

UNAMIR

G3 UNIT - REASSMENT OF NEW PHASE II

8 AUG 1994 - 22 JAN 1995

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UNAMIR FORCE HQ  
OUTGOING FACSIMILE NO:-  
MIR NO:-  
MISC NO:-

January 22, 1995

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN SRSG UNAMIR, KIGALI RWANDA
INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, NEW YORK UN SECUR COORD SEVAN/	
FAX: 001 (212) 963 9069 FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053	FAX: (250) 86877
<b>INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:</b> UN SECUR SECT CIVPOL HQ MILOB GP HQ TAC HQ (BUTARE) GHANBATT ETHIOBATT FRAFBATT ZAMBATT TUNBATT INDBATT MALAWICOY MALICOY NICOY AUSMED CANSIGS 1 CDHSR UNHQ OR SECT 3 HQ FORCE ENGR COY FORCE MP COY COS DCOS SP	
SUBJECT: DAILY SITREP FOR 21 JAN 95	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS ONE: THIRTEEN	

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE DAILY SITREP MENTIONED ABOVE.
2. REGARDS.

FROM: UNAMIR, KIGALI.

DAILY SITREP FOR 21 JAN 95

1. GEN SITUATION. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN RWANDA CONTINUES TO BE GENERALLY UNDER CONTROL.

1. IN SECTOR 4C, ETHIOBATT REPORTED THAT TWO GRENS EXPLODED AT KAMEMBE CENTRAL MARKET WHICH KILLED 2 LOCALS WITH 6 OTHER LOCALS SUSTAINING INJURIES. EOD TEAM SENT TO THE AREA FOUND AND DML 2 OTHER GRENS WHICH WERE SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN BURIED LONG TIME AGO.

B. DETAILS OF BORDER CROSSING:

(1)	<u>AREAS</u>	<u>INFLOW</u>	<u>OUTFLOW</u>
(A)	<u>SECTOR 1</u>		
	UGANDA	919	NA
(B)	<u>SECTOR 2</u>		
	I. TANZANIA	137	NA
	II. BURUNDI	NA	NA
(C)	<u>SECTOR 3</u>		
	I. BURUNDI	NA	NA
(D)	<u>SECTOR 4</u>		
	I. BURUNDI	147	20
	II. ZAIRE	53	NA
(E)	<u>SECTOR 5</u>		
	I. UGANDA	18	NA
	II. ZAIRE	179	NA
(F)	<u>TOTAL FOR THE DAY</u>	<u>1,453</u>	<u>20</u>
(G)	TOTAL FOR THE MONTH OF JAN TO DATE ARE INFLOW - 9,498 AND OUTFLOW - 20.		

(2) REPORTED FROM OTHER SOURCES: NIL.

2. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. NTR.

3. FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES.

A. RPA. RPA DENIED SECT 1 MILOBS PTLs ENTRY INTO KIVUYE.

B. FRGF. MILOBS IN SECT 4C REPORTED THAT FRGF OBSERVED TO BE CONTROLLING OF MOVE OF REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN FROM THE IJWI ISLAND TO GAFUNZO PENINSULA.

C. MILITIA. MILOBS INVESTIGATIONS IN SECT 4C REVEALED THAT MILITIA SEEMS TO BE IN FULL SUPPORT OF THE FRGF AND CONFIRMED TO BE SERIOUSLY INVOLVED AND ACTIVE ON THE IJWI ISLAND. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT 2 INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM WHICH OCCURRED IN THE PAST THREE WEEKS, THE GRENADE EXPLOSION AND SHOOTING AT THE ORPHANAGE ON 4 JAN 95 AND THE EXPLOSIONS AT THE KAMEMBE MARKET TODAY WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE MILITIA.

4. OWN MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

A. FORCE HQ.

(1) NORMAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WERE CONDUCTED.

(2) OP RETOUR. A TOTAL OF 231 DPs WERE EVACUATED FROM CYANIKA, RUKONDO AND KIBEHO TO BUTARE AND OTHER DESTINATIONS ON 21 JAN 95.

(A) CYANIKA - 113.

(B) RUKONDO - 33.

(C) KIBEHO - 85.

TOTAL NUMBER OF DPs MOVED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF OP RETOUR IS 15,226.

B. SECTOR 1 (NICOY). CONDUCTED PATROLS IN AOR.

(1) AT KINYAMI GR 154193 EOD TEAM DETECTED AND RECOVERED 1 X RUSSIAN GREN, 9 X ANTI PER MINES TS50, 6 X SHRAPNEL EXPLOSIVE NO.2 AND 1 X 40MM ROUND.

(2) 83 LOCALS RECEIVED MED TREATMENT IN MED CENTRE.

C. SECTOR 2 (GHANBATT). CONDUCTED PTLS IN AOR.

(1) THE FOLLOWING RETURNEES WERE RECEIVED IN SECTOR 2 ON OP RETOUR:

(A) RILIMA. 33 IDPs ARRIVED RILIMA ORC GR 2561. THEY WERE REGISTERED AND DESPATCHED TO THEIR VARIOUS COMMUNES.

(B) KAZENZE. 4 REFUGEES ARRIVED FROM TANZANIA TO KANZENZE COMMUNE AND WERE DESPATCHED TO THEIR HOMES.

(C) SAKE. 4 ADULTS AND 9 CHILDREN TOTAL 13 IDPs WERE RECEIVED AT SAKE ORC. THEY ARE AWAITING EVAC TO THEIR HOMES.

(2) RECEIVED THE VISIT OF MR. CLARENCE, CHIEF OF HUMAN RIGHTS MISSION IN RWANDA TO BN HQ, KIBUNGO GR 5961. HE WAS BRIEFED AND LATER HAD DISCUSSIONS ON OP RETOUR WITH BN COMD.

(3) 137 DPs ENTERED RWANDA THROUGH RUSUMO BORDER POST.

D. SECTOR 3 (MALAWICOY AND MALICOY)

(1) CONDUCTED PTLs AND SECURITY DUTIES IN AOR. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT.

(2) ASSISTED THE WFP TO CONVEY FOODSTUFF FROM BUTARE TO RUNYINYA AND NDORA COMMUNES.

E. SECTOR 4A SOUTH (GHANBATT). CONDUCTED PTLs AND SY DUTIES IN AOR. PATROL BASE IN KIBEHO PROVIDED SY FOR THE EVACUATION OF 85 IDPs FROM KIBEHO TO BUTARE BY IOM.

F. SECTOR 4A NORTH (ZAMBATT). CONDUCTED PTLs AND SY DUTIES IN AOR.

(1) PROVIDED SY FOR OP RETOUR AT CYANIKA AND RUKONDO DP CAMPS WHERE 113 AND 33 IDPs WERE REPATRIATED RESPECTIVELY.

(2) MED STAFF TREATED 34 LOCALS.

G. SECTOR 4B (FRAFBATT). CONDUCTED PTLs AND SY DUTIES IN AOR.

(1) FRAFBATT TROOPS AND CIVPOL HAVE ARRESTED A SUSPECT IN CONNECTION WITH THE THEFT OF UNAMIR VEH 1077. SUSPECT WAS IDENTIFIED BY A WITNESS, WHO HAD SEEN HIM WITH KEYS OF THE VEH. THE SUSPECT WAS HANDED OVER TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS. UN MP COY INFORMED.

(2) MED STAFF TREATED 27 LOCALS.

H. SECTOR 4C (ETHIOBATT).

(1) CONDUCTED PTLs AND SY DUTIES IN AOR. SEE PARA 1.

(2) 37 RETURNEES ARRIVED AT NYAGATARE TRANSIT CAMP.

(3) MED STAFF TREATED 14 LOCALS.

I. SECTOR 5 (TUNBATT).

(1) CONDUCTED PTLs AND SY DUTIES IN AOR. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT.

(2) MED STAFF TREATED 117 LOCALS.

J. SECTOR 6 (INDBATT). CONDUCTED PTLs AND SECURITY DUTIES IN AOR.

(1) 256 IDPs ARRIVED AT NDERA CAMP. 405 IDPs WERE EVAC FROM THE CAMP BY UNHCR TO NGENDA, GASHORA AND NYAMIRAMBO. 970 IDPS STILL REMAINING IN NDERA CAMP.

(2) 113 DPs MOVED BY INDBATT VEHS FROM CYANIKA DP CAMP TO BUTARE.

(3) MED STAFF TREATED 394 LOCALS.

K. MILOB GP. THE SITUATION WAS GENERALLY CALM DURING THE PERIOD.

(1) POLITICAL. THE PREFECT OF BYUMBA ADDRESSED POLITICAL MEETINGS AT VARIOUS COMMUNES WITHIN THE PREFECTURE THROUGHOUT THE WEEK. HE CALLED ON ALL CITIZENS TO EMBRACE PEACE AND HARMONY SO THAT EFFORTS COULD BE DIRECTED TO AGRICULTURE AND OTHER ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES. HE ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO LISTEN TO THEIR PROBLEMS AND EXPLAINED REASONS FOR DELAYS IN PAYMENT OF SALARIES.

(2) BORDERS. FOLLOWING BORDER POSTS WERE OPEN TO TRAFFIC.

(A) GATUNA AND KAGITUMBA.

(B) RUSUMO BORDER POST (RWANDA/TANZANIA).

(C) RUSIZI BORDER POST IN SECT 4C.

(D) GISENYI BORDER POST (EXCEPT UNAMIR PERS).

(3) MILOB GP HQ. CONTINUED COORDINATION AND MONITORING OF MILOBS ACTIVITIES IN THE SECTORS.

(4) IN SECTOR 1-BYUMBA. CONDUCTED PTLs IN AOR.

(A) NICOY EOD TEAM AND MILOBS PTLs RECOVERED 1 X STICK GRENADE, 6 X CLAYMORE MINES, 10 X A/P MINES AND 1 X RIFLE GRENADE FROM MUNYINYA HEALTH CENTRE GR 150185.

(B) IMMIGRATION OFFICERS AT KAGITUMBA BORDER POST REQUESTED UNAMIR TO ASSIST WITH VEHS TO TPT RWANDESE REFUGEES WHO WANT TO RETURN HOME FROM UGANDA AND TANZANIA AND ALSO TO MOVE RETURNEES FROM THE RECEPTION CENTRES TO THEIR HOME COMMUNES.

(C) A MINEFIELD WAS REPORTED AT KINJOJO 2 KMS FROM RUTARE. THE BOURGEMESTRE HAS PROMISED TO SHOW EOD TEAM THE EXACT LOC.

UN RESTRICTED

(5) IN SECTOR 2-KIBUNGO. CONDUCTED PTLS IN AOR.

(A) THE DFC PAID A WORKING VISIT TO THE SECTOR.

(B) HEL PTL WAS ALSO CONDUCTED ALONG THE BORDERS AND OTHER AREAS WITHIN THE SECTOR.

(6) IN SECTOR 3-GITARAMA. CONDUCTED PTLS IN AOR. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT.

(7) SECTOR 4A-GIKONGORO. CONDUCTED PTLS IN AOR. COORDINATED THE MOVEMENT OF DPs FROM CYANIKA, KIBEHO AND KAMANA IDPs CAMP TO BUTARE AND OTHER DESTINATIONS.

(8) IN SECTOR 4B-KIBUYE.

(A) CONDUCTED PTLS IN AOR.

(B) PTLS SENT TO RUBENGERA REPORTED THAT LOCALS CLAIMED THAT ANYONE SEEN TALKING WITH MILOBS WAS ARRESTED BY THE RPA. THEY INFO MILOBS THAT 16 LOCALS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY RPA IN DEC 94 AND THEIR WHEREABOUTS ARE NOT KNOWN. LOCALS IN THE AREA ARE THEREFORE RELUCTANT TO TALK TO MILOBS. MATTER UNDER INVESTIGATION.

(C) AT BIRAMBO, CHADIAN TPS REPORTED HEARING SCREAMING AND GUNSHOTS FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE PRISON ON NIGHT OF 13/14 JAN 95. MILOBS INVESTIGATING.

(9) IN SECTOR 4C-CYANGUGU.

(A) TWO EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD AT THE KAMEMBE MARKET AT ABOUT 1130HRS 21 JAN 95. 6 PERS SUSTAINED SERIOUS INJURIES. CAS ADMITTED AT NORWEGIAN PEOPLES HOSP. ALSO DISCOVERED 2 X GREN AS BOOBY TRAPS SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN LAID SOME TIME AGO.

(B) MILOBS PTLS COVERED GAFUNZO PENINSULAR, BURUNDI AND ZAIRE BORDER AREAS. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT.

(10) IN SECTOR 5-GISENYI. CONDUCTED PTLS IN AOR. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT.

(11) IN SECTOR 6-KIGALI CONDUCTED PTLS IN AOR. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT.

L. AUSMED

(1) AUSMED CONTINUED TO PROVIDE MEDICAL SUPPORT TO

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR AND HUMANITARIAN MEDICAL SUPPORT TO PEOPLE OF RWANDA.

(2) AUST FORCES AT CHK TREATED 23 PATIENTS AND 11 DENTAL PATIENTS. CHK IS HOLDING 12 IN-PATIENTS.

(3) MED SCREENING TEAM AND PROTECTIVE ELEMENT IN SPT OF OP RETOUR SCREENED ONE IDP AND TWO DENTAL PATIENTS AT RUKONDO AND KIBEHO CAMP.

(4) AUSMED ELM DELIVERED MED SUPPLIES TO CLINIC AT KIBILIRA.

M. 1 CDHSR. NTR.

N. AIR OPS. NORMAL UNAMIR AND COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS IN OPERATION AT THE AIRPORT. A TOTAL OF 20 FLIGHTS ARRIVED AND DEPARTED KIA DURING THE PERIOD.

O. UN MP COY.

(1) PROVIDED POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES THROUGHOUT KIGALI.

(2) APPREHENDED A 17 YR OLD INTRUDER AT AMAHORO STADIUM TRYING TO STEAL FUEL. SUSPECT IS TO BE HANDED OVER TO THE PROSECUTOR.

P. 95 FLSG. NTR.

6. CIVPOL.

A. UNAMIR CIVPOL HQ CONTINUED COORDINATION AND MONITORING OF ACTIVITIES OF CIVPOL OBSERVERS IN THE SECTORS.

B. THE TRAINING PROGRAMME OF GENDARMERIE AT RUHENGERI NATIONAL GENDARMERIE TRAINING SCHOOL IS STILL IN PROGRESS.

7. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES. NTR.

8. CIVIL AFFAIRS. NTR.

9. LOGISTICS.

A. FORCE RESERVE STOCK LEVELS AS AT TODAY ARE:

(1)	WATER	-	19	DAYS.
(2)	RATIONS	-	21	DAYS.
(3)	FUEL	-	5	DAYS.
(4)	MOGAS	-	67	DAYS.



UN RESTRICTED

(5) JET FUEL - 17 DAYS.

(6) LPG - 13 DAYS.

B. DETAILED FORCE RESERVE STOCK LEVELS. ANNEX C.

10. MISCELLANEOUS.

A. FORCE LEVEL STRENGTH.

(1) SUMMARY OF FORCE LEVEL STRENGTH AS AT TODAY:

(A) CONTINGENTS	-	5,509
(B) STAFF	-	66
(C) MILOBS	-	303
(D) CIVPOL	-	89
(E) <u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	=	<u>5,967</u>

(2) DETAILED FORCE LEVEL STR REPORT. ANNEXES A AND B.

B. BROWN & ROOT LOGISTIC REPORT. ANNEX D.

C. IN PATIENTS. 12.

D. UNAMIR CIV STAFF. 192.

E. TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS WERE RECORDED ON 21 JAN 95:

(1) RWANGANA. ACCIDENT WAS BETWEEN TWO UN VEHS, UN 3082 AND UN 2139. INVESTIGATION STILL IN PROGRESS.

(2) KICUKIRO. ACCIDENT WAS BETWEEN A UNAMIR VEH, UN 207 AND US AID EMBASSY VEH, CD 0425. INVESTIGATIONS ONGOING.

(3) KAMIHURURA. ACCIDENT WAS BETWEEN A UN VEH, UN 3838 AND A CIVIL VEH, KN 0399. INVESTIGATIONS IN PROGRESS.

