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BOX 118

FILE 3

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ANNEX B TO
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
"KIBEHO INCIDENT" 22 APR

SYNOPSIS OF ROLE OF UNAMIR

TPS LOC WITHIN KIBEHO PRIOR TO AND ON 22 APR 95.

1. ZAMBATT. Initially, a pl of ZAMBATT was deployed in KIBEHO camp. Early Apr 95, the force level was built up to a coy plus strength (220 pers). In addition, ZAMBATT also deployed medical pers to provide medical assistance to the IDPs. The various tasks performed by ZAMBATT were as follows :

- a. Patrolling within the camp and establishment of a comd post so as to provide security to the IDPs and NGOs in the camp and also to coordinate all the activities therein.
- b. Treatment and evac of casualties.
- c. Transportation of IDPs to various home communes from the KIBEHO Camp.
- d. Burial tasks after the massacre.
- e. Information campaign to convince the IDPs to leave the camp voluntarily.
- f. Assistance to the NGOs in distribution of food, water and other relief stores.
- g. Established a comm link between the Coy HQ and UNAMIR HQ.
- h. Assisted in negotiations with the RPA to diffuse the stand off situation at the MSF Building.
- j. Providing a counter to RPA activities and being a deterrence by their physical presence thus minimizing casualties.

2. ZAMBATT troops did not fire back during the shooting by RPA at KIBEHO because the IDPs would have been caught in the fire fight and the casualties would have been higher. Secondly, instructions received from New York specifically stated that UN troops should not stand in the way of the RPA should they forcibly want to close the camps.

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3. AUSMED. On 21 April 95, RPA opened fire at 0700 hrs which resulted in heavy casualties from the ensuing panic and violence. AUSMED immediately despatched two CCPs for evacuating and treating possible UNAMIR as well as assisting IDPs casualties. The detachment, which remained in location until 29 April 95, in conjunction with ZAMBATT med pers, provided medical assistance to hundreds of IDPs. AUSMED also established a HF comm link with their elements in KIBEHO camp which gave accurate and timely info to all concerned.

4. MILLOBS. In addition to the Sector Milobs in sector 4A, seven Milobs teams were despatched to KIBEHO camp on 21 Apr 95 from other sectors. These teams remained in the sector till 01 May 95.

5. VISITS.

A. On 18 April 95, RPA cordoned the whole of KIBEHO, NDAGO and MUNINI DPCs and fired warning shots to force the IDPs to concentrate in selected areas without prior intimation/info to UNAMIR. The DFC accompanied by the RPA COS visited KIBEHO camp to assess and diffuse the situation and coordinate details on the ground.

B. On 19 Apr 95, DFC and DCOS OPS visited KIBEHO camp to assess the sit and to coord UNAMIR efforts in BUTARE in a vain attempt to convince UN Agencies and NGOs to start evacuation and aid in KIBEHO IDPC.

C. On 20 Apr 95, the FC accompanied by the COS visited KIBEHO camp to see the situation on ground.

D. On 21 Apr 95, the SRSG with DCOS OPS visited BUTARE and requested the civil and military authorities to allow UN Agencies and NGOs to distribute food and water to the IDPs while the op was in progress. In several meetings in Butare with all civil and international agencies, tasks and responsibilities were assigned and a communications, command and control plan was discussed. At a subsequent visit to Kibeho camp, they discussed aspects of coordination between UNAMIR and MSF and discussed the outcome of the Butare meeting with the RPA Comd in the camp.

E. On 23 Apr 95, the FC accompanied by COS visited KIBEHO to assess the extent of damage and current sit. The Rwandese Ministers of Interior and Justice with the Chief UNHRFO visited KIBEHO to witness the situation after the massacre the previous night. The President of Rwanda also visited the IDPC later that afternoon.

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F. On 24 April 95, when there was a stand off between the RPA and IDPs inside the MSF building, the DFC and DCOS OPS visited KIBEHO to try and negotiate a peaceful settlement. Several hundreds were evac using UN vehicles. UNAMIR is still encouraging the IDPs still holed up in the MSF building to leave the camp and go to their respective home communes.

G. On 27 Apr 95, the Rwandese President, SRSG, members of the Rwandan Cabinet, members of the international diplomatic corps and international media representatives, visited KIBEHO DPC.

