

ADR

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

5 APR - 1 NOV 1994

[8 CONFIDENTIAL]

RH/NG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S 1002

BOX 103

FILE 4

ACC. 1998/0703

23.10.94 IR

AMNESTY REPORT

The ten recommendations (10) of the Amnesty Report all fall within the competence of the Human Rights Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur. Also they are not new. Certain slant given to the report suggests that they had previous knowledge of the UNHCR report. The Government has declared that it would be in agreement with the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry. In fact, they had agreed to the principle of openness and investigations after the UNHCR Gersony report results were known. Bilateral donors are providing legal expertise to assist the Government in carrying out investigations.

Africa Watch, another human rights NGO has requested that the names of all detainees be published or broadcast through the radio in order to allow family members of visit. They also have pointed out that many people believed to be missing are in fact detained. Other points of interest:

PAGE 5

Second paragraph. Report mentions that RPF occupied North East Sector in February 1994, and that they were at NYABWISHONGWEZI at that time. This place is identified as a location where atrocities were committed by the RPF.

My question is, how were they able to confirm that the RPF had in fact as early as February advanced in that area?

PAGE 8

Paragraphs 3 and 4. Please note that in both cases it is suggested that evidence was suppressed, specially regarding the priest and later implying that a returning refugee was killed at a checkpoint at the edge of United Nations "safe zone".

PAGE 9

Paragraph 2. Identified RPF massgrave in Byumba. Can this be verified?

Last paragraph, speaks of a mass grave in military security zone, at the Valley next to Groupes Scolaire in Butare. Can this be verified?

PAGE 11

Paragraph 4.3 We should be careful in reacting to the last sentence of this paragraph where it is stated that the international community must not make excuses or turn a blind eye to human rights violations committed by the RPF.

G3
28/1/95
SB

RWANDA

Reports of killings and abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, April - August 1994

1. Introduction

The Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA)¹, Rwanda's new national army which until July 1994 was the armed wing of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), has the reputation of being much better organized and disciplined than the security forces of the former government² it overthrew in July 1994. Soldiers and militia of the former government are reported to have killed 500,000 or more members of the minority Tutsi ethnic group and its opponents from the majority Hutu ethnic group between April and July 1994. Given the horrendous scale of massacres committed by forces loyal to the former government, there could never be any comparison between those massacres and other human rights abuses committed by the RPA³. Nevertheless, this fact should not be allowed to prevent the truth about alleged RPA abuses from being uncovered and, where appropriate, action being immediately taken to bring those responsible to justice and to prevent such abuses from recurring. Although it is generally unclear whether human rights abuses by the RPA are ordered or condoned by top government and security officials, it is incumbent on them to take action to prevent the abuses and to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

Reports of abuses by the RPA have already been exploited as political propaganda by supporters of the former government. This report may also be exploited for partisan

¹ The RPF/RPA was formed and is dominated by exiled members of the minority Tutsi ethnic group. They and, or their parents fled to neighbouring countries such as Uganda in the wake of massacres of Tutsi by Hutu before and after independence in 1962.

² The former government and its security forces were dominated by members of the majority Hutu ethnic group.

³ Former government security forces and militia are believed to have carried out massacres of 500,000 or more members of the Tutsi ethnic group and members of the Hutu ethnic group opposed to the government and the killing of Tutsi since 6 April 1994 when the plane carrying Rwanda's President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundi's President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down. Amnesty International has published numerous reports of the massacres and other human rights abuses which have occurred in Rwanda since the war in Rwanda began on 1 October 1990. More recently, on 23 May 1994, the organization published a report about the massacres which began on 6 April 1994 entitled, *Rwanda: Mass murder by government supporters and troops in April and May 1994*, AI Index: AFR 47/11/94.

human rights violators in Rwanda. During their visit, Amnesty International's representatives collected testimonies regarding allegations of serious human rights violations by the RPA, particularly those committed since April 1994. Amnesty International also interviewed Rwandese asylum-seekers in neighbouring countries and found substantial evidence of severe ill-treatment and attempted execution by the RPA, in addition to numerous testimonies about killings and other abuses which were so consistent in dates, places and names of victims as not to be dismissed as anti-RPA/RPF propaganda. Amnesty International is concerned that the authorities are not known to have conducted independent and impartial inquiries to establish the full truth about these allegations with a view to identifying those responsible and bringing them to justice.

Amnesty International is now making public some of the information it has collected in order to draw the attention of the Rwandese authorities and the international community to them. These allegations are very grave and require immediate action so as to ensure that members of the security forces and government supporters are not led to believe that they can continue to violate human rights with impunity. This will significantly contribute to ensuring that the cycle of violence and other human rights abuses is broken. Amnesty International is calling on the international community to assist the Rwandese authorities to accomplish this urgent task. Amnesty International is also urging the international community to deploy human rights monitors in Rwanda who could investigate any further reports of abuse over the coming months. Evidently it is also vital that objective information be available on the public record about the human rights situation in Rwanda so that refugees can make an assessment based on sound information of whether their safety will be guaranteed or not when they return home.

Amnesty International submitted the concerns contained in this report to the Rwandese authorities at the start of October 1994.

2. Deliberate and arbitrary killings by the RPA

Reports received from Rwandese eye-witnesses and others suggest that hundreds - possibly thousands - of unarmed civilians and captured armed opponents of the RPF have been summarily executed or otherwise deliberately and arbitrarily killed since countrywide massacres and other acts of violence flared up after the death of former President Juvénal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994. Many of the killings took place in a series of arbitrary reprisals mainly against groups of Hutu civilians, some of which occurred in some cases before 6 April, but mainly afterwards in the northeast. There were also sporadic deliberate and arbitrary killings as the RPA took control and, uncovering evidence of genocide, took indiscriminate revenge on unarmed Hutu civilians. There were also deliberate executions carried out in the course of "screening"

process⁷. There have also been reports of revenge killings by Tutsi supporters of the RPF.

Many of these killings by the RPA, which appear to have gone largely unreported, appear to have taken place in northeastern Rwanda in mid-April 1994. Others have occurred in southern and western Rwanda once the RPA took control of these areas in May and June 1994. There are also reports that the RPA, as well as RPF supporters, were responsible for numerous killings of unarmed civilians in August and September 1994 in southeastern Rwanda. Some corpses of the victims were reported to have been dumped in the Akagera river which flows along the border between Rwanda and Tanzania. The floating of corpses in the Akagera river is reminiscent of the hundreds or even thousands of bodies of people reportedly massacred by former government forces and militia in May and June 1994, which floated downstream to Lake Victoria.

In mid-September the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said that it had received dozens of testimonies from refugees who had fled from the area, alleging that the RPA had carried out numerous killings, forcing many people who had returned to the area to flee. The UNHCR suspended repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries. A controversy soon arose when some other UN agencies expressed or implied doubt over UNHCR findings. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) sent several dozen soldiers to monitor the situation. The Rwandese Government denied that its soldiers had been involved in any massacres and agreed to cooperate with a UN investigation team which was reported to have begun its work in early October 1994.

2.1 Deliberate and arbitrary killings in northeastern Rwanda

Amnesty International representatives received numerous disturbing reports of deliberate and arbitrary killings in April and May 1994 of unarmed civilians by units of the RPA in northeastern Rwanda. Witnesses reported that such killings took place at Nyabwishongwezi and Kagitumba in Byumba prefecture's Ngarama district (commune). At both locations the killings reportedly took place at public meetings to which local people had been summoned by the RPA. RPA soldiers were reported by eye-witnesses to have used guns, grenades, bayonets and hoes to kill their unarmed victims. Accounts by the eye-witnesses portray a striking consistency of dates and places of the killings.

⁷ The RPA has been recording the identities and places of origin of people returning from places inside Rwanda or from neighbouring countries where they had fled as a result of the war. There have been reports that returnees suspected of involvement in the massacres of RPA supporters or sympathizers have been arrested or even killed during or after the screening process.

Several dozen witnesses reported that members of the RPA arrived in Kagitumba on 12 April 1994. At first the fighters were reportedly very friendly to the local population and promised that the RPA was determined to protect the local people who were then summoned to a public meeting at Gishara. On 13 April unarmed civilian men, women and children gathered at Gishara in Kagitumba. RPA officials reportedly began addressing the crowd and suddenly without provocation or warning they opened fire on the crowd and threw grenades at the crowd. It is unclear how many people were killed. However, from accounts of eye-witnesses, dozens are likely to have been killed in the incident.

One 36-year-old man present told Amnesty International representatives that RPA fighters seemed friendly at first, only to open fire on civilians without warning or provocation. He said most of the people in Nyabwishongwezi had only arrived there recently, having fled from other parts of Rwanda. Other inhabitants of Nyabwishongwezi were Rwandese nationals who had recently been expelled from Tanzania where they had been living for some years. Government soldiers had withdrawn from the area several weeks earlier. When RPA forces occupied the area in February 1994 the local population first fled but was convinced by the RPA to return. The witness explained that in March the RPA called the first public meetings during which RPF officials told people that they had nothing to fear. At one such meeting in April the RPA fired a rocket and threw grenades into the crowd. Others were shot and killed, while others sustained severe injuries. The RPF continued to deny that any killings had occurred in Kagitumba. But people did not believe them and continued to flee from Nyabwishongwezi. RPA fighters reportedly started a man-hunt for the Hutu, killing many using bayonets and guns. More extensive killings reportedly occurred on 15 April. The witness said he saw RPF soldiers hunting for civilians in the fields. He said that among those killed were his 30-year-old wife, Jovans Nakabonye, who was shot. The others, including his 12-year-old daughter, Felicita Busingye, were bayoneted to death. Those killed included a four-year-old child known as Yankunda.

One 56-year-old survivor of the killings at Gishara in Kagitumba and in Nyabwishongwezi narrated how his family and friends were slaughtered by the RPA. He said he and others were summoned to a public meeting on 13 April 1994 at Gishara. He said, "We had been told that men, women and children must attend. They said they would kill hippos for us and needed some representatives from among us to go hunting with the soldiers. Twelve of us were taken behind a house of 'tailleur' (tailor) Muziga and they said they wanted to talk to us. They asked us to indicate who among us knew how to shoot or was a soldier. We said none of us knew how to shoot and that all soldiers had left. All of a sudden we heard a grenade explosion". He said many people were killed including his wife, Anastasia Mukamurigo, his 10-year-old son Nkwaya, and 20-year-old daughter Mukazaza. Others killed by the grenade and gunshots included

Azaria Ukuyemuye, a director of Nyabwishongwezi primary school, and his wife, Anne Maria, and a Roman Catholic nun known as Helène from Muyanza parish in Byumba.

The witness then fled from Kagitumba to Nyabwishongwezi. On 16 April 1994 RPA forces came to the area while he was at the home of Sinamenye, in Rwantanga village in Nyabwishongwezi. Sinamenye's house was surrounded by six RPA soldiers, two of whom entered the house asking for the home owner and identity papers. They confiscated the papers and told Sinamenye to go to a soldier at the entrance to collect valid papers. The soldier assaulted him with a bayonet and he fell. They then shot and killed him. The soldiers told Sinamenye's son, Bampora, to walk away and shot him in the back. The survivor said he was one of the few who managed to run away from the scene of these killings.

2.2 Deliberate and arbitrary killings in southern Rwanda

Amnesty International representatives who visited Burundi in July 1994 received reports of both deliberate executions and cases of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to which civilians from southern Rwanda said they had been subjected by RPA soldiers after they took control of Bugesera in southeastern Rwanda. The witnesses, some of whom had themselves narrowly survived execution and bore the marks of blows to their heads, had fled to northern Burundi from the area of Mututu in Butare prefecture's Muyira district and from parts of rural Kigali prefecture.

Towards the end of May 1994 RPA soldiers were reported to have carried out numerous arrests of Hutu who had returned to their homes in the Mututu area from Burundi. Virtually all those arrested were subjected to "three-piece-tying"⁴. In one incident a unit of about 10 soldiers and armed Tutsi civilians who had recently returned from exile are reported to have arrested and tied up all adult men and teenage boys in Mututu. They were first held in the compound of one Rutekeleza before being killed. Those executed included Leodomir Kazadi whose head was reportedly smashed with a blunt weapon, possibly a hoe. Other victims were reportedly killed in the same way. These and other killings caused many people in the area to flee to Burundi. There were claims that some of those who tried to escape were shot as they tried to cross River Akanyaru on the border with Burundi.

⁴ In August 1994 the Rwandese Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Major General Paul Kagame (a former senior officer of Uganda's NRA), told Amnesty International representatives that "three-piece-tying" had been abolished and those found responsible would be punished. However, this form of tying was reported to be still in evidence in August with detainees bearing wounds around the elbows caused by ropes or flex used.

Around early June 1994 about 100 men, women and children were reportedly arrested by the RPA in the same area and detained in a compound for about a day. They were then moved towards Muyira district when the eye-witness who spoke to Amnesty International representatives and at least six of his close relatives managed to escape. All bore scars caused by "three-piece-tying". The witness and others returned to the area after the RPA had left only to find that dozens of those who had remained in the custody of the RPA had been killed. Bodies were still tied and heaped in an open pit in the compound of one Gakwayiro, near the Mahwa river. All the victims, including the witness' neighbours, Senama and Kareje, were male adults and youths.

A woman formerly resident in Burenge, in rural Kigali prefecture's Ngenda district, testified that she and many others had been hiding in sorghum fields after the RPA took control of the area, only returning home when they heard that the RPA had stopped killings. They handed themselves over to the RPA and were taken to a "screening" centre at Rutonde. On the second day young men were taken away and her husband was taken away on the third day. A man who had been taken away with her husband reportedly returned and reported that those taken away, including her husband, had been tied up, hit on the head and killed, and that their corpses were being thrown into the river. She alleged that some of the women detainees were taken away by RPA soldiers and raped: she thought they were killed afterwards. She tried to escape with her child strapped to her back but was subsequently recaptured with several other women escapees by RPA soldiers. The soldiers killed two other women with blows to the head and also killed her child. She was hit on the head with a nail-studded club but survived. The scars caused by blows, in particular by nails, were clearly visible.

2.3 Deliberate and arbitrary killings in western Rwanda

Around 5 June 1994 four members of the RPA killed 13 Roman Catholic priests, including the Archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumva, and three other bishops, at Byimana, a few kilometres south of Kabgayi Roman Catholic church near Gitarama. The RPF subsequently declared that the combatants had been assigned to the bishops as their bodyguards. On 9 June RPF leaders announced that one of the killers had been shot dead by fellow soldiers as he fled and that the other three had escaped. RPF leaders explained that the combatants seemed to have carried out the killings because they suspected the priests of complicity in the killing of members of their families, including some of the Tutsi who had fled to Kabgayi.

A priest who survived the killings gave a different version of the incident. He said that the RPF took control of Kabgayi on 2 June, arrested the priests and took them to a mission at Byimana. On 5 June some of the soldiers who had been guarding the priests entered the room where the priests were being held and opened fire. The surviving priest

escaped through a door at the end of the room. The next day he was found by RPA soldiers who told him that the killings had been an accident. The soldiers reportedly detained him, insisting that he accepted the soldiers' version of the killings. He was released when he said he would agree to the RPA's version and he escaped.

Members of the government told Amnesty International representatives in August that the three escapees had never been found. The RPF's explanation that its soldiers had killed the priests to avenge the killing of their relatives appeared to be guess-work rather than based on any statement made by any of those involved. It is not clear whether any formal investigation or judicial inquiry had been carried out: indeed, the priest's testimony above suggests that evidence was deliberately suppressed.

People suspected of killing RPF supporters appear to have been deliberately executed by the RPA. For example, a returning refugee was killed on 27 August 1994 at a checkpoint at the edge of the United Nations (UN) "safe zone" by RPA soldiers. The circumstances suggest that returning refugees may have been extrajudicially executed or that the soldiers may have used excessive lethal force in breach of international human rights standards. According to the report, the RPF soldiers stopped a convoy of five British army trucks carrying approximately 200 returning Hutu refugees at a checkpoint 40 kilometres east of the border town of Kibuye as they were crossing from the UN "safe zone" into territory controlled by the Government of Rwanda. One of the passengers fled and was reportedly pursued by approximately 15 RPA fighters. Witnesses heard five bursts of automatic gunfire and said that when the soldiers returned they said that they had killed the man who fled. Three other men in the convoy were detained.

Amnesty International subsequently wrote to the Rwandese authorities seeking clarification about the circumstances of this killing and the identities and whereabouts of those detained and called on the RPA to issue standing orders about the circumstances in which soldiers could use firearms, which would prevent such killings. Amnesty International also wrote to the United Nations seeking clarification about a statement reportedly made by the spokesman of the UNAMIR suggesting that RPA soldiers were justified to shoot the fleeing man. The organization expressed concern that if correctly reported, the spokesman's statement was inconsistent with the UN's own fundamental international standards on the intentional use of lethal force. The organization had not received a response from the Rwandese Government by the start of October 1994. A senior UN official replied in early September 1994, saying that the UNAMIR spokesman had been misquoted, and that his exact words were: "This man was fleeing and, in these situations, if one runs, he can expect that someone will shoot". However, the UN official did not explain whether UNAMIR had investigated the killing to determine whether the man had been extrajudicially executed or not. The official added that

UNAMIR had initiated an investigation concerning the other three persons arrested, but had not obtained any specific information about their whereabouts.

3. Abductions and "disappearances" by the RPA

There have been numerous reports of abductions and "disappearances" carried out by the RPF since April 1994. There are fears that those who were abducted or "disappeared" may have been killed and their bodies secretly disposed of.

Amnesty International has received reports that a medical doctor known as Dr Canisius, and former head of Byumba Hospital was abducted in May 1994 by the RPF. He was apparently accused of being a member of the *Interahamwe* (predominantly Hutu militia loyal to the former government) and had expressed his fear for his life to some of his friends prior to his abduction. He and his wife and children were allegedly taken away by the RPF and they were never seen again. There have been unconfirmed reports that Dr Canisius and his family were killed and buried in a mass grave in Byumba. Some of his colleagues have inquired about him from the RPF but the authorities have not revealed any information about the fate of the doctor and his family.

Amnesty International representatives visiting Rwanda in August 1994 were informed that several hundred soldiers who were left at a school complex known as *Groupe scolaire* in Butare "disappeared" soon after the town fell to the RPA at the start of July 1994. Part of the complex had been turned into a make-shift hospital by former government forces. The representatives learned that former government soldiers had been severely wounded or disabled in battle and were left behind by their retreating colleagues. Amnesty International found in the abandoned make-shift hospital one decomposed body of a soldier whose head had been smashed allegedly by RPA soldiers before death.

There were further reports of "disappearances" in July 1994 of about 600 people from a camp for the displaced at Rango, several kilometres south of Butare. Amnesty International representatives were told that the RPA was thought to have killed and buried those who had "disappeared" in mass graves in a valley next to the *Groupe scolaire* in Butare. However, Amnesty International's representatives were prevented from going to the valley by RPA soldiers manning a roadblock on the road leading to the valley on the grounds that it was a military security zone. As a result, neither the "disappearances" nor the mass graves could be confirmed by Amnesty International.

4. Recommendations to the Rwandese Government

The RPF and the new Rwandese Government have usually denied that their combatants have carried out serious human rights violations. In some instances they have acknowledged that abuses have occurred but explained that they were not committed as part of RPF or government policy. Government officials told Amnesty International representatives visiting Rwanda in August 1994 that two RPA soldiers had been executed by official order in mid-1994, one for murder and another for rape. The authorities said the soldiers were tried by the RPA military court in accordance with the RPA Operation Code of Conduct. The authorities said they were holding in custody more than 60 RPA soldiers accused of criminal offences.

While welcoming government action to bring those responsible for human rights abuses to justice, Amnesty International is concerned that the RPA violated the ultimate fundamental right to life in order to punish persons accused of human rights abuses. It is unclear whether their offences had been the subject of any independent and impartial investigations. Furthermore, those convicted had, according to RPA officials, no right of appeal, although the decision to carry out the sentence had to be made by the RPA High Command.

For government action and statements to be taken seriously by the people of Rwanda, particularly members of the security forces, it is essential that immediate action be taken in response to the allegations of human rights violations by the RPA described in this report. To this effect Amnesty International is recommending the implementation of its 14-Point Program for the Prevention of Extrajudicial Executions and for the Prevention of "Disappearances"⁹. It is also recommending:

4.1 In addition to accepting responsibility for carrying out impartial investigations into past killings of civilians and captured armed opponents, it is urgent that the new government set up a commission of inquiry with specific responsibility to investigate reports of human rights violations both in areas under the RPF's control before July 1994 and in the whole country since then. The commission of inquiry should be composed of people known for their independence and impartiality and should be asked

⁹ Amnesty International has developed a 14-Point Program for the Prevention of Extrajudicial Executions, published in March 1993, AI Index: POL 36/02/93, and another one for the Prevention of "Disappearances", adopted by Amnesty International in December 1992, to call attention to the official steps needed to end these abhorrent human rights violations. The programs consist of a series of detailed measures which should be taken by all governments. Amnesty International believes that the implementation of these measures is a positive indication of a government's commitment to stop extrajudicial executions and "disappearances" and to work for their eradication.

to investigate the allegations mentioned in this report and those reported elsewhere, either published by other organizations or the media, or made by private individuals. The commission could also ask United Nations investigators to assist in carrying the inquiries. All investigations should be consistent with the standards set forth in the UN Principles on the Prevention and Investigation of Extrajudicial, Arbitrary and Summary Executions and the UN Manual on their implementation¹⁰.

4.2 The investigating body should be given powers to summon any witnesses, regardless of their position in the government or the security forces, to testify. Its terms of reference should include making recommendations on any action to be taken against those responsible and prevent a recurrence of the abuses. The findings of the inquiry should be made public as soon as it has been completed. The findings should then be submitted to a competent, independent and impartial court of law to try those found by the inquiry to have been involved in perpetrating the abuses.

