

UNAMIX

TRANSITION FROM UNAMIR I TO UNAMIR II

23 FEB - 30 APR 1994

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

CONFIDENTIAL  
RH/WG JUNE 2007

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 51002

BOX 163

FILE 7

ACC. 1993/283

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

2000.1 (CMPO)

30 April 1994

See Distribution

FORCE COMMAND ORGANIZATION

The enclosed org charts depict the revised Command Organization. Although the totals add up to 457, our present strength is 453 only. We will reach 457 once rotation of the Canadian officers is completed.

*M. Bussiere*  
M BUSSIERE  
Maj  
CMPO

Enclosures: 3

Distribution

External

SRSG  
CAO  
CO BYUBAT  
OC Tunisian Coy

Internal

FC  
DFC  
COO  
CMO  
CHAO  
C Log O  
A/C plan  
Camp Comdt  
OC Support Pl

156  
18  

---

174

708  
81  

---

627

453  
175  

---

628

Tps 318  
staff 14  
mils 24  

---

356

GHANA  
Troops — 318  
MIL OBS/STAFF — 38  

---

356

453  
356  

---

97

# UNAMIR FORCE HQ

1200/27 APR 94

## FC OFFICE

FC - MGEN. DALLAIRE (CAN)  
MA - CMDT DIAGNE (SEN)  
AMA - MAJ. BEARDSLEY (CAN)  
ADC - CAPT. FAYE (SEN)  
- CAPT. SECK (SEN)  
Driver - SGT ADJEI (GHA)  
Bodyguard - SGT AZINADAGA (GHA)

## DFC OFFICE

DFC/COS - BGEN. ANYIDHOHO (GHA)  
MA - LCDR ZOWONOO (GHA)  
ADC - CAPT. NSIAH (GHA)  
Driver - CPL NORVIHOHO (GHA)

## PERSONNEL

CMPO - MAJ. BUSSIERE (CAN)  
/ [MAJ. McCOMBER (CAN)]  
DCMPO - MAJ. SENCHEM (GHA)  
CLK - SSGT ARHIN (GHA)

## OPERATIONS

COO - COL. MOEEN (BAN)  
DCOO - MAJ. QUIST (GHA)  
SDO - MAJ. NAZMUL (BAN)  
DO - MAJ. LAGAGWOMA (NIG)  
DO - SQNLDR MOTTALB (BAN)  
DO - CAPT. ACHEANPONG (GHA)  
DO - CAPT. NDLOVU (ZIM)  
MIO - CAPT. DEME (SEN)  
MIO - CAPT. [LEBLANC] (CAN)  
CLK - SGT NAZIR (BAN)

## LOGISTICS

CLO - LCOL. NYAAKU (GHA)  
DCLO - MAJ. PLANTE (CAN)  
LOG BASE - LCDR READ (CAN)  
LOG BASE - MAJ. RACINE (CAN)  
/ [CAPT. ST DENIS (CAN)]  
LOG BASE - CAPT. ALHASSAN (GHA)  
CLK - SGT DEBRAH (GHA)

## HQ COMMANDANT


HQ CMDT - MAJ ANNAN (GHA)

## PLANS

CPLANS - LCOL. [AUSTDAL] (CAN)  
SO PLANS/ENG - MAJ. MACZKA (POL)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. KONNEY (GHA)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. [DEMERS] (CAN)

# FORCE HQ 35 MULTINATIONAL

1100/30 APR 94




GHANA TROOPS

273  
+ 45  
-----  
318

(1) TOTAL FORCE PRESENTLY - 459 ALL RANKS



1200/27 AP





MA  
How far is this  
BOI proceeding  
3/4  
DFC

1000./FC/BOI

27 April 1994

See Distribution

**TERMS OF REFERENCE -  
SUMMARY INVESTIGATION - BOARDING OF  
A CANADIAN C130 AIRCRAFT AT KIGALI  
AIRPORT BY TEN RWANDESE ON 24 APRIL 1994**

GENERAL

1. Maj Stefan Stec is to carry out a Summary Investigation into the circumstances leading to the boarding at Kigali Airport of a Canadian C130 aircraft bound for Nairobi by ten (10) local Rwandese dressed in UN gear with falsified UNAMIR ID Cards on Sunday 24 April 1994.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The investigating officer shall obtain statements from all available witnesses and in particular shall record evidence as to:

- a. How the local citizens arrived at the airport and who was responsible.
- b. How come the local citizens were in possession of UN helmets, flak jackets and UNAMIR ID cards.
- c. The identity of the locals involved in the incident.
- d. Why the pilots refused to heed to a warning from the control tower to return to the ramp if the boarders were local citizens.
- e. The reaction of the RGF troops near the button of the runway to the whole incident.

FINDINGS

3. The investigating officer shall make findings as to:
  - a. The type and registration of vehicles used for transporting the locals to the airport terminal and onto the tarmac.


- b. The names, UNID and nationalities of the drivers of the vehicles involved; and
- c. How the UNAMIR ID cards were obtained for the locals.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 4. The investigating officer shall make recommendations on:
  - a. The requirement to take disciplinary or administrative action against those involved; and
  - b. Measures to be put in place to prevent such occurrences in future.

SUBMISSION OF REPORT

- 5. The report is to be submitted in three (3) copies to the CMPO by Wed 4 May 1994.

  
RA DALLAIRE  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:

Milob Gp HQ  
Byubat Rear

Internal:

Humanitarian Office  
Maj Stefan Stec - FHQ

Information:

CAO

FC  
DFC  
CMPO

1000.5/ HQ COMDT/G

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR  
RE-LOCATION OF UNAMIR HQGENERAL

1. These instructions are issued for implementation in the event of establishment of a Step-up HQ at KANOMBE International Airport and subsequent movement of remaining elements of the HQ.

COMPOSITION OF STEP-UP HQ

2. The Step-up HQ will comprise personnel as shown at Annex A, attached.

MOVEMENT

3. Movement of personnel and essential stores will be carried out using maximum number of vehicles. Branches will use own transport for the move. Additional transport requirements should be submitted to C Log O immediately for action.

4. The sequence of the move by groups is as follows:

a. Group 1. Comd - DCOO.

(1) Ops Staffs.

(2) Comm Staffs.

Group 2. Comd - C Plans.

(1) Plans.

(2) SRSG's Office Staff.

(3) Civ attached to SRSG.

c. Group 3. Comd - CHAO.

(1) Humanitarian Section.

(2) UNHCR Personnel.

e. Group 4. Comd - CLOGO.

(1) Pers Branch.

(2) Log Branch.

f. Group 5. Comd - AMA TO DFC.

(1) DFC's Office Staff.

(2) CTO.

UNAMIR HQ  
29 April 1994

*1/11/14  
Pse mlt and Comtin  
ADG as my chv 15 hold  
themselves ready.*



UN RESTRICTED

g. Group 6. Remaining elements of all branches. See Annex B.

OFFICE ALLOCATION

5. Office space allocation will be made known at the beginning of the move.

SIGNAL FOR MOVE

6. On receipt of the codeword PINTO all Step-up HQ personnel will be at 2hrs NTM. The signal for move of the main body of the HQ will be comm through branch heads.

RATION AND WATER

5. Existing stocks of ration and water at the Force Log Base at the Airport will be used. The Camp Admin Offr will liase with C LOG O for issue of ration and water

STEP-UP HQ ADMIN

6. DCMPO will act as Camp Admin Offr until arrival of the main body of the HQ.



A ANNAN  
Maj  
for Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

MILOB GP HQ  
Ops Branch  
Pers Branch  
Log Branch  
Plans  
Humanitarian Section  
AMA TO FC  
MA TO DFC  
Ghana Def Pl

Information:

CAO



UN RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO  
1000.5/HQ COMDT/G  
DATED APR 94

COMPOSITION OF STEP-UP HQ

SRL	BRANCH	PERS	REMARKS
1	MILOB GP HQ	DCMO AND 8 OTHERS	
2	OPS BRANCH	DCOO, & 2XDOs	
3	PERS BRANCH	CMPO, DCMPO, CLERK	
4	LOG BRANCH	C LOG OFFR & CLERK	
5	PLANS	C PLANS, SO PLANS	
6	HUMANITARIAN SECTION	CHAO, 2 X SO HUMANITARIAN, CLERK	
7	UNHCR STAFF	5 No	
8	FC's OFFICE	DFC, MA TO DFC, ADC TO DFC, DVR,	
9	COMMS SECTION	3XCOMMS STAFF	
10	SRSG's OFFICE	EXEC DIR, ASSIST TO SRSG, 2XCIV SERVANTS	
11	CTO's OFFICE	ASSIST TO CTO	

UN RESTRICTED

ANNEX B TO  
1000.5/HQ COMDT/G  
DATED APR 94

COMPOSITION OF MAIN BODY

SRL	BRANCH	PERS	REMARKS
1	MILOB GP HQ	CMO & 8 OTHERS	
2	OPS BRANCH	COO AND 4 X DOs	
3	FC's OFFICE	FC, AMA TO FC, ADC TO FC, DVR BODY GUARD	
4	CAMP COMMAND	COMDT	
5	DEF PL	1 & 20	
6	TUN PL DET	5 No OR	
7	CTO's OFFICE	CTO	
8	COMMS SECTION	2 No COMMS STAFF	

UN SECRET

Copy No. 6 of 15

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ

27 Apr 94

3000.15 (Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER NO. 9

1. SITUATION

a. RPF/RGF/MILITIA

(1) Fighting has been going on in the country (Rwanda) for the past three weeks between the RGF and Presidential Guards on one side and the RPF on the other hand. In Kigali in particular, armed Militias have also become a force to contend with over the past three weeks. They are uncontrollable and are usually doped and drugged most of the time.

(2) The situation in Kigali keeps deteriorating day in and day out with the RPF infiltrating into the city and consolidating positions they are already holding. The RGF and the Presidential Guards are also putting up stiff resistance in the areas under their control.

(3) Attempts to broker a cease fire by UNAMIR and the facilitator of the peace Process (The President of Tanzania) have so far yielded no results. From all indications both sides are determined to carry on the fight for sometime to come.

b. UNAMIR FORCES

(1) After the withdrawal of UNAMIR troops/MILOBs from the DMZ to Kigali and further scaling down of the force to 459, all troops are presently concentrated in Kigali. Present disposition is as follows:

- (a) Byubat Coy and Bn HQ - KIA
- (b) Byubat Coy (+) - Amahoro Stadium.
- (c) Force HQ - Amahoro Hotel
- (d) Tunisian Pl (+) - Amahoro Hotel.
- (e) MILOB GP HQ - Amahoro Hotel.
- (f) Force Sp Gp - KIA.

UN SECRET

(2) Should this situation deteriorate further, it will be necessary to pull out all UNAMIR troops out of RWANDA.

2. MISSION. To withdraw all UNAMIR troops and some essential equipment from RWANDA.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. The withdrawal will be conducted in Two Phases:

(1) Phase I. Concentration of all UNAMIR troops at KIA with some essentials for withdrawal.

(2) Phase 2. Evacuation by air or by road as soon as possible.

b. Byubat

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1

i. Ensure security of KIA as first priority on receipt of Codeword BULL DOG.

ii. Provide security at KIA for Force HQ and all personnel/aircraft.

iii. Assemble all personnel, essential equipment and vehicles at present locations.

iv. Move personnel, equipment and vehicles to KIA.

v. Secure route from Amahoro to KIA with armed escorts.

vi. Prepare own transport with drivers for possible road evacuation.

vii. Ensure all important document, stores and equipment not being evacuated are destroyed before abandoning present locations. Only very essential materials to be taken.

UN SECRET

viii. Prepare load table and forward it to C Log O for approval. with 48 hrs (from issue of this order).

(b) Phase II

i. Ensure security at KIA during air evacuation.

ii. Withdraw from KIA by air.

iii. Line up for road move (if situation demands) under direction from Force HQ G-3. Format of road move at Annex A.

b. Tun Platoon (+)

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase I

i. Provide armed escorts for Force HQ move to KIA.

ii. Concentrate all your personnel and stores at KIA.

iii. Assist Force HQ to evacuate all essential stores to KIA.

iv. Prepare vehicles and drivers for possible road move.

v. Ensure that all important documents stores and equipment not being evacuated are destroyed. Only very essential material is to be taken.

vi. Prepare load table and forward it to C Log O for approval within 48 hrs (from issue of this order).

(b) Phase II

i. Provide local protection to Force HQ at KIA.

ii. Withdraw from KIA by air.

iii. Be part of UNAMIR road convoy if evacuation is not possible by air.



UN SECRET

c. MILOB GP

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(a) Phase I

- i. Concentrate all personnel and stores and move by road to KIA.
- ii. Earmark vehicles and drivers for possible road move.
- iii. Ensure that all important documents and stores not being evacuated are destroyed.

(b) Phase II.

- i. Provide UNMO Team to act as Mov Con.
- ii. Withdraw from KIA by air as per plan.

d. Force HQ

(1) Tasks

(a) Phase I. All branch heads to ensure the following:

- i. Destroy all stores, and equipment not being evacuated. Only very essential materials to be taken.
- ii. Concentrate all personnel and move to KIA by road.
- iii. COO to establish Step Up HQ at KIA.
- iv. Form part of UNAMIR road convoy if road move is under taken. Provide LOs for road convoy.
- v. All branches prepare their load table and forward it to C Log O witing 48 hrs (from issue of this order).

(b) Phase II.

- i. All branches to set up their offices in tower building at KIA and be operational quickly.
- ii. CMPO evacuation plan is attached as Annex B.

UN SECRET

iii. Ops branch to establish Step Up HQ at Nairobi if required.

iv. Withdraw from KIA as per plan.

v. Form part of UNAMIR road convoy if required. Ops branch will be functional from command vehicle.

vi. C Log O to scrutinize load tables received from branches/units and allot vehicles.

(c) C Comm Offr to ensure comm to outside world during all phases.

e. Force Support Gp

(1) Tasks

(a) Phase 1.

i. Prepare vehicles and drivers for possible road move. Coord with C Log O for details.

ii. Assist Force HQ in loading personnel and equipment onto aircraft.

iii. Assist Mov Con (MILOB Team) in smooth loading of all personnel and equipment.

iv. Ensure all important documents and equipment not being evacuated are destroyed.

(b) Phase II

i. Withdraw by air from KIA as per plan.

ii. Be part of UNAMIR road convoy if evacuation by air is not possible.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timing

(a) Emergency. All to be at one hr NTM.

(b) Normal. All to be at four hrs NTM.

(2) Liaison. COO and CMO to liaise with warring factions for safe passage of UNAMIR troops/convoys.

UN SECRET

(3) All to earmark vehicles, essential stores equipment and drivers for possible withdrawal with immediate effect.

(4) Rules of Engagement. Annex C.

(5) Route for Road Withdrawal. (If undertaken) KIGALI - RUKOMO - NGONOORE - GATUNA - KABALE - KAMPALA. Sketch of route to be used out of Kigali attached as Annex D.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Feeding. All to carry three days C - ration.

b. Water. Enough water to be carried centrally by all groups.

c. Dress. As per UNAMIR instructions. Flak jackets and steel helmets to be worn.

d. Weapons. All to carry personal weapons.

e. Ammo. First line ammo will be carried with hand grenades by all. Convoy protection escorts to carry LAWs.

f. Medical. Force Sp Platoon medical elements to provide medical support in both phases.

g. Tpt. C Log O to work out detailed requirement of tpt with immediate effect.

h. Fuel. C Log O to work out requirements for a possible road move.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Locations

(1) Force HQ remains at present location until withdrawal commences. Step Up HQ will be established at KIA before Force HQ withdraws.

b. Radio Net

(1) All low priority radio assets will be closed.

(2) Withdraw all radio sets from all, other than key appointment holders who require it.

(3) Detailed signal instructions at Annex E.

UN SECRET

c. Codewords and Nicknames

(1) Codewords

Srl	Codeword	Meaning	Issued By
1	BULLDOG	Evacuation Starts	Force HQ
2	EAGLE	Evacuation by air	Force HQ
3	GORILLA	Evacuation by road	Force HQ

(2) Nicknames

Srl	Nickname	Meaning
1	HURRY UP	KIA
2	RED ANT	FORCE HQ
3	COW BOY	RUKOMO
4	DIRTY HEROES	NGONDORE
5	GOOD BOY	GATUNA
6	SLEEPY BABY	KABALE

6. Ack Instructions: All ack.

Authentication

MOEEN UDDIN AHMED  
Colonel  
Chief Operation Officer

  
R.A. DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander

UN SECRET

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Copy No

MILOB GP HQ

BYUBAT

Tun Pl (+)

Force Support Gp

Internal:

DFC

CAO

HAC

COO

CMPO

C Log O

C Plans

FSO

Camp Comdt

File

Spare

6



FORMAT OF ROAD MOVE

<input type="text"/>	ARMED ESCORT
<input type="text"/>	UNMOS ESCORT
<input type="text"/>	* TCV (No of TCV will depend upon availability of trucks)
<input type="text"/>	TCV
<input type="text"/>	TCV
<input type="text"/>	LUGGAGE TRUCKS (No of luggage trucks will depend upon availability of vehs)
<input type="text"/>	"
<input type="text"/>	"
<input type="text"/>	ARMED ESCORT

\*TCV : Troop Carrying Vehicle.

UN SECRET

ANNEX B  
TO OP ORDER NO 9

UNAMIR EVACUATION PLAN

1. As part of its emergency evacuation plan, UNAMIR must be ready to evacuate, either by air or by road, its 459 military personnel as well as its 20 civilian personnel. The following paragraphs will indicate the priorities to be respected.

ROAD EVACUATION

2. This move will be coordinated by the COO using the plan drawn by the C Log O. Personnel will be travelling in vehicles as assigned by the COO.

AIR EVACUATION

3. Evacuation will be from Kigali International Airport, likely using C130 HERCULES aircraft. The authorized load for each aircraft is 70 personnel. It is expected that a minimum of nine (9) lifts will be required: seven (7) for personnel and two (2) for essential equipment and stores to be withdrawn. In case of emergency evacuation, all personnel will travel with minimum personal equipment and clothing.

EVACUATION PRIORITIES

4. The priority for evacuation will be as follows, keeping in mind that some UNMOs will be required to stay behind to carry on negotiations:

- a. injured and non-essential/combattant personnel;
- b. BUYBAT Coy at Amahoro stadium;
- c. FHQ and Tunision Coy; and
- d. BUYBAT Coy at Airport.

