

[4 CONFIDENTIAL]

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
TAC HQ Butare

OPS

10 October 1994

Distribution List

MEETING BETWEEN CHIEF OPERATION OFFICER AND  
RPA BDE COMD FOR SECTOR 4 ON 7 OCT 94



INTRODUCTION

1. Further to the desire to promote cooperation and good working relation between the RPA and UNAMIR, the COO, TAC HQ accepted an invitation from the RPA Bde Comd for Sector 4 and visited the latter HQ on 7 Oct 94. The COO was accompanied by Capt Glen Leduc and Lt Karemera, the RPA LO attached to TAC HQ.

2. The meeting was held in a relaxed and friendly atmosphere. The Bde Comd, Lt Col Fred Ibingira formally informed the COO that he has temporarily moved his comd to Cyangugu. This movement was the result of the number of RPA soldiers in Sector 4C as well as the possible threat from Zaire where most of the former government soldiers and the militia are camped as refugees.

3. The Bde Comd assured the COO that Maj Kazura, one of his Commanding Officers will be at the Bde HQ to handle affairs during his absence from Butare.

OP HOMEWARD

4. The COO, TAC HQ briefed the Bde Comd on the current OP HOMEWARD and the rather disappointing results as thought to be due to circulating amongst the displaced people concerning alleged molestations and executions to some of the returnees by RPA soldiers. It was stressed that our investigations to date have neither confirmed nor denied these rumours.

5. Another source of worry expressed by the COO was the constant denial of access or passage to certain areas which the RPA have declared "restricted areas."

6. The COO also complained about alleged RPA molestation, searches at check points (Road Blocks) and their uncooperative attitude towards the NGOs who are operating in Rwanda for purely humanitarian reasons.

7. The COO formally invited the Bde Comd to attend the regular evening meetings of UNAMIR, NGOs and the Prefect at TAC HQ whenever he visits Butare. His presence, the COO said will encourage UNAMIR

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②  
G.C. Tousignant  
Major - General  
Commandant

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and the NGOs that both the government and the RPA are in full support of OP HOMEWARD.

BDE COMDS'S VIEWS

8. The Bde Comd assured the COO that he is fully aware and appreciates the enormous and untiring efforts that UNAMIR is making at bringing peace and stability to Rwanda.

9. He however expressed his deepest regrets for any unfortunate incidents that might have been committed by RPA soldiers to the discomfort and embarrassment of UNAMIR. He assured COO that such incidents are not the views of the RPA hierarchy and hoped it will not happen again.

10. The Comd further said that the RPA is still in a high state of alert because of the unstable nature in both the military and political fronts. Consequently, snap road blocks and cordon and search operations have become part of their mode of operation. These exercises are based on information which must be acted upon immediately. Large quantities of arms, ammunitions, military uniforms and communication equipment have been captured from unauthorised persons in such operations lately.

ACTIVITIES OF NGOS

11. The Comd expressed his disgust at the conduct and activities of the NGOs. He complained that most of the NGOs are in the country with hidden agenda, hence their uncooperative attitude towards OP HOMEWARD. He claims of having knowledge that NGOs are spreading lies and rumours in the refugee camps about atrocities purportedly committed by the RPA. He indicated that the NGOs should be advising people to return to their homes.

12. He referred to a case on 2 Oct 94, where there was a sudden cancellation of all scheduled relief flights to Cyangugu. He stated that the RPA later confirmed that staff from ICRC had informed Nairobi about security problems at Cyangugu airport which halted all flights for the rest of the day. He claimed that the report of security problems was false.

13. Another source of worry to the Bde Comd is the open show of disrespect and contempt by some NGOs at the various RPA check points.

CONCLUSION

14. The COO expressed his appreciation at the openness and frankness that characterised the meeting. He assured the Bde Comd of continued UNAMIR cooperation with the RPA.

15. He advised the Bde Comd to adopt a policy of transparency in their activities. This will dissuade the minds of people concerning rumours of atrocities and killings within the sector.

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
16. The COO advised the Comd to avoid the tactics of "collective punishment" within the communities. He further advised that the reasons for the various cordon and search operations conducted by the RPA should be explained to the communities where such operations are conducted. Such explanation is likely to win the hearts and minds of the people.

