

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER  
CLEAR

Country Files of the Secretary-General: Uthman  
at Iraq (West & New Guinea) - Dag Hammarskjöld File on West Iraq

29/12/1960-02/03/1961

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 0884  
BOX 23  
FILE 8  
ACC. 15.2.4

Mar 01  
mp

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the Federation of Malaya to the United Nations and acknowledges receipt of the note verbale dated 28 December 1960 by which is transmitted, for his information, a letter from the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya to the President of the United States.

29 December 1960



The Permanent Representative of the Federation of Malaya to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and on the instruction of the Ministry of External Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, has the honour to transmit as follows, for the information of the Secretary-General, the text of a secret and personal message from the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya to the President of the United States :

"My dear Mr. President,

Recently Doctor Soekarno made a statement that before the cock crows next year Irian Barat would become part of Indonesia provided that the Indonesians were united. It is not unusual for Doctor Soekarno to make a statement like that but I have heard on good authority that General Nasution the Minister of National Security and Chief of the Staff will be going to Russia. The reason for the visit is no doubt to obtain arms and equipment for the purpose of enforcing their claim on Irian Barat. The Indonesians have been most violent in their attacks on the Dutch and this no doubt gives me the impression that they aim to use force.

Though the problem of Irian Barat has created so much interest in the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations Organization after I have taken up the matter, the Dutch are not serious about coming to an understanding on the question of Irian Barat. Both appear obstinate. The Dutch however took full advantage of Indonesia's hysterical stand but in my view they are no less to be blamed than the Indonesians if something happened as a result of their differences over Irian Barat.

In order to reduce tension it is my feeling that the Dutch should be persuaded to invite a fact finding commission from the United Nations to visit Irian Barat for the purpose of making a report to the United Nations on the actual situation in that territory. The Dutch should also agree to abide by any recommendation of the United Nations in respect of Irian Barat.

" I fully appreciate that the intention of the Dutch is to give self determination but at the moment and indeed for a long time inhabitants of Irian Barat are in no position to assume control of their country. In the meantime tension increases and unless such action is taken immediately by the Dutch some trouble will inevitably break out in this part of the world with disastrous consequences. Malaya would naturally wish to remain neutral at the same time we will do all we can to ease the situation. We would therefore welcome the assistance of other nations such as the United States, to persuade the Dutch to agree to the sending of this commission to Irian Barat as soon as possible. I have already sent a message to the Netherlands Government imploring them to agree to the United Nations commission to visit Irian Barat.

Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra

"

The Permanent Representative of the Federation of Malaya has been instructed to inform the Secretary-General further that identical messages as above have also been sent to Mr. MacMillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Mr. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia.

The Permanent Representative of the Federation of Malaya avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of his highest consideration.

New York, 28 December, 1960.



UN.Y.1/1 (59)



*Wilmington  
D-5-1-1  
und 1-1*

I. On December 1960 the General Assembly approved resolution 1514(XV), Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The Netherlands supported this resolution and is fully prepared to put it into practice with regard to the sole dependent territory under its administration, that is Netherlands New Guinea.

II. The Netherlands at present administers the Western part of New Guinea as a non-selfgoverning territory under Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations. In accordance with article 73e of the Charter the Netherlands Government has yearly transmitted reports on its administration, including information on political conditions, to the Secretary-General and has participated in the work of the Committee on information from non-selfgoverning territories.

III. As mentioned in those reports the Netherlands has taken certain important steps to accelerate the development of the population of Netherlands New Guinea towards selfgovernment, i.a. the establishment of a New Guinea Council, as well as local councils and the training of indigenous persons for administrative functions.

IV. In the course of the general debate of the fifteenth General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands declared that the Netherlands is prepared to subject its policy and its actions, aimed at the speediest possible attainment of self-determination by the Papuan people to the continuous scrutiny and judgment of the United Nations.

-In conformity-

In conformity with and further to this statement the Netherlands now wishes formally to place the development and future status of Netherlands New Guinea before the General Assembly. In doing so the Netherlands Government is led by the following motives:

- a) the purpose of the Netherlands in its policy in respect of Netherlands New Guinea is the granting of complete self-determination to the people of New Guinea in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- b) Netherlands New Guinea, however, will still - for some time to come - require foreign technical assistance and guidance.
- c) in conformity with resolution 1514(XV) the Netherlands wishes to terminate its sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea at the earliest possible date, that is as soon as the right of self-determination of the population is properly safeguarded.
- d) the Netherlands therefore is looking for a way in which resolution 1514(XV) can be put into practice as soon as possible and in which at the same time Netherlands New Guinea can receive the necessary guarantee of assistance and guidance required for the integral development towards self-determination.
- e) the General Assembly has asked in its resolution 1514(XV) that the administering powers terminate the dependency of areas administered by them at the earliest possible date. In conformity with this expressed desire the Netherlands now requests that the General Assembly assist in attaining that aim.