5. Non-essential/combattant personnel.

- a. Flight 1. All civilians and those military personnel that are unarmed (UNMOs) will depart on the first available aircraft. There are 20 civilians. The CMO will determine who the first 50 UNMOS to be evacuated will be.
- b. Flight 2. The BUYBAT support platoon, less the medical team (45 personnel), 17 personnel from FHQ and

UN SECRET

UN SECRET

8 personnel from BUYBAT HQ will leave on flight 2. Priority has to be given to those personnel who are not armed.

- c. Flight 3. Equipment and stores, as determined by the C Log O.
- d. Flight 4, 5. CO BUYBAT to allocate 140 seats to his personnel from the Amahoro stadium on these two flights; this should include the remainder of Bn HQ, less 6 personnel.
- e. Flight 6. Equipment and stores, as determined by the C Log O.
- f. Flight 7. 55 personnel from BUYBAT Airport Coy with 6 personnel from the medical platoon;
- g. Flight 8. 22 UNMOs, 6 personnel from FHQ and 40 personnel from Tun Coy.
- f. Flight 9. 6 personnel from Bn HQ, 2 from the Med pl and the remaining 62 personnel from the Airport Coy.

6. It is hoped that sufficient aircrafts will be available to ship out essential stores early in the evacuation phase; if this is not the case, all stores and equipments will have to be destroyed at the airport.

ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURES

7. Any follow-on administration procedures dealing with such things as pay and allowances, documentation, travel, etc. will be handled in Nairobi.

UN SECRET

B-2

UN SECRET

ANNEX C TO  
OPO-9

SPECIFIC FOR HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION ESCORT  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TO: ALL SECTORS

RULE NO 1: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS.  
STATE B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS.

RULE NO 2: STATE OF WEAPONS.  
STATE B: WEAPON CARRIED WITH MAGAZINE CHARGED.

RULE NO 3: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT  
WITHOUT USE OF FIRE.

STATE D: OBSERVE AND REPORT, STAY IN PLACE, WARN  
AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND  
DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS.  
DEMONSTRATIVE USE OF FIRE IS AUTHORIZED.

RULE NO 4: DISARM PARAMILITARY.  
STATE B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED.  
USE OF MINIMUM FORCE.  
EVALUATE INTENT TO USE.

RULE NO 5: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS.  
STATE B: INTERVENTION BY FIRE FOR EFFECT AGAINST  
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND DESIGNATED TARGETS  
ONLY AFTER WARNING SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED AS  
PART OF THE WARNING PROCESS.

RULE NO 6: DESIGNATED AUTHORITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE  
FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED BUT WILL BE  
SPECIFIED BY:

MAN - MOVE - PREPARE - FIRE.

C-1  
UN SECRET



LEGEND

Main Route

Alternative Route




UGANDA

KAMPALA

PARC

NATION

D.E





UN SECRET

ANNEX E TO  
OPO - 9

COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS

1. SITUATION

- a. Concept of Ops. Srl 3a of OPO 9 Ref above.
- b. Att and Dets. The CCO's outfit will be in direct sp.

2. MISSION

To provide comm sp for the wdr of UNAMIR.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Gen Outline. The existing VHF comm would be used.

- b. Radios

- (1) The following nets will be estb for road convoy.

- (b) Convoy Comd Net.

- (b) Escort Net.

- (c) UNMOs Net.

- (2) The Force Comd Net would be used in case of air evac. All other nets would be closed down.

- (3) Callsign Extracts. Appendix 1.

- (4) Channel Allocation. Appendix 2.

- c. Line. CCO will ensure the existing line comm are maintained for long as possible.

E - 1 of 2

UN SECRET

UN SECRET

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings. Various nets to be estb on the issue of codeword BULLDOG.

(2) Radio Discipline. Use of radio comms should be kept as short as possible and used only for urgent operational matters.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. All users of motorolla handie talkies will ensure they carry along spare charged batteries.

b. The Signal Offr will carry a few spare radios for emergencies.

c. Apart from the key appointment holders that appear on the Road Convoy Command net, all walkies talkies will be wdr.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

a. Location

(1) See serial 5 para 9 of OPO 9 ref A.

b. Comms Cord.

(1) Signal offr.

UN SECRET

APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX E TO  
OPO 9

CALL SIGNS EXTRACTS

ROAD CONVOY COMD NET

SRL	CALL SIGN	APPT
1.	F 9	FC
2.	Z-F-9-A	ADC TO FC
3.	F-8	DFC
4.	Z-F-8-A	ADC TO DFC 5.
5	C-C-9	CONVOY COMD
6.	F-3	COO
7.	A-9	ARMED ESCORT COMD
8.	U-9	UNMOS ESCORT COMD
9.	C-9	CMO
10.	F-S-8	MO

E1 - 1

UN SECRET

UN SECRET

APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX E TO  
OPO 9

ARMED ESCORT NET

SRL	CALLSIGN	APPT
1.	A 9	COMD
2.	A 1	Leading Veh
3.	A 2	Last Veh

UNMOS NET

SRL	CALLSIGN	APPT
1.	U 9	CMO
2.	UI	First Veh
3.	U 2	Second Veh

E1 - 2

UN SECRET

UN SECRET

APPENDIX 2 TO  
ANNEX E TO  
OPO 9

RADIO NETS AND CHANNEL ALLOCATION

- |    |                                    |          |
|----|------------------------------------|----------|
| 1. | Road Convoy Comd Net               | - CH - 1 |
| 2. | Armed Escort Net                   | - CH - 2 |
| 3. | UNMOs Net                          | - CH - 3 |
| 4. | UNAMIR Comd Net(For air move only) | - CH - 7 |

E2- 1

UN SECRET



UN RESTRICTED

BRIEF FOR STAND-TO

PRACTICE ON WED 27 APR 94

1. Signal for Stand-to. HQ alarm scheme will be adopted to simulate an attack on the HQ.

2. Deployment and tasks.

a. Def Pl.

(1) Loc. Deploy in Fire posns and 3rd Floor verandahs.

(2) Tasks. Be prep to fight in def of HQ.

b. Tunisian Troop Det. Mount and be prep to fight in def of HQ.

c. Ops Staff. Remains under comd of COO. Provide umpire team for ex to be responsible for following areas.

(1) HQ Compound.

(2) Roof-top OPs/Fire posns.

(3) 3rd Floor.

d. Pers Branch. (3No)

(1) Loc. 3rd Floor front verandah.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Be prep to reinforce tps on floor.

(b) Be prep to assist rep mags for tps on floor.

e. Log Staff. (3No)

(1) Loc. 3rd Floor rear verandah.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Be prep to reinforce tps on floor.

(b) Be prep to rep mags for tps on floor.

f. Plans Staff. (2No)

(1) Loc. Ground floor.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Cas collection and first aid in comms section area.

UN RESTRICTED

UNRESTRICTED

(b) Be prep to fight in self-defence.

g. Humanitarian Staff.

(1) Loc. Ground floor.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Cas collection from front area of building and first aid treatment.

(b) Be prep to fight in self-defence.

h. MILOBS

(1) Loc. 2nd Floor verandahs.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Be prep to fight in self-defence.

(b) Be prep to assist with cas collection and first aid.

i. Civilian Staff.

(1) Loc. Ground floor.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Maint comm links.

(b) Be prep to assist with cas collection and first aid treatment.

3. Debrief. Debrief will be conducted at reception area by Umpire team.

Camp Comdt

UN RESTRICTED

CNR - 161 P1/3

CNR 162

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1994 APR 26 P 10:30

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 26 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: 1309

*[Handwritten signature]*

1. As previously discussed, attached <sup>is</sup> Guld Abdallah's sitrep 027 of 26 April 1994 which provides information on latest events in Burundi.
2. On a parallel development, the UN Security Coordinator has instructed all UN agencies and programmes to relocate staff dependents out of Burundi.

Best regards.

①

②  
*[Handwritten initials and signature]*

UNAMIR

1994 APR 27 14:18

FC

SRS G



CNR - 161 P2/3

UNAMIR

184 APR 27 14 (32) OUTGOING FAX

~~7/17/82~~

DATE: 26.4.94

Ref BU/ORG/0161

TO: MR. MARRACK GOULDING USG/DPA UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH RSSG BUJUMBURA <i>AOA</i>
FAX No: 1-212-963 50 65	FAX No: (257) 21 28 68 (office) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 22 52 22 (hotel)
ATTN:	CC: MR. K. ANNAN 1-212-963 92 22 MR. H. KITANNI 1-212-963 21 55
SUBJECT: SITREP No 027/94	No OF PAGES: 2

1. Chaos in Rwanda continues to weight heavily on situation in Burundi as the two ethnic groups Hutu/Tutsi are following closely what is happening up there to their kins. The most dramatic consequence was Sunday night (early Monday morning) coup attempt in Bujumbura. Aware of unorthodox contacts within civilian and military activist circles (see SITREP No 25/94) we were not surprised when told, on Sunday 2:00 p.m. (8:00 a.m. New York time), of a coup planned for Tuesday night. Obviously Tuesday night was given to deceive authorities as the true date was set for Sunday night. Early afternoon that day two junior army officers from military Academy were arrested. Their interrogation provided sufficient proof of a plot already in motion whose immediate objective was to neutralize interim President, Minister of Defence and Army Chief of Staff. It was thus urgent to try to provide safe shelter in particular for interim President who had contacted me to that effect. I called NY UN Headquarters at 3:00 p.m. (9:00 a.m. NY time) to report on this situation and to inform on the need to get safe haven for interim President. I also added that the mission, in cooperation especially with French and US embassies, will try to help avert the coup... For the time being!
2. Army Chief of Staff and top aids played certainly a crucial role in aborting the coup. But the question remains what next? What to do to prevent an other attempt this week or next, etc.? How to ensure that security, especially in the capital, is addressed not only for foreign residents but also for Burundese? Sunday coup attempt involved mostly officers from military Academy/ISCAM and Gendarmerie. Only four officers were arrested in connection to Sunday coup and none of higher level (Majors, Lieutenant-colonels) when it is known around town that key officers in key positions were actively involved or at least fully aware of what was going on. We were told that a few were interrogated. Not surprisingly only two to three members of the coup civilian branch were arrested when it is known that a large number of politicians engineered or at least encouraged the plot as many did on 21st October 1993.

*FC* *SRSG*

CNR - 161 P3/3

2.

Despite coup failure situation remains tense though the city is calm and busy as in normal days. Security issues, in particular disarmament of northern neighbourhood, are again the problem as if it were to divert attention from Sunday coup. We spent the whole Monday addressing issues concerning the coup and security. In particular the mission organized an informal meeting for two delegates of northern neighbourhood, five army officers, the Head of internal security and a former Primer Minister to discuss disarmament of civilians. Participants agreed to: stop shootings (a sort of truce between Hutu activists and army requested by the Government to disarm them); free for traffic main roads in these neighbourhoods; start giving up arms and ammunitions Wednesday morning and provide population with emergency assistance. This agreement reached late last night has not been yet fully implemented. It seems that extremists among activist groups have not accepted terms of the agreement. Consequently, tension has risen in town as army, after postponing the deadline for disarming civilians by leaving from Sunday at 5:00 p.m. to Monday and Tuesday could be tempted to go ahead. We are calling for patience and further delays.

Today tension coming after yesterday tension following coup attempt is not propice to foreign residents presence in Burundi. It is accelerating their departure from the country. Western nationals continue to leave by small groups (spouses, children and none necessary staff). More than 100 Chinese experts left on chartered plane for Addis Ababa and China. Accelerated departure of foreign residents could further accelerate destabilization of the country. To address these departures and their consequences on stability, the mission convened two separate meetings last Thursday and yesterday with foreign and national businessmen respectively, drawing their attention on the gravity of the situation and the need for them to be actively involved in calming down the atmosphere and advising patience and dialogue. We even organized a successful "Cross for life and peace" Sunday morning intended primarily to bring hope and encouragements to all.

Once again relationships between Burundi and Rwanda have proven their eloneness. Chaos in Rwanda and killings of innocent Tutsis and moderate Hutus could have an impact on relations between Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi. While refugees arriving from North, about 15 000 Tutsis fleeing massacres and 40 000 Burundi October 1993 refugees (Hutus) have not suffered from Hutu activists or army uncontrolled elements, it is the political dimension of the ethnic conflict that constitutes major and immediate concern. Presidential succession in Burundi and ambitions related to it are adding to the concerns.

A. Ould Abdallah  
SRSG - Burundi  
26 April 1994



CNR - 160 P1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CNR 161

REC'D APR 26 P 10 30

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK.  
DATE: 26 April 1994  
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1308  
SUBJECT: RPF letter

*[Handwritten signature]*

Please find attached copy of a self-explanatory letter addressed to the President of the Security Council today by the RPF representative in New York. Regards.

UNAMIR

194 APR 27 14 18

①  
②  
Dre  
Jito  
*[Handwritten signature]*  
PC  
27/4

FC

SRSG

CNR - 160 P2/3

R  
P  
F**FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS**  
**RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT**F  
P  
R

New York, 26 April 1994

H.E. Ambassador Colin Keating  
President of the UN Security Council  
United Nations  
New York

**GENOCIDE IN RWANDA**

When the institution of the United Nations was created after the second World War, one of its fundamental objectives was to see to it that what happened to the Jews in Nazi Germany would never happen again. Today, in Rwanda, we are witnessing the implementation of a carefully planned campaign to exterminate the Tutsi ethnic group. Mr. President, the mass killings of Rwandan tutsi for no reason other than their ethnicity is genocide. The International Community, under the Genocide Convention, is obliged to suppress and punish genocide. The perpetrators of this horrendous crime are the Rwandan Army, particularly the Presidential guard and the MRND-CDR militia. The names of those who are responsible for planning and implementing this heinous plan are known; they include senior officers of the Rwandan Army as well as the Extremist Hutu Politicians of the so called interim government. These should be denounced, arrested and brought to justice.

Mr. President, the UN Security Council, in the past weeks, has put more emphasis on obtaining a ceasefire between the RPF and the Rwandese Army. Allow me to point out that casualties of actual combat between RPF and RGF are insignificant compared to those of thousands of innocent Tutsi children, women and men slaughtered by the Rwandan Army. Furthermore the Rwandan Army, instead of bombing clearly known positions of RPF, it has shelled hospitals, and stadiums full of innocent civilians in Kigali and has gone as far as massacring patients and humanitarian staff and other innocent people in Butare, a town hundreds of miles away from the combat zone. It is clear, therefore, that the Rwandan Army's objective is not to win the war with the RPF, but to exterminate a people. We appeal to the Security Council to focus more on efforts to stop genocide and to support efforts of those who seek to stop this insanity and restore law and order in Rwanda. To this end, we appeal to the International Community to increase humanitarian aid and we appeal once again to the Security Council to condemn those responsible, order them to halt the carnage, and set up a war crimes tribunal to try those responsible for atrocities in Rwanda.

/...

CNR - 160 P3/3


-2-

Mr. President, the media and some in the International Community have endeavored to present the tragic events in Rwanda as a tribal war. How can we talk of a tribal conflict when we have not seen or heard of incidents where Tutsi people have risen up with machetes to slaughter Hutus or incidents where innocent people have died defending themselves against the extremist Hutu Rwandan Army and Militia? To justify the theory of a tribal conflict some have tried to characterize the RPF as a Tutsi organisation. Whereas the Rwandan Army is a purely Hutu Army recruited solely from late President Habyarimana's home province, The Rwandese Patriotic Front not only has Hutu, Tutsi, Twa in its ranks but it has Rwandese from all regions in the Country. The RPF is a national organisation with a democratic agenda and it welcomes all Rwandese irrespective of their ethnic or regional origin who share its political ideals.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the simple and innocent Rwandan children, women and men look to the International Community to protect them from a band of Hutu extremists that has gone insane. It will, in itself, be a crime for the civilised International Community to fold its arms and watch a systematic extermination of a people.

Trusting that you will transmit our appeal to members of the Security Council, please accept my highest regards.

Yours sincerely,



Claude Dusaidi  
Director of External Relations and,  
Rwandese Patriotic Front at the UN

CC: Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali  
The UN Secretary General

All missions at the UN

UNAMIR

CNR - 157 P1/3

194 APR 27 14 1091

CNR 158

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 26 April 1994  
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1305  
SUBJECT: AFP news item

*[Handwritten signature]*

1994 APR 26 P 10 30

①  
②  
DRC  
note  
and return  
re  
27/4

1. Attached is a news item from Agence France Presse (AFP) dated today in which RPF Secretary-General Theogene Rudasingwa is quoted extensively. You will note that Rudasingwa is reported as having called for the resignation of the SRSG.
2. We would appreciate it if you would bring this matter to the attention of the RPF leadership tomorrow and request clarifications of their views and position. You should stress that we cannot accept that the impartiality of the SRSG be questioned and ask the RPF to retract this statement. You should also point out that such statements can only undermine the current efforts of the United Nations to assist in the restoration of peace in Rwanda.
3. We have tried to reach the SRSG in Nairobi, but were unable to get through to him. Grateful you contact him asap to inform him of this development and discuss with him whether it would not be preferable for him, under the present circumstances, to delay his return to Kigali for a few days. Many thanks and regards.

FC

SRSG



CNR - 157 P2/3

10272tm--p

u.i.. Rwanda-ceasefire sched 04-26 0686

Rebels accuse Rwandan government troops of violating ceasefire  
(RECASTS with details from Geneva and Burundi)  
By David Chazan

NAIROBI, April 26 (AFP) - Rwandan rebels Tuesday accused government forces of ignoring a ceasefire and continuing its slaughter of civilians which, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, has already cost 100,000 lives.

Meanwhile, a spokesman for the UN assistance mission in Rwanda, Abdul Kabia, said firing in and around the Kigali hills had decreased in intensity Tuesday compared to the previous day.

At least 100,000 people have been killed in the ongoing Rwandan massacres over the past three weeks, according to Rene-Luc Thevoz, a spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva.

"It's very difficult to have a clear picture of what is going on, but one can speak of 100,000 dead at least," he said.

And the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said Kigali was threatened with an outbreak of disease because of rotting bodies littering the streets following the ethnic carnage opposing the majority Hutus to the minority Tutsis.

Meanwhile, mainly Tutsi rebels from the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) Tuesday called for the resignation of UN special envoy Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, whom they accuse of backing the interim government which they do not recognise.

"We want him to pack his bags and go," said Theogene Rudasingwa, the RPF secretary-general, which now claims to control about half of the country.

"This man is partly responsible for the breakdown in law and order".

"As of Tuesday morning, government troops were shelling our positions," Rudasingwa told a news conference in the Kenyan capital Nairobi.

Rudasingwa pledged that the rebels would anyway observe a 96-hour "grace period" from the start of the ceasefire at midnight Monday before resuming full-scale military operations.