17. The COO drew the attention of the Bde Comd to the fact that the NGOs are not in the country to sabotage the efforts of the BBGNU. They are here purely for humanitarian reasons and will not support any activity that leads to human rights violations. The RPA stands to gain a lot from the NGOs if they (the RPA) adopts the policy of transparency in their operations. Denial of access to certain 'restricted' areas only give credence to the rumours which eventually tarnish the image of the RPA.

18. The COO finally promised to refer the issue of uncooperative and antagonism between the RPA and the NGOs to the appropriate quarters for amicable settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

19. It is strongly recommended that UNAMIR HQ urgently arranges a meeting between the RPA and the various NGOs to settle the differences which hamper UNAMIR operations.

  
H. Osae-Addae  
Colonel  
Chief Operations Officer  
TAC HQ Butare

Distribution List

Action

→ Force Commander

Information:

DFC  
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G3 Plans  
HAC

3/3

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UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE OCT 14 22 1591

TO: TOUSIGNANT, FORCE COMMANDER, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 13 October 1994  
NUMBER: 3313  
SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement.

RECEIVED  
OFFICE OF FC  
OCT 14 1994  
P 3 43

1. The Office of Legal Affairs is reviewing approval procedures for Rules of Engagement and minor changes may be decided.
2. In the meantime, the updated Rules of Engagement submitted by your fac-simile No. 1998, dated 26 September 1994, have been approved.
2. Regards.

RECEIVED OFFICE OF FC	
Date	15/10/94
No	By G.S.

FAX: 254 - 622668  
TEL: 254 - 622508

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

7 October 1994

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Mr. Shaharyar Khan  
SRSG/UNAMIR

FROM: Ally H. Golo  
OIC/Administration

SUBJECT: MISUSE OF UNAMIR ID CARD AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT BY MR. TROJANOVIC

It came to my attention that the individual identified as Mr. Trojanovic is a holder of a UNAMIR identification card designed by UNAMIR for international staff and carrying explicit references to privileges and immunities only enjoyed by international personnel as per the Headquarters agreement signed between the United Nations and the Government of Rwanda.

In order to clarify the above, I have requested the Chief, Security and Safety Unit, to undertake an investigation. He is yet to submit his report to me.

In the interim, I am again informed by the Chief of Movement Control, Mr. Roger Lambo, of an alleged misconduct, evidently by the same individual. Please see attachments 1 and 2.

I intend to investigate this situation further and will report to you in due course. In the meantime, I submit to your attention that the continued "association" of this individual with UNAMIR, including the use of our air resources, is not in the best interests of the Organization. Accordingly, I have directed MOVCON/UNAMIR not to allow this individual on any aircraft operated by UNAMIR, given his alleged misbehaviour, witnessed by both UNAMIR staff and Kenyan nationals, at Jomo Kenyatta Airport.

cc: FC CSSU - for follow-up GSS  
ED AIROPS

② Major Plante  
For you to note  
11 Oct 94 G.C. Tousignant  
Major - General

7 October 1994

TO: A. H. Golo, OIC, Administration

FROM: R. Lambo, Chief Airops

*R. Lambo*

SUBJECT: Airport incident involving Mr. M. Trojanovic

1. Please find attached Memo of 30 September 1994, concerning an incident that occurred on 29 September 1994 at JKI Airport, involving a certain Mr. Trojanovic.

2. From the report submitted by Mr. J. Lombardo, it appears that Mr. Trojanovic's behaviour was both offensive and an inconvenience to fellow passengers. I should therefore like to recommend that he should not be given access to UNAMIR flights.

3. It has also transpired that Mr. M. Trojanovic, who I understand is a Contractor to the Canadian Contingent, is a holder of a UNAMIR ID card (a photocopy of which is also attached). I suspect this to be irregular, as he is neither a UNAMIR staff member, nor a contractor to the mission.

