

UNAMIR

G3 OPERATIONS/ PLANS

10 DEC 1994 - 28 JAN 1995

OPERATION OVERTURE , OPERATION RETOUR
AND OPERATION HOPE .

[3 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 135

FILE 6

ACC. 1998/0283

3000.15

FROM: G3 (OPS)

TO: ZAMBATT

DATE: 27 JAN 95

SUBJECT: CONVEYANCE OF IDPs - OP RETOUR

1. In order to give prior info to tps in Home Communes, you are requested to fwd the following details prior to mov of convoys daily.

- a. Name of tgt camps from where IDPs are being moved.
- b. Number of vehicles and number of IDPs in each convoy.
- c. ETD from tgt camp and ETA in Home commune.
- d. Name of Home Commune to which IDPs are being transported.

2. Ack.



UNAMIR - MINUAR
NEWS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR-95.008

January 24, 1995

Seen

25/1

OPERATION "RETOUR"
OVER 19 000 PEOPLE BACK HOME

KIGALI, RWANDA -- The consolidated effort by the United Nations, Non-Government Organisations (NGO) and the Rwandan Government to bring displaced people back to their homes is continuing to show success. In its first month, Operation "RETOUR" has managed the safe transport of over 19 000 people to their communes of origins.

Operation "RETOUR" was officially launched in late December 1994 by the Special Representative to the Secretary General for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, after a long, detailed and careful planning process. This consolidated approach aims at offering to hundreds of thousands of displaced Rwandans an alternative to the life in camps. Those who wish to go back home are provided with the basic tools, support and aid which they require to resume a normal life back in their home villages.

The dissolving of the displaced person camps in south western Rwanda currently under way, is the first step in settling the humanitarian problem which has been overshadowing the country. Displaced persons in camps are routinely subjected to mischievous misinformation by those who oppose the normalisation process presently taking place in the country. Displaced Rwandans now have the freedom to choose. After spending months in camps, they can safely travel back to their home communes and finally regain their dignity by rebuilding their lives and their country.

Thrust
802 ops
26/1

- 30 -

Note to editors: For more information, plse contact the UNAMIR military public affairs officer, Capt S. Grenier in Kigali at (212) 963-9906 ext 11124.

UNAMIR

INTEGRATED OPERATIONS CENTRE
(IOC)

Kigali

23 January 1995

OPERATION RETOUR - WEEKLY REPORT

PERIOD 16 TO 22 JANUARY 1995

SUMMARY

Numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) transported under Operation Retour increased. No major security incidents were reported. Open Relief Centres appeared to function relatively well. The information campaign was intensified, with visits and leaflet drops. The former appear to have increased the IDPs' willingness to return to their homes.

NUMBERS

During the reporting period 6221 IDPs were transported from camps under Operation Retour. This represents an increase of 4211 on the previous week. The daily totals were as follows:

16 Jan - 1291	19 Jan 1949	22 Jan - Sunday (nil)
17 Jan - 575	20 Jan 1353	
18 Jan - 825	21 Jan 228	

Cyanika camp is fast reducing in size: it is hoped that this will be the first major camp to empty under Operation Retour.

There are unconfirmed reports of many people walking from the camps to their homes during the reporting period, particularly from Cyanika and Rukondo camps. It was confirmed that some others have walked from Cyanika camp to southern camps, notably Ndago, Munini and Kamana. The intention often stated is to continue to Burundi.

The total number of internally displaced people moved under Operation Retour since the operation began on 29 December 1994 now stands at 14846.

TRANSPORT

Transport was focused on the Cyanika, Rukondo and Kibeho camps, with some trucks also provided to the smaller Maheresho camp on 2 days during the reporting period.

Transport from Kibeho was suspended on 18 January pending a decision on whether to vaccinate the camp population against meningitis. An alternative response to the meningitis cases was decided on by the Ministry of Health, allowing transport from Kibeho to resume on 19 January.

SECURITY

Security liaison between RPA and UNAMIR continued to improve, resulting in a reduction in the number of RPA roadblocks. No major security incidents were recorded.

OPEN RELIEF CENTRES (ORCs)

Eleven out of a planned thirteen ORCs are open in communes receiving the largest numbers of returning IDPs. Open ORCs are at Runyinya, Gishamvu, Nyakizu, Kigembe, Ntyazo (Butare prefecture); Ntongwe and Kigoma (Gitarama prefecture - facilities still to be completed); Kanzenze, Gashora, Ngenda (Kigali Rural prefecture); and Sake (Kibungo prefecture). ORCs yet to open are planned for Masango and Murama (Gitarama prefecture).

Few problems are reported. ORCs vary in the services that they provide; all provide a presence designed to build the confidence of returning IDPs.

INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

The information campaign is central to increasing the confidence of IDPs to return home. It continued to be strengthened.

During the reporting period visits were organised between camps and communes. IDPs currently living in camps were enabled to visit their home areas. Local officials were assisted to visit camps to encourage people to go home.

Leaflets and loud hailers were used to inform camp populations of visits and transport arrangements.

COORDINATION

Most day-to-day organisation of Operation Retour takes place on the ground in Butare and Gikongoro. Since 12 January, however, overall coordination has been from the Integrated Operations Centre (IOC), located in the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration (MINIREISO) in Kigali.

The IOC is designed as a centre in which the government and the humanitarian community, both local and international, can coordinate the safe and speedy return of IDPs. It provides a focus for discussion, decision and action for all concerned Ministries, UN agencies and NGOs as well as UNAMIR and the RPA. MINIREISO has the lead role. Development of the IOC's personnel, communications, procedures and physical offices continues alongside the coordination of Operation Retour.

OPERATION OVERTURE
PLAN TO CLEAR THE
CRIMINAL ELEMENT FROM KIBEHO AND NDAGO DP CAMPS

Mission

1. To clear the criminal element from Kibeho and Ndago DP camps in order to establish a security environment which will encourage DP repatriation.

Execution

2. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA battalions will form the cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will conduct the search. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR company will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A two-three platoon support/reserve element will be located at Kibeho. A preliminary operation to increase UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

Grouping and Tasks

3. Grouping General grouping is as follows:

a. Tactical HQ - HQ UNAMIR;

b. Remaining OPCON:

- (1) Inf Bn (-) - two companies; *Filthubalt - Tac. HQ*
- (2) Inf Bn (-) - two companies; *TWO Tac HQ*
- (3) Inf Bn (-) - two companies; *Chambalt - Tac HQ*
- (4) Two independent infantry companies; *Ched, & Zambalt*
- (5) One independent infantry company (-) - two platoons; *Nicoy two Tac HQ*
- (6) 20 x MILOB Teams; *Estb the 6 control units.*
- (7) MP Coy (-); *—*
- (8) Logistic element (tpt); *Qd.*
- (9) Casualty clearing Post; *FMD*
- (9) CIVPOL Detachment;
- (11) UN Agency Detachment (UNHCR, UNREO, Human Rights Commission)
- (12) Interpreter Detachment (30 pers). *CLC to Inter Com & Info.*

b. In Cooperation:

- 2x
- (1) Two RPA Bn; ~~Get~~ give them motorole on Comd net.
 - (2) 30 x RPA liaison teams. ~~F80~~ separate channel for op.
4. Tasks: one liaison team per station.

a. UNAMIR element:

- (1) Establish preliminary presence in the camps; Gharbail to increase presence before opening.
- (2) Coordinate the operation; PH in as announced camp.
- (3) Secure FUP;
- (4) Clear company objectives;
- (5) Arrest criminals;
- (6) Confiscate unauthorised weapons, equipment and stores;
- (7) Provide blocking force;
- (8) Route marking/traffic control;
- (9) Establish, secure and man detainee screening/holding facility;
- (10) Augment 1st line transport resources to transport troops, detainees, rations and water;
- (11) Treat and evacuate casualties;
- (12) Conduct medical screening of detainees;
- (13) Conduct liaison and monitor proceedings;
- (14) Maintain post operation presence in the camps.

b. RPA element:

- (1) Cordon camps;
- (2) Arrest and disarm escapees;
- (3) Provide liaison teams;
- (4) Identify criminals/wanted persons;
- (5) Conduct screening process under UN supervision;
- (6) Escort detainees to designated detention facility;
- (7) Provide post operation security.

5. Coordinating Instructions

a. Timings

- (1) Planning:

- (a) D Day - 14 Dec 94 - Op commences;
 - (b) D-1 - Move to blocking/cordon positions/FUP;
 - (c) D-2 - Move to assy area;
 - (d) D-3- Coy comd O Gp; ,
 - (e) D-4 - Coy level recon;
 - (f) D-5 - DFC/Bn Comd recon;
 - (g) D-6 - FC O Gp;
 - (h) D-7 - FC approval of OPORD;
 - (i) D-8 - Spt plans complete;
 - (j) D-9 - FC approval of outline plan;
 - (k) D-10 - Staff guidance on outline concept.
- (2) Operational:
- (a) H-3hrs - Cordon in position;
 - (b) H-1hr - FUP secure;
 - (c) H-30 - Occupy FUP/blocking force in position;
 - (d) H Hr - 1st light D Day;
 - (e) H + 3hrs - Holding/screening facility established;
 - (f) L Hr - H + 48.
- b. Control measures (indicative only):
- (1) Boundaries, objectives, report lines - see overlay;
 - (2) Routes - Green (primary), red (secondary);
 - (3) Axis of search - Main road Kibeho/Ndago.

Administration and Logistics

6. General Adminord to be issued seperately by 10 Dec.
7. Key Factors The exact timing of D Day will be largely dependant on the logistic capacity to support the operation;
- a. Transport capacity;
 - (1) Requirement to deploy approx 1200 pers plus stores and equipment.
 - b. Requirement for dumping (defence stores, general stores, rations and water) at Butare should be considered;

- c. Aeromedivac (estb LZ).

Command and Signals

- 7. Location of HQ. Tac HQ - Kibeho (see overlay);
- 8. Control One C&C helo is to be dedicated to Tac HQ.
- 9. Communications
 - a. Spt plan to be developed;
 - b. Frequencies and Callsigns - CEOI for the operation to be issued.
 - c. Loan of 2 x Motorola and spare batteries to RPA BHQ
- 10. Liaison
 - a. CLO to develop liaison support plan (Annex ?).

RETURN OF SQN LDR JANIUREK TO RWANDA

1. Sqn Ldr J A Janiurek was recently posted back to the UK at the end of his three month UN tour with UNAMIR. HQ UNAMIR has now requested that he be returned to Rwanda. This minute seeks to secure his services for a further short, critical period in a project in which he was a major player.
2. As well as his primary duty as SO2 G3 Air in HQ UNAMIR, Sqn Ldr Janiurek became involved in a secondary duty, which latterly consumed much of his time. This was to be effectively 2IC to Lt Col Mullarkey, the British Officer responsible for Op RETOUR.
3. Op RETOUR is the combined Government of Rwanda/United Nations strategic plan to restore Rwanda's infrastructure, the nub of which is the return of the bulk of Rwanda's 2.6 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), to their homes. The operation was conceived by Lt Col Mullarkey who has further been given the responsibility of implementing it. Planning started in early November and the operation commenced on 29 December 1994.
4. The Operation is progressing well and there is a slow building of momentum. To date, some 20,000 IDPs have been moved from the camps, and the plan is in a fragile state. Principal problem areas are at Government/UN interface level, in the political and organisational dimensions, and in the information campaign which seeks to encourage the people to leave the camps through confidence building.
5. On the UNAMIR staff of the operation, there are particular skill areas which are incomplete. These lie particularly in the analysis and coordination functions, an area in which Sqn Ldr Janiurek proved to be particularly adept. The requirement is to advocate a range of complex solutions within a coordinated framework, frequently with little preparation time. Inevitably this involves a thorough understanding of the Operation and the agility to put numerous component ideas into practical effect, with very little direction.
6. This process is personality driven and requires a very high level of commitment. Further it utilises a network of contacts throughout Government Ministries, UN Agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations. Sqn Ldr Janiurek had developed this network to a considerable extent; his departure has left a gap in the "corporate memory", particularly involving the genesis of the operation.
7. It is understood that Sqn Ldr Janiurek would be available immediately to assist in Op RETOUR. The requirement would be for a short deployment, in order to improve his functional area in the short term, and then to hand over to a suitable successor. A month would probably be sufficient, but given that Lt Col Mullarkey and Capt Moorhouse are leaving on 6 Mar 95, this might also be an appropriate moment for Sqn Ldr Janiurek to leave.
8. Because of the importance of this task, HQ UNAMIR has agreed to fund travel and other expenses. Sqn Ldr Janiurek would be established in the SO2 G3 Plans post in HQ UNAMIR.
9. This is a high profile appointment which demonstrates again the high value work which British officers have contributed to UNAMIR. As it will have further positive effects on the British image in Rwanda, at very little cost, and because of the short duration involved in the deployment, it is recommended that the UK accede to this UNAMIR request.