TRANSPORTATION OF IDPs

6. UNAMIR provided a total of 32 vehicles for the transportation of IDPs to various communes, casualty evacuation and distribution of humanitarian stores. These vehicles remained under comd the Tac HQ BUTARE from 19 Apr 95 till 29 Apr 95.

SECURITY ARRANGMENTS - ENROUTE/HOME COMMUNES

7. On 23 April 95, when RPA surrounded the BUTARE stadium in which approx 12,000 IDPs had concentrated, MALICOY rushed a platoon to the stadium to protect the IDPs from hostile locals, fighting amongst themselves and prevent clashes between the IDPs and the RPA. This platoon was subsequently relieved by a platoon from GHANBATT. The platoon was deployed until all the IDPs held at the stadium were evac to their respective communes.

8. UNAMIR formed troops provided security in the ORCs and home communes so as to ensure that the returnees could resettle in their home communes without undue harrasment by locals/RPA.

9. SENBATT and Milobs provided security at GISHAMVU, RUNYINYA, GISHALI and GISHITA which were the main concentration areas for the IDPs displaced from KIBEHO until evacuated by UNAMIR/UNHCR/IOM vehs to their respective home communes.

10. Escorted veh and foot convoys of IDPs evicted from KIBEHO camp to their home communes.

ROLE OF ENGRS

11. UNAMIR Force Engr Coy deployed dozers and all available dump trucks to improve the road BUTARE-KIBEHO which greatly assisted in the speedy movement of IDPs out of the camp. Also deployed recovery assets to keep the traffic moving.

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12. Provided a trench digger on 23 Apr 95 to assist in the burial of some of those killed in KIBEHO. However, due to the intensive efforts by the RPA to bury many during the night 22/23 Apr 95, there was little need for this excavator.

ROLE OF SIGNALS

13. The Force Sig Coy established VHF comm with HF back up from Coy HQ to UNAMIR HQ on 22 Apr 95 in KIBEHO camp which resulted in minute to minute accurate info being passed. In addition, the Force Signal Officer tried to install an INMARSAT terminal but were prohibited from doing so by the RPA until 24 Apr 95 when the terminal finally became operational.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

14. UNAMIR troops in sectors 1, 2, 3 and 4B arranged with UN Agencies and NGOs for the provision of relief aid to returning IDPs to their home communes. The UNAMIR Chief Humanitarian Officer and the staff of Tac HQ (BUTARE) provided constant liaison with the forward deployed element of the Integrated Operations Centre and ensured that UNAMIR efforts were well coordinated and maximized.

FOLLOW UP

15. Approximately 1700 IDPs are reported to remain in the MSF building compound in KIBEHO camp. Despite best efforts on the part of the Rwandese govt and UNAMIR, the IDPs initially refused to vacate the premises which resulted in the RPA cordoning off the complex and positioning anti-tank weapons with the aim of demolishing the building. The DFC, DCOS OPS and CO ZAMBATT persuaded the RPA to do away with the dead line. Consequently, the holed up IDPs started leaving the building in a small trickle. Only about 200 IDPs have departed between 24 Apr 95 and 03 May 95.

16. Since ordering/institution of an International Investigation Commission on the KIBEHO incident, constant reports have been received both from ZAMBATT troops and Milobs in KIBEHO, that the RPA has started exhuming bodies in the camp and transporting them on road KIBEHO-BUTARE to unknown destinations with the possible aim of reducing the number of bodies to about 300 which was the official figure of the killed IDPs quoted by the Rwandese Govt. It is believed that this activity is conducted to project false info to the International Commission of Inquiry. UNAMIR troops and Milobs have been denied access to the sites where the exhuming is being carried out and to the sites where these bodies are suspected to be dumped/reburied.

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CURRENT CONDITIONS IN KIBEHO DPC

17. Health/Medical No medical aid is being provided to the IDPs and it is likely that unless medical aid is provided, there may be an outbreak of an epidemic soon.

18. Sanitation The hygiene and sanitation conditions are pathetic in the camp with human excrement and other garbage lying in the places where the IDPs are living and eating.

19. Food/Water The RPA is not permitting any supply of food and water to the holed up IDPs with the result, deaths due to starvation have started occurring.

20. Security RPA have cordoned off the complete MSF building complex. ZAMBATT troops are deployed in the camp to provide security to the IDPs and NGOs in the camp. Approximately 1700 IDPs remain, consisting of 300 males, the remainder being women and children.

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