4. Best regards.

Tel: 254-2-622508  
Fax: 254-2-622668

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Roger Lambo  
Chief, Air Operations  
UNAMIR, Gigiri, Kenya

FROM : Mr. Joseph Lombardo  
Movement Control Officer  
UNAMIR, Gigiri, Nairobi

THROUGH: Mr. Serge Smith  
Senior Movement Control Officer  
UNAMIR, Gigiri, Nairobi

DATE : Friday September 30, 1994

RE : Airport Incident Involving Mr. M. Trojanovic

*Seen 3/10/94  
I support the  
Recommendation made  
in paragraph 8. Mr.  
Trojanovic should not  
be encouraged to use  
UNAMIR flights.*

1. On September 29, 1994, Mr. Trojanovic, of Tower Air Canada, presented himself at the United Nations check-in counter in order to receive his boarding pass for United Nations flight 392 (UN392) flying from Nairobi to Kigali. At the time of check-in, Mr. Trojanovic was advised by myself that his luggage exceeded the maximum allowable limit. I further advised him that if there were any passengers who did not show up for the flight I would be able to accommodate his excess baggage. Several persons did not present themselves for UN392 that day, so I therefore allowed Mr. Trojanovic to check in 20 kgs of excess baggage.

2. As part of my duties I must ensure all passengers are safely aboard UNAMIR flights. Upon arriving with the last group of passengers at UN392 I found Mr. Trojanovic inside one of the baggage trolleys, looking and acting quite agitated. He had effectively disrupted and brought completely to a halt, the loading of cargo and passengers onto UN392. When I asked what he was doing, Mr. Trojanovic explained to me that a piece of his luggage was open and part of its contents had gone missing. Instead of performing their normal functions, the baggage handlers were all occupied with finding the missing items. The items were found shortly after my arrival.

3. Upon inspection of the piece of Mr. Trojanovic's luggage which was open, I found that it was secured only with brown tape, because, as Mr. Trojanovic explained to me, the zipper was broken. Having come to the conclusion that the items had fallen out due to the inappropriate securing of the luggage by Mr. Trojanovic himself, I made a note of his name and decided to report the incident to you.



4. In his state of anxiety, before the missing items were found, Mr. Trojanovic used words and phrases such as "I know how these people work," and "I have been in Africa a long time and I know how things operate". These remarks were made explicitly towards the African baggage handlers with the intent of questioning their integrity. I found the tone of his remarks to be racially offensive towards the African baggage handlers.

5. Not only did Mr. Trojanovic interfere with the loading of cargo and passengers onto a UNAMIR flight, he was also the sole cause of its subsequent delay. He was verbally abusive towards myself and insulting towards the baggage handlers. It is my recommendation that Mr. Trojanovic's access to UNAMIR flights be limited.

6. I would be happy to clarify the situation further if needed.

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CNR 593 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 6 October 1994  
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 3229  
SUBJECT: Next steps in Rwanda

94 OCT 11 11:11  
UNAMIR  
MOST IMMEDIATE

1994 OCT 11 11:11  
P 6 14

In preparation of a meeting which we will have with US Government officials tomorrow morning, we have received the attached "non-paper" from the US Permanent Mission. We would be grateful if you could let us have your views regarding the issues raised in the paper. Please ensure that your reply is received here by 9:00 a.m. our time tomorrow, so that it can be used, as appropriate, during the meeting. Many thanks and regards.

G.  
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(SRSG)

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U.S. Government Non-Paper on  
Next Steps in Rwanda and the Region

The primary objective of the international community in Rwanda should be to create a safe and secure environment so that refugees and displaced persons can voluntarily repatriate in confidence.

In this regard, there are at least three related problems which need to be addressed: <sup>yes but</sup> security in the refugee camps [including security for refugees, relief workers, and removal/separation of ex-FAR and Hutu militia]; ex-FAR and Hutu militia incursions into Rwanda; and human rights violations by the RPA. <sup>10/10/97</sup> These problems should be addressed through a coordinated strategy of concurrent and integrated steps that will create conditions for the primary objective: safe, voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons.

The U.S. Government is exploring various ideas to address the security issues involved in repatriation of refugees/displaced persons from the camps in Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. We believe at least two actions are necessary to reach the primary goal of a safe repatriation:

- UNAMIR must be fully deployed throughout Rwanda. *yes we are moving full strength out together support in ending No pub 12/6*
- Until restoration of confidence is achieved, there is a need *to minimize suffering and exposure to violence in the camps. This means protection of refugees and relief workers from militia and ex-FAR.*

The U.S. Government is ready to cooperate in both endeavors. However, to be effective, we must explore thoroughly the options and define exactly the mission. Questions about the mandate of an expanded UNAMIR mission or any other option must be addressed and thought through.