② OIC Op Retour

1. CSS is unable to provide funding for travel.
2. Only option would be to indicate that he is unique indiv that is only one to fill this post and justify to HGen & UNNY by FC/SRG. This would be difficult, time consuming (through PMRNY) and likely unsuccessful. At DCOS ops 24.1

From: DCOS OPS

File No: 3000.15/1(Ops)

To: TAC HQ BUTARE
SECTOR 4A(N)
SECTOR 4A(S)
ZAMBATT
UNREO KIGALI
IOC CELL
FORCE PAO

Date: 20 JAN 95

Subject: OP RETOUR INFO CAMPAIGN

1. In support of Op Retour, UNAMIR has accepted to coord the vocal and print part of the current info campaign. Force PAO will be in-charge of the campaign.

2. Zambatt will provide two Public Relations mobile teams for this op. Each team will comprise of the following:

- a. One light veh.
- b. One driver.
- c. One Co-driver.
- d. Two armed escorts.
- e. One/two interpreters (to be provided by UNREO/IOC).

3. One of the two co-drivers will be a senior NCO to lead the two PR teams and coord their activities. Each team will have an interpreter who will use loud hailers to read messages to the DPs. The messages will be prepared by the Force PAO and forwarded to Tac HQ Butare and Zambatt.

4. This campaign will commence on 23 Jan 95 and will last for a period of four weeks. The PR teams are requested to draw four loud hailers with spare batteries from Tac HQ Butare by 22 Jan 95.

5. Both the PR teams will be present at Gikongoro landing zone at 0730 hrs on 23 Jan 95 to receive a briefing from the Force PAO after which they will move to the camps and commence the op.

6. Acknowledge.

Delivered
AS 20/1

Thur
PO2 OPS
23/1



From: Col K M Tutt
DCOS (Sp)
HQ UNAMIR

Extn 11109


To: FMO, Camp Commandant
Info: COS, DCOS(Ops), OP RETOUR IOC, CTO

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG 6.1


Date: 20 Jan 95


Subject: MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR OP RETOUR

1. Project Manager and Transport Manager. In discussion with DCOS(Ops) it has been agreed that support Branch would find replacements for the current two officers deployed within the Integrated Operations centre for Op RETOUR. I would like FMO to confirm that he would support the possible use of up to two replacement Australian Officers on this task, it may in the end only require one.
2. Clerical Support. The ability of the IOC to function effectively is dependent upon good clerical support, Camp commandant is to advise if there is a possibility of detaching a Force HQ clerk from the future central registry to undertake this key task.
3. Transport. The current transport used within the IOC by the Support Branch officers is to be handed over to their successors in the IOC. Any additional transport requirements will have to be staffed to the vehicle establishment committee within the next week.


K M TUTT
Col
DCOS (Sp)


23/1


802 OPS
21/1


21/1



UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: SRSG, FC

From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline

Info: DFC, COS, DCOS Ops, DCOS Sp
UN HR FOR (one copy each for Mr Assaied and Team
Leader Gikongoro)
FMO (I would be grateful for your comment on the
credibility of the change in numbers
reported at paragraph 4b.)

Date: 19 Jan 95

File: FPM/5

Subject: OPERATION HOPE - 5TH REPORT ON THE HANDLING OF
DETAINEES BY RWANDAN CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1. Today, in the company of an HRFOR field officer (Miss Stacey White) and an interpreter, I visited Mr Aloys Havugiyaremye, the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro Prison and discussed the 44 people taken into detention by UNAMIR during Op HOPE. I learnt that one of the detainees (together with a prisoner not connected with HOPE) escaped from custody on 11 Jan; the HRFOR officer was already aware of the escape - although not that it had included a HOPE detainee; there is no reason to suppose that there is anything sinister in our loss of contact with this individual. The other 43 detainees are all still held in Gikongoro Prison.

2. Progress to Date. The prosecutor returned to Gikongoro from his visit to Kigali (from 30 Dec 94 to Mon 16 Jan 95) and has not made a great deal of progress. A schedule of visits has now been drawn up, however, beginning in earnest on 23 Jan using transport and escorts provided by ZAMBATT and coordinated by the HRFOR officer.

3. Conditions in the Prison. I was able to tour the prison and found that:

a. Conditions have improved vastly in the time since my earlier visits; floors have been cleared of litter, swept and scrubbed, walls are about to be painted and the overall climate is much more hygienic.

b. The prison is considerably more crowded - with 197 inmates, up more than 50 since my last visit - although the population is well below the theoretical ICRC maximum (that would depend on the installation of bunk beds).

c. During the day, the 43 are still allowed to mix freely with other prisoners.


The increase in prisoners may result from the Minister of Justice's new policy of moving inmates to the prisons nearest their home communes.

4. The Condition of the Detainees. I was able to greet and speak individually to every one of the 43. They were, for the most part, in good heart and communicative.

a. Complaints. Some complained that they do not know whether or not their families know where they are (although some talked of having sent mail and it is known that ICRC has supervised a mail-shot to families) because they have received no mail or visitors. The lack of visitors has a bearing on the other principal complaint; that of a lack of food - bearing in mind that it is normal for families to provide food for inmates in Rwandan jails. Notwithstanding this complaint, I was told that they receive a hot meal once daily. ICRC continues to monitor conditions and will be asked to check on the notification of families.

b. Medical Concerns. The prison nurse reported that there is no dysentery cases in the prison and only 3 of malaria. (There were 5 and 30 sufferers respectively according to ICRC when I visited on 30 Dec 94.)

5. Next Visit. I have asked to visit the prison again on 9 Feb and will produce another report subsequently.



M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRIORITY PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
OF DE	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO				
	181820	B	JAN 95						
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE									
<p>FROM — DE Tac HQ</p> <p>TO — A UNHQ OPS HAC</p> <p>INFO : MILOB GP HQ</p> <p>SUBJECT : OP RETOUR</p> <p>1. IDPs WILL ARRIVE AT KAZENZE AND MARABA COMMUNES ON 19 JAN 95 FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING FROM RUKONDO AND CYANIKA CAMPS.</p> <p>2. IDPs WILL BE TRANSPORTED IN ZAMBATT TRUCKS AND DROP OFF POINTS AT COMMUNE OFFICES. REQUIRE ESCORT AND TRANSPORT TO THEIR SECTORS IF POSSIBLE.</p> <p>3. DRIVERS WILL PICK IDPs AT COMMUNE OFFICES ON FRIDAY 20 JAN 95 BACK TO THEIR CAMPS</p> <p>4. DRIVERS WILL PASS NIGHT 19/20 AT KIGAH. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO ARRANGE TPT AND ESCORT AS NEC.</p> <p>5. ETA KAZENZE IS 191000 B JAN 95 AND MARABA 190900 B JAN 95</p> <p>6. PLEASE CONTACT GORAN FOR UNREG FOR KAZENZE ORC AND CHENTALE FOR MARABA COMMUNE</p>									
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION									
<p>Copies for HAC and MILOB GP HQ dispatched to Capt</p> <p>202 Pse make MILOB 15/1</p>									
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU			TEL — TEL		RX BY Capt MAWU		
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR									
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU			TEL — TEL				
SIGNATURE					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				
Actioned									



UNAMIR HQ

FROM:

TPT COORD IOC

TO:

DCOS OPS
DCOS SP

FOR INFORMATION:

FC
DFC
COS
IOC
A/DCOS SP
CLOGO

DATE:

18 January 1995

SUBJECT:

UNAMIR TPT SPT TO OP RETOUR

1. Apparently there has been some discussion of withdrawal of UNAMIR transport support from Op Retour. This minute is intended to outline the case for continued support. The aim of Op Retour, in simple terms, is to return Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) to their home communes with dignity, in safety and before forced camp closures by the RPA. The operation has the support of the UN Secretary General and is considered to be a top priority of the SRSg and, as such, has the full support of the Force Commander UNAMIR.
2. Given the number of IDPs to be moved, it is accepted that there is not enough road transport to be able to move them home in the short term. Rather, the intention is to create an environment where there will be a natural impetus for IDPs to move themselves home.
3. Similarly, in the early stages of the operation it is accepted that there will be a natural inertia on the part of the IDPs. Their experiences over the last six to eight months naturally lead them to prefer the perceived safety of the camps. However, it is obvious, for their long term well being, it is essential they be returned to their home communes in a timely manner.
4. The success of Op Retour is predicated upon the willing participation of UNAMIR, UN agencies and NGOs and their commitment to an integrated and coordinated effort. Obviously, transport (and the provision of transport resources) is pivotal to the success of the operation. In particular, the provision of UNAMIR transport is vital for the following reasons:
 - a. It is a demonstration to the Rwandan Government, RPA, IDPs, UN agencies and NGOs that UNAMIR is committed to support Op Retour.

② G3 Ops
G3 Plans

FYI

DCOS OPS
18.1

23/1


Thrust
802 OPS
19/1

Levy
19/1

- b. It has become obvious that a large number of IDPs feel more secure being moved on clearly marked UN vehicles. In fact, a large number may well have refused to move at all had it not been for the UNAMIR presence.
- c. Although actual numbers moving in this early stage of Op Retour are relatively small, as was anticipated, it is expected that this will surge and all available vehicles will be in great demand.

5. The vehicles currently provided by UNAMIR are brigaded unit first line vehicles. They are not second line vehicles and, as such, do not impact upon UNAMIR's ability to be sustained. Therefore, it is an operational decision as to the level of commitment of brigaded transport. However, to withdraw UNAMIR vehicles in total could be expected to have a significant negative effect upon the success of Op Retour, particularly at this very early and sensitive stage of operations. It should be remembered, also, that the vehicles committed to Op Retour are, in fact, no more than were committed to Op Homeward. However, the vehicles currently committed are making a significant contribution, beyond the number of people being moved, by demonstrating UNAMIR's support.

6. Therefore, the vehicles provided to Op Retour by UNAMIR are vital to the success of the operation. To withdraw them would seriously affect the possibility of success of Op Retour.



S.W. MOORE
MAJ
TPT COORD
IOC



File No 5000.65(G3 PLANS)

To: FC

From: OIC Op RETOUR

Info: Executive Director
Political Adviser SRSG
DFC
COS
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
CHAO

Date: 17 Jan 95

Sam
19/1

Thur
802 OPS
19/1

23/1

MEETING OF POLICY CELL - OP RETOUR

1. In its original concept, the Op RETOUR Policy Cell consists of the following key players:

- a. VP and Minister of Defence.
- b. SRSG.
- c. Ministers of Rehabilitation, Interior and Defence.
- d. FC UNAMIR.
- e. COS of the RPA.
- e. Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator - UNREO.

2. The Policy Cell has not yet been able to meet and as a result, none of the work done on Op RETOUR has received formal political endorsement, nor has guidance and direction formally been given from above. As the operation is now under way, it seems essential to convene a meeting of the Policy Cell to consider the following broad issues (an agenda has not yet been staffed):


- a. Endorsement of the work carried out so far.
- b. Endorsement of the Principles and Operational Concept of Op RETOUR.

camps.

d. The public image of Op RETOUR.