4.3 The international community, particularly governments and the United Nations, should assist the Rwandese Government with the human and material resources the Rwandese authorities require to carry out these investigations in accordance with international standards, just as it should be assisting with investigations into the crimes against humanity committed before July 1994 mostly by soldiers and supporters of the former government. Furthermore, the international community should assist the Rwandese Government to build a competent, independent and impartial judiciary to protect and promote human rights. The international community must not make excuses for or turn a blind eye to human rights violations committed by the RPA or other institutions or officials of the new government on the grounds that they are not "as serious" as those committed by its predecessor.

4.4 The government should take immediate steps to avoid a recurrence of the killings of civilians and captured armed opponents in which members of the security forces have been implicated. These steps should include training in international standards and explicit instructions made publicly to all security personnel to the effect that firearms may only be used with lethal intent when strictly unavoidable and in order to protect life. All killings by the security forces must be the subject of an inquiry to establish if this standard has been respected or violated. Members of the security forces responsible for

¹⁰ By Resolution 1989/65 on 24 May 1989 on "Effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions", the UN's ECOSOC called on all governments to take into account and respect a series of Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions. The Principles give some guidance on procedures for investigation and suggest that if the established investigative procedures (for example of the Procuracy) are inadequate, governments should establish independent commissions of inquiry.

unlawful killings should be brought to justice in legal proceedings which satisfy international minimum standards.

Amnesty International is requesting the Rwandese Government to make public the identities of RPA soldiers in custody and details of their cases. Amnesty International demands that the soldiers be given prompt and fair trials and that in no case should anyone of them be sentenced to death or executed. The organization also requests the Rwandese authorities to reveal the identities of those of its combatants and others who have been executed and the offences of which they were convicted.

4.5 All allegations of extrajudicial executions and of similar deliberate and arbitrary killings before July 1994 by security personnel should, as a matter of course, be the subject of an impartial, independent and thorough inquiry. The inquiry should establish the reasons for and circumstances of the killings, make its conclusions public, and recommend action to be taken against the security personnel who have either ordered or carried out the killings. Failure by the authorities to open an inquiry into killings of this sort is likely to be interpreted by observers and other members of the security forces as indicating government approval or condonement of violence by security personnel against civilians.

4.6 The names of all those taken into custody and any subsequent transfers or releases should be recorded and the Ministry of Justice notified. In the absence of any functioning court or legal procedures similar to habeas corpus, this will bring an end the current practice whereby government officials or private individuals must at present simply request the Minister of Defence for information about their whereabouts and wait indefinitely for a response. This provides no effective safeguard for detainees who may be at risk of "disappearance" or ill-treatment.

4.7 The Rwandese Government should use the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials as basic texts for the training of security personnel in human rights, in addition to training about the basic humanitarian standards contained in the Geneva Conventions. The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials stipulates that law enforcement officials (whether police or military) should respect and protect human dignity and defend and safeguard human rights. In addition, members of the security forces should receive training in international human rights standards and in the provisions of national legislation both concerning the use of firearms and force, and concerning detention procedures and the treatment of prisoners.

4.8 The authorities should prohibit the security forces from ill-treating any citizen, including political opponents, and should investigate all allegations of such behaviour,

including the use of *kandoya* and nail-studded clubs. Official silence on the brutality to which suspected opponents of the government have been subjected has led some to believe that the authorities are implicated, there being no other explanation for their refusal to pursue the reports published by human rights groups and the media. Those who have committed such violations should be brought to justice.

4.9 The Rwandese authorities should not deny or explain away, without thorough independent investigation, allegations of serious human rights violations by their security forces.

4.10 The security forces which have responsibility for arrests and detentions should as a matter of priority be placed under effective judicial and administrative control to comply with national and international law and accountable for their actions not only to the RPA internal hierarchies, but to the courts under the rule of law.

Handwritten notes:
JLH
Roo
fle
mtd
BPC

United Nations Children's Fund
Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'enfance
Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia

Le rapport dont les informations suivent est le plus récent effectué par l'UNICEF sur les enfants exposés aux scènes de guerre. Il a été effectué, à la demande de l'UNICEF par Magne Raundalen, spécialiste norvégien sur la question des enfants traumatisés par la guerre.

Quote

1/ The results of the current study reveals an exposure to war scenes that are the highest the authors of this report have seen in their more than ten years of conflict related research. The degree of exposure and ensuing psychological reactions manifest as war traumas should grant the children psychological follow-up in a long term perspective.

2/ In late August, five teachers under the supervision of two psychopedagogues and social workers interviewed 207 children aged 9 to 15 years (females 53,5%) in the city of Nyamata (south of the country), a place known for having a massive mass grave. The children were randomly selected among 1200 children placed in orphanages in this city. They were interviewed individually. One of the investigators went through each of the questions together with those who interviewed the children to make sure that the meaning of the questions was clear and understood.

3/ These findings reflect a very high degree of exposure to war atrocities. More than half of the group have witnessed family members being killed and 75% of the group have witnessed others being killed. A majority of the group has been chased by armed forces, experiences armed people entering their home, the destruction of their home or the threat of being killed as well as witnessing mass killings and seeing other children participants in killings. More than 90% have been in hiding to survive the war. All children except few have seen dead bodies, and a clear majority have seen body parts.

4/ Regarding reactions, the author of the report says that it is his impression that many children still are in a shock or denial phase, where they keep the traumatic material at bay, trying to survive by not thinking about it. More than 80% of the group say that they think about the event even when they do not want to. It is evident that the majority of children have a lot of intrusive images, thoughts and feelings. At the same time, they try to avoid such intrusive image. Many children shows signs of Hyperarousal, feeling more jumpy and nervous than before and having difficulties in paying attention and concentrating. However, they do not think very much about not living to become an adult.

- 5/
- 55,6% have witnessed family members being killed
 - 74,9% have witnessed other than family members being killed
 - 58,5% have been chased by armed forces
 - 70,5% have seen armed people entering their home
 - 40,5% have seen people be beaten, or kicked

Handwritten notes:
63
28
7/11/94

67,6% have seen destruction of their home

~~77,8% have been threatened to be killed~~

52,2% have witnessed mass killings in churches, schools

56,5% have witnessed children participating in killings

42% have witnessed children killing children

96,1% thought that they will be killed

85,0% sensed the smell of rotting bodies

23,7% buried other people

79,7% heard the screams of dying people

60,2% saw body parts

79,9% saw dead bodies

50% try to stay away from things that remind them of the event

44,4% have strong waves of strong feelings about the events

68,6% do not worry about the fact they may not become an adult

6/ The authors of the report say that these children have witnessed traumatic events to a level hitherto unknown of in modern history. The children are haunted by sights, smells, and sounds of people screaming. The severe life threat to many children faced might have increased their sense of danger and increased their feelings of vulnerability.

From their many interviews, the authors believe that this group is representative for a large part of Rwandese children related to the targeted population.

A special attention should be given to the horrifying fact that large number of children report that they have seen other children participate in the killings. Even though child soldiers is a known phenomenon, the authors think that the country is confronted with here is even worse than regular recruitment as child combatants.

Unquote

Best regards

DRAFT

MILITARY COORDINATION OFFICER TO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

1. The Human Rights Commission has identified the need for a military officer to assist them in certain areas of support to their operation. I have agreed to its request and enclose the Terms of Reference of the Military Coordination Officer(MCO):

The HRC MCO will work in support of the administration of the HRC to facilitate its personnel in the conduct of their duties. The overarching consideration in this appointment is that the HRC's independence is respected; the coordination function does not infer any military control. He will work under the direct authority of DCos Ops, keeping him informed of his activities. The MCO is to provide advice on the military security situation as it affects HRC operations. He is to coordinate HRC's requests for helicopters, the provision of military escorts when requested by HRC, and to facilitate HRC's field operations e.g. providing training assistance in the use of map and compass, radios, off-road driving and emergency maintenance etc.

2. I see this appointment as extremely useful in providing start-up assistance to the fledging HRC, but intend the post to remain until such time as it is no longer required. I have appointed Maj Lancaster as MCO.

DCMO
can you detail an gbr of
a Captain's rank for this. Let us discuss
J Li
01/11
DFC/CS/CMO

~~Report will be sent to the Commission~~

H. K. ANYIDOH
BRIG GENERAL
DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

*Pls see memo
Dec by DFE/CO/emo
08/10*

To: Distribution List

From: HAC Ops

Date: 19 Sep 1994

Subject: INFORMATION ON DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS WITHIN RWANDA

1. HQ BRITCON has put together a compiled list of displaced persons camps within Rwanda and in neighbouring countries. The compiled list has been made available to UN and NGO agencies operating inside and outside Rwanda with a view to having them verify the information.
2. While these organizations are most capable of verifying some information, it is felt that the UNMO teams which have been designated as humanitarian representatives within Sectors have a more permanent presence in the area and consequently can be invaluable in confirming information with regards to numbers of displaced present, agencies operating in the area and any security problems present.
3. To this end a copy of the British effort is forwarded to you for verification. It is requested that Sectors confirm the information present in the package and indicate any camps which have been excluded in their Sectors.
4. Sectors are to forward the information to HAC Ops at UNAMIR HQ Kigali, where a consolidation of information will be conducted to up - date the list produced by BRITCON.

[Signature]
C. B. Yaache
Col
CHAO

Distribution

<u>Action</u>	<u>Information</u>
Comd Sec 1	FC
Comd Sec 2	DFC
Comd Sec 3	UNREO
Comd Sec 4A	
Comd Sec 4B	
Comd Sec 4C	
Comd Sec 5	

*9/10
8-3*

UN UNCLASSIFIED

89/1013/UN

Mil Info Sect
HQ BRITCON
UNAMIR


See Distribution

10 Sep 94

BRITCON CONSOLIDATED REFUGEE/DISPLACED PERSONS LIST

INTRODUCTION

1. To date no consolidated list has been produced numbering refugees and displaced persons (DPS) in camps inside Rwanda and its neighbouring countries.
2. This product will remain effective if updates are forthcoming.
3. All comments are requested to be passed to HQ BRITCON by Fri 16 Sep 94.



JML GILLESPIE-PAYNE
Capt
BRITCON LO

Annexes:

- A. RWANDA
- B. ZAIRE
- C. UGANDA
- D. TANZANIA
- E. BURUNDI

Distribution:

External:

HQ UNAMIR (For G2 and Hum Cell)
UNDP (Attn Mr G Le Claire)
AUSCON
CANCON

Internal:

COMBRITCON
CO 23 PFA
OC 9 PARA SQN RE

UN UNCLASSIFIED

UN UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
89/1013/UN
DATED 10 SEP 94

DP CAMPS IN RWANDA - SECTOR 1

SECTOR 1 TOTAL: 290,000

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>101</u>	<u>R7324/B9624</u>	<u>BYUMBA</u>	<u>200,000</u>

REMARKS: DP FIGURE BELIEVED TO BE OVER ESTIMATED.

<u>102</u>	<u>R9435/B5635</u>	<u>NGARAMA</u>	<u>45,000</u>
------------	--------------------	----------------	---------------

REMARKS:

<u>103</u>	<u>R5928/B2528</u>	<u>GABIRO</u>	<u>45,000</u>
------------	--------------------	---------------	---------------

REMARKS:

A1-1

UN UNCLASSIFIED

UN UNCLASSIFIED

209 R /B DIHOLO 1700-5000

REMARKS: CAMP NOT LOCATED ON MAPPING. BELIEVED TO BE IN BUGESERA
COMMUNE.

210 R /B RWINKWAVU 12,000

REMARKS: CAMP NOT LOCATED ON MAPPING. BELIEVED TO BE IN
KABARONDO COMMUNE.

211 R /B GASETZA 3,000

REMARKS: CAMP NOT LOCATED ON MAPPING.

A2-2

UN UNCLASSIFIED

DP CAMPS IN RWANDA - SECTOR 3SECTOR 3 TOTAL: 424,000

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>301</u>	<u>R0771/73715</u>	<u>GITARAMA</u>	<u>N/K</u>

REMARKS: THE LAST ESTIMATE FOR ALL CAMPS IN THE GITARAMA AREA WAS 150,000 DPS, DATED 20 AUG 94.

<u>302</u>	<u>R0868/B7470</u>	<u>KABAGAYI</u>	<u>10,000</u>
------------	--------------------	-----------------	---------------

REMARKS:

<u>303</u>	<u>R0953/B7553</u>	<u>RUHANGA</u>	<u>10,000</u>
------------	--------------------	----------------	---------------

REMARKS:

<u>304</u>	<u>R0413/B7112</u>	<u>BUTARE</u>	<u>200,000</u>
------------	--------------------	---------------	----------------

REMARKS: LAST ESTIMATE, AS AT 20 AUG 94, WAS 200,000 DPS IN THE BUTARE AREA.

<u>305</u>	<u>R0100/B6801</u>	<u>KIBINGO</u>	<u>60,000</u>
------------	--------------------	----------------	---------------

REMARKS:

<u>306</u>	<u>R9953/B6154</u>	<u>MUSANGO</u>	<u>700</u>
------------	--------------------	----------------	------------

REMARKS: ON 04 SEP 94 MILOBS REPORTED THIS LOC AS NEW DP CAMP. DESCRIBED AS NOT WELL ORGANISED.

<u>307</u>	<u>R2456/B9057</u>	<u>NTONGWE</u>	<u>3,000</u>
------------	--------------------	----------------	--------------

REMARKS: 04 SEP 94 MAJORITY OF DPS AT THIS LOC EXPRESS WISH TO REMAIN IN CAMP BUT REQUIRE WATER, FOOD AND SHELTER.

<u>308</u>	<u>R /B6649</u>	<u>MURAMA</u>	<u>700</u>
------------	-----------------	---------------	------------

REMARKS: ON 07 SEP 94 MILOBS REPORTED THIS LOC AS NEW DP CAMP. DESCRIBED AS NOT WELL ORGANISED.

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX A TO
89/1013/UN
DATED 10 SEP 94

DP CAMPS IN RWANDA - SECTOR 4ASECTOR 4A TOTAL: 821,094

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>4A01</u>	<u>R8020/B4621</u>	<u>BUHORO</u>	<u>10.000</u>

REMARKS:

<u>4A02</u>	<u>R7891/B4491</u>	<u>BUSANZE</u>	<u>15.000</u>
-------------	--------------------	----------------	---------------

REMARKS: GHANBAT HAVE PRESENCE IN AREA, CAMP PEACEFUL. BURUNDIANS CROSS BORDER DAILY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. CAMP LDR'S DAUGHTER, MS KADOGI, HAS BEEN REGISTERING NAMES OF DPS WHO WISH TO RTN TO THIER HOMES. NONE WILL MOVE UNLESS UN PROVIDE IPT. INTIMIDATION OF DPS BY FORMER RGF. CATTLE REGULARLY STOLEN BY BURUNDIANS CROSSING BORDER. SEE R066. FOOD, MEDICINE AND SHELTER NEEDED. REGULAR TRADING WITH BURUNDIANS.

<u>4A03</u>	<u>R8929/B5529</u>	<u>CYANIKA</u>	<u>58.000</u>
-------------	--------------------	----------------	---------------

REMARKS: THERE ARE ALSO 7,000 DPS OUTSIDE THE CAMP WHICH COULD BE THE REPORTED "10,000" WHO MOVED HERE FROM MUDASOMWA 4A15 ON 04 SEP 94. IT IS GUARDED BY GHANBAT AT NIGHT. LITTLE EVIDENCE OF BLACK MARKETEERING DUE TO GOOD NGO COVER. HAND GRENADES HAVE BEEN SEEN IN THE CAMP. 02 SEP 94 LOCAL NGO WORKER KILLED. POSSIBLE REASON: WORKER WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE SON OF THE DOCTOR WHO TREATED FORMER PRESIDENT OF RWANDA. AUTOMATIC WPN WAS USED.

<u>4A04</u>	<u>R7501/B4401</u>	<u>GASHINGE</u>	<u>1.200</u>
-------------	--------------------	-----------------	--------------

REMARKS: NO NGO ACTY REPORTED. CAMP LDR HAS FLED, REASONS X/K. ICRC REPORT 3,000 DPS LOCATED HERE, MILOB REPORT NO CAMP LOCATED.

<u>4A05</u>	<u>R7516/B4117</u>	<u>GISONZO/GISUNZO</u>	<u>10.000</u>
-------------	--------------------	------------------------	---------------

REMARKS: NUMBER OF DPS PROBABLY GROSSLY OVER ESTIMATED AS NO ACTUAL CAMP LOCATED. MANY DPS IN THIS AREA THOUGHT TO BE LIVING WITH RELATIVES.

<u>4A06</u>	<u>R8115/B4816</u>	<u>GISORORO</u>	<u>4.000</u>
-------------	--------------------	-----------------	--------------

REMARKS:

<u>4A07</u>	<u>R8041/B4743</u>	<u>KADUHA</u>	<u>25.000</u>
-------------	--------------------	---------------	---------------

REMARKS:

UN UNCLASSIFIED

4A08 R8596/B5196 KAMANA 20.000

REMARKS: CAMP LDR: LAZAR MPWEYINANA, HE CONTROLS FOOD DISTRIBUTION.

4A09 R8622/B5122 KAMEGELI 3.000

REMARKS:

4A10 R8930/B5631 KARAMA 10.000

REMARKS:

4A11 R5007/B8406 KIBEHO 75.000

REMARKS: (INCLUDES 30,000 LOCALS). SHIGELLA DYSENTRY IS BIG PROBLEM. THRIVING BLACK MKT OPERATING. INCREASED NIGHT PTLS BY GHANBAT DUE TO ALLEGED INTERAHAMWE ACTY. SEVERAL AUTOMATIC WPNS CONFISCATED TO DATE. MILOB ESTIMATES MAX OF 75,000 DPS HERE, PREVIOUS ESTIMATE WAS 148,000. ONLY 40% OF DPS WISH TO RTN HOME AS AT 04 SEP 94.

4A12 R8531/B5131 KIRARO (S) 32.000

REMARKS: ON 31 AUG 94, 4 FORMER RGF SOLDIERS SHOT AN ELDERLY MALE DP.

4A13 R8722/B5322 KIZI 1.500

REMARKS: MALARIA AND DYSENTRY BOTH APPARENT. SY PROVIDED BY 2 ARMED FORMER RGF GENDARMES.

4A14 R8601/B5202 MUBUGA/NDAGO 50.000

REMARKS: 25 AUG 94, 15 TUTSIS REPORTEDLY ABDUCTED 6 DPS AND KILLED 7 OF THEM. INCREASING REPORTS OF THEFT/ INTIMIDATION. CRIMINALS ARE USING GRENADES TO THREATEN VICTIMS. BLACK MKT THRIVING. CAMP IS SPREAD OVER LARGE AREA. CAMP LDR: BAKUNDUKIZE INNOCENT. EMPLOYS A NUMBER OF ARMED GENDARMES FOR SY. GOAL CARRYING OUT NEW CENSUS AS AT 04 SEP 94, REPORTEDLY CALMER ATMOSPHERE.

4A15 R7622/B4322 MUDASOMWA 0

REMARKS: CAMP COVERS LARGE AREA AND IS STEADILY INCREASING IN SIZE. NO OBVIOUS LDR. FOOD DISTRIBUTION IS DISORGANISED. THE 10,000 DPS HAVE REPORTEDLY MOVED TO CYINIKA R059 WHERE AID ACTY IS CONCENTRATED. CAMP CLOSED AS AT 04 SEP 94. ON 06 SEP 94 THE CAMP LEADER AT THIS CAMP THAT INTERAHAMWE ELMS ARE HOLDING EVENING MEETINGS IN THE CAMP. AT LEAST ONE INTERAHAMWE MEMBER FROM RWAMIKO CAMP GR 4913 REGULARLY TRAVELS TO THESE MEETINGS.

UN UNCLASSIFIED

4A16 R9020/B5621 MUGANO 6.534

REMARKS: CAMP LDR: CELESTINE RUGINDAMES. NO PROBLEMS REPORTED.

4A17 R7703/B4303 MUGANZA 20.000

REMARKS: CAMP LDR: KANJA EMMANUEL, SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND HAS REASONABLE AUTHORITY IN CAMP. NO PROBLEMS REPORTED AT THIS LOCATION. 04 SEP 94, DPS FORCED TO PROCURE FOOD FROM MUNINI R070,

RELATIVELY CALM.

4A18 R9730/B6431 MUHANGA/KANWAMBI 1.500

REMARKS: GRENADE ATTACK 02 SEP 94 LEFT 2 DEAD, 1 INJURED. GHANBAT HAVE INCREASED PRESENCE IN AREA. NO NGOS IN EVIDENCE. FORMER RGF HAVE BEEN CARRYING OUT CRIMINAL ACTS. RPA TROOPS HAVE REPORTEDLY VISITED CAMP BUT DID NOT INTIMIDATE DPS. ACCESS TO CAMP EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AS BRIDGES HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY DISMANTLED OR BLOWN. IT IS ASSESSED THIS CAMP WILL CLOSE SOON AS OCCUPANTS MOVE SW POSSIBLY TO MUSEBEYE R062. 02 SEP 94 1 KILLED. 1 WOUNDED BY H/GRENADE AND 1 MAN STABBED TO DEATH.

4A19 R7140/B3740 MUKO 28.000

REMARKS: 05 SEP 94 MILOBS REPORT THAT AN EXTRA 6.000 DPS HAVE ARRIVED AT CAMP. PREVIOUS ESTIMATE WAS 28.000. NO PLASTIC SHEETING. INFERIOR SANITATION AND POOR MED COVER.