Questions For Consideration:

The following set of questions are a fact-finding tool, and should not be taken to imply any preferred course of action. However, we would like the UN to address the following questions:

General Issues:

- How does the UN intend to work toward the primary objective as we see it, that is to create a secure environment in Rwanda to enable the safe repatriation of refugees and the return to their homes of internally displaced persons?
- Does the UN intend to propose an expansion of UNAMIR, or the creation of a new force [or forces] to achieve these goals?

-- If so, what would be the role of this force [an expanded UNAMIR, an OAU force, something similar to the French-led Operation Turquoise, or a country acting bilaterally are possible ideas]? Would this force [or forces] provide security only for returnees in Rwanda? For refugees in camps outside Rwanda? For relief workers in camps?

-- Assuming a UN-led mission, if this force was being asked to provide some form of protection in the camps, would it be under a chapter VI mandate, or would a chapter VII mandate be required?

-- If chapter VI, who would be asked for consent - Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, former government leaders?

-- In general, should there be a UN political dialogue with the refugee Hutus, and who would the UN [Dillon or Khan] talk to? Would the UN talk to armed groups? If not, what are the implications for Ch VI vs. Ch VII?

-- What size force is envisioned? What is the predicted budget for such a force and where would resources be identified to support the force?

-- What would be the UN's strategy to recruit sufficient troops?

-- What would be the proposed timeline of the operation? What clear objectives and realistic criteria would be taken into account for ending the operation?

-- What would be the UN's response if political reconciliation does not progress as expected?

#### Camp Security

-- It is vital to know exactly what threat exists before a mission to address that threat can be formulated. We understand that the threat varies from camp to camp, and for each individual [i.e., a different threat exists for Tutsi refugees, Hutu refugees, and relief workers, etc.].

-- What is the UN's view of the existing threat[s] in the refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania?

-- Are you considering having a potential force remove the ex-FAR and Hutu militia from the camps? What role should the force play in disarming/reintegrating ex-FAR forces? Are these achievable goals that are worth pursuing?

-- How would efforts towards demobilization and reintegration of the ex-FAR affect planning?

Border Incursions:

-- Is it necessary to place an inter-positional force along Rwanda's border? If so should UNAMIR assume this role, or should a separate force be for this purpose?

Human Rights:

-- What should be UNAMIR's mandate concerning the deterrence/halting of human rights abuses inside Rwanda? What is the appropriate relationship between UNAMIR or any new force and Human rights monitors?

Other Concepts:

-- In addition to the multilateral force option, other concepts need to be explored.

-- The donor community should examine incentives [primarily financial] which the international community could offer the ex-FAR to disarm, don civilian clothing, and relocate voluntarily.

-- Consideration should be given to continuing to look for countries willing to provide or assist Zaire and Tanzania to provide security on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

-- Consideration should also be given to pursuing the option of a regional security effort [the immediate neighbors/the Great Lakes States organization], with OAU/UN blessing, which would provide security in the camps and might even escort volunteer refugees back. This latter aspect [an idea floated by Tanzania] faces obvious problems [e.g., the need for GOR agreement, the need for donor financing] and assumes that, absent intimidation in the camps, a large number of refugees would be willing to return to Rwanda.

-- Above all, the international community needs to continue its efforts to reduce the level of insecurity in Rwanda by encouraging the new authorities in Kigali to eliminate reprisal killings and help the gor to reestablish infrastructure [judicial, financial, commercial and transport] and create conditions which will encourage voluntary repatriation of refugees. Effective action is especially necessary to address land/property tenure issues inside Rwanda in order to address competing claims on the part of recently-departed Hutu refugees and returning long-duration Tutsi refugees.

-- An achievable mission to address these urgent problems must be clearly defined. We would appreciate hearing your views as soon as possible.

-- We would like to send a team of US government officials to New York to discuss further these issues. We look forward to the issuance of UN secretariat's next report on Rwanda and the region.