3. It would be helpful if SRSG's staff could now concentrate on convening a meeting of the Principals. I have asked the Ministries of Rehabilitation and Defence to push for one as soon as possible, but to ask them to arrange the meeting would probably involve considerable delay. As Mr Kent is out of country until 25 January, it is suggested that 26 January would be an appropriate date.

4. With your concurrence, I will instruct Task Force staff to offer an agenda and carry out preparatory briefings of their Principals.



T A P MULLARKEY
Lt Col
OIC Op RETOUR



17 Jan 95

15/11


To: UNREO (ED)

Info: FC / D COS Ops

From: UNAMIR PAffO

Subject: OP RETOUR INFO CAMPAIGN//POSTERS & PAMPHLETS

1. In accordance with discussions held last week with the info cell of Op Retour, I have found a local contractor who has developed drawings which will be the focal point of the next pamphlet/poster campaign for the IOC. These products are 100% graphic and self explanatory. It will therefore be impossible for criminal elements to censor the information.
2. To speed up and initiate the production of these information tools, I have agreed with local contractor (COREC) on avenue de la Paix downtown Kigali, to have them design and produce the posters/pamphlets. They have already worked several hours on the project and have produced good sketches.
3. COREC required a down payment to carry on with the production to initiate production immediately. I therefore advanced them \$500.00 US from my UNAMIR public affairs petty cash.
4. As understood with the SRSG in Dec 94, such information projects can be considered as joint ventures between UNAMIR and UNREO. The cost can therefore be shared. It is therefore requested that the balance of \$ 669.00 be payable by UNREO once I confirm receipt of the 1000 posters.


S. Grenier
Captain
UNAMIR PAffO
11124

This is to certify that COREC has received from Capt Grenier a down payment of \$500.00 US for the production of 1000 posters. I understand that the balance of payment of \$669.00 will be paid upon delivery to occur prior to 4 Feb 1995.

Director




CONTRAT DE PRODUCTION D'AFFICHES

Entre COREC SARL, B.P. 1105 KIGALI, fournisseur d'une part, et Capitaine GRENIER C/o Q.G. de la MINUAR client d'autre part, il est conclu un contrat de production de mille affiches en 4 couleurs 50 X 70 cm sur Bristol 120 gr à raison de 1.169 \$ US payables en deux étapes:

1ère étape tout de suite : US\$ 500.
2ème étape à la livraison: US\$ 669.

Date de livraison avant le 4 février 1995.

Fait à Kigali, le 17 Janvier 1995.


Capitaine GRENIER

POUR COREC SARL :
GASABA MANUTUS audidas



COREC

Avenue de la Paix
Quartier Commercial
B.P. 1105 KIGALI
Tél: 7 3485 - 7 3499
Téléc: 22685 COREC RW
FAX: 250 73485
R.C.A. 277/KIG

Facture n°
112859

SERVICES MINUTES

NOM
PRENOM **Cyril GRENIER**

JOUR **12**

MOIS **1**

AN **95**

QTE	DESIGNATION	P.U.	P.T.
	Paiement avance pour la product° de nos affiches		
TOTAL		US\$	500

Nous disons: **Cinq cents dollars américains**

Signature **PAVE**
CASH ☒
CHEQUE ☐
BC N° ☐
TOTAL **US\$ 500**

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NEWS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR-95.006

January 18, 1995

OPERATION "RETOUR"
OVER 10 000 PEOPLE BACK HOME

KIGALI, RWANDA -- The consolidated effort by the United Nations, Non-Government Organisations (NGO) and the Rwandan Government to bring displaced people back to their homes is now well under way. In less than a month, Operation "RETOUR" has managed the safe transport of over 10 000 people to their communes of origins.

Operation "RETOUR" was officially launched in late December 1994 by the Special Representative to the Secretary General for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, after a long, detailed and careful planning process. This consolidated approach aims at offering to hundreds of thousands of displaced Rwandans with an alternative to the life in camps. Those who wish to go back home are provided with the basic tools, support and aid which they require to resume a normal life back in their home villages.

The Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, Maj.-Gen. Guy Tousignant, met yesterday with several UN and NGO officials to further discuss this consolidated approach. Although no major changes to the operation are expected, UNAMIR will nevertheless attempt to increase its presence in many more communes and will remain committed and supportive to Operation "RETOUR".

The dissolving of the displaced person camps in south western Rwanda currently under way, is the first step in settling the humanitarian problem which has been overshadowing the country. Displaced persons in camps are subjected to a

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Levy
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mischievous misinformation campaign mounted by those criminals who oppose the normalisation process presently taking place in the country. Displaced Rwandans now have the freedom to choose. They can safely travel back to their home communes and finally regain their dignity by rebuilding their lives and their country.

- 30 -

Note to editors: For more information, please contact the UNAMIR military public affairs officer, Capt S. Grenier in Kigali at (212) 963-9906 ext 11124.

UNAMIR Force HQ
c/o UNEP
P.O. Box 30552
Nairobi
KENYA

16 January, 1995

3000.10(Ops)

See Distribution

MINUTES OF A COORD CONFERENCE
HELD AT UNAMIR FORCE HQ CONFERENCE
ROOM FOR "OP RETOUR" ON 27 DEC 94

Present:	Maj Gen	Tousignant	-	FC	-	Chairman	
	Brig Gen	Anyidoho	HK	-	DFC	-	Member
	Col	Siva Kumar	KS	-	COS	-	Member
	Col	Asae-Addae		-	COO	-	Member
	Lt Col	Tom Malarkey		-	IOC	-	Member
	Lt Col	Apogan-Yella		-	G3 OPS	-	Member
	CO	Zambatt				-	Member
	CO	Ghanbatt				-	Member
	Sector 3	Comd				-	Member
	CO	Indbatt				-	Member
	FEO					-	Member
	Comd	CIVPOL				-	Member
	G3	Air				-	Member
	HAC					-	Member
	UNREO	Rep				-	Member
	AUSMED					-	Member
	Provost	Marshal				-	Secretary
	Maj	Pitre	TM	-	G3 OPS2	-	

OPENING REMARKS

1. The conference commenced at 0930 hrs with the FC welcoming all present to the conference and said that he hoped everyone had a good Christmas. He then explained the aim of the conference and said that it was time that UNAMIR becomes pro-active and takes the initiative to try and settle the IDP problem, failing which there was no valid reason to carry out any other humanitarian activity.

2. The Chairman further said that not taking the initiative would be a threat to the stability and future of peace in Rwanda and may result in a similar tragedy which is presently occurring in Goma and Bukavu camps. He said that Op Retour was part of the overall process to bring help to the tragedy struck people of Rwanda.

3. The DFC stated to all present that the aim of the conference was to ensure that the refugee problem in Rwanda did not become a permanent one. He asked all participants to come out with their problems and reason out a viable solution.

4. The COS informed that though the UNAMIR, RPA and UN Agencies were involved in the Op, the ultimate responsibility to provide security is that of the RPA. He asked everyone present to constantly inform the UNREO cell of the progress of ops so that mid course corrections can be made as and when required.

5. The COS further said that it is imperative that the IDPs go to their correct Home Communes. As multiple agencies were involved, the COS stressed that it was not necessary that everyone moves by vehs - the DPs who are fit can move by foot initially, the idea being to empty the camps as fast as possible.

ITEM 1 - GENERAL SITUATION

6. The G2 informed that the conflict in Rwanda has resulted in displacement of millions of people from their homes. In addition to the 1.9 million DPs in Rwanda, he mentioned that there are 1.1 million DPs in Zaire.

7. The return of the refugees to their homes would go a long way to normalise the situation in Rwanda. The G2 informed that OP RETOUR was planned for the return of IDPs and refugees to their Home Communes. The whole effort would be concentrated on moving the IDPs in the Prefecture of Gikongoro to their Home Communes, principally in the Prefectures of Gitarama, Butare and South Kigali.

ITEM 2 - CONCEPT OF OPERATION

8. IOC (Offr-in-Charge) The IOC Officer-in-charge gave out the background to Op Retour. He said there were four important stages in the Op, namely:

- a. Improving the incoming fund position.
- b. Improving the security position which has already been accomplished to an extent as was proved by Op Hope.
- c. Land distribution, which was a big problem and action was in hand to resolve it.
- d. Development of info strategy which encompassed two main actions.

(1) Talking to the IDPs to explain the purpose of the Op and its advantages. Info teams have already been sent to DP Camps for this purpose.

(2) Developing means to portray the Op to the world media so as to accelerate the inflow of funds.

9. The IOC I/C explained that the background and formation of the IOC is based on four plans which are as follows:

- a. Aid Plan.
- b. Transport Plan.
- c. Security Plan.
- d. Info Plan.

10. He remarked that the major obstacle was the in fighting amongst the NGOs to try and further their own aims. He stated that on 29 Dec 94, Op Home would cease and Op Retour would commence. The differences between the two operations were:

- a. Provision of full security in Op Retour.
- b. Adopting camp by camp and commune by commune approach.
- c. Movement of the IDPs in the camps to the Home Communes.
- d. Natural integration process.

11. He further explained the procedure which would be followed at Cyanika Camp would be as under:

- a. DPs would be fed at 0630 hrs.
- b. Screening would be carried out.
- c. Medical screening would be done.
- d. DPs would be registered.
- e. DPs would be issued with non-food items like utensils, blankets etc. (The next feed would be given to the DPs only in their home communes).

12. The IOC I/C informed that the tasks of UNAMIR encompassed the following:

- a. Provision of Security.
- b. Provide presence so as to stop harassment and intimidation of DPs.
- c. Assist UNREO to organise procedures.
- d. Liaise with the RPA.
- e. Provision of escorts to DP convoys.
- f. Provision of security and services to Home Communes.
- g. Provide feed back on op progress.
- h. Provide coord and org.
- i. Encourage people to leave the camps.

ITEM 3 - BRIEF ON COORD OF OPERATION

13. COO Tac HQ. The COO informed that all coord with the RPA and the Prefect of Butare has been carried out. Info has gone to the camps to reassure the DPs. Recce of the Cyanika Camp has been carried out and locations for various facilities identified. He said there were two problems namely:

- a. He had not been able to sort out what exactly was to be done in the Home Communes.
- b. NGOs attitude towards the op was hostile and uncooperative and thus they still have to be convinced to sp the op.

14. UNREO Representative. The UNREO rep explained the background of the refugee transfer process and the problems involved. He assured everyone present that the NGOs will not hinder the progress of the op in any way. He said that his only concern was that the information campaign was not upto the mark; however action is already in hand to improve the campaign.

ITEM 4 - COMMENTS ON SY INSTRS FOR THE OPERATION

15. CO Zambatt. The CO informed that he has deployed a coy at Cyanika camp and a inf pl at Rukondo camp. He said he had no other problems.

16. The COS asked CO ZAMBATT to monitor the progress of ops and feed in info constantly.

17. CO Ghanbatt. The CO informed that recce of ORCs in Sector 2 have been completed. The pace of movement of IDPs is presently slow but is expected to pick up. He stated the following problems

in the ORCs:

- a. Inadequate accn to receive 5000 IDPs per day.
- b. Better coord essential to enable DPs to harvest standing crop.
- c. Urgent need to upgrade med facilities.
- d. Stockpiling and water in the ORCs is essential.
- e. Critical requirement of tpt for monitoring progress of ops.

18. The CO then informed of the NGO's objection to the inclusion of the RPA in the list for use of their tpt. The DFC said that the RPA is a legally elected Government and that their due must be given to them. He asked the NGOs to communicate extensively with the RPA and develop a healthy working relationship with them.

19. Sector 3 Comd. The Sector 3 Comd briefed on the sit in his AOR. He said that Butare Sector was well informed but this was not the case with Gitarama Sector. He said that the only problem that would remain unsolved would be that of communication.