But "the other side has not respected the ceasefire," he said. "Not only have they continued to attack our positions, they have also failed to stop the killings of innocent civilians."

The unilateral ceasefire declared by the RPF followed unsuccessful efforts by the UN, the Organisation of African Unity and Tanzania to bring the rebels to the negotiating table with the Hutu-dominated government.

"As far as we are concerned there is no interim government. There is a cocktail of killers and we are simply not going to meet them because they are a band of killers," Rudasingwa said.

He said the holocaust would end if the "government forces are adequately defeated."

The rebels had declared a ceasefire to demonstrate goodwill but warned that it was "the last chance" for the government forces to reach a peaceful settlement, he said.

The interim government was proclaimed after President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed in a suspicious April 6 plane crash that plunged the country into frenzied bloodletting.

The presidential guard, which accused the rebels of shooting down Habyarimana's plane, spearheaded massacres of Tutsis and opposition figures as RPF rebels marched on Kigali and gained ground against government forces in northern and eastern Rwanda.



CNR - 157 P3/3

Rudasingwa renewed the rebel call for an international tribunal to be formed to investigate the genocide in Rwanda and "punish those responsible."

He said some Rwandans guilty of "crimes against humanity and war crimes" had already fled Rwanda, but vowed that the RPF would pursue and bring them to justice, "even if it takes 100 years."

He said many Rwandans wanted to flee the country to join a massive refugee exodus to neighbouring countries, but were being prevented from crossing the borders by government forces.

The fighting has prevented aid workers from travelling around the country, but Rudasingwa invited relief agencies to come into the rebel-held north and east via Uganda. "The situation is very grave," he said.

The UNHCR in Geneva said it was getting reports from non-governmental organizations and local authorities of killings "all over the country".

dc/fc AFP AFP 261605 GMT 04 94

TO: FC

FROM: Log Base

DATE: 26 April 1994

SUBJECT: LOG BASE PROGRESS AND AIRPORT SECURITY

1. Progress towards establishing a log base at the airport has been very slow. The following observations have been made over the past few days concerning the unit providing the support group which, if not addressed, may jeopardize the establishment of an efficient and effective log base;


- a. lack of organization to set work parties;
- b. inadequate control of personnel and inefficient use of time;
- c. sense of urgency is lacking;
- d. lack of coordination and cooperation between the support group and the battalion; and
- e. inability to establish priorities.


2. It has also been noted that the directive to heighten security has failed to reach a level commensurate with the threat. At the moment the bunker and the observation posts have not been re-enforced and do not provide the required protection. Furthermore, perimeter security and access control to the airport are inadequate and not consistently present.

3. The above points have been raised at various levels of command but have had little effect.

4. Respectfully submitted for your consideration.

②  
DRC  
I have visited the  
airport and given  
firm direction to Co BYUBA.  
COO is putting some of these  
points on order today. I request  
your personal contact with Co  
in these matters.

  
R.J. Read  
LCdr

  
21/4

UNAMIR COMMAND NET (CHANNEL 7)

ALTERNATE CHANNEL - 14  
EFFECTIVE 250600B APR 94

SRL	CALL SIGN	APPT	IDENTITY
1.	F-99	SRSG	DR R BOOH-BOOH
2.	F-9	FC	MAJ GEN DALLAIRE
3.	ZF-9	A/AMA TO FC	MAJ BEARDSLEY
4.	ZF-9-A	ADC TO FC	CAPT BABACAR
5.	F8	DFC/COS	BRIG HK ANYIDHO
6.	ZF-8	MA TO DFC	LT CDR ZOWONOO
7.	ZF-8-A	ADC TO DFC	CAPT NSIAH
8.	F-7	C PLANS	
9.	F-7-8	SO PLANS	MAJ MACZKA
10.	F-6	SIG OFFR	CAPT ACHEAMPONG
11.	F-S-9	OC FORCE SP GP	CAPT MANU
12.	F-S-8	MO	CAPT EWUSI
13.	F-4	CHIEF LOG OFFR	LT COL NYAAKU
14.	F-4-8	DCLOGO	MAJ PLANTE
15.	F-3	CHIEF OPS OFFR	COL MOEEN
16.	F-3-8	DEPUTY CHIEF OPS	MAJ QUIST
17.	F-3-1	SNR DUTY OFFR	MAJ NAZMUL
18.	F-2	MIO	CAPT DEME
19.	F-1	CMPO	MAJ BUSSIÈRE
20.	F-18	DCMPO	MAJ SENCHIM
21.	F-H-9	HUMANITARIAN OFFR	COL YAACHE
22.	F-0	OPS ROOM	DUTY OFFR
23.	RED CROSS	ICRC TEAM LEADER	
24.	F-3-H	CASO	SON LDR MOTAEB
25.	MAMA PAPA-0	BASE STATION	MAJ MACNIEL
26.	MAMA PAPA-1	MIL HUMANITARIAN OPS	
27.	MAMA PAPA-2	ATT CIV HUM ORG (LESS RED CROSS	

MILOB GP NET CHANNEL -12

ALTERNATE CHANNEL - 14

EFFECTIVE 250600B APR 94

SRL	CALL SIGN	APPT	IDENTITY
1.	C-9	CMO	COL TIKOKA
2.	Z-C-9	ADC TO CMO	CAPT ALHASSAN
3.	C-8	DCMO	LT COL GANA SECK
4.	C-5	CLO	LT COL DOUMBIA
5.	F-9-A(1 - 4)	RGF LO	MAJ MOIGNY
6.	CL-1	RPF LO	MAJ BRAUN
7.	C-3-A	LO (FC)	
8.	F-L-O-1(1-2)	AIRPOPRT LO	CAPT OLESSONGO/CAPT CHERIF
9.	C-L-2	SRSG LO	CAPT ILOKIO
10.	C-4	CLOGO	MAJ TRAORE
11.	C-3	COO	LT COL ILIYA
12.	C-3-8	DCOO	MAJ BABACAR
13.	C-0	OPS ROOM	DUTY OFFR
14.	C-A-0	RGF SECTOR TEAM	OPS ROOM
15.	C-A-9	COMD RPF SECT TEAM	LT COL MASANGAN

BYUBAT CHANNEL - 9

ALTERNATE CHANNEL - 14  
EFFECTIVE 250600B APR 94

SRL	CALL SIGN	APPT	IDENTITY
1.	G-9	CO	LT COL ADINKRA
2.	G-3	OPS OFFR	MAJ AYITOR ✓
3,	G-19	OC A COY (AMAHORO)	CAPT IDDI
4.	G-29	OC B COY (KIA)	CAPT ADOKOR
5.	G-0	OPS ROOM	DUTY OFFR

TUNISIAN PL (+) - CHANNEL 9

ALTERNATE CHANNEL - 14  
EFFECTIVE 250600B APR 94

SRL	CALL SIGN	APPT	IDENTITY
1.	T-9	DET COMD	MAJ BEL GASSEM
2.	T-3	PL COMD FORCE HQ	CAPT HABIB
3.	T- 31-34	4xAPCs FOR ESCORT	



## UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

### MEMORANDUM

**TO:** DISTRIBUTION LIST

**FROM:** C LOG O

**CC:**

**DATE:** 24 APR 94

**RECORD:**

**SUBJECT:** ALLOCATION OF UNAMIR VEHICLES

**REF:** UNAMIR OPS BRANCH OF 23 APR 94

---

1. In view of the reduction of the UNAMIR forces, it has become imperative to redistribute our vehicles in order to enhance the efficient operations of the various component of the Mission.
2. In this regard, the Log Branch will conduct an exercise with the aim of identifying each vehicle still in UNAMIR.
3. To begin, the Log Branch urgently requires that the Vehicle Control Sheet attached to this Memo be thoroughly filled out by each addressee. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that some vehicles have simply been abandoned within your Area Of Responsibility (AOR), we urge you to complete the form with the utmost accuracy. For operational and emergency reasons, we must also know the number of qualified drivers that you have in your

unit for each type of vehicles and more specifically the heavy trucks.


4. The vehicles abandoned within **your** AOR and for which you do not have the keys will be rendered unserviceable and assembled in the areas outlined by the FC. (Commanders are reminded of the need to properly identify the "part(s)", such as the Injection Pump, which will be removed - while keeping in mind that we could very well have to use those vehicles, at a later date.

5. Completed Vehicle Control Sheets must be handed back (by hand) to the Log Tpt Offr at the FC meeting of 2000 hrs, 25 Apr 94. Moreover, for the FC's meeting of the morning of 27 Apr, we will require a complete list, by UN Number, of all vehicles in your AOR. This list will include all serviceable vehicles and a short explanation for those non serviceable.

6. At the FC's briefing of 28 Apr 94, you will also be required to produce the means by which your vehicles are being maintained. Needless to say that more than ever now, adequate time must be devoted to maintain each vehicle. Daily Morning Maintenance Parade must be conducted by all drivers and the Vehicle Log Book annotated to that effect. Each driver, regardless of his rank and/or position, must be held accountable for his vehicle.

7. Within the next few days, the Log Tpt Offr, will visit each one of you and assist/report on the condition of your respective vehicle fleet.

8. Your cooperation is appreciated and I trust that everyone will do his share to get our vehicle pool "back on its feet/wheels".

  
J-C Plante  
Maj  
For C Log O

#### DISTRIBUTION LIST

##### ACTION

Comdt Buybat  
Comdt Tun Coy  
CMO  
Comdt Med Base  
Force HQ (Camp Cmdt)  
OIC Log Base (Airport)

##### INFO

FC  
DFC  
CAO  
COO  
CMPO

UNAMIR

# VEHICLE CONTROL SHEET

as of .....Apr 94

[illegible]

UN RESTRICTED

1000.5/HQ COMDT/A

24 April 1994

To: See Distribution

From: Camp Commandant

Subject: UNAMIR HQ CAMP STANDING INSTRUCTIONS

1. Please find attached a copy of UNAMIR HQ Camp Standing Instructions for your information and retention.
2. I am to request you to publish the contents of the document for the information of all under command. Thank you.



A ANNAN  
Maj  
Camp Comdt

Distribution:

At

TO: 311-11

MILOB GP HQ  
Ops Branch  
Pers Branch  
Log Branch  
Plans Section  
Humanitarian Section

Information:

FC  
DFC  
CAO



UN RESTRICTED

## UNAMIR HQ CAMP STANDING INSTRUCTIONS

### GENERAL

1. The instructions that follow are intended to ensure that all staff of UNAMIR HQ and other personnel who need to carry out duties in this HQ are fully aware of the barest minimum acceptable standard of comportment required. The instructions are also to help create an orderly atmosphere within which the HQ can best function.

### DISCIPLINE

2. Responsibility. All staff are expected to exercise self-discipline in the discharge of their duties or as it affects the duties, functions or privileges of other colleagues in the mission. Personnel are to be generally guided by existing UNAMIR SOPs or other instructions as may from time to time be issued by the HQ or Contingent Senior National Officers.

3. Avoidance of Noise. While radios and tape recorders may be used for general entertainment, they should in no way create a nuisance to other staff members. Loud conversations and unnecessary shouting in the corridors or offices is also to be avoided.

Paying of Compliments. It is only customary for all military personnel to pay compliments in the proper fashion to their superiors. This custom is to be adhered to by all and be extended to members of the civilian staff. This should promote a spirit of understanding and co-operation among the HQ staff. It is the responsibility of each individual to be familiar with the various national badges of rank and to know who is who at the HQ.

5. Dressing. While on duty all military personnel will be in the approved uniform with UN arm-bands and headgear. Off-duty personnel may wear mufti and shall be decently dressed for any function at which their presence is required.

### SECURITY

6. Responsibility. The security of the camp and the safety of every individual is the responsibility of all.

7. Alertness. Military personnel are to be alert at all times and be extra vigilant in times of hostilities or imminent threat to the HQ or the person of any member of the staff.

8. Strangers. Suspicious movements or presence of unknown persons in and around the HQ compound are to be reported promptly to Camp HQ for appropriate action.

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

9. Packages. Suspicious objects or packages found in the compound are to be reported. In this regard it is prohibited to leave brief cases, boxes or parcels in alleys, corridors, toilets or other unusual places.

FIRE PREVENTION

10. Fire prevention in the camp is of utmost importance for the safety of personnel, stores and equipment at the HQ. Each individual is to make a conscious effort to prevent fires.

11. Electrical Equipment. Electrical appliances, fittings or electronic equipment should always be checked to ascertain their serviceability status.

12. Waste Disposal by Fire. Fire may be set to thrash only out of doors in areas designated for such purposes.

13. Smoking. Smoking is permitted in the offices or out of doors. However, smokers are to use ash trays provided for odds and ends.

USE OF CAR PARKS

14. Long-term Parking. The car park behind the HQ building is designated LONG-TERM CAR PARK. This will be used by staff for any duration which is beyond 15 minutes. Vehicles which are unlikely to be moved for any number of days should also be parked in this area.

15. Special Parking Area. The car park in front of the HQ building is for the use of OPS Branch senior staff cars, duty vehicles and where there is vacant space, by any UNAMIR vehicle which will be moved in less than 15 minutes. Special parking lots reserved for FC, DFC, CAO or other distinguished personalities will not be trespassed.

16. Loading Area. The middle area in the front car park may only be used for loading, off-loading and turning round. Vehicles found parked in this area will attract an appropriate sanction to the branch, unit or department to which the vehicle has been assigned.

SANITATION

17. Cleanliness of the HQ environment is essential to keep the health of all and therefore maintain the effectiveness and efficiency of the staff of the HQ.


18. Use of Thrash Containers. The HQ compound is to be devoid of all thrash. All are required to deposit unwanted material in the bins and baskets provided in the offices and corridors. The refuse container and pit located near the communication section offices may also be used.

UN RESTRICTED

UNRESTRICTED

19. In-door Toilets. The toilets in offices are to be maintained in good condition at all times. During periods of water shortage it is incumbent upon individuals to obtain water by other means for the system. Periodic inspections will be undertaken by Camp Commandant to ensure compliance with this instruction.

20. Pit-latrines. The pit-latrines provided near the satellite dish antenna will also be used when there is water shortage. The deposit of used toilet paper, sticks and empty water bottles in the open spaces around the toilets is forbidden.



R A DALLAIRE  
Major-General  
Force Commander

UN RESTRICTED



UN RESTRICTED

1000.5/HQ COMDT/G  
28 April 1994

To: See Distribution

From: Camp Comdt

Subject: UNAMIR HQ ALARM SCHEME

1. In view of the possibility of shells falling on this HQ, it is decided to adopt an alarm scheme to ensure that all personnel take appropriate action in case of such an event.

2. Please find below action to be taken by personnel who may find themselves in various locations during attacks.

- a. Personnel in offices and corridors. Move to reception and remain there until all clear sign is given.
- b. Personnel Outside Building. Dash to the nearest firing position or move into the reception and remain there until all clear sign is given.
- c. Personnel in Opsroom. Move to reception via the cafeteria with comm gear to monitor situation and give necessary direction.
- d. Sentries. Remain or move into firing positions with overhead protection and observe.

3. The first practice of the alarm scheme will take place at 231700 B APR 94. Shelling on the camp will be simulated by several long whistle blasts. The end of the exercise will be marked by several short whistle blasts. (1)

4. Further details of the alarm scheme will be posted at vantage points in due course for all to read.

5. Addressees are requested to bring the contents of this letter to the notice of all under command.



A ANNAN  
Maj  
Camp Comdt



UN RESTRICTED

Distribution:

Action:

MILOB GP HQ  
Ops Branch  
Pers Branch  
Plans Section  
Log Branch  
Humanitarian Section  
Def Pl

Information:

FC  
DFC  
CAO

Note

(1) In the absence of a suitable whistle a NISSAN pick-up horn will be used instead.

23 Apr 94

3000.10(OPS)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: DECISIONS TAKEN DURING CONF ON 230700 APR 94

Reference:

A. Operation Order No. 7 dated 22 Apr 94.

1. Following decisions were taken during Morning Prayers Conf on 230700 Apr 94:

a. 65 UNMOs will stay in Rwanda instead of 61.

b. BYUBAT is authorised to keep additional 30 persons in addition to the manpower given in ref A. Out of these 30 persons, maximum should be truck drivers. BYUBAT to get control of all trucks and be ready to utilise them for refugee evacuation and transportation of relief good/food from KIA.

c. Tun Coy to immediately takeover 4 x APCs from BYUBAT.

d. Defence of UN Installations.

(1) Force HQ. Following to be ensured by Camp Commandant:

(a) Entrance of the building to be protected by sand bags.

(b) A bomb shelter to be made in the building, preferably in the Main Hall.

(c) Shell attack drill to be practised.

(d) The height of sentry posts to be reduced and strengthened. Over head protection needs improvement.

(2) KIA and Amahoro Stadium

(a) Defences to be fortified.

(b) Ensure protection of UN vehs and materials around the place.

(c) Dig trenches around the camp.

e. Abandoned Vehicles and Equipments. BYUBAT, Tun Coy and Camp Commandant of Force HQ to collect all abundant *abandoned*

vehs and eqpts and handover to Inf Coy, Ghana located at Amahoro Stadium. C Log O will coord.

f. MILOBs at Meridien Hotel. MILOBs staying at Meridien Hotel will stay at the Hotel till 241600 Apr 94 and then shift to Amahoro Stadium.

g. Alternative Communication. Communication Section will test all the alternative international communication system. Minimum 5 international lines to be fixed. Communication Section is requested to inform COO after it has been fixed. A trial exercise will be carried out by COO or his representative.

h. Face Lifting/Cleaning Up Operation. As troops are thinning out, the UN installations need to be cleaned. Water may be brought from Meridien Hotel for cleaning purpose. C Log O to see the feasibility of bringing water from Meridien and pump it to the water tank of Force HQ.



MOEEN UDDIN AHMED  
Colonel  
For Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MILOB GP HQ  
BYUBAT  
Tun Coy  
Force Log Base  
Communication Section

Information:

Internal:

FC  
DFC  
CAO  
CMPO  
C Log O  
Commandant, Force HQ

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR HQ  
AMAHORO  
Kigali

WEL/2000.3/MISC

22 Apr 94

See Distribution

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF FUNDS

Reference:

A. 031/GS/02/94 dated 08 February 1994.

1. This is to certify that Maj Cooper-Glawu the out-going Military Welfare Officer has handed over the under-listed amount and receipts to Maj Patrick Senchim, the ACMPO, on the 22 April 1994 as a result of my departure from the mission area:

- |    |   |                       |
|----|---|-----------------------|
| a. | Cash on hand                              | - 11,660.00FRW.       |
| b. | Receipt (Printing of Jersey Numbers)      | - 9,240.00 FRW.       |
| c. | Receipt Misc (Attached)                   | - 1,100.00 FRW.       |
| d. | Misc Expenses:                            |                       |
|    | (1) Deposit for 6 x Crates of Soft Drinks | - 4,500.00 FRW        |
|    | (2) Deposit for Empty bottles             | - 2,300.00 FRW        |
|    | Total                                     | - <u>28,800.00FRW</u> |

UN RESTRICTED




UN RESTRICTED

Date... 22 April 94

Signature..... 