IV. Following are concrete proposals, based on the above-mentioned motives, which, if approved and accepted by the General

-Assembly-

Assembly, could lead to a speedy (and balanced economic and social) development of the territory and to an early termination of the present Netherlands administration while at the same time <sup>fully</sup> guaranteeing the right of self-determination.

- A) The Netherlands is prepared to bring the administration and the development of the territory, politically as well as economically, under the active supervision of the United Nations and is prepared to accept a decision of the General Assembly which clearly guarantees the right of self-determination of the population.
- B) To this end the Netherlands is prepared to relinquish its sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea to the population and to co-operate in the establishment of an organization or authority, which the General Assembly (by its above mentioned decision) may wish to establish.
- C) The Netherlands is prepared to share its authority and responsibilities with an International Development Authority and, more specifically, to transfer its present powers (in the economic, social and educational field) to such an authority which would operate under the aegis of the United Nations and be invested with real executive power and which could (gradually) take over other tasks and responsibilities and prepare the population for self-determination.
- D) The Netherlands is prepared to continue its contribution to the development of the territory on the basis of the present contribution.



VI. The above mentioned proposals sub C would constitute a form of international administration by the International Development Authority under the supervision of the General Assembly. It is realized that the United Nations may not be able to provide all the necessary personnel for such an International Development Authority. For this reason, the Netherlands, and more specifically the Netherlands civil service in New Guinea, could, if required, continue to perform such tasks as the General Assembly would deem necessary [for the purpose of promoting a smooth transition from national to international administration.] This new form of administration could be established by an agreement to be concluded between the United Nations and the Netherlands.

The Netherlands Government is prepared to request its civil servants at present serving in New Guinea and numbering approximately 3000 to remain in function as international civil servants.

VII. If and where required, the Netherlands Government is prepared to continue its responsibility under U.N. supervision in those fields of administration, where its presence might usefully serve the purpose of the development of New Guinea under international control. In such a case the Netherlands officials concerned could remain in the service of the Netherlands Government.

As already stated, the Netherlands Government is prepared to provide the funds for the administration and development of the territory on the basis of its present expenditure. The budget could be drafted jointly by the Netherlands Government and the International Development Authority.

-When-

When deciding upon the establishment of an International Development Authority the General Assembly could simultaneously fix in consultation with the population intermediate and final target-<sup>the main</sup> dates for self-determination by the inhabitants of New Guinea.

VIII. Since these proposals are entirely new and without precedent in the history of the U.N., the General Assembly might wish to study these more closely. The General Assembly might also wish to acquaint itself with the present condition in the territory and <sup>particularly</sup> the wishes of the population and to have a complete and impartial report thereon.

Therefore the Netherlands Government suggests that as a first step (towards effective internationalisation) a U.N.-commission be set up which could perform the following tasks on behalf of the General Assembly.

- a. to proceed to Western New Guinea and to
  1. investigate the political, economic, social and educational conditions in the territory;
  2. investigate the opinion amongst the population as to its present situation and future developments;
  3. investigate the possibilities for organizing an early plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations in order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the territory concerning their future;
- b. on the basis of the findings on the spot
  1. to suggest, if desirable and feasible, intermediate and final targetdates for self-determination



*during the interim period*

2. to investigate the possibility of bringing the development of the territory under the administration of an International Development Authority as explained under VI.

The Commission should report together with its recommendations to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.

\* \* \*

Recent threatening statements by Indonesian spokesmen  
about Netherlands New Guinea

15 August 1960 (Reuter Djakarta)

"The Indonesian Defence Minister, General Abdul Haris Nasution, has said that the struggle for regaining West Irian from the Dutch would be determined in West New Guinea itself".

"He told a public meeting over the weekend that he was convinced this struggle could not be determined in the United Nations ....."

"Indonesian appeals and mass rallies in the past to gain this objective did not yield any result. Indonesia had to renounce such methods and intensify its efforts in the economic and security fields".