20. CO Indbatt. The CO remarked that the only problem was that thinning out of static duties in Kigali would have to be accepted for the duration of the op.

21. DCMO. The DCMO complimented the COS on the security instrs issued. He projected the following requirements:

- a. Coord HQ in DP Camps. The COS said that the Bn in whose AOR the camp is loc will

provide the HQ from integral resources.

- b. Separate radios net for the Op. The COS said this may not be possible and remarked that the existing communication set up will be utilised.

- c. Coord Confs during the op. The COS said that such confs will be held periodically.

- d. Vehs. The COS said that the 34 vehs of the Milobs, in the Wksp would be repaired on priority.

- e. Interpreters. The COS asked the DCMO to use the RPA cadres and the locals in the AOR

to act as interpreters

f. Thinning out of Resources. The DCMO said that thinning out of Milobs teams in other sectors would occur due to the commitment in Op Retour which the COS accepted.

22. The DCMO then said that the details of number of convoys being originated must be intimated to him to enable him to detail the Milob teams. The COS asked the DCMO to liaise with the Tac HQ and NGOs. He stressed that a sort of a informal IOC HQ will be established at Sector level too.

23. FEO. The FEO informed that the Busoro bridge is not repairable at present as the stores requirement is heavy. The COS directed that till the bridge is repaired, a recce will be carried out at the bridge site to select a place for a detour.

24. The FEO further said that the Sector engrs EOD teams should function under him for Op Retour. The COS remarked that each case for use of sector engrs will be discussed with him by the FEO before implementing it and further directed that the force engr coy EOD teams be used for such tasks.

25. CIVPOL. The Comd CIVPOL said that one det in Sector 3 is without a veh and that it requires a veh for the op. The COS said that as Sectors 1 and 5 are not that deeply involved in the op, a veh should be pulled out from the CIVPOL dets in these sectors and given to the CIVPOL det in Sector 3.

26. G3 Air. The G3 Air also said that heli use must be minimized due to shortage of fuel, limited number of helis and limited no of flying hours. He further suggested allocation of 4 flying hours per day for the op.

27. The G3 Air further suggested that a milob team from each sector each be put in the heli with a two fold aim:

a. Milobs become experts in the op and can talk to the locals directly.

b. Comd of Milobs teams becomes the focal point of the briefing everyday.

28. He also stressed that the units must fill in the task msggs properly so that proper prioritisation and allotment of flights can be coord.

29. HAC. The HAC informed that the final coord meeting for NGOs and UN Agencies is being held on 28 Dec 94 at Kigali to sort out the differences. HAC objected to the proposed procedure to be

followed at the camps of feeding, screening etc and said that it would take a long time to be completed. HAC recommended that the procedure can be reduced by cutting out elaborate medical screening procedures.

30. The COS directed the officer I/C OIC to examine the proposal in detail.


31. AUSMED. The AUSMED rep informed that all the participating soldiers must be aware of the med sp available and the cas evac procedure so as to ensure that no delay in cas evac takes place.

32. Provost Marshal. The PM highlighted the procedure of arresting a suspect and handing over of detainee to the MP Coy. He further explained the need to hand over the detainee to the Public Prosecutor at the earliest. The PM remarked that it is absolutely essential that enough evidence is given for the arrest. This evidence will be in the form of a written statement giving the identity of the person affecting the arrest and the evidence leading to the arrest.

ITEM 5 - CLOSING REMARKS

33. The COS thanked all present for their contributions to the conference. He emphasised the need to coord all efforts by the UNAMIR, RPA and NGOs to make Op Retour a success and said that he was fully confident that each one will do his best towards this end.

34. The meeting came to a close at .1130.hrs.


TM PITRE
Maj
S02 Ops/Secretary

Distribution:

Action:

FC
DFC
COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
COO TAC HQ (BUTARE)
IOC (OIC)
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT

ZAMBATT
GHANBATT
TUNBATT
INDBATT
NICOY
SECTOR 2
SECTOR 3
FORCE PROVOST MARSHALL
G4
FORCE ENGR
FMO
G3 OPS
G2
G3 PLANS
CANSIGS
AUSMED
CIVPOL
HAC
HRFO
FSO
CLO
G3 AIR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFR

01 02

14 JAN 95 00 00 UUUU

UNAMIR PAFF 024

UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS//

SECTOR 4A HQ GIKONGORO//COMD/CHIEF MILOB/UNREO REP OP
RETOUR//

INFO : UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//DCOS OPS/HAC/MILOB HQ//
TAC HQ BUTARE//DUTY OFFICER//
UNREO KIGALI//IOC/CHRIS KAYE//

[Handwritten signature]
14-1

UNCLAS UNAMIR PAFF 024

SUBJ: OP RETOUR INFO CAMPAIGN

1. AS PART OF THE PRINT AND VOCAL INFO CAMPAIGN WHICH I AM RESPONSIBLE, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT AND VERY HELPFUL TO GET FIRST HAND INFORMATION FROM THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE DECIDED TO RETURN USING OP RETOUR RESOURCES. PLSE PASS ON THIS REQUEST TO THE UNREO REP IN CHARGE OF OP RETOUR.

2. AS PEOPLE ARE REGISTERED, PLSE INCLUDE IN THE PROCESS A FEW QUESTIONS TO ESTABLISH WHAT MADE THEM DECIDE TO RETURN. ALTHOUGH THIS QUESTION IS VERY BASIC IN NATURE, IT WILL NEVERTHELESS BE THE CORNERSTONE OF A SUSTAINED PRINT CAMPAIGN.

3. PLSE SEND REPLY TO THIS HQ NO LATER THAN 19 JAN 95.

S. GRENIER CAPT, UNAMIR PAFF, 11123/2052

[Handwritten scribble]

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16/1

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8020PS
16/1

[Handwritten signature]
17/1

01 01 19 JAN 95 00 00 UUUU UNAMIR PAFF 028

FROM : UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//DCOS-OPS//
TO : TAC HQ BUTARE//COMD//
SECTOR 4A GIKONGORO//SECTOR COMD//
INFO : UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//FC/DFC/COS/DCOS SUP/G3-OPS/G3-AIR
OPS//
UNREO KIGALI//ED/IOC INFO CELL//

UNCLAS UNAMIR PAFF 028

SUBJ: OP RETOUR INFO CAMPAIGN

1. IN SUPPORT OF OP RETOUR UNAMIR HAS ACCEPTED TO COORDINATE THE VOCAL AND PRINT PART OF THE CURRENT INFO CAMPAIGN. THE OFFICE OF PRIME INTEREST (OPI) FOR THE CAMPAIGN WILL BE THE FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER (FORCE PAO) LOCAL 11124 AT UNAMIR HQ KIGALI.
2. SECTOR 4 A SOUTH IS TO PROVIDE TWO PUBLIC RELATION MOBILE TEAMS FOR THIS OPERATION. EACH MOBILE TEAM WILL REQUIRE A VEHICLE AND WILL BE COMPRISED OF 1 DRIVER, 1 CO-DRIVER AND 2 ARMED SOLDIERS. ONE OF THE TWO CO-DRIVERS TO BE A SENIOR NON COMMISSIONED MEMBER/JUNIOR OFFICER TO LEAD PR TEAMS AND COORD ACTIVITIES. EACH TEAM WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH AN INTERPRETER WHO WILL USE LOUD HAILERS TO READ MESSAGES TO DISPLACED PERSONS IN CAMPS. INTERPRETERS TO BE SUPPLIED BY UNREO/IOC. TEAM WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED TO HAND OUT PAMPHLETS ONCE THEY HAVE BEEN PRODUCED. FORCE PAO TO COORD
3. THIS TASK IS FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST 3 WEEKS AND IS TO COMMENCE ON MONDAY 23 JAN 95.
4. MESSAGES WILL BE PREPARED BY OPI AND FORWARDED TO TAC HQ BUTARE AND SECTOR 4 A SOUTH.
5. FORCE PAO TO FLY TO GIKONGORO MONDAY 23 JAN 1995 TO PERS BRIEF TEAMS AND TO LAUNCH OPERATION. PR TEAM TO BE READY TO RECEIVE BRIEF AS OF 0745 HRS MONDAY 23 JAN 1995. ONCE BRIEFING HAS BEEN GIVEN PR TEAM WILL BE REQUIRED TO MOVE TO CAMP AND COMMENCE OPERATION. PR TEAM TO OBTAIN LOUD HAILERS FROM TAC HQ BUTARE PRIOR TO MONDAY MORNING.
6. SENIOR MEMBER OF PR TEAM TO ATTEND DAILY BRIEF AT TAC HQ FOR DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS.
7. TAC HQ IS AUTHORISED TO ISSUE MIN OF 4 OPERATIONAL LOUD HAILERS AND SPARE BATTERIES TO APPOINTED STAFF PRIOR TO SUNDAY.
8. PLSE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MSG TO THIS HQ ASAP.

J. ARP, COLONEL, DCOS OPS, 11186

802095 14/1
14/1
14/1

Displaced Persons (DP) Camp Closures by the RPA

1. The recent massacre at Busanze DP camp GR 4591 (Sector 4A South) has highlighted what has become the standard method of closing DP camps by the RPA over the past few months. Whilst this latest massacre has drawn more attention from UNAMIR than previous incidents, similar incidents have occurred since 15 Oct 94.

2. Following is a summary of incidents where the RPA have used force to "encourage" DP's to either attend "meetings" and rallies, or to enforce ultimatums previously given to the DP to leave the camps:

a. **NDABA:**

(1) MILOBS 4B reported that on the morning of 18 Oct 94 the RPA surrounded the DP camp at Ndaba GR 4173 (Sector 4B) to gather them together for an address by a representative of the local Comd (poss a LT). When the DP refused assemble the RPA fired into the crowd, wounding four DP's who were taken to Kibuye hospital and treated by MSF. During the address the Soux Prefect of Mabanza told the DP to leave the camp. A forced registration of the DP was conducted after the address. Locals reported that the RPA were forcibly taking away valuables and home appliances; and

(2) MILOBS reported that during the evening of 18 Oct 94, the RPA deployed in and around the Ndaba DP camp and expelled the DP between 181800 and 182300 Oct. It was alleged that the RPA loaded two trucks with the personal belongings of the DP once they had been expelled. All the huts in Ndaba camp were reported to have been burned by 20 Oct 94;

b. **RUGABANO:**

(1) FRAFBAT reported on 29 Sep 94 that an RPA Coy Comd had wanted to search the Rugabano DP camp GR . The DP's, armed with machetes refused. The RPA fired into the air and said they would be back to search the camp the next day;

(2) MILOB 4B reported that on 24 Oct the RPA had told the DP at Rugabano DP camp GR 4268 to be out of the camp by 29 Oct or they would be forcibly evicted;

(3) MILOBS 4B reported on 28 Oct 94 that they had learned of an RPA intention to conduct cordon and search operations in Rugabano camp in line with the ultimatum to vacate the camp by 29 Oct. The DP's asked for protection from FRAFBAT; and