UNAMIR

ANNEX A

DAILY CONTINGENT STATE

DATE-21-JAN-95

S/NO	CONTINGENT	LOCATION																			TOTAL	REMARKS	
		KIG	BUT	GIK	GIT	RUH	GIS	KIB	CYA	KIBG	BYU	UG	GOM	NAI	MOM	EBB	MIL	POL	ENGR	LEAVE			SICK
1	AUSMED	295																		3		298	
2	BRITCON																						
3	CANCON	290										8			3		7						308
4	ETHIOBATT								708											100			808
5	GHANBATT	42	20	223						535							12						832
6	INDBATT	598																	202				800
7	MALAWICOY		164														5						169
8	MALICOY				199																		199
9	NICOY										250						10			67			327
10	TUNBATT					826											11						837
11	ZAMBATT			445																			445
	FRAFATT																						
12	CHAD							128													1		129
13	CONGO							37												1			38
14	GUINEA-BISSAU							35															35
15	NIGER							43															43
16	SENEGAL							241															241
	TOTAL	1225	184	668	199	826		484	708	535	250	4			3		45	202	171	1		5509	

SUMMARY

1. CONTINGENT	-	5509
2. STAFF	-	58
3. MILOBS	-	303
4. CIVPOL	-	59
GRAND TOTAL	-	5987

UNAMIR

ANNEX A

DAILY CONTINGENT STATE

DATE-21-JAN-95


S/NO	CONTINGENT	LOCATION																			TOTAL	REMARKS	
		KIG	BUT	GIK	GIT	RUH	GIS	KIB	CYA	KIBG	BYU	UG	GOM	NAI	MOM	EBB	MIL	POL	ENGR	LEAVE			SICK
1	AUSMED	295																		3		298	
2	BRITCON																						
3	CANCON	290									8				3		7						308
4	ETHIOBATT								708											100			808
5	GHANBATT	42	20	223						535							12						832
6	INDBATT	598																	202				800
7	MALAWICOY		164														5						169
8	MALICOY				199																		199
9	NICOY										250						10			67			327
10	TUNBATT					826											11						837
11	ZAMBATT			445																			445
	FRAFBATT																						
12	CHAD							128													1		129
13	CONGO							37												1			38
14	GUINEA-BISSAU							35															35
15	NIGER							43															43
16	SENEGAL							241															241
	TOTAL	1225	184	668	199	826		484	708	535	250	4			3		45	202	171	1		5509	

SUMMARY

1. CONTINGENT	-	5509
2. STAFF	-	68
3. MILOBS	-	303
4. CIVPOL	-	89
GRAND TOTAL	-	5967

COMBAT SUPPLIES THEATRE HOLDINGS

WEEK 15 - 22 JAN 95

[illegible]

EXACT TOTAL CSUP SITREP			21 JAN 95		DISTRIBUTION		ANNEX C TO			
PERIOD COVERED - 1500 HR 20 JAN TO 1500 HR 21 JAN					CAO		UNAMIR II DAILY SITREP			
FORCE STRENGTH:					DCOS(SP)		DATED JAN 95			
CONTINGENTS:			5509		CSS					
HQ/MILOBS:			303		CLOGO					
TOTAL:			5812		CCLOGO					
					CIV LOG OFFR					
					OPS DUTY OFFR					
REPORT CORRECT AS AT:			21-Jan-95 17:43							
ITEM			WHERE HELD	UNIT OF ISSUE	START	RECEIVED	ISSUED	END BALANCE	DAYS	REMARKS
WATER										
BOTTLED										
1ST LINE			LT	95846	0	10.5	95835.5			
2ND LINE			LT	0	0	0	0			
TOTAL BOTTLED WATER			LT	95846	0	10.5	95835.5	5.5		
BULK										
1ST LINE			LT	257050	15700	49140	223610			
2ND LINE			LT	0	90000	64000	26000			
TOTAL BULK WATER			LT	257050	105700	113140	249610	14.3		
TOTAL WATER										
1ST LINE			LT	352896	15700	49150.5	319445.5			
2ND LINE			LT	0	90000	64000	26000			
TOTAL WATER IN THEATRE			LT	352896	105700	113150.5	345445.5	19.8		
COMBAT RATIONS										
1ST LINE			EA	36397	852	45	37204			
2ND LINE			EA	92402	0	5995	86407			
TOTAL CBT RATIONS IN THEATRE			EA	128799	852	6040	123611	21.3		
DIESEL										
1ST LINE			LT	87709	3000	9928	80781			
2ND LINE			LT	107724	38500	43914	102310			
TOTAL DIESEL IN THEATRE			LT	195433	41500	53842	183091			
AV DAILY USAGE			35000 LT					5.2		
GASOLINE										
1ST LINE			LT	80570	24	1989	58605			
2ND LINE			LT	112554	0	1542	111012			
TOTAL GASOLINE IN THEATRE			LT	173124	24	3531	169617			
AV DAILY USAGE			2500 LT					67.8		
JET A-1										
1ST LINE			LT	0	0	0	0			
2ND LINE			LT	83503	0	2994	80509			
TOTAL JET A-1 IN THEATRE			LT	83503	0	2994	80509			
AV DAILY USAGE			4500 LT					17.9		
LP GAS										
1ST LINE			KG	537	0	20	517			
2ND LINE			KG	360	0	180	180			
TOTAL LP GAS IN THEATRE			KG	897	0	200	697			
AV DAILY USAGE			50 KG					13.9		

LOCATION	PREVIOUS BALANCE	DAILY PRODUCTION	DAILY ISSUES	CLOSING BALANCE
POINT # 1: STADIUM	0	90000	64000	26000

II. GROUND TRANSPORTATION

A. MISSIONS (TOTAL) -	37
SCHEDULED -	36
UNSCHEDULED -	1
COMPLETED -	28
IN-PROGRESS -	9
CANCELLED -	0

B. CARGO DATA

TYPE CARGO	AMOUNT DELIVERED	KM TRAVELLED
BULK RAW WATER (K)	508	614
BULK POTABLE WATER (K)	90.7	1627
BULK FUEL	18380	254
GENERAL CARGO (KG)	467876	4212
PASSENGERS	18	233
OTHER	0	0

III. AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

A. PASSENGER STATISTICS

DESCRIPTION	ARRIVALS	DEPARTURES
PERSONNEL	23	9
LUGGAGE (KG)	422	108

B. AIRCRAFT STATISTICS

DESCRIPTION	ARRIVALS	DEPARTURES
CN-235		
AN-26	2	2
BEECH-200		
L-100		
IL-76		
OTHER		

IV. EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

DESCRIPTION	VEHICLES			OTHER
	SMP (WHEEL)	SMP (TRACK)	COMMERCIAL	
EQUIPMENT ACCEPTED	8	0	0	2
EQUIPMENT COMPLETED	3	0	0	4
EQUIPMENT ON JOB ORDERS	59	8	0	21

V. FUEL OPERATIONS (IN LITERS)

LOCATION & TYPE OF FUEL	OPENING BALANCE	RECEIVED	DAILY ISSUES	CLOSING BALANCE
AIRFIELD (JET A-1)	61103	0	2994	58109
PACKAGED JET A-1	22400	0	0	22400
SS FUEL STATION (DIESEL)	36086	38500	26919	47667
SS FUEL STATION (PETROL)	112554	0	1542	111012

Spencer

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.21 (G3 PLANS)

To: DCOS Sp  
SO1 G3 Ops  
SO3 G2 MillInfo

From: G3 Plans 3

Info: DCOS Ops  
SO1 G3 Plans  
SO2 G2 MillInfo  
MA/FC  
SDO

Date: 11 Oct 94

Subject: VISIT BY UK DA KAMPALA AND UK MOD RWANDA DESK OFFICER

1. A visit to HQ UNAMIR is planned on 13 Oct, between 1630 and 1700 hrs, of the following two British officers:

- a. Lt Col E M A Graham - Defence Adviser, Kampala.
- b. Lt Col C Mantell - SO1 Middle East & Africa 6, Ministry of Defence, London (Desk Officer for Rwanda).

2. I would be grateful if action addressees could be available to give short, informal briefings in the Ops Room, as shown below:

- a. 1630 - Welcome - DCOS Sp.
- b. 1635 - G2 Overview - SO3 G2.
- c. 1640 - Plans - SO2 G3 Plans 3.
- d. 1645 - Current Ops - SO1 G3 Ops.
- e. 1650 - Logistic Issues - DCOS Sp.

T A P MULLARKEY  
Maj  
G3 Plans 3



To: DCOS Sp  
SO1 G3 Ops  
SO3 G2 MilInfo

From: G3 Plans 3

Info: DCOS Ops  
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T A P MULLARKEY  
Maj  
G3 Plans 3



UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.21 (G3 PLANS)

To: DCOS Sp  
SO1 G3 Ops  
SO3 G2 MilInfo

From: G3 Plans 3

Info: DCOS Ops  
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- c. 1640 - Plans - SO2 G3 Plans 3.
- d. 1645 - Current Ops - SO1 G3 Ops.
- e. 1650 - Logistic Issues - DCOS Sp.

T A P MULLARKEY  
Maj  
G3 Plans 3

**UN ARMS AND AMMO HELD BY THE CONTINGENTS**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	FE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1	81 MM MOR#	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
2.	60 MM MOR#	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
3.	MK 4 RIFLES	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	68
4.	MK 4 BIPODS	07	—	—	—	—	—	—	07
5.	RL(LAW)#	—	—	—	07	—	—	—	07
6.	MILAN MIRA	—	—	—	02	—	—	—	02
7.	GREN HAND HE FRAG —	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	35
8.	GREN HAND HE SFG 87 —	87	—	—	—	—	—	—	87
9.	GREN HAND HE M 26 —	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
10.	GREN HAND HE PINEAPPLE —	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
11.	9 MM BALL	307	—	—	—	273	5,650	—	6,230
12.	RL(LAW) HEAT 66 MM —	98	—	—	—	—	—	—	98
13.	HAND THROWER DM 34 —	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
14.	SMK HAND GREN M 50 —	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	13

15.	SIG CART RED	01	---	---	---	---	---	---	01
16.	SIG CART GREEN	06	---	---	---	---	---	---	06
17.	SIG CART ILL	01	---	---	---	---	---	---	01
18.	NO 10	---	---	---	---	14	---	---	14
19.	410	---	---	---	---	18	---	---	18
20.	.38 BROWNING SPL	---	---	---	---	05	---	---	05
21.	.357 BROWNING MAGNUM	---	---	---	---	09	---	---	09
22.	380 FN AUTO	---	---	---	---	07	---	---	07
23.	FN	---	---	---	---	09	---	---	09
24.	WCC-86	---	---	---	---	112	---	---	112
25.	LM-91	---	---	---	---	20	---	---	20
26.	IVI-92	---	---	---	---	20	---	---	20
27.	.22 SHALK	---	---	---	---	28	---	---	28
28.	FN 9.3X62 RINS	---	---	---	---	82	---	---	82
29.	MISCELANEOUS	---	---	---	---	550	---	---	550
30.	7.62 BLANKS	---	---	---	---	30	---	---	30
31.	FN 765	---	---	---	---	12	---	---	12
32.	375 H&H KAG	---	---	---	---	27	---	---	27

34.	300 WINMG BROWNING	---	---	---	---	57	---	---	57
35.	9X 57 RWS	---	---	---	---	15	---	---	15
36.	GREN-72M FRAG	---	---	---	232	---	---	---	232
37.	BOMB 81MM MOR HE	---	---	---	92	---	---	---	92
38.	BOMB 81MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	108	---	---	---	108
39.	BOMB 81MM ILL	---	---	---	120	---	---	---	120
40.	BOMB 60MM MOR HE	---	---	---	288	---	---	---	288
41.	BOBM 60MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	156	---	---	---	156
42.	BOMB 60MM MOR ILL	---	---	---	99	---	---	---	99
43.	SMK WP	---	---	---	502	---	---	---	502
44.	SIG SMK, RED, ORANGE,BLUE,VIOLET AND YELLOW	---	---	---	182	---	---	---	182
45.	7.62 MM CART	---	---	---	2190	---	80,350	---	82,540
46.	26 MM SIG FLARE WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	70	---	70
47.	26 MM SIG FLARE RED	---	---	---	---	---	56	---	56
48.	26 MM SIG FLARE GREEN	---	---	---	---	---	68	---	68
49.	ALUM SIG SC 7802 WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	42	---	42
50.	CHARGE DEMO C-4 8 OZ STICKS	---	---	---	---	---	10	---	10

51.	7.62 MM XS4 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	18,000	---	18,000
52.	7.62 MM 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	90,475	---	90,475
53.	7.62 4T 1T	---	---	---	---	---	2,830	---	2,830
54.	7.62MM M67 BALL	---	---	---	---	---	860	---	860
55.	7.62 MM TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	2,750	---	2,750
56.	14.5 MM APT	---	---	---	---	---	17,020	---	17,020
57.	50 CAL 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	600	---	600
58.	50 CAL API LINK	---	---	---	---	---	84,200	---	84,200
59.	60 MM MOR HE TYPE 63	---	---	---	---	---	240	---	240
60.	105 MM HEAT 45-83-32	---	---	---	---	---	48	---	48
61.	RIFLE GREN M62	---	---	---	---	---	122	---	122
62.	FRAG GREN	---	---	---	---	---	432	---	432
63.	HEAT ROCKET	---	---	---	---	---	18	---	18
64.	HEAT ROCKET T-69	---	---	---	---	---	09	---	09

**ARMS AND AMMO RECOVERED IN RWANDA**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	HE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1.	AK 46 WITH 48 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
2.	AK 47 WITH 30 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
3.	7.62MM	—	5,490	—	—	2745	—	3,673	11,908
4.	7.62MM BALL M 56	—	371	—	—	—	—	—	371
5.	7.62 MM TRACER NATO	—	1,685	—	—	—	—	—	1,685
6.	7.62 MM BALL M 53 CHINESE	—	400	—	—	—	—	—	400
7.	7.62 BLANKS NATO	—	796	—	—	—	—	—	796
8.	7.62 MM TRACER M 56 (CHINESE)	—	137	—	—	—	—	—	137
9.	7.62 MM BALL NATO	—	22,486	—	—	—	—	—	22,486
10.	7.5 MM INCEND NATO	—	1,652	—	—	—	—	—	1,652
11.	5.56 MM BALL NATO	—	6,990	—	—	1,265	—	1710	9,765
12.	9 MM	—	390	—	—	—	—	278	668
13.	AK 47 MAGAZINES	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	100
14.	AK 47 4 ORDS MAGAZINES	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	15

15.	SLR MAGAZINES 20 RDS	—	168	—	—	—	—	—	168
16.	SLR MAGAZINES 30 RDS	—	38	—	—	—	—	—	38
17.	SMG NATO MAGAZINES	—	06	—	—	—	—	—	06
18.	SLR NATO MAGAZINES 10 RDS	—	25	—	—	—	—	—	25
19.	5.56 MM VARIABLE	—	—	1.769	—	—	—	—	1.769
20.	7.62 MM RIM1 B 81	—	—	166	—	—	—	—	166
21.	7.62 MM SHORT 72	—	—	72	—	—	—	—	72
22.	9 MM IV1 92	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	14
23.	O. 50 TRACER	—	—	—	—	—	—	606	606
24.	12.7 MM	—	—	—	—	347	—	—	347
25.	PFP 303 BDR	—	—	—	—	850	—	—	850
26.	CART 16 BORE	—	—	—	—	425	—	—	425
27.	CART 12 BORE	—	—	—	—	43	—	—	43
28.	7.5 MM GREEN	—	—	—	—	559	—	—	559

**UN ARMS AND AMMO HELD BY THE CONTINGENTS**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	FE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1.	81 MM MOR	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
2.	60 MM MOR	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
3.	MK 4 RIFLES	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	68
4.	MK 4 BIPODS	07	—	—	—	—	—	—	07
5.	RL(LAW)	—	—	—	07	—	—	—	07
6.	MILAN MIRA	—	—	—	02	—	—	—	02
7.	GREN HAND HE FRAG —	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	35
8.	GREN HAND HE SFG 87 —	87	—	—	—	—	—	—	87
9.	GREN HAND HE M 26 —	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
10.	GREN HAND HE PINEAPPLE —	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
11.	9 MM BALL	307	—	—	—	273	5,650	—	6,230
12.	RL(LAW) HEAT 66 MM —	98	—	—	—	—	—	—	98
13.	HAND THROWER DM 34 —	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
14.	SMK HAND GREN M 50 —	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	13



15.	SIG CART RED	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
16.	SIG CART GREEN	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
17.	SIG CART ILL	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
18.	NO 10	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	14
19.	410	—	—	—	—	18	—	—	18
20.	.38 BROWNING SPL	—	—	—	—	05	—	—	05
21.	.357 BROWNING MAGNUM	—	—	—	—	09	—	—	09
22.	380 FN AUTO	—	—	—	—	07	—	—	07
23.	FN	—	—	—	—	09	—	—	09
24.	WCC-86	—	—	—	—	112	—	—	112
25.	LM-91	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	20
26.	IVI-92	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	20
27.	.22 SHALK	—	—	—	—	28	—	—	28
28.	FN 9.3X62 RINS	—	—	—	—	82	—	—	82
29.	MISCELANEOUS	—	—	—	—	550	—	—	550
30.	7.62 BLANKS	—	—	—	—	30	—	—	30
31.	FN 765	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	12
32.	375 H&H KAG	—	—	—	—	27	—	—	27

34.	300 WINMG BROWNING	---	---	---	---	57	---	---	57
35.	9X 57 RWS	---	---	---	---	15	---	---	15
36.	GREN-72M FRAG	---	---	---	232	---	---	---	232
37.	BOMB 81MM MOR HE	---	---	---	92	---	---	---	92
38.	BOMB 81MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	108	---	---	---	108
39.	BOMB 81MM ILL	---	---	---	120	---	---	---	120
40.	BOMB 60MM MOR HE	---	---	---	288	---	---	---	288
41.	BOBM 60MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	156	---	---	---	156
42.	BOMB 60MM MOR ILL	---	---	---	99	---	---	---	99
43.	SMK WP	---	---	---	502	---	---	---	502
44.	SIG SMK, RED, ORANGE,BLUE,VIOLET AND YELLOW	---	---	---	182	---	---	---	182
45.	7.62 MM CART	---	---	---	2190	---	80,350	---	82,540
46.	26 MM SIG FLARE WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	70	---	70
47.	26 MM SIG FLARE RED	---	---	---	---	---	56	---	56
48.	26 MM SIG FLARE GREEN	---	---	---	---	---	68	---	68
49.	ALUM SIG SC 7802 WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	42	---	42
50.	CHARGE DEMO C-4 8 OZ STICKS	---	---	---	---	---	10	---	10

51.	7.62 MM X54 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	18,000	---	18,000
52.	7.62 MM 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	90,475	---	90,475
53.	7.62 4T 1T	---	---	---	---	---	2,830	---	2,830
54.	7.62MM M67 BALL	---	---	---	---	---	860	---	860
55.	7.62 MM TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	2,750	---	2,750
56.	14.5 MM APT	---	---	---	---	---	17,020	---	17,020
57.	50 CAL 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	600	---	600
58.	50 CAL API LINK	---	---	---	---	---	84,200	---	84,200
59.	60 MM MOR HE TYPE 63	---	---	---	---	---	240	---	240
60.	105 MM HEAT 45-83-32	---	---	---	---	---	48	---	48
61.	RIFLE GREN M62	---	---	---	---	---	122	---	122
62.	FRAG GREN	---	---	---	---	---	432	---	432
63.	HEAT ROCKET	---	---	---	---	---	18	---	18
64.	HEAT ROCKET T-69	---	---	---	---	---	09	---	09

**ARMS AND AMMO RECOVERED IN RWANDA**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	FE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1.	AK 46 WITH 48 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
2.	AK 47 WITH 30 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
3.	7.62MM	—	5,490	—	—	2745	—	3,673	11,908
4.	7.62MM BALL M 56	—	371	—	—	—	—	—	371
5.	7.62 MM TRACER NATO	—	1,685	—	—	—	—	—	1,685
6.	7.62 MM BALL M 53 CHINESE	—	400	—	—	—	—	—	400
7.	7.62 BLANKS NATO	—	796	—	—	—	—	—	796
8.	7.62 MM TRACER M 56 (CHINESE)	—	137	—	—	—	—	—	137
9.	7.62 MM BALL NATO	—	22,486	—	—	—	—	—	22,486
10.	7.5 MM INCEND NATO	—	1,652	—	—	—	—	—	1,652
11.	5.56 MM BALL NATO	—	6,990	—	—	1,265	—	1710	9,765
12.	9 MM	—	390	—	—	—	—	278	668
13.	AK 47 MAGAZINES	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	100
14.	AK 47 4 ORDS MAGAZINES	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	15