4A20 R8199/B4700 MUNINI 10.000

REMARKS: ICRC REPORT THIS LOCATION TO BE PEACEFUL. GHANBAT PL LOCATED NEARBY. CAMP LDR: APPOLINAIRE GASIGWA. ICRC REPORT DOCTOR AT CAMP IS SELLING FOOD AID AND MEDICINE. SOME OF IT TO DPS AT MUGANZA 4A17.

4A21 R8647/B5347 MUSANGE 21.800

REMARKS: NO INTIMIDATION REPORTED, GOOD ATMOSPHERE. SY PROVIDED BY CHAD PL LOCATED NEARBY. ONLY 15.000 ACTUALLY IN CAMP AS AT 04 SEP 94. UNHCR PLAN TO MOVE 1,200 TO THEIR HOMES ON 06 SEP 94. 4 SEP 94. 5.000 DPS HAVE NOW REGISTERED TO RTN HOME. TPT WILL BEGIN ON 8 SEP 94.

4A22 R7231/B4033 MUSEBEYE HOSPITAL 18.000

REMARKS: LOCATED IN/AROUND HOSPITAL WHICH STILL HAS REASONABLE FACILITIES. TENSION HIGH DUE TO LOCALS CUTTING OFF WATER SUPPLY AND USING IT FOR IRRIGATION IN ORDER TO ANTAGONISE DPS. SEVERAL KILLINGS REPORTED. THE RESIDENT DOCTOR RESIGNED DUE TO RISING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. 03 SEP 94 CAMP LDR HANDED 2 AKS, 1 G3, AMMO AND 4 H/GRENADES TO GHANBAT.

UN UNCLASSIFIED

4A23 R7296/B3996 NSHILI 9,000

REMARKS: REFERRED TO AS RUHERO CAMP BY LOCALS. 2 I/C UNDER PASCALE IS PAUL KADOG WHO EMPLOYS ARMED EX-RGF GENDARMES FOR SY. FOOD, SHELTER AND MEDICINE REQD. 01 SEP 94 UP TO 3,000 BURUNDIANS IN VICINITY OF CAMP. 04 SEP 94 MILOBS REPORTED ONLY 3,000 DPS IN TOTAL LEFT IN CAMP. WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 7-15,000 DPS AT END OF AUG, CONFIRMED AS 9,000 05 SEP 94. REPORTEDLY SHORT OF FOOD AS AT 05 SEP 94.

4A24 R7822/B5422 NYAMIGINA 1,000

REMARKS: REPORTED TO BE PEACEFUL AND EFFICIENTLY RUN. PREVIOUSLY 2,000 DPS HERE AS AT 31 AUG 94.

4A25 R8938/B5536 RUHONDO 30,000

REMARKS: CAMP LDR HAS FLED, REASONS N/K. HIS DEPUTY, JEAN HAHIZAYEZU, IS NOW IN CHARGE. ON 05 SEP 94 A GHANBAT PTL RECOVERED 1 SMALL ARM AND 2 H/GRENADES FROM THE CAMP.

4A26 R8312/B4914 RWAMIKO 17,500

REMARKS: MALARIA AND DYSENTRY BOTH APPARENT. SY PROVIDED BY 4 ARMED FORMER RGF GENDARMES. REPORTED TO BE CRIME FREE. CAMP LDR: SILAS MAGERONGABO. INTERAHAMWE OPENLY ACTIVE IN CAMP. ON 05 SEP 94, 2 DPS WERE INJURED IN A SHOOTING AND GRENADE ATTACK. THE REASON FOR THE ATTACK IS N/K. HOWEVER, THE CAMP POPULATION SUSPECT THE RPF.

4A27 R7994/B4594 SHORORO 4,000

REMARKS: CHIEF OF THIS CAMP ALSO IN CHARGE OF 4A02 AND 4A23. HE IS CALLED MR PASCALE AND HAS BEEN USING DPS ASWELL AS LOCAL LABOUR TO HELP WITH CROP PLANTING IN RETURN FOR FOOD.

4A28 R4224/B7523 TARE 20,000

REMARKS: GHANBAT PL LOCATED 3KM AWAY, CAMP PEACEFUL. CAMP LDR IS "ALBERT" WHO HAS 23 COMMUNE LDERS UNDER HIM. MOST DPS LOCATED HERE ARE FROM BUTARE AND KIGALI.

4A29 R8823/B5224 GIKONGORO 100,000

REMARKS:

4A30 R9426/B6026 KINYAMAKARI 100,000

REMARKS:

4A31 R6920/B3520 KITABI 15,000

REMARKS:

UN UNCLASSIFIED

4A32 R73002/B4003 MURAMBI 3.000

REMARKS:

4A33 R7404/B4004 KIVU 15.000

REMARKS:

4A34 R8143/B4743 BUNYAMBILI 23.000

REMARKS:

4A35 R9528/B6129 MBOGO 20.000

REMARKS: INCREASED PRESENCE IN AREA BY GHANBAT DUE TO LEVEL OF VIOLENCE. 23-30 AUG 94, 3 MURDERS REPORTED. ALL 3 DECEASED DIED FROM MULTIPLE MACHETE WOUNDS. FORMER RGF MOUNTING CRIMINAL ATTACKS FROM A BASE NEARBY. RPA TROOPS HAVE VISITED CAMP BUT DID NOT INTIMIDATE DPS. POPULATION INCREASING DUE TO EXODUS FROM SECTOR 3. REPORTS OF FIGHTING OVER FOOD. CAMP IS VISITED DAILY BY LOCAL MEDIC: MUDANGE MODESTE. CAMP LDR: ALPHONSO MARIE CASIRA. HIS HEAD STOREMAN IS EPHEUS BUGINGO. BANDITS ARMED WITH MACHETES AND GRENADES STOLE 14 TONNES OF FOOD AID ON 31 AUG 94. 04 SEP 94 GANG OF MEN WITH STICKS ACTING AS CAMP ORGANISERS, NOT ABLE TO PREVENT THEFT OF FOOD.

4A36 R8727/B5328 KARAMBI 10.000

REMARKS:

4A37 R9139/B5840 MACHIRA 1.500

REMARKS: SATELITE CAMP OF 4A25 RUHONDO. NUMBERS INCREASING DAILY.

4A38 R9337/B5937 KABILIZI N/A

REMARKS: SATELITE CAMP OF 4A25, RUHONDO.

4A39 R8835/B5436 U/I 1.500

REMARKS: SATELITE CAMP OF 4A25, RUHONDO.

4A40 R8826/B5427 NYAMAGABI 30.000

REMARKS:

DP CAMPS IN RWANDA - SECTOR 4B

SECTOR 4B TOTAL: 51,000

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>4B01</u>	<u>R6172/B2772</u>	<u>KIBUYE</u>	<u>16,000</u>
<u>REMARKS: TUTSI AND HUTU.</u>			
<u>4B02</u>	<u>R6169/B2769</u>	<u>U/I CAMP</u>	<u>N/E</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>4B03</u>	<u>R6367/B2967</u>	<u>U/I CAMP</u>	<u>N/E</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>4B04</u>	<u>R6566/B3166</u>	<u>U/I CAMP</u>	<u>N/E</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>4B05</u>	<u>R7958/B4259</u>	<u>MWENDO</u>	<u>25,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>4B06</u>	<u>R6773/B3472</u>	<u>RUBENGARA</u>	<u>10,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>4B07</u>	<u>R6872/B3373</u>	<u>MABANZA</u>	<u>8-10,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			

DP CAMPS IN RWANDA - SECTOR 4CSECTOR 4C TOTAL: 74,500

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>4C01</u>	<u>R1125/B7724</u>	<u>CYANGUGU</u>	<u>N/A</u>

REMARKS:

<u>4C02</u>	<u>R1123/B8522</u>	<u>NYARUSHISHI</u>	<u>12,000</u>
-------------	--------------------	--------------------	---------------

REMARKS: MAINLY TUTSIS. MANY DPS- ARE KEEN TO RTX TO CENTRAL RWANDA IF UN PROVIDE TPT. SY PROVIDED BY ETHIOBAT WHO HAVE COY LOC NEARBY. 31 AUG 94 FORMER RGF OBSERVED IN CAMP. 05 SEP 94 MILOBS REPORT 11,000 IN CAMP. 05 SEP 94 QUARRELLING BETWEEN TUTSIS/HUTUS LED TO ETHIOBAT EXTRACTING PERSON(S) IN DANGER.

<u>4C03</u>	<u>R1225/B7622</u>	<u>MURURI</u>	<u>8,000</u>
-------------	--------------------	---------------	--------------

REMARKS: CAPACITY FOR 15-16,000. MILOBS REPORT 6,000 IN CAMP AS AT 05 SEP 94.

<u>4C04</u>	<u>R1511/B8111</u>	<u>GISHOMA</u>	<u>N/A</u>
-------------	--------------------	----------------	------------

REMARKS:

<u>4C05</u>	<u>R2302/B8901</u>	<u>BUGARMA CITY</u>	<u>3,000</u>
-------------	--------------------	---------------------	--------------

REMARKS:

<u>4C06</u>	<u>R1910/B8510</u>	<u>NYANGE</u>	<u>30,000</u>
-------------	--------------------	---------------	---------------

REMARKS:

<u>4C07</u>	<u>R1022/B7722</u>	<u>KARAMBO</u>	<u>N/A</u>
-------------	--------------------	----------------	------------

REMARKS:

<u>4C08</u>	<u>R3843/B0444</u>	<u>KIRAMBO</u>	<u>10-20,000</u>
-------------	--------------------	----------------	------------------

REMARKS:

<u>4C09</u>	<u>R2421/B9021</u>	<u>RURAMBA</u>	<u>1,500</u>
-------------	--------------------	----------------	--------------

REMARKS:

UN UNCLASSIFIED

4C10 R1119/B7719 CYIMBOGO N/K

REMARKS:

4C11 R /B MUSHAKA N/K

REMARKS: 24KM FROM CYANGUGU.

4C12 R /B MASHA N/K

REMARKS: IN VICINITY OF CYANGUGU.

4C13 R2307/B8909 BEGARAMA 3.000

REMARKS:

A6-2

UN UNCLASSIFIED

DP CAMPS IN RWANDA - SECTOR 5SECTOR 5 TOTAL: 182,800

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>501</u>	<u>R5314/B1814</u>	<u>GISENYE</u>	<u>1,300</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>502</u>	<u>R9335/B5735</u>	<u>RUHENGRI</u>	<u>N/K</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>503</u>	<u>R0646/B7046</u>	<u>KIDARI</u>	<u>50,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> MILOBS REPORT AS AT 07 SEP 94 THERE WERE 50,000 DPS LOCATED HERE. PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED TO BE 60,000.			
<u>504</u>	<u>R0568/B7168</u>	<u>MATA</u>	<u>N/K</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>505</u>	<u>R0186/B6586</u>	<u>NTUNGA</u>	<u>4,500</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>506</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KIRARO</u>	<u>2,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>507</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KAOUHA</u>	<u>15,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>508</u>	<u>R /B1544</u>	<u>BUTARO</u>	<u>80,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> MILOBS ESTIMATE THERE TO BE 80,000 DPS LOCATED HERE AS AT 07 SEP 94, 1000 OF THESE ARE ORPHANS.			
<u>509</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KINYABABA</u>	<u>30,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> NOT YET LOCATED, MILOBS ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE 30,000 DPS HERE AS AT 07 SEP 94.			

UN UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 8 TO
ANNEX A TO
89/1013/UN
DATED 12 SEP 94

DP CAMPS IN RWANDA - NOT YET LOCATED

UNLOCATED CAMPS TOTAL: 18,100

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>X01</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>NINJA</u>	<u>N/A</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> REPORTED TO HAVE THE CAPACITY TO HOLD UP TO 60,000 DPS.			
<u>X02</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KAMANA</u>	<u>1,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>X03</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>MONIGI</u>	<u>N/A</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>X04</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>NKANDA</u>	<u>2,500</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>X05</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>BYORO</u>	<u>3,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>X06</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>IJWI</u>	<u>1,600</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>X07</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>NYIMISHUBA</u>	<u>10,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			

A8-1

UN UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX B TO
89/1013/UN
DATED 10 SEP 94

REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE

ZAIRE CAMPS TOTAL: 1,310,000 - GOMA AREA: 800,000
- BUKAVU AREA: 320,000
- UVIRA AREA: 190,000

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>Z001</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>SAKE</u>	<u>N/E</u>

REMARKS: NEW CAMP ESTABLISHED FOR FORMER RGF, 20,000 PREVIOUSLY AT MUGUNGA.

<u>Z002</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>MUGUNGA</u>	<u>150,000</u>
-------------	-------------	----------------	----------------

REMARKS:

<u>Z003</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>MUNIGI</u>	<u>100,000</u>
-------------	-------------	---------------	----------------

REMARKS:

<u>Z004</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KIBIMBA</u>	<u>250,000</u>
-------------	-------------	----------------	----------------

REMARKS:

<u>Z005</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KATALL</u>	<u>200,000</u>
-------------	-------------	---------------	----------------

REMARKS:

<u>Z006</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>JOMBA</u>	<u>5,000</u>
-------------	-------------	--------------	--------------

REMARKS:

<u>Z007</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>GOMA TOWN</u>	<u>150,000</u>
-------------	-------------	------------------	----------------

REMARKS: UP TO 10,000 UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN AT 18 ORPHANAGES AT GOMA. UNHCR AS AT 31 AUG 94. ESTIMATED TO BE UP TO 800,000 REFUGEES IN GOMA AREA AS AT 31 AUG 94.

<u>Z008</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>LAC VERT</u>	<u>N/E</u>
-------------	-------------	-----------------	------------

REMARKS:

<u>Z009</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KITUKU</u>	<u>1,000</u>
-------------	-------------	---------------	--------------

REMARKS: TUTSI CAMP.

<u>Z010</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>RUTSHURU</u>	<u>500</u>
-------------	-------------	-----------------	------------

REMARKS:

UN UNCLASSIFIED

Z011 R /B BUKAVU N/K

REMARKS: UNHCR REPORT THERE ARE 13 CAMPS IN THE BUKAVU AREA. ESTIMATED TO BE APPROX 320,000 REFUGEES IN BUKAVU AREA; AS AT 31 AUG 94. 03 SEP 94 NGOS REPORTED FAZ TPS INCREASINGLY HOSTILE TO REFUGEES AND NGOS. ROUTES TO CAMPS WERE DETERIORATING AND WILL BE IMPASSABLE DURING RAINS. SEVERAL SIGHTINGS OF MEN IN UNIFORMS, SOME ARMED WITH AKS.

Z012 R /B ALFAJIRI 30,000

REMARKS: LOC OUTSIDE CATHOLIC COLLEGE IN CENTRAL BUKAVU.

Z013 R /B KAMONYOLA 200,000

REMARKS:

Z014 R /B NYAMANANGILE N/K

REMARKS:

Z015 R /B HONGO N/E

REMARKS:

Z016 R /B LIE IDJWI 3,000

REMARKS:

Z017 R /B CHIMUNGA 5,100

REMARKS:

Z018 R /B KAHGARASHINGA 2-5,000

REMARKS:

Z019 R /B UVIRA 190,000

REMARKS:

Z020 R /B VALLE DE RUZI N/E

REMARKS:

ANNEX C TO
89/1013/UN
DATED 20 SEP 94

REFUGEE CAMPS IN UGANDA

UGANDA CAMPS TOTAL: 15,000. ALTHOUGH UNHCR ASSESS THERE ARE BETWEEN 60-70,000 REFUGEES (6-8,000 FAMILIES) WANTING TO RETURN TO RWANDA PREDOMINANTLY THROUGH MULINDI. THESE ARE PROBABLY TUTSI/MODERATE HUTU WHO FLED COUNTRY PRIOR TO LATEST CONFLICT.

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>U001</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>KISORO</u>	<u>4,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>U002</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>KABALE</u>	<u>6,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>U003</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>KIKAGALI</u>	<u>4,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			

UN UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX D TO
89/1013/UN
DATED 16 SEP 94

REFUGEE CAMPS IN TANZANIA

TANZANIA CAMPS TOTAL: 420,000 (UNHCR) - NGARA DISTRICT: 300,000
- KARAGWE DISTRICT: 98,400

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>T001</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>CHABALISA</u>	<u>N/E</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> (SEE T004)			
<u>T002</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>MURONGO</u>	<u>N/E</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> (SEE T004)			
<u>T003</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>KAGENYE 1</u>	<u>N/E</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> (SEE T004)			
<u>T004</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>KAGENYE 2</u>	<u>105,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> ESTIMATED TO BE UP TO 105,000 REFUGEES IN CAMPS T001, T002, T003, T004.			
<u>T005</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>MUGANO 1</u>	<u>(SEE T006)</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> (SEE T006)			
<u>T006</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>MUGANO 2</u>	<u>N/E</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> T005+T006 ARE BELIEVED TO CONTAIN UP TO 35,000 REFUGEES. THE MAJORITY ARE HUTU BUT THERE ARE SOME TUTSI (SEPARATE CAMPS).			
<u>T007</u>	<u>R</u> / <u>B</u>	<u>BENACO</u>	<u>N/E</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> FORMER RGF AND MILITIA SIGHTED IN THIS AREA.			

ANNEX E TO
89/1013/UN
DATED 6 SEP 94

REFUGEE CAMPS IN BURUNDI

BURUNDI CAMPS TOTAL: 200,000 (UNHCR) - 179,500 ACCOUNTED FOR.

<u>No</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>CAMP NAME</u>	<u>TOTAL OF DPS</u>
<u>B001</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>CIBITOKI</u>	<u>200</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>B002</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KAYANZA</u>	<u>5,900</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>B003</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>NGOZI</u>	<u>17,100</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>B004</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>MUYINGA</u>	<u>35,300</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>B005</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>KIRUNDO</u>	<u>12,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>B006</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>RUNYOMBI</u>	<u>10,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>B007</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>REMERA</u>	<u>1,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>B008</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>MUTINGA</u>	<u>N/K</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u>			
<u>B009</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>MUREKE</u>	<u>5,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> AS AT 05 AUG 94, CANADIAN OXFAM.			
<u>B010</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>MUBUGA</u>	<u>8,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> AS AT 05 AUG 94, CANADIAN OXFAM.			
<u>B011</u>	<u>R /B</u>	<u>GASHIKANWA</u>	<u>35,000</u>
<u>REMARKS:</u> ESTIMATED TO BE UP TO 35,000 REFUGEES IN B011/B012 CAMPS AS AT 05 AUG 94, CANADIAN OXFAM.			

UN UNCLASSIFIED

B012 R /B GAKERE (SEE B011)

REMARKS: (SEE B011)

B013 R /B KIVUMU 0

REMARKS: CLOSED AS AT 05 AUG 94, CANADIAN OXFAM

B014 R /B GAHOMBO 0

REMARKS: CLOSED AS AT 05 AUG 94, CANADIAN OXFAM.

B015 R /B MUGANO 35,000

REMARKS: 2 SEPARATE CAMPS 1+2. MAJORITY HUTU/MINORITY TUTSI. AS AT 05 AUG 94 CANADIAN OXFAM.

FC
I suggest we communicate
these findings to Human Rights
organizations within Rwanda.
I shall personally cross-check
on some of the information.

G2 Cell
HQ UNAMIR

16 Sep 94

G2/5000

See Distribution

16/9
DFC/WS

MASS GRAVES


1. On 15 Sep 94 SO3 G2 conducted a recce of a mass grave site in conjunction with elements of AUSCON. During the course of the recce another 2 sites were identified and contact established with a local civilian source.

2. The primary site recce'd was the church in NTARAMA (Sector 2, GR 064666). An estimated 300-400 bodies are in the church or the immediate area surrounding it. To date the bodies have not been buried and are in an advanced state of decay, most consisting solely of skeletons. The size of some of the skeletons clearly indicates that children were killed. Walking sticks indicate that old people were also murdered. Source claims that the massacre was carried out by soldiers of the former RGF on 15 Apr 94. Source states that 3 truck loads of troops were sent down from KIGALI to kill Tutsis in the area.

3. One of the other mass graves was behind the Shell petrol station at the western end of KAYUMBA (Approx GR 096635). Source claims that "hundreds" of bodies are buried there. The area is covered with piles of earth and it was not possible to verify this claim at the time.

4. Source was able to guide elements of the recce party to the other site which is a feature to the North of KAYUMBA (GR 094648). Fleeing Tutsis from KAYUMBA hid in the forest which covers the hill and were reported to have been hunted and killed by INTERAHAMWE over a period of days from 11 Apr 94 onwards. Source claims that about 400 bodies are scattered all over the hill. The recce party was able to verify 22 and believes that 100 is a more reasonable estimate.

5. A list of all mass graves is to be drawn up and updated on a regular basis. The list will be distributed by this HO. Addressees are asked to contribute all details of mass graves in their possession to G2, HQ UNAMIR as a matter of urgency in order that the scale of the problem can be assessed and all information collated centrally. Details should include whether or not the site has been confirmed as a grave, approximate numbers of bodies (if possible), grid reference and a brief description of the site ie. above or below ground.



S H MOORHOUSE
Capt
For FC

Distribution:

External:

Action:

TAC HQ
MILOB GP HQ
AUSMED
BRITCON
1 CDHSR
GHABATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
MALAWICOY
ZAMBATT
TUNBATT
NIGBATT

Internal:

Information:

FC
DFC
DCOS Ops



UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: Distribution List

FROM: LCol P. Desnoyers *[Signature]*

DATE: 16 September 1994

SUBJECT: REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
RETURN HOME

BACKGROUND

1. Numerous quantities have been mentioned with regard to the amount of refugees/displaced Rwandans within and outside Rwanda. Suffice it to say that the exact number is well above one million persons or the equivalent of more than 25,000 vehicle-load of 40 persons per vehicle. Very little movement is currently observed coming from the refugee/displaced persons camps. The camps are themselves contributing to the instability of the country. Many UNAMIR vehicle resources are now available pending the arrival of the main bodies of contingents and the now routine weekly resupply concept adopted for the Force.