(4) MILOBS 4B reported that on 29 Oct the RPA had entered Rugabano camp and evicted all the DP, in line with the ultimatum previously given. It was reported that all the huts had been burned and that there had been no violent clashes;

c. **BIRAMBO:**

- (1) MILOBs 4B reported that on 15 Oct 94 the Soux Prefect of Birambo GR 4763 had attempted to hold a meeting in the Birambo DP camp. The DP were angry about the arrest of one of the DP the day before and demanded to know his whereabouts. The RPA fired into the air to quieten the crowd and one RPA soldier fired into the crowd killing a 22 year old woman and injuring a man;
- (2) MILOBs 4B reported that on 20 Oct the DP in the Birambo camp were warned by the RPA to vacate the camp by 25 Oct or face "forceful ejection";
- (3) MILOBs 4B reported that the Soux Prefect of Birambo held a meeting with DP in the camp to emphasise the requirement to be out of the camp before 29 Oct. MILOBs reported that most of the DP had already left, with 400 remaining, all waiting for transport to leave; and
- (4) FRAFBAT reported that at 311100 Oct the RPA burned all the shelters at the Birambo DP camp;

d. **MUKO:**

- (1) MILOBs 4A reported on 26 Oct 94 that the burgemeister of Muko GR 3840 was involved in ordering the burning of shelters for not obeying his orders (to return home?); and
- (2) MILOBs reported on 1 Dec 94 that the burgemeister of Muko had warned the refugees that the camp must be cleared by 5 Dec and that the camp would be burned on that day. DP told MILOBs that the burgemeister had told them that the RPA would burn the camp and kill DPs;

e. **MUSANGE:**

- (1) MILOBs 4A reported that on 10 Nov 94 an RPA PL arrived in the Musange DP camp GR 5247 and told the DP to leave the camp. The RPA fired shots and burned down huts. 6 DP were killed and 3 were wounded. ZAMBATT transported the wounded to hospital; and
- (2) MILOBs 4A reported that on 11 Nov 94 the same RPA returned at 2200 hrs and started shooting and burning the whole camp. 7 DP were killed. RPA at Kaduha GR 4643 (4A) blamed an RPA unit from Gitwe GR 6453.

f. **BUSANZE:**

- (1) Interviews of four DP's who were present in the Busanze camp on night 6/7 Jan revealed the following sequence of events:
 - (a) during the week prior to the attack, the Commune Leader accompanied by an RPA officer and eight soldiers had addressed the DP's telling them that they must go home or they "would go home with trouble";

(b) Those interviewed stated that there had been no trouble previously with the RPA from the nearby camp in Masiga GR 4489;

(c) At approx 2230 hrs 6 Jan, between 150 - 200 RPA soldiers arrived at the Busanze camp. No vehicles were seen and the DP's thought they had arrived from the camp at Masiga on foot;

(d) The soldiers encircled the camp and began banging on the shelters and shouting at the DP's to get out and go home. The DP's gathered together in the centre of the camp and "began making a noise" (presumably in an attempt to raise the alarm);

(e) At approx midnight the soldiers threw a grenade and began firing small arms at the DP's. One source stated that he saw people who had fallen over in their attempt to run away, shot in the head by soldiers where they had fallen. "Many grenades" exploded and there was a "lot of rifle fire";

(f) The sources felt that the attack was organised and controlled rather than a group of soldiers running amok. Many of the soldiers carried hand torches. None of the sources claimed to have seen bayonets fixed to the rifles although two said they had seen knives carried;

(g) At approx 070230 hrs the soldiers took the money from the DP's and gathered food and belongings from the camp. They then forced a number of DP's to carry the collected items back to the RPA camp. One source stated that he was told the next morning, by another DP who had gone to the Masiga camp looking for the people who had been forced to carry the food etc, that they had been killed and he had seen about 80 bodies lying near the RPA camp; and

(h) According to the camp leader there were 11 624 DP's in the camp at the time of the attack.

3. There has not been a violent conclusion to all the incidents noted above however these examples illustrate that there is a standard procedure used by the RPA to close the DP camps. This involves giving the DP a date by which to be out of the camp and then returning on that date and forcibly removing the DP from the camps and burning the huts. Because of the wide area over which the technique has been used and the involvement of civil administrators, it is not unreasonable to assume that this may have tacit approval in the upper echelons of the RPA, if not government. On a number of occasions it has been reported that the RPA have removed DP personal belongings after the DP have gone.

4. This document is designed to provide a guide of RPA activity in relation to forcibly closing down DP camps. Due to the lack of resources to properly investigate all incidents, there may be some error of detail, however the main points are reflective of the truth.

Displaced Persons (DP) Camp Closures by the RPA

85-1

1. The recent massacre at Busanze DP camp GR 4591 (Sector 4A South) has highlighted what has become the standard method of closing DP camps by the RPA over the past few months. Whilst this latest massacre has drawn more attention from UNAMIR than previous incidents, similar incidents have occurred since 15 Oct 94.

2. Following is a summary of incidents where the RPA have used force to "encourage" DP's to either attend "meetings" and rallies, or to enforce ultimatums previously given to the DP to leave the camps:

a. NDABA:

(1) MILOBS 4B reported that on the morning of 18 Oct 94 the RPA surrounded the DP camp at Ndaba GR 4173 (Sector 4B) to gather them together for an address by a representative of the local Comd (poss a LT). When the DP refused assemble the RPA fired into the crowd, wounding four DP's who were taken to Kibuye hospital and treated by MSF. During the address the Soux Prefect of Mabanza told the DP to leave the camp. A forced registration of the DP was conducted after the address. Locals reported that the RPA were forcibly taking away valuables and home appliances; and

(2) MILOBS reported that during the evening of 18 Oct 94, the RPA deployed in and around the Ndaba DP camp and expelled the DP between 181800 and 182300 Oct. It was alleged that the RPA loaded two trucks with the personal belongings of the DP once they had been expelled. All the huts in Ndaba camp were reported to have been burned by 20 Oct 94;

b. RUGABANO:

(1) FRAFBAT reported on 29 Sep 94 that an RPA Coy Comd had wanted to search the Rugabano DP camp GR . The DP's, armed with machetes refused. The RPA fired into the air and said they would be back to search the camp the next day;

(2) MILOB 4B reported that on 24 Oct the RPA had told the DP at Rugabano DP camp GR 4268 to be out of the camp by 29 Oct or they would be forcibly evicted;

(3) MILOBS 4B reported on 28 Oct 94 that they had learned of an RPA intention to conduct cordon and search operations in Rugabano camp in line with the ultimatum to vacate the camp by 29 Oct. The DP's asked for protection from FRAFBAT; and

(4) MILOBS 4B reported that on 29 Oct the RPA had entered Rugabano camp and evicted all the DP, in line with the ultimatum previously given. It was reported that all the huts had been burned and that there had been no violent clashes;

c. BIRAMBO:

- (1) MILOBs 4B reported that on 15 Oct 94 the Soux Prefect of Birambo GR 4763 had attempted to hold a meeting in the Birambo DP camp. The DP were angry about the arrest of one of the DP the day before and demanded to know his whereabouts. The RPA fired into the air to quieten the crowd and one RPA soldier fired into the crowd killing a 22 year old woman and injuring a man;
- (2) MILOBs 4B reported that on 20 Oct the DP in the Birambo camp were warned by the RPA to vacate the camp by 25 Oct or face "forceful ejection";
- (3) MILOBs 4B reported that the Soux Prefect of Birambo held a meeting with DP in the camp to emphasise the requirement to be out of the camp before 29 Oct. MILOBs reported that most of the DP had already left, with 400 remaining, all waiting for transport to leave; and
- (4) FRAFBAT reported that at 311100 Oct the RPA burned all the shelters at the Birambo DP camp;

d. MUKO:

- (1) MILOBs 4A reported on 26 Oct 94 that the burgemeister of Muko GR 3840 was involved in ordering the burning of shelters for not obeying his orders (to return home?); and
- (2) MILOBs reported on 1 Dec 94 that the burgemeister of Muko had warned the refugees that the camp must be cleared by 5 Dec and that the camp would be burned on that day. DP told MILOBs that the burgemeister had told them that the RPA would burn the camp and kill DPs;

e. MUSANGE:

- (1) MILOBs 4A reported that on 10 Nov 94 an RPA PL arrived in the Musange DP camp GR 5247 and told the DP to leave the camp. The RPA fired shots and burned down huts. 6 DP were killed and 3 were wounded. ZAMBATT transported the wounded to hospital; and
- (2) MILOBs 4A reported that on 11 Nov 94 the same RPA returned at 2200 hrs and started shooting and burning the whole camp. 7 DP were killed. RPA at Kaduha GR 4643 (4A) blamed an RPA unit from Gitwe GR 6453.

f. BUSANZE:

- (1) Interviews of four DP's who were present in the Busanze camp on night 6/7 Jan revealed the following sequence of events:
 - (a) during the week prior to the attack, the Commune Leader accompanied by an RPA officer and eight soldiers had addressed the DP's telling them that they must go home or they "would go home with trouble";

(b) Those interviewed stated that there had been no trouble previously with the RPA from the nearby camp in Masiga GR 4489;

(c) At approx 2230 hrs 6 Jan, between 150 - 200 RPA soldiers arrived at the Busanze camp. No vehicles were seen and the DP's thought they had arrived from the camp at Masiga on foot;

(d) The soldiers encircled the camp and began banging on the shelters and shouting at the DP's to get out and go home. The DP's gathered together in the centre of the camp and "began making a noise" (presumably in an attempt to raise the alarm);

(e) At approx midnight the soldiers threw a grenade and began firing small arms at the DP's. One source stated that he saw people who had fallen over in their attempt to run away, shot in the head by soldiers where they had fallen. "Many grenades" exploded and there was a "lot of rifle fire";


(f) The sources felt that the attack was organised and controlled rather than a group of soldiers running amok. Many of the soldiers carried hand torches. None of the sources claimed to have seen bayonets fixed to the rifles although two said they had seen knives carried;

(g) At approx 070230 hrs the soldiers took the money from the DP's and gathered food and belongings from the camp. They then forced a number of DP's to carry the collected items back to the RPA camp. One source stated that he was told the next morning, by another DP who had gone to the Masiga camp looking for the people who had been forced to carry the food etc, that they had been killed and he had seen about 80 bodies lying near the RPA camp; and

(h) According to the camp leader there were 11 624 DP's in the camp at the time of the attack.

3. There has not been a violent conclusion to all the incidents noted above however these examples illustrate that there is a standard procedure used by the RPA to close the DP camps. This involves giving the DP a date by which to be out of the camp and then returning on that date and forcibly removing the DP from the camps and burning the huts. Because of the wide area over which the technique has been used and the involvement of civil administrators, it is not unreasonable to assume that this may have tacit approval in the upper echelons of the RPA, if not government. On a number of occasions it has been reported that the RPA have removed DP personal belongings after the DP have gone.

4. This document is designed to provide a guide of RPA activity in relation to forcibly closing down DP camps. Due to the lack of resources to properly investigate all incidents, there may be some error of detail, however the main points are reflective of the truth.





Minute

From: DCOS Ops
To: COS
Info: D COS Sp
PAffo
G2
CO AUSMED
MA to FC

Date: 15 Jan 95

Subject: PSYOPS STAFF

1. Previous attempts to convince IDP's and refugees to return to their Rwandan homes have not been overly successful. In order to convince IDP's to go home and put some impetus behind Op Retour, we need an extensive, comprehensive and well-executed information campaign. I believe that this type of PsyOps campaign needs to be assessed, planned and implemented by experts in the field.

2. Accordingly, I feel that UNAMIR HQ should add the position of a PsyOps Staff Officer on its establishment. His anticipated function and duties would be as per the attached brief. He would work closely with the G2 and the PAffo in the fulfilment of his tasks. He would also be responsive to the IOC.

3. I have asked CO AUSMED to explore the possibility of Australia filling this position ASAP or on their next rotation. He will contact the necessary authorities and provide me with feedback within the next week. In the event that Australia is unable to provide this capability we should approach other contingents in UNAMIR or ask UN HQ to source.

GUIDANCE NOTES - PSYOPS OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. OP Retour was to include a public information (PSYOPS) campaign - Phase 1. On 29 Dec 94 OP Retour began with Phase 2 - return of DP home. Since then the number of DP returning has been dissappointing. An information campaign has been attempted, but to date this has lacked the specialist personnel, planning and co-ordination essential for success.

AIM

2. The purpose of this paper is to provide guidance on the roles and tasks that a specialist PSYOPS Officer could fulfil in support of OP Retour and subsequent UN operations in Rwanda.

