existing hospitals, and that a military team of fifty to sixty medical, nursing and ancillary personnel should be stationed there.

The proposal received full approval, and an appeal was sent to the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, the United States and France for such tents as were required, a type which is not readily available on the ordinary market.

In the meantime Colonel Kapoor and The Refugee Relief Coordinator visited Bakwanga to discuss the plan with Messrs Kalonji and N'Galula who, after some consideration, agreed on condition that the medical personnel, though military, should be fully integrated into the civilian operation which was carrying out the relief programme.

It was agreed that the Austrian Medical team should depart just as soon as at all possible to prepare the project. The advance party arrived in Bakwanga on 17 January. In the meantime a reply had been received to the appeal for tents from the Government of Kenya putting the required tents immediately at our disposal. These tents were in part flown to Usumbura by the Royal Air Force and then by ONUC lift to Bakwanga and partly by the United States Air Force from Nairobi to Kamina.

Many were the difficulties that had to be overcome in the initial stages to get the project under way. However, the Austrian team under the leadership of Oberst Pervulesko at great inconvenience and hardship to the medical and nursing staff got the tented camp around Disele hospital at Bakwanga under

way. The former dispensary located most inadequately in a school building was transferred to the pediatrics ward of the hospital where the Austrians assumed the medical care.

At the time of closing this report the tented hospital at Bakwanga was working fully. It is hoped that those foreseen for Mabi and Herode will also be organized soon.

As has already been mentioned; the present improved situation is precarious, to say the least, dependant as it is on the continued regular distribution of food. The continued arrival of new refugees in smaller and larger groups also constitutes a problem. WHO is therefore studying the situation with a view to changing the present emergency medical services into a more permanent form which may become the kernel of the regular medical services to be developed in the area.

The distribution of medical supplies provided for the relief programme is at present being re-organized. While hitherto it was the responsibility of the WHO medical personnel to see to it that the supplies got to the places where they were needed most, it has now been agreed that the supplies will be centralized in the Central Pharmacy and distributed exclusively under

the supervision and with the agreement of a coordinating committee on which at least two WHO representatives will sit. The priorities of the refugee programme in the field and at the hospitals will be observed.

The question of medical supplies, as, indeed, of all other assistance, will have to be reviewed at some not too distant point in the future with an eye to determining to what extent the diamond state of the South Kasai could apply its own wealth to dealing with its own problems.

Until a more long term arrangement is possible; however, the Refugee Relief Coordinator's Office is providing the necessary medicaments and supplies, obtaining them either by purchase or donations in kind.

The Seed Programme

The South Kasai knows two harvesting times: the so-called 'small' harvest in June and the 'big' harvest in December. The situation which the relief programme seeks to correct arose, as has already been pointed out, mainly from the fact that many refugees arrived too late to sow in time for a December harvest; and that those who had managed to sow saw much of their crop burnt by the invading Congolese troops. The food situation was in fact relieved slightly by the December yield which, small as it was, nevertheless came at the critical time when the relief programme was still trying to get under way. In early February the FAO nutritionist reported that what little stocks of food had been built up was now consumed and the refugees would have to live entirely on the relief programme.

It was to avoid a recurrence of this situation and to make the refugees self-supporting as soon as possible that it was decided early in January to assist

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them as much as possible in sowing for the June crop. The odds against the programme were considerable. First, sowing was, according to the agriculturists, to be completed by the end of the first week in February, but in early January it was not known yet where suitable seeds could be located, much less whether they could be delivered immediately to be flown in.