24 September 1960 (Antara Djakarta)

Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, uttered:

"The warning here today that the longer the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West Irian is left pending the more difficult it will be to settle the controversy without endangering world peace".

19 October 1960 (Antara Bangkok)

Statement by General Nasution at a Press Conference during his visit to Thailand:

"Referring to the West-Irian problem the Indonesian General said that he agreed with Indonesian President Sukarno that peaceful means to settle this question had failed and that he considered the problem a military one".

1 December 1960 (Antara Djakarta)

Foreign Minister Subandrio stated today here that it would be difficult for Indonesia at this moment to give a guarantee there will not be a meeting of armed forces between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The statement was made by the Minister in reply to press questions asking his opinion on the Dutch-launched reports regarding what the Dutch described "activities from the Indonesian side" in areas in West Irian.

9 December 1960 (Antara Djakarta)

The Chairman of the Indonesian Nationalist Party and former Indonesian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, today reminded the international world of the previous warning made by President Sukarno in the U.N. General Assembly that the situation in West Irian is very explosive. These words "were no mere hollow propaganda ..... which if not paid due attention by the international world will plunge the world in a situation endangering world peace".

22 December 1960 (Reuter Djakarta)

Statement by General Nasution:

"Indonesia will start to follow a new course to solve the question, because efforts at negotiations with the Netherlands and incorporation of the territory through measures by the United Nations have failed".

He further stated that the number of elite fighting forces of Indonesia was at least four times as large as that of the Netherlands. "We shall meet force with force in the political, economic and military field".

23 December 1960 (Antara New York)

Letter from Mr. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto to the Secretary-General of the U.N.:

"This (Dutch) policy, pursued in a part of Indonesia, must inevitably lead to clashes between Indonesian and Dutch forces. It constitutes, therefore, an imminent threat to peace and security".

"For these reasons, no one can hold the Government of the Republic of Indonesia responsible if it is obliged to adopt stronger measures in the face of the continuing Dutch policy of force".

24 December 1960 (PIA Tasikmalaja)

Statement by General Nasution during a mass meeting:  
"Turning to the struggle for the liberation of Dutch-occupied West Irian the Minister appealed to the population to have full confidence in the strength of the Indonesian armed forces.

".....the Indonesian Army Chief declared that Indonesia was ready to meet the Dutch any time if ~~it~~ wished. We will meet 1000 Dutch troops in West Irian with 5000 of ours and three times of every 100 units of modern military equipment deployed by the Dutch for the defence of that region".

28 December 1960 (AFP Djakarta)

"In an interview with the Indonesian Press Agency Antara Minister Subandrio announced that, with the coming of the New Year, the Indonesian people is firmly resolved to settle the West Irian question within a short time. He added that the Dutch armed forces might well have to cope with the Indonesian armed forces".

30 December 1960 (HA Djakarta)

Minister for National Security and concurrently Army Chief of Staff, General A.H. Nasution, told the press before leaving for Moscow last night that the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union was not detached from the "confrontation in all fields in the struggle for recovering West Irian which should be won by us".

31 December 1960 (Antara Djakarta)

The AirForce Chief pointed to the absolute need to consolidate unity among the airforce ranks, among the armed forces and the society into one compact national force to enable the country to meet squarely the external challenge posed by the Dutch in West Irian".

6 January 1961

The Indonesian military attaché at Bonn, Colonel D.J. Pandjaitan, informed the press that a military conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia could break "at any moment" and that an invasion in New Guinea was imminent.



Editorial, "Straits Times," Singapore, December 30, 1960

THE BUILD UP

The only significant military build-up that could be interpreted as preparation for fighting in or around West Irian is being carried out by Indonesia. Not since the Karel Doorman landed a few aircraft in June have the Dutch, so far as is known, increased their military strength on the island; if the Indonesian Government has information to the contrary it should publish details instead of distributing vague rumours, the more so since General Nasution has said that the Indonesian Army is increasing strength by 140 battalions. These extra battalions are, on his own admission, unnecessary; Indonesia's armed forces are numerically superior not only to the Dutch New Guinea garrison but to Holland's entire armed service. So why the shopping spree in Moscow armouries by Dr. Subandrio, General Nasution and Air Marshal Suryadarma?