ROLES AND TASKS

3. It is important that any PSYOPS campaign is planned and controlled at the highest level..

4. Tasks a psyops officer can provide would include:

a. Provision of PSYOPS Estimate which consists of :

- (1) Target audience analysis;
- (2) Aim of campaign;
- (3) Coordination at the highest level of parties involved;
- (4) Mediums and equipment available; and

b. Provide a PSYOPS plan which consists of:

- (1) What information is to be passed;
- (2) Which mediums can best be used to pass information;
- (3) Coord timings to ensure the most effective dissemination of information; and
- (4) Validation and continual review of the plan to improve the effectiveness and ensure the validity of the information being disseminated.

4. I hope that this information is of assistance.

01 01

11 JAN 95 00 00 UUUU

UNAMIR PAFF 021


UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS//

TAC HQ BUTARE//DUTY OFFICER/OPI OP RETOUR//
SECTOR 4A HQ GIKONGORO//COMD/CHIEF MILOB//INFO : UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//DCOS OPS/HAC/MILOB HQ//
UNREO HQ KIGALI//IOC//

UNCLAS UNAMIR PAFF 021

SUBJ: OP RETOUR PAMPHLET DROP

1. IOC HAS REQUESTED THIS OFFICE TO ASSIST IN THE PASSAGE OF INFORMATION IN CAMPS IN SUPPORT OF OP RETOUR. THE ATTACHED TEXT IN RWANDESE IS GOING TO INCLUDED ON A PAMPHLET DROPPED OUT OF HELICOPTERS TODAY AT 13H30 OVER SOME CAMPS TO BE MOVED TODAY.
2. YOUR HQ MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE REQUIRED TO ASSIST IN HAVING THIS TEXT READ IN CAMPS USING LOUD HAILER DURING FUTURE OP RETOUR ACTIVITIES. PLEASE KEEP HANDY AND BE READY TO ASSIST IOC IF REQUIRED.
3. ENSURE YOUR 10 LOUD HAILERS ARE OPERATIONAL AND READY FOR USE. ALSO COORD WITH IOC REP IN BUTARE THE HIRING OF INTERPRETERS FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES.
4. RWANDESE TEXT FOLLOWS:


S. GRENIER CAPT, UNAMIR PAFF, 1112⁴/2052AK
14/1

AMAHANGA ARIMO GUFASHA ABANYARWANDA GUSANA IGIHUGU CYABO GUVERINMA Y'U RWANDA // MINISITERI YO
GUSANA IBYANGIRITSE NO GUCYURA IMPUNZI

Abategetsi ba Guverinoma y'u Rwanda, i Kigali no mu ma perefegitura, barashaka ko musubira mu ngo zanyu. Ibihugu by'amahanga byemye kubafasha gutaha mu mutekano no mu cyubahiro gikwiriye ikiremwa muntu. Umuryango w'abibumbye uri ino kugirango ubafashe unafasha igihugu cyanyu. Amahanga yohereje abakozi b'Umuryango w'abibumbye nab'imiryango itagengwa na Leta kugirango byoroherewe abanyarwanda akababaro.

**** Ingabo z'Umuryango w'abibumbye zubahiriza umutekano, zambaye ingofero z'ubururu, zizaherekeza amakanyo muzagenda mutaha iwanyu.

**** Abakozi b'Umuryango w'abibumbye n'ab'imiryango itagengwa na Leta bafatanije n'abategetsi bo mu makomine yanyu bazabagezaho imfashanyo y'ibiribwa, imbuto zo gutera n'ibikoresho byo mu rugo mu masigiteri zanyu. Amahanga arakora uko ashoboye kugira ngo murushaho kugira ubuzima bwiza kandi n'amazi abagereho mu makomine zanyu.

**** Umuryango w'Abibumbye urimo urashinga ibigo bitanga imfashanyo muri Ngenda, Gashora, Kanzenze, Ntyazo, Runyinya, Ntogwe, Masango, Murama, Geshamvu, Kigembi, Niakazu, Kigoma na Sake. Ingabo z'Umuryango w'Abibumbye zishinzwe umutekano zamaze koherezwa muri ayo ma komine.

**** Ibindi bigo bizafungurwa mu yandi makomine. Mushobora kujya mujyaye gusaba inama no gufata imfashanyo y'Umuryango w'abibumbye n'ya Guverinoma.

**** Ni ngombwa ko abagize umuryango umwe bagendera hamwe. Mugihe umwe mu bagize umuryango arwaye, mugomba kugana abakozi bashinzwe ubuzima mu nkambi. Ntimugasige abana inyuma. Nimugera mu makomine buri umuryango uzakabwa imfashanyo.

**** Gufasha abantu kugera iwabo mu modoka bizakorwa mu gihe gito. Ntimucikwe n'ubwo buryo imiryango mpuzamahanga ibahaye kugirango musubire mubanyu mutavunitse.

"Imana ifasha uwifashije"

Dr. Jacques Bihozagara
Minisitiri wa Gusana Ibyangiritse no Gucyura Impunzi

Australian Medical Support Force



MINUTE

Seen
12/1

521-1-1
5/95

FCE PM

For Information:

802 OPS
10.1


Seen
802 OPS
12/1

FCE PM POST OPERATION REPORT ON OP HOPE

Reference:

- A. Your FPM 5 dated 21 Dec 94 - Post-Operation Report on the Organization and Tasking of the UNAMIR MP Company in Support of Operation Hope and, their Impact on the Handling of Detainees During and Immediately After the Operation
1. I have read the Reference and agree with the basic thrust of the document. I do, however, make the following comments in relation to it:
- a. I believe it is inappropriate to use RPA interpreters to assist in the screening and processing stages of handling a detainee. The impartiality of the interpreter needs to be beyond reproach when interviewing detainees. Consequently, I suggest that UNAMIR should provide its own interpreters (see Reference A, paragraph 7(2)b).
- b. Reference A, paragraph 7g(2)(b) states that the military legal officer is to compliment and assist the work of HRFOR. With due respect, this is an inappropriate suggestion. If UNAMIR troops make the detentions, the legal onus is upon UNAMIR to screen and process the detainees. This is made difficult if the military legal officer is to compliment the work of HRFOR. Furthermore, in some circumstances the aim of UNAMIR may be different to that of HRFOR. For example, UNAMIR only has authority to detain a person who has committed a serious offence where there is a prima facie case against such a person. The mandate of HRFOR is much wider than this and consequently the aims of the organisations may not always coincide. It should also be noted that not all members of the HRFOR are lawyers.

- c. My comments in relation to Reference A, paragraph 7(g)(3) are similar to the ones I have made in sub paragraph b above. From a legal perspective it is imperative that UNAMIR retains control of a detainee right up to the time of hand over to the local authorities.
 - d. At Reference A, paragraph 8h the comment is made that both ICRC and HRFOR personnel must agree in advance to a hand over of a detainee and must be present at such a hand over. I disagree with this comment on the basis that the hand over of detainees is a matter solely for UNAMIR as it is UNAMIR that made the detention. ICRC are aware of their role as monitors and are unlikely to interfere in the hand over process. UNAMIR will only complicate the hand over procedure by relying upon others to approve it or otherwise. Furthermore, HRFOR's mandate relates to the Rwandan authorities and not to UNAMIR.
 - e. Having the RPA sign the hand over certificate hardly suggests that the hand over has been made to an impartial judicial authority which is what the Public Prosecutor is supposed to be (see Reference A, paragraph 8i).
2. My primary concern with Reference A is that it gives HRFOR too much say in the way UNAMIR fulfils its mandate as stated under Resolution 925. My informal discussions held with senior members of HRFOR suggests that they too agree with my legal reasoning that UNAMIR should remain solely responsible for processing and screening of detainees.



B.M. OSWALD
MAJ
SO2 LEGAL

2 JAN 95

3000.15/1/OPS

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO: SECTOR 3

DATE: 14 JAN 95

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF OP RETOUR

Reference:

- A. Your letter on Security of Op Retour dated 09 Jan 95.
1. You are requested to deploy a section str ptl each on a 24 hour basis to MURAMA, KIGOMA, NYAKIZU and GISHAMVU communes to show UNAMIR presence.
 2. For your compliance.

TO : COS, FHQ

DATE : 09 JAN 95

FROM : HQ SECTOR 3 GITARAMA

INFO : MILOB GP HQ, KIGALI

SECURITY OF OP RETOUR

ATT
14/11

1. Reference Security Instrs OP RETOUR issued by FHQ.
2. This is to outline some outstanding issues which need addressing at the earliest.
3. There are eight tgt communes in this Sector - MASANGO, MURAMA, KIGOMA, NTONGWE (all in Gitarama Prefecture), NYAKIZU, GISHAMVU, KIGEMBE and RUNYINYA (all in Butare Prefecture). It is noticed that even at this early stage the returnees of OP RETOUR are not limited to the above communes. This Sector has been tasked in Phase 2 to provide security in the home communes, provide a pl RRF, secure the OWS at Butare and provide half sec escort for any cvys leaving the DPCs.
4. The Sector has a presence of one pl each already at MASANGO and NTONGWE in Gitarama Prefecture and at RUNYINYA and KIGEMBE at Butare Prefecture. Thus, four tgt communes are without permanent presence but have been covered by increased patrolling by day by formed troops and MILOBS. It is appreciated that KIGOMA commune and GISHAMVU commune do not require permanent presence being close to locs of formed tps.
5. In an earlier sig msg to FHQ (OPS), it was recommended that the remaining two communes of NYAKIZU and MURAMA be covered through dply of pl less a sec each at the two locs. This would entail weakening the current dply in the remaining locs in Butare Prefecture and KABGAYI, in Gitarama Prefecture. In Butare Prefecture the str at RUNYINYA and KIGEMBE will have to be reduced to a pl less a sec each taking into account the other tasks allotted to this Sector.
6. Considering all the above the following decisions need to be conveyed to this Sector :-
 - (a) Whether all tgt communes need to have a physical presence of formed tps. This should be decided after considering the fact that the returnees of OP RETOUR are not restricted to tgt communes only.
 - (b) If tgt communes have to have physical presence, is the weakened dply upto pl less a sec acceptable within laid down security norms.

④
Actioned
14/11

③ G3 Ops

Pls study option and
lets discuss ASAP what
dir to provide Sept 3 Comd
13.01

② COS (ops)


1. Ref att.
2. Could be discuss.
Link up with earlier
sig received on the subject
we have to issue clear
instrs.

A
10/11

(c) Should the present system of stronger dply in some locs with enhanced patrolling by day be continued in preference to the above proposals.


7. If a pl strong presence is required in all tgt communes, this Sector would require the increment of at least one rif coy at the earliest.

8. Forwarded for early decision and conveyance please.


S A HASNAIN
Lt Col
Sect Cdr

Deos ops

Sir, deployment of
a section 8tr pte
on a 24 hr basis
in the target communes
to show UNAMIR presence
at all times will suffice.


id/1

10. While the present system of ...
with ...
The ...

11. It is ...
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... for ...



8000

of ...
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1/11

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.65(G3 PLANS)

To: FC

From: OIC Op RETOUR

Info: DFC
COS
DCOS Ops (on return)

Date: 21 Dec 94

Subject: OP RETOUR - UPDATE ON PROGRESSGENERAL

1. This minute seeks to update you on Op RETOUR and the progress that has been made in your absence.
2. In my last briefing, I suggested that it was likely that either planning would continue (if the Government agreed to the Principles of Op RETOUR), or that it would become reactive, if forcible closure of the camps continued. Planning has continued, but at the cost of preparation time; D Day has now been set at 29 Dec 94.
3. This changes a number of things, and poses serious problems in many areas. These are discussed below.

PLANNING

4. We offered the Government an alternative to camp closure, in the shape of a rough plan for vacating camps - attached. It is primarily designed for their consumption, but now that they seem to have tacitly accepted it, we have to try to achieve the deadlines. We are thus working on achieving some results on 29 Dec, and building up thereafter.
5. Planning has been hampered by a poor database (as yet only partially complete) and the fact that camp closures shifted camp populations, throwing out all the figures. This can not be rectified and current figures are only a best guess. Nonetheless we have been able to identify Open Relief Centres (ORCs) for the first two camps, and work is now progressing to have them open by the deadlines set. A list of ORCs is also attached.