15.	SLR MAGAZINES 20 RDS	---	168	---	---	---	---	---	168
16	SLR MAGAZINES 30 RDS	---	38	---	---	---	---	---	38
17	SMG NATO MAGAZINES	---	06	---	---	---	---	---	06
18	SLR NATO MAGAZINES 10 RDS	---	25	---	---	---	---	---	25
19	5.56 MM VARIABLE	---	---	1,769	---	---	---	---	1,769
20.	7.62 MM RIMI B 81	---	---	166	---	---	---	---	166
21	7.62 MM SHORT 72	---	---	72	---	---	---	---	72
22	9 MM IVI 92	---	---	14	---	---	---	---	14
23.	O. 50 TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	---	606	606
24.	12.7 MM	---	---	---	---	347	---	---	347
25.	PFP 303 BDR	---	---	---	---	850	---	---	850
26.	CART 16 BORE	---	---	---	---	425	---	---	425
27	CART 12 BORE	---	---	---	---	43	---	---	43
28	7.5 MM GREEN	---	---	---	---	559	---	---	559

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SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	FE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
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2	60 MM MOR	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
3	MK 4 RIFLES	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	68
4	MK 4 BIPODS	07	—	—	—	—	—	—	07
5	RL(LAW)	—	—	—	07	—	—	—	07
6	MILAN MIRA	—	—	—	02	—	—	—	02
7	GREN HAND HE FRAG —	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	35
8	GREN HAND HE SFG 87 —	87	—	—	—	—	—	—	87
9	GREN HAND HE M 26 —	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
10	GREN HAND HE PINEAPPLE —	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
11	9 MM BALL	307	—	—	—	273	5,650	—	6,230
12	RL(LAW) HEAT 66 MM —	98	—	—	—	—	—	—	98
13	HAND THROWER DM 34 —	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
14	SMK HAND GREN M 50 —	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	13

15.	SIG CART RED	01	---	---	---	---	---	---	01
16.	SIG CART GREEN	06	---	---	---	---	---	---	06
17.	SIG CART ILL	01	---	---	---	---	---	---	01
18.	NO 10	---	---	---	---	14	---	---	14
19.	410	---	---	---	---	18	---	---	18
20.	.38 BROWNING SPL	---	---	---	---	05	---	---	05
21.	.357 BROWNING MAGNUM	---	---	---	---	09	---	---	09
22.	380 FN AUTO	---	---	---	---	07	---	---	07
23.	FN	---	---	---	---	09	---	---	09
24.	WCC-86	---	---	---	---	112	---	---	112
25.	LM-91	---	---	---	---	20	---	---	20
26.	IVI-92	---	---	---	---	20	---	---	20
27.	.22 SHALK	---	---	---	---	28	---	---	28
28.	FN 9.3X62 RINS	---	---	---	---	82	---	---	82
29.	MISCELANEOUS	---	---	---	---	550	---	---	550
30.	7.62 BLANKS	---	---	---	---	30	---	---	30
31.	FN 765	---	---	---	---	12	---	---	12
32.	375 H&H KAG	---	---	---	---	27	---	---	27

34.	300 WINMG BROWNING	---	---	---	---	57	---	---	57
35.	9X 57 RWS	---	---	---	---	15	---	---	15
36.	GREN-72M FRAG	---	---	---	232	---	---	---	232
37.	BOMB 81MM MOR HE	---	---	---	92	---	---	---	92
38.	BOMB 81MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	108	---	---	---	108
39.	BOMB 81MM ILL	---	---	---	120	---	---	---	120
40.	BOMB 60MM MOR HE	---	---	---	288	---	---	---	288
41.	BOBM 60MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	156	---	---	---	156
42.	BOMB 60MM MOR ILL	---	---	---	99	---	---	---	99
43.	SMK WP	---	---	---	502	---	---	---	502
44.	SIG SMK, RED, ORANGE,BLUE,VIOLET AND YELLOW	---	---	---	182	---	---	---	182
45.	7.62 MM CART	---	---	---	2190	---	80,350	---	82,540
46.	26 MM SIG FLARE WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	70	---	70
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48.	26 MM SIG FLARE GREEN	---	---	---	---	---	68	---	68
49.	ALUM SIG SC 7802 WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	42	---	42
50.	CHARGE DEMO C-4 8 OZ STICKS	---	---	---	---	---	10	---	10



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52.	7.62 MM 4B 1T	—	—	—	—	—	90,475	—	90,475
53.	7.62 4T 1T	—	—	—	—	—	2,830	—	2,830
54.	7.62MM M67 BALL	—	—	—	—	—	860	—	860
55.	7.62 MM TRACER	—	—	—	—	—	2,750	—	2,750
56.	14.5 MM APT	—	—	—	—	—	17,020	—	17,020
57.	50 CAL 4B 1T	—	—	—	—	—	600	—	600
58.	50 CAL API LINK	—	—	—	—	—	84,200	—	84,200
59.	60 MM MOR HE TYPE 63	—	—	—	—	—	240	—	240
60.	105 MM HEAT 45-83-32	—	—	—	—	—	48	—	48
61.	RIFLE GREN M62	—	—	—	—	—	122	—	122
62.	FRAG GREN	—	—	—	—	—	432	—	432
63.	HEAT ROCKET	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	18
64.	HEAT ROCKET T-69	—	—	—	—	—	09	—	09

**ARMS AND AMMO RECOVERED IN RWANDA**

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2.	AK 47 WITH 30 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
3.	7.62MM	—	5,490	—	—	2745	—	3,673	11,908
4.	7.62MM BALL M 56	—	371	—	—	—	—	—	371
5.	7.62 MM TRACER NATO	—	1,685	—	—	—	—	—	1,685
6.	7.62 MM BALL M 53 CHINESE	—	400	—	—	—	—	—	400
7.	7.62 BLANKS NATO	—	796	—	—	—	—	—	796
8.	7.62 MM TRACER M 56 (CHINESE)	—	137	—	—	—	—	—	137
9.	7.62 MM BALL NATO	—	22,486	—	—	—	—	—	22,486
10.	7.5 MM INCEND NATO	—	1,652	—	—	—	—	—	1,652
11.	5.56 MM BALL NATO	—	6,990	—	—	1,265	—	1710	9,765
12.	9 MM	—	390	—	—	—	—	278	668
13.	AK 47 MAGAZINES	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	100
14.	AK 47 4 ORDS MAGAZINES	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	15

15	SLR MAGAZINES 20 RDS	---	168	---	---	---	---	---	168
16	SLR MAGAZINES 30 RDS	---	38	---	---	---	---	---	38
17	SMG NATO MAGAZINES	---	06	---	---	---	---	---	06
18	SLR NATO MAGAZINES 10 RDS	---	25	---	---	---	---	---	25
19	5.56 MM VARIABLE	---	---	1,769	---	---	---	---	1,769
20	7.62 MM RIMI B 81	---	---	166	---	---	---	---	166
21	7.62 MM SHORT 72	---	---	72	---	---	---	---	72
22	9 MM IVI 92	---	---	14	---	---	---	---	14
23	O. 50 TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	606	---	606
24	12.7 MM	---	---	---	---	347	---	---	347
25	PFP 303 BDR	---	---	---	---	850	---	---	850
26	CART 16 BORE	---	---	---	---	425	---	---	425
27	CART 12 BORE	---	---	---	---	43	---	---	43
28	7.5 MM GREEN	---	---	---	---	559	---	---	559

**UN ARMS AND AMMO HELD BY THE CONTINGENTS**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	FE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1.	81 MM MOR	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
2.	60 MM MOR	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
3.	MK 4 RIFLES	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	68
4.	MK 4 BIPODS	07	—	—	—	—	—	—	07
5.	RL(LAW)	—	—	—	07	—	—	—	07
6.	MILAN MIRA	—	—	—	02	—	—	—	02
7.	GREN HAND HE FRAG	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	35
8.	GREN HAND HE SFG 87	87	—	—	—	—	—	—	87
9.	GREN HAND HE M 26	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
10.	GREN HAND HE PINEAPPLE	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
11.	9 MM BALL	307	—	—	—	273	5,650	—	6,230
12.	RL(LAW) HEAT 66 MM	98	—	—	—	—	—	—	98
13.	HAND THROWER DM 34	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
14.	SMK HAND GREN M 50	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	13

15.	SIG CART RED	01	---	---	---	---	---	01
16.	SIG CART GREEN	06	---	---	---	---	---	06
17.	SIG CART ILL	01	---	---	---	---	---	01
18.	NO 10	---	---	---	---	14	---	14
19.	410	---	---	---	---	18	---	18
20.	.38 BROWNING SPL	---	---	---	---	05	---	05
21.	.357 BROWNING MAGNUM	---	---	---	---	09	---	09
22.	380 FN AUTO	---	---	---	---	07	---	07
23.	FN	---	---	---	---	09	---	09
24.	WCC-86	---	---	---	---	112	---	112
25.	LM-91	---	---	---	---	20	---	20
26.	IVI-92	---	---	---	---	20	---	20
27.	.22 SHALK	---	---	---	---	28	---	28
28.	FN 9.3X62 RINS	---	---	---	---	82	---	82
29.	MISCELANEOUS	---	---	---	---	550	---	550
30.	7.62 BLANKS	---	---	---	---	30	---	30
31.	FN 765	---	---	---	---	12	---	12
32.	375 H&H KAG	---	---	---	---	27	---	27

34.	300 WINMG BROWNING	—	—	—	—	57	—	—	57
35.	9X 57 RWS	—	—	—	—	15	—	—	15
36.	GREN-72M FRAG	—	—	—	232	—	—	—	232
37.	BOMB 81MM MOR HE	—	—	—	92	—	—	—	92
38.	BOMB 81MM MOR SMK	—	—	—	108	—	—	—	108
39.	BOMB 81MM ILL	—	—	—	120	—	—	—	120
40.	BOMB 60MM MOR HE	—	—	—	288	—	—	—	288
41.	BOBM 60MM MOR SMK	—	—	—	156	—	—	—	156
42.	BOMB 60MM MOR ILL	—	—	—	99	—	—	—	99
43.	SMK WP	—	—	—	502	—	—	—	502
44.	SIG SMK, RED, ORANGE,BLUE,VIOLET AND YELLOW	—	—	—	182	—	—	—	182
45.	7.62 MM CART	—	—	—	2190	—	80,350	—	82,540
46.	26 MM SIG FLARE WHITE	—	—	—	—	—	70	—	70
47.	26 MM SIG FLARE RED	—	—	—	—	—	56	—	56
48.	26 MM SIG FLARE GREEN	—	—	—	—	—	68	—	68
49.	ALUM SIG SC 7802 WHITE	—	—	—	—	—	42	—	42
50.	CHARGE DEMO C-4 8 OZ STICKS	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	10

51.	7.62 MM X54 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	18,000	---	18,000
52.	7.62 MM 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	90,475	---	90,475
53.	7.62 4T 1T	---	---	---	---	---	2,830	---	2,830
54.	7.62MM M67 BALL	---	---	---	---	---	860	---	860
55.	7.62 MM TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	2,750	---	2,750
56.	14.5 MM APT	---	---	---	---	---	17,020	---	17,020
57.	50 CAL 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	600	---	600
58.	50 CAL API LINK	---	---	---	---	---	84,200	---	84,200
59.	60 MM MOR HE TYPE 63	---	---	---	---	---	240	---	240
60.	105 MM HEAT 45-83-32	---	---	---	---	---	48	---	48
61.	RIFLE GREN M62	---	---	---	---	---	122	---	122
62.	FRAG GREN	---	---	---	---	---	432	---	432
63.	HEAT ROCKET	---	---	---	---	---	18	---	18
64.	HEAT ROCKET T-69	---	---	---	---	---	09	---	09

**ARMS AND AMMO RECOVERED IN RWANDA**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	HE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1.	AK 46 WITH 48 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
2.	AK 47 WITH 30 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
3.	7.62MM	—	5,490	—	—	2745	—	3,673	11,908
4.	7.62MM BALL M 56	—	371	—	—	—	—	—	371
5.	7.62 MM TRACER NATO	—	1,685	—	—	—	—	—	1,685
6.	7.62 MM BALL M 53 CHINESE	—	400	—	—	—	—	—	400
7.	7.62 BLANKS NATO	—	796	—	—	—	—	—	796
8.	7.62 MM TRACER M 56 (CHINESE)	—	137	—	—	—	—	—	137
9.	7.62 MM BALL NATO	—	22,486	—	—	—	—	—	22,486
10.	7.5 MM INCEND NATO	—	1,652	—	—	—	—	—	1,652
11.	5.56 MM BALL NATO	—	6,990	—	—	1,265	—	1710	9,765
12.	9 MM	—	390	—	—	—	—	278	668
13.	AK 47 MAGAZINES	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	100
14.	AK 47 4 ORDS MAGAZINES	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	15



15.	SLR MAGAZINES 20 RDS	---	168	---	---	---	---	---	168
16.	SLR MAGAZINES 30 RDS	---	38	---	---	---	---	---	38
17.	SMG NATO MAGAZINES	---	06	---	---	---	---	---	06
18.	SLR NATO MAGAZINES 10 RDS	---	25	---	---	---	---	---	25
19.	5.56 MM VARIABLE	---	---	1,769	---	---	---	---	1,769
20.	7.62 MM RIMI B 81	---	---	166	---	---	---	---	166
21.	7.62 MM SHORT 72	---	---	72	---	---	---	---	72
22.	9 MM IVI 92	---	---	14	---	---	---	---	14
23.	O. 50 TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	---	606	606
24.	12.7 MM	---	---	---	---	347	---	---	347
25.	PFP 303 BDR	---	---	---	---	850	---	---	850
26.	CART 16 BORE	---	---	---	---	425	---	---	425
27.	CART 12 BORE	---	---	---	---	43	---	---	43
28.	7.5 MM GREEN	---	---	---	---	559	---	---	559

**UN ARMS AND AMMO HELD BY THE CONTINGENTS**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	FE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1.	81 MM MOR	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
2.	60 MM MOR	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
3.	MK 4 RIFLES	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	68
4.	MK 4 BIPODS	07	—	—	—	—	—	—	07
5.	RL(LAW)	—	—	—	07	—	—	—	07
6.	MILAN MIRA	—	—	—	02	—	—	—	02
7.	GREN HAND HE FRAG	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	35
8.	GREN HAND HE SFG 87	87	—	—	—	—	—	—	87
9.	GREN HAND HE M 26	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
10.	GREN HAND HE PINEAPPLE	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
11.	9 MM BALL	307	—	—	—	273	5,650	—	6,230
12.	RL(LAW) HEAT 66 MM	98	—	—	—	—	—	—	98
13.	HAND THROWER DM 34	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
14.	SMK HAND GREN M 50	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	13

15.	SIG CART RED	01	---	---	---	---	---	---	01
16.	SIG CART GREEN	06	---	---	---	---	---	---	06
17.	SIG CART ILL	01	---	---	---	---	---	---	01
18.	NO 10	---	---	---	---	14	---	---	14
19.	410	---	---	---	---	18	---	---	18
20.	.38 BROWNING SPL	---	---	---	---	05	---	---	05
21.	.357 BROWNING MAGNUM	---	---	---	---	09	---	---	09
22.	380 FN AUTO	---	---	---	---	07	---	---	07
23.	FN	---	---	---	---	09	---	---	09
24.	WCC-86	---	---	---	---	112	---	---	112
25.	LM-91	---	---	---	---	20	---	---	20
26.	IVI-92	---	---	---	---	20	---	---	20
27.	.22 SHALK	---	---	---	---	28	---	---	28
28.	FN 9.3X62 RINS	---	---	---	---	82	---	---	82
29.	MISCELANEOUS	---	---	---	---	550	---	---	550
30.	7.62 BLANKS	---	---	---	---	30	---	---	30
31.	FN 765	---	---	---	---	12	---	---	12
32.	375 H&H KAG	---	---	---	---	27	---	---	27

34.	300 WINMG BROWNING	---	---	---	---	57	---	---	57
35.	9X 57 RWS	---	---	---	---	15	---	---	15
36.	GREN-72M FRAG	---	---	---	232	---	---	---	232
37.	BOMB 81MM MOR HE	---	---	---	92	---	---	---	92
38.	BOMB 81MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	108	---	---	---	108
39.	BOMB 81MM ILL	---	---	---	120	---	---	---	120
40.	BOMB 60MM MOR HE	---	---	---	288	---	---	---	288
41.	BOBM 60MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	156	---	---	---	156
42.	BOMB 60MM MOR ILL	---	---	---	99	---	---	---	99
43.	SMK WP	---	---	---	502	---	---	---	502
44.	SIG SMK, RED, ORANGE,BLUE,VIOLET AND YELLOW	---	---	---	182	---	---	---	182
45.	7.62 MM CART	---	---	---	2190	---	80,350	---	82,540
46.	26 MM SIG FLARE WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	70	---	70
47.	26 MM SIG FLARE RED	---	---	---	---	---	56	---	56
48.	26 MM SIG FLARE GREEN	---	---	---	---	---	68	---	68
49.	ALUM SIG SC 7802 WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	42	---	42
50.	CHARGE DEMO C-4 8 OZ STICKS	---	---	---	---	---	10	---	10

51.	7.62 MM X54 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	18,000	---	18,000
52.	7.62 MM 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	90,475	---	90,475
53.	7.62 4T 1T	---	---	---	---	---	2,830	---	2,830
54.	7.62MM M67 BALL	---	---	---	---	---	860	---	860
55.	7.62 MM TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	2,750	---	2,750
56.	14.5 MM APT	---	---	---	---	---	17,020	---	17,020
57.	50 CAL 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	600	---	600
58.	50 CAL API LINK	---	---	---	---	---	84,200	---	84,200
59.	60 MM MOR HE TYPE 63	---	---	---	---	---	240	---	240
60.	105 MM HEAT 45-83-32	---	---	---	---	---	48	---	48
61.	RIFLE GREN M62	---	---	---	---	---	122	---	122
62.	FRAG GREN	---	---	---	---	---	432	---	432
63.	HEAT ROCKET	---	---	---	---	---	18	---	18
64.	HEAT ROCKET T-69	---	---	---	---	---	09	---	09

**ARMS AND AMMO RECOVERED IN RWANDA**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	FE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1.	AK 46 WITH 48 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
2.	AK 47 WITH 30 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
3.	7.62MM	—	5,490	—	—	2745	—	3,673	11,908
4.	7.62MM BALL M 56	—	371	—	—	—	—	—	371
5.	7.62 MM TRACER NATO	—	1,685	—	—	—	—	—	1,685
6.	7.62 MM BALL M 53 CHINESE	—	400	—	—	—	—	—	400
7.	7.62 BLANKS NATO	—	796	—	—	—	—	—	796
8.	7.62 MM TRACER M 56 (CHINESE)	—	137	—	—	—	—	—	137
9.	7.62 MM BALL NATO	—	22,486	—	—	—	—	—	22,486
10.	7.5 MM INCEND NATO	—	1,652	—	—	—	—	—	1,652
11.	5.56 MM BALL NATO	—	6,990	—	—	1,265	—	1710	9,765
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13.	AK 47 MAGAZINES	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	100
14.	AK 47 4 ORDS MAGAZINES	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	15