AIM

2. To propose a military option to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of the refugees/displaced Rwandans.

FACTORS

3. The following factors are considered in the assessment of options:
- a. Will to Return Home. The will to return home depends on the following aspects:
 - (1) Security. Will it be safe for them to return home?
 - (2) Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The humanitarian effort has been very successful so far; over one hundred camps have been established and are being resupplied and supported by various relief agencies. Are the refugees/displaced persons becoming dependant on the relief effort itself? Will the rain season permit the continuation of the uninterrupted provisioning of support/relief?
 - (3) A propaganda campaign to reassure and encourage people to return to their home is essential to the success of this task.

- b. Health Conditions. The health conditions in these camps are not ideal and, in some cases, contagious diseases could be spread in non-afflicted areas if the sick are not contained and treated first. A medical screening is required prior to moving any refugees/displaced persons;
- c. RPA Verifications. Currently, verifications are conducted at check points which slows down the movement process because of the offloading and loading of personnel on the vehicles. These verifications should be done with the full participation of the authorities, including the receiving prefects, at the initial loading points (at the camps themselves);
- d. Final Destinations. Because almost 90% of the Rwandan population were rural-based, it must be assumed that most of the refugees/displaced persons should not be returned to cities/villages. Close coordination is required with the selected receiving prefectures to ensure that correct moves are made;
- e. Road Conditions. The conditions of the roads are very difficult, either because of hills or dirt surfaces, which limits the selection of the vehicles that are capable of performing the task of moving people. This situation will worsen shortly with the arrival of the rain season. Movement and use of military-type vehicles should be restricted to those areas not accessible to other types;
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. Staging is an important step of the return home of refugees/displaced persons. It ensures that they are provided with the essential ingredients to start up in their home as well as ensuring that they arrive at their final destinations during daylight hours. Close coordination is required with the UNHCR/IOM staging areas;
- g. Mass Population Effect. This factor cannot be underestimated following its effect during the war. The more concentrated the relocation effort for refugees/displaced persons the more chances are that all those in the targeted areas will want to return home;
- h. Location of Camps. Camps are located throughout the country but most are concentrated in sector 4 (for those within Rwanda), estimated at well over half a million persons;
- i. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. These agencies have mainly hard surface resources including 50 passenger buses; and
- j. Available UNAMIR Resources. Until the arrival of ZAMBATT and TUNBATT and while BRITCON is available, the following assets are available:
 - (1) 50 x Bedford 4T trucks (British and Brown and Root drivers) - 3 have been allocated to sector 5 for the movement of refugees/displaced persons,
 - (2) 50 x DAF trucks (Zambian drivers).

- (3) 10 x ISUZU/MAN trucks (Brown and Root drivers), and
- (4) a transport company/squadron command and control element (BRITCON).

OPTIONS

4. Considering the factors, all the options considered must have the following criteria:

- a. A propaganda campaign sponsored by the government in cooperation with UNAMIR;
- b. The presence of prefecture, RPA and medical authorities at loading points;
- c. Staging at a UNHCR/IOM base; and
- d. Coordination with NGOs bringing relief aid to camp to ensure the transfer of the aid is done concurrently with the transfer of persons.

5. Option A - Split the UNAMIR Vehicle Resources under Sector Control.

This option ensures that all sectors get a proportionate quantity of vehicles in accordance with the number of refugees/displaced persons in their sectors. The coordination is difficult as most refugees/displaced persons will have to cross between sectors.

6. Option B - Retain Centralized Control in KIGALI. This option ensures the broadest view of the situation but enhances the coordination problem of Option A with the involvement of all sectors (5) and prefectures (12).

7. Option C - Focus on One Area which has a High Contration of Persons. This option favours one area over the others but provides the following advantages:

- a. Simplifies coordination;
- b. Accelerates the planned movements; and
- c. Provides the potential generator for mass population movement within that area.

CONCLUSION

8. Though UNAMIR has resources available to assist in the relocation of refugees/displaced persons, its number is relatively small compared to the total requirements. Nevertheless, there is a potential impact that a concentrated effort on a selected area could have on the remainder of the population.

RECOMMENDATION

9. Option C in sector 4 A with the following details:
- a. task each sector (1, 4B and 4C) to provide 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons;
 - b. provide sector 2 with 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons (sector 5 already has 3 x trucks);
 - c. provide all other available trucks (up to 100) for the movement of refugees/displaced persons from sector 4A - the GIKONGORO Prefecture (350.000 in 28 camps) - to sector 3 - the BUTARE and GITARAMA prefectures;
 - d. locate these transport assets in the BUTARE area to be in proximity to the UNHCR/IOM staging base and one of the prefects involved (30 minutes from GIKONGORO and 60 minutes from GITARAMA);
 - e. task BRITCON with the coordination requirements of all parties involved; and
 - f. locate the command and control element of this task in the current TAC HQ location for ease of communication and liaison.
10. This task should be assigned as soon as possible as the rain season is already starting and the main bodies of new contingents are scheduled to arrive shortly.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

CHAC

Information

FC
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
G3 Plans
G4 Log

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Dre

VERBAL NOTE

SRSG/NV/20/94

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Rwandese Republic and is greatly honored to announce that the Government of Burkina Faso wishes to send humanitarian aid to the Population and Government of Rwanda. Please find attached copy of the note NO 94/929/MREX/SG dated 12 September 1994 from the Burkinabé Ministry of Exterior Relations of Burkina Faso and directed to UNAMIR Executive Director.

UNAMIR would like to call the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to the content of the last but one paragraph of the said note and would be grateful for kindly being provided with all the required information-for response to the Burkinabé Ministry of Exterior Relations-concerning the coming to Kigali of the Government delegation of Burkina Faso.

UNAMIR is thankful in advance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Rwandese Republic for the coming response to this request and seizes upon this opportunity to renew the assurance of its highest consideration.

Kigali, 15 September 1994

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation
of the Republic of Rwanda
KIGALI

MA
Keep me informed of
date and my role

J. Li

16/9

DFC/cos

JFC



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSG/NV/20/94

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République rwandaise, et a l'honneur et le plaisir de lui annoncer le souhait du Gouvernement du Burkina Faso d'envoyer de l'assistance humanitaire au Peuple et au Gouvernement du Rwanda. Ci-joint copie de la note NO 94/929/MREX/SG du 12 septembre 1994 émanant du Ministère des Relations Extérieures du Burkina Faso et adressée au Directeur Exécutif de la MINUAR.

Elle voudrait attirer la bienveillante attention du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale sur le contenu de l'avant-dernier paragraphe de ladite note et lui saurait gré de bien vouloir lui communiquer en retour, pour réponse au Ministère burkinabé des Relations Extérieures, toutes les informations requises quant à la venue à Kigali de la délégation gouvernementale du Burkina Faso.

La MINUAR remercie d'avance le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République rwandaise de la prochaine suite réservée à la présente requête et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.



Fait à Kigali, le 15 septembre 1994

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES


MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE TO THE DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER

1. At this morning briefing, the designated Military Officer-in-charge of humanitarian cell informed that Prof. Runyinya Barabwiliza who had been under UNAMIR protection was handed over to the government at 4 p.m. in the presence of a Ministry of Justice official and a representative of the Red Cross.
2. I was personally surprised that no contact was established with my office during this procedure, especially since I had a long interview yesterday with the Professor where he handed me some documents.
3. May I ask your kind cooperation in ensuring that matters which have political overtones automatically involve my office from beginning to end.

Kind regards.


Isel Rivero
9/9/94

Isel
There must have been a communication
gap somewhere. The professor was expected
to have been handed over a day after his
arrival but the RPA did not seem to
be ready to accept him immediately. This
was announced at early morning briefing
yesterday. I am sorry if you were not
specifically informed but I am sure
you can certainly follow-up with Min of Justice.
Thank you
JLi
9/9/94
DFC/WS.

RAAUZYUW RCCPSPO0053 2502227-UUUU--RCCPJSA.

ZNR UUUUU

R 072227Z SEP 94

FM COMD MILOB//SECTOR 5

TO HQ UNAMIR//COS//COO/CLOGO//

INFO C/S MP 1 (HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE)

BT

UNCLAS DSIG

SUBJ: UNAMIR ASSISTANCE TO NGO OPERATIONS IN SEC 5

DATE 07 SEP 94

DCOS # SP
See how best we can
undertake this task. I am
not sure we have 3100
that will be fully
dedicated for that
job.
HJL
08/9
08/05

1. IN GENERAL, NGO OPS IN SUPPORT OF REFUGEES RETURNING FROM GOMA AREA CAMPS IS WORKING WELL. THERE IS EXCELLENT COORD OF EFFORT BETWEEN VARIOUS GROUPS.
2. AS RATES OF RETURN HAS INCREASED TO ABOVE 1000 PERS DAILY THERE IS A GROWING PROBLEM IN TRANSPORTING REFUGEES FROM ZAIRE BORDER TOWARDS RUHENGERI AND KIGALI. IOM IS CURRENTLY OPERATING 5-7 CARGO TRUCKS DAILY ON THIS TASK. PLAN IS TO SUPPLEMENT WITH MORE TRUCKS/BUSES IN THE NEXT 3/6 WEEKS.
3. LACK OF TRANSPORT IS CREATING A "SURGE" SITUATION, WITH SOME AID STATIONS BECOMING TEMPORARY CAMPS WHILE RETURNEES WAIT FOR

PAGE 2 RCCPSPO0053 UNCLAS

LIFT. THESE CAMPS CANNOT BE PROPERLY SUPPORTED. OTHER STATIONS ARE UNDER UTILIZED AT THE SAME TIME. IN SHORT, THE SYSTEM WILL WORK BEST WHEN A STEADY LIFT-FLOW OF REFUGEES IS ACHIEVED.

4. UNAMIR COULD ASSIST IN THIS CRITICAL TIME BY PROVIDING 3X TCV AND DVRS. PLAN WOULD BE TO UTILIZE THESE VEHS IN A "SHUTTLE" FROM GISENYI TO RUHENGARI. IOM WOULD THEN CONCENTRATE ON MOVING RETURNEES TO KIGALI AREA.

5. VEHS AND DRIVERS WOULD BE HOUSED AND ADMINISTERED BY HQ-SEC 5 AT GISENYI. ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TASK IS 30 DAYS MAXIMUM, UNTIL ADDITIONAL IOM TRUCKS ARRIVE.

6. ADVISE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BT

#0053

Received 09-07-1994 22:55:49

MEMORANDUM

9850-1

3 Sept 94

FC (thru DFC/COS)

REFUGEE RETURN

Ref: Rwanda Presidential letter dated 1 Sep 94 (attached)

1. The majority of concerns and issues in the letter at ref are outside of UNAMIR force's control or influence. Security of Tanzanian and Zairean refugee camps, the repatriation of refugees and the human rights issues are clearly outside UNAMIR's mandate for its military force. Those issues should be addressed by UNREO, UNHCR and other NGO's.

2. With respect to the establishment of safe corridors for the return of refugees, it should be noted that there is an NGO/humanitarian aspect as well as a military force/security aspect associated. In so much that it is my assessment that the current deployment, tasks and situation precludes the military force from assuming any additional tasks without receiving additional troop reinforcement beyond those currently authorized/planned.


3. Prior to considering the creation of safe corridors, UNAMIR should confirm the required information and determine feasibility of the following:

- a. routes and location where corridors are required (ie: in all sectors or just in Sector 4);
- b. whether refugee flow warrants this extraordinary measure;
- c. final destination of refugees (to avoid "Kigali DP" situation from worsening);
- d. assistance avail from IOM, UNHCR and other NGO's to screen/move refugees/DP's and establish "way stations"; and
- e. establishment of collection pts at border and the provision of tpt, secur, escort is sufficient to BBGNU and achievable/practical for UNAMIR and NGO's.

FC
I agree with the pertinent issues raised by DCOS ops. I have asked ~~it~~ my MA to convene a meeting of the officers at pages 2 para 4 for us to look through the matter.
JLW 04/9
DFC

4. Suggest a meeting chaired by DFC/COS with DCOS OPS, DCOS SP, HAC, UNREO and SRSG rep be convened to resolve some of the issues in para 3 to determine feasibility and way ahead.

5. Furthermore, the attached letter should be referred to UNDP/UNREO in order to address the non-military issues.



J. Arp
Col
DCOS OPS

Attachement: 1



PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE
CABINET DU PRESIDENT

Kigali, le 01/09/1994

N°

[Handwritten signature]

Annexe :

Réf. N° :

Objet :

The Representative,
United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees
KIGALI / RWANDA

②

DLOS QS

Please review this
request and brief FC
on our capability to
support it

A

MA 5/9

Dear Mr Representative,

During our discussions with the different citizens of our country, certain facts have emerged about the plight of Rwandese citizens who are living in refuge in our neighbouring countries that deeply concern us. In one meeting with the population in Ruhengeri town, citizens who had been living in refuge in Zaïre but had to flee from that country in fear of their life after being evicted from their home, exemplified a problem which is beginning to take on alarming proportions.

Mr Representative, the Interahamwe and political leaders who orchestrated the genocide in our country are still as active in their countries of asylum, as they were in our country. In Zaïre and Tanzania, they are still busy planning massacres and terrorising innocent citizens whose right it is to live in peace and security. They are busy creating the climate of insecurity that preceeded the genocide in our country.

In Zaïre these Interahamwe found a group of Rwandese who had been living in exile for more than thirty years. They terrorised them and even evicted many of them from their homes and took ownership of the property they had acquired. As if this was not enough, even those who try to flee back to Rwanda are ambushed on the way and are either killed or maimed. In one incident alone more than twenty people returning to Rwanda were ambushed and killed. All this is done with the impunity that is characteristic of these interahamwe.

The Interahamwe and their leaders, including those suspected of having been the brains behind the genocide in Rwanda, freely, openly, and publically carry out propaganda inciting the population to hate, hunt and kill others on ethnic lines. Those refugees who dare to voice dissenting views are ruthlessly suppressed and those who dare to return to their homeland are actively hunted down and harassed if not killed. All this is done by people who at the close of day return to refugee camps run by the UNCHR.

In Tanzania, in the camps that house recent Rwandese refugees this same sorry state of affairs prevails.

The Interahamwe of Benako camp have earned themselves notoriety for stopping and harassing refugees attempting to return to Rwanda from the neighbouring countries. Again many innocent lives have been lost due to the activities of these notorious killers.

[Handwritten mark]

During our discussions with the local Tanzanian authorities, they indicated that they had little control over the activities and affairs of the camp because as they say, the camps are the UNHCR's responsibility and are under its jurisdiction.

We think, Mr Representative, that this state of affairs is unacceptable. not only is it against the 1952 Geneva convention on refugees but it is also inimical to the UNHCR principle of encouraging voluntary repatriation.


We strongly recommend that the UNHCR use its power and jurisdiction over the refugee camps wherever they maybe, to isolate and separate the interahamwe and their leaders from the rest of the population so that the people may be able to choose whether they want to return to their homes or stay in exile without coercion. In addition, the activities of the Interahamwe outside the camps should be severely curtailed.

As the security of Banyarwanda is our concern we strongly recommend that corridors be set up in order to facilitate safe returning of old or recent refugees who are willing to come back.

These are criminals who should only be brought before the courts of law . If the above is not done with all urgency, we fear that the world will only be fanning the beginnings of another holocaust.

Expecting a favourable response, accept Mr Representative, the expression of my highest consideration.

His Excellency Pasteur BIZIMUNGU
President of the Republic of Rwanda



C.C :

- Prime Minister
KIGALI
- V/President and Minister of Defence
KIGALI
- Mr SHAHARYER KHAN, Special Representative
of the UN Secretary General
KIGALI
- Maj. Gen. G.C. TOUSIGNAT
Force commander UNAMIR
KIGALI

Dear Doctor,

I have passed by to transmit to you the greetings from Brigadier General GATSINZI Marcel who is still staying at KICUKIRO. Besides, I would like to ask you to tell MILOB-KAMEMBE to speed up the process of sending us the vehicles we left in BUKAVU in the hands of the Deputy Chief of Intelligence at BUKAVU(NORTHERN KIVU). He had promised to transfer them to KAMEMBE as soon as possible. His full name is MUZAZA KOLIAS Albert.

We count on your usual good understanding.

Yours respectfully,

Mrs. GATSINZI Julienne

(2)

DCOF OPS

Have we done something
about that yet.

Jh.

04/9

DFC/OPS

TRANSFERS

REPUBLIC OF
RWANDA

1	
2	
3	
4	

VEHICLE REGISTRATION
CERTIFICATE
(ORIGINAL)

No 17682

085/20

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION

REGISTRATION NO	TYPE	TRADE MARK	ENGINE NUMBER	CHASSIS NUMBER	YEAR	DATE
IT 3898	CAR	HYUNDAI	G4DUN 506338	21JPU 633018	1992	13/12

OWNER IDENTIFICATION

NAME	ADDRESS
GATSINZI MARCEL	B.P.60 BUIARE

RECOMMENDATION

In case the vehicle is no longer used, even if provisionally, the registration papers must be returned to the office which has issued them all the while giving the reason why they are returned. Anything that might cause changes to the information relating to the owner of the registration certificate or to the vehicle identification must be notified to the service that has issued the certificate either verbally or through a registered letter. In case the vehicle is sold or handed over to someone else, the certificate must be modified to bear the name of the buyer or the recipient.

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

UNAMIR

94 SEP -7 12 09

NO OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCL THIS: ONE

TO: GHANBATT FRAFATT ETHIOBATT	FROM: DCOS OPS for UNAMIR HQ KIGALI Jelli 21-SEP
INFO: DFC	
FAX: 00-873-151-5562- ok FAX: 00-873-383-020020 FAX: 00-871-383-020050	FAX: 1-212-963-3090 UNSUCCESSFUL
	DATED: 07 SEPTEMBER 1994

SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF REFUGEE/DISPLACED - VIPS FROM SECTOR 4 BY UNAMIR/NGOS

1. THE SCREENING OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTED AT SECTOR/SUB-SECTOR HQS BEFORE ANY MOVEMENT OF SUCH PERSONS IS UNDERTAKEN BY UNAMIR/NGO CONVOYS AS PER FC'S DIRECTIVE ON TRANSPORTATION OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS IN UNAMIR AOR.
2. TO PREVENT ANY FUTURE EMBARRASSMENT TO UNAMIR, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THIS DIRECTIVE IS ADHERED TO AND CLEARANCE IS SOUGHT FROM FORCE HQ BEFORE, REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS THAT SHOW ANY INDICATION THAT APPEAR TO LINK THEM WITH THE PREVIOUS RWANDESE GOVERNMENT, ARE TRANSPORTED UNDER UNAMIR ARRANGEMENT OUT OF SECTOR 4.
3. FOR YOUR NECESSARY GUIDANCE.

FC (DFC) DCOS OPS



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
CABINET DU MINISTRE
BP 23 KIGALI

30th August, 1994

The Special Representative of
the Secretary General of
United Nations
UNAMIR HQs
KIGALI

①

received today.
E) 3/8
FC

**RE : PRESENCE OF FORMER ARMY AND GENDARMERIE IN
THE HUMANITARIAN ZONE**

I would like to express to you the concern of the Government on the presence of the Former Army and Gendarmerie in the Humanitarian Zone.

They are many former Rwandese Government Forces moving freely with their guns in the Humanitarian Zone. In particular there is a Gendarmerie Force of about two hundred and fifty imposed by the French to control the Area.

The Government of Rwanda has invited all former Rwandese Government Forces to come and be integrated in the National Army. A programme to integrate them has been drawn.

It is our understanding that the only Force allowed at the moment to control security in the area is UNAMIR and the Government after consultation with UNAMIR.

All other forces should be disarmed by UNAMIR and confined. UNAMIR should then forward those willing to the Government for integration in National Army. In case UNAMIR would require our assistance in this exercise we shall be available to assist.

Yours sincerely,

Paul Kagame
Major General

VICE PRESIDENT AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE

c. c. : - H.E President of the Republic of Rwanda
- Prime Minister
- Minister for Internal Affairs

③ FC

I think we are doing our best.
You have just come from the zone and
can see you have seen a lot for yourself.
If the RGF and the Gendarmes are freely
handing over their weapons (I think
we are getting there. The RPA
should exercise patience. It is in
their interest to do so.

FC 04/9 DFC

② DFC

1. We must keep
our initiatives
alive and well.
I see this as a warning
That if we can't do the job, they will!

FC.
2 Sep 94

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
MINISTERE DU COMMERCE,
DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DE
L'ARTISANAT
B.P. 73 KIGALI.

Kigali, le 26/08/1994

N° 545 /13/02/94

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial
du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU
KIGALI.

S/Couvert de Monsieur le Ministre
des Affaires Etrangères et de la
Coopération
KIGALI.

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

J'ai l'honneur de recourir à votre haute autorité pour solliciter l'intervention de la MINUAR en vue de protéger le patrimoine de l'Etat se trouvant dans la zone de Sécurité dans le Sud-Ouest du pays. Il s'agit principalement de la CIMENTERIE de MASHYUZA (CIMERWA), des Usines à Thé et des unités de production des minerais.

En effet, nous avons appris avec beaucoup d'amertume qu'une cinquantaine d'agents de la CIMERWA se sont livrés au pillage et à la destruction du patrimoine de cette entreprise, avant de regagner le Zaïre et avec la ferme intention de revenir pour parachever leur ignoble action, voire-même attenter à la vie de leurs collègues restés au service.