OPEN RELIEF CENTRES.

6. The ORC concept has not been widely accepted. Some Prefects and Bourgmestres have said that they do not want ORCs. UNHCR is uncomfortable with some of the ideas. It is clear to most players, however, that ORCs are necessary and a simple, no-nonsense ORC will be required in the priority Communes. This will be a place where shelter materials and seeds and tools will be distributed and administrative support provided, for instance for the resolution of property disputes. Food will be distributed across Communes and not at ORCs. Security support in the shape of a permanent UNAMIR presence, to augment Gendarmerie and RPA resources, during at least the early stages of reintegration, will be required.

7. Identification of later ORCs is now under way. These details will be promulgated as soon as they are available.

8. UN agencies and NGOs are generally very positive about ORCs. Many have agreed to shift emphasis directly from their camps to ORCs, and that is excellent news. Others are reluctant to leave their camps, unless the population voluntarily leaves, to the last man. The prevailing view is that, de facto, camps will be "closed", since the International Community has accepted the concept of Op RETOUR, and people will not go home unless there are demonstrable reasons for them to do so. I hope this common resolve will continue.

IOC

9. The IOC has not got off the ground. Attendance is desultory, tardy and without continuity. It is impossible to plan properly without commitment. Without UNAMIR and UNREO staff, there would be no permanent presence, and Christmas leave has reduced this to a minimum. The initial idea of having a "humanitarian headquarters" has not come to fruition, and will not, in my view, unless there is a full-blown disaster. This lack of coordination is the biggest threat to Op RETOUR, and there seems to be no way to neutralise it. We just have to soldier on!

10. Plans to move the IOC to the Ministry of Rehabilitation have not made evident progress. Mr Kent insists that the move is just around the corner, but it seems unlikely that the infrastructure will be ready for some time. Frankly, the only people available to orchestrate the Ministry project, and move the IOC into it, are too busily involved in crisis management, to spare the subject any thought.

SECURITY PLAN

11. The UNAMIR security instruction is about to be distributed. The security element of Op RETOUR is probably its most fundamental aspect, and the one most likely to succeed. The relevant COs have been briefed by me. There will be a coordination conference at HQ UNAMIR on Tue 27 Dec 94. Coordination on the ground will be effected by UNREO Butare and Gikongoro, and their coordination meeting is on 26 Dec.

ROLE OF TAC HQ

12. Tac HQ has a major coordinating role in Op RETOUR. Op HOMEWARD uses Tac HQ as a meeting place and it is intended to continue and to develop this method during Op RETOUR.

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER			
UNCLAS											
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	GA1/GIC IAC/IOG	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR		
OF DE	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO						
BOOK DOSSIER	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE										
<p>FROM — DE 0A/G3 OPS 3000.15</p> <p>TO — A 0/UNHQ G3 OPS.</p> <p>REF UPCOMING OP ALL CONTINGENT FM THIS LOC REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING AT THE RELEASE POINT IN BUTARE IMMEDIATELY.</p> <p>① ALL CONTINGENT REQUIRE LOUD HAILER.</p> <p>② " " " HAND HELD MOTOROLA PAD SET</p> <p>③ STILL AWAITING OF RPA LO + INTERPRETER ARRIVAL AT THE RELEASE POINT.</p> <p>④ PLEASE ACK IMMEDIATELY</p> <p>△ Talk to Maj. Philbert Kwizanso. OPNS OFFR "ALPHA" Mobile with head quarters in Gikomoro.</p>											
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION											
GHA SUP PL BUTARE											
<p>Actioned</p> <p>CSOPS2 1312</p>											
NAME — NOM						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES					
OFFICE — BUREAU						RX VIA VOICE PM PAD OP.					
TEL — TEL											
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR											
NAME — NOM						OR Asenewon.					
OFFICE — BUREAU											
TEL — TEL											
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE					
						UNCLAS					

082/UNAMIR/A

3000-15

13 Dec 94

From : INDBATT

To : UNAMIR HQ (Ops)

Subject : CONDUCT OF SEARCHES

Thunt
G30P82
14/12

1. Please refer to your letter No 3000.15 (Ops) dated 11 Dec 94.
2. Acknowledged.

PC Roy
(PC Roy)
Major
Adjutant
for CO INDBATT

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

3000.151 OPS

LINE 1			
LINE 2			
LINE 3			GR
LINE 4			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
LINE 5			
PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO	DATE - TIME GROUP 120121 Z DEC94	SIC/ORIG NO E3L/I4O/OPS/ 1047
ROUTING INDICATORS	From: ASC UNAMIR		
	To: HQ UNAMIR		


HQ UNAMIR FOR OPS CELL

SUBJ: OP OVERTURE

A. HQ UNAMIR MSG OP OVERTURE DATED 11 DEC 94

1. ACK RECEIPT OF REF A

TH
OPS2
14/12

PAGE NO 1		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE J.P. PARSONS (ADJT)				PHONE 1125010000		REF FILE NO 44-1-1	
NO OF PAGES 1		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE		BRANCH/UNIT AUSMED		SIGNATURE 		DATE DEC 94	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM OPERATOR
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED									

3000.15

PAAUZYUW UCCVVD0003 3442044-UUUU--UCCVVDA UCCVVDB.

ZNR UUUUU

P 102044Z DEC 94

FM SECTOR 4B HQ//FRAFBATT//

TO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI

INFO TAC HQ BUTARE//CLO LT COL THIANDOU//

BT

UNCLAS OPS 101

SUBJ: OPERATION OVERTURE.

REF: FILE NUM 3000.15 OPS.

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT FRAFBATT'S COMPANY FOR THE FORTH COMING
OPERATION WILL BE COMPRISED OF 03 PLATOON FROM 03 DIFFERENT CONTINGENTS.

Thumt
G3 OPS 2
14/12

May be incomplete, No ETX indicator received!

21 15

For G3 ops' attn

Jy to capt
102225 B DEC 94.

UN SECRET

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Copy No 14 of 27

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
KIGALI

ADMINO 01

10 Dec 94

RELATED OPO NO 21

Reference:

A. Map Series Z723 BUTARE Sheet 40 Edition 1, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: BRAVO

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. As per OpO.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) As per OpO.

(2) In addition 3 CSG, GHA Sup Pl and BRSC pers will provide sp for the op.

c. Att and Det

Under comd for daily maint:

TUNBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
ETHIOBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
GHANBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
FRAFBATT - One Indep Inf Coy
ZAMBATT - One Indep Inf Coy
NICOY - One Indep Coy
less 2 pls

INDIBATT - TBA

20 MILOBS

30 RPA LO/Interpreter

1 of 11

UN SECRET

UN SECRET

2. MISSION. To maint UNAMIR Force during OP OVERTURE.

3. GENERAL

a. General Outline

- (1) Estb of Log Base at Butare.
- (2) Selected log elms to deploy fwd to Op area.

4. MATERIAL AND SERVICES

a. Supply

(1) Class 1 - Rat

- (a) 3 days CRP and water per soldier to be provided by the contingents.
- (b) 3 CSG to deliver qty 5600 CRP to GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1. Note CRP to include menu that do not contain pork.
- (c) 3 CSG is to deliver 500 german rations and 500lt bottled water to GHA Sup Pl GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1. These rations are for sustenance of detainees only.
- (d) 3 CSG to deliver bottled water qty 11200 bottles to GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
- (e) Units to collect 2 days CRP and water from GHA Sup Pl at Butare GR 7011 D + 1 and D + 3.
- (f) Brown and Root to provide 1 x Water Tanker with 20,000lt ROWPU water. Report GHA Sup Pl and move fwd to KIBEHO GR 5007 and NDAGO GR 5201 when ordered by GHA Sup Pl Comd.

(2) Class 2 - Gen Stores. Contingents to provide and deploy with their immediate requirements. Specific requirements as indicated on contingent returns will be provided as far as possible and delivered to GHA Sup Pl.

- (3) Class 3 - POL
 - (a) 3 CSG to deliver 10,000 lts (in drums) of diesel to GHA Sup Pl loc in Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
 - (b) 3 CSG to deliver 1000 lts (in drums) of gasoline (petrol) to GHA Sup Pl loc Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
 - (c) 3 CSG is to deliver 2000LT JET-A1 fuel to BUTARE airstrip for helo op by H-HR + 2.
 - (d) GHA Sup Pl to confirm any additional requirement for hand fuel pumps to G4.
 - (e) POL resup is by unit collection from GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011. Resup pt will open 140600B Dec 94.
- (4) Class 4 - Def Stores. 3 CSG to deliver the following def stores to GHA Sup Pl loc in Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
 - (a) Barbed Wire - 5 rolls.
 - (b) Concertina - 50 rolls.
 - (c) Tie Wire - 2 rolls.
 - (d) Sand Bags - 500 bags.
 - (e) 6" Post Picket - 300.
- (5) Class 5 - Ammunition. Contingents to deploy with contingent first line holding.
- (6) Class 6 - Welfare and Personal Demand Items. Not required.
- (7) Class 7 Major Items. Not required.
- (8) Class 8 - Medical Stores. To be covered under medical.
- (9) Class 9 - Repair Parts
 - (a) First line repair parts to be catered for by all units.
 - (b) Second line to be provided by BRSC.

b. Transportation

- (1) G4 TPT. G4 TPT is to;
 - (a) Provide one potable water tanker to be located at the GHA Sup Pl Butare for the duration of op.
 - (b) Arrange provision of four minibuses to the Provost Marshal for movement of detainees.
- (2) 3 CSG. 3 CSG is to;
 - (a) deliver the stores and equipment detailed at para 4a. and as otherwise instructed to GHA Sup Pl Butare.
 - (b) return all unused stores and equipment from GHA Sup Pl Butare at end of op.
- (3) ZAMBATT. ZAMBATT is to;
 - (a) Provide the G4 TPT cell for the operation of TAC HQ.
 - (b) Ensure the nominated offr to be G4 TPT contact HQ UNAMIR G4 TPT for briefing prior to op.
 - (c) Provide and operate 15 MDM veh for tpt tasking in support to op.
 - (d) Tpt TUNBATT elm and their stores and equipment from Busogo to the assembly area at Butare.
 - (e) Redeploy TUNBATT elm and stores and equipment to Busogo at end of operation.
 - (f) Tpt GHANBATT and their stores and equipment from Gikongoro to the assembly area at Butare.
 - (g) Redeploy GHANBATT elm and their stores and equipment to Gikongoro at the end of op.
 - (h) Coordinate tpt for deployment of units from the assembly area to the FUP.
 - (i) Coordinate the tpt of stores, equipment, water and rations forward of GHA Sup Pl Butare as required.

- (4) All Units Less TUNBATT AND GHANBATT. Deploy and redeploy unit personnel stores and equipment to and from the assembly area at Butare. Unit tpt used for deployment are to come under op con ZAMBATT for deployment of units from the assembly area to the FUP.

c. Services

- (1) BRSC to deliver qty 2000 garbage bags to GHA Sup Pl at Butare at the rate of 100 bags per coy.
- (2) All contingents are to back load their garbage to GHA Sup Pl at Butare.
- (3) BRSC to collect for disposal, all garbage from GHA Sup Pl on a daily basis and at the end of the operation.

d. Maintenance

- (1) All units to provide first line repairs.
- (2) Second line repairs to be provided by BRSC at Butare.
- (3) BRSC to provide MRT at Butare.
- (4) BRSC to provide first and second line recovery.
- (5) Requests for recovery and second line repairs are to be directed to the G4 staff at op TAC HQ.