15.	SLR MAGAZINES 20 RDS	---	168	---	---	---	---	---	168
16.	SLR MAGAZINES 30 RDS	---	38	---	---	---	---	---	38
17.	SMG NATO MAGAZINES	---	06	---	---	---	---	---	06
18.	SLR NATO MAGAZINES 10 RDS	---	25	---	---	---	---	---	25
19.	5.56 MM VARIABLE	---	---	1,769	---	---	---	---	1,769
20.	7.62 MM RIMI B 81	---	---	166	---	---	---	---	166
21.	7.62 MM SHORT 72	---	---	72	---	---	---	---	72
22.	9 MM IVI 92	---	---	14	---	---	---	---	14
23.	O. 50 TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	---	606	606
24.	12.7 MM	---	---	---	---	347	---	---	347
25.	PFP 303 BDR	---	---	---	---	850	---	---	850
26.	CART 16 BORE	---	---	---	---	425	---	---	425
27.	CART 12 BORE	---	---	---	---	43	---	---	43
28.	7.5 MM GREEN	---	---	---	---	559	---	---	559

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2.	60 MM MOR	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
3.	MK 4 RIFLES	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	68
4.	MK 4 BIPODS	07	—	—	—	—	—	—	07
5.	RL(LAW)	—	—	—	07	—	—	—	07
6.	MILAN MIRA	—	—	—	02	—	—	—	02
7.	GREN HAND HE FRAG —	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	35
8.	GREN HAND HE SFG 87 —	87	—	—	—	—	—	—	87
9.	GREN HAND HE M 26 —	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
10.	GREN HAND HE PINEAPPLE —	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
11.	9 MM BALL	307	—	—	—	273	5,650	—	6,230
12.	RL(LAW) HEAT 66 MM —	98	—	—	—	—	—	—	98
13.	HAND THROWER DM 34 —	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
14.	SMK HAND GREN M 50 —	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	13



15.	SIG CART RED	01	---	---	---	---	---	---	01
16.	SIG CART GREEN	06	---	---	---	---	---	---	06
17.	SIG CART ILL	01	---	---	---	---	---	---	01
18.	NO 10	---	---	---	---	14	---	---	14
19.	410	---	---	---	---	18	---	---	18
20.	.38 BROWNING SPL	---	---	---	---	05	---	---	05
21.	.357 BROWNING MAGNUM	---	---	---	---	09	---	---	09
22.	380 FN AUTO	---	---	---	---	07	---	---	07
23.	FN	---	---	---	---	09	---	---	09
24.	WCC-86	---	---	---	---	112	---	---	112
25.	LM-91	---	---	---	---	20	---	---	20
26.	IVI-92	---	---	---	---	20	---	---	20
27.	.22 SHALK	---	---	---	---	28	---	---	28
28.	FN 9.3X62 RINS	---	---	---	---	82	---	---	82
29.	MISCELANEOUS	---	---	---	---	550	---	---	550
30.	7.62 BLANKS	---	---	---	---	30	---	---	30
31.	FN 765	---	---	---	---	12	---	---	12
32.	375 H&H KAG	---	---	---	---	27	---	---	27

34.	300 WINMG BROWNING	---	---	---	---	57	---	---	57
35.	9X 57 RWS	---	---	---	---	15	---	---	15
36.	GREN-72M FRAG	---	---	---	232	---	---	---	232
37.	BOMB 81MM MOR HE	---	---	---	92	---	---	---	92
38.	BOMB 81MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	108	---	---	---	108
39.	BOMB 81MM ILL	---	---	---	120	---	---	---	120
40.	BOMB 60MM MOR HE	---	---	---	288	---	---	---	288
41.	BOBM 60MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	156	---	---	---	156
42.	BOMB 60MM MOR ILL	---	---	---	99	---	---	---	99
43.	SMK WP	---	---	---	502	---	---	---	502
44.	SIG SMK, RED, ORANGE,BLUE,VIOLET AND YELLOW	---	---	---	182	---	---	---	182
45.	7.62 MM CART	---	---	---	2190	---	80,350	---	82,540
46.	26 MM SIG FLARE WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	70	---	70
47.	26 MM SIG FLARE RED	---	---	---	---	---	56	---	56
48.	26 MM SIG FLARE GREEN	---	---	---	---	---	68	---	68
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50.	CHARGE DEMO C-4 8 OZ STICKS	---	---	---	---	---	10	---	10

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52.	7.62 MM 4B 1T	—	—	—	—	—	90,475	—	90,475
53.	7.62 4T 1T	—	—	—	—	—	2,830	—	2,830
54.	7.62MM M67 BALL	—	—	—	—	—	860	—	860
55.	7.62 MM TRACER	—	—	—	—	—	2,750	—	2,750
56.	14.5 MM APT	—	—	—	—	—	17,020	—	17,020
57.	50 CAL 4B 1T	—	—	—	—	—	600	—	600
58.	50 CAL API LINK	—	—	—	—	—	84,200	—	84,200
59.	60 MM MOR HE TYPE 63	—	—	—	—	—	240	—	240
60.	105 MM HEAT 45-83-32	—	—	—	—	—	48	—	48
61.	RIFLE GREN M62	—	—	—	—	—	122	—	122
62.	FRAG GREN	—	—	—	—	—	432	—	432
63.	HEAT ROCKET	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	18
64.	HEAT ROCKET T-69	—	—	—	—	—	09	—	09

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2.	AK 47 WITH 30 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
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4.	7.62MM BALL M 56	—	371	—	—	—	—	—	371
5.	7.62 MM TRACER NATO	—	1,685	—	—	—	—	—	1,685
6.	7.62 MM BALL M 53 CHINESE	—	400	—	—	—	—	—	400
7.	7.62 BLANKS NATO	—	796	—	—	—	—	—	796
8.	7.62 MM TRACER M 56 (CHINESE)	—	137	—	—	—	—	—	137
9.	7.62 MM BALL NATO	—	22,486	—	—	—	—	—	22,486
10.	7.5 MM INCEND NATO	—	1,652	—	—	—	—	—	1,652
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12.	9 MM	—	390	—	—	—	—	278	668
13.	AK 47 MAGAZINES	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	100
14.	AK 47 4 ORDS MAGAZINES	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	15

15.	SLR MAGAZINES 20 RDS	—	168	—	—	—	—	168
16.	SLR MAGAZINES 30 RDS	—	38	—	—	—	—	38
17.	SMG NATO MAGAZINES	—	06	—	—	—	—	06
18.	SLR NATO MAGAZINES 10 RDS	—	25	—	—	—	—	25
19.	5.56 MM VARIABLE	—	—	1,769	—	—	—	1,769
20.	7.62 MM RIMI B 81	—	—	166	—	—	—	166
21.	7.62 MM SHORT 72	—	—	72	—	—	—	72
22.	9 MM IVI 92	—	—	14	—	—	—	14
23.	O. 50 TRACER	—	—	—	—	—	606	606
24.	12.7 MM	—	—	—	—	347	—	347
25.	PFP 303 BDR	—	—	—	—	850	—	850
26.	CART 16 BORE	—	—	—	—	425	—	425
27.	CART 12 BORE	—	—	—	—	43	—	43
28.	7.5 MM GREEN	—	—	—	—	559	—	559

**UN ARMS AND AMMO HELD BY THE CONTINGENTS**

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2.	60 MM MOR	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
3.	MK 4 RIFLES	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	68
4.	MK 4 BIPODS	07	—	—	—	—	—	—	07
5.	RL(LAW)	—	—	—	07	—	—	—	07
6.	MILAN MIRA	—	—	—	02	—	—	—	02
7.	GREN HAND HE FRAG —	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	35
8.	GREN HAND HE SFG 87 —	87	—	—	—	—	—	—	87
9.	GREN HAND HE M 26 —	04	—	—	—	—	—	—	04
10.	GREN HAND HE PINEAPPLE —	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
11.	9 MM BALL	307	—	—	—	273	5,650	—	6,230
12.	RL(LAW) HEAT 66 MM —	98	—	—	—	—	—	—	98
13.	HAND THROWER DM 34 —	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
14.	SMK HAND GREN M 50 —	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	13

15.	SIG CART RED	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
16.	SIG CART GREEN	06	—	—	—	—	—	—	06
17.	SIG CART ILL	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
18.	NO 10	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	14
19.	410	—	—	—	—	18	—	—	18
20.	.38 BROWNING SPL	—	—	—	—	05	—	—	05
21.	.357 BROWNING MAGNUM	—	—	—	—	09	—	—	09
22.	380 FN AUTO	—	—	—	—	07	—	—	07
23.	FN	—	—	—	—	09	—	—	09
24.	WCC-86	—	—	—	—	112	—	—	112
25.	LM-91	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	20
26.	IVI-92	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	20
27.	.22 SHALK	—	—	—	—	28	—	—	28
28.	FN 9.3X62 RINS	—	—	—	—	82	—	—	82
29.	MISCELANEOUS	—	—	—	—	550	—	—	550
30.	7.62 BLANKS	—	—	—	—	30	—	—	30
31.	FN 765	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	12
32.	375 H&H KAG	—	—	—	—	27	—	—	27

34.	300 WINMG BROWNING	---	---	---	---	57	---	---	57
35.	9X 57 RWS	---	---	---	---	15	---	---	15
36.	GREN-72M FRAG	---	---	---	232	---	---	---	232
37.	BOMB 81MM MOR HE	---	---	---	92	---	---	---	92
38.	BOMB 81MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	108	---	---	---	108
39.	BOMB 81MM ILL	---	---	---	120	---	---	---	120
40.	BOMB 60MM MOR HE	---	---	---	288	---	---	---	288
41.	BOBM 60MM MOR SMK	---	---	---	156	---	---	---	156
42.	BOMB 60MM MOR ILL	---	---	---	99	---	---	---	99
43.	SMK WP	---	---	---	502	---	---	---	502
44.	SIG SMK, RED, ORANGE,BLUE,VIOLET AND YELLOW	---	---	---	182	---	---	---	182
45.	7.62 MM CART	---	---	---	2190	---	80,350	---	82,540
46.	26 MM SIG FLARE WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	70	---	70
47.	26 MM SIG FLARE RED	---	---	---	---	---	56	---	56
48.	26 MM SIG FLARE GREEN	---	---	---	---	---	68	---	68
49.	ALUM SIG SC 7802 WHITE	---	---	---	---	---	42	---	42
50.	CHARGE DEMO C-4 8 OZ STICKS	---	---	---	---	---	10	---	10



51.	7.62 MM X54 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	18,000	---	18,000
52.	7.62 MM 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	90,475	---	90,475
53.	7.62 4T 1T	---	---	---	---	---	2,830	---	2,830
54.	7.62MM M67 BALL	---	---	---	---	---	860	---	860
55.	7.62 MM TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	2,750	---	2,750
56.	14.5 MM APT	---	---	---	---	---	17,020	---	17,020
57.	50 CAL 4B 1T	---	---	---	---	---	600	---	600
58.	50 CAL API LINK	---	---	---	---	---	84,200	---	84,200
59.	60 MM MOR HE TYPE 63	---	---	---	---	---	240	---	240
60.	105 MM HEAT 45-83-32	---	---	---	---	---	48	---	48
61.	RIFLE GREN M62	---	---	---	---	---	122	---	122
62.	FRAG GREN	---	---	---	---	---	432	---	432
63.	HEAT ROCKET	---	---	---	---	---	18	---	18
64.	HEAT ROCKET T-69	---	---	---	---	---	09	---	09

**ARMS AND AMMO RECOVERED IN RWANDA**

SER NO	TYPE OF AMMO	GHANBATT	ZAMBATT	TUNBATT	INDBATT	HE COY	FLSG	AUSMED	TOTAL
1.	AK 46 WITH 48 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
2.	AK 47 WITH 30 ROUNDS	01	—	—	—	—	—	—	01
3.	7.62MM	—	5,490	—	—	2745	—	3,673	11,908
4.	7.62MM BALL M 56	—	371	—	—	—	—	—	371
5.	7.62 MM TRACER NATO	—	1,685	—	—	—	—	—	1,685
6.	7.62 MM BALL M 53 CHINESE	—	400	—	—	—	—	—	400
7.	7.62 BLANKS NATO	—	796	—	—	—	—	—	796
8.	7.62 MM TRACER M 56 (CHINESE)	—	137	—	—	—	—	—	137
9.	7.62 MM BALL NATO	—	22,486	—	—	—	—	—	22,486
10.	7.5 MM INCEND NATO	—	1,652	—	—	—	—	—	1,652
11.	5.56 MM BALL NATO	—	6,990	—	—	1,265	—	1710	9,765
12.	9 MM	—	390	—	—	—	—	278	668
13.	AK 47 MAGAZINES	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	100
14.	AK 47 4 ORDS MAGAZINES	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	15

15.	SLR MAGAZINES 20 RDS	---	168	---	---	---	---	168
16.	SLR MAGAZINES 30 RDS	---	38	---	---	---	---	38
17.	SMG NATO MAGAZINES	---	06	---	---	---	---	06
18.	SLR NATO MAGAZINES 10 RDS	---	25	---	---	---	---	25
19.	5.56 MM VARIABLE	---	---	1,769	---	---	---	1,769
20.	7.62 MM RIMI B 81	---	---	166	---	---	---	166
21.	7.62 MM SHORT 72	---	---	72	---	---	---	72
22.	9 MM IV1 92	---	---	14	---	---	---	14
23.	O. 50 TRACER	---	---	---	---	---	606	606
24.	12.7 MM	---	---	---	---	347	---	347
25.	PFP 303 BDR	---	---	---	---	850	---	850
26.	CART 16 BORE	---	---	---	---	425	---	425
27.	CART 12 BORE	---	---	---	---	43	---	43
28.	7.5 MM GREEN	---	---	---	---	559	---	559

# TANZANIAN REFUGEE CAMPS File

## POPULATION FIGURES

04/02/95 camp name		NEWCOMERS 27/1-2/2/95		SECTOR
CARE/BENACO				
BIRENGA (A)	19,239	57		2
KABARONDO	16,625	8		2
KIGARAMA	25,947	50		2
MURAMBI	23,264	8		1
	85,075		123	
CARE/MUSUHURA				
AKAGERA	108	0		
BIRENGA (B)	21,476	66		
BURUNDI	2,291	0		
KAYONZA	8,899	2		2
MUGESERA	7,204	75		2
MUHAZI	3,999	1		2
NGENDA	7,683	441		2
NYARUNGENCE	3,957	8		6
RUTONDE	7,159	17		2
RUKARA	11,136	9		2
SAKE	5,553	62		2
	79,465		681	
RED CROSS/BENACO				
RUSUMO	126,162	35		2
	126,162		35	
CONCERN/LUMASI				
BWISIGE	492	0		1
BUTARE	18,815	547		43
GITARAMA	4,580	19		33
GITUZA	6,450	1		1
KIUYE	1,312	0		1
KIYOMBE	10,737	0		1
MUHURA	2,447	0		1
MUKARANGE	558	0		1
MUYUMBA	34,757	0		1
NGARAMA	8,979	0		1
RUKIRA	36,613	13		2
	125,740		580	
RED CROSS/LUKOLE				
BURUNDESE	24,501	530		
	24,501		530	
LUKOLE	24,501	530	530	
LUMASI	125,740		580	
MUSUHURA	79,465	419	681	
BENACO	211,237		158	
TOTAL	440,943		1,949	

JOINT TASK FORCE - BRAVO  
KIGALI, RWANDA  
APO AE 09430

AESE-B

20 AUG 94

MEMORANDUM FOR: JTF Support Hope, UNAMIR, UNICEF, UNDP, DART,  
Electrogaz Co.

SUBJECT: Survey and Analysis for Electrical Transmission/  
Distribution Grid supplying Kigali, Rwanda.

1. Aerial survey of transmission grid from Kigali north to Ntaruka and Mukungwa Hydroelectric Power Stations, completed 19 AUG 94, yielded the following information:
  - A. Transmission lines from Jabana (Kigali) substation to Rulindo substation - minor damage in 3 locations (Annex A).
  - B. Rulindo substation control building, busswork, and transformer appear intact. Ground survey required.
  - C. Transmission lines from Rulindo substation to Gifurwe substation - center conductor down in 1 location (Annex A).
  - D. Transmission lines from Gifurwe substation to Ntaruka Hydroelectric Power Station - outside conductor down in 1 location (Annex A).
  - E. Ntaruka Hydroelectric Power Station appears to be intact although not in operation at this time. Ground survey required.
  - F. Transmission lines from Gifurwe substation to Mukungwa Hydroelectric Power Station - broken strain insulator in 1 location (Annex A).
  - G. Mukungwa Hydroelectric Power Station appears to be intact although not in operation at this time. Ground survey required.
2. Ground survey of Jabana (Kigali) substation and conversations with Mr Nyaninani Francois, Electrogaz, yielded the following information:
  - A. Substation controls and distribution circuit breakers are intact and operable.
  - B. Substation busswork is intact and operational.
  - C. 6 MVA, 110KV-15KV, power transformer #1 is inoperational due to oil leakage.
  - D. 6 MVA, 110KV-15KV, power transformer #2 is inoperational due to faulty voltage taps.
  - E. Controlled substitution of parts from transformer #1 to transformer #2 will restore operation of transformer #2 and provide Kigali with 6 MVA of power capability.