C'est dans le but de sauvegarder les biens publics et de protéger les vies humaines que je sollicite votre concours, en vous demandant de détacher des unités de garde aux endroits figurant dans le tableau ci-dessous :

Nom de l'Entreprise à garder	Préfecture	Commune
1. Cimenterie de Mashyuza	CYANGUGU	BUGARAMA
2. Riziculture de Bugarama	CYANGUGU	BUGARAMA
3. SONAFRUIT	CYANGUGU	CYIMBOGO
4. Usine à Thé Shagasha	CYANGUGU	GISUMA
5. Usine à Thé Gisakura	CYANGUGU	KAGANO
6. Usine à Thé MATA	GIKONGORO	RWAMIKO
7. Usine à Thé KITABI	GIKONGORO	MUDASOMWA
8. Projet Théicole NSHILI-KIVU	GIKONGORO	NSHILI
9. Usine à Thé GISOVU	KIBUYE	GISOVU
10. Secteur minier de BISESERO	KIBUYE	GITESI
11. Secteur minier de Rutsiro	KIBUYE	RUTSIRO

.../...

L'intervention de la MINUAR est également sollicitée pour l'escorte des camions de transport de ciment de CYANGUGU à KIGALI où de nombreux travaux de reconstruction s'imposent.

A cet effet, mon Département se tient à la disposition de vos services pour définir ensemble les modalités pratiques pour la mise en oeuvre de cette opération.

En attendant votre réaction que j'espère favorable et rapide, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

LE MINISTRE DU COMMERCE, DE
L'INDUSTRIE ET DE L'ARTISANAT,

HIGIRO Prosper.



Copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le
Président de la République
KIGALI.
- Son Excellence Monsieur le
Premier Ministre
KIGALI.
- Monsieur le Ministre de la
Défense
KIGALI.
- Monsieur le Ministre des Finances
KIGALI.

Note to the File

Executive Director's Meeting with Representatives of the Ministry of Youth

1. Mlle. Francine Umurungi and Mr. Pierre Karemera from the Ministry of Youth and Sports came to UNAMIR Headquarters to speak with the UNAMIR Executive Director.
2. The representatives inquired if it would be possible:
 - a. for UNAMIR to vacate the outside offices of the Amohorro Stadium so that the Ministry of Youth and Sports could occupy them;
 - b. for UNAMIR to facilitate the Ministry's visit to the stadium to assess the facilities;
 - c. for UNAMIR to discuss reimbursement for the use of the Amohorro Hotel with the Rwandan Government.
3. The representatives will come to UNAMIR HQ tomorrow at 0900 hours to find out when they can visit the stadium.

[Handwritten signature]

Kristen Scott
Political Affairs Officer
23 August 1994

SPC
Could we surgically
divise a & b before
the note is forwarded
to the SRSG and FC?
APK ED 23/8

CAN SIGS + BOUTCOM
Pse be aware that Dr Kabu - the
Executive Director and some
officials from Ministry of Youth & Sports
will be visiting the stadium
today Thursday 25 Aug 94 at
1000 hrs. Be prepared to
receive them.

*✓ By mfa
Returned to
25/8*

[Handwritten signature]
25/8/94
DFC/COS

Report from Dr Alan Goodall of situation at Karisoke & Kinigi

1 I met briefly with the Prime Minister on Friday 29 July and explained my mission in Rwanda. He told me to meet with the Minister for the Environment as soon as possible.

2 It proved difficult to find him - but I eventually had a meeting with him early morning Sat. 30 July. We had a wide ranging discussion about what will be necessary to re-build environmental aid and tourism. Obviously the first priority was to do a situation analysis. The Minister gave me an 'A Qui de Droit' to explain my mission.

3 Since Karisoke and the rare mountain gorillas are a world-wide focus of attention I started there.

4 Accompanied by Major C Braun of UNAMIR I left Kigali at approx. 14.30 on Saturday 30 July for Ruhengeri and, eventually Karisoke. We were cordially received by the RPF checkpoint at Kinigi - who said that they had heard of our trip, presumably via radio. We travelled on up to the area of Kinigi. There were very few people - in marked contrast to before. This region had more than 10 per square km.

5 We arrived at Bisati/Bisoke near the base of the forest at the edge of the park after 17.00 hours. The local people knew me well. We asked them about the staff at Karisoke. They replied that they had all fled into Zaire - with their families, animals and what little they could carry. They had fled through the park. It appeared that most of this formerly densely populated area had fled the same way.

6 We organised the porters and climbed up to Karisoke in 55 minutes - a good time. It was deserted and had been ransacked and looted. Since it was now dark we had to organise food and a place to sleep for the porters and ourselves. We did this quickly because of the rapid drop in temperature at this altitude of 3,000 metres. Major Braun and I slept in the same cabin that had been built for me in 1970. It was one of the few which had intact windows and a door!

7 At dawn on Sun 31 Jul. we organised the six porters into the various groups we needed. I had decided to travel through the park into Zaire to try to find the Karisoke staff and their families. After all the organisations were complete I left at 09.00 with two porters. We followed the familiar trail due west out of camp.

8 I had only travelled over half of this area before. This trip took far longer than I had expected and we did not arrive on the

Zaire side until around 14.30 hours.

9 During our journey we met some refugees in several small groups (totalling only 40-50) returning to Rwanda. One group had a few cows and another goats. The damage to the forest by the people and the animals was MINIMAL. We crossed two fresh trails of Mountain gorillas - in the zone of the giant nettles. I am confident that they are all fine - and are wondering where the Scientists from Karisoke are! I saw and heard more Bushbuck and Black-fronted Duiker than I had ever done before. It later became obvious that this is because there is now only minimal poaching - IF ANY. I found only one trap on the whole journey. This could have been there for some time. Thus, as far as the park and its rare animals are concerned they are probably better off now regarding disturbances and poaching than they have ever been. How ironic, that these animals should avoid all the recent tragedies.

10 We met two Zaire park guards at the border of the park. They were VERY friendly - and in fact one of them knew of my work in Kahuzi-Biega and Kivu province. They told us that the Karisoke staff were camped at Bikuma - about one kilometre North East along the park boundary from where we had come out. They were accompanied by NDARUHEBEYE - one of the Karisoke trackers. He told me more news.

11 The guards showed us the way to Bikuma - where we found an excellent Gite. The 'Responsable' was Rafael. He also knew of me and was extremely helpful during our whole stay.

12 We found that there was a camp of some 300 Rwandan refugees right next to the Gite. All the men from Karisoke - and their families were there. With the single exception of KANA no-one had lost their family during the war. Almost all had fled via the park, only a few via Goma.

12 They were extremely fortunate for several reasons:-

- a The Zaire park guards know them well.
- b There is plenty of water in a large concrete tank. This is a rainwater filled tank measuring 7m x 2m x 2m. The water depth was 1.5m.
- c Raphael had been giving the refugees ample water each day. I took photos to illustrate this.
- d They had tents made of heavy duty polythene.
- e They appeared to be in quite good state of health. In fact, several children were playing a hectic game with a home made plastic ball. If they can play they are healthy.

13 Most of the men from Karisoke had gone to RUMANGABO, several hours walk away, to the park headquarters to try to get food for their families. At Rumangabo the Conservator of the Parc National des Virungas is M. Wato (tel no. 15-6612). Also there is M.

Canisius - the Conservator of the Rwandan side, Parc National des Volcans.

14 They all returned at approx 18.00 hours. Rafael let us use the main room in the gite for meeting. It even had a small electric light - powered from solar panel. They gave me a list of all Karisoke staff who were there. Despite assuring them that they are safe to return - in as many ways as I could, it became obvious that they are too afraid to return. I went to bed in VERY low spirits.

15 At dawn I toured their make-shift camp. They were very organised with various families in separate tents. I took photos to illustrate the entire situation.

16 Since it had been difficult to talk to some 20/30 men I arranged a meeting with two - Nemeye (who has worked at Karisoke for nearly thirty years), and Uwimana Fidele who was there when I was Director in 1987. We discussed, in depth their problems:-

a They have ample water - but very little food.

b They have been helped a great deal by the Zaire locals. This is probably not surprising because refugees from Zaire have made the reverse trip nearly thirty years ago.

c They had sold what cows they had to buy food. Obviously, in these circumstances they had not got a very good price.

d They had very little, if any money.

e They were obviously sharing resources and working well together.

f They said that they believe there are some 500,000 scattered in 4-5 (probably more) areas along the Zaire border of the park. The names of these areas are Bukima, Zugari, Bikemke, Cyanzu and Mutovu. They believe that there is some Cholera and dysentery - but, obviously do not know the extent. This may be more widespread among the other camps, if many of those came through Goma. However, I personally think that most of these people came through the park via two routes.

g They want to come back - but they are VERY afraid. They believe that they will be harmed by soldiers if they return.

We then discussed what they require in re-assurance and help to return as quickly as possible. They are, of course, fully aware that they need to get their present crops in within the next few weeks - so that, in addition to getting immediate fresh food, they will need seeds for the next harvest. They have asked for:

1 Re-assurance of their security from the Rwandan authorities if they return. That they will not be harmed or badly treated by RPF soldiers on their return. That they will be able to occupy their own homes on their return. They have asked if this can be given via Radio Rwanda. I left new batteries for their radio.

2 They, quite sensibly in my opinion, want to return through the park. They know that if they go via Goma, it is much longer and, of

course there is the greater danger from Cholera. This trip, in their present state of health, would be too dangerous for them.

3 Since this is a National Park - of Zaire - they have asked the Rwandan Government to request permission from the Zaire authorities, especially the Zaire Conservator M. Wato, for them to return via the park. They also said that they will need the permission of the Rwandan Conservator to travel - with their livestock - through the Rwandan side of the park. Since M. Canisius, the conservator is staying with M. Wato at Rumangabo I do not think this will be a problem - assuming that he wants to return, and wants them to return.

4 There are two major, ancient routes through the park that they can take. One goes via Karisoke - but I think this should be avoided for several reasons:-

It is further for many of them, even perhaps those at Bukima.

It takes a higher route - over 3,000m.

It is through the very heartland of Karisoke and its research area.

I think that the main route will bring them out through the saddle area between Visoke and Sabinio - but much nearer to Visoke at the place they call 'Bisoke'. From there they can then spread over their own home areas. This will take them at least one day's travel. It may even take some of them one day to travel from their present location to the park border on the Zaire side and then through the park to Bisoke. However, the main concentration will then spread over the commune of Kinigi. There is an RPF area local commander there - I think at the old Prefecture.

5 If possible they would like medical and food aid available on their return. They will also need water. Since this is the dry season, I noted that all the rivers leaving the park are dry. There are some wells - but I do not know the status of these.

6 Since they will need to get in their crops, they have asked for help with farming implements - to replace those they have lost during the war.

6 Nemeye and Uwimana feel that it will take about a week to get everyone from Zaire to Rwanda.

I do not feel that this is the place to give details of Karisoke or the gorillas. I will do that, in more detail, elsewhere. It is sufficient to note here, that whilst Karisoke has been looted it can be re-equipped. From trail signs that I saw of gorillas, they appear to be fine. There is minimal, if any poaching.

What is needed now, and URGENTLY, is the rapid re-patriation and rehabilitation of the Rwandan refugees who, in many ways have been far better off than those in Goma. I therefore make the following recommendations:-

- 1 That the Rwandan Government be fully informed of this situation as quickly as possible. At 08.30 This morning (3.8.94) I gave a written, brief outline of this situation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He promised to inform the rest of his government right away.
- 2 The refugees need re-assurance from their government - ideally via radio Rwanda - as soon as possible, so that they can plan and begin their return.
- 3 Rwandan government needs to contact their counterparts to get permission for the refugees to return via the park. I assume that they can give permission for the Rwandan side of the park themselves.
- 4 The refugees need a wide range of Medical aid, food and water and further facilities on their return. Presumably UNAMIR and the necessary NGO's can be involved.
- 5 Since the British medical teams are going to be deployed in the Ruhengeri area, I suggest that they send a recce team to look at the Kinigi area for further deployment.
- 6 That the international press be given this information - and what action is being taken, by the Rwandan Government and UNAMIR.

Finally, I personally would like to thank MANY people for their help over the past week - especially General Dallaire and his staff at UNAMIR, in particular Major C Braun; various members of the Rwandan government; staff of several NGO's. Additionally some people on the Zaire side of the border have aided me personally - and, more importantly, aided the many refugees. I feel that this good co-operation and aid should be recognised.

Kigali 14.00 Wednesday 3 August 1994

Dr Alan Goodall
University of Strathclyde
Glasgow

To : CHAO

From: Maj Kirschner and Capt Demers, HAC Ops

Date: 23 Aug 1994

SUBJECT: RECCE REPORT ON HPZ AND GISENYI-RUHENGERI ROUTE

1. Maj Kirschner and Capt Demers visited the HPZ and the Gisenyi area from 21 aug 1994 to 23 aug 94. The route was as follow: Kigali, Gitarama, Butare, Gikongoro, Cyangugu, Kibuye, Gisenyi, Goma, Ruhengeri, Kigali. Contact was made with UNMOS in Gikongoro, Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gisenyi.

2. KIGALI-GIKONGORO:

a. At Km 69 minus 50 meters on the route to Butare HAC recce discovered 15 bodies killed execution style in the ditch on the right side of the road. Most of the 4 to 6 weeks old bodies were killed with their arms tied behind their back (rope around the elbows).

b. The RPF border check point for the HPZ was quiet. Some displaced persons (DPs) were observed at the border and were in the process of being searched by the RPA soldiers before being allowed to go on to BUTARE.

c. Road between HPZ border to Gikongoro was quiet with very little DPs movement. Situation in Gikongoro is quiet with no apparent mass exodus towards Cyangugu. According to UNMO in this location, during the hand over period between UNAMIR and OP TURQUOISE, DPS left for Cyangugu.

3. GIKONGORO-CYANGUGU:

a. HAC recce witnessed about 4000 DPs on the road, concentrated on the second half of the route. According to the UNMO team leader in Cyangugu a flow of 15000 DPs/day for the period of 18 to 20 aug 1994 arrived in Cyangugu. He expected this number to go down to 10000 DPs/day for the period of 21 to 23 aug 1994.

b. After discussion with UNHCR, 4 transition camps have been identified: MURURU (capacity of 15-20000 DPs, 2 Km from Cyangugu); CYIMBOGO (6 Km from Cyangugu); MUSHAKA (24 Km from the city) and MASHA. UNHCR rep indicated that only 600 DPs were presently in the MURURU camp. Attempts to persuade the DPs to move into the camps were met by refusal. The main reason being strong opposition and propaganda from the ex-RGF leadership and the fact that many of the DPs have family already in BUKAVU.

c. Border check point RUZIZI 1 & 2 were closed on 19

(2)
DCOS OPS
1.1 Consider this a useful report. We have already initiated corrective measures in Sector 4. Let us keep track of events in all other sectors.
2. This type of recce by UNMOS must be often.
if/12
24/8
DFC

and 20 aug 1994. After intervention by the UNHCR, RUZIZI 2 check point was opened late in the afternoon of the 21 aug 1994. UNHCR organized transport from RUZIZI 1 to RUZIZI 2 in the morning of the 22 aug 1994 and were also organizing with the help of various NGOs transport from the border to the camps in BUKAVU area.

d. Current official authority in Cyangugu rest with Maj Cyiza, an ex-gendarmerie officer with probable ties with the RPF. His force is about 100 strong with small arms. He used to assist the OP TURQUOISE forces with the counter-banditry activities in the area and he does not seem to be able to control ex-militias which were seen carrying weapons among the DPs.

4. CYANGUGU-KIBUYE:

a. No DPs movement was observed on this route by the HAC recce.

b. Locals interviewed indicated that there was a fear of the RPF but as long as UNAMIR maintains a presence in the area DPs intend to stay. They also indicated that food is becoming short, medical care is presently not sufficient for the needs of the DPs. Radio Rwanda (RPF) is reaching Kibuye area since last week.

c. Situation in Kibuye is calm but Senegal Bat CO indicated that more food and more medical care is required in order to keep the situation stable.

5. KIBUYE-GISENYI:

a. HAC recce could not observe any large concentration or troop movement of RPA soldiers. Situation at border HPZ is very calm, only 3 small RPA check points along the road. No clearances were required in order to cross the border.

6. GISENYI/GOMA CITY AREA:

a. Situation in Gisenyi is calm. Almost no refugee movement.

b. Situation in Goma city area is normal. City is completely clear of refugees. HAC recce could not observed any refugees coming in or out at border check point.

7. GISENYI-RUHENGERI-KIGALI:

a. The road between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri is calm, DPs and local population are using the medical facilities along the road in large numbers. Business traffic is back on the road

and HAC recce observed numerous small markets and "kiosks". People seems to be going back to the fields.

b. Road to Kigali from Ruhengeri is also calm. DPs movement, in small numbers, was observed going both ways along this axis.

8. CONCLUSION: After initial shock of the OP TURQUOISE withdrawal the people in the HPZ have accepted UNAMIRs presence as a viable replacement for OP TURQUOISE troops. Fear of the RPA moving in have been proven wrong. Situation in Cyangugu is still tense and UNHCR is going against UNAMIR's policy by providing transport to BUKAVU for the DPs. The largest problem, besides food and medical care, for the DPs is the lack of contact with the RPF authorities to counter act the RGF propaganda, as the refugees in the camps in Bukavu and Goma are being held hostage by ex-RGF authorities. If we are to keep the DPs in the area of Kibuye and Gikongoro we have to increase our efforts to bring food, medical care and communication to this area.

H. Kirschner, Maj
Maj H. Kirschner
HAC Ops



UNAMIR - MINUAR

*MA/ASC
E. G. G. G. G.
gets its copy.
J. G. G. G. G.
18/8
DFC/105*

1000(FC)

18 August, 1994

To : See Distribution

From: FC

Subject: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RWANDESE COMMUNITIES

1. One of the major elements of the current mandate of UNAMIR is the provision of humanitarian assistance to Rwandese. Therefore the success of our mission will depend largely on how well we are able to achieve this task.

2. The SRSG has accordingly developed a plan, RWANDA EMERGENCY NORMALIZATION PLAN (RENP) which aims at a rapid but systematic normalization of the social and economic situation in Rwanda through international assistance. A copy of the plan is attached for your information.

3. In order to speed up the implementation of this plan, it is necessary that UNAMIR troops initiate and vigorously pursue humanitarian projects within their areas of operation, taking into consideration the primary needs of the different communities. Local initiatives will therefore be highly appreciated and encouraged and these may be co-ordinated with the Humanitarian Affairs Cell (HAC).

4. The following areas of activities may serve as guidelines:

a. Medical assistance to communities.

b. Engineer assistance in the areas of

(1) Re-habilitation and reconstruction works.


(2) EOD disposal.

c. Communal labour to improve on the social and health needs of communities.

d. Active assistance to UN Agencies and NGOs in the conduct of relief operations.

e. Other activities, to encourage the local population to remain in their home areas.

5. All action addressees are urged to react to this memo with the desired sense of urgency and commitment.


RA DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:
Ghanbatt
Britcon
Ausmed Coy
Cansigs
Ethiobatt

Information

SRSG
DFC
CAO

17 August 1994

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR


194 AUG 17 17 49

OUTGOING FACSIMILE NO.

894

DATE:

17 August 1994

TO: BRIGADIER AGYEMFRA GENERAL HEADQUARTERS BURMA CAMP, ACCRA-GHANA	FROM: BGEN ANYIDHOHO, DFC/COS UNAMIR CONTICO GHANBATT 1 KIGALI-RWANDA 
FAX NO:	FAX NO: 1-212-963-3090
THROUGH: GHANA HIGH COMMISSION DEFENCE, LONDON	
FAX NO: 44-81-342-8566	
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM JOHN SPRING, UNICEF, GOMA-ZAIRE	
INFO:	ORIGINATOR: ROOM NO: 2029
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2	

1. THE ATTACHED MESSAGE FROM MR. JOHN SPRING FOR YOUR ATTENTION.

2. BEST REGARDS.

DFC ONLY

E/DIR

17 AUG

Col YAAKYE

Kindly send a message for me to

B. Gen Agyemfra:

I'm sorry - it was impossible for me to break free from the Unicef coordination meetings to send a message or to talk to you myself.

It's now 15:15 and I must depart for Goma, 3 hrs drive, so as to avoid too much driving in the night.

I'm fine - extremely busy as coordinator for Unicef in Goma. Not much sleep, but otherwise conditions are OK. So many people on the edge of survival!

Next time I have the chance, I'll contact you through UNAMIR. If you're coming, pls let me know through Unicef Kigali and I'll come to Kigali or meet you at the Goma border!

Chars, and greetings to all!

DFC's COPY

DRAFT

GENERAL INSTRUCTION FOR THE VISIT OF THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR TO THE HPZ ON SUNDAY 14 AUG 1994

GENERAL

1. As a measure to win the confidence of the people in the HPZ prior to the take over of the area by UNAMIR from the French, and as a measure of reassuring the local population of their security after the withdrawal of the French, the Rwandese Interim Minister of Interior will visit the HPZ on Sunday 14 Aug 1994. The SRSG will accompany the minister on the visit.

AIM

2. The aim of this instruction is to assign responsibilities for a smooth and successful movement of the minister in and out of the HPZ.

PLACES TO BE VISITED

3. a. MBABANZA. A team of nuns have been protecting both Tutsi and Hutu refugees since the beginning of the war.
- b. GISHYITA. To serve as a confidence boosting exercise for the Govt.
- c. RWAMATAMU. The Bourgemestre is a brother of the minister of Interior and this visit will go a long way to boost the image of the Bourgemestre.
- d. GISOVU. This is one town in which no massacres have been recorded so far and it is expected that a pat on the shoulder of the people of this town will go a long way to recognise their good work.