Secondly, it was thought that the population was so enfeebled that the clearing of land, most of it virgin in the main area, would be both very limited and superficial. Thirdly, the soil in the region was notorious for its infertility and for its lack of surface water. Fourthly, transport for distribution of seeds in the area would have to be at the expense of the food distribution programme, which had to be increased at the same time. Last but not least, when it became quite clear that no sizeable stocks of seed were accessible in the Congo, airlifting the seed from the neighbouring

(seed programme: page 3)

countries became a sine qua non, because by any other means they would arrive too late; and, as has been described elsewhere, this was in a period when it was very doubtful that additional airlift would be available. Based on the FAO nutritionist's report it was estimated that some 1,000 tons of bean, groundnut and maize seed would be required. This figure was based on the assumption that the refugees would have used their seed reserve as food and did not take into account what sowing the peasant refugees, with their sound instinct for survival, might already have done despite their losses and difficulties. The extent of the sowing done was in fact surprising. The FAO team of agronomists who joined the operation to advise on the seed programme, were able to reduce the requirement of seed to 100 tons of groundnut, 200 tons of maize and 175 tons of beans, a total of 475 tons. The groundnut

(see programme: page 4)

seeds were purchased from Garoua in the Camerouns, the maize seeds from Salisbury in Rhodesia and the beans from Luanda in Angola and all were flown into Bakwanga for the most part by the USAF, but also by ONUC's own airlift.

The inestimable help given to ONUC by the FAO liaison officer, Mr. Abbott and by the members of the seed team Messrs. Wirtz, de Jong and Egli in these hard-pressed days must be acknowledged. Without their expert advice and their willingness to help in any of the related functions, the seed programme might well have foundered.

In order to stimulate and facilitate the clearing and preparation of the maximum expanse of soil, simple agricultural tools such as hoes and bush knives were purchased by ONUC and distributed.

In Bakwanga the FAO team worked in very close collaboration with the local agricultural

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authorities and were full of praise for the active support they were given in carrying out this programme of assistance. Together with the authorities the team worked out a distribution plan, participated personally in the distribution to main drop-off points and later extensively supervised the distribution and the sowing of the seed.

The distribution and sowing having been successfully completed, it is hoped that one FAO expert will remain to watch the further development of the harvest and to advise on experiments in the use of fertilisers, so far little known in the area, and of which donations of 150 tons in kind have been offered.

It is at this stage impossible to say what the yield of the crops will be. It is tentatively estimated, however, that the June harvest is unlikely to provide enough

(see programme: page 6)

food to last the whole period of six months between the July and December harvest so that a renewed food distribution programme may prove necessary towards the end of 1961. Moreover, a certain assistance, but how much is not yet known, will be required for the June-July sowing to ensure that the first full harvest in December will in fact make further food assistance unnecessary. However, before that time important decisions will first have to be taken with regard to the permanent rehabilitation of these people. It cannot, for example, be certain at this stage whether or not the refugees will want to remain in the area which they now inhabit or whether the authorities will make an attempt to resettle them in more fertile lands farther East.

International Publicity and the
Response to it

When, in early December 1960, the magnitude of the South Kasai calamity and of the assistance it called for became clear for the first time: - 300,000 people in need, 200 dying a day, the real threat of the death rate rising to thousands, a six months' full-scale programme and a medical programme, a further six months' programme of food distribution on a reduced scale but coupled with a full programme of rehabilitation - there were but few who were not at least temporarily overawed.

At that moment only the first UNICEF allocation of \$150,000 was available. Apart from this there was only USA surplus milk powder temporarily diverted from a school feeding programme and some small quantities of miscellaneous foods. The residue of the earlier ONUC Food Coordinator's programme which, its original purpose having been fulfilled, had been allowed to run down.

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Such were the means available to meet a need which was not only many times larger than the resources but had to be met immediately if it was to be effective.

Two points were immediately clear. Funds were needed for transportation and warehousing and funds were needed to enable the purchase in the Congo or neighboring countries the foods that were required to bridge the period until bulk supplies from abroad could be expected to arrive by surface at Matadi. To meet the first need an allocation of \$150,000 was made from the U.N. Congo Fund. To meet the second need, UNICEF with most commendable speed and understanding, made a second allocation of \$206,000.

In the meantime, the Press had got the wind of the story. In answer to an ever increasing number of requests for more information, Dr. S. Linner, Chief of ONUC Civilian Operations, gave a press conference on 22 December during which the nature of the problem, the extent of

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the need and the relief measures taken and planned were fully expounded.