( MAJ COOPER-GLAWU ) (UNID-0071)  
Out-going Welfare Officer

Date... 22 APRIL 94

Signature..... 

(MAJ PATRICK SENCHIM) (UNID 0073)  
Officer Taking-over

Distribution:

External:

Action:

ACMPO

Information:

CGSO (Attn Mr N Beaudin)

Internal:

Information:

DFC/COS ←

CMPO

UN RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO  
WEL/2000.3MISC  
DATED 22 APR 94

OUTSTANDING WELFARE JOBS

1. Please take follow-up action on the following:

a. UN Medals, Ribbons and Certificates.

b. Sports Certificates and Trophies.

( Contact, Manager, COREC, Box 1105, Kigali ) *Jank*

c. Collection of 12 Tee- Sports Tee-Shirts. *Jank*

( From same address above )

2. Quantity 12 x Sports Shorts are also being handed over to you.

UN RESTRICTED

# UNAMIR KIGALI RWANDA

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO : EMERY BRUSSET/NAIROBI	FROM : DALLAIRE/UNAMIR/KIGALI
OUT GOING FAX NO:	DATE : 22 APRIL 1994
ATTN : LANCE CLARK	PHONE :
FAX NO : 254-2-210675	FAX NO : 250-84271
INFO:	DRAFTER : MAJ. PAZIK FILE REF :
SUBJECT : HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SITUATION IN KIGALI	

1. SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS - FIND ATTACHED LETTERS FROM REFUGEES.
2. SITUATION ON THE SOUTH OF RWANDA - SEE ATTACHED INTERVIEW WITH THREE MISSIONARIES FROM GITARAMA.
3. RESCUE MISSIONS - PLEASE ADVISE TO ALL AGENCIES REQUESTING EVACUATION OF RWANDAISE CITIZENS THAT THEY MUST SEND US FAXES ENSURING THAT THE PERSON EVACUATED WILL RECEIVE THE REFUGEE STATUS IN RESPECTIVE COUNTRY. A VISA AND A PASSPORT MUST WAIT FOR THOSE PEOPLE IN NAIROBI. **TODAY KENYAN AUTHORITIES HAS RETURNED TO RWANDA 47 REFUGEES EVACUATED BY UNAMIR.** EACH RESCUE MISSION POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO LIVES OF UNAMIR SOLDIERS AND PERSONS BEING EVACUATED. OUR EFFORTS CANNOT BE WASTED IN SUCH A WAY. ADDITIONALLY WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT RWANDAISE REFUGEES IN KENYA ARE PUT IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS WHERE CONDITIONS ARE MUCH WORSE THAT IN UNAMIR CAMPS. PLEASE INSPECT CAMPS IN KENYA IN COOPERATION WITH UNHCR.
4. ZAIRIAN REFUGEES - TODAY UNAMIR WAS VISITED BY MR VINCENT KEANE THE REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER (EAST AFRICA) FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION IN NAIROBI (TEL. 340295, FAX 333987). HE TOOK AVAILABLE LISTS OF ZAIRIAN REFUGEES AND PROMISED TO CONTACT ZAIRIAN AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND ESCORTS FROM RGF SIDE. DO YOU HAVE CONTACT WITH HIM? AT 2100 HRS KIGALI TIME MS RIVERO INFORMED US THAT THE PROBLEM OF ZAIRIAN REFUGEES WILL BE SOLVED WITH COOPERATION FROM UNHCR SIDE.
5. PLEASE SEND US MORE HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES. WE CAN DELIVER THEM AND DISTRIBUTE IN OUR CAMPS. WE MUST KNOW ON WHICH FLIGHT AND WHAT KIND OF CARGO IS COMING. FC TRIES TO HELP YOU WITH THE ACCESS TO CANADIAN AIRPLANES BUT PLASE USE ALSO YOUR INFLUENCE IN NEW YORK TO PUSH THAT ISSUE.

6. UNAMIR WILL CONTINUE THINNIG OUT OF ITS FORCES. MAJ PAZIK WILL TALK IN THE MORNING 22 APR WITH RPF AUTHORITIES HOW TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN AREAS ABANDONED BY UNAMIR. THE SECURITY OF CAMPS IN MERIDIEN HOTEL, KING FAYCAL HOSPITAL AND AMAHORO STADIUM WILL BE TAKEN OVER BY RPF.

7. FC IS GOING TO MEET RWANDAISE GOVERNMENT IN GITARAMA ON 22 APR 1994. WE EXPECT SOME SUCCESS ON HUMANITARIAN SIDE DURING FACE TO FACE TALKS. DFC IS LEAVING FOR ARUSHA THE SAME DAY AND WILL INTRODUCE A PACKET OF HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION TO BOTH PARTIES.

8. NO CHANGES IN THE AIRPORT STATUS AND NOTHING HEARD ABOUT PROPOSED BY UNAMIR *HUMANITARIAN AGREEMENT*.

9. RGF STILL DOES NOT ALLOW US TO TRANSFER REFUGEES FROM MILLES COLLINES TO THE RPF ZONE.

10. UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CELL TELEPHONE IS OPERATIONAL AGAIN. THE NUMBER IS 1-212-963-3091. IF MAJ PAZIK IS NOT AVAILABLE PLEASE ASK FOR THE SECOND IN CHARGE MAJ STEFAN STEC.

11. REGARDS.



UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISION  
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

From : MIO

3000.9(IO)

To : FC

Through: DFC  
COO

21 Apr 94

INTERVIEW OF THREE MISSIONARIES  
FROM GITARAMA ON 20 APRIL 1994

1. The following Catholic missionaries arrived at the Force HQ from Gitarama in the south of the country on 20 April 1994:

- a. Rev Fr Luciano FONTANA (Parish priest in Commune NGENDA of Kigali Diocese. Nationality - Italian).
- b. Rev Fr Andre LERUSSE (Parish priest in Commune NYABIKENKE of Gitarama Diocese. Nationality - Belgian).
- c. Rev Sister Agnes FAVRE (Ruhuha Ngenda Health Centre in Kigali Prefecture).

2. They were escorted to Kigali jointly by UNAMIR personnel and the Gendarmerie.

3. In view of the current military and political situation prevailing in Rwanda, they were debriefed by the Military Information Cell. The following is a summary of the information they provided.

GENERAL SITUATION.

4. The general situation in the southern part of the Kigali Prefecture, the Gitarama Prefecture and the southern tip of the Ruhengeri Prefecture is said to be stable. Nonetheless, over the last two weeks or so since the death of President Habyarimana, a number of incidents reflecting the general trend in Kigali in particular have taken place in selected areas in the regions mentioned. Tutsis were specially victimised.

INCIDENTS.

5. Unconfirmed reports indicate that;

- a. A French Catholic priest (Rev Fr Andre Caloone) was killed by a soldier on 7 Apr at Kanzenze (KIGALI Prefecture).
- b. More than 200 civilians, including women and children, massacred by Interamhwe militia members at Ngenda (near the border with Burundi).
- c. On 13 Apr unspecified number of people killed near the church in Ntarabana.
- d. 54 people, including some medical doctors, in Kilinda

UNRESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

(Gitarama Prefecture) were killed sometime last week.

e. The church building at Nyange was bulldozed and the congregation inside (numbers not determined) crashed to death.

f. On 19 Apr the Petite Seminary of Zaza was burnt and the residence of the missionary in Kibungo also ransacked by unidentified persons.

REFUGEES AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION.

6. There are a number of displaced persons in Gitarama, Kabgayi and Byimana (a total of about 5/6000). In the Kabgayi seminary alone there are 1500 displaced persons. There are also about 400 persons displaced in Kanyaga and Nyabikenke.

7. Daily, thousands of people are fleeing towards the southwest and southeast from hostilities in Kigali.

8. Whereas these displaced persons may have water, they lack adequate food and medical attention. It is confirmed that no humanitarian or relief agency is operating in these areas.

9. It is however advised that humanitarian missions to the south should be escorted, jointly by UNAMIR and the Gendarmes.

SECURITY.

10. The missionaries have confirmed that there is reduced military presence in the south and that troop movement is noticed northwards towards Kigali, ostensibly to reinforce the units in the city as hostilities intensify between the government forces and the RPF forces. There are, however, a number of road blocks manned mainly by the militias.

11. It was observed that, despite confidence of civilians in the south in the government forces, soldiers in this part of the country did not seem keen to join forces with other government troops to contain the RPF onslaught to the north. This may well be the result of an apparent resentment by soldiers from the southern regions against control by their counterparts from the northern regions.

CONCLUSION.

12. Notwithstanding the current volatile and insecure situation throughout the country arising from the death of President Habyarimana on Wednesday, 6 Apr, the general situation in Gitarama and other areas in the south of the country remains stable.

13. It is nevertheless advised that attention be paid to the area since most people fleeing hostilities in Kigali are heading southwards, where already there are refugees from Burundi.

MA  
Cross-check on the  
correct figure of Colmanicus  
that left yesterday and  
also those that came  
from the DMZ.  
fji  
21/4  
DFC

DRAFT

M E S S A G E

PRIORITY

21

B APR 94

FROM: CONTICO(UNAMIR GH 1)

RESTD

TO: GHQ(COS)  
GHQ(JOPS & PLANS)

1000.7(DFC/COS)A/3

INFO: ARMY HQ

CURRENT CRISIS SITUATION IN UNAMIR (RWANDA)

REF: 1000.7(DFC/COS)2A/2 OF 191245B APR 94.

1. THINNING OUT OF UNAMIR TROOPS IN PROGRESS. FIRST BATCH OF 114 ALL RANKS OF OUR 800 MEMBER BATTALION ARRIVED IN NAIROBI PM WED 20 APR 94.
2. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FC AND UN HQ NY LAST NIGHT INDICATES UN SECURITY COUNCIL IS AGAINST PULLING OUT UNAMIR FROM RWANDA. A FORMAL WRITTEN CORRESPONDENCE IS AWAITED TO OBTAIN MORE DETAILS ON THE DECISION AND THE MODIFIED SHAPE AND ROLE OF UNAMIR.
3. THE <sup>86</sup>80 TROOPS IN THE DMZ STARTED THE JOURNEY THIS MORNING AND ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN KIGALI PM TODAY.
4. MORALE REMAINS FAIRLY HIGH AMONG ALL RANKS.

DRAFTER'S NAME	APPT	TELE
BRIG HK ANYIDOHO	DFC/COS	84265

RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE  
WITH RANK

# THINNING OUT STATE

SL	AIRCRAFT	DEP KGL	CAPACITY	RUTBAT	BYUBAT	ENGR COY	TUN COY	LOG COY	MED PL	MILOB	MOV CON	STAFF	TOTAL
1	IL 76	0800 HRS	120	-	* 116	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	116
2	L 100	0900 HRS	90	-	68	-	-	-	16	-	6	-	90
3	C 130	0930 HRS	90	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90
4	C 130	1000 HRS	90	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90
5	IL 76	1200 HRS	120	-	22	71	-	-	-	16	-	11	120
6	L 100	1500 HRS	90	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90
7	C 130	1500 HRS	90	14	-	-	-	56	-	20	-	-	90
8	C 130	1530 HRS	90	-	-	-	20	-	21	23	-	26	90
9	IL 76	1600 HRS	120	-	99	-	-	-	-	8	13	-	120
	TOTAL		900	284	305	71	20	56	37	67	19	37	896
NO OF PERS TO BE EVAC				284	393	71	20	56	37	67	19	37	984
PERS LEFT				-	88	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88

1. STR ON GROUND ON 21 APR 94 - 1566
- 
2. DVR AND 2ND SEATER - 166 (LESS BYUBAT)
3. STR TO BE LEFT BEHIND - 416
4. STR CAN BE EVAC ON 22 APR 94 - 896
5. LEFT OVER PERS - 88 (ONLY FROM BYUBAT)
- 

TOTAL= 1566

6. \* INDICATES SRSG AND HIS DELEGATIONS.




UNAMIR  
Force HQ

19 April 1994

Subject : MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU)

1. A draft MOU for establishment of UN neutral territory at Kigali International Airport (KIA) is attached herewith for your information and approval please.
2. In this regard, your meticulous and quick respond is solicited. Warm regards.

  
R. A. DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander

Distribution :

External :

Action :

RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES

RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

Internal :

Information :

SRSG  
SECTOR COMD, KIGALI SECTOR  
SECTOR COMD, DMZ SECTOR COMD

**UN RESTRICTED**

DRAFT  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
FOR  
ESTABLISHMENT OF UN NEUTRAL TERRITORY AT KIA

General

1. In light of Arusha Peace Agreement and UN Resolution 872 (1993) dated 05 Oct 93, the Secretary General (code cable 1115, 13, 13 Apr 94) has established as a condition of cautioned presence of UNAMIR in RWANDA, the requirement of establishing a UN neutral territory area in and around KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KIA).

2. The aim of establishing UN neutral area at KIA is to ensure smooth and peaceful use of KIA by the UNAMIR and international humanitarian agencies. This will allow UN to assist in the humanitarian aid and to bring UNAMIR supplies. It will also ensure no forces on or near the site and thus will avoid cross fire/shelling at KIA.

3. KIA UN neutral territory shall be established by UNAMIR and will be maintained as long as it is required and that according to mutually agreed milestones.

Responsibility

4. Kigali Sector Commander is designated for establishing KIA UN neutral Territory (KIA UNNT).

5. BYUBAT, Force Engr Coy and UN Military Observers of KIGALI Sector a force of approximately 950 persons will monitor all activities in and around KIA.

Area of Operation

6. KIA UNNT is shown on the sketch as Anx 'A'. The important landmarks demarcating the boundary are:

- a. North: Road from REMERA - RWIMBOGO upto NYARUGUNGA.
- b. South: Road from REMERA - KANOMBE GAKONI upto road bend.
- c. East: NYARUGUNGA.
- d. West: REMERA.

7. The actual boundary shall be physically reconnoitred and demarcated by the BYUBAT Battalion Commander.

UN RESTRICTED

**Definition Related to Establishment and Enforcement of KIA UNNT**

8. **Weapon**. Any lethal object which can be used to cause physical damage/harm or deterrence to an individual is a weapon. It includes fire arm (including artillery and mortars), knife, sword, bayonet, spear, baton, clubs etc.

9. **Secure Area**. An area where movement and employment of force/troops or weapon of any faction is controlled and regulated by UNAMIR forces. Enforcement of security for UNAMIR military and civilian component is also a requisite qualification of such a secured area.

10. **Check Points**. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicle and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations. These may be static or mobile.

a. **Static Check Points**. Troops are permanently located at fixed points. These will be normally on important road junctions, at entrances/exits of KIA and around airfield. A static check point is manned 24 hours a day and 7 days a week basis. It must have both radio and line communication with the base/battalion HQ.

b. **Mobile Check Points**. Static Check Points may not be enough to cover an area of operation. In such circumstances, mobile check points are necessary. It will have minimum of a section strength (10 men) with two UN vehicles. It is established at varying time and place and at irregular interval. It must have radio communication with base/battalion HQ.

c. **Reserve Force**. One coy of BYUBAT to be kept ready near terminal building to cater for any unforeseen.

11. **Road Block**. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement is called a road block. A road block must have signs regarding "Road Block" in english and local language and be clearly visible from a distance from the vehicle. No vehicles, arms and personnel of both the forces will be allowed to enter KIA UNNT.

12. **Search**. Search operation is a cause of harassment. This operation, therefore, have to be short, methodical and accurate together with correct behaviour of the soldiers carrying out search. Following principle should be employed during search operation:

a. Due care must be taken to avoid damage to vehicle or property being searched.

b. All unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found

UN RESTRICTED

are to be confiscated and receipt given to individual.

c. Personal Search. If the situation warrants, the battalion commander may authorize personal search of local civilian working at KIA. It must be carried out in dignified manner taking care not to cause any public embarrassment to the individual.

13. Area of Defence. BYUBAT will take up area defence in and around terminal building and air-field to ensure air flow and road movement. It will also counter any air threat. Details to be worked by BYUBAT Battalion Comd.

14. Patrolling. Patrolling will form an essential part of KIA UNNT operation. This will be done both by infantry battalion and UN military services.

a. Type of Patrols. There may be following types of patrols depending on the terrain and intensity of operation:

- (1) Foot patrol.
- (2) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol.
- (3) Air patrol (whenever possible)

b. Aim of Patrolling

- (1) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or truce violation.
- (2) To locate and confiscate arms, ammunition and explosives etc.
- (3) To indicate UN presence.
- (4) To provide protection to own forces in defence.
- (5) To prevent infiltration of un-wanted elements into controlled area/zone.

c. Strength. In no case a foot patrol be less than a section (10 men) and a vehicle patrol be less than two vehicles.

d. Security. Contrary to conventional patrols, security of UN patrols lies prior information about faction or parties through the LOs. However, following aspects needs consideration:

- (1) Patrol routes should be free from cross firing and hostile shelling.



UN RESTRICTED

(2) Ensure that UN signs/marks in the form of UN flag, white painted UN marked equipment and UN headgear are clearly visible during patrolling.

Pre-condition for Enforcement Plan

15. The enforcement plan of KIA UNNT will depend on fulfilment of following conditions:

- a. RGF and Gendarmerie must withdraw their troops and direct fire weapons entirely from 500 meters around the KIA. No indirect system should be closer than 1000 meters of the KIA. The area is shown on the sketch.
- b. RGF and RPF must stop shelling and firing in KIA UNNT.
- c. RGF and RPF must not use force to break through the KIA UNNT.
- d. RGF and RPF should provide their detailed deployment around KIA.
- e. Use of KIA by either of factional forces must be cleared from all three RGF, RPF and UNAMIR.
- f. Local civilians working at KIA must be allowed by both the forces to come to KIA for work.
- g. Daily monitoring is to be done by presence of UNAMIR, RGF and RPF LOs.

