



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

23 November 2015

Dear Mr. President,

Pursuant to operative paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 2241 (2015), the Secretariat conducted an assessment of the security planning for Juba during the transition and the appropriate role the United Nations should play in securing key infrastructure in order to protect freedom of movement in the capital. This assessment was undertaken in consultation with the Government of South Sudan. UNMISS troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) were also consulted on its findings.


### 1. Security arrangements planned for the transition

The parties agreed to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA) during two series of negotiations in Addis Ababa in September and October 2015. These arrangements are designed to address the security requirements of the leaders of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Opposition and the Former Detainees when they return to Juba and minimize the risk of security incidents in the capital during the transition. The parties agreed on the composition of forces to remain in Juba during the transition in a follow-up meeting on 3 November 2015.

According to the PCTSA, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) would withdraw to areas 25 km outside of Juba, leaving only a sufficient number of soldiers to guard key government infrastructure. The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (Peace Agreement) also provided for the withdrawal of foreign forces from South Sudan, except for Western Equatoria State, within 45 days of its signing, implying that the Ugandan troops deployed in Juba since early 2014 should be withdrawn.

The parties agreed that 4,830 armed personnel (3,420 for the Government and 1,410 for the SPLM in Opposition) would remain in the capital. These would include: 1,000 Presidential Guards, responsible for protecting the President, the First and Second Vice Presidents, and other key officials; an administrative and logistical battalion, numbering 750 and 840 personnel respectively; 1,320 guards for the Shared Unified Command to be established by the parties; 500 military police; and 170 armed National Security officers who would only be allowed to carry small arms.

His Excellency  
Mr. Matthew Rycroft, CBE  
President of the Security Council  
New York



The remaining personnel, whose number is unspecified, would have to hand their weapons over to the armories. Personnel belonging to the Wildlife Services, the Fire Brigade and prisons officers, whose numbers are also unspecified, would be allowed to remain in Juba. Their arms would also be kept in armories. They would only be allowed to use them when on official duty. According to the 3 November 2015 Agreement, the Shared Unified Command will decide on the status, encampment and deployment of the guards and military police. A total of 3,000 Joint Integrated Police (JIP), comprising 1,500 personnel from each side, will be responsible for the security of persons and civilian installations in Juba, working under the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) decentralized structure. A Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) will verify the numbers and deployment of the above forces in Juba and the state of their armament.

At the time of writing, the Shared Unified Command, the JIP command, and the CTSAMM had not yet been constituted in Juba. No further operational plans on the specific deployments, organization of and division of labor between these forces had been agreed. According to public statements by key ministers, the SPLA would redeploy its excess forces in the vicinity of the seven major access routes into Juba. The JIP units would most likely be responsible for ensuring freedom of movement in the capital. However, precise security arrangements for key civilian infrastructure are yet to be determined. The parties have also jointly appealed to the members of "IGAD Plus" and other regional and international partners to meet urgent financial and resource needs associated with the implementation of the Agreement.

## **2. Most likely security environment during the transition**

The current security arrangements in Juba are under the control of the Government, through the deployment of both military and police forces. However, with the majority of these forces deployed outside Juba, the Government will continue to control access to the capital. No external threat is foreseen against Juba during the transition period.

The Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), have now withdrawn from Juba, in accordance with the August 2015 Peace Agreement. The support provided by the Ugandan forces to the Government during the conflict reinforced the perception of security in the capital. Their withdrawal has not had a noticeable impact so far. The security functions they performed in Juba, including maintaining a deterrent presence at some key sites, have been handed over to the SPLA. This will have to be addressed by the Shared Unified Command and the JIP. The SPLM in Opposition is not believed to have retained organized military units in Juba.

However, several thousand Nuer police officers and soldiers fled the fighting and sought safety and shelter in the UNMISS Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites. Some are still present in the sites today, albeit unarmed and in civilian clothes.



It is expected that some of the Opposition security personnel present in the UNMISS Juba PoC site will join the Opposition's authorized contingent in the capital. However these details are yet to be worked out by the parties.

The Agreement does not address the presence of other South Sudanese ex-combatants, including an unknown number of militia members affiliated with the Sudan Armed Forces who were left behind after the civil war and after South Sudan gained independence, potentially with their weapons.