8. ANALYSIS

- A. The southern transmission grid is approximately 85% intact. Rural repairs could be made within 1-2 weeks. Extensive repairs near Kigali would require 60-90+ days dependant upon parts and equipment availability.
- B. The northern transmission grid is approximately 97% intact. Repairs could be made within 1-2 weeks.
- C. Gikondo substation is approximately 40% intact. Limited operation could be established within approximately 30 days upon receipt of parts and equipment.
- D. Jabana substation is approximately 80% intact. Limited operation could be established within 1-2 weeks.
- E. The Gikondo-Jabana interconnection transmission line is approximately 50% intact. Extensive repair and replacement of conductor and insulators would require 60-90+ days dependant on parts and equipment availability.
- F. The Kigali distribution grid is approximately 90% intact and suitable for limited operation now. Repair ongoing.
- G. Utilizing local Electrogaz technicians would speed up repair operations as they are on site and familiar with the locale and electrical grid. Subsidizing their salaries would help stimulate the Rwandan economy.
- H. Source hydroelectric power stations operability and output capability not surveyed.
- I. The transmission grid for eastern Rwanda not surveyed.
- J. Rural sub-transmission grids not surveyed.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Phase I (0-30 days)
  - 1. Identify critical loads, ie Water facilities, Hospitals, Airport operations, Communications, Health clinics, Fire stations, etc.
  - 2. Place small generators to meet immediate needs.
- B. Phase II (14-60 days)
  - 1. Provide transportation assets and equipment for Electrogaz personnel, and subsidize salaries.
  - 2. Repair northern transmission grid.
  - 3. Repair Jabana substation for limited capacity.
  - 4. Repair city distribution grid and isolate critical loads to maximize utilization of large generator assets.
  - 5. Survey source hydroelectric power stations for operability.
  - 6. Survey transmission grid for eastern Rwanda.
  - 7. Survey rural sub-transmission grids.
  - 8. Order repair parts needed as per Electrogaz recommendations.

- C. Phase III (60+ days)
  - 1. Repair southern transmission grid.
  - 2. Repair Gikondo substation for limited capacity.
  - 3. Repair Gikondo-Jabana interconnection transmission line.
- D. Phase IV (180+ days)
  - 1. Restore Jabana substation to full capacity.
  - 2. Restore Gikondo substation to full capacity.

10. POC this report, SSG Richards, CPT Cherry (CE), or CPT Fearing (J5), JTF Provide Support Kigali, Rwanda.

*Michael G. Richards*

Michael G. Richards  
SSG, USA  
Br Pwr Sta Op/Elec

Annex A - Damage Detail  
Annex B - UNAMIR Survey  
Annex C - Local Map

ANNEX A Detail summary of damage to northern transmission grid.

LOCATION	GRID COORD	DAMAGE OBSERVED
Alpha	RU 673 008	Center conductor down at 1 tower. (Near Cyabasigi)
Bravo	RU 662 033	2 Neutral/Static lines down at 1 tower. (West of Cyinzuzi)
Charlie	RU 275 083	3 jumper cut at 1 tower. (West of Nyakahembe)
Delta	RU 258 090	Rulindo substation appears intact.
Echo	RU 144 272	Center conductor down between 2 towers. (Near Kabukoko)
Foxtrot	RU 113 297	Gifurwe substation appears intact.
Golf	RU 073 353	Outside conductor down at 1 tower. (South of Bugoholi)
Hotel	RU 062 364	Ntaruka Hydroelectric Power Station appears intact but not in operation.
India	RU 112 295	Outside strain insulator broken at 1 tower. (Near Ruganda)
Juliet	QU 985 299	Mukungwa Hydroelectric Power Station appears intact but not in operation.



# **Helicopter recon of power lines from Kigali to Kigoma and Kilinda tranformer stations** Damage location sheet

No	Description of damage	Place (GPS)	Town neer to	Remarks
1a	From transformer station Gikondo in Kigali to the first bend on the line to Kigoma all lines are down (6.0 km).		Kigali	Install new power lines between masts and splice.
1	Lines are down between several masts	30°00. 495 E 02°00. 178 S	Kigese (Rwesero)	Inspect insulation on mast.
2	Lines down between tree masts	29°58. 281 E 02°00. 932 S	? Kigese (sw)	Inspect insulation on mast.
3	Transformer station no damage and in good condition. Buildings are broken in to and papers/diagrams are spread in the floor.		Kigoma	APR will place gard at the station.
4	Line down between two masts	02°13. 869 S 29°39. 330 E	Karambi	Inspect insulation on mast.
5	Transformer station no damage on transformers but the station are disconnected on ground and mast on line to Kigoma and Kigali. There are missing fuses in the control pannels.		Kilinda	Install new fuses.  APR will place gard at the station.

RENEWED MANDATE - MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

The following initial considerations fall out of the draft resolution on Mandate renewal. There are 7 additional military tasks which UNAMIR has been given.

1. Provide Security and Protection of DPs, Refugees and Civs at Risk.
    - a. Does this mean we provide security in every DP camp? If it does it will incur a heavy manpower bill.
  2. Establish and Maintain Secure Humanitarian Areas.
    - a. Conflicts with established BBGNU position on the establishment of Welcome Centres.
    - b. May institutionalise the dependency culture.
    - c. Is UNAMIR to lead on the positioning of these, or is it a UNHCR/UNREO or BBGNU responsibility.
  3. Provide Security and Support for Distribution of Relief Supplies.
    - a. This will require UNAMIR to replace the existing structures in the DP camps.
      - (1) Will be confrontational.
      - (2) Will be manpower intensive, for a prolonged period (until camps close).
  4. Provide Security for Personnel from International Tribunal.
    - a. In offices.
    - b. In accommodation.
    - c. In transit.
    - d. Close Protection Team to accompany members when they are off duty?
    - e. Manpower intensive.
  5. Provide Security for Human Rights Personnel.
    - a. Should be on an as necessary basis, to be determined by the military security assessment (as at present), not at the whim of HRC.
  6. Provide Physical Protection of Prosecutor's Offices.
    - a. UNAMIR must influence choice of location of offices (Stadium?).
  7. Provide Security for Missions outside Kigali.
    - a. Should be on an as necessary basis, to be determined by the military security assessment (as at present), not at the whim of HRC, or other agency.
-

CNR 676 P6/7

29 November 1994

7 p.m.

cc FC, ED  
GUPOLDRAFT RESOLUTION RENEWING THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

Tsd. S.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 4 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, and 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the progress report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 25 November 1994 (S/1994/1344),

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on security in the Rwandese refugee camps of 18 November 1994 (S/1994/1308),

Recalling its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of achieving genuine reconciliation between all elements of Rwandan society within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Noting the deployment of human rights officers to Rwanda by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in order to monitor the ongoing human rights situation, to help redress existing problems and prevent possible human rights violations from occurring, to help foster a climate of confidence and the establishment of a more secure environment and thus facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons, and to implement programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human rights particularly in the area of administration of justice,

Noting also that the widespread dispersal of landmines is causing hardship to the civilian population and is hampering the return of refugees and displaced persons and other humanitarian relief efforts,

Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of a Trust Fund pursuant to resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 9 June 1995;

2. Reaffirms that UNAMIR will:

(a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas,

(b) Provide security and support for the distribution of supplies and humanitarian relief operations;

(c) Exercise its good offices to assist in the achievement of peace within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement

CNR 676 P7/7

3. Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it:

(a) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and for human rights officers, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali;

(b) Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force;

4. Strongly urges the Government of Rwanda to continue its cooperation with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring unimpeded access to all areas of Rwanda by UNAMIR forces, personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and human rights officers;

5. Welcomes UNAMIR's efforts to increase its radio broadcasting capabilities so as to reach the refugee camps in neighbouring countries and expresses the hope that it will soon be possible for the Government of Rwanda to conclude appropriate arrangements with UNAMIR in this regard, including the allocation of a radio frequency;

6. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, and encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, particularly in Rwanda;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations on possible steps that could be taken by the United Nations to promote the establishment of an effective mine clearance programme in Rwanda;

8. Calls upon the international community to provide resources needed to meet the immediate needs of the Government of Rwanda, <sup>especially</sup> through the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council should he consider that the additional tasks in paragraph 3 require an adjustment in the logistic and personnel requirements of UNAMIR;

10. Decides to keep under review the situation in Rwanda and the role played by UNAMIR and, to that end, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 February 1995 and 9 April 1995, on UNAMIR's discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

11. Commends the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and his Special Humanitarian Envoy to coordinate the United Nations response to the various aspects of the crisis in Rwanda;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter

Distribution List

FC DIRECTIVE FOR THE HANDLING OF DETAINEES

Reference:

- A. Section 9: Op Directive No 2 Rules of Engagement.
- B. FC Directive for the Disposal of Criminals dated 8 Sep 94.

1. General. In the conduct of their duties, UNAMIR personnel may be required to apprehend people who have committed or are suspected of committing a hostile act or have a hostile intent against:

- a. oneself and the personnel in one's unit,
- b. other UNAMIR military or civilian personnel,
- c. non-UNAMIR humanitarian aid personnel,
- d. displaced persons, refugees and civilians in sites or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces, or
- e. other UN-authorized military or civilian personnel.

There may also be occasions where UNAMIR may be required to detain individuals who have stolen or are suspected of stealing items from: UNAMIR, UN, humanitarian organisations or UN protected sites (see Reference A paragraphs 4 b and 9).

2. Aim. The aim of this Directive is to outline the procedure for handling detainees.

3. Definition. For the purpose of this Directive detainee is any person who commits the type of activities described in paragraph 1 above.

4. Handling Procedures. All detainees are to be handled as follows:

---

- a. They are to be searched, disarmed and segregated. At all times they are to be treated in accordance with the principles of minimum force as detailed at Reference A.
- b. They are to be identified and their personal details recorded.
- c. A safe and secure place is to be arranged as a temporary place of custody. Detainees are to be kept in custody by UNAMIR troops for the minimum time necessary.
- d. detainees and the property found in their possession are to be handed to the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF KIGALI. The detainee is to be allowed to keep all property essential for his/her comfort and survival (eg food and water).
- e. During the handing over procedures from UNAMIR to the Office of the PROSECUTOR OF Kigali the ICRC should be present so that the personal details of the detainee may be recorded.
- f. Detainees are not to be handed to any other RPA authorities. The Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali is the only authorised Office in Kigali for the processing and handing over of detainees in Rwanda.
- g. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2 and G3 Ops:
  - (1) Name of the detainee,
  - (2) Location where person was detained,
  - (3) Crime person accused of,
  - (4) Name of the UNAMIR person who detained the person, and
  - (5) Date and time the detainee was handed to the Office of the Prosecutor of Kigali.

5. Note. Reference B is now cancelled.

GC TOUSIGNANT  
Major-General  
Force Commander

ANNEX A  
To Part 9

UN RESTRICTED

~~PAGE~~ 19

Rank: \_\_\_\_\_ Name: \_\_\_\_\_

A-2

UN RESTRICTED

GS PLANS 4

2 SEP 94



- (s) Organise all available resources to move the refugees/displaced persons.
- (t) Be prepared to provide transport for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.
- (u) Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.
- (v) Coordinate with the RPA regarding the safety of the people.
- (w) Assist relief committees in preparation of list of the affected families.
- (x) Assist the affected people in settling down to their respective homes.
- (y) Assess the requirement of the affected people for settling down specially in farming sector and forward the same to HAC.
- (z) Assist in the distribution of house building material and farming tools.
- (aa) Assist in the coordination of all activities of the NGOs.
- (ab) Be prepared to conduct up to company level reinforcement operations in Sector 1 on order.

(2) Phase 2. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

7. MALAWICOY (Motorized)

a. Grouping. As per UN Table of Organization and Equipment (strength 167 personnel). Company is allocated under OPCON of MILOB Sector Comd.

b. Tasks

(1) Phase I

- (a) Occupy and conduct operations in Sector 3.
- (b) Provide armed escorts as required.
- (c) Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps by static guards /mobile patrolling.
- (d) Participate in security operations with local authorities such as Communal Police and Gendarmerie.

		<u>LIST OF FILES</u>
		<u>'C' PLANS</u>
1.	OPERATION GENERAL	- 5000.1 (PLANS)
2	WITHDRAWAL/DEPLOYMENT	- 5000.2 (PLANS)
3	TRAINING GENERAL	- 5000.3 (PLANS)
4.	LOGISTIC GENERAL	- 5000.4 (PLANS)
5.	AIR MOVEMENT	- 5000.5 (PLANS)
6.	STAFF DUTIES	- 5000.6 (PLANS)
7.	STANDING OPERATION PROCEDURES (SOPs)	- 5000.7 (PLANS)
8.	RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)	- 5000.8 (PLANS)
9.	BRIEFING NOTES/REPORTS	- 5000.9 (PLANS)
10	STANDING/TAKING OVER/CEREMONY	- 5000.10 (PLANS)
11.	HUMANITARIAN (HAC)	- 5000.11 (PLANS)
12.	INTER OFFICE MEMO	- 5000.12 (PLANS)
13.	UNAMIR VEHICLE REGULATION	- 5000.13 (PLANS)
14.	COMMUNICATIONS	- 5000.14 (PLANS)
15.	UN NEUTRAL TERRITORY AT KIA	- 5000.15 (PLANS)
16.	DEMOBILIZATION/INFRASTRUCTURE	- 5000.16 (PLANS)
17.	RE-ASSESSMENT OF NEW PHASE II	- 5000.17 (PLANS)
18.	SITREP/OUTGOING FACIMILE	- 5000.18 (PLANS)
19.	GENERAL CONVENTION	- 5000.19 (PLANS)
20.	LOGISTIC PLAN FOR UNAMIR FORCES	- 5000.20 (PLANS)
21.	VISIT GENERAL	- 5000.21 (PLANS)
22.	STANDING OPERATION PROCEDURE (MP COY)	- 5000.22 (PLANS)
23.	KINIHIRA AGREEMENT	- 5000.23 (PLANS)
24.	STATIONERY	- 5000.24 (PLANS)
25.	RWANDA GENERAL MAP	- 5000.25 (PLANS)
26.	FORCE <sup>STRUCTURE</sup> <del>HQ</del> ORGANIZATION	- 5000.26 (PLANS)
27.	KIGALI WPN SECURE AREA	- 5000.27 (PLANS)
28.	LEAVE/CTO APPLICATION FORM	- 5000.28 (PLANS)

(s) Organise all available resources to move the refugees/displaced persons.

(t) Be prepared to provide transport for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

(u) Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.

(v) Coordinate with the RPA regarding the safety of the people.

(w) Assist relief committees in preparation of list of the affected families.

(x) Assist the affected people in settling down to their respective homes.

(y) Assess the requirement of the affected people for settling down specially in farming sector and forward the same to HAC.

(z) Assist in the distribution of house building material and farming tools.

(aa) Assist in the coordination of all activities of the NGOs.

(ab) Be prepared to conduct up to company level reinforcement operations in Sector 1 on order.

(2) **Phase 2.** Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

7. **MALAWICOY (Motorized)**

a. **Grouping.** As per UN Table of Organization and Equipment (strength 167 personnel). Company is allocated under OPCON of MILOB Sector Comd.

b. **Tasks**

(1) **Phase I**

(a) Occupy and conduct operations in Sector 3.

(b) Provide armed escorts as required.

(c) Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps by static guards /mobile patrolling.

(d) Participate in security operations with local authorities such as Communal Police and Gendarmerie.

Copy No    of  
UNAMIR  
Force HQ  
Kigali, Rwanda

8 Aug 1994

3000.15 (Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: OPERATION DIRECTIVE NO. 17

Reference:

- A.    Operation Order No 16 Dated 25 July 1994.
- B.    Modification No 1 to OPO - 1: Dated 6 Aug 94.

**SITUATION**

1.    a.    **Military**. The military situation in Rwanda has improved considerably and it seems that the war has ended with the capture of Gisenyi by RPA. RPA now controls the entire country excluding the HPZ in the south west. French Led Coalition Force (FCF) is continuing to disarm the members of the militia and other illegal elements in addition to their humanitarian activities. However, a considerable number of ex-government forces have taken shelter inside the HPZ though FCF has disarmed more than 8000 members of ex-government forces in Goma. FCF has also planned to withdraw from Rwanda by 22 August 94.
- b.    **Political**. Improvement in the Military situation has directly influenced the political situation. The newly formed BBGNU of Rwanda has started functioning. USA has already reopened its embassy in Rwanda and some other countries, for example Belgium, are also planning to re-establish their embassies in Rwanda. Beside this a number of high level teams from different countries are visiting Rwanda and having talks with the present Government.
- c.    **Humanitarian**. Humanitarian situation has deteriorated in Goma where more than a million Rwandese took refuge earlier in front of the RPA advance. Hundreds of people are dying every day in Goma due to the out break of disease and starvation. More and more NGOs are visiting and working in those areas. A lot of countries have come forward to assist and stabilize the situation.
- c.    **UNAMIR**. Changes in military, political and humanitarian aspect have also made UNAMIR to alter its working procedure. Under the expanded mandate of Security Council, UNAMIR is

now expected to deploy forces and support capabilities in RWANDA with an aim to contribute largely in the military, political and humanitarian fields. Ghana, UK, Australia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Canada and USA have agreed to contribute forces. Those of USA not coming directly under UNAMIR but in direct support for humanitarian assistance.

#### MISSION

2. UNAMIR is to assist and coordinate the humanitarian support of participating countries/organizations with a view to bring rapid and effective end to the crisis. in Rwanda.

#### EXECUTION

##### 3. Concept of Operation

a. The thrust of the effort is to bring back the refugees and displaced persons and resettle them in their respective home areas. About one million refugees are presently staying in Goma and two millions displaced persons are waiting to return home from Sector 4. Confidence building activities among the population in ensuring their security, extensive assistance in carrying out humanitarian tasks by different countries/ agencies, monitoring cease-fire, assisting Broad Base Government of National Unity to participate in establishing relief capability in Rwanda and in re-settling displaced persons/refugees is of paramount importance.

b. Most refugees/displaced persons seem eager to return to their home areas as quickly as possible. As an example over 50,000 have already started their long journey from Goma on foot. UNAMIR in consultation with US Forces and other contributing countries, has evolved a plan for their successful return. This operation must:

(1) Stabilize refugees/displaced persons in their present location.

(2) Encourage them to return to their home areas.

(3) Provide transportation, food, water, medical assistance and some accoutrements on their way to their home areas.

(4) Prepare home areas for return of refugees and improve essential life supporting services.

(5) Assist the people to return to their normal life.

(6) Handover in due course all humanitarian activities to the Rwandese Government.

c. The operation will be conducted in 4 phases:

(1) Phase 1. To continue in stabilizing the refugees/displaced persons in the present locations by providing food, water, medical support and rudimentary public health measures with an emphasis in sector 4 where limited to no services have created a situation of despair and a potential massive human tidal wave west to Bukavu. Simultaneously planning for home area preparation and repatriation of refugees/ displaced persons. Concurrently, open the Kigali International Airport for 24/7 operations and improve essential services in the capital, KIGALI.