16. After the UN infantry battalion reinforced have been deployed in KIA area, following control measures will have to be adhered to by both RGF and RPF political/military leaders:

- a. Government forces withdraw from all static check points, piquet and guards within KIA. The process of withdrawal of RGF to start within two hours from tri-lateral decision.
- b. All forces of both the factions should stop their patrolling activities in the KIA UNNT.
- c. There will be no movement of formed units/contingents of any factional forces within 500 meters from outskirts of KIA UNNT.
- d. The Air Defence (AD) system. An air field, either guns stay but are made in-operative/no-ammunition, or guns are with ammunition. Details are attached at Anx 'B'.

UN RESTRICTED

Modus Operendi

17. UNAMIR military component i.e. infantry battalion reinforced and the military observers should at all time ensure that pre-conditions set out in the fore-going paragraphs are implements/adhered to.

18. To establish KIA UNNT and to enforce control measures, both infantry battalion and military observers of Kigali Sector should carry out following operations:

a. Establishment of Check Points. Both mobile and static check points should be established on all major road junctions, entry and exit points of KIA. Static check points must be established in the entry and exit points of KIA with sufficient strength.

b. Search. Search operation should be carried out in all mobile and static check points. It shall be done at irregular interval of time.

c. Patrolling. Elaborate patrol programme shall be prepared both by infantry and military observers to cover terminal building and air-field. Military observers shall always be accompanied by armed escorts while patrolling at night.

d. Rules of Engagement. Attached at Anx 'C'.

19. UN military observers shall constantly monitor, observe, investigate and report about:

a. RGF deployment and any changes to their already existing deployed troops/weapon systems in and around KIA UNNT.

b. Deployment and re-deployment (if any) of major weapon systems like field and anti-aircraft guns, tanks/APCs and armed helicopters etc of all factions in and around KIA.

20. Public Relation/Media Coverage. Positive public relation and correct media coverage is a major factor in the over all success of establishment and control of KIA UNNT. All concerned should state the facts to the media/press on the establishment of this very positive gesture by both sides as the importance of this national strategic target and its becoming a UN neutral territory will give hope to so many who needs this humanitarian assistance so desperately.

Conclusion

21. Establishment of KIA UNNT is vital to the success of UNAMIR operation in the neutral humanitarian and peace keeping tasks

**UN RESTRICTED**

depends on cooperation, transperncy, good communication.

22. The degree and intensity of imposing control measures, restrictions will ultimately rest on cooperation between UNAMIR military components deployed on ground and the factional armies. Utmost caution must be exercised and absolute neutrality should be maintained in handling both the opposing factions, so that no parties feel deprived or betrayed.

PROCEDURE FOR AIR TRAFFIC OPERATION  
AT KIGALI AIRPORT

1. GENERAL. Under the existing situation in Rwanda, it is felt necessary to keep the Kigali Airport usable by UN aircraft or aircraft chartered by UN or by any other aircraft that may take part for the expatriation of the different nationals and for humanitarian reasons in Rwanda. The following procedure is laid down for the safe conduct of air traffic operation to and from Kigali:

a. Arrival Procedure.

- (1) All traffic must contact Kigali HF at least 10 minutes prior to entry FIR boundary. If HF contact can not be established, then the aircraft must contact Kigali Approach as soon as possible.
- (2) Traffic coming from DARES SALAM, MOMBASA, NAIROBI and ENTEBEE will report at respective FIR boundary at assigned flight level ( FL ) given by the appropriate ATS authority.
- (3) Traffic from FIR reporting point will report 20 NM/DME from Kigali DME on VOR radial (R) 103 at or above FL 120.
- (4). Traffic from 20 NM will remain in a corridor of 05 miles width upto 08 NM / DME and report 08 NM / DME on radial 103 at or above altitude 7,500 ft for final approach.
- (5) Traffic from BURUNDI and ZAIRE will follow the existing procedure.

b. Departure Procedure.

- (1) All aircraft are to submit their flight plan as per existing procedure. If none is available at pre-flight information center, flight plan may be submitted at the tower.
- (2) All traffic towards east are to climb to FL 120 or above at or before 20 NM / DME.
- (3) All other traffic will turn right and climb to assigned level.



2. AUTHORIZATION OF FLIGHT.

- a. . Any aircraft operator intends to operate to and from KIGALI airport for any mission related to UNAMIR will apply for authorization of their flights to UNAMIR HQ.
- b. UNAMIR HQ will make necessary arrangement with RGF and RPF for safe passage of the air craft.
- c. After making necessary co-ordination between both the parties, aircraft will be authorized to operate in RWANDA.
- d. After having authorization, aircraft operators will observe the existing formalities to operate their aircraft.

Faustn

UNAMIR

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

1000.7(DFC)/A/1

To: FC

From: DFC

Date: 19 April 1994

Subject: CIVPOL - UNAMIR DEPARTURE  
FROM RWANDA

1. I have read through NY Code Cable No 1174 of 18 Apr 94 and have the following comments to make:

a. It is true that Col Brien Manfred was on leave before the current crisis started whether he was in Nairobi or elsewhere is a different matter.

(b) The UNCIVPOL of UNAMIR did not make any contact with our operations room when the crisis started. I, however, personally saw some of them at the Headquarters in the early days mixed up with our civilian staff.

(c) I did not remember seeing Col Taridonna himself at the Headquarters so he could have reported at Amahoro Stadium. However if he was in the stadium, there was no reason why he could not have communicated with us. We still have communication with Amahoro stadium. He just simply did not make the attempt. He could have used radios from RUTBAT and MILOBS in the stadium.

d. UNAMIR military did not issue instructions to UNCIVPOL to evacuate to Kigali Airport. Instead the UNCIVPOL declared that they were considered as civilians as such as soon as orders were given to the non-essential civilian staff to leave they joined in a hurry. None of them officially informed us about their departure.

(e) Col Taridonna could have still made contact with the SRSG because components in the Amahoro were and are still in contact with the SRSG.

(f) If the CAO approved their departure I don't know but I was in charge of the Headquarters at the time, UNCIVPOL left with the non-essential staff after having rated themselves as such and they did not even inform me let alone being granted permission to leave.

(g) I do not think there is any need for UNCIVPOL to return to Kigali now.

2. As for the recommendations of the report, any disciplinary action considered appropriate to let UNCIVPOL be responsible to their duties is supported.



HK ANYIDOHO  
Brig-Gen  
DFC/COS

## UN RESTRICTED

DATE: 18 APRIL 1994


TO: FORCE HQ	FROM: DMZ SECTOR HQ AIRPORT
FAX: 84265	FAX: 84265
SUBJECT: <u>SITREP 108- PERIOD FROM 170600 - 180600 APR 94.</u>	
	ORIGINATOR/ROOM NO: COL CB YAACHE, UNAMIR AIRPORT KIGALI.
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: TWO	

1. GEN SIT. TENSE WITH SPORADIC CLOSE MOR SHELLING HMG AND SMALL ARMS FIRING AROUND BYUBAT GOLF LOC.
2. FAC ACTY. THERE WAS CLOSE SPORADIC EXCHANGE OF MOR SHELLING, HMG AND SMALL ARMS FIRE BETWEEN UNIDENT AES AROUND BYUBAT GOLF LOC. CAS UNKNOWN.
3. OWN MIL OPS.
- a. FOL PERS EVAC FROM NKUMBA WITH 27 VEHS ARR KIGALI (BYUBAT GOLF LOC X MERIDIEN HOTEL) AROUND 1115 HRS:
- (1) 16 X RGF SECTOR MILOBS (MERIDIEN HOTEL).
- (2) 195 X BYUBAT PERS ]  
] BYUBAT GOLF
- (3) 6 X DMZ HQ STAFF ]
- b. FOL PERS IN DMZ YET TO BE EVAC:
- (1) KINIHIRA CAMP - 237 ALL RANKS.
- (2) NGARAMA CAMP - 85 ALL RANKS.
- c. 1 X 4 WD NO 1056 DRIVEN BY CAPT KWEIFIO-OKAI OF FHQ WAS FIRED ON IN GENDARMIE/RGF CON AREA NEAR SONATUBE IN KICUKIRO AT ABOUT 0930 HRS. B 4581 L/CPL AZUMAH ALI, OCCUPANT OF VEH WAS INJURED IN THE RIGHT THIGH. CAS EVAC TO UNAMIR FD HOSP. ACCIDENT VEH NOW LOC IN BYUBAT GOLF COMPOUND.
- d. RICOCHET OF .50 INS BROWNG RD FIRED INTO BYUBAT GOLF COMPOUND INJURED B 5074 L/CPL KANKAM IN THE RIGHT SHOULDER. CAS TREATED AND RESPONDING WELL TO TREATMENT.

UN RESTRICTED

e. UNAMIR APC ESCORTING A WATER TANKER WAS FIRED ON BY UNIDENT AES 200M NE OF BYUBAT GOLF LOC. OCCUPANTS OF WATER TANKER EXTRICATED THEMSELVES, JOINED THE APC AND ABANDONED THE WATER TANKER.

4. HUMANITARIAN ACTY. NTR.
5. LOGISTICS. NO CHANGE.
6. CIVIL AFFAIRS. NTR.
7. MISC. NTR.

  
DMK LADZEKPO  
Maj  
SDO



UN SECRET

Copy No 15 of 18

UNAMIR  
Force HQ

16<sup>th</sup> April 1994

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION TO OPS ORDER NO. 5

Reference: Operation Order No. 5 dated 15 April 1994.

1. Following actions are to be taken in addition to the orders given in the above reference:

a. Withdrawal from DMZ area to start from 16 Apr 94 and to be completed by 191800 Apr 94.

b. Two platoons of BYUBAT GOLF to immediately move to KIA (by 161700 Apr 94) and take over the responsibility of protecting air field at KIA.

c. One coy of KIBAT, which will hand-over air field responsibility to BYUBAT GOLF, will be Force HQ's reserve. Reserve Coy to be ready to take orders with effect from 161800 Apr 94 and be located at KIA.

d. BYUBAT to take over the entire responsibility of KIA from KIBAT by 191800 Apr 94. Relief in operation to start with immediate effect.

e. BYUBAT to take over M-113, SPA and CVRT from KIBAT as soon as possible but not later than 19 Apr 94. Training of commanders, drivers and gunners will be arranged by KIBAT.

2. It may be mentioned here that efforts are being made to declare KIA as UN neutral zone.



H K ANYIDOHO  
Brig Gen  
For Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Kigali Sector HQ  
DMZ Sector HQ  
MILOB GP HQ  
Force Engr Coy  
Force Log Coy  
Tun Coy  
Force Med Pl  
Mov Con Pl  
MP Sec

1  
UN SECRET

UN SECRET

Information:

SMSG  
RUTBAT  
BYUBAT GOLF  
CAO

Internal:

FC  
DFC ✓  
COO  
C Log O  
CMPO  
Office Copy

UN SECRET

Copy No...of...

UNAMIR Force HQ  
Hotel Amahoro  
KIGALI

1000.7(DFC)/G/1

16 April, 1994

See Distribution:

Subject: ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION TO OPS ORDER NO 5

References:

- A. Operation Order No 5 dated 15 Apr 94.
  - B. Additional Instr to Ops Order No 5 dated 16 Apr 94.
1. Further to reference 'B' above, the following supplementary instructions are issued:
- a. It must be emphasized that BYUBAT must be sure it is conversant with the weapon systems being handed-over to the battalion and can fully operate them before a final take-over.
  - b. A complete assessment of the capability to fully defend the airport would have also been done by the time the final take-over takes place.
2. All to note for compliance.



HK ANYIDOHO  
Brig Gen  
for Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:	<u>Copy No</u>
Kigali Sector HQ	1
DMZ Sector HQ	2
MILOB Gp HQ	3
Force Engr Coy	4
Force Log Coy	5
Tun Coy	6
Force Med Pl	7
Mov Con Pl	8
MP Sec	9
File	10
Spare	11-12

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

1000 (FC)

From: FC

To: UNAMIR Force HQ Standard Distribution List A  
Country Seniors


Info:

Date: 15 April 1994

Subject: ACCESS TO TELEPHONE AND FAX FOR COMMUNICATION  
WITH HOME NATION

Reference:

- 
1. Each contingent senior will be authorized a 5 minute phone call to his national government once per day from the comms centre on the first floor of the Force HQ.
  2. Contingent seniors will pass personal messages during this period. Contingent Seniors may recommend personal compassionate telephone calls to the DFC\COS for approval.
  3. Fax messages may be prepared and submitted to the DFC\COS for approval for lengthy messages.
  4. It must be appreciated by all members of UNAMIR, that the SATCOM is our only outside link and the priority must go the incoming and outgoing telephone and fax messages for operational and logistics matters.

  
R. A. Dallaire  
Major-General  
Force Commander  
UNAMIR

DFC/COS

15 Apr 94

3000.2(DCOO)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: CEASE FIRE MEETINGS BETWEEN UNAMIR, RGF AND RPF -  
MERIDIEN HOTEL

1. In order to discuss the possible cease fire between the warring RGF and RPF, UNAMIR will organize confidential meetings at the MERIDIEN HOTEL.

2. As the MERIDIEN HOTEL actually is in the area controlled by RPF, free movement of their leadership is essentially guaranteed. The Representatives of RGF on the other hand need special escorts of UNAMIR.

3. Procedure. The overall commander of this operation is the Senior UNMO of Lt Col rank minimum:

a. Kigali Sector to provide:

(1) One armed escort (RUTBAT rifle platoon).

(2) Two BTR 80 APC.

(3) Both have to report to Force HQ on call for their tasking.

b. MILOB HQ to provide four UNMO Teams:

(1) Team 1: Senior UNMO and overall mission commander.

(2) Team 2: Escort team and RGF escort lead.

(3) Team 3: Escort team and RPF escort lead.

(4) Team 4: Security team, to control the access to MERIDIEN HOTEL between forward positions of RPF and the meeting place, making sure that no ambush or other aggression against the RGF convoy is intended by RPF troops or any other element. This control has to be executed before and after the meeting.

c. Force HQ to contact: (F-3)

(1) F-9 A(LO at Army HQ): He will gather the RGF representatives by the time that the escort arrives at the RGF Army Headquarters or the designated pick up point.




(2) CL-1(LO at RPF HQ, CND): He is to ensure that RPF agrees with the movement of the escort through their lines and that cease fire action is taken along the route.

(3) KT-9 (Tunisian Coy Comd): He will deploy a complete platoon in all round defence at MERIDIEN. Another section will ensure security of the entrance, corridors and meeting hall.

d. RUTBAT rifle platoon is to insure close security of RGF representatives in and around the APCs and inside MERIDIEN HOTEL.

e. RPF leadership to move with their own escort and an UNMO escort team. This escort will stay outside of the perimeter occupied by Tun Coy. RPF escort to be not more than two sections.

f. After the meeting, RPF will leave first with their escort, controlled by the RGF escort leader. Subsequently but no later than 30 minutes after the departure of RPF leaders, the escort will bring the RGF representatives back to their HQ.



W. BALIS  
LT COL  
DCOO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Kigali Sector HQ  
MILOB GP HQ  
Tunisian Coy

Info:

SRSG

✓ DFC/COS

Chairman, RPA

Chief of Staff, Rwandan Army

Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie

UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISION  
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

3000.9 (io)  
10 April 94

FROM : MIO *Luc*

TO : FC

THROUGH : COO  
DFC

SUBJECT: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION IS STILL VERY VIOLENT IN KIGALI AND IN AROUND. RPF FORCES HAVE ENGAGED THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE JUNCTION WITH THEIR INCOMING FORCES.

2. A VOLUME OF ABOUT 01 FRENCH BATTALION ENTERED THE OPERATIONAL AREA. THEY TOOK OVER THE CONTROL OF KIGALI AIRPORT. ABOUT 50 FRENCH FAMILIES AND 12 MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL FAMILY HAVE BEEN RESCUED SO FAR .THEY HAVE BEEN IN SOME POINTS IN TOWN. IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED THAT BELGIC OFFICERS ALLOWED FRENCH MILITARIES TO GET ON BOARD IN UN VEHICLES.

3. THE UNDP CONVOY REACHED THE BORDER OF BURUNDI THIS MORNING AT 0700 WITH AN UNMO ESCORT. THE OVERALL WAS ABOUT 110 PERSONS. 03 WERE LIGHTLY WOUNDED ( 02 CHILDREN AND 01 WOMAN BY BROKEN GLASSES).

4. IN FRONT OF THE CND COMPOUND, A VEHICLE WAS AMBUSHED BY RPF. THEY CLAIMED THE VEHICLE WAS A BLUE ONE WITHOUT A RED CROSS MARKING. RPF FURTHER CLAIMED A SEARCH ON THOSE WHO SURVIVED REVEALED THAT THEY WERE RGF SOLDIERS. INVESTIGATIONS ARE ONGOING

5. ONE CONGOLESE UNMO WAS SHOT WHILE IN A CIVILIAN VEHICLE AT A SHORT DISTANCE OF MERIDIEN. RPF DID NOT IDENTITY HIM AS A UN MEMBER. AS A MATTER OF FACT HE WAS NOT AT THE RIGHT PLACE IN THE CONVOY. FORCE COMMANDER WITNESSED. HIS NAME IS EMILE ZOUNGOU.

6. A MORTAR SHELL LANDED IN KING FAISAL HOSPITAL AROUND 1650. ABOUT 60 PERSONS ARE KILLED AND 100 ARE INJURED.??? THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES HAS TO BE CONFIRMED MORE PRECISELY.

7. IN KICICURU AREA MASSIVE KILLINGS ARE STILL GOING ON. ON THE 09th OF APRIL, ABOUT 70 PERSONS WERE HORRIBLY KILLED AND ABOUT 65 PERSONS ARE KILLED TODAY AND BURRIED IN KICIKIRU'S CHURCH. 15 POOLISH PADRES WITH POOLISH UN PERSONNEL HELPING HAND HANDLED THE SITUATION. COLLECTIVITY GRAVES WERE DUG.

PEOPLE PRESENT AT THAT TIME REPORTED THAT RED CROSS SHOWED PRESENCE BUT INSTEAD OF HELPING THEY WERE GIVING PRESS CONFERENCE. IN FACT THE RED CROSS VEHICLE SEEMED TO CARRY PRESS STAFF INSTEAD OF HELPERS.

8. IN AMAHORO STADIUM NUMBER OF REFUGEES IS MORE AND MORE INCREASING (ABOUT 5000). IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT RPF KILLED SOME INTEARAMWES WHO GOT INFILTRATED ( 05 ).