Most recently, the significant rise in crime has been the main source of insecurity in Juba. This is evident in the increased number of break-ins into the compounds of international non-government organizations and instances of street crime. Armed robberies take place during the day and night. Previous compound robberies seemed to be planned and executed by organized criminals. However, a pattern of more random and opportunistic incidents has emerged. There has also been an increase in incidents involving the use of force. Perpetrators sometimes wear uniforms belonging to the security forces. They also present identification cards from security agencies to gain access to compounds. Street crime outside restaurants and hotels frequented by foreigners, who are often carrying foreign currency, is also on the rise. While crime targeting international compounds is well documented, crime affecting South Sudanese neighbourhoods is more difficult to measure.

Rising crime is at least partially attributable to the rapid deterioration of the economy. The economic slowdown and hyperinflation have contributed to low incomes, an escalating cost of living and high rates of unemployment. The economic forecast for the transition suggests that there will be no improvement. Crime is, therefore, likely to remain a recurrent source of insecurity. This will need to be addressed by the JIP units.

Security incidents in Juba also stem from intercommunal tensions, particularly between victims of the conflict and other internally displaced persons (IDPs) assembled in the UNMISS PoC sites, as well as other communities perceived to be supportive of or sympathetic towards the Government. Currently, approximately 28,000 IDPs are residing in two sites inside and adjacent to the United Nations House in Juba.

Tension in and around the sites is visible. Surrounding neighborhoods, many of which host security personnel and their families, are feared by the IDPs. At the same time, the residents of these neighbourhoods live in fear of the perceived desire for revenge of the IDPs. Both sides suffer from the activities of criminal gangs, many of which include former combatants, who possess crude weapons and small arms. UNMISS conducts frequent and thorough searches to uncover any weapons.

However, the vastness of the sites and their relatively porous perimeters make it exceedingly difficult to uncover weapons hidden inside them or in their vicinity. Several instances of violence between gangs within the sites illustrate that the sites can be extremely unruly and difficult to manage.

In addition to the JIP units, there are three institutions in particular which will play a critical role in maintaining security in Juba during the transition: the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), the CSTAMM and the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). The JOC is designed to be the nerve center for coordinating the movements of authorized security forces, including VIP escorts, monitoring of developments in the capital around the clock, and dispatching JIP units in response to incidents. It should benefit from the constant reporting provided by the CTSAMM monitors and observers, who will be deployed at key locations and will be patrolling throughout the town. The CTSAMM monitors will be responsible for verifying the parties' compliance with the security arrangements in Juba and reporting regularly on the state of armories, as well as the positions of military units and their equipment. In case of any incidents, in addition to deploying police units, CTSAMM leaders will be able to call for political support from the members of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) to contain violence and restore law and order.

The success of the JIPs will depend largely on their initial training, command and control, level of resources and the amount of operating space given to them by the other security forces present in Juba. They will require significant international support. The parties have already asked UNMISS to assist with their standing-up and operationalization, as they have done for the JOC, CTSAMM and JMEC. I have made recommendations to this effect in my Special Report on the review of the UNMISS mandate, including the deployment of up to 100 additional trainers to enable the Mission to perform these support tasks, which would include mentoring, planning assistance and command coordination through co-location. UNMISS could also provide some operational support to the JIPs. Other partners will need to assist with equipment, communications, logistics and administrative support to the units.

In accordance with its protection of civilians mandate, UNMISS conducts joint military and police patrols in Juba to maintain a deterrent and confidence-building presence during the daytime. Plans are being formulated to also conduct night patrols, in an effort to mitigate the risk of incidents in town and deter crime. UNMISS should continue to police and protect the PoC sites, as well as United Nations personnel and assets, in line with the Status of Forces Agreement and its existing mandate.

The Mission is also prepared to deal with possible crisis scenarios. It updates its contingency plans regularly and prepares for the extraction and rescue of civilians in need, within its capabilities. If need be, UNMISS would assist in concentrating international personnel in key locations, protecting them prior to a possible evacuation, and securing access routes as necessary.