MODE OF TRAVEL

4. Options.
- a. By Helicopter.
- b. By Road.
- c. Combination of (1) and (2).
5. This will be determined after consultations with the Govt.

TASKS

6. HAC.

- a. Provide two 10 ton trucks load of food items for distribution to the population to coincide with the visit of the minister.
- b. Trucks will leave KIGALI on Sat 13 Aug 94 for KIBUYE.
- c. Food to be distributed in MBABANZA.
- d. Coordinate with French LO Team with UNAMIR for exact location.

SECURITY

7. It is requested that the French Coalition Forces provide site security during the visit of the minister. Lt Col F Giraud FCF LO (UNAMIR) is to liaise with the FCF on this.

8. In addition to the RPA providing close security to the minister with 3-4 RPA soldiers, the following will be provided by UNAMIR:

a. GHANBATT (REAR)

- (1) Provide one x section for medium security to the minister's team during the visit.
- (2) Section will be airlifted in 1 x helicopter from KIGALI on Sunday 14, 94 at 1000 hrs should the minister travel by helicopter.
- (3) Detail an officer to command the section.
- (4) Offr detailed should report to the DCOO for briefing at 1000 hrs on Sat 13 Aug 94.
- (5) Detail armed escorts in 2 x pickup to escort the food convoy to Kibuye on Sat 13 Aug 94. Escort commander to report to HAC for briefing before departure.
- (6) Detail armed escorts in 2 x pickups to standby to provide security should the journey by the minister be undertaken by road. Escorts to be commanded by an officer.

9. MILOB GP HQ

- a. Provide 1 x MILOB Team to escort Food Convoy to MBABANZA on Sat 13 Aug 94.
- b. Team leader to report to HAC for briefing before departure on Sat 13 Aug 94.

c. Task MILOB Team in KIBUYE to join the minister's team on arrival at KIBUYE on Sun 14 Aug 94.

10. CANSIGs

a. Provide 2 x 10 ton trucks with drivers to convey the food to MBABANZA on Sat 13 Aug 94.

b. Drivers and trucks to report to HAC for briefing in the morning of Sat 13 Aug 94.

11. AIR OPS

a. Detail 2 x Helicopters to lift the ministers team and the Ghanbatt Section from KIGALI for the visit.

b. Helicopters to be ready for take off by 140900 Aug 94.

12. Force Military Spokesman. Select a team of journalists to cover the visit. Team to leave KIGALI latest PM Sat 13 Aug 94.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

13. Timings

a. Food convoy leaves KIGALI not later than 131400 Aug 94.

b. Food Convoy Escorts Report to HAC for briefing _ 131000B 94.

c. Ministers Team departs KIGALI - 141000 Aug 94.

d. Estimated time of departure from MBABANZA - To be determined by Convoy Comd.

ADMIN

14. a. Feeding. All to carry C-rations and water to last one and a half days.

b. POL. All drivers to ensure that all vehicles are filled before the start of the journey.

c. Accommodation. Request MILOB HQ arranges overnight stop for drivers and escorts at GITARAMA. All to carry overnight equipment.

d. Repair and Recovery. Ghanbatt (Rear) is to detail one veh mechanic to accompany the team.

e. Convoy Commander. The seniormost MILOB accompanying the convoy is appointed the convoy commander.

f. Return Journey. Convoy Comd is to liaise with the local French Commander to convey displaced persons wishing

to return to KIGALI or its environs on the empty trucks.

CONCLUSION

15. The Interim Govt minister of Interior intends to visit the HPZ on Sun 14 Aug 94, in order to reassure the population in the HPZ. As a confidence boosting exercise UNAMIR will distribute some food to the local population to coincide with the minister's visit. All concerned are to play an active role to make this visit a success.

R.A. DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

French coalition Forces
HAC
MILOB GP HQ
GHANBATT

Information:

Internal:

Action:

CANSIGs
Airops
Mil Spokesman

Information:

SRSG's Office
DFC

Q 1

DFC

A/COO is working
on getting these people
to come here today to
meet the government.
Transport by helicopter
you say. I don't
know if the
government
is ready
to

receive them and
if the logistics and
security is sorted
out here in Icajali.
It is urgent to
get them to see the
government, but we
cannot have a screen
up in security nor in
logistics/meetings.
(A) 11/9

A/COO

What have you
been able to
achieve so far?

11/8
DFC

DFC

Yes, it looks like
the Govt is rather
interested in going there
than them coming here.
They still haven't cleared
them to proceed.

12/8

A/COO
OK 12/8

file - Translated from French

1. A number of inhabitants from the CYANGUGU region are leaving or have left the zone in the direction of Zaire. It appears to me of the utmost importance that this movement be stopped rapidly because such a hemorrhage of population movement towards BUKAVU would gravely endanger the success of the humanitarian missions of both TURQUOISE and UNAMIR II.

2. The worried people are asking for reassurance from the authorities in KIGALI. It would therefore seem necessary to establish direct contact as soon as possible between the authorities in KIGALI and representatives of the local administration. This procedure, conducted under your aegis, could permit a number of questions from the population concerning the intentions of the new government and could thus reassure them.

3. The following persons are proposed to conduct this liaison mission:

- Mr MUNYANGABE, Theodore,
former sub-prefect for technical affaires of CYANGUGU
- Mr KAVUTSE, Leonard,
representative for the zone of CYANGUGU
- Major (Gendarmerie) CYIZA Augustin
- Mr N'DUNGUTSE, Evariste
secretary of the mission.

4. These persons could get to KIGALI by tomorrow. If the government agrees to this initiative, I would ask that you furnish them transport between BUKAVU or CYANGUGU and KIGALI.

5. An urgent response is requested in view of the importance of this initiative.

Gen Lafourcade

115020 000 17140 N° 2342. Immédiat.
Fue

FM Général LAFOURCADE
TO Général DALLAIRE

Goma, le 10 août 1994

- 1 - Un certain nombre d'habitants de la région de CYANGUGU a quitté ou s'apprête à quitter la zone pour rejoindre le Zaïre.

Il m'apparaît primordial que ce mouvement soit stoppé rapidement car une hémorragie importante de population en direction de BUKAVU serait de nature à menacer gravement le succès de la mission humanitaire de TURQUOISE puis de la MINUAR II.

- 2 - Les populations inquiètes demandent en effet à être rassurées par les autorités de KIGALI ; il apparaît donc nécessaire qu'un contact direct soit établi le plus rapidement possible entre les autorités de KIGALI et les représentants de l'administration locale.

Cette démarche, conduite sous votre caution, pourrait permettre d'apporter des réponses aux nombreuses interrogations de la population sur les intentions du nouveau gouvernement et ainsi de les rassurer.

- 3 - Les personnalités proposées pour effectuer cette liaison sont les suivantes :

- Mr MUNYANGABE Théodore,
ancien sous préfet aux affaires techniques de CYANGUGU.
- Mr KAVUTSE Léonard,
représentant de la zone de NYAMASHEKE
- major de gendarmerie CYIZA Augustin
- Mr N'DUNGUTSE Evariste,
rapporteur de la commission

COO
② PASSED
with translation
copy made for R/C
POT
MA

- 4 - Ces personnes pourraient se rendre dès demain à KIGALI.

En cas d'accord des autorités gouvernementales, je vous saurais gré de bien vouloir assurer leur transport par voie aérienne entre CYANGUGU ou BUKAVU et KIGALI.

- 5 - Réponse urgente souhaitée compte tenu de l'importance de la démarche.

Le Général LAFOURCADE
commandant l'opération TURQUOISE

C
t) ~~AM~~
Fc.

We shall have to look out
for such politically motivated
requests. ~~See below~~ 7.1.8.8

File

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Yaache
From: Capt Demers
Date: 6 Aug 1994

(2)
SRSG
My I ask for your
intervention in this
sort of affair. This is the north-
east where most of the refer-
ees are from Uganda.
H
12/8
DTC
7/8

SUBJECT: REPORT ON VISIT TO NYAGATARE WITH Dr BIOZAGARA, MINISTER OF REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION.

1. On 5 august 1994 UNAMIR provided at the request of the minister of rehabilitation and reintegration, one helicopter to go on a visit of a refugee camp in the area of NYAGATARE. This camp was supposed to be, according to Dr Biozagara, a "humanitarian disaster area". The following personnel were present for the visit:

- a. Dr Biozagara;
- b. Capt Demers;
- c. UNHCR rep;
- d. 2 x soldiers from the APR; and
- e. 2 x journalists from STERN magazine (invited by the minister).

Seen and noted
12/8
DTC

2. After over-flying the village of NYAGATARE and the surrounding area, we could not spot any mass concentration of refugees nor could we spot the alleged refugee camp. I suggested to the minister that we should land close to the village in order to ask the local population as to the exact location of the camp.


3. Once on the ground, we were met by an APR colonel with his staff, representative of the local government, two journalists from radio RWANDA, a rep from the UNHCR and a platoon of the APR. We were led to a field where the local population was assembled (a crowd of 400-500 farmers). The minister and the local government representatives went on with political speeches.

4. The speeches were followed by a visit to the local center for rehabilitation for veterans. The minister then went on for a private meeting with the APR colonel and his staff. I went with the UNHCR rep to visit the "refugee camp". There was no refugee camps. The people in this area have a lot of cattle and there is no sign of the alleged widespread famine in this area.

5. The minister concluded his visit by giving two interviews: one for radio Rwanda and the other for the BBC.

6. In conclusion, there was no "humanitarian disaster" in this area, the visit was strictly for the political benefit of the minister. The visit had obviously been planned by the RPF considering the elaborate reception and speeches once we were on the ground. A timely report from the UNHCR representative in this area could have saved us from doing this unnecessary trip by helicopter.

7. For your information.



Capt A. Demers
LO HAC

we may
for such political motives
reports. [Signature] 8.8
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

File

(2)
SRSG
my ask for your
intervention in this
sort of affair. This is the north-
east where most of the refugees
goes are from Uganda
[Signature]
7/8

To: Colonel Yaache

From: Capt Demers

Date: 6 Aug 1994

SUBJECT: REPORT ON VISIT TO NYAGATARE WITH Dr BIOZAGARA, MINISTER OF REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION.

1. On 5 august 1994 UNAMIR provided at the request of the minister of rehabilitation and reintegration, one helicopter to go on a visit of a refugee camp in the area of NYAGATARE. This camp was supposed to be, according to Dr Biozagara, a "humanitarian disaster area". The following personnel were present for the visit:

- a. Dr Biozagara;
- b. Capt Demers;
- c. UNHCR rep;
- d. 2 x soldiers from the APR; and
- e. 2 x journalists from STERN magazine (invited by the minister).

2. After over-flying the village of NYAGATARE and the surrounding area, we could not spot any mass concentration of refugees nor could we spot the alleged refugee camp. I suggested to the minister that we should land close to the village in order to ask the local population as to the exact location of the camp.


3. Once on the ground, we were met by an APR colonel with his staff, representative of the local government, two journalists from radio RWANDA, a rep from the UNHCR and a platoon of the APR. We were led to a field where the local population was assembled (a crowd of 400-500 farmers). The minister and the local government representatives went on with political speeches.

4. The speeches were followed by a visit to the local center for rehabilitation for veterans. The minister then went on for a private meeting with the APR colonel and his staff. I went with the UNHCR rep to visit the "refugee camp". There was no refugee camps. The people in this area have a lot of cattle and there is no sign of the alleged widespread famine in this area.

5. The minister concluded his visit by giving two interviews: one for radio Rwanda and the other for the BBC.

6. In conclusion, there was no "humanitarian disaster" in this area, the visit was strictly for the political benefit of the minister. The visit had obviously been planned by the RPF considering the elaborate reception and speeches once we were on the ground. A timely report from the UNHCR representative in this area could have saved us from doing this unnecessary trip by helicopter.

7. For your information.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'A. Demers', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Capt A. Demers
LO HAC

Le

non official translation

Letter from the Minister of Justice
Alphonse Marie NKUBITO

Kigali, 2 August 1994

Last week I asked you to do everything in your power to bring back certain judges living in the Humanitarian Protected Zone at Cyangugu. One of them, Mr Martin NGILIMANA has arrived in Kigali. However, the most important ones still remain:

President Ephrem GASASIRA (Court of Appeal of Cyangugu).
Legal Adviser Francois Xavier NDEZE (at his home).
Président Bernardette MUKARUTABANA (see ONATRACOM.
Cyangugu).
Judge Gratien RUHORAHOZA.

Information concerning their place of residence can be obtained from Lt Col Innocent BARUGAMENSHI, Commander at Cyangugu.

(Signed)
Alphonse-Marie NKUBITO
(Minister of Justice)

Another request from
the Justice Ministry.
We need to reply.

Shalungu
3/8

ED and
FC

2/12

Plse speak
ASAP.

3/8

Answer given to FC
7/8
DEC



MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE

B. P. 160 KIGALI

Kigali, le

No

2/04/94

Réf No :

Annexe :

Objet :

Monsieur le Représentant des Nations Unies au Rwanda

Monsieur le Représentant,

La semaine passée je vous avez demandé de faire le possible pour m'amener certains magistrats résidant dans la Zone Turquoise à Cyangugu, et l'un d'eux, Monsieur Ngirimana Martin est parvenu à Kigali ; Cependant il reste le plus important comme le Président BASASIEA Ephrem (Cour d'Appel à Cyangugu), le Conseiller Ndeze François Xavier, et chez lui le Président du Conseil de Guerre, Cyiza Augustin, chez lui, Madame Nukarutobana Bernadette (Vice Procureur Cyangugu) le juge Ruhorahoza Gratien.

Les informations sur leur lieu de résidence vous seront données par le Colonel G. Zampamushi Inocent commandant de Place à Cyangugu.

Le Ministre de la Justice
Mukito Alphonse Marie




Kigali, 1 August 1994
3000.15 (OPS)

Dear General,

Subject: MOVEMENT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL

1. It has been observed with great concern that UNAMIR personnel are denied access to some areas in and around Kigali city and also in some parts of the country by the RPA personnel. For the smooth operation of the humanitarian activities in and around Kigali city and in Rwanda in general, UNAMIR needs to assess the actual situation in order to plan accordingly.
2. It is therefore requested that you allow all UNAMIR personnel, as well as NGOs, access to all the required areas in order for them to carry out their duties as per our mandate. If there are any restricted areas, you are kindly requested to specify them and inform us in writing so that we can plan our activities accordingly, avoiding those areas.
3. An early reply in this regard would be greatly appreciated.
4. I thank you in advance for your understanding and should like to assure you of our full cooperation at all times.


Roméo A. Dallaire
Major-General
Force Commander

Major-General Paul KAGAME
Vice-President and Minister of Defence
Broad-Based Government of
National Unity of Rwanda
Kigali

①
CMO
For your info
Hli
08-8-94
DFC/WS
②
Copied for CMO
GSC 09/08
MA

file

Translated from French attached.

Kigali, July 5, 1994

Mister President,

Subject: ADMINISTRATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN
AND SECURITY ZONE

I am transmitting here attached a copy of administrative chart, card I just received from the Commander of the Turquoise Operation regarding the creation of regional and administrative units in the Humanitarian and Security Zone.

The setting up of the above mentioned administrative units, which are aimed to create conditions favorable to rapid and normal life come back; will contribute certainly for a safe transition controlled by the UNAMIR taking over of the coalition Forces of the Turquoise Operation.

With my Highest Regards,

Undersigned: Romeo A. Dallier
Major General
UNAMIR Force Commander

H.E. M. Pasteur Bizimungu
President of the Republic
of Rwanda.

cc:- Vice-President and Minister of Defense

- Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration

MA
What is meaning of
all these?
+ 9
08/8
DFC

Goma, August 03, 1994

CHART

Subject: Administration in Humanitarian
and Security Zone (HSZ)

The events that took place in Rwanda since April 6, 1994 and the massive exodus of the populations towards the regions Of the West, have disturbed the system and the function of the public administration services in the major parts of the country.

In the HSZ the groups commanders tried promptly, in close collaboration with the local populations, to set up regional administrative structures in the aim of essentially creating conditions favorable to rapid come back of normal life. For the purpose three objectives are retained:

- Establishment of the security of persons and their belongings
- restoration of the minimum public services

- Make easy the recover of the economic activities (farming, commercial activities,...)

The structures set up under these conditions have, obviously a provisional status. They might help for transition with the UNAMIR and further to the rwandan government authorities.

1) Creation of provisional administrative structures

Under different callings, comities, cellule, counselors,...the structures put in place in the three grouping sectors present the following similarities:

- they were requested by local populations;
- They are formed by people that local populations agreed upon;
- They are supposed to represent all sensibilities;

2) Functioning of the structures:

It was noticed the critical situation in Rwanda created an uncontrolled situation of the community entities in the country side. The solution to increasing humanitarian problems, should mainly start by a rapid restoration of an administrative system capable of taking in consideration the populations needs and allowing them to be administered and find someone to address their problems.

The management and the functioning of the provisional structures are based on the size and type of the existing ones.

The prefecture is the head of the decision center. It is on that level that are conceived all types of different priorities. The grouping commanders are present on this decision making level, or represented by officers in charge of civilian affairs.

They take part in coordinating the planned activities and help in putting them in applications. Relays are found on the sous-prefectures and communes level and finally the creation of zonal and local comities. The commanders of elementary units and section chiefs of the Turquoise, ensure, at the various levels, permanently or occasionally, the same coordinating part in liaison with the grouping commander.

3) Grounds of action:

To facilitate the come back to normal life, while waiting the official structure to set up again, the local comities, assisted by the Tourquoise, were interested in the followings:

-Public Security: Due to insufficient number of the security and police forces, local comities called on the Turquoise units in helping on the security of property and persons.

The guidance to be applied, were described by writing in reference to rules applicable in similar situation.

In addition , the local comities proceed in nominating police agents according to their unanimously well known capacity, integrity and reputation. At the same time some of the penitentiary houses were restored.

It probably will be necessary to continue the action for a certain time in the demilitarized zone. However, it will be necessary to give full legal status required for such operations and rapidly proceed for designating regional judicial authorities.

-Public Health:

The Turquoise Forces have insured liaison between the agencies and NGOs operating in the zone and the local comities in order to restore the health centers and hospitals. Medical kits were put in place and military physicians were assisting actively in the functioning of the new medical services.

It was also called on the voluntary action of the local qualified persons.

This public health action was also oriented to camps of the displaced people. It was necessary not only to protect, but also to assist them in giving first medical aid whenever possible and provide them with food. The action of the Turquoise and the local comities in that matter, was to draw the attention on the special agencies for assistance on the most special cases.

-Public Services:

The well functioning of public services is the condition to the well being of communities and good health of the populations. On the contrary, the deterioration and the abandon of the infrastructure and the distribution network lead to destabilization factors and to the exodus.

Therefore, on the request of the comities, the Turquoise Forces have:

- insured security of electricity power supplies, generators, and water supply pumps and caption sites,
- Assisted in restoration and repair work of the distribution networks,

- restoration of public transportation system in requisitioning stolen vehicles,
- Insuring security of local market places.

All those administrative measures started to bring valuable improvement. Towns recover a certain security. It is obvious things are still precarious, it is necessary to sustain and more likely to increase the support in the above described domains. That will be the condition to the success of the ANOMER. In order to achieve its objectives, it will be necessary, in the short run, to trust in paying them, the administrative agents. It will be also necessary to insure these agents be conscious of the respect of public property.



Kigali, le 5 juillet 1994

Monsieur le Président,

Objet: ADMINISTRATION DANS LA ZONE DE PROTECTION SURE

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-joint copie d'une fiche que je viens de recevoir du Commandant de l'Opération Turquoise concernant la mise sur pied des organismes de gestion et d'administration régionaux dans la Zone de Protection Sûre.

La mise en place de ces structures, dont le but est de créer un environnement propice au retour rapide à une vie normale, contribueront sans doute à la transition qui sera assumée par la MINUAR après le départ des Forces de coalition de l'Opération Turquoise.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

Roméo A. Dallaire
Major-Général
Commandant de la Force

Son Excellence Monsieur Pasteur BIZIMUNGU
Président de la République du Rwanda
Kigali

copies: Vice-Président et Ministre de la Défence
Ministre de la Réhabilitation et de
la Réintégration Sociale

OPERATION TURQUOISE
sous-chef opérations

Goma, le 03 aout 1994

FICHE**Objet: Administration en ZHS**

- Les événements survenus au Rwanda depuis le 6 avril et l'exode massif des populations vers les régions de l'ouest, ont perturbé les structures et le fonctionnement des services administratifs et publics dans la majeure partie du pays.

En ZHS les commandants de groupements se sont d'emblée efforcés, en étroite collaboration avec les populations, de mettre sur pied des organismes de gestion et d'administration régionaux, dans le but essentiel de *créer un environnement propice au retour rapide à une vie normale*.

A cet effet trois objectifs ont été retenus:

- rétablir la sécurité des personnes et des biens;
- restaurer un minimum de services publics;
- favoriser la reprise des activités économiques (agriculture, commerce,...).

Les structures ainsi mises en place n'ont, bien évidemment, qu'un caractère intérimaire. Elles pourraient avoir vocation à assumer la transition avec la MINUAR, puis avec les autorités gouvernementales rwandaises.

1°-Constitution des structures administratives provisoires

Sous des appellations différentes, comités, cellules, conseils,... les structures mises en place dans les trois secteurs de groupements présentent les similitudes suivantes:

- elles ont été demandées par les populations;
- elles sont composées de personnels cooptés par les habitants;
- elles se veulent représentatives des différentes sensibilités.

2°-Fonctionnement des structures:

Il est vite apparu que la situation de crise au Rwanda avait provoqué la déliquescence des organismes de gestion des cités et des campagnes. La solution aux problèmes humanitaires ainsi générés, passait en grande partie par la restauration urgente d'un cadre administratif capable de prendre en compte les aspirations des populations et permettant à ces dernières, de trouver une structure d'accueil et de référence.