9. AT BYUBATT, ONE RGF PLATOON FOUND SHELTER AND DECLARED TO BE FED UP WITH FIGHTING.

10. RPF MORAL IS VERY HIGH AND THE TROOPS ARE VERY CONFIDENT.

11. REGARDS.

UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISION  
INTER OFFICEW MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

3000.9 (IO)

8 April 94

FROM : MIO *See*  
TO : FC  
THROUGH : COO  
DFC

SUBJECT : COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. The general situation is still very tense in KIGALI and around. Heavy firing continued throughout the day. It seemed that one of the main targets of RPA was Camp KANOMBE and the area of the airport.
2. RGF and Presidential Guard units are still conducting looting and killing. It has also been confirmed that they target UN vehicles. RPA has the vicinity of CND under control and they even helped some people to find shelter at AMAHORO stadium.
3. Gendarmes, RGF and Presidential Guard elements are most of the time monitoring the INTERAHAMWES. In some areas of KIGALI, INTERAHAMWES have the control ( NIAMIRAMBO BILYOGO and KIMISAGARA)
4. At different road blocks, I have been told that they will give trouble only to the Belgians. They ask the nationality of UN personnel. One should be careful since Gouvernement elements are most of the time under influence ( alcohol or drugs).
5. Our MILOBS reported killings and lootings committed by civilians, MRND supporters under the protection of the Gendarmerie in BUGARAMA- KIBUYE and CYANGUCU.
6. At GISENYI, one Austrian Major was threatened; his money was taken away ( 800 U\$) and his walkie-talkie was seized.

7. In the southern sector, some killings and lootings are reported. About 350 persons took refuge in a catholic church.

8. In KICALI, it is still very difficult to estimate the number of victims. Thousands lost their life. The victims are mostly TUTSIS or HUTUS from the south of RWANDA or politics.

9. Two MILOB's from URUGAY were injured at AMAHORO stadium due to schrapnel fragments. One was injured at the abdomen and the second got a finger damaged. They were taken to King Faisal Hospital.

10. Civilians who took refuge in AMAHORO have been taken to AMAHORO stadium. At this time there are more than 1000 refugees inside the stadium. Hygiene is becoming very critical. In deed there is a lack of water, of food and there are no toilets available for them.

11. The Ambassador of the USA has requested security by UNAMIR because he is feeling threatened at his residence.

12. Some people are attacking Belgian isolated families. One Belgian woman and his child have been assassinated at KICIKIRU area.

13. Regards.



This morning a R.G.F. major whose name is NTUYAHAGA Bernard had dropped 5 ghanéans and nearly 13 Belgian soldiers in front the HTS office in Camp Kigali. Those soldiers were on security duty at the prime minister house, and according to them since yesterday night they were attacked by the R.G.F. soldiers led by that major - and this morning they took their weapons and vehicles before bringing ~~brought~~ them to the camp.

Five minutes after their arrival the R.G.F. of Camp Kigali who were in formation came to the office and started beating them with bat and stone and some of the R.G.F. soldiers tried to kill them with bayonet. I opened the office and some of the UNAMIR soldiers got in and four of the belgian soldiers who couldn't get inside were seriously wounded.

As they R.G.F. soldiers told me they didn't want to kill me I stayed ~~in~~ ~~for~~ the door to force them to do not get in but one of them said he'll throw grenade inside if I didn't let them get in - then two soldiers brought me away from the door. They brought me to another room and told me they don't have problem with me.

Few minutes later some superior officers came there and tried vainly to disperse them away. At that time I would like to take the opportunity to bring the wounded to the hospital but the soldiers

refused. When the colonel commanding the camp Kigali H.Q. Company arrived he asked me to help him bring them to the hospital and soldiers refused and were about to beat him. His escorts brought he and I to the E.S.M. and I take the opportunity on their talking: "they don't have problem with black people" to go and bring the five ghanians soldiers who were there - One of them went and brought them to E.S.M. By the way a R.G.F. soldier was about to shoot at me but his friend opposed.

● About five minutes later R.G.F. soldier shot for a long time. and according to the soldiers at E.S.M. it might be at the Belgian soldiers.

At that time a meeting was going on at E.S.M. - After the meeting a sergeant in charge of us introduced us to the colonel commanding E.S.M. (who I asked instructions from). General DALERE arrived at that time and I briefed him on the situation, he wanted us to go to the MINISTRE of Defense with him but the gendarmerie Major suggested to bring us to the Force H.Q.

Kigali, the 7th April 1994

Capitain APERO, Kodyo  
656 - MT5.

Aug  
17

FORCE HQ  
UNAMIR

8 APRIL 1994

OPERATION ORDER NO - 3

1. SITUATION. After the death of president Habriyamana, the sit deteriorated very fast. Mass killing of civilian population in and around Kigali created panic and fear among the habitants of Kigali. The Prime Minister designate Mr Faustin was escorted upto Force HQ and kept under UNAMIR protection. For this reason and others, the Force HQ could now become a major target for the rebellion elements. Furthermore, the Amahoro sports complex is the primary assembly point of our evacuation plan.

2. MISSION. To defend Amahoro complex including the UNAMIR HQ complex wef 080600 Apr 94 until further order.

3. EXECUTION.a. Grouping.

- (1) Commander: Col Nazrul.
- (2) Under Command:
  - (a) RUTBAT.
  - (b) 2 x Section of BYUBAT G.

b. Tasks.

- (1) Defend Force HQ complex from all ground attacks.
- (2) Defend Amahoro Stadium Complex from all ground attack.
- (3) Keep all roads/routes clear between Amahoro Stadium and Force HQ.
- (4) Stop persons trying to break through to the Force HQ.
- (5) Eescort duties must still be done.
- (6) Alert all concerned if attack is imminent.
- (7) Civilians are not to be allowed to enter the Force HQ or to RUTBAT. All civilians presently at these areas are to be vacated by 080600 hrs.
- (8) Rules of Engagement. As issued on 07 Apr 94

c. Coord Instructions.

(1) Timings. Tpts to be in position by 080600 Apr 94 and will be in position till further order.

(2) For any coord COO may be contacted.

(3) Close liaison to be maintained with different Rwandan Forces.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Under unit arrangement.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Location of FC. Location of FC will be at the Force HQ, any changes in it will be intimated in time.

b. Command Status. RUTBAT will remain under the command of Kigali Sector.

c. Communication. Rutbat will have its own communication. Commanding Officer to be always in communication with Force HQ.

6. Please acknowledge.



R. DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander

Annex A : A Map Showing Area of Responsibility.

Distribution :

Action :

External :

Kigali Sect HQ

Info :

External :

RUTBAT

BYUBAT G

Internal :

Dy Force Commander


COO

C Log

Office Copy



MAP SHOWING AOR



07 April 1994

UPGRADED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TO : ALL SECTORS

RULE NO 1  
STATUS B

AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS  
AUTHORITY - GRANTED

RULE NO 2  
STATUS B

WEAPON STATE  
MAGAZINES ON WEAPONS - CHARGED

RULE NO 3  
STATUS C

RESPONSE TO THE HOSTILE INTENT  
WARN - DEMONSTRATE - RESOLVE

RULE NO 4  
STATE B

DISARM PARAMILITARY  
YES - WITH MINIMUM FORCE


RULE NO 5  
STATE B

INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS  
YES - IN SEQUENCE OF ESCALATION  
WARNING-WARNING SHOT-FIRE IN SELF  
DEFENSE

RULE NO 6  
STATE B

CONTROL OF WEAPONS  
MAN- PREPARE-FIRE ON ORDER

AUTHORISED BY



H ANYIDOHO  
B GEN

PREPARED BY

B P BEARDSLEY  
MAJOR

A draft copy of OPO/4 given for  
necessary action. 8/9/4

UN CONFIDENTIAL

C log

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
OPS BRANCH

Apr 94

3000.15 (OPS)

See Distribution:

OPO /94 - UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL PLAN - OPERATION "HARBOR LIGHTS"

THIS ORDER REPLACES THE OPO 1/94 DATED 27 JAN 94 THAT HAS TO  
BE DESTROYED BY THE ADDRESSEES

1. SITUATION

a. General. After the death of the President of the Republic, Mr. Juvenal HABİYARIMANA, the political situation deteriorated very fast. The Prime Minister and other ministers were abducted with their spouses and children from their homes and subsequently killed. A pall of smoke hang over the city of KIGALI. Mass killings of civilian population in and around KIGALI created panic and fear among the habitants of KIGALI, specially Tutsis. No government machineries are functioning and there is hardly any possibility of any leader to arrest the situation. All negotiations among the different factions have failed and there is no chance of forming a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) in the near future. This uncertain political situation have UNAMIR forces made ineffective. Rwandans also did not spare UNAMIR members. Whilst on duty, 10 Troops were killed and several wounded. Analyzing the situation, UNO has decided to withdraw the Force from RWANDA and its civilian personnel and a certain number of governments might wish to withdraw their expatriates.

b. General climate. Political uncertainty has led to insecurity due to ethnic cleansing, banditry, riots by sections of the armed forces and militia elements of the civil population. It is also evident that elements of UNAMIR is being targeted and expatriates could become targeted also by unruly elements of the armed forces and militias. UNAMIR will continue concentrating on good co-operation with local orderly Forces but the withdrawal to be conducted under hostile conditions.

c. Own activities. UNAMIR forces are at full strength and deployed according to current operational concepts all over the country. During the withdrawal concentration will be on the security of the vital ground Kigali International Airport (KIA).



UN CONFIDENTIAL

d. Friendly Forces. It is assumed 2 X Airborne infantry battalions will be attached to UNAMIR during the withdrawal.

2 MISSION

- a. To withdraw UNAMIR through KIA on order.
- b. To assist the repatriation of expatriates by establishing and securing of assembly points (AP) and by securing, guiding and monitoring their movements.

3. EXECUTION

a. General Outline

Withdrawal of UNAMIR personnel and expatriates will be conducted in FIVE phases:

(1) Phase 1.

(a) Two Airborne battalions from UN sources to secure Kigali Airport and routes Airport-Kigali city and Byumba-Kigali City.

(b) Move the DMZ troops to KIGALI along secured road BYUMBA - KIGALI.

(2) Phase 2.

(a) Defend KIA and its access, as well as main traffic key points in Kigali with one battalion Airborne troops.

(b) Establish APs for expatriates in the prefecture capitals, have those APs:

- secured by ONE rifle section of BYUBAT each;
- under command of UNMOs in their respective areas of responsibility and move them to KIGALI on order.

(c) Meanwhile, in KIGALI, monitor the execution of evacuation plans of expatriates and the establishment of APs.

(d) Have one Airborne battalion troops available as a Force reserve for reinforcement, intervention and clearance tasks.

(e) Keep the Force QRF ready to assist and rescue menaced expatriates if needed.

(3) Phase 3.

(a) Withdrawal of expatriates and civil Staff.

(b) Withdrawal of all UNMOs not involved in monitoring/escorts tasks.

(c) Defend KIA with one Airborne battalion.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Phase 4.

(a) Withdrawal of BYUBAT (- BYUBAT Golf), Force Engr Coy, Force Log Coy, Force HQ (- Tac HQ), Force Med Pl.

(b) Continue to defend KIA with a battalion Airborne.

(5) Phase 5.

Withdrawal of Airborne battalions and Kigali Sector Troops and Tac HQ.

b. Tasks

(1) KIGALI Sector

(a) Grouping.

i. 2 x Airborne Infantry Battalions

ii. BYUBAT Golf under command, eventually after completion of Phase 1.

iii. MP section under command in Phases 1 & 2.

(b) Tasks.

i. Phase 1. Secure movement of DMZ Troops to KIGALI within KWSA.

ii. Phase 2.

- Defend KIA, the main accesses to KIA and the main traffic points in KWSA.

- Monitor the execution of evacuation plans of expatriates and the establishment of APs.

- Furnish states of expatriates to Force HQ Pers Branch (CMPO).

- On order, detach an expatriate evacuation support and control cell (ESCC) to Force Tac HQ.

- Deploy medical assistance at KIA through all phases.

iii. Phase 3-4: Defend KIA.

(iv) On order, withdraw through KIA.



UN CONFIDENTIAL

(2) MILOB Gp.

(a) Grouping. Detach under command to Kigali Sector all UNMO teams operating in KWSA.

(b) Tasks.

i. Phase 1 & 2.

- Monitor and secure expatriate AP in the prefecture capitals (ONE rifle Sec of BYUBAT under UNMO command in each AP).

- Escort the expatriates to KIGALI.

- Furnish state of expatriates to Force HQ Pers Branch (CMPO).

ii. Phase 3.

Withdraw through KIA.

(3) DMZ Sector

(a) Grouping. As on 02 March 94, Force Engr Coy under command for move to KIA.

(b) Tasks.

i. Phase 1.

Move all DMZ Troops (-) to KIA.

ii. Phase 2. On order, detach ONE rifle Section of BYUBAT to secure AP's for expatriates in the prefecture capitals.

iii. Phase 3 - 4. Be ready, as a Force reserve, for reinforcement, intervention and clearance tasks.

iv. On order, withdraw through KWSA.

(4) Force Engr Coy

(a) Grouping. Under command of DMZ Sec for Move to KIA.

(b) Tasks.

i. Phase 1.

Move to KIA through secured corridor BYUMBA - KIGALI.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- ii. Be prepared to perform road clearance tasks on order.
- iii. On order, withdraw through KIA.

(5) Force Log Coy

- (a) Grouping. Integral.
- (b) Tasks. On order, withdraw through KIA.

(6) Medical platoon

- (a) Grouping.
  - i. One First Aid Det (FAD).
  - ii. Med platoon (-)
- (b) Tasks.
  - i. Med platoon (-), on order, withdraw through KIA.
  - ii. FAD: deploy at AMAHORO stadium and provide Med support during all the phases; on order withdraw through KIA.

(7) Mov Control

- (a) Grouping.
  - i. KIA Control Detachment.
  - ii. Mov Control Platoon (-)
- (b) Tasks.
  - i. Mov Control Platoon (-), on order, withdraw through KIA.
  - ii. KIA Control Det: Assist Force Tac HQ through all the phases; withdraw with Force Tac HQ.

(8) MP Sec

- (a) Grouping. Integral.
- (b) Tasks.
  - i. Phases 1 & 2: Under command Kigali Sector
  - ii. Phases 3 & 5: Control of traffic and persons at KIA.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

x. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timing

(a) Phase 1 starts with codeword "HARBOUR LIGHTS" on "WHISKY-Day"

(b) W: "HARBOR LIGHTS"

- Prepare secure Mov to KIGALI by DMZ troops

- Warning to all Embassy's and NGO's on DTG of opening and location of AP's. No movement to AP's before announced opening time.

W+1: "CLEAN CORRIDOR"

W+2: Phase 2

W+3: Phase 3 - 5

... and following

(c) Duration of Phases 3 - 5 determined by:

- Availability of aircrafts (AC)

- Capability of KIA (Estimated: EIGHT AC/Hr)

(2) Waiting time by MILOB for expatriates in outside AP's: opening time PLUS FOUR Hrs, unless:

(a) AP warden reports all expatriates are present: the convoy can start at that moment.

(b) The local situation does not allow secure movement and external help of UNAMIR reserve elements have to be sent to the spot.

(3) No Mov to be allowed to KIA if airplane for evacuation is not on the ground.

(4) DMZ Troops Mov into buffer zones in KIGALI:

- Force Engr Coy: AMAHORO Stadium.

- BYUBAT: to be determined.

(5) If BYUBAT GOLF is not detached to KIGALI Sector at the time that present withdrawal plan is activated, it will be placed under command of KIGALI Sector immediately after completion of phase 1.

(6) (a) BYUBAT rifle sections that have to secure the AP in the prefecture capitals will move from BYUMBA to those destinations, under command of the UNMO teams who are responsible for the AP's.

(b) The UNMO team leaders will take over command of their assigned rifle sections:

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- i. At BYUMBA with destination BYUMBA, RUHENGERI and GYSENYI.
- ii. At KIGALI (Force HQ) with destination KIBUNGO, BUTARE, GIKONGORO, CYANGUGU, KIBUYE and GITARAMA.

(c) After completion of the mission, the UNMO team leader will report to the ESCC at KIA: the BYUBAT rifle sections will return to BYUBAT on order of Force HQ Ops Branch.

(7) Mission of the ESCC

- (a) Collect necessary information on expatriates all over RWANDA.
- (b) After completion of Phase 2, report to Force Tac HQ Pers Branch with states of expatriates and assist in the control, dispatching and evacuation of expatriates through KIA.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Phase 1 (DMZ KIGALI). Timing (D - D+2).

(1) Class I

- (a) Normal supply (ECONOMAT) for troops in KIGALI.
- (b) Troops in DMZ should use the reserve rations from BYUBAT.
- (c) MilObs + CivPol: Self-sufficient.

(2) Class II: Everybody to be in possession of personal equipment & sleeping facility.

(3) Class III

- (a) Full vehicle tank before operation.
- (b) Resupply in pump-station (RWANDA PETROL) or in Log Coy.

(4) Med

- (a) DMZ units are responsible for their own first line medical support.
- (b) Second line medical support in AMAHORO Stadium (Phases 2 to 5).



UN CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Tpt

(a) Hypothesis I Phase 1 = 1 day.

i. Buses Available

- CTO is requested to provide 15 buses to the DMZ assembly points for transport of troops to assembly points in KIGALI.
- Log Coy is responsible to transport the most expensive materials from DMZ to material assembly points in KIGALI.
- Engr machinery should be driven on their own to KIGALI.

ii. No Buses Available

- Log Coy is responsible for the transport of troops from DMZ to Kigali assembly points.
- Engr machinery should be driven on their own to KIGALI.

(b) Hypothesis II Phase 1 = 2 days.

i. Buses available

- CTO is requested to provide 1 x 12 buses (day 1) and 1 x 3 buses to the DMZ assembly points for transport of troops to KIGALI assembly points.
- Log Coy is responsible to transport all material from DMZ - to the material assembly points. (about 50 truck charges)
- Engr machinery should be driven on their own to KIGALI.

ii. No buses available.

- Log Coy is responsible to transport troops and most expensive material from DMZ to KIGALI assembly points.



UN CONFIDENTIAL

- Engr machinery should be driven on their own to KIGALI.

b. Phase 2 - 5

(1) Class I

- (a) If possible supply from ECONOMAT. To be organized by FOOD OFFR FORCE.
- (b) If not possible CGSO is requested to provide 5400 rations to the AMAHORO stadium.
- (c) In all cases CGSO is requested to provide 16000 ltrs of potable water to the AMAHORO stadium.

(2) Class II

- (a) RUTBAT is responsible to set up some tentage in their possession on the airfield.
  - i. Med. (Coordination with SMO FORCE)
  - ii. For expensive material.
- (b) CCO is requested to provide emergency lighting sets in the airfield.