(2) Phase 2. Phase 2 must emphasize the return of refugees to Rwanda and the enticement/encouragement of displaced persons in Rwanda to go back to their home areas. This phase will begin no later than Wednesday 10 Aug 94, with the deployment of the newly arrived UNAMIR, Canadian and US assets. KIGALI will be the centre of gravity of the humanitarian relief and sustainment effort/programme for Rwanda. The NODAL POINTS will be managed by the US Forces. From the NODAL POINTS materials will be brought to the Distributing Points under the arrangement of UNAMIR. UNAMIR along with NGOs and local authorities will distribute food and other item to the affected people. There will be a number of distributing points in each affected prefectures. Details to be worked out by HAC. Five NODAL POINTS will be established in RUHENGARI, BYUMBA, GITARAMA, BUTARE and GIKONGORO. In these NODAL POINTS trucks, food, assistance supplies (like soap), clean water and medical supplies and facilities will be stockpiled in a wholesale format. Men, experts, material handling, trucking and security will all be in evidence in order to ensure that onward distribution, and/or more extensive care/treatment, is provided to the various WAY STATIONS between these nodes and to the outlying areas under distribution from each node (see Annex A for boundaries of these humanitarian areas). The WAY STATIONS along the major return route are already being established every 20 Kms or so along the major priority corridor of GISENYI-RUHENGARI. This principal corridor leading to KIGALI will be implemented as priority one in this phase in order to relieve the pressure on GOMA. A pseudo-quarantine radius from the Zaire border is in effect (40 Kms, see Annex B) so as to screen cholera victims before they move beyond RUHENGARI to KIGALI. NGOs will be encouraged to assist in establishing the WAY STATIONS. Concurrently commence transport of seriously ill and other displaced persons from sector 4A and sector 4B through Gitarama to eastern and western prefectures. A second priority in this phase is the BURUNDI-BUTARE-GITARAMA-KIGALI corridor. The third priority is the TANZANIA-RUSUMO-KIBANGO, RWAMAGANA-KIGALI corridor. The Humanitarian Affairs Cell (HAC), of UNAMIR, with direct support from the US

civilian/ humanitarian element will coordinate all military support in the corridor so that there are no duplications in a particular area. The last priority is the BYUMBA-KIGALI corridor. During this phase, the majority of refugees will be returning to their home areas and emphasis will switch from route feeding and support to take-home WAY STATION centres located on the secondary axes.

(3) Phase 3. It is expected that most of the refugees/displaced persons will be well on their way to their home areas by the beginning of phase 3. They have to be supported logistically till the next harvest of crops expected by December/January if the planting happens in September/October as RWANDA is an aggro based country. Food, clean water, medical facilities, roads and bridges reconstruction, home building material and farming tools etc will have to be initiated and/or stockpiled in the NODAL POINTS for onward distribution and/or production.

(4) Phase 4. As conditions in RWANDA stabilize and BBGNU gets control of the situation and the Govt with NGOs is capable of providing sufficient assistance without direct UNAMIR and US support a progressive handover of all activities to the Govt and NGOs will be done in accordance with a normalisation process. This phase is accomplished when the majority of the refugees/displaced persons returned to their homes and the routine life sequence is re-established.

b. Deployment. The overall deployment of UNAMIR force will be as per OPO-16 (MOD-I). Operation Support Hope (US) and Operation Passage (Canada) will deploy according to coordination with UNAMIR and RPA.

#### US FORCES

4. a. Grouping. Will be provided by US Force.

b. Deployment. Operation Hope is requested to provide their detailed deployment plan by 03 Aug 94. Kigali Airport, Kacyru Gendarmerie Camp and NODAL POINTS will be the centres of deployments.

c. Tasks.

(1) Assist the Govt in re-structuring basic infrastructure in Kigali.

(2) Assist the Govt in re-vamping the Kigali Airport.

(3) Establish NODAL POINTS at RUHENGARI, BYUMBA, GITARAMA, BUTARE and GIKONGORO.

(4) Dump food and medical supplies at the NODAL POINTS.

(5) Provide purified water at the NODAL POINTS. Water may be purified at the NODAL POINTS and be stored for further distribution.

(6) Provide ware house control, material handling and trucks with drivers at the NODAL POINTS for carrying materials to the DISTRIBUTION POINTS.

(7) Assist UNAMIR in transporting refugees/displaced persons to their homes.

(8) Establish treatment centres at KIBONGO, GITARAMA and BUTARE.

#### CANDADIAN CONTINGENT

5. a. Grouping. 2 Fd Amb (RWANDA/ZAIRE) will deploy with a medical coy, an engr platoon with water purification detachment, a defence and security platoon and a services platoon.

b. Deployment. This will be in the vicinity of MARERU, in the commune MUTURA (RWANDA) - approx 10 km from the ZAIRE border and approx 20 km from GISENYI. Water purification will be provided at LAKE KARAGO or LAKE KIVU.

c. Tasks

(1) Establish hospital and medical clinic facilities at deployment sites.

(2) Provide medical support to refugees/displaced persons to stabilize their situation.

(3) Encourage refugees to return to their home areas.

(4) Assist NGOs where possible with the distribution of food and water to refugees/displaced persons.

(5) Assist UNAMIR in transporting the refugees to their home areas when possible.

#### HAC

6. a. Coordinate all activities of NGOs and other Humanitarian organizations.

b. Assist US Force in their humanitarian efforts.

c. Arrange reception of the refugees at GISENYI in coordination with Govt authorities and NGOs.

d. Identify the WAY STATIONS in between GISENYI and RUHENGARI and assist Sector 5 and NGOs in establishing the WAY STATIONS.



- e. Provide assistance to US Forces and NGOs to stabilize refugees in GOMA and BUKAVU.
- f. Attract and motivate refugees/displaced persons to return to their homes.
- g. Monitor the movement of refugees from GISENYI to RUHENGARI.
- h. Ensure that WAY STATIONS are well equipped with food, water and medical facilities.
- i. Coordinate with US Forces and NGOs for lifting refugees from RUHENGARI and GIKONGORO to their homes.
- j. Coord with US Forces for establishing NODAL POINTS.
- k. Select the DISTRIBUTION POINTS in the Prefecture/Commune in coordination with local authorities and Sector Commanders.
- l. Disseminate all pertinent data to human rights rapporteur.
- m. Prepare a guideline for the DISTRIBUTION PTS regarding their organization and tasks.
- n. Collect data from Sectors on the need of the affected people, eg. farming tools, seeds, fertilizer, house building materials, health centres etc.

SECTORS 1, 2, AND 3

- 7. a. Grouping. NO change from refs A and B.
- b. Deployment. No change from refs A and B.
- c. Tasks.
  - (1) Phase 1.
    - (a) Identify and list all the refugee/displaced persons' camp in the area of responsibility.
    - (b) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.
    - (c) Assist the NGOs and the US forces in distributing food, water and medical support.
    - (d) Provide security in the refugee/displaced persons' camp
    - (e) Assist the local authority in maintaining law and order situation in the camps.
    - (f) Carryout recce and establish water points in

coordination with the NGOs and local authorities at commune level.

(g) Carryout recce and find out the food distribution point at commune level.

(h) Organise all available resources to move the refugees/displaced persons.

(i) Be prepared to provide transports for the repatriation.

(j) Try and motivate the people to return to their home.

(2) Phase 2.

(a) Provide escort for the convoy carrying the refugees/displaced persons if required.

(b) Coordinate movement of displaced persons to their homes.

(c) Encourage all the people to return home.

(d) Coordinate with local authorities regarding the safety of the people.

(e) Assist the NGOs and the US forces in the NODAL POINTS.

(f) Make relief committee in coordination with the local authority at commune level for smooth operation of relief work.

(g) Assist the relief committee in preparation of list of the affected families.

(3) Phase 3.

(a) Assist the relief committee, NGOs and the US forces in distributing food, water and other relief items.

(b) Assist the affected people in settling down to their respective homes.

(c) Assess the requirement of the affected people in settling down specially in farming sector and forward the same to HAC.

(d) Assist in distributing of the house building material and farming tools.

(e) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.

(4) Phase 4. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

SECTOR 4A (GHANBATT)

8. a. Grouping. Same as OPO-16.
- b. Deployment. Same as OPO-16.
- c. Tasks. Tasks in addition to the tasks mentioned in OPO-16 are as follows:

(1) Phase 1.

- (a) Identify and list all the refugee/displaced persons' camp in the area of responsibility.
- (b) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.
- (c) Assist the NGOs and the US Force in distributing food, water and medical support.
- (d) Provide security in the refugee/displaced persons' camp.
- (e) Assist the local authority in maintaining the law and order situation in the camps.
- (f) Carryout recce and establish water points in coordination with the NGOs and local authorities at commune level.
- (g) Carryout recce and identify the food distribution points at commune level.
- (h) Organise all available resources to move the refugees/displaced persons.
- (i) Be prepared to provide transports for the repatriation.
- (j) Try and motivate the people to return to their home.

(2) Phase 2.

- (a) Provide escorts for the convoy carrying the refugees/displaced persons if required.
- (b) Provide transports and arrange convoy from GIKONGORO towards BUTARE / KIGALI / GITARAMA.
- (c) Encourage all the people to return home.

(d) Coordinate with the RPF regarding the safety of the people.

(e) Assist the NGOs and the US Forces in the NODAL POINTS.

(f) Make relief committee in coordination with the local authority at commune level for smooth operation of relief work.

(g) Assist the relief committee in preparation of list of the affected families.

(3) Phase 3.

(a) Assist the relief committee, NGOs and the US Forces in distributing food, water and other relief items.

(b) Assist the affected people in settling down to their respective homes.

(c) Assess the requirement of the affected people for settling down specially in farming sector and forward the same to HAC.

(d) Assist in distributing of the house building material and farming tools.

(e) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.

(4) Phase 4. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

SECTOR 4B (SENEGALESE/CHADIAN BN)

9. a. Grouping.

b. Deployment. Will continue to remain in Sector 4B.

c. Tasks.

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Identify and list all the refugee/displaced persons' camp in the area of responsibility.

(b) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.

(c) Assist the NGOs and the US Forces in distributing food, water and medical support.

(d) Provide security in the refugee/displaced persons' camp.

(e) Assist the local authority in maintaining the law and order situation in the camps.

(f) Carryout recce and establish water points in coordination with the NGOs and local authorities at commune level.

(g) Carryout recce and identify the food distribution points at commune level.

(h) Organise all available resources to move the refugees/displaced persons.

(i) Be prepared to provide transport for the repatriation.

(j) Try and motivate the people to return to their home.

(2) Phase 2.

(a) Provide escorts for the convoy carrying the refugees/displaced persons if required.

(b) Provide transports and arrange convoy for displaced persons returning home.

(c) Encourage all the people to return home.

(d) Coordinate with the RPF regarding the safety of the people.

(e) Assist the NGOs and the US Forces in the NODAL POINTS.

(f) Make relief committee in coordination with the local authority at commune level for smooth operation of relief work.

(g) Assist the relief committee in preparation of list of the affected families.

(3) Phase 3.

(a) Assist the relief committee, NGOs and the US forces in distributing food, water and other relief items.

(b) Assist the affected people in settling down to their respective homes.

(c) Assess the requirement of the affected people for settling down specially in farming sector and forward the same to HAC.

(d) Assist in distributing of the house building material and farming tools.

(e) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.

(4) Phase 4. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

SECTOR 4C (ETHIOPIAN BN)

10. a. Grouping. As per UN table of organisation.

b. Deployment. Will be deployed in Sector 4C.

c. Tasks.

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Identify and list all the refugee/displaced persons' camp in the area of responsibility.

(b) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.

(c) Assist the NGOs and the US forces in distributing food, water and medical support.

(d) Provide security in the refugee/displaced persons' camp.

(e) Assist the local authority in maintaining the law and order situation in the camps.

(f) Carryout recte and establish water points in coordination with the NGOs and local authorities at commune level.

(g) Carryout recce and identify the food distribution points at commune level.

(h) Organise all available resources to move the refugees/displaced persons.

(i) Be prepared to provide transports for the repatriation.

(j) Try and motivate the people to return to their home.

(2) Phase 2.

(a) Provide escort for the convoy carrying the refugees/displaced persons if required.

(b) Provide transports and arrange convoy for displaced persons' returning home.

(c) Encourage all the people to return home.

(d) Coordinate with the RPF regarding the safety of the people.

(e) Assist the NGOs and the US Force in the NODAL POINTS.

(f) Make relief committee in coordination with the local authority at commune level for smooth operation of relief work.

(g) Assist the relief committee in preparation of list of the affected families.

(3) Phase 3.

(a) Assist the relief committee, NGOs and the US Force in distributing food, water and other relief items.

(b) Assist the affected people in settling down to their respective homes.

(c) Assess the requirement of the affected people for settling down specially in farming sector and forward the same to HAC.

(d) Assist in distributing of the house building material and farming tools.

(e) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.

(4) Phase 4. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

SECTOR 5

11. a. Grouping. No change from refs A and B.

b. Deployment. No change from refs A and B.

c. Tasks.

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Identify and list all the refugee/displaced persons' camp in the area of responsibility.

(b) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.

(c) Assist the NGOs and the US forces in distributing food, water and medical support.

(d) Provide security in the refugee/displaced persons' camp.

(e) Assist the local authority in maintaining the law and order situation in the camps.

(f) Carryout recce and establish water points in coordination with the NGOs and local authorities at commune level.

(g) Carryout recce and find out the food distribution point at commune level.

(h) Organise all available resources to move the refugees/displaced persons.

(i) Be prepared to provide transport for the repatriation.

(j) Try and motivate the people to return to their home.

(2) Phase 2

(a) Provide escort for the convoy carrying the refugees/displaced persons if required.

(b) Provide transports and arrange convoy from GISENYI to RUHENGARI.

(c) Encourage all the people to return home.

(d) Coordinate with the RPF regarding the safety of the people.

(e) Assist the NGOs and the US Forces in the NODAL POINTS.

(f) Assist in the distribution of food and water in the WAY POINTS.

(g) Make relief committee in coordination with the local authority at commune level for smooth operation of relief work.

(h) Assist the relief committee in preparation of list of the affected families

(3) Phase 3

(a) Assist the relief committee, NGOs and the JS forces in distributing food, water and other relief items.

(b) Assist the affected people in settling down to their respective homes.

(c) Assess the requirement of the affected people for settling down specially in farming sector and forward the same to HAC.




(d) Assist in distributing of the house building material and farming tools.

(e) Coordinate all the activities of the NGOs.

(4) Phase 4. Handover all activities to the Government and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

12. All sectors will report to Force HQ for direction regardless of whether they are commanded by a MILOB or a Battalion Commander. MILOB Gp HQ and CIVPOL HQ will continue to have their normal liaison, coordination and administrative tasks associated with their personnel. OP support Hope (US) and OP Passage (CDN), although under national control vice UNAMIR will operate in close cooperation and support of the UNAMIR humanitarian effort. Detail Command and Control net work is given in Annex - C.

  
R A DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander

Annexes

- A. Map showing NODAL POINTS and WAY STATIONS.
- B. Map showing Pseudo - Quarantine Radius.
- C. Command and Control Net Work

Distribution:

External:

Action:	<u>Copy No</u>
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
Internal:

Action:

DFC	14
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
Information:

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Spare	25-30




LEGEND

1. NODAL POINT - □



UNAMIR COMMAND AND CONTROL



UNAMIR FORCE HQ  
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS: 6

TO: GHANBATT ZAMBATT TAC HQ MILOB	FROM: G. TOUSIGNANT MAJ GEN FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
INFO: FRAFBATT ETHIOBATT TUNBATT MALAWI COY CANSIGS AUSMED UNCIVPOL	DATE: 23 AUGUST 1994
INTERNAL: DFC D/COS OPS C LOGO  FMO	ORIGINATOR: G3 PLANS
FAX: 00-873-151-5560 00-873-383-020021 00-871-383-020051 00-873-383-020056 00-871-151-5556 00-873-383-020026 00-871-144-6462 00-873-154-5273	FAX: 1-212-963-3090 TEL: 3 3091

SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER.

REFERENCE: OPORD NO 16 AND OP DIR 17.

SITUATION

1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN RWANDA IS REPORTED TO REMAIN CALM. CONFIDENCE AND SENSE OF SECURITY IN SECTOR 4 IS EXPECTED TO IMPROVE DURING THE COMING WEEKS. ZAMBATT RECCE PARTY WILL ARRIVE KIGALI ON 25 AUG.

1  
Seen  
21/11

MISSION

2. ZAMBATT AND GHANBATT ARE TO DEPLOY TO AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 4A AND 2 RESPECTIVELY.

EXECUTION

3. GENERAL OUTLINE. A TWO PHASE OPERATION AS FOLLOWS:

- a. PHASE 1 ZAMBATT IS TO CONDUCT A RELIEF IN PLACE (RIP) WITH GHANBATT IN SECTOR 4A.
- b. PHASE 2 GHANBATT IS TO REDEPLOY TO AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 2.

4. GROUPING AND TASKS

a. ZAMBATT

(1) GROUPING - NO CHANGE

(2) TASKS

(a) PHASE 1

(i) CONDUCT RIP WITH GHANBATT.

(ii) CONDUCT OPERATIONS JOINTLY WITH GHANBATT.

(b) PHASE 2. CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 4A IN ACCORDANCE WITH GHANBATT DISPOSITIONS.

(c) GHANBATT

(1) GROUPING - NO CHANGE

(2) TASKS

(a) PHASE 1

(i) CONDUCT RIP WITH ZAMBATT.

(ii) CONDUCT OPERATIONS JOINTLY WITH ZAMBATT.

(b) PHASE 2

(i) REDEPLOY TO SECTOR 2.

(ii) CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 2.

5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

a. TIMINGS

(1) PHASE 1

(a) ZAMBATT RECCE OF SECTOR 4A COMPLETE BY 29 AUG.

(b) GHANBATT RECCE OF SECTOR 2 COMPLETE BY 2 SEP.

(c) RIP COMPLETE BY 101800B SEP 94

(2) PHASE 2

(a) GHANBATT NOT TO COMMENCE MOVE TO SECTOR 2 FROM SECTOR 4A BEFORE 101800B SEP 94.

b) GHANBATT TO BE CLEAR OF SECTOR 4A BY 111800B SEP 94.

(c) SECTOR 2 TO BE OCCUPIED BY 121800B SEP 94.

(d) CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SECTOR 2 BY 131800B SEP 94.

b. LIAISON

(1) ZAMBATT TO EFFECT LIAISON WITH UNAMIR TAC HQ TO COORDINATE PASSAGE THROUGH SECTOR 3.

(2) GHANBATT TO EFFECT LIAISON WITH UNAMIR TAC HQ TO COORDINATE PASSAGE THROUGH SECTOR 3.

(3) MILOBS TO ESCORT ZAMBATT RECCE PARTY KIGALI TO SECTOR 4A AND RETURN.