L'organisation et le fonctionnement des structures provisoires s'appuient sur le découpage administratif existant.

La préfecture est le siège du centre décisionnel. C'est à ce niveau que s'élaborent les concepts d'action dans les différents domaines prioritaires. Les commandants de groupements sont présents, ou représentés par des officiers chargés des affaires civiles, dans ces instances. Leur rôle est d'aider à la coordination des actions envisagées et de participer à la mise en oeuvre des moyens.

Les relais se situent au niveau des sous-préfectures et des communes, par l'instauration de comités de zones et de comités locaux. Les commandants d'unités élémentaires et les chefs de section Turquoise assurent auprès de ces instances, de manière permanente ou itinérante, le rôle de coordinateur et de prestataire de service, en liaison avec le commandant de groupement.

3°-Domaines d'action.

Pour favoriser le retour à une vie normale, en attendant que les structures officielles soient à nouveau en place, les comités locaux, avec l'aide de Turquoise, se sont intéressés aux domaines qui suivent:

-Sécurité publique: Face à l'insuffisance numérique des forces de gendarmerie et de police, les comités locaux ont sollicité les unités Turquoise pour participer à la sécurité des biens et des personnes. Les conduites à tenir en la matière, ont été consignées par écrit en s'inspirant des règles communément appliquées dans ce type de situation.

De plus les comités locaux ont procédé à la nomination de gendarmes, dont la compétence, l'intégrité et la notoriété étaient unanimement reconnues. Dans le même temps certains établissements pénitentiaires ont été réhabilités.

Il faudra probablement envisager de poursuivre cette action pendant un certain temps encore en zone démilitarisée. Toutefois il sera nécessaire de donner toute la légitimité indispensable à ces opérations, de faire procéder rapidement à la nomination des instances judiciaires régionales.

-Santé publique:

Les forces Turquoise ont assuré la liaison entre les agences et ONG présentes sur zone et les comités locaux afin de réactiver les centres de soin et les hôpitaux. Des kits médicaux ont été mis en place et les médecins militaires ont participé activement au fonctionnement des services médicaux recréés.

Il a été fait appel, au bénévolat des personnels locaux qualifiés.

Cette action de santé publique s'est aussi orientée vers les camps des personnes déplacées. Il convenait non seulement de les protéger, mais aussi de veiller, autant que faire se pouvait, à leur prodiguer des soins et leur procurer eau et nourriture. L'action de Turquoise et des comités locaux en l'espèce, fut d'appeler l'attention des agences spécialisées sur les cas les plus sérieux et de les aider.

-Services publics:

Le bon fonctionnement des services publics conditionne la vie des cités et le bien-être des populations. A contrario la détérioration ou l'abandon des installations et des réseaux de distribution constituent des facteurs de déstabilisation et d'exode.

C'est pourquoi, à la demande des comités, les forces Turquoise ont:

- assuré la garde des centrales électriques, des génératrices, des stations de pompage des eaux;
- participé aux travaux de remise en état des réseaux de distribution ;
- relancé les transports en commun publics en réquisitionnant les véhicules volés;
- assuré la sécurité des marchés locaux.

Toutes ces mesures d'ordre administratif commencent à porter leur fruit. Les villes retrouvent peu à peu une certaine sérénité. Mais l'équilibre est encore précaire et il paraît indispensable de maintenir voire d'accentuer les efforts dans les trois domaines qui précèdent. Ils conditionneront le succès de la MINUAR. Pour y parvenir il faudra à court terme fidéliser, en les rétribuant, les agents de l'administration. Et il conviendra aussi de veiller à ce que ces personnels soient avant tout, soucieux du bien public.

ARTURO HEIN OF B.
FROM DAVID FLETCHER FC only

CNK-24 CNR-340 P1/1

RWAA622A YHM

TO: HEIN, UNREO, NAIROBI

INFO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: HANSEN, DHA, NEW YORK

DATE: 22 June 1994

NUMBER: 2029

SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN RWANDA

1. As you are aware, the French have proposed to mount an immediate military operation in conjunction with other interested governments to ensure the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda during the transition period preceding the arrival of reinforced UNAMIR as envisaged in Security Council resolution 918 (1994) and 925 (1994). A copy of the Secretary-General's letter to the Security Council discussing inter alia this proposal is attached. It is expected that the Security Council will act very soon, perhaps as early as 22 June.

2. While the specific modalities of the proposed operation have not been spelled out in detail, it is anticipated that the focus will be on RFG controlled areas. Under the most optimistic scenario, this would suggest early access to those in need in these areas. Accordingly, as a matter of priority, please consult with your colleagues to ensure that UNREO is prepared to respond quickly to the humanitarian needs in the areas which would become accessible.

3. The RPF has indicated its opposition to the French initiative. Hopefully, this will not affect on-going humanitarian operations in RPF controlled areas, but this possibility should be borne in mind. In this connection, it is not at all clear how the situation in Kigali will be handled.

4. We will continue to follow closely and keep you advised. In the meantime, it is important that you initiate all appropriate action to respond to these new developments.

② Mr Fletcher

Please read and see me.

done ✓

12/6

1994-06-22

16:30

PAGE = 01

FC EDIR OIC

2

302 Received Message

16:04 22/06/94

ZCZC KGMS0384 DPIC1304
SP KGM
.NEWYORK (PKFOD) 22 1801Z
BT

FROM DPIIDS
UNITED
NATIONS

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/728
20 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 JUNE 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Since the breakdown of the peace process in Rwanda in the wake of the tragic events of 6 April 1994, I have reported to the Security Council on several occasions, repeatedly stressing the need for an urgent and coordinated response by the international community to the genocide which has engulfed that country.
2. The Security Council initially decided, by its resolution 912 (1994) adopted on 21 April 1994, to adjust the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and to reduce its strength to 270 all ranks. However, in my letter of 29 April to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/518), I pointed out that the situation had deteriorated to the point where it had become necessary to consider what further action the Council could take, or authorize Member States to take, in order to contribute to the restoration of law and order, to end the wanton violence and massacres of defenceless civilians and to promote a cease-fire.
3. On the basis of my report of 13 May (S/1994/565), the Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994) on 17 May 1994, authorizing the expansion of the force level of UNAMIR up to 5,500 troops and expanding its mandate to contribute to the security and protection of civilians at risk as well as to provide security and support for humanitarian relief operations. The Council requested me, as a first phase, to immediately bring up to full strength the mechanized infantry battalion already in Rwanda, and further requested me to report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR's deployment.
4. On the basis of a further report which I submitted to the Security Council on 31 May (S/1994/640), following the visit of a special mission from Headquarters to Rwanda, the Council adopted resolution 925 (1994) on 8 June 1994, in which it

endorsed my proposals for the simultaneous deployment of the first and second phases of the expanded operation and for the continuation of urgent preparations for the deployment of the third phase. As of 18 June, UNAMIR consisted of a total force of 503 all ranks (354 troops, 25 military staff personnel and 124 military observers) under the command of Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire. Two Canadian C-130 aircraft are also supporting the mission. I must again reiterate my admiration for the dedication and courage of all UNAMIR personnel, despite serious casualties.

5. In anticipation of the expansion of the mandate of UNAMIR, I had written, on 30 April, to a number of Heads of State in Africa to encourage them to provide troops, and to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), asking him to support my requests. I pursued my efforts through numerous contacts with Heads of State and Government during my visit to South Africa in early May, and with African leaders at the OAU Summit conference in Tunis earlier this month. At the same time, the Secretariat had already commenced efforts to secure the equipment and troops required by UNAMIR for the implementation of the first and second phases. Accordingly, over 50 potential contributing countries were approached.

6. To date, the United Nations has received offers for the following:

- Ethiopia: motorized infantry battalion (fully equipped);
- Ghana: mechanized infantry battalion (offer not yet confirmed and made on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Senegal: mechanized infantry battalion (offer not yet confirmed and made on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Zambia: motorized infantry battalion (on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Zimbabwe: motorized infantry battalion (on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Congo: infantry company (on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Malawi: infantry company (on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Mali: infantry company (on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Nigeria: infantry company (on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Italy: 1 aircraft (most probably C-130, not to fly into Rwandese airspace);
- Netherlands: 1 Fokker 27 aircraft (not to fly into Rwandese airspace);
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 50 trucks for infantry and cargo;
- United States of America: 50 armoured personnel carriers (APCs);
- France, on a bilateral basis, has offered 20 million French francs to Senegal to cover the equipment requirements of 200 men.

7. Some countries have indicated an interest, but have not yet made commitments, to provide the following:

- Australia: 1 medical company;
- Canada: a communication company;
- Italy: 20 water/fuel trucks;
- Romania: a surgical team;
- Russian Federation: 8 transport helicopters and a number of heavy transport cargo aircraft.

8. On the basis of the offers for troops and equipment received so far, and of the discussions between the Secretariat and the Governments concerned, the United Nations expects, in the best of circumstances, to complete the deployment of the first phase of UNAMIR in the first week of July 1994. This envisages bringing the depleted battalion presently in Kigali to its full strength, for which confirmation of the offer from Ghana is expected. Meanwhile, 10 APCs, which are being transferred from the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), have already started arriving in Rwanda as part of the deployment of the first phase. In addition, the United States will start airlifting 50 APCs to Entebbe, Uganda, on 24 June.

9. The deployment schedule for the second phase of the expanded operation, which was intended to be synchronized with the first phase, cannot be determined at this time. Final confirmations of the resources required, namely two infantry battalions, a communications unit and other logistic support, have not yet been received from the Governments concerned. Moreover, the Secretariat has still not been able to secure offers for medical and other support units. In the absence of firm commitments for military logistic units, it will be necessary to seek a civilian contractor on an emergency basis. Such a contractual alternative already exists within UNOSOM II and it would be extended to UNAMIR until the necessary logistic support from Governments can be secured.

10. In the conditions prevailing in Rwanda, it is clear that additional troops can only be deployed once the necessary equipment to support them is on the ground and after the troops have been trained to use the equipment with which they may not be familiar. It also is noteworthy that, although Governments are expected to offer fully trained and equipped units for United Nations operations, almost all offers received from Governments are conditional in one way or another. The difficulties that the Secretariat has faced in securing resources for UNAMIR's expanded mandate show that there is no guarantee that the stipulated conditions can be met. Even if they can, protracted negotiations will be required, not only with the Governments making these conditional offers, but also with other Member States. In this context, it should be noted that none of those Governments possessing the capacity to provide fully trained and equipped military units have offered so far to do so for the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions to deal with the situation in Rwanda.

11. In the light of the above, it is evident that, with the failure of Member States to promptly provide the resources necessary for the implementation of its expanded mandate, UNAMIR may not be in a position, for about three months, to

fully undertake the tasks entrusted to it by those resolutions. Meanwhile, the situation in Rwanda has continued to deteriorate and the killing of innocent civilians has not been stopped. Furthermore, the parties have not yet come to an agreement for a cease-fire in the talks under UNAMIR auspices, nor have they respected the cease-fire to which they agreed at the recent OAU summit in Tunis.

12. In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider the offer of the Government of France to undertake, subject to Security Council authorization, a French-commanded multinational operation in conjunction with other Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Such an operation was one of the options envisaged in my letter of 29 April (S/1994/518) and a precedent exists for it in the United States-led operation Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) which was deployed in Somalia in December 1992. If the Council decides to authorize an operation on these lines, I consider it would be necessary for it to request the Governments concerned to commit themselves to maintain their troops in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength to take over from the multinational force and the latter has created conditions in which a peace-keeping force operating under Chapter VI of the Charter would have the capacity to carry out its mandate. This would imply that the multinational force should remain deployed for a minimum period of three months.

13. The activities of the multinational force and UNAMIR would be closely coordinated by the respective force commanders, who would take into account the fact that the former would be operating under Chapter VII of the Charter. UNAMIR would continue to fulfil, to the extent permitted by the resources made available to it, its mandated responsibilities in and around Kigali and at the airport. It would also continue to assist in providing support for the delivery of humanitarian aid to accessible areas. During this period, UNAMIR would operate on the assumption that the parties will cooperate with the activities of the mission. However, in the event that the safety and security of UNAMIR personnel were to be jeopardized, I would immediately reassess the situation and make appropriate recommendations to the Security Council.

14. It is self-evident that the efforts by the international community to restore stability in Rwanda, both by halting the genocide and by securing a cease-fire, are directed to a resumption of the Arusha peace process. In this connection, as the Security Council is aware, my new Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan, plans to take up his assignment shortly.

15. I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

END OF TRANSMISSION

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
URBAN PREFECTURE OF
KIGALI.

Kigali, 16 June 1994.
No 136/04.07

Mayor of NYARUGENGE commune
Urban Prefecture

Mayor of KACYIRU Commune
Urban Prefecture

Subject : Transportation of the war displaced.

Dear Mayor,

Referring to conclusions of the meeting I held with the UNAMIR representatives yesterday on the transportation of the war displaced persons blocked in different areas in the city of Kigali, and to the meeting I had with General, the Deputy Force Commander, I would like to inform you that the exercise of the war and troubles displaced persons' movement will resume from tomorrow 17 June 1994, 8:00 hours am.

In this view, I ask all the authorities concerned with this operation to do whatever is possible for its success. We agreed with UNAMIR that you would go to the Rwandese Government side where people would come to from AMOHORO Stadium, King Faycal Hospital or Meridian Hotel. At the same time, those who would like to join the RPF zones would come from Sainte Famille Parish.

All the population on road-blocks are required to avoid aggressing the UNAMIR personnel either at the embarkation or through the road. All the mayors and councillors in charge of the zones in which the operation will be conducted must be present to implement these briefings, and must work in good collaboration with UNAMIR as much long as the exercise will last to keep such a good comprehension.

Urban Prefecture of Kigali
RENZAHO Tharcisse
Lt.Col.

cc

Minister of Defence
KIGALI

Minister of Home Affairs
KIGALI

Chief of Staff/RGF
KIGALI

①
MA
Put on the appropriate file
pse
J. J. J.
19/6
DFC

Chief of Staff/Gendarmerie
KIGALI

→ UNAMIR Force Commander
KIGALI

Mrs and Mr the councillor of

- RUGENGE Sector
- KIMIHURURA Sector
- MUHIMA Sector
- GATSATA Sector
- KIMISAGARA Sector.

Emmanuel

Puis - je te demander
de faire une traduction en
anglais de cette lettre, s. t. p.

Merci.

Susana

17/6/94

Kigali, kuwa 16/06/1994

N° 136/04.07

Bwana Burgmestiri wa Komini NYARUGENGE
P.V.K.

Impamvu: Gutwara abantu
bahunze intambara.

Bwana Burgmestiri wa Komini KACYIRU
P.V.K.

Bwana Burgmestiri,

Mpereye ku myanzuro y'inama nagiranye
ejo n'intumwa za MINUAR kubyerekeye gutwara abantu bahunze inta-
mbara bakaba barunze ahantu hanyuranye mu mujyi wa Kigali, iyo
mishyikirano nkaba nongeye kuyigirana none na Général Umugaba
wungiriye w'Ingabo za Loni mu Rwanda, ndabamenyesha ko gutwara
abaturage banywe mu byabo n'intambara n'imvururu bizasubukurwa
ejo tariki ya 17/06/1994 saa mbiri za mugitondo.

Kubera iyo mpamvu nsabye abategetsu bese
barebwa n'iki kibazo gukora ibishoboka byose kugirango uko gutwara
abantu kuzagende neza.

Twumvikanye ko muzajya mu gipande cya Guverinoma y'u Rwanda, haza-
za abazaturuka kuri Stade AMAHORO cyangwa se kuri Hôpital Roi
FAYCAL cyangwa Méridien. Naho, abazajya mu ruhande rwa FPR bazava
kuri Paroisse Sainte Famille.

Abaturage bari kuri bariyeri basabwe
kudahutaza abatwara abo bantu haba aho babapakira, cyangwa se
mu muhanda. Ba Burgmestiri na ba Konseye b'aho ibyo bizabera ba-
gomba kuba bahari kugirango bubahirize aya mabwiriza; kandi bazu-
mbikane na MINUAR igihe icyo gikorwa kigomba gukomeza kugira
ngo ubwo bufatanye bukomeze.

.../...

Bimenyeshejwe:

- MINADEP
KIGALI
- MININTER
KIGALI
- Chef wa Etat-Major y'Ingabo z'u Rwanda
KIGALI
- Chef wa Etat-Major ya Gendarmerie
KIGALI
- ✓ - Komanda wa MINUAR
KIGALI
- Madame, Bwana Konseye wa Segiteri
 - RUGENGE
 - KIMIHURURA
 - MUHIMA
 - GATSATA
 - KIMISAGARA

PREFE WA PREFEGITURA
Y'UMUJYI WA KIGALI
RENZAHU Tharcisse
Col. G.

(1)

Mr Méhu

Thank you for the effort but I think there is a lot we can do. We should at least ask new task for the money ~~in press~~ for press education. If you make a strong case, no one will refuse. I disagree with your much credibility as people. In the eyes of well-meaning people, we have done a lot with very little.

NOTE TO THE F.C.

The current situation in Rwanda where people are striving just to stay alive excludes the possibility of a well-conceived, comprehensive information programme. Nevertheless something is possible on a small scale now.

With all newspapers shut down and television non-existent, Radio broadcasting is the only means at our disposal for the dissemination of UNAMIR's message and to provide the population with correct information about the mission and its humanitarian assistance function.

We are already sending by fax news releases explaining our activities to press agencies and television and radio broadcasters in Europe, North America and parts of Africa. Those news releases have intentionally been short because we don't want them to be edited and thus loose control of their content. We need now to concentrate our efforts on an information campaign targeting the Rwandese population.

Why? Think positively. We should ask.


It is quite obvious that the HQ in N.Y. is not going to give us right now the financial means to put together a radio studio in Kigali. The situation is too volatile and we cannot realistically make a case for it.

We can however take advantage of the initiative of the organisation "Reporters sans Frontières" to build a joint venture.

is incorrect. We have done our best to save many lives.

We do not think that it would be wise to be involved at this juncture in rwandese politics. UNAMIR has lost a great deal of its credibility since 6 April in Rwanda because of its inability to protect the civilian population and the moderate political leadership from the killings. UNAMIR should therefore in its information campaign concentrate mainly on the humanitarian aspects of its mission. Later, after a cease-fire and the renewal of political dialogue, we would be able to get involved in other aspects of Rwandese life.

In conclusion, I recommend that we contact rapidly Mr. Philippe Gaillard of the ICRC to discuss with him the implications of the R.S.F. project and the wisdom of our participation.


Pierre Méhu

19 June 1994

cc: DFC

UNAMIR

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: FC

Info: DFC

From: HAC

Date: 02 June 1994

Subject: NOTES ON MEETING BETWEEN FC AND CHAIRMAN
RPF HIGH COMMAND ON 01 JUNE 1994

1. The FC met with the Chairman, RPF High Command on 01 Jun 94 to discuss some issues of concern to UNAMIR Command.
2. The FC expressed grave concern about the current security situation in Kigali and especially about the death of one UNAMIR personnel on 31 May 94. Gen Kagame on his part expressed his regret for the unfortunate incident and his condolences to UNAMIR.

EVACUATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS

3. The CHAO, UNAMIR briefed Gen Kagame on the on-going evacuation of displaced persons in Kigali and the main problems hampering the smooth execution of the exercise (non observance of truce and deliberate firing on UNAMIR convoys by parties).
4. Both commanders then exchanged views on the issue after which the following broad agreements were reached:
 - a. RPF is not in the position to completely stop its military operations in Kigali or fore warn UNAMIR about its impending operations. However, periodic truce will be observed within agreed time slots during which evacuation exercises will take place.
 - b. An LO from RPF, with reliable communications will be permanently attached to UNAMIR HQ.
 - c. A representative from RGF will be permitted by RPF to conduct an assessment of the situation at the Amahoro Stadium with particular reference to the response of the displaced persons to the evacuation exercise.
 - d. The wrong media image given to the evacuation exercise should be corrected in the interest of all parties.

A worthwhile meeting
HAC
02/6
DFC

- e. All Rwandans wishing to be evacuated through Kigali should be vetted/screened by both parties (RGF and RPF) to ensure that only innocent citizens are allowed to exit by air.

ACCESS TO WAREHOUSES

5. The CHAO outlined the difficulties being encountered by Aid Agencies in having access to relief aid items in warehouses in parts of Kigali City.

6. Gen Kagame gave the assurance that these Agencies will be permitted to enter these areas in a few days time when he hoped the operational situation would have improved.

UN AGENCIES/NGOS OPERATIONS

7. The operation of UN Agencies and NGOs (both current and the future) in RPF held areas were discussed. The highlights of the discussions on this subject are as follows:

a. Agencies and NGOS will be permitted to operate in the South of Rwanda from the North provided the modalities are properly worked out.

b. The RPF will continue to exercise some control over the operations of NGOS in their area for reasons of:

- (1) Security.
- (2) Ensuring that aid is delivered to the right places.
- (3) Only credible NGOS operate in the area.

c. WFP vehicles in Kigali will be allowed passage through RPF zone into Uganda to help transport relief aid items into Rwanda.

d. UNOMUR will continue to clear NGO vehicles entering Rwanda from Uganda to ensure that only authorised items are carried.

UNMOS OPERATION IN RPF ZONE

8. The FC reiterated his intention to deploy UNMO teams in RPF zone as part of UNAMIR Phase I deployment. Meanwhile, he wished that the UNMO HQ at Mulindi be authorised to move to BYUMBA while the current restrictions on their movement be removed.