(3) Class III: Resupply of vehicles in pump-stations or Log Coy.

(4) Med

- (a) Med Platoon should deploy support capability at the AMAHORO stadium.
- (b) Coordination by SMO FORCE.

(5) Tpt

- (a) Kigali Units are responsible to transport their own Eqt to the material assembly points.
- (b) Log Coy should provide transport to move Eqt from BYUBAT GOLF to the material assembly points.
- (c) Tpt Offr Force shall collect all possible transport in transport assembly point to be used on call.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

c. Ground-Space management

Later.

d. Planning Airlift

Later.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. Signals

- (1) Normal command nets are operational.
- (2) All sub-units that are to withdraw in one of the phases will change to alternate channel as soon as codeword for activation of this phase is issued.
- (3) Sub-units nets close down as of arrival at KIA for Evac.

b. Communications in Force Tac HQ location: to be arranged by FSO through COO.

c. Force HQ

- (1) At AMAHORO Hotel
- (2) After completion of Phase 1 Force Tac HQ deploys at KIA.

(a) Composition

- i. Command cell
- ii. Pers Branch: PLUS Kigali Sec ESCC
- iii. Log Branch
- iv. Ops Branch
  - MINUS Mil Trg Offr
  - Duty Offr Cell: Sr Duty Offr's and Maj ZAHID, Maj MASUD
  - Air Ops: PLUS Sqn Ldr MOTALEB and Sqn Ldr BASHAR.

(b) Task: Command phases 2 - 5 of Ops HARBOR LIGHTS.

(c) Installation: Recce and installation of Force Tac HQ in buildings next to Presidential Hangar by Plans Sec.

(d) Remarks: All Branch heads to determinate the exact strength of their branch in the Force Tac HQ.

## UN CONFIDENTIAL

d. Codewords

Ser	Codeword	Meaning	Issued by
1.	HARBOR LIGHTS	Activation of Wdr plan	Force HQ
2.	CLEAN CORRIDOR	Activation of phase 1	Force HQ
3.	SNOW WHITE	Phase 1 completed	KIGALI Sec
4. a.	SAFE DOCK	Phase 2 activated	Force HQ
b.	SAFE DOCK GREEN	Phase 2.a. in place	KIGALI Sec
c.	SAFE DOCK BLUE	Phase 2.b. in place	KIGALI Sec
d.	SAFE DOCK YELLOW	Phase 2.c. in place	KIGALI Sec
e.	SAFE DOCK RED	Phase 2.b. executed for	KIGALI Sec
	+ name of town	this town (1)	
5.	ANCHORS UP	Phase 3 activated	Force HQ
	+ location of AP or		
	buffer zone		
6.	FIRM FORTRESS	Defence KIA in place	KIGALI Sec
7.	FULL SAILS	Phase 4 activated	F Tac HQ
	+ designation of		
	unit(s) and number of		
	personnel to be		
	evacuated		F Tac HQ
8.	ABANDON SHIP	Phase 5 activated	FC (to NY?)
9.	LIGHTS SWITCHED OFF	End of Ops	

(1) This means that the convoy is arrived and installed at KIGALI.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

e. Nicknames

Ser	Name	Meaning
1.	KUCKUUS NEST	KIA
2.	BOOT HILL	KIGALI
3.	HALLELUJAH TRAIL	GATUNA - KIGALI Corridor

MOEEN  
Col  
Chief Operation Officer

R.A. DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MILOB GROUP - CMO  
UNOMUR SECTOR - COMD  
DMZ SECTOR - COMD  
KIGALI SECTOR - COMD  
RPF SECTOR - COMD  
RGF SECTOR - COMD  
ENGINEER COY - COMD  
LOGISTIC COY - COMD  
MEDICAL PL - COMD  
MOV CON PL - COMD  
MP SECT - COMD

Internal:

Information:

DFC/COS  
COO  
DCOO  
C PLANS  
C LOGO  
CMPO  
SRSG  
CAO  
UNCIVPOL

C

②

D/C

See notes  
attached p. 1.

B/C

2/3

SL NO	COUNTRY	MILOBS		
		AUTH	HELD	DEF
1	ARGENTINA	5	-	5
2	AUSTRIA	15	15	
3	BANGLADESH	43	59	
4	BELGIUM			
5	BOSTWANA		9	-
6	BRASIL	13	13	
7	CANADA	1	1	
8	CONGO	25	26	
9	EGYPT	10	10	
10	FIJI	1	1	
11	GHANA	20	20	
12	HUNGARY	4	4	
13	MALAWI	5	-	5
14	MALI	10	10	
15	NETHERLANDS	10	10	
16	NIGERIA	15	15	
17	PAKISTAN			
18	POLAND		5	
19	RUSSIA	15	15	
20	SENEGAL	39	39	
21	SLOVAKIA	5	5	
22	TANZANIA	15		15
23	TOGO	15	15	
24	TUNISIA			
25	URUGUAY	20	20	
26	ZIMBABWE	26	29	
	TOTAL	332	322	



NOTE: FOL LIKELY TO COME AS STATED AGAINST THEIR NAMES. THIS WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL INDUCTION PLAN:

A	COL CHEICK DIARRA	-	MALI	END OF FEB 94
B	MAJ DIOP	-	SENEGAL	15 FEB 94
C	LT COL ADU-AMANFO	-	GHANA	FROM JAN-JUNE 94

*nothing special*

*you know this chap. Tico might  
possibly*

*need a strong  
hand in his HQ  
and let the younger  
chaps go out on  
patrol.*

*This chap could come  
in to replace Lt Col  
Mazo who is leaving  
over next few days  
as ops at HQ as it is.  
Col Tikohe leaves  
in June I believe, then  
this Col could possibly  
replace him.*

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017  
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNATIONS NEWYORK

REFERENCE

DPKO/MIL /322

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the assignment of officers of his country's Armed Forces as Military Observers with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The Secretary-General wishes to confirm that it would be appreciated if the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh could make available one officer in the rank of Colonel to serve with UNAMIR as Chief Operations Officer.

The practical details relating to the deployment of the Bangladeshi officer, including the timing, will be the subject of consultation at staff level. It is hoped, however that the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh will find it possible to deploy this officer by the end of February 1994. The tour of duty of this officer will be one year, subject to the renewal of the mandate of UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express his appreciation to the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for its contribution to this important United Nations peace-keeping operation.

MM/

23 February 1994

File	..
FOD	
Mission	
Financial Svces	



POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE UNITED NATIONS N.Y. 10017  
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK

REFERENCE

DPKO/MIL/291

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the informal consultations between the Secretariat and Permanent Mission regarding the assignment of Officers of his country's Armed Forces as Staff Officers with United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The Secretary-General wishes to confirm that it would be appreciated if the Government of Belgium could make available one Staff Officer in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to serve with UNAMIR as Chief Logistics Officer. The candidate should be a specialist in the Logistics field.

The practical details relating to the deployment of the Belgian officer, including the timing, will be the subject of urgent consultation at staff level. It is hoped, however that the Government of Belgium will find it possible to deploy this officer before 28 February 1994. The tour of duty of this officer will be one year, subject to the renewal of the mandate of UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express his appreciation to the Government of Belgium for its contribution to this important United Nations peace-keeping operation.

mm/

16 February 1994

File	..
FOD	
Mission	
Financial Svces	

②  
A/MA  
Are there new or  
file copies on those that  
we already have?  
28/3  
DFC/4

③  
A/FC  
Old file  
copies for own  
info.  
Reserve can  
keep on file.  
1300  
may  
A/MA  
29/3



POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017  
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNATIONS NEWYORK

REFERENCE

DPKO/ MIL/293

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the informal consultations between the Secretariat and the Permanent Mission regarding the assignment of officers of his country's Armed Forces as Military Observers with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The Secretary-General wishes to confirm that it would be appreciated if the Government of Uruguay could make available five military officers in the rank of Major or Captain to serve with UNAMIR as Military Observers.

The practical details relating to the deployment of the Uruguayan officers, including the timing, will be the subject of consultation at staff level. It is hoped, however that the Government of Uruguay will find it possible to deploy this personnel before 28 February 1994. The tour of duty of these officers will be one year, subject to the renewal of the mandate of UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express his appreciation to the Government of Uruguay for its contribution to this important United Nations peace-keeping operation.

MM,

17 February 1994

File	..
FOD	
Mission	
Financial Svces	





POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017  
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNATIONS NEWYORK

REFERENCE.

DPKO/MIL/298

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the informal consultations between the Secretariat and the Permanent Mission regarding the assignment of officers of his country's Armed Forces as Staff Officers with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).


The Secretary-General wishes to confirm that it would be appreciated if the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh could make available one officer in the rank of Major to serve with UNAMIR as Senior Medical Officer.

The practical details relating to the deployment of the Bangladeshi officer, including the timing, will be the subject of consultation at staff level. It is hoped, however that the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh will find it possible to deploy this officer before 28 February 1994. The tour of duty of this officer will be one year, subject to the renewal of the mandate of UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express his appreciation to the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for its contribution to this important United Nations peace-keeping operation.

nn/

17 February 1994







POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE: UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017  
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE: UNATIONS NEWYORK

REFERENCE.

DPKO/ MIL/299


The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the informal consultations between the Secretariat and Permanent Mission regarding the assignment of Officers of his country's Armed Forces as Staff Officers with United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The Secretary-General wishes to confirm that it would be appreciated if the Government of Bangladesh could make available one Staff Officer in the rank of Major to serve with UNAMIR as Logistics Officer. The candidate should be a specialist in the Logistics field.

The practical details relating to the deployment of the Bangladeshi officer, including the timing, will be the subject of urgent consultation at staff level. It is hoped, however that the Government of Bangladesh will find it possible to deploy this officer before 28 February 1994. The tour of duty of this officer will be one year, subject to the renewal of the mandate of UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express his appreciation to the Government of Bangladesh for its contribution to this important United Nations peace-keeping operation. MM/

16 February 1994



PERMANENT MISSION OF BANGLADESH  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

821 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA  
8TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

TEL: (212) 867-3434-7  
FAX: (212) 972-4038

No. Pol-97/93

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations and with reference to this Mission's note of even number dated 25 January 1994 conveying names of three additional civil police monitors (CIVPOL) for ~~Rwanda~~ (Rwanda) has the honour to request the Mission be kindly informed soonest of their travel arrangements.

The names of the three Bangladeshi CIVPOLs once again are as follows :

1. Dr. Md. Abdur Rahim  
Assistant Superintendent of Police.
2. Mr. Md. Mozibur Rahman  
Assistant Superintendent of Police
3. Mr. Md. Shariful Alam  
Assistant Police Commissioner.

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.



Office of the Secretary General  
of the United Nations  
UN Secretariat  
New York.

(Atten: Lt. Colonel Miguel Martin, Room No.3650G)

File
FOD
Mission
Financial Svces



**PERMANENT MISSION OF URUGUAY  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

No. 038/1994

The Permanent Mission of Uruguay to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to the Note Verbale DPKO/MIL/293 regarding the assignment of Uruguayan Military Officers to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The permanent Mission of Uruguay is pleased to inform that its Government has agreed to make available five additional Officers to serve as Observers with UNAMIR as requested. Their names and ranks are as follows:

1. Major Washington SOSA
2. Major Luis MEYER
3. Captain Gerardo CURBELO
4. Captain Mario CARRASCO
5. Captain (Air Force) Eduardo KEUCHELARIAN.

The Permanent Mission of Uruguay takes this opportunity to renew the Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.

18 February 1994

To the Secretariat of the United Nations  
New York

File
FOD
Mission
Financial Svces

## RWANDA - draft presidential statement

The Security Council is absolutely appalled and horrified over continuing reports of indiscriminate slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and various other localities in Rwanda. It notes that according to reliable reports, transmitted to the Council by the Secretary-General in his Special Report (S/1994/470), the current wave of killings was started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, joined by elements of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF). The interim Government, established on April 8, has been stating its efforts to establish its authority over the unruly soldiers who were also responsible for the brutal murders of Mrs. Agathe Unwillingiyimana, Prime Minister, and several other ministers, of the provisional Government that stemmed from the initial implementation of the Arusha Accords, as well as for the deaths of 10 members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR.

In addition to information available from the Secretary-General, the Security Council has considered information available from well-respected NGO's. All this information points to one thing: the horrors of Rwanda's killing fields has few precedents in the recent history of the world. The Security Council reaffirms that the systematic killing of any ethnic group, with intent to destroy it in whole or in part constitutes an act of genocide as defined by relevant provisions of international law.

The Security Council points out that genocide cannot be condoned or tolerated, let alone justified, under any circumstances: not by civil war, not by the death of a leader, whatever suspicions surround it, not by past history. The Council further points out that an important body of international law exists that deal with perpetrators of genocide.

The Security Council warns the interim Government of Rwanda of the responsibility it bears for immediately reining in and discipline all elements of the RGF and of the Presidential Guards responsible for the brutalities. The Council also calls upon the Interim Government of Rwanda to investigate all acts of genocide and to severely punish those responsible for their commission. The Council furthermore expresses its hope that RPF that are currently engaging the RGF and the Presidential Guard will not resort to comparable countermeasures.



**FORCE HQ WITH ONLY KIGALI SECT**  
**( CHANGES ONLY )**

**FORCE HQ**

SL	NAME	PRESENT UNIT	APPT	IN PLACE OF
A	LT COL NYAAKU	MILOB	C LOG O	LT COL MASSAUX
B	LT COL MUSTAFIZ	MILOB	D COO	LT COL BALIS
C	MAJ MACZKA	FHQ-PLANS	C PLANS	LT COL VAN PUT
D	MAJ MAULA	FHQ-LOG	DY C LOG O	MAJ DEPREZ
E	SQN LDR MOTAEB	FHQ-OPS	CHIEF OF AIR SVCS	MAJ MANCEL
F	MAJ QUIST	DMZ SECT HQ	SNR OPS OFFR	MAJ MAGGEN
G	MAJ AZAM	"	OPS OFFR	MAJ DUPUIS
H	MAJ ANNAN	"	CAMP COMDT	MAJ BREADSLY
I	CAPT ATINTANDE	"	INFO OFFR	CAPT CLAYES
J	MAJ MAHMOOD	"	LOG OFFR	MAJ MOULA
K	MAJ PAZIK	FHQ-PLANS	HUMANITARIA N OFFR	MAJ PODEVIJAN
L	SGT ARTHUR	"	CLK	WO YANSENNE
M	ENGR COY TO DETAIL	ENGR COY	DVR OF FC	CPL TRAUTES

**KIGALI SECT HQ**

SL	NAME	PRESENT	APPT	IN PLACE OF
A	COL YAACHE	DMZ SECT	KIGALI SECT	COL MARCHAL
B	MAJ NAZMUL	"	OPS OFFR	MAJ PROVENCIAL
C	MAJ LADZEKPO	"	RRTL	MAJ DE LOCKER
D	CAPT KOTIA	"	DUTY OFFR	MAJ ASBROECK
E	CAPT ALHASSAN	"	DUTY OFFR	MAJ PUFFET



MEMBERS OF HUMANITARIAN CELL

SL	ID NO	RANK	NAME	COUNTRY
1	687	MAJ	PAZIK	POLAND
2	689	MAJ	STEC STEFAN	"
3	656	CAPT	APEDO K.EKPC	TOGO
4	511	CAPT	FAYE BABACAZ	SENEGAL

**LIST OF UNMOS REMAINING WITH UNAMIR**

SER	UNID	RANK	NAME	NATIONALITY	APPT/LOC	REMARKS
1	694	MAJ	BRAUN K H	AUSTRIA	KIGALI	
2	591	MAJ	KIRSCHNER HARALD	AUSTRIA	KIGALI	
3	593	MAJ	MEISSNER KURT	AUSTRIA	R-MULINDI	
4	701	MAJ	LENHARDT M	AUSTRIA	R-MULINDI	
5	635	SN LDR	HASSAN M NAIM	BANGLADES	KIGALI	
6	567	SN LDR	ATM NAZRUL ISLAM	BANGLADES	KIGALI	
7	674	MAJ	SHAHIDUL HAQUE	BANGLADES	KIGALI	
8	629	MAJ	MONJUR HOSSAIN	BANGLADES	KIGALI	
9	502	MAJ	ASAD R KHAN	BANGLADES	KIGALI	
10	573	MAJ	BEARDSLY B	CANADA	KIGALI	
11	552	MAJ	KOUMOU M A	CONGO	KIGALI	
12	526	MAJ	MOIGNY P V	CONGO	KIGALI	
13	534	CAPT	MALONDA G	CONGO	KIGALI	
14	531	CAPT	ILOKI D	CONGO	KIGALI	
15	551	MAJ	AVOUKOU E	CONGO	KIGALI	
16	535	MAJ	BOYEMBE C	CONGO	KIGALI	
17	528	CAPT	OLESSONGO O	CONGO	KIGALI	
18	B004	COL	TIKOKA ID	FIJI	KIGALI	
19	600	MAJ	ADUSEI A	GHANA	KIGALI	
20	597	MAJ	OPPONG-OTCHERE K	GHANA	R-MULINDI	
21	612	CAPT	ALHASSAN C B	GHANA	KIGALI	
22	504	LT CDR	ZOWONOO G	GHANA	KIGALI	
23	613	CAPT	DANQUAH N O K	GHANA	KIGALI	
24	603	CAPT	AYER S	GHANA	KIGALI	
25	596	LT COL	NYAAKU P K	GHANA	KIGALI	
26	610	CAPT	APPIAH AK	GHANA	KIGALI	
27	656	CAPT	BLEBOO WKC	GHANA	KIGALI	
28	602	MAJ	GBORGLAH B K	GHANA	R-MULINDI	
29	599	MAJ	MUSAH BRIMAH	GHANA	KIGALI	
30	620	MAJ	DIARRA D	MALI	KIGALI	
31	616	LT COL	DOUMBIA A	MALI	KIGALI	
32	624	CAPT	BERTHE A	MALI	KIGALI	
33	618	MAJ	TRAORE D	MALI	KIGALI	
34	693	LT COL	ILIYA S	NIGERIA	KIGALI	
35	670	MAJ	MANDE B M	NIGERIA	KIGALI	
36	656	LT CDR	ALADE S I	NIGERIA	R-MULINDI	
37	661	MAJ	EKWELOR F O	NIGERIA	R-MULINDI	
38	663	MAJ	LOGAGWOMA L C P	NIGERIA	KIGALI	
39	664	LT CDR	AKPAN P J	NIGERIA	KIGALI	
40	B0021	MAJ	PAZIK M	POLAND	KIGALI	
41	B0022	MAJ	MECZKA J W	POLAND	KIGALI	
42	B0034	MAJ	S STEFAN	POLAND	KIGALI	
43	540	CAPT	A DEME	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
44	506	MAJ	SARR M	SENEGAL	R-MULINDI	
45	541	CAPT	ADJE M	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
46	546	CAPT	ABDUL BA	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
47	565	CAPT	DIOF M	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
48	511	CAPT	FAYE B	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
49	547	MAJ	DIERAHIM	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
50	508	CAPT	DIA Y	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
51	561	CAPT	SENE IBO	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
52	553	CAPT	S TALL	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
53	532	CAPT	M IERAHIM	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
54	516	CAPT	B MOCTAR	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
55	520	CAPT	IA SECK	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
56	563	CAPT	MALICK	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
57	542	CAPT	CHERIF M B	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
58	523	CAPT	TALL S ND	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
59	524	CAPT	ARIS O	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
60	533	MAJ	BABACAR N D	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
61	566	MAJ	DIOF M	SENEGAL	KIGALI	
62	727	LT COL	MASANGANISE M	ZIMBABWE	R-MULINDI	
63	721	CAPT	CHIPETA R	ZIMBABWE	KIGALI	
64	725	MAJ	NDEBELE J H B	ZIMBABWE	KIGALI	
65	724	CAPT	MALIGWA D	ZIMBABWE	KIGALI	
66	726	MAJ	CHITERA N A	ZIMBABWE	KIGALI	
67	722	CAPT	NDLOVU T	ZIMBABWE	KIGALI	
68	734	MAJ	MURIRO T	ZIMBABWE	R-MULINDI	
69	730	MAJ	MOYO T	ZIMBABWE	R-MULINDI	
70	733	CAPT	NDLOVU L	ZIMBABWE	KIGALI	
71	B0006	COL	YAACHE	GHANA	KIGALI	

## RWANDA - Draft Presidential Statement


The Security Council is absolutely appalled and horrified over continuing reports of indiscriminate slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and various other localities in Rwanda. It notes that according to reliable reports, transmitted to the Council by the Secretary-General in his Special Report (S/1994/470), the current wave of killings was started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, joined by elements of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF). The interim Government, established on April 8, has been stating its efforts to establish its authority over the unruly soldiers who were also responsible for the brutal murders of Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Prime Minister, and several other ministers, of the provisional Government that stemmed from the initial implementation of the Arusha Accords, as well as for the deaths of 10 members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR.