Ambassador Dayal who, from the very beginning, had taken a deep interest in the matter, visited Bakwanga and the 'famine area' on Christmas Day 1960 and to meet the interest which Dr. Linner's press conference had aroused permitted a large number of correspondents to accompany him in a special U.N. aircraft. The season of the year, the political frustrations in the remainder of the country, the figure of Ambassador Dayal offset against the unrecognised break-away state of South Kasai and its much discussed leader, Mr. Kalonji, the innate irony of the situation: "famine on top of a diamond mine", all these factors combined with the appalling reality of the conditions under which the refugees lived, and died, led to a reaction in the Press perhaps unequalled, thus far, in the whole of the unhappy history of the U.N. in the Congo.

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Press, radio and television set "The Bakwanga Famine" or "the Belsen of the Congo" before a public of millions at a time of the year when people are perhaps more readily than ever moved to charity. The reaction was instantaneous and overwhelming. Within minutes of the television shows and radio programmes enquiries came in as to where money for assistance could be sent. Within hours of publication newspapers received letters enclosing sometimes small but therefore all the more impressive contributions. Established relief organisations set their machinery in motion and provided channels for the individuals' generosity. Individual campaigns were started by schools, boy scouts, junior Red Crosses and the like. The U.N. associations and the U.N. information centres all over the world ran campaigns or received monies for transmittal to the Congo. Soon contributions in kind began to come in from Governments, and pledges for many more future

(international publicity: page 5)

donations. Enquiries came streaming into the Refugee Coordinator's Office from all over the world as to how this or that government or organisation could best contribute or on what the collected funds would most wisely be expended. People wrote offering their services, organisations specific programmes. Donations in kind began to arrive, unannounced by ship and by plane.

Thus, then, hundred of thousands of people contributed instantaneously and spontaneously, generously and charitably to the relief in the first instance, of the famine stricken people of the South Kasai without ever stopping to consider differences of race, creed or political belief, a truly splendid support of the relief programme coordinated by the United Nations.

It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing in the Congo coordination not only of the donations but also of their distribution is even more imperative than it usually is.

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The very spontaneity and enthusiasm of the response to the need, coming as it did from so many different quarters, defeated to some extent the attempts made from the beginning at coordination. It was as unavoidable as it is regrettable that this should have led to a certain amount of waste of effort on the part of some donors.

The number of organisations who despatched supplies without first checking whether these were really needed is small. The number of organisations who asked the Refugee Relief Coordinator's Office for guidance and information as to what assistance was most needed was considerable. Some in the latter group tended to lose patience when a reply was not immediately forthcoming.

It should be pointed out that this delay in providing concrete suggestions for immediate action arose out of the all overriding desire not to see any of the generous contributions

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wasted or even ill spent on supplies which were either not essential or had already been donated in adequate quantities. Once the immediate foreseeable needs were covered the only truly justifiable advice that could be given in most cases was for donors to bide their time and wait until the situation cleared. That this course of action should at times have created the impression that the U.N. "refused" donations is highly regrettable.

Some examples may help to clarify the position.

Too many of the nations wishing to contribute to the relief programme milk is a very natural food and to several among them it is a surplus product. Nothing was more natural, than, for many to wish to contribute milk in one form or another. As a result of spontaneous donations made simultaneously from a number of different sources, however, the situation arose almost immediately that

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milk was on the way in quantities which far exceeded the needs of the programme. It is fortunate that milk powder is an easy article to distribute and one which can be fitted into almost any programme. Hence the surplus milk will at least be used somewhere in the Congo in schools, hospitals, leprosariums, maternity clinics and the like.

The problem is more grave, however when the food in question is a so-called "exotic" food and under that heading must be classified all those foods to which the recipients are not used ~~to~~ and to which they will no longer have access once the programme of assistance comes to a stop. Small quantities of these foods are needed for purely medical purposes but beyond that they must be considered undesirable. There can be little point in accustoming someone to an article, however good, which is not included in his normal diet and, indeed, this may raise grave risks

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as in the case of canned meat where injudicious handling and ignorance of the product's keeping qualities might well lead to serious food poisoning.