Fear of Dutch hostilities against Indonesia cannot be accepted as a serious motive. Such action by the Dutch would have neither rhyme, reason nor hope of success, and would merely earn worldwide opprobrium. A direct Indonesian attack on West Irian seems only a little less improbable. But an excuse for what the Indonesians might call police action could arise from an incident--provoked or otherwise--involving Indonesian citizens in what the Indonesian Government claims is already the Indonesian territory of West Irian.



Even this act of last resort is well within Indonesia's military capacity, and no matter how many Russians arms are purchased, its ability to undertake the exercise will not grow in any important way. The approach to Russia looks much more like a political move, intended to bring pressure on Holland itself and on its allies. If so, it is cynical, clumsy and ill-advised. Apart from anything else it ignores the Australian interest in the whole affair, which greatly complicates the mechanism in which this simple lever is intended to work. However, it does also emphasise -- where further emphasis might be thought unnecessary -- Indonesia's determination to conclude its eleven year wrangle with Holland.

---

## Indonesian infiltrations into Netherlands New Guinea

1. On 13 November 1960 the local administration was warned by the Papuan population that a group of armed Indonesians had landed in the neighbourhood of Etna Bay (South West coast of Netherlands New Guinea).

In an action, undertaken by the police with military assistance, three of the invaders were killed on 17 November and one was made prisoner. The other members of the group fled into inhospitable and sparsely populated country. With the assistance of the population the search for them is being continued. Because of the difficulty of the terrain it will probably be some time before they are discovered.

According to statements made by the captured prisoner he belongs to the "Corps Irian 17", which corps is a regular contingent of the Indonesian army. The infiltration group to which he belonged was composed at Dobo (Aru islands, Indonesia) from military personnel brought there and was given the name of "Pasukan Gerilja Irian Barat". It consisted of 3 corporals and 9 privates under the command of a lieutenant. Five of the privates were Indonesians, the other members of the group were born New Guineans but had lived in the Moluccas, where many Papuans, chiefly from Geelvinkbaai, settled long ago.

The group was armed with 2 mortars, 3 brenguns, 7 stenguns and 7 Lee Enfield rifles. The crossing from Dobo to the point of landing had been made during the night of 9/10 November in a sailing prao with auxiliary motor. On entering territorial waters the vessel had hoisted a Netherlands flag. Thus the statement of the prisoner.

In a deserted bivouac of the group there were found arms and explosives as well as 2 metal uniform emblems with the inscription "Corps Irian 17".

2. In the night of 27/28 November the Netherlands Navy intercepted a 30 ton Indonesian vessel ("Singkuan"), in the same neighbourhood, with 12 persons aboard, 7 of them Indonesian soldiers.

During the pursuit material was thrown overboard from the vessel. Found aboard were; helmets, ignition cord and a maritime map of the hydrographic service of the Indonesian Navy, on which the route from the Aru islands to the coast near Etna Bay had been marked. According to statements made by the crew this second group had crossed from Dobo and the sailing prao had been requisitioned by the Indonesian military authorities. The cargo consisted of rice and cases containing explosives, intended for the provisioning of the first group.

When the vessel was intercepted by the Netherlands Navy the Indonesian commander ordered compromising objects, among them uniforms, to be thrown overboard.

3. The employment of native New Guineans, living in Indonesia, for infiltrations fits in with the Indonesian attempt to make it appear to the world that the population of Netherlands New Guinea resists the Netherlands administration. Ever since the time of the revolution the Indonesians have tried to gain the support of Papuans by offering them prominent positions (Silas Papare, the "Radja" of Kokas).

Recently throughout Indonesia a campaign has been carried out to exert pressure on Papuans living in that country to allow themselves to be used for subversive activities of the "Irian Front". During previous armed and unarmed infiltrations Papuans were also employed as guides and propagandists.

At present an Indonesian propaganda campaign is in full swing, aimed at making the rest of the world believe that the Netherlands administration in Netherlands New Guinea is violently suppressing widespread uprisings. In fact, complete quiet prevails in Netherlands New Guinea, disturbed only by Indonesian infiltrations. The use of Papuans as armed invaders is obviously intended to pass off the Indonesian military aggression as resistance of the population.

New York, 8 December 1960



SECRET

Notes for a talk with the SG

1/ The purpose of Netherlands administration of NNG is to achieve a rapid and systematic development of the country and its people towards self-determination in the earliest possible future.