6. ADMIN AND LOG

a. AMMO

(1) PHASE 1 AND 2 AS DIRECTED IN OPORD 16.

b. POL

(1) ZAMBATT

(a) PHASE 1



- (i) DEPLOY WITH STOCKS TO 10 SEP TO BE COLLECTED FROM LOG SUPPORT BASE KIGALI PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT FROM KIGALI.

- (a) PHASE 2

- (i) RESUPPLY BY 2ND LINE TRANSPORT TO ZAMBATT LOG ELEMENT 9 SEP 94.

- (2) GHANBATT

- (a) PHASE 1

- (i) FIRST LINE STOCK HOLDINGS.

- (b) PHASE 2

- (i) RESUPPLY OF 7 DAYS TO BE COLLECTED BY GHANBATT LOG ELEMENT 9 SEP 94 ON MOVE THROUGH KIGALI.

c. RATIONS AND WATER

- (1) ZAMBATT

- (a) PHASE 1

- (i) DEPLOY WITH RATIONS AND WATER FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND MAIN BODY TO 10 SEP. TO BE COLLECTED FROM LOG SUPPORT BASE PRIOR TO MOVE FROM KIGALI.

- (b) PHASE 2

- (i) RESUPPLY BY 2ND LINE TRANSPORT TO ZAMBATT LOG ELM ON 9 SEP.

- (2) GHANBATT

- (a) PHASE 1

- (i) FIRST LINE HOLDINGS TO 10 SEP. IF RESUPPLY REQUIRED BEFORE THIS TIMING, GHANBATT TO NOTIFY LOG COORD CELL HQ UNAMIR.

- (b) PHASE 2

- (i) GHANBATT LOG ELEMENT TO COLLECT FROM LOG SUPPORT BASE 7 DAYS ON MOVE THROUGH KIGALI ON 10 SEP.

d. TRANSPORT

(1) ZAMBATT AND GHANBATT

(a) PHASE 1 AND 2

- (i) SELF DEPLOY. IF UNABLE TO SELF DEPLOY AN ELEMENT THEN CONTINGENTS ARE TO BID AT THE EARLIEST NOTICE TO LOG COORDINATION CELL HQ UNAMIR FOR 2ND LINE TRANSPORT SUPPORT.

e. REPAIR AND RECOVERY

(1) ZAMBATT AND GHANBATT

(a) PHASE 1 AND 2

- (i) A VEHICLE RECOVERY TO BE FORWARD WITH FIRST LINE ELM. IF FIRST LINE ASSET NOT SUITABLE RECOVERY BID TO LOG COORDINATION CELL HQ UNAMIR FOR SECOND LINE RECOVERY TASKING.
- (ii) B AND C VEHICLE RECOVERED FORWARD BY FIRST LINE ASSET.
- (iii) FORWARD REPAIR TO BE EFFECTED. BACKLOADING ONLY ON ASSESSMENT OF TASK BY SECOND LINE REPAIR AGENCY (BRITCON).

f. MEDICAL

(1) ZAMBATT AND GHANBATT

(a) PHASE 1 AND 2

- (i) TREATMENT AT UNIT LEVEL. EVACUATION TO BE COORD BY AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL (AUSMED) STAFF, HQ UNAMIR TO AUSMED BUTARI OR TO AUSMED FIELD HOSPITAL KIGALI.

COMD AND SIG

7. TAC HQ LOC BUTARE.

REMAINING LOCS PER REF A.

# G3 PLANS

H  
K

RF

OK

Re: UNAMIR A. UNAMIR CP 1 0411 31 AUG 94

Time zone used throughout this order: BRAVO

## Situation

1. General Phase 1 of current operations is developing according to plan. The situation in Sector 4 is now sufficiently stable to commence Phase 2.
2. Political The political process must be accelerated in order to develop a national will for reintegration. In order for the RENP to succeed, a secure and stable environment must exist so that outside agencies and governments feel confident enough to invest funds and resources to assist the BCGNU to rebuild Rwanda. Accordingly, UNAMIR must create an atmosphere of law and order while gradually introducing BCGNU government officials and RPA elements without causing unrest or undue concern among the Rwandan population in Sector 4.
3. Threat There are reports of as many as ten (10) thousand RGF members located in ZAIRE opposite CYANGUGU. These soldiers are believed to have crossed with 50% of their personal weapons. The possibility of having heavy weapons can not be disregarded. About two thirds of these soldiers were recruited and trained during the civil war and are believed to be poorly trained.
4. There are strong rumours that these soldiers are being trained by the ZAIRIAN army. None of these reports/rumours have been confirmed.
5. During the past week, there have been reports of RGF members being seen entering Rwanda in small groups. Some have been seen crossing the border in civilian clothes. They have been using the normal roads either by vehicles or on foot. There are also increased reports on RGF banditry and murders in the sector. Some of the RGF members have surrendered themselves and some have surrendered weapons, grenades and vehicles. There are also reports on RGF members blocking refugees returning to Rwanda.
6. Assessment The possibility of the RGF mounting a large scale formed attack in Sector 4 in the next thirty days or so is very minimal. The likelihood of insurgent activity on a small scale (ie section/ platoon attack or raids) will grow. They may only be able to mount a large scale attack when they re-organize which may take some time. The possibility of RGF establishing caches (especially in the forests) can not be ruled out either.
7. The chances of direct attacks on UNAMIR forces in Sector 4

are significantly higher than in other sectors. However, should relations be established between Zaire and the BBGNU, the RGF will further be isolated, thus decreasing its capabilities.

8. RPA Capability Approximately five-plus brigades. Many soldiers are newly recruited and trained. Careful selection must be stressed for sensitive tasks inside Sector 4 if insertion is contemplated especially in the early phases.

9. UNAMIR Forces Currently three battalions, one independent company and support elements are deployed. Within the next week, a further battalion and a company group will be deployed along with the advance party of an additional battalion.

#### Mission

10. UNAMIR is to monitor, control and facilitate the reintegration of the BBGNU and the RPA of RWANDA into Sector 4.

#### Execution

11. General Outline Reintegration will be effected, initially, with the installation of Prefects in Sectors 4A, 4B and 4C at GIKONGORO, KIBUYE AND CYANGUGU, respectively. Each Prefect will be escorted by a platoon size RPA security element. A gradual increase to RPA presence in the sector in the immediate future can be anticipated. Within the framework of the current operation, UNAMIR will conduct 'normal', yet vigilant, operations with particular emphasis on manning check points, patrolling and the security of vital points.

12. Grouping and Tasks.

a. Grouping No change.

b. Tasks

(1) MILOB

(a) Provide escort teams for Prefect insertion and subsequent movement within the Prefecture;

(b) Provide continuous liaison with the RPA and the Prefect;

(c) Provide escort for RPA resupply on order.

(2) CIVPOL

(a) Coordinate the dispatch of BBGNU Police Administrators to each of the Sector 4 Prefectures with a CIVPOL monitor to observe and report;

(b) Supervise the screening of Communal Police and the issue of credentials;

(c) Develop an abbreviated training plan to induct Community Police;

(d) Observe and monitor the recruitment, screening and training of ex-RGF Gendarmes.

(3) GHANBATT

(a) Man check points along PINK route within boundaries;

(b) Identify location of Prefect's final destination and establish outer security cordon to complement RPA security;

(c) Complement RPA security as the Prefect moves throughout the Prefecture.

(d) Assist in the legitimization process of the Communal Police.

(4) FRAFBATT

(a) Man check points along RED route within boundaries;

(b) Identify location of Prefect's final destination and establish outer security cordon to complement RPA security;

(c) Complement RPA security as the Prefect moves throughout the Prefecture.

(d) Assist in the legitimization process of the Communal Police.

(5) ETHIOBATT

(a) Man check points along PINK route within boundaries;

(b) Identify location of Prefect's final destination and establish outer security cordon to complement RPA security;

(c) Complement RPA security as the Prefect moves throughout the Prefecture.

(d) Continue disarmament and reintegration of FCF installed Gendarmerie.

(e) Assist in the legitimization process of the Communal Police.

(6) UNAMIR TAC HQ

(a) Provide radio relay as required.

(b) Monitor and record all transmissions.

13. Coordinating Instructions

a. Timings

- (1) D Day - 6 Sep
- (2) Recce complete 051400 Sep 94
- (3) Man check points and vital points by 051800 Sep 94
- (4) MILOBS to man RV by 051800 Sep 94

b. Routes See Annex C to Reference A.

c. RV Points

- (1) Sector 4A - vic GR596224
- (2) Sector 4B - vic GR440721
- (3) Sector 4C - vic GR368218

Administration and Logistics

14. RPA to be self sufficient. Sector Commanders to be prepared to provide emergency logistic support on order by UNAMIR HQ.

15. Medical AUSMED CCP to remain at BUTARE.

Command and Signals


16. Control of Sector 4 to revert to UNAMIR HQ (Main) with effect 0530 Sep 94.

17. Nicknames

HIGH TIME	Escort commenced	Issued by MILOB
BROKEN ARROW	Escort complete	Issued by MILOB

Acknowledge Instruction

ACK



G.C. Tousignant  
MGEN  
Force Commander

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Tac HQ  
MILOB HQ  
CIVPOL  
GHANBATT  
FRAFATT  
ETHIOBATT

Information

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ERITCON  
CANSIGS

Internal  
SRSG  
MA to FC  
DFC  
D COS OPS  
FMO  
G1  
G2  
G3  
G3 Plans  
G4  
G6  
Mil Spokesman



UNAMIR FORCE HQ  
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

*G3 PLANS*  
*5/9*

04 SEP 94

<p>TO: TAC HQ DFC AUSCON COMD BRITCON COMD CONCON COMD GHANCON COMD CMO HAC SECTOR 1 COMD SECTOR 2 COMD SECTOR 3 COMD SECTOR 4A COMD SECTOR 4B COMD SECTOR 4C COMD SECTOR 5 COMD CIVPOL G3 PLANS G4 CLO UNREO</p>	<p>FROM: G3 OPS UNAMIR HQ KIGALI, RWANDA <i>Li-wf</i></p>
<p>FAX: 00-871-383-020056 00 873-151-5561 00-873-383-020020 00-871-383-020050 00-871-151-5555 00-871-151-5556</p>	<p>FAX: (250) 84265</p>
<p>INFO: FC</p>	
<p>SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER</p>	
<p>NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THE COVER: TWO</p>	

1. THERE WILL BE ORDERS GROUP AT UNAMIR HQ (OPERATIONS) AT 1000 HRS MON 5 SEP 94.
2. ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES TO ATTEND .
3. SECTOR 1, 2 AND 3 COMDS WILL COME BY OWN TRANSPORT.
4. THE FOLLOWING WILL STANDBY TO BE AIRLIFTED FOR THE ORDERS GROUP:

- A. COO TAC HQ.
- B. SECTOR 4A COMD.
- C. SECTOR 4B COMD.
- D. SECTOR 4C COMD.

5 ACK.

# G3 PLANS

Distr

G3 Plans 2 MK-

G3 Plans 3

G3 Plans 4 7D 5/9/94

G3 Plans CLK

H  
K

4

0200

19

Reference: A. UNAMIR 01 18 00 131 00 00

Time zone used throughout this order: BRAVO

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
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ACK



G.C. Tousignant  
MGEN  
Force Commander

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Tac HQ  
MILOB HQ  
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FRAFATT  
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Information

AUSMED  
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CANSEGS

Internal

SRSG

MA to FC

DFC

D COS OPS

FMO

G1

G2

G3

G3 Plans

G4

G6

Mil Spokesman

FILE MIL INFO

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

TO: HQ UNAMIR KIGALI // COS //

FROM: COMD MILOB SECTOR 5 GISENYI

DATE: 20 NOV 94

SUBJ: RECONNAISSANCE OF GOMA AREA REFUGEE CAMPS

1. Attached is report of subject reconnaissance conducted 14 - 16 Nov 94 by Sector 5 HAC team.

*M. Austdal*

AM Austdal  
LCol

Attachments: 1

② HQUNAMIR OR

1. Copies to FC, DFC, DCOS Sp, DCOS Ops, G3 Plans and G2.

*[Signature]*  
G3 Plans  
26/11

*[Signature]*  
DCOS Ops  
24.11



GOMA AREA REFUGEE CAMPS:  
GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND TERRAIN  
ESTIMATE

Map Ref: Joint Operations Graphic (Air) SA 35-4 / 35 - 8  
(1:250,000)

GENERAL

1. While UNHCR reports 6 x Goma Area camp areas, for military planning purposes the Goma area camps can be discussed in four general groups:

a. MUGUNGA CAMP ( GOMA Area Camps )

Incl:

MUGUNGA ( primary )  
ZURO  
KITUKO  
NDOSHO  
BULENGO  
HIMBI  
MUGAMBIRO

Area population approximately 200,000 including estimated 23,000 FAR.

b. KIBUMBA CAMP

Incl:

KIBUMBA ( primary )

Area population approximately 210,000. Small (300) FAR presence.

c. KATALE CAMP

Incl:

KATALE ( primary )  
RUGARI  
KARENGERA  
KAHINDO  
RUBARE

Area population approximately 230,000. Small FAR

presence.

d. RUTSHURU / JOMBA CAMPS

Incl:

RUTSHURU  
BUHUNDA  
KIHALI  
MABUNGO  
REMER  
RANGIRA  
KIBANDA  
KABINDI  
KINYONI  
KITUMAINI  
BUGUSA

Area population approximately 50-80,000. Small FAR (500) presence.

2. Camps listed at sub-para a.- c. are "official camps" and are administered by UN agencies and NGOs. Camps listed in sub-para d. are "unofficial camps" and receive aid from a limited number of NGOs only. There is no UN presence at these camps.

3. UN policy for the camps remains provision of emergency humanitarian assistance only. No assistance supporting "permanency" such as aid to schools, hard accommodation, etc. is provided. Construction of road networks in the primary camps and in some cases construction of central market place sites are seen to be control measures and are related to security. An example of this is the construction of a market place site on the western edge of the MUGUNGA camp. The aim is to negate the requirement for FAR (concentrated at ZURO camp) to enter MUGKUNGA to utilize the markets presently located there.

4. Although incidents of shooting and killing occur routinely in the camps, the overall security situation at this time is generally good in terms of the safety of aid workers. I observed aid workers moving freely and unescorted through all camps. All are aware, however, that the security situation could change rapidly and without warning as has been evidenced by a number of potentially dangerous situations in the past. As all routes through camp areas are controlled by refugee "camp authorities" aid workers can be held in camps or prevented from entering camps. Presently all aid workers conduct operations in the camps in daylight hours only. While international aid workers may not yet be directly targeted there is a danger that they could become accidental victims of an incident in or around the camps. A comprehensive security plan for UN/NGOs has been prepared by UNHCR protection staff and submitted to UNNY for comment approval in the past week.

5. Control within all camps is exercised by several layers of "local government" ( cell chefs, committee sociale, etc ). "Security" is provided by a force known as "La Jeune-es." Elements of this group that were observed could be identified by beret headdress and whistles worn around their necks. Civilian dress is worn. No arms were observed but it was reported by several UNHCR Field Officers and others that small arms and grenades have been seen to be carried covertly by this force during some recent incidents. Whistle signals are used for communications.

6. The term "La Jeune-es" seems to be applied generically to all former members of the RGF and militia including Interhamwe. The use of the terms FAR, RGF and Interhamwe appears to be discouraged in the camps.

7. FAR observed appeared to be in good condition i.e. well fed and physically fit. Most do not wear uniforms but can be identified by military footwear and accoutrements. FAR bivouacs did not seem to be organized on military lines. No defenses were evident. Only TCV (3-TON) vehs and busses were seen.

8. Zaire military / police presence in the area of the camps appears to be limited to small police posts ( Garde Civil or Gendarmerie ) located at edges of main camps. On several occasions these personnel have reportedly responded to incidents inside the camps but in general they do not enter the camps or conduct patrols. Larger concentrations (coy size ?) of Zaire military or Garde Civil are found at:

- a. GOMA (military and Garde Civil);
- b. RUGARI (military); and
- c. RUTSHURU (Garde Civil)

UNHCR Security and Protection Officers note that there are many problems experienced with Zaire military and police. UNAMIR is aware of this situation. When observed during this recce Zaire troops and Garde Civil appeared very disorganized and poorly equipped. This was noticeable even at the HQ position visited near KATALE camp. At KITUMAINI camp the local Garde Civil commander asked (a UNHCR Field Officer) for UN assistance in disarming FAR and militia at that camp. He said that Garde Civil could not do this.

#### INSPECTION OF CAMP AREAS

9. Goma area camps were inspected 14/15/16 November 94 by Sect 5 MILOB HAC team. Fol factors were evaluated:

- a. Terrain incl route infrastructure and going;

- b. Gen sit incl presence / posns of FAR; and
- c. Factors effecting possible deployment of secur force.

10. Principle UNHCR Fd Offrs were interviewed at all camps to provide insight into local sit and concerns. UNHCR Secur / Protection Offrs were interviewed to provide info on present sit and concerns.

#### **MUGUNGA AREA CAMPS**

11. Gen. MUGUNGA is a large and densely populated camp loc immed WEST of GOMA. Population is gen civilian but presence of militia is probable. Population is estimated to be 200,000. Camp is currently being developed by UNHCR with an aim of easing density of population. Developments include an expanded road network on perimeter of the camp and construction of market area and food distribution point to the WEST of the present camp centre. NGOs move freely within the camp and situation appears gen calm at this time.

12. FAR. FAR elements in this area are concentrated immed WEST of this camp at ZURO. Note that FAR elements presently use the MUGUNGA camp market. It is hoped that FAR presence in the camp will be reduced when new market is established WEST of camp and outside of camp boundaries. Most FAR now wear civ dress to gain access to food distribution. Possible identifiers include age, bearing and the wearing of military boots with other accoutrements (berets, belts, etc.)

13. Gen Terrain. Camps in this area are situated on a bed of volcanic rock. Terrain is gen difficult for movement by vehs of all types off road. Movement on foot is restricted by the extremely dense concentration of makeshift dwellings. Vegetation in the camp proper is non-existent, but perimeter areas are covered with a dense, low brush. Several high features surround the camps offering good points of observation over the area.

14. Roads. Main EAST/WEST road (GOMA - SAKE) is paved 2-lane. This route is in good condition and facilitates high speed movement through the area. Terrain NORTH and SOUTH of the road is gen non-passable to wh vehs allowing road to be easily blocked. MUGUNGA camp is circled by a newly constructed perimeter road and intersected by several newly constructed tracks. In all cases these have been scraped out of the lava bed and in some areas are very rough. Rubber tired vehs will be likely to experience rapid tire wear and failure. Tracked vehs will be prone to thrown tracks as large stones lodge between track and road wheels on turns. If cross-country movement is necessary only tracked vehs will be suitable. This movement will be very slow.