9. Gen Kagame was agreeable to the requests on UNMO Team deployment and the move of the UNMO HQ. He however indicated that UNMO patrols will continue to be accompanied by RPF LOS for the security and ease of movement of the patrols.

MEETING WITH BISHOPS


10. Gen Kagame declined a request by a group of Bishops in Kigali to have audience with him on the subject of a possible ceasefire. His reason was that some of the bishops were implicated in crimes against innocent Rwandans.

CEASEFIRE TALKS

11. The chairman RPF High Command confirmed the intention of the RPF to attend the next ceasefire talks at UNAMIR HQ on 02 June 1994. He however intimated that a ceasefire by the RPF would depend on several factors including the dissolution of the current Rwandan interim Government.

CONCLUSION

12. The discussions took place in a friendly and cordial atmosphere. Gen Kagame appeared to have a full grasp of the war situation and felt confident of victory.



CB YAACHE
Col
CHAO

KMF.691

File

1 of 4

UN Advance Humanitarian Team
(UNAHT)
Kigali

UNAHT
tel 873-682-380042
fax 873-682-380045

c/o UNAMIR
fax 1-212-963-3090

To: Mr. Arturo Hein (Room 346)
UN Humanitarian Coordinator
UNREO Nairobi

fax 254-2-210675

From: Gromo Alex
UNAHT Kigali

Subject: Situation Report for 7 May 1994

Date: 7 May 1994

Overview

Foodstocks in Kigali in Kicukiro, Gikondo and the Industrial Area are presently inaccessible due to heavy shelling and fighting between the opposing forces. This means that the only food available for distribution is located in the airport --- 800 kg of biscuits, or roughly one biscuit for each of the displaced persons in the King Faisal Hospital and Amahoro Stadium for each of the next two days.

It was announced at the evening security briefing of 7 May that the last, repeat last, Canadian Air Force flight to Kigali from Nairobi will be on 8 May. The Canadians will be leaving for Canada on 9 May. The UN, it was disclosed, is supposed to take over the air support operations for Kigali.

The food needs in Kabgaye where ICRC is establishing a sub-delegation are critical. ICRC has requested an immediate airlift of food supplies to Bujumbura which could be then trucked north to Kabgaye where an estimated 200,000 displaced persons require assistance.

The situation of water in Kigali has become critical.

I. Security Situation

There was been heavy shelling and small arms fire in various parts of the city throughout the day. ICRC staff members in trucks seeking to remove stocks from their warehouses in the Rwandex area this morning received direct fire and were forced to withdraw from the area.

II. Humanitarian Assistance

A. Critical needs:

1. As food in Kigali warehouses is not accessible, an airlift into Kigali of foodstuffs, whatever they may be, is urgently requested.

Present foodstocks (at the airport): One (1) pallet of UNICEF High Energy Biscuits

2. The supply of aluminum sulfate ($Al_2(SO_4)_3$) required by Electrogaz for the purification of water in Kigali is now finished. Immediate supplies of the chemical are required to avoid the distribution of contaminated water in the city. Disease is certain to follow if immediate action is not taken. (Please see the attached memo to the UNAMIR Humanitarian Assistance Cell Chief for further details.)

Present stocks in Kigali: Zero (0)

3. While basic health kits are available, medicines for the following ailments (as specified in the Sitrep for 6 May) are requested for immediate delivery:

- diarrhea
- malaria

Medicines for tuberculosis patients and asthmatics have also been requested. (Please modify the AHT Report of 26 April which states: "Have stocks for medical needs for 50,000 persons for 3 mos." This estimation did not take into account the conditions that have arisen in the displaced camps nor the circumstances in which those dispensing drugs find themselves.

Present UN medical supplies stocks: 1 UNICEF basic health kit, 6 of 7 boxes (# D missing); 10 WHO basic emergency health kits; 1 series WHO (#11 - 24) drugs, infusions, renewable supplies

4. Information is required from agencies who wish to move relief supplies into Rwanda before they are sent and not afterwards. UNAMIR, in response to an apparent lack of commitment from its sister UN agencies to keep Kigali informed, will halt and question UN vehicles at neighboring country border points to ascertain their destination, cargo and intent.

B. Distributions

None were effected by the UN on 7 May. Whatever arrives on 8 May is planned to be distributed to King Faisal and Amahoro Stadium. Distribution capacity is not as much a problem as a lack of food and other supplies.

III. UN National Staff

It is presently impossible to move any people, particularly Tutsis, from other parts of town to non-RGF held areas.

II. Humanitarian Assistance

A. Critical needs:

1. As food in Kigali warehouses is not accessible, an airlift into Kigali of foodstuffs, whatever they may be, is urgently requested.

Present foodstocks (at the airport): One (1) pallet of UNICEF High Energy Biscuits

2. The supply of aluminum sulfate (Al₂(SO₄)₃) required by Electrodes for the purification of water in Kigali is now finished. Immediate supplies of the chemical are required to avoid the distribution of contaminated water in the city. Disease is certain to follow if immediate action is not taken. (Please see the attached memo to the UNAMIR Humanitarian Assistance Cell Chief for further details.)

Present stock in Kigali: zero (0)

3. While basic health kits are available, medicines for the following ailments (as specified in the Strip for a Day) are requested for immediate delivery:

- diarrhea
- malaria

Medicines for tuberculosis patients and patients with other chronic diseases. (Please modify the AMT Report of 12 April which states: "Have stocks for medical needs for 30,000 persons for 3 mos. This estimation did not take into account the conditions that have arisen in the displaced camps nor the circumstances in which those dispensing drugs find themselves.")

Present UN medical supplies stocks: 1 UNICEF basic health kit, 6 of 7 boxes (1/2 missing); 10 WHO basic emergency health kits; 1 series WHO (all - 24) drugs, injections, renewables supplies

4. Information is required from agencies who wish to move relief supplies into Rwanda before they are sent and not afterwards. UNAMIR, in response to an apparent lack of commitment from the latter UN agencies to keep Kigali safe, will raise and question UN vehicles at neighboring countries to get points to ascertain their destination, cargo and status.

B. Distributors

None were affected by the recent earthquake. May 1994. Distribution of relief supplies. Lack of food and other supplies.

III. UN National Staff

It is presently impossible to move any people, particularly Tutsis, from other parts of town to non-RFC held areas.

622880

622508

334000 Rm 9/11 CR Tilleta

I have just spoken over the telephone with General Dallaire after he has had the chance to review the documents on the "Proposed Overall Framework for UN Humanitarian Actions on the Rwanda Emergency", as well as the related 4 May fax from Mr. Hein to Debbie Saily (for distribution to UN agency Focal Points) elaborating further on that document. Please allow me to convey my understanding of General Dallaire's views.

General Dallaire agrees that reaching agreement with the RPF on the essential pre-conditions which should underlie any sizable UN cross-border operations into areas under their control can probably be done in a matter of days. However, he thinks that reaching such agreements with the RGF will be difficult, and that the possibility of being able to actually carry out the movement of relief convoys, and distribution at sites, in a secure manner in RGF-controlled areas is extremely unlikely without the provision of "overwhelming military force" by UNAMIR. The experience yesterday with the attempted movement of persons from the Mille Colline to the airport is seen as an example of the very limited value of written agreements with the RGF in the face of an angry group of militia. His observation is that the gendarmes are of very limited value in a situation of actual confrontation with the RGF or even the militia, at which time they fade into the background.

General Dallaire suggests that a next step with the RGF would be to test the possibility that some limited relief distribution might be possible, by negotiating an agreement with the RGF (in Gitarama, perhaps with the Chief of Staff of the RGF) as well as working out with local authorities how a trial distribution might be done, for example using the existing WFP stocks in Gitarama. However, his prediction and fear

is that such an effort is likely to fail, including with possible bloodshed. He does not agree to put unarmed UNAMIR Military Observers in such a setting.

General Dallaire is concerned about the trend of increasing tension and difficulties between UNAMIR, and expatriates in general, with the RGF. He thinks that such tensions are only likely to increase in the near future as the RPF continues to advance.

General Dallaire is now in the process of pushing hard for a revised mandate for UNAMIR and a substantially increased level of troops and firepower. He would see this new mandate as including a number of responsibilities relating to humanitarian assistance, including (to be completed). If such a mandate were authorized, he would see it taking a matter of weeks, not months, to put such an increased military capacity on the ground in Rwanda.

We agreed on the idea of having his Deputy come from Arusha tomorrow to Nairobi to meet directly with Mr. Hein and the UN agency representatives here (at 1500 hrs) to discuss these matters in more detail and agree on the next steps to be taken.

Original in French/file: hunger.DV4/DV

Summary translation of Article on Famine

Kibuye: the Eternal Food Deficit

Hunger has been endemic to Kibuye for more than a decade. The future outlook remains bleak.

Hail storms late 1992 destroyed many crops in some regions while excessive rain has been the problem on others.

In several areas the losses reach 85% of the normal harvest.

48.8% of the rural population can eat once a day while the majority eat once every two or three days.

According to surveys, only 3.2% of households say they have enough to eat and drink, the rest are lacking.

MA

Kibuye is in the Southern Sector
being looked after by ML035
Get ML035 COD to arrange this
on Wednesday/Thursday next week.

There should be a press coverage
arranged through LO RGF
and a letter must also go to
Minis of Information, Labour and
Social welfare, Tell them also
to arrange for the ^{int} world Press Coverage.

Note that personal contact is what
will yield the results needed. PIO
at the third floor could also go ahead
with arrangements for press coverage once
you are certain on the date but do
not leave it to them. I want to
be briefed on day to day basis on this.

JW

21/3
DFC/WS

* Note SRG may go by
helicopter in which case the
press team and all others should be
there waiting.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:

A:

FC ①

FROM:

DE:

EO

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

31/3

FOR ACTION

POUR SUITE A DONNER

FOR APPROVAL

POUR APPROBATION

FOR SIGNATURE

POUR SIGNATURE

FOR COMMENTS

POUR OBSERVATIONS

MAY WE DISCUSS?

POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?

YOUR ATTENTION

VOTRE ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

COMME CONVENU

AS REQUESTED

SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE

NOTE AND RETURN

NOTER ET RETOURNER

FOR INFORMATION

POUR INFORMATION

Please arrange
a programme for
the SRSG's visit to
KIBUYE which he
wants to undertake
early next week.

②

Direct
costAction plan
due me

31/3

COM.6 (2-78)

5113

①

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:

A:

FC

FROM:

DE:

Kibua

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

17/2

FOR ACTION

POUR SUITE A DONNER

FOR APPROVAL

POUR APPROBATION

FOR SIGNATURE

POUR SIGNATURE

FOR COMMENTS

POUR OBSERVATIONS

MAY WE DISCUSS?

POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?

YOUR ATTENTION

VOTRE ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

COMME CONVENU

AS REQUESTED

SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE

NOTE AND RETURN

NOTER ET RETOURNER

FOR INFORMATION

POUR INFORMATION

Re: a Hacked

The SRSG wishes to visit
KIBUYE on Thursday
24/2. Could we please
discuss?

APM
EO 17/2②
ADC

COM.6 (2-78)

Show me
another map and then
coord with appropriate
Sector office. Similar to
last time in dis-
posed possibly

17/2

Kibuye: L'éternel déficit alimentaire...

La famine désormais endémique dans Kibuye depuis près d'une décennie n'augure rien de bon. Déjà au début de l'année 1993, l'on assistait à un norme déficit alimentaire dû à éternelle incidence des aléas climatiques (des précipitations anormales).

Comme le soulignent les données du Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage (MINAGRI), des cas de grêle enregistrés dans les communes de Gisovu, Givumu, et Bwakira à la fin de l'année 1992 ont occasionné d'importants dégâts sur son nombre de cultures notamment sur le haricot, les soja, le bananier, le manioc et le caféier. Dans Gishyita, les pluies excessives de la même période ont particulièrement affecté les mêmes cultures, qui lors de leur stade de levée, présentaient des signes de jaunissement.

Selon le rapport sur le bilan alimentaire pour le 1er semestre 1993 du MINAGRI, les pertes aux cultures susmentionnées ont été évaluées à 85% des produits normales dans plusieurs endroits. A la lumière d'une production agricole de tout le pays qui venait de diminuer de 21% (en termes de volume) par rapport au semestre de l'année précédente, les calculs du bilan alimentaire-valables également pour Kibuye-de ce 1er semestre 93 ont révélé un déficit de 40,49, et 85% respectivement pour les disponibilités énergétiques, protéiques et lipidiques.

Cette situation s'est empirée au cours du deuxième semestre de la même année: le manque prononcé des pluies a complètement handicapé la bonne marche des activités agricoles. Au cours des mois de septembre, octobre et novembre caractérisés par une trentaine de jours de faibles pluies, le déficit pluviométrique était de 35%, selon les relevés pluviométriques de la Direction régionale des Services Agricoles de Kibuye.

En conséquence, l'état général des cultures était mauvais dans le deuxième semestre 93. D'après les fiches des prévisions des récoltes des services agricoles de Kibuye, la production a terriblement chuté par rapport à celle de l'année dernière: le haricot (62%), le bananier (17%), la patate douce (34,5%), la pomme de terre (22,3% le maïs (41%), et le caféier (13,3%).



Le déficit alimentaire affecte en particulier les enfants

rement inextricables les conditions et la qualité de vie des populations des communes que la famine affecte depuis longtemps: Gishyita et Rwamatamu. Mais c'est tienne, c'est la vie de toute une préfecture qui est en jeu.

Dans Gitesi, par exemple, l'enquête sur la situation socio-économique et nutritionnelle, réalisée en 1992 par le Département de Développement de l'Eglise Méthodiste Libre au Rwanda, a révélé ce qu'on n'osait pas crier tout haut. En fait, sur plus d'une centaine de ménages enquêtés, "seulement 48,8% des paysans ne peuvent manger qu'une fois par jour, alors que la majorité ne mangent qu'une fois tous les deux ou trois jours".

Parmi les ménages enquêtés, 3,2% déclarent qu'ils ont assez à manger et à boire. Tandis que 96,8% se disent déficitaires. Ce découpage épouse, à cet effet, un peu la situation professionnelle de la population de Kibuye (et du Pays en général): il est donc probable que presque tous les agri-éleveurs (soit plus de 90% des habitants) soient déficitaires en vivres.

sement ont été engagées. Mais sans être exploitées.

De son côté, le Président du syndicat des agri-éleveurs de Kibuye (IMBARAGA), Onesphore Ntezimanzi crie son S.O.S: "Nous devons rétablir, réhabiliter les actions de lutte antiérosive et les canaux d'irrigation; faut restructurer la politique des projets de développement pour donner à l'agri-éleveur un rôle concret dans leur gestion; le gouvernement doit aussi implanter dans Kibuye des activités industrielles qui créent des emplois non agricoles; Une aide d'urgence aux nécessités doublée d'approches de solutions durables à cette famine s'avère à cet effet, indiscutablement imminente.

La question de déficit alimentaire sans la préfecture de Kibuye demande donc le concours de tout un chacun. L'oeuvre, l'on constatera qu'aux grands maux il faut les grands remèdes.

CRI Kibuye
KABANZA Fraterne

KIGALI, 05 Apr 94

To: Force Commander

Through: Acting CPLO

From: Planning Section
Humanitarian Officer

SUBJECT: Coordination meeting on Burundese refugees dated 28 Mar 94. Comment.

1. As it appears from the list of presents, humanitarian Offr attended to the above meeting.
2. A report of summary of the discussed items was drafted and sent to DFC (File No: 94/5000.5/0193).
3. Comment

The situation in the Burundese refugee camps is constantly improving due to the weekly coordination between the concerned operators and to their permanent engagement.

The situation of the refugees is even starting to get much better than that of the local inhabitants especially in the prefectures of BUTARE and GIKONGORO. This eventually could lead to incidents although field operators say that the local people are too weak to cause problems.

②
D/C
can sit rep.
the common of Southern sector
saying this?

belly aren't
are they monitoring
any robbery / attacks at
distric locations points?
rc
5/4

cor/c plans
see me,
5/4
DFC/LOS

63
14/12/94
SB

**MINUTES OF THE COORDINATION MEETING
OF MONDAY, 28 MARCH 1994**

Translated from the French
Kyle Utley, 31031994

①
CPLANS/HUMANITA-
RIAN OFFER
Read and let me
have your comments
When you at the
meeting at all?
+ Jli
03/4
DJC

1. Participants

- List attached
- Dr. Vincent Vercruysse is in Rwanda for several weeks to make an evaluation of MSF/B programs

2. Corrections/Comments on the minutes of the 21 March meeting

- World Food Program (WFP) beneficiaries in Burundi include several displaced and repatriated groups, not only displaced Tutsis.
- The assassination reported by UNAMIR was in Byumba and not Ruhengeri.

3. Security

A refugee employee of MSG in Ntangwa was assassinated during the night of Thursday, 17 March for reasons still unknown. The MINITRASO (Ministry of Work and Social Affairs) recalls that all crimes perpetrated in refugee camps must be identified to the Commune and the police in an imperative way.

UNAMIR signals new arrivals in the camps and more frequent verifications by the Gendarmerie and the Army along the roads. It is as well mentioned that a Catholic woman is distributing food in an unfair way. Considering that this person is not part of FIRC, it is supposed that she belongs to an agency. On this subject, it is recommended to agencies that want to distribute aide not foreseen in the world assistance plan, that they contact UNHCR and FIRC who can direct these distributions to those who need it most.

The MINITRASO strongly recommends the employment of Rwandese personnel.

~ will they
be impartial?

4. Food Aide

- No major problems
- The 2nd cycle of supplies is finished. The 1st cycle for April is being currently prepared.
- 160 MT of CSB arrived in Dar-Es-Salaam (of the 610 coming from Beira)
- 1,000 MR of chinese beans arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, 280 of which are en route to Kigali.

- 200 MR of CSB are en route from Mombassa to Kigali.
- Rations will remain at 120 grs of Beans and 50 grs of CSB.
- Distributions continue (2nd cycle of March in all the camps except Saga I and II who are receiving the 1st cycle)
- The FIRC will try to generalize the distribution for 1 month; it is necessary to make the refugees aware of proper management of their stocks. This requires an increase of warehousing capacities in the EDP.
- Computerized lists are still a source of problems.
- Diversion of food aide: FIRC has taken strong measures with the local authorities to clarify the causes and identify the guilty. HCR has, for it's part, requests MINITRASO and the Ministry of Commerce to take the necessary steps to rectify these problems of disappearing food.
- FIRC established distribution support committees with the refugees.
- The aide package:
 - Karama : 1974 Kilocalories
 - Shororo : 1462 K.Cal without CSB
 - Saga : 1947 and 2041 without CSB
- FIRC has 5 mills to grind corn. It has not yet been decided how they will be used.

5. Non-food Aide

- We have distributed 88% of the goods.
- Need jerrycans to replace the preceding distributions.
- The distribution of plastic sheeting will begin.
- FIRC received 8900 blankets and 800 sheets from the German Red Cross.

6. Health

- The death rate is stable:
 - Global: 0.78 deaths/day/10,000 persons
 - Under 5 years-old: 1.74 deaths/day/10,000 persons
- Respiratory infections are the leading cause of death of children under 5 years-old.

- The death rates are highest in Burenge, Maza, Kagina and Kanage.
- Diarrhea is on the decline; fevers are stable; respiratory infections are on the rise.
- A gynecologist from Benin and an eye doctor from Belgium are offering their services in the camps. All other medical specialists are welcome.

7. Nutrition

In Akankuba, the global malnutrition rate is 4.9% (0.9 severe)

8. Infrastructure

The move from Bweyeye to Nyarushishi will take place on Wednesday, 30 March 1994.

9. Education

Caritas and HCR will meet to establish a plan of action.

10. ECHO

- UNHCR will make payments (period of 1 Nov to 15 Dec not covered by ECHO) and budgetary advances.
- Meetings planned with agencies and HCR.
- Agencies are advised to prepare their budgets in 3 month modules considering the global presentation at ECHO.

11. Miscellaneous

- Mr. Bertrand Desmoulins will be responsible for medical co-ordination during the absence of Dr. Peignot (29 March - 13 April)
- Rectification of the list of NGOs intervening in the camps; the presence of CPPS is to be noted.
- Co-ordination Committee in the Sous-prefect of Kanazi on Thursday, 31 March 1994, for the Maza, Nsangwa and Burenge camps.
- The Co-ordinator for AICF will leave Rwanda at the end of the mission.
- UNHCR offices will move to the building "La Centrale" next to the Meridien.
- The next co-ordination meeting will take place on Monday, 11 April 1994.

REUNION de coordination
DATE 28 Mars 1994

NOMS DES PARTICIPANTS

ORGANISME

1. Daniel BELLAMY	UNHCR
2. John Bullock	UNITED R.
3. Claude PELIGNOT	UNHCR
4. ARTIGAS Benoit	CEE / Comité Cise
5. LAURE Monnier	ASC / SDR
6. Henry Fay	O. M. S
7. KAROMÉ Joseph	PAIG
8. MAMADOU MBAIE	PAM
9. Cecilia Ljungman	PAM
10. William COMLAN	CPDS
11. RICHARD Patrice	BSF
12. M-Paule Spiehlmann	MSF-B
13. Paul LELCAMPES	HCF/B
14. Vincent VERCRUYSE	MSP/B
15. FREYENS Pierre	OMS
16. FONS PODEVYN MAJOR	UNAMIR
17. ANN Heesbeen	CRB
18. Florence DAUNIS	AICF
19. Yves KATIELI	AICF.
20. ABEL William BABINGUI	IFRC
21. NDWASEZU Epaphrodite	PNUD / MINITRASO
22. Alessandro Bolzoni	UNHCR
23. Kagambirwa Melani	MINITRASO
24. H. Ngorambe Bernadette	CRS / EW
25. Gregoire Alex	PNUD/DHA

DATE