In addition to information available from the Secretary-General, the Security Council has considered information available from well-respected NGO's. All this information points to one thing: the horrors of Rwanda's killing fields has few precedents in the recent history of the world. The Security Council reaffirms that the systematic killing of any ethnic group, with intent to destroy it in whole or in part constitutes an act of genocide as defined by relevant provisions of international law.

The Security Council points out that genocide cannot be condoned or tolerated, let alone justified, under any circumstances: not by civil war, not by the death of a leader, whatever suspicions surround it, not by past history. The Council further points out that an important body of international law exists that deal with perpetrators of genocide.

The Security Council warns the interim Government of Rwanda of the responsibility it bears for immediately reining in and discipline all elements of the RGF and of the Presidential Guards responsible for the brutalities. The Council also calls upon the Interim Government of Rwanda to investigate all acts of genocide and to severely punish those responsible for their commission. The Council furthermore expresses its hope that the RPF that are currently engaging the RGF and the Presidential Guard will not resort to comparable countermeasures.





LA ZONE DEMILITARISEE  
(24 septembre 1993)

Annexe I

S/26488  
Français  
Page 15

CNR 225

05

- 3 -

- a. In accordance with resolution 912 (1994), all mediation efforts would be continued with the objective of reaching a ceasefire agreement and restoring the peace process.
- b. At the time of deployment of UNAMIR-A an agreed ceasefire would not be in place.
- c. The revised mandate of UNAMIR-A would not envisage enforcement actions.
- d. Because of the need to stabilize the security situation in Rwanda as quickly as possible, deployment of UNAMIR-A would have to be rapidly effected.
- e. Kigali airport, which is critical to the deployment and sustainment of the mission, would be established as a "neutral zone" with the consent of the parties. The Security Council should, therefore, call on the parties to declare Kigali airport a "neutral zone" under the exclusive control of the United Nations.
- f. Lines of communication through neighbouring countries would remain open and available to support UNAMIR-A throughout the mandate of the mission.
- g. It is expected that UNAMIR-A would undertake its tasks for a period of four months from the date of initial deployment, on the understanding that UNAMIR's mandate would be reviewed by the Council as necessary and, in particular, following an agreement on a ceasefire.

#### Concept of Operations

7. The task of UNAMIR-A under an expanded mandate would be to provide support and ensure safety for displaced and other affected persons and for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNAMIR-A would depend primarily on deterrence to carry out its tasks and would resort to force only in self-defence.

Why are we accepting all this?  
This is being detected to us by the belligerents and we are accepting it.

Have we seen any point in signs towards this. It is only a dream.

We want to remain in this poor situation for four months to enable us see a winner or what?



# UNAMIR FORCE HQ

## FC OFFICE

FC - MGEN. DALLAIRE (CAN)  
MA - MAJ. BEARDSLEY (CAN) \*  
ADC - CAPT. BABACAR (SEN) \*  
Driver - SGT ADJEI (GHA)  
Bodyguard - SGT AZINADAGA (GHA)

## DFC OFFICE

DFC/COS - BGEN. ANYIDHOHO (GHA)  
MA - LCDR ZOWONOO (GHA) \*  
ADC - CAPT. NSIAH (GHA)  
Driver - CPL NORVIHOHO (GHA)

## PERSONNEL

CMPO - MAJ. BUSSIERE (CAN)  
DCMPO - MAJ. SENCHEM (GHA)  
CLK - SSGT ARHIN (GHA)

## OPERATIONS

COO - COL YAACHE (GHA)  
DCOO - MAJ QUIST (GHA)  
SDO - MAJ LADZEKPO (GHA)  
DO/AIR - \_\_\_\_\_  
DO/SIGS - CAPT. ACHEANPONG (GHA)  
DO/ENGR - CAPT. RACINE (CAN)  
MIO - CAPT. DEME (SEN) \*  
CLK - SSGT ARTHUR (GHA)

## LOGISTICS

CLO - LCOL. NYARKO (GHA) \*  
DCLO - MAJ. LAPLANTE (CAN)  
SO - LCDR REID (CAN)  
CLK - SSGT DEBRAH (GHA)

## HUMANITARIAN

CHAO - MAJ. PAZIK (POL) \*  
HAO(EDP) - MAJ. STEC (POL) \*  
HAO - MAJ. McNEIL (CAN)  
HAO - CAPT. KOTIA (GHA)

## PLANS

CPLANS - LCOL. \_\_\_\_\_ (CAN)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. ANNAN (GHA)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. KONNEY (GHA)

# UNAMIR FORCE HQ

## FC OFFICE

FC - MGEN. DALLAIRE (CAN)  
MA - MAJ. BEARDSLEY (CAN) \*  
ADC - \_\_\_\_\_ ( )  
Driver - SGT ADJEI (GHA)  
Bodyguard - SGT AZINADAGA (GHA)

CAPT BABACAR

## DFC OFFICE

DFC/COS - BGEN. ANYIDHOHO (GHA)  
LCDR MA - MAJ. ZOWONOO (GHA) \*  
ADC - CAPT. NSIAH (GHA)  
Driver - CPL NORVIHOHO (GHA)

## PERSONNEL

CMPO - MAJ. BUSSIERE (CAN)  
DCMPO - MAJ. SENCHEM (GHA)  
CLK - SSGT ARHIN (GHA)

## OPERATIONS

COO - COL YAACHE (GHA)  
DCOO - MAJ QUIST (GHA)  
SDO - MAJ LADZEKPO (GHA)  
DO/AIR - SQNLDR MOTTALEB (BAN)  
DO/SIGS - CAPT. ACHEANPONG (GHA)  
DO/ENGR - CAPT. RACINE (CAN)  
MIO - CAPT. DEME (SEN) \*  
CLK - SSGT ARTHUR (GHA)

## LOGISTICS

CLO - LCOL. NYARKO (GHA) \*  
DCLO - MAJ. LAPLANTE (CAN)  
SO - LCDR REID (CAN)  
CLK - SSGT DEBRAH (GHA)

## HUMANITARIAN

CHAO - MAJ. PAZIK (POL) \*  
HAO(EDP) - MAJ. STEC (POL) \*  
HAO - MAJ. McNEIL (CAN)  
HAO - CAPT. KOTIA (GHA)


## PLANS

CPLANS - LCOL. \_\_\_\_\_ (CAN)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. ANNAN (GHA)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. KONNEY (GHA)

Canada - 8  
Ghana - 18  
Poland - 2  
Senegal - 2  
Unknown - 1  
31

\* UNMO

FORCE HQ  
25  
MULTINATIONAL



110  
40  
150  
105  
255  
31  
286

LIST OF REAR PARTY OFFICERS - UNMOS

SER	UNID	RANK	NAME	NATIONALITY	APPT/LOC	REMARKS
1	B004	COL	TIKOCA ID	FIJI	MILOB HQ	CMO
2	626	LT COL	MUSTAFIZUR RAHMAN	BANGLADESH	FHQ(DCOO)	ATT FHQ
3	693	LT COL	ILIYA S	NIGERIA	MILOB HQ	COO
4	596	LT COL	NYAAKU P K	GHANA	FHQ(LOG)	ATT FHQ
5	618	MAJ	TRAORE	MALI	MILOB HQ	LOGO
6	547	MAJ	D IBRAHIM	SENEGAL	FHQ LO	
7	502	MAJ	ASAD R KHAN	BANGLADESH	MILOB HQ	OPS
8	B0023	MAJ	MECZKA J W	POLAND	FHQ	
9	B0022	MAJ	BAYER J	POLAND	FHQ	
10	B0021	MAJ	PAZIK M	POLAND	FHQ	HUM OPS
11	B0028	MAJ	CHUDY R	POLAND	FHQ	
12	591	MAJ	KIRSCHNER HARALD	AUSTRIA	MILOB HQ	OPS
13	694	MAJ	BRAUN K H	AUSTRIA	RPF LO	CND
14	B0034	MAJ	S STEFAN	POLAND	FHQ	
15	533	MAJ	BABACAR N D	SENEGAL	MILOB HQ	OPS
16	554	MAJ	ANWARUL KADIR	BANGLADESH	HUM	HT-2
17	552	MAJ	KOUMOU M A	CONGO	HUM	HT-3
18	573	MAJ	BEARDSLY B	CANADA	FHQ	MA-FC
19	526	MAJ	MOIGNY P V	CONGO	RGF LO	MILLES COLLIN
20	667	SQN LDR	GAJERE A A	NIGERIA	A LO	AIRPORT
21	504	LT CDR	ZOWONOO G	GHANA	FHQ	MA-DFC
22	567	SQN LDR	ATM NAZRUL ISLAM	BANGLADESH	A LO	AIRPORT
23	635	SQN LDR	HASSAN M NAIM	BANGLADESH	A LO	AIRPORT
24	520	CAPT	M SECK	SENEGAL	FHQ LO	
25	603	CAPT	AYER S	GHANA	RGF LO	MILLES COLLIN
26	724	CAPT	MALIGWA D	ZIMBABWE	HUM	HT-3
27	545	CAPT	NKATOUDI JP	CONGO	FHQ LO	SRSG
28	531	CAPT	ILOKI D	CONGO	FHQ LO	SRSG
29	542	CAPT	SHERIF M B	SENEGAL	A LO	AIRPORT
30	528	CAPT	OLESSONGO O	CONGO	A LO	AIRPORT
31	651	CAPT	NAKOURA K N	TOGO	HUM	HT-1
32	650	CAPT	KEMENCE O	TOGO	TO CMO	HT-1
33	540	CAPT	A DEME	SENEGAL	FHQ	
34	613	CAPT	DANQUAH N O K	GHANA	RPF LO	CND
35	622	CAPT	TOGOLA K	MALI	FHQ	
36	686	CAPT	BLEBOO WKC	GHANA	MILOB HQ	OPS


37 CAPT FAYE SENEGAL

38 CAPT DIAGNE SENEGAL



# SUGGESTED 250 MAN ORGANIZATION


## OPTION ONE





SUGGESTED 250 MAN ORGANIZATION

OPTION TWO



# SUGGESTED 250 MAN ORGANIZATION

FORCE COMMANDER	MGEN DALLAIRE
MILITARY ASSISTANT	MAJ BEARDSLEY
ADC	CAPT KUMI
DRIVER	GHANA SGT
BODYGUARD	GHANA SGT

DFC\COS	BGEN ANYIDHO
MILITARY ASSISTANT	LCDR GODSON
ADC	CAPT NSIAH
DRIVER	CPL LUCAS
<i>Clerk</i>	<i>SGT DEBRAH</i>

PERSONNEL	OPERATIONS	LOGISTICS	LIAISON	HUMANITARIAN
CMPO BUSSIERE	COO - MOOEN	CLO NYARKO	CLO MAJMOYNE	SHO MAJ PAZIK
CLERK	DCOO- QUIST	DCLO PLANTE	LO MAJMUSA	HO (EDP) MAJSTEC
	INT O-DEME		LO MAJSENGAL	CLERK
<i>Can Lt Condr</i>	SDO- NAZMUL	TPT	LO CAPTAPPIAH	
<i>Reid.</i>	DO (AIR) MOTTALEE	SUP		
<i>Capt Botong</i>	DO (SIGS) READ	MOVCON		
<i>Acheampong</i>	DO (ENGR) MACZKA	MED		
	<i>CLERK</i>	<i>CLERK</i>		

GHANA COMPANY 100 (AIRPORT/BELGIAN CAMP OR TOWER BUILDING AND FORCE RESERVE WITH APCs)

TUNISIAN COMPANY 60 (MERIDIEN AND FORCE HQ WITH COMDT AS CAMP COMDT OF BOTH LOCATIONS)

MILOB GP GP HQ OF 5 AND 5 TEAMS OF 4 UNMO EACH SELECTED BY CMO.

POLITICAL STAFF 5

CIVILIAN STAFF 10

25

60

100

23

---

208

*7 when the 250*

Ghana Company 120 ✓

Tunisian pl 30 ✓

Milob 40 ✓

10

11

23

7

---

51

120

30


40

---

241

Driver Sgt Adjei E

Bodyguard Sgt Azmadaga M



MAP NO. 3807.1 UNITED NATIONS  
SEPTEMBER 1993

LA ZONE DEMILITARISEE  
(24 septembre 1993)

Annexe I

# UNAMIR FORCE HQ

## FC OFFICE

FC - MGEN. DALLAIRE (CAN)  
MA - MAJ. BEARDSLEY (CAN) \*  
ADC - CAPT. BABACAR (SEN) \*  
Driver - SGT ADJEI (GHA)  
Bodyguard - SGT AZINADAGA (GHA)

## DFC OFFICE

DFC/COS - BGEN. ANYIDHOHO (GHA)  
MA - LCDR ZOWONOO (GHA) \*  
ADC - CAPT. NSIAH (GHA)  
Driver - CPL NORVIHOHO (GHA)

## PERSONNEL

CMPO - MAJ. BUSSIERE (CAN)  
DCMPO - MAJ. SENCHEM (GHA)  
CLK - SSGT ARHIN (GHA)

## OPERATIONS

COO - COL MOEEN (BAN)  
DCOO - MAJ QUIST (GHA)  
SDO - MAJ NAZMUL (BAN)  
DO/AIR - SQNLDR MOTTALEB (BAN)  
DO/SIGS - CAPT. ACHEANPONG (GHA)  
DO/ENGR - CAPT. RACINE (CAN)  
MIO - CAPT. DEME (SEN) \*  
CLK - SSGT ARTHUR (GHA)

## LOGISTICS

CLO - LCOL. NYARKO (GHA) \*  
DCLO - MAJ. LAPLANTE (CAN)  
SO - LCDR READ (CAN)  
CLK - SSGT DEBRAH (GHA)

## HUMANITARIAN


CHAO - MAJ. PAZIK (POL) \*  
HAO(EDP) - MAJ. STEC (POL) \*  
HAO - MAJ. McNEIL (CAN)  
HAO - CAPT. KOTIA (GHA)

## PLANS

CPLANS - LCOL. \_\_\_\_\_ (CAN)  
SO PLANS/ENG - MAJ. MACZKA (POL) \*  
SO PLANS - MAJ. ANNAN (GHA)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. KONNEY (GHA)

\* UNMO





- (1) ALL APC DRIVERS STAY AND TROOPS ARE DRIVER QUALIFIED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE  
(2) TAKEOVER BTR 80  
(3) TOTAL FORCE - 414 ALL RANKS



(12D) VOUS SIGNALE AVOIR TROUVE SUR CADAVRES ENI 9 MACARONS MINUAR AVEC I  
PHOTO DES INTERESSES IL S'AGIT DE : CPL E.DZ OTFE B 5298 - LSA BABA  
ASUMAH B 5167 - LS S OWUSU B 5205 -L/CPL OWUSU BP B 4997 - SGT .  
J. HAMENU B 5173 - BDR ADJEIS B 5046 - LT JR ADI B 5178 - LSEK ARTH  
B 5169 - CPL SIDI MOHAMMED B 5035 (.) VOUS DEMANDE DE DENONCER CETT  
IMPLICATION DE LA MINUAR DANS LE CONFLIT ACTUEL (.) DITS DOC VOUS  
ARRIVENT INCESSAMMENT =/=

NOM DU REDACTEUR :

Pour opérateur

IN

22

19

RT

BAK OUT

(14) Signature de l'officier délégué

Grade

## LEVELS OF READINESS/ALERT

SL	STATUS	UNITS/HQ	MEANING/ACTION
1.	GREEN	All	Normal everyday status.
2.	YELLOW	HQ	a. Planning for next higher status commences. b. Liaison increased. c. VIP visits postponed. d. No leave granted except on compassionate ground.
		Units	a. Precautionary stage. b. Double duties of sentries. c. Night movements restricted. d. Test shelters. e. Stand to/Local alarm practice. f. No leave granted except on compassionate ground. g. Backup comm units/weapons. h. Reserves put on 3 hours notice to move.
3.	RED	HQ	a. General alert. b. VIP visits cancelled. c. No leave granted. d. Emergency movements only. e. Special sitreps to UN HQ. f. Civilian evacuation if situation warrents.
		Units	a. Troops in defensive position. b. Troops in stand to position. c. Reserves put on 1 hour notice. d. No leave granted. e. Troops on duty outside to be with flak jacket on.