15. Obstacles to Movement. Dwellings covering the area, though

dense, are of flimsy construction and will pose no obstacle to cross-country movement. However, the loose composition of the surface terrain (pumice rock) will likely cause some reduced mobility for tracks and wheels on even slight inclines. Also present in the camp are many small walls constructed of lava stone reinforced with cribbing and in some cases cement. A high power line parallels the EAST/WEST road through the camp. This will be an obstacle to helicopters.

16. **Factors Effecting Deployment of UN Troops.** Any troops positioned in this area will face the same infrastructure difficulties currently faced by the refugees. Lack of available water, difficulty in constructing sanitation facilities, etc. The concentration of camps in this area will restrict development of any large base camp. Lake KIVU is obvious water source for resupply of deployed personnel in this sector. GOMA AIRPORT could be utilized as LOG BASE as was done by French OP TURQUOISE force.

#### KIBUMBA AREA CAMPS

17. **Gen.** KIBUMBA is a very large camp that sprawls for approximately 5 kms on the EAST side of the GOMA - RUTSHURU road. This camp lies very close to and immediately WEST of the RWANDA - ZAIRE border and 15 kms NORTH of GOMA. The terrain is generally open with no vegetation. The camp is overlooked by a high ridgeline on the RWANDA - ZAIRE border. Ground to the WEST of the camp, including the main road, also overlooks the camp. Several high features lie within the area of the camp.

18. **FAR.** FAR presence in the camp is estimated to be 3 - 500. These soldiers appear to be concentrated at the SOUTH end of the camp site. There is a heavy militia presence in the camp.

19. **Gen Terrain.** The terrain is gen flat and open. Density of dwellings is medium to heavy. There are few obstacles to movement within the camp itself. Off-road movement would be possible for tracked vehs but would be very slow due to undulating nature of the ground.

20. **Roads.** Main GOMA - RUTSHURU road is paved two-lane and facilitates fast movement. Terrain adjacent to road is gen open and could be crossed by tracked vehs. There is a good system of secondary tracks including a perimeter track inside the camp itself. Surface is earth over volcanic rock.

21. **Obstacles to Movement.** There are few obstacles to movement by tracked within the camp. There is no significant vegetation in the camp area. The ground WEST of the main GOMA - RUTSHURU road rises steeply to VOLCAN NYIRAGONGO and is heavily wooded. It is impassable to veh movement and in poor weather is an obstacle to air/helicopter ops.

22. **Factors Effecting Deployment of UN Troops.** This area offers many sites for large scale deployments on commanding ground. Proximity of GOMA (15 kms) is an important factor for logistic planning. There is good potential for isolating this camp if required.

#### KATALE AREA CAMPS

23. **Gen.** The KATALE/KAHINDO camps sprawl for approximately 15 kms through a narrow volcanic valley 35 kms NORTH of GOMA. The camps have been constructed on a lava plateau. Viewed from the ground the camps have a somewhat "lunar" appearance.

24. **FAR.** There is limited FAR presence in this camp. There is a heavy militia presence.

25. **Gen Terrain.** Terrain is extremely difficult for movement, with undulating ground cross-hatched with deep fissures (some emitting toxic volcanic gasses) and patches of thick scrub brush. In low areas deep swamps/small lakes have formed. Dominating ground to the EAST is very steep and covered with banana plantations or thick jungle. Ground to WEST of camps is generally covered with thick scrub. Off road movement is impossible for all types of vehs and is difficult and slow for foot movement.

26. **Roads.** The main GOMA-RUTSHURU road running NORTH/SOUTH is paved 2-lane as far as RUTSHURU. This road runs through the valley bottom or along the EAST side of the valley and is very restricted. It could be easily blocked. Roads NORTH and EAST of RUTSHURU are narrow dirt tracks through heavy jungle. While heavy lift vehs travelling from UGANDA now utilize these routes they are very difficult, especially during rainy seasons. However, with basic maintenance these routes offer alternative supply lines. Roads within the camps are under construction. A perimeter road around KATALE camp will be completed within 2 weeks. All areas of the camps are connected by a system of foot trails.

27. **Obstacles to Movement.** The volcanic rock and gen nature of the terrain is an obstacle to all veh movement. Field Officers interviewed noted that on average a pair of boots lasts only one month in these camps.

28. **Factors Effecting Deployment of UN Troops.** Troops deployed to this area must be completely self-contained. All construction including digging of latrines is extremely difficult. Resupply line from GOMA will be very vulnerable. Note that there is an unmarked airstrip located near the SOUTH end of KATALE camp, EAST of the main road. This is a grass strip 1100 m x 100 m which is suitable

for helicopters and possibly as a site for a small log base. It is presently occupied by a platoon and HQ of Zaire Garde Civil.

#### RUTSHURU/JOMBA AREA CAMPS

29. **Gen.** Camps in this area are small (avg pop. 5,000) and are situated in clear areas surrounded by heavy jungle. Limited support to refugees is provided by local missions and some NGOs. Populations essentially "live off the land."

30. **FAR.** There is some militia presence in all camps. FAR presence appears to be confined to KITUMAINI camp (200). Zaire Garde Civil post there noted that FAR regularly conducts armed patrols in the region, covering the approaches to routes through the VOLCANO PARK (Karisimbi Region).

31. **Gen Terrain.** Area is thick rain forest with ground generally rising towards the volcano peaks in the SOUTHEAST. Thick canopy prevents roads from drying completely during the rainy season. There are a number of small rivers in the area, several running close to the principle roads. A number of mission schools provide the only hard accommodation. Most dwellings are of mud-hut type.

32. **Roads.** EAST-WEST road running through RUTSHURU is the primary route in the region. It is a dirt single lane road which is difficult in rainy seasons. Secondary tracks run through the many banana plantations along this road, offering limited by-pass options at some points.

33. **Obstacles to Movement.** Jungle is impassable to vehicles. Main route is difficult to wheeled vehs in rainy season. All routes are easily blocked.

34. **Factors Effecting Deployment of UN Troops.** Mission schools provide the best sites for firm base locations. A good hospital is located near KIBANDA ( EAST of RUTSHURU). Troops deployed to this area must be self-sufficient. Supply lines from GOMA are very vulnerable. Possible routes through UGANDA could be considered in logistic planning. Engineer and recovery resources must be considered.

#### CONCLUSIONS

35. The following are principle conclusions taken from this reconnaissance:

- a. Terrain analysis shows a requirement for deployed units to have a mixed track / wheel capability. This is especially true for RRF units;


- b. Units deployed at or near camps must be prepared for difficulty in the establishment of basic infrastructure i.e. latrines, camp drainage, field defenses. A good engineering capability should be a high priority in force structure planning.
- d. Log planning including resupply of deployed sub-units must make contingency for units becoming isolated in their AOs. Alternate supply routes into ZAIRE via UGANDA should be considered.


JS McComber  
Major  
HAC Tm Ldr Gisenyi

Attachments:

Map JOG SA 35-4/8 1:250,000 (annotated)







Major Refugee Concentrations  
Congo, Zaire







HQ UNAMIR  
Kigali

Plans 5000-1

31 Sep 94

Distribution List

ORDERS - SECTOR 4 SECURITY

Situation

1. There are increasing reports of banditry, intimidation and general lawlessness in Sector 4. A fundamental reason for this is that there is excessive freedom of movement in Sector 4. This freedom of movement is to be halted in order to effectively impose law and order.

Mission

2. To restrict the freedom of movement of disruptive elements in Sector 4.

Execution

3. a. General Outline Freedom of movement in Sector 4 is to be restricted by increased control measures to include road blocks, check points, restricted areas, observation posts and escorts. Vehicles and personnel are to be actively searched for weapons and where possible ammunition and checked for identification.

b. Grouping and Tasks

- (1) Grouping. No change.
- (2) Tasks - all sectors;
  - (a) Identify and establish restricted areas
  - (b) Establish additional road blocks and check points on all primary and secondary routes
  - (c) Increase surveillance on border crossings

- (d) Search vehicles and personnel for illegal weapons and equipment
- (e) Confiscate weapons and ammunition
- (f) Monitor the carriage of excessive supplies of rations, water and fuel

c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Timings - To commence immediately

Administration and Logistics

4. No change

Command and Signals

5. No change

6. Acknowledge

G.C. Tousignant  
MGen  
FC

Distribution List

CO Ghanbatt  
CO Ethiobatt  
CO Frafbatt



File No 3000.15 (Ops)


To: Distribution List

From: DCOS Ops

Date: 2 Sep 94

Subject: OP ORDER 18 PAGE CHANGES

- 
1. Enclosed, for your immediate action, are page changes to Op Order 18.
  2. Ensure that pages 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are replaced.

  
J. Arp  
Col  
DCOS Ops

Enclosures: 1

Distribution List

Action

GHANBATT  
ETHIOBATT  
FRAFBATT

Info

G3 Plans <

**F/Sigs 266**  
**(Revised 6/92)**

**Security Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED

Serial No.

Line 1	Routed by		
2	Time		
3 DE	Prepared by		
4	Time		
Precedence : Action <i>ROUTINE</i> / Info <i>Routine</i>			
DTG: <i>112030 Z</i>		Month <i>SEP</i>	Year <i>94</i>
Routeing indicators	From: <i>BRITCN KISAL</i>		
	To: <i>HQ JW AMIR</i>		
	Info:		
	For single transmission		
	Transmitted to		
	Channel No / system		
	Time		
	Operator		
	Message instructions		
	Security classification		
	<i>UNC LRS (SEC)</i>		
	SIC(s)		
	<i>19B</i>		

LET YOUR PLANS 004 110850Z SEP 94 ACR  
BUT STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT COL YAAEH  
FROM HUMANITARIAN ASST CELL IS INCL


① Do  
Be make a copy  
for G3 PLANS

② ~~G3 PLANS~~  
~~For your attention~~ HAC was  
on the original  
distib.

12/1

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**Internal distribution:**



Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u> pages		File No. or reference <u>1390/6</u>		Releasing Officer's signature 	
Have you referred to a classified message?		Director's name and Rank/Grade (BLOCK letters) <u>W. H. Luby</u>		Name (BLOCK letters) <u>W. H. Luby</u>	
State yes or no in box <u>NO</u>		Branch and telephone No. <u>NR 11174</u>		Rank/Grade <u>LT COL</u>	
for OPR's use	Routing time/TOR	System	Operator	Branch and telephone No. <u>NR 11174</u>	

**Secret**  
**Classified**

10-1-1964

HMSD Dd 008374863D1470F

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MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE		UNCLAS	3350-1
1 140604Z AUG 94 00 PP GGGG		CMEDO 002/94	
HQ UNAMIR II 2 FD AMB COMD CANCOM INFO: MILOB GP HQ FORCE SIG SQN		 0025	
SUBJ: WNG ORDER REF: A. MAP REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE CARTE ADMINISTRATIVE ET ROUTIERE 1:250 000. 1. UNAMIR IS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPS IN SW RWANDA. IT IS REQUESTED THAT 2FD AMB BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN HEALTH SUPPORT TO THESE OPS IN THE VICINITY OF KIBUYE.. 2. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT 2FD AMB HEALTH SUPPORT CAPACITY WILL BE EQUIVALENT TO THAT PROVIDED IN MUTURA. 3. YOUR RECON IS TO BE CONDUCTED ON 15 AUG 94. NO OTHER PRELIMINARY MOVES OR SCALING DOWN UNTIL ADVISED. 4. NO CHANGE TO CURRENT NOTICE TO MOVE. THIS IS CONTINGENCY PLANNING ONLY. 5. TIMING OF ORDERS TO BE ADVISED. ANTICIPATE NO ORDERS UNTIL PLAN IS ACTIVATED. 6. ADMIN IS TO INVOLVE PLANNING ONLY. CONSIDER LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF MOVE TO NEW LOCATION 7. REPORT TO HQ UNAMIR ON COMPLETION OF RECON AND NLT2200B16AUG94. 8. ACK			
INTERNAL : SRSG OFFICE, DFC, COO, HAC, C PLANS, C LOG O, C MED O			
COL W.P. RAMSEY MED BR			
MAGEN R.A. DALLAIRE			
 W.P. Ramsey S.F.C.		UNCLAS	



**OPERATION OVERTURE**  
**PLAN TO CLEAR THE**  
**CRIMINAL ELEMENT FROM KIBEHO AND NDAGO DP CAMPS**  
**(Updated 3 Dec 94)**

**Mission**

1 To clear the criminal element from Kibeho and Ndago DP camps in order to establish a security environment which will encourage DP repatriation.

**Execution**

2. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA battalions will form the cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will conduct the search. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR company will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A two-three platoon support/reserve element will be located at Kibeho. A preliminary operation to increase UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

**Grouping and Tasks**

3. Grouping General grouping is as follows:

- a. Tactical HQ - HQ UNAMIR,
- b. Remaining OPCON:
  - (1) Inf Bn (-) - two companies,
  - (2) Inf Bn (-) - two companies,
  - (3) Inf Bn (-) - two companies,
  - (4) Two independent infantry companies,
  - (5) One independent infantry company (-) - two platoons,
  - (6) 20 x MILOB Teams,
  - (7) MP Coy (-);
  - (8) Logistic element (tpt),
  - (9) Casualty clearing Post;
  - (9) CIVPOL Detachment,
  - (11) UN Agency Detachment (UNHCR, UNREO, Human Rights Commission)
  - (12) Interpreter Detachment (30 pers)
- b. In Cooperation:

- (1) Two RPA Bn;
- (2) 30 x RPA liaison teams.

4 Tasks:

a. UNAMIR element.

- (1) Establish preliminary presence in the camps (Coy GHANBATT and MILOBS);
- (2) Coordinate the operation.
- (3) Secure FUP;
- (4) Clear company objectives;
- (5) Arrest criminals;
- (6) Confiscate unauthorised weapons, equipment and stores,
- (7) Provide blocking force;
- (8) Route marking/traffic control;
- (9) Establish, secure and man detainee screening/holding facility;
- (10) Augment 1st line transport resources to transport troops, detainees, rations and water;
- (11) Treat and evacuate casualties;
- (12) Conduct medical screening of detainees;
- (13) Escort detainees to designated detention centre;
- (14) Conduct liaison and monitor proceedings;
- (15) Maintain post operation presence in the camps;
- (16) Provide reserve.

b. RPA element.

- (1) Cordon camps;
- (2) Arrest and disarm escapees,
- (3) Provide liaison teams,
- (4) Identify criminals/wanted persons;
- (5) Conduct screening process under UN supervision.
- (6) Escort detainees to designated detention facility;
- (7) Provide post operation security

5. Coordinating Instructions

a. Timings

(1) Planning:

- (a) D Day - 14 Dec 94 - Op commences,
- (b) D-1 - Move to assy area complete/preliminary Op complete;
- (c) D-2 - Move to assy area commences;
- (d) D-3- Coy comd O Gp;
- (e) D-4 - Coy level recon;
- (f) D-5 - DFC/Bn Comd recon;
- (g) D-6 - FC O Gp;
- (h) D-7 - FC approval of OPORD;
- (i) D-8 - Spt plans complete;
- (j) D-9 - FC approval of outline plan and commence preliminary Op;
- (k) D-10 - Staff guidance on outline concept.

(2) Operational:

- (a) H-3hrs - Cordon in position;
- (b) H-1hr - FUP secure;
- (c) H-30 - Occupy FUP/blocking force in position;
- (d) H Hr - 1st light D Day;
- (e) H + 3hrs - Holding/screening facility established.

b. Control measures (indicative only)-see overlay:

- (1) Company level objectives numbered sequentially from North to South and East to West;
- (2) Report lines - From assy area to FUP;
- (3) FUP;
- (4) Axis of search;
- (5) Routes - Green (primary), red (secondary),
- (6) Axis of search - Main road Kibeho/Ndago.

c. Air

- (1) Two helo in direct support from 131500 to 170000hrs.

- (a) Command and Control; and
- (b) AME.

d. Reconnaissance Restricted to company R Gp level. OPSEC remains paramount

e. Battle procedure

- (1) WNGO to be iss by 051000 Dec 94,
- (2) OPORD to be iss by 091600 Dec 94

f. Legal

- (1) Representative of Prosecutor's Office to conduct proceedings at screening/holding facility;
- (2) UNHCR, ICRC and UNHR supervision to be provided;
- (3) Detainee handling plan (Annex ?)

g. ROE Minimum force applies. No change to current ROE

#### **Administration and Logistics**

6. General Adminord to be issued separately by 101600 Dec 94

7. Key Factors The exact timing of D Day will be largely dependant on the logistic capacity to support the operation;

a. Ammo 1st line - unit responsibility.

b. Rations and Water

- (1) Two days CRP on the man,
- (2) Four days resup to be available to sustain the operation

a. Transport capacity,

- (1) Requirement to deploy approx 1200 pers plus stores and equipment
- (2) Requirement for dumping (defence stores, general stores, rations and water) at Butare should be considered,
- (3) Movt of detainees from holding/screening facility to designated detention centre (probably Gikongoro);
- (4) Troop redeployment,
- (5) Future Ops requirements - Op HOMEWARD

c. Medical

- (1) Med plan to be completed by 7 Dec 94

- (2) CCP estb by 140900 Dec 94
- d. MP - responsible for
  - (1) TC between Butare and Kibeho;
  - (2) Detainee Handling
    - (a) Establishment of facility by 140700 Dec 94;
    - (b) Security
- e. CIVPOL
  - (1) Monitor screening process,
  - (2) Monitor incarceration of detainees at designated detention facility

#### **Command and Signals**

- 8. HQ
  - a. Tac HQ - Kibeho (see overlay).
  - b. Suggested HQ manning:
    - (1) G3 OPS;
    - (2) G3 OPS 2;
    - (3) G3 INT;
    - (4) Sig Offr
    - (5) Clerk,
    - (6) CLO;
    - (7) RPA liaison and interpreter;
    - (8) Rad Det
- 9. Communications
  - a. FSO to develop comms spt plan by 7 Dec (Annex ?);
  - b. Frequencies and Callsigns - CEOI for the operation to be issued;
  - c. Loan of 2 x Motorola and spare batteries to RPA BHQ
- 10. Liaison CLO to develop liaison support plan by 7 Dec (Annex ?).
  - a. Allocation of RPA liaison teams and determination of RPA protection parties;
  - b. Allocation of interpreters;
  - c. Determination of UNAMIR liaison requirements.

- d. Negotiate presence of representative from Prosecutor's Office at screening/holding facility by 140900 Dec 94

11 Nicknames

- a. FUP secure;
- b. Blocking force in position;
- c. Reserve deploy to line AB