### **3. Consultation with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan**

As requested by the Council, the Secretariat sent a team to Juba from 4 to 6 November 2015 to consult with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan on these issues. The Ministers for Defence and Internal Security expressed their full commitment to the implementation of the Agreement.

They stressed that there was no risk or intention of political violence from their side against the leadership of the SPLM in Opposition, the Former Detainees, or the IDPs. They noted that while they did not like the Agreement, they would implement it in good faith. They also stated that the SPLM in Opposition leaders could come with or without their body guards and even seek a third-party protection force if that made them feel more comfortable.

The Ministers noted that while not necessary, the protection forces were nevertheless welcome. In their view, the only insecurity that would affect Juba during the transition would be crime, which is a result of poverty, economic underdevelopment and the legacy of the civil war. They appealed to the United Nations to support the establishment of the JIP units and address the root causes of poverty through the development of infrastructure in the country. They emphasized that UNMISS should have no other role to play in securing Juba other than supporting the JIP units and the Transitional Government of National Unity.

### **4. Conclusions**

The institutions envisaged by PCTSA have not yet been established. It is therefore extremely difficult to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their plans to address the above-mentioned security threats or determine an appropriate role for the United Nations in securing key infrastructure in order to protect freedom of movement in the capital.


There is undoubtedly a risk that there could be violence in the capital during the transition. However, the provisions of the Peace Agreement contain a range of mechanisms designed to mitigate this risk. It is essential that they are properly supported, trained and equipped, and receive the full cooperation of the parties. The security of Juba during the transition will ultimately depend on the parties' commitment to the implementation of their Agreement, their ability to resolve disputes peacefully and, most importantly, their readiness to put the conflict behind them.

In the event of a severe crisis, UNMISS will do its utmost, within its capabilities, to support efforts to respond to such a crisis and protect civilians, United Nations national and international staff and other international personnel under imminent threat of physical violence. It will not, however, be in a position to address such a crisis alone and will need the full support of partners in the "IGAD Plus".

UNMISS is already mandated to support the mitigating mechanisms proposed in the Agreement. With the additional resources requested in my Special Report, the Mission should be in a position to contribute significantly to their operationalization. The support of other partners will also be necessary to guarantee that these mechanisms perform their agreed functions efficiently and professionally. UNMISS TCCs and PCCs have been consulted on this assessment and concur with its conclusions.

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Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
BAN Ki-moon

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Executive Office of the Secretary-General  
Cabinet du Secrétaire général

 **PRIORITY**

To: DSG (through ODCD),

Please find attached for your approval and SG's signature a letter addressed to the President of SC, on the assessment of security planning for Juba, South Sudan.

The letter is due to the Council by Monday, 23 November along with the two SG reports that have already been submitted for clearance.



Political Unit  
20 November 2015

Received in ODSG

20 November 2015

Seen by:

ll. FZ


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Note to the Deputy Secretary-General

**Secretary-General's letter to the Security Council on the assessment of security planning for Juba, South Sudan**

1. Security Council resolution 2241 (2015) requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of South Sudan and respective troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs), to conduct an assessment of security planning in Juba, and the appropriate role for the United Nations in providing support for security to key infrastructure in order to protect freedom of movement in Juba and report back to the Security Council in 45 days.
2. In light of the above, the assessment was conducted jointly by UNMISS and this Headquarters. Subsequently, a DPKO team visited Juba from 4 to 6 November and held consultations with the Government of South Sudan on security planning for Juba. ASG Mulet conducted the requisite consultations with the TCCs/PCCs on 13 November in New York.
3. Given that the parties are yet to finalize their plans for the security of Juba and the Government of South Sudan remains opposed to any direct role for the United Nations in this regard, it is our considered opinion that the United Nations should limit its role to supporting the institutions stipulated in the peace agreement. The same holds true for any direct support to the parties which should be offered as and when requested by them.
4. The conclusions of the abovementioned assessment are presented in a draft letter to the President of the Security Council which is attached. The letter is due to the Security Council by 23 November. Accordingly, we would be grateful for the approval and subsequent signature of the Secretary-General at his earliest convenience.

Herve Ladsous  
19 November 2015

Cc: Mr. Khare  
Mr. Drennan

*DL/06/001; PRG/04/006*