Another aspect of declining donations arises when the foreseeable requirements have all been covered, offered for delivery free at Matadi. While further donations offered free at Matadi are accepted and other larger contributions reduced in order to give the later donor the justified satisfaction of taking part in the programme, donations offered at other ports have had to be ~~xxx~~ declined since it would have meant unnecessarily expending contributed funds on freight.

Yet another problem arises with regard to medical supplies. Those supplies which are most urgently needed beyond the supplies immediately needed, ^{are} ~~we~~ naturally purchased locally and paid for from the contribution ^{made} ~~made~~ in cash to the Special Trust Fund. The provision of medical supplies and medicaments

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requires careful planning if costly overstocking and duplication is to be avoided. However, such planning requires time, and as in the other cases, the advice to those who wished to provide medical supplies could only be to bide their time.

On the other hand it is necessary to know what funds are available and for what purpose. In that way requests to organisations could be scaled to their financial means. The time required for re-submitting the uncovered portion to another organisation is thus gained.

By the end of February that which had been started at Christmas by the charitable interest of many individuals, had become a programme in which the established international non-governmental organisations took a great interest and enquiries have been received from several of them as to how they might develop programmes to meet the needs of the Congolese people.

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Although the increasing political tensions within and around the Congo make any kind of constructive forward planning at this time impossible, there is no doubt that once the present crisis passes there will be ample need for assistance programmes of many different kinds, not only in Bakwanga ^{the} area but elsewhere in the Congo.

The disruption of the economic life of the Congo with its loss of purchasing power, the non-availability of food as a result of the breakdown of internal transport has resulted in considerable damage which, though it may not ~~may~~ be permanent, will require a great deal of assistance to repair.

The breakdown of the health services due to a lack of personnel as well as a lack of finance is causing a rec^{id}esence of disease. Leprosaria, for example, have had to go without the Government ~~subvention~~ subvention for many months. As a result the sick cannot be fed and will disappear into the bush.

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This will set back the anti-leprosy work very seriously indeed.

If then the present time and conditions impose a certain inactivity as regards planning for more and more diversified programmes there will, hopefully soon, undubitably be many good uses to which the funds so generously contributed, can be put.

Costs and Finance

The Refugee Relief Operation is functionally and organizationally part of the Civilian Operations' sector of the United Nations Organization in the Congo (ONUC), and for that reason is not administered on a separate budget. The main operational and administrative costs of the operation have up to now been charged against ONUC general funds. Two special funds have been created, however; for financing the relief operation; a Relief Operation Project, to which \$500,000 has been allocated from the UN Congo Fund, and the UN Congo Famine Relief Fund, which is the depository of contributed funds received directly by ONUC from national societies and individuals, plus monies collected through UN offices. No decision has yet been taken on the apportionment of operational and administrative costs, so far financed by ONUC general funds, to the Relief Operation Project of the Congo Fund, or to the Congo Relief Fund. It has, however, been agreed in principle that such charges as amortization of vehicles, and salaries of ONUC personnel, should remain an ONUC charge, and that only such expenditures as are incurred specifically for the relief operation should be charged against relief funds.

Up to 28 February, the funds available to the Refugee Relief Coordinator consisted of the following:

	\$	\$
UNICEF, first allocation	150,000	
UNICEF, second allocation	<u>261,000</u>	
		411,000
Congo Famine Relief Fund:		
- through national Societies	524,020	
- through UN Offices	68,192	
- other contributions	<u>19,638</u>	<u>611,850</u>
TOTAL		\$1,022,850

Food, seed, medical supplies, agricultural tools and other equipment, required in the initial phase of the relief operation, (i.e. in the period ending with the arrivals of donations of food in February), were purchased by ONUC to a total value of \$466,091.

The foreseeable need for foodstuffs to continue the relief operation in South Kasai through June 1961 (i.e. until the next harvest) is amply covered by donations received and pledged in kind. The need to purchase foodstuffs, insofar as that need can be actually foreseen, is therefore now very limited. It