2/ In the national sphere the Netherlands Government is pursuing these ends by i.a. intensification and amplification of education, health care and economic development and by promotion of local, regional and countrywide self-government (institution of various councils amongst which a legislative council (the New Guinea Council) with a predominantly autochthonous majority; a ten years development scheme provides for the almost complete papuanisation (95%) of the entire civil service and administration to the highest levels).

3/ Furthermore the Netherlands Government is willing to co-operate in any international measure that would contribute to the speedy and peaceful attainment of the objectives stated sub 1.

4/ The Netherlands Government has considered the following

possible measures and would invite the SG to give his views on them:

- a) offer of trusteeship, under conditions to be discussed in more detail;
- b) acceptance of visiting mission by analogy with Article 87(c) of the Charter;
- c) one or more officials to be stationed by the SG in NNG (personal or resident representatives);
- d) visit by one or more officials to be appointed by the SG to report on progress towards self-determination in NNG;
- e) a group of observers of high international standing to be invited by the Netherlands Government to report on progress towards self-determination in NNG, such observers to be chosen from a list furnished by the SG;
- f) offer to the UN to supervise, in due course, the consultation of the population.

\* \* \* \* \*

September 1960



CONFIDENTIAL

27 January 1961

TO: The Secretary-General

Yesterday I received a letter from a reliable and otherwise unexcitable Member of the Dutch Parliament (Socialist Opposition) in which he depicted a kind of panic in official circles in the Hague. He wrote that it was generally expected that Indonesia would commit some act of aggression in New Guinea in the near future.

The information is that the United States and United Kingdom Governments have been sounded out on what their reactions would be in such an eventuality, and the replies have been completely negative. They are said to have promised no support whatsoever to the Netherlands, and it is rumoured that London has even refused to make Hong Kong and Singapore available to the Dutch Navy as ports to withdraw to.

To forestall becoming involved in an international conflict, deprived of allied support, the idea is now gaining ground in Parliamentary circles to urge the Government to ask the United Nations to take over the territory under Trusteeship (Article 77, 1(c) of the Charter) and to force acceptance of such offer by a threat of abandonment.

I do not know how much of all this is based on facts (though it can not all be surmise), but I personally have for some time felt that Indonesia is intent on creating some sort of international incident in order to elicit internationalization of the dispute. They seem to feel that once the United Nations is seized of the problem substantially, they will get the best part of the bargain as they did in 1947-1949. The official approaches of the Netherlands Government made to you are simply seen as attempts to win lawyers points, namely, to give the impression that the Netherlands wants international involvement, while in reality trying to keep the issue from the agenda.

However this may be, I felt it my duty to give you this information, which I can assure you does not come from the so-called Indonesian lobby in the Hague.

*/acme*

*View 47*



PO 240 Indo (1)

RECORDS CONTROL

7 FEB 1961

22.

The Permanent Representative of the Federation of Malaya to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit as follows, a message from the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya to the Secretary-General on the subject of West Irian :

"Your Excellency:

In view of the allegations made by the Indonesian Government against the Dutch Administration in Irian Barat as outlined in the Indonesian letter addressed to Your Excellency on December 23, 1960, I would earnestly urge upon Your Excellency to make an investigation on the spot or else send Your Excellency's own representative to do so on Your Excellency's behalf.

I am apprehensive that unless this is done immediately Indonesia might regard herself free to adopt some drastic measures


2.

"which in consequence would render difficult any attempt to settle this long outstanding issue amicably.

Sgd. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra  
Prime Minister of the  
Federation of Malaya. "

The Permanent Representative of the  
Federation of Malaya avails himself of this opportunity  
to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of his  
highest consideration.

New York, February 6, 1961.



UN.Y.1/1 (74).

To: The Secretary-General

From: J.F. Engers

2 March 1961

Following is partial text of summary of Luns' speech in Foreign Affairs debate on 23 February in the Lower House (my translation):

"Mr. Hammarskjöld has made some suggestions to me on how we should act in the New Guinea question within the United Nations. The invitation of United Nations observers has been made on the compelling advice\* of Mr. Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General now is considering the Netherlands request for such observers. He finds himself, however, because of the Russian attacks in a difficult position. It is therefore impossible yet to say when and whether Mr. Hammarskjöld will be able to comply with the Dutch request. Under the present circumstances he might be inclined to give a narrower interpretation of his authority ..... The government is in principle not opposed to a U.N. Trusteeship, provided that rights of the population be safeguarded."

\* The Dutch term used is "dringend advies"

/J.F.E.