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- a. Medical Support. Companies are to deploy with organic level one health including Coy Aid Posts (CAP). AS MSF is to provide a Casualty Collecting Post (CCP) capable of limited level one and a level two capability of two resuscitation teams and a 10 bed holding facility. The CCP is also to provide three ambulances and crews and AME teams as required. The AS MSF will continue to provide level three support in Kigali. One MO to be deployed to sp detainee holding area.

b. Casualty Evacuation

- (1) Casevac is to be conducted using road and AME assets. Units are responsible for evacuation with their unit area of responsibility. The normal means from CAP to CCP is to be by road. AME is to be normal means of evacuation from KIBEHO to level three facility.
- (2) Road. Three ambulances and crews are to be available for road evacuation and are to be positioned at the CCP. Sub-units requesting evacuation to the CCP are to initiate the request using the Casevac Request format transmitted on the OP OVERTURE command net. Road evac rearward of the CCP will be directed by Med Br, HQ UNAMIR.
- (3) Air. Dedicated AME is to be allocated under op con HQ UNAMIR. This ac is to be pre-positioned at KIBEHO during daylight hours and will be re-positioned at KIGALI during hours of darkness. AS MSF in consultation with Air Ops are to ensure this ac is equipped for AME prior to H hour. Requests for AME are to be transmitted on the UNAMIR Command net to HQ UNAMIR using the Casevac Request format. Casualty regulation rearward of KIBEHO is to remain the responsibility of Medical Branch, HQ UNAMIR.

c. Holding Policy. Holding policy for casualties is as follows:

- (1) CAP - nil.
- (2) CCP - 24 hrs.
- (3) Level Three - 28 days.

d. Health

- (1) All units are to be responsible for organic field sanitation and hygiene throughout the Op. Units are to deploy with sufficient health stores for this purpose. Given the high concentration of personnel during the op, unit commanders are to ensure that the highest standards of field hygiene are maintained.
- (2) Queries on appropriate health measure are to be directed to Med BR and HQ UNAMIR.

e. Dental. Dental support will not be provided at Level ONE and Level Two facilities. Casualties requiring dental treatment will be evacuated to AS MSF Kigali.

- f. Medical Resupply. CAP and CCP are to deploy with 9 days Class 7 (medical) supplies. Requests for resupply are to be staffed to G4 Med at HQ UNAMIR, through TAC HQ using normal message demand procedures.
 - g. Health Report CAP are to provide reports to their unit HQ as required. CCP is to provide a daily medical SITREP for the duration of the Operation to Med Branch as per UNAMIR Medical Branch SOP. They are also to provide the AS MSF with medical statistics for weekly reports as required. All personnel elements are to be aware of Casualty Evacuation request formats prior to deployment.
6. PERSONNEL
- a. Units are to fwd nominal roll of all personnel taking part in the operation to Tac HQ (G1), copy to Force HQ (CMPO) by 1800 hrs D-1.
 - b. Personnel are to wear ID tags (if aval) and UN ID cards for immediate identification.
 - c. NOTICAS. Any occurrence of death or serious injury is to be reported to the KIBEHO HQ immediately. As soon as possible thereafter, as much of the following information as possible in respect of the casualty is to be passed to the HQ:
 - (1) UN ID CARD number.
 - (2) Service number.
 - (3) Rank.
 - (4) Name.
 - (5) Sex.
 - (6) Contingent.
 - (7) Status (MILOB or contingent).
 - (8) Nature of casualty (death or serious injury).
 - (9) Cause of casualty.
 - d. Detainees. The correct handling of detainees is a critical component of Op OVERTURE and is, therefore, covered in the OpO. The following stores are required:

- (1) Polaroid cameras. 4 cameras (with film) have been issued for the authentication of evidence, to document finds and to ensure that any damage caused in the searching of dwellings and vehicles is accurately and fully recorded.
 - (2) Bags for the Collection and Handling of Evidence. Any evidence and personal property collected will need to be safeguarded and transferred to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC). It is to be placed in bags and taken by the soldier who collects it to the DPC where it will be documented and labelled by MP personnel. There is a requirement, therefore, for 2,000 heavy duty plastic bags (or sandbags if none better are available) and luggage labels:
 - (a) Bags. Bags are to be issued to:
 - (i) Infantry coys: 200 to each.
 - (ii) The MP Coy: the remainder, both for the processing of evidence and to act as a reserve for redistribution to infantry coys.
 - (4) Labels. Labels are to be issued to the Force MP Coy.
- e. Paper proforma. Locally produced proforma - examples of which are included with the OPO - will be needed for the documentation of searches and detainees; the requirement is:
- (1) Search Proforma: 200 to each infantry coy.
 - (2) Detainee Proforma: 1,000 to the Force MP Coy.
 - (3) CCO is requested to provide, a photocopier and 4 reams of paper to the Force MP Coy for the local production of additional forms should the need arise.
- f. (1) Loud Hailer. A loud hailer (with batteries if necessary) is needed by the Force MP Coy.
- (2) Eating and drinking utensils. Eating and drinking utensils are required for the provision of meals and drinks to detainees; 50 sets are required.

8. Engrs

- a. Erection of wire and tentage. Engr sp is to be provided from NICOY is to establish the MP DPC - specifically, the erection of tentage and concertina wire. NICOY and the CO of the Force MP Coy are to liaise as necessary to ensure that it is positioned as required.
- b. Route Maintenance. Bad weather may give rise to problems with the 2 x main routes, in particular. The ability to place fascines may be required, should any minor bridges be washed away.
- c. Generator and Lighting. CCO is requested to provide a generator and lighting for the DPC as it will need to be lit at night. CCO and CO of the Force MP Coy are to liaise as necessary.

9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Location of HQ.
 - (1) TAC HQ KIBEHO, to incl GI/G4 rep.
 - (2) Alternate HQ - TAC HQ Butare.
 - (3) MILOB HQ Det co-loc with TAC HQ.
- b. ZAMBATT is to provide personnel for operation of TAC HQ G4 cell.
- c. TAC HQ Butare is to provide G4 personnel for SUP and MAINT for operation of TAC HQ G4 for the duration of op.
- d. 15 X ZAMBATT mdm veh under op con of operation TAC HQ.
- e. Unit first line veh used to deploy unit elements to assembly area Butare to come under op con of operation TAC HQ for deployment of troops from assembly area to FUP.
- f. Electronic Silence. As per OPO..
- g. Code Words. As per OPO.

10. Ack Instrs: Ack.

HK ANYIDOHO
Brig Gen
FC



K P O'KELLY
Col
DCOS SP

Authentication:

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Copy No

GHANBATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
ZAMBATT
TUNBATT
NICOY
INDBATT
MILOB GP HQ
AUSMED
CANSIG
3CSG
FMO
MP COY
G3 OPS
TAC HQ BUTARE
GHA SUP PL
BRSC

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Internal:

Information:

FC'S FILE	18
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3000.15/1/OPS

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS



TO: GHANBATT

ZAMBATT

ETHIOBATT

INDBATT

SECTOR 3

INFO: TAC HQ

DATE: 12 JAN 95

SUBJECT: SEARCH OF IDPS - OP RETOUR

1. Please be informed that UNAMIR troops are authorised to search IDPs for weapons and military equipment before they are evacuated by UN trucks to their home communes. Details on the mentioned subject to follow.

2. For your necessary information.

TO : ✓ FORCE HQ (OPS)
TAC HQ BUTARE
HQ SECTOR 4A

01 Jan 95

SECTOR 3/OPS/1

INFO: MILOBS GP HQ, KIGALI

FROM: HQ SECTOR 3 GITARAMA

COORDINATION : OP RETOUR

1. With the commencement of Phase 2 of OP RETOUR, it is submitted that there is a need for greater coordination to afford this sector to execute the tasks which have been allotted to it. As per Security Instructions, this sector is to monitor the return of IDPs to their home communes and maintain pl strength RRF in readiness whenever IDP convoys are transiting the sector.

2. To perform the above tasks effectively, there is a need to ensure that adequate and timely information is passed on to us. The following information, if available, will greatly assist us in optimising the execution of our tasks :-


(a) The number of IDPs who have been registered in the marshalling areas along with the names of the communes to which they are being transported. The number of IDPs per commune should preferably be indicated.

(b) The terminal location for each convoy and its route eg. Kigali, Gitarama etc.


(c) The number of vehs in each convoy and the identity of the escorts along with their call sign.

(d) The start time of the convoy.

3. May we seek the kind cooperation of all concerned to please consider the above request.


SA Hasnain
Lt Col
Sector Cdr

802
Pse mlt ^{and info him} to Sector 3
Cmndr that the Co-ordinating
Hd for OP Retour is
Tce Hl and should liaise
closely with that Hd for
answers to questions posed


as ops

Actioned
Thur 802 OPS
09/1

03 017

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Handwritten notes at top right, including "202" and "203".

SECTION 002
THE COM 11
BY HANSHU

SECTION 001
THE COM 11
BY HANSHU

- (a) The name of the company.
- (b) The name of the person who is the owner of the company.
- (c) The name of the person who is the manager of the company.
- (d) The name of the person who is the director of the company.
- (e) The name of the person who is the secretary of the company.

SECTION 002
THE COM 11
BY HANSHU

SECTION 003
THE COM 11
BY HANSHU

COORDINATION : OF SECTION

SECTION 004
THE COM 11
BY HANSHU

SECTION 005
THE COM 11
BY HANSHU

SECTION 006
THE COM 11
BY HANSHU

AFTER ACTION REPORT OF OP HOPE

GENERAL

1. OP - HOPE was a cordon and search Op undertaken by UNAMIR in co-ordination with RPA to clear Kibeho and Ndago - IDP camps (Sector 4) of criminal elements who were indulging in looting, acts of banditry and wanton killings aimed at discouraging IDPs in those camps from voluntarily going back to their respective home communes.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to highlight the conduct and problems encountered by UNAMIR during OP HOPE.

CONDUCT

3. Level of Participation.

a. UNAMIR Troops. The op was conducted from 13 - 15 Dec 94. A total of 1,552 UNAMIR tps, MILOBS and support staff participated in the op, details of which are given below:

Ethiobatt	-	302
Ghana	-	238
Tunisia	-	202
French African Contingent	-	134
Zambia	-	161
Nigeria	-	140
India	-	95
Australia	-	50
Canada	-	36
MILOBS	-	79
Mil Police	-	37
HQ Staff	-	21

b. RPA. The RPA contributed two Battalions during the operation as the outer cordon troops. In addition, they provided a small number of liaison officers.

4. Personnel Arrested and Weapons Confiscated. A total of 44 suspected criminals were taken into custody during the Op and handed over to the office of the prosecutor in GIKONGORO in the presence of Human Right and ICRC representative. Details of weapons confiscated were as follows:

a.	Machete	-	810)	
b.	Spear	-	58)	
c.	Axes	-	190)	
d.	Bayonets	-	4)	
e.	7.62mm Rounds	-	21)	These were sorted out and
f.	Magazines	-	1)	those considered not real
g.	Swords	-	5)	killing weapons were
)	returned to the owners.
h.	Knives	-	214)	Whilst the very dangerous
i.	Harpoon	-	16)	ones are being held by
j.	Sickles	-	10)	UNAMIR MP Coy.

5. Post Operation Presence. UNAMIR continues to maintain a strong presence in those two camps in an attempt to create a climate of confidence and security amongst the displaced persons and discourage criminals from returning.

HIGHLIGHTS

6. The following are worthy of mention:

a. There was neither a UNAMIR nor IDP casualty throughout the entire operation. The planning was thorough and professionally executed.

b. The population co-operated fully with UNAMIR troops and showed no signs of fear, resentment or panic. Instead they remained calm and quite content with whatever steps we went through to make the place free of the criminals to allow them to take a decision on their own to return to their home communes.

c. The operation, has without doubt sent out a clear signal to those criminal elements in Zairean and Tanzanian camps that some day, an operation of this nature will be launched to get rid of them also.

d. The humane and orderly way in which the whole operation was conducted is also worth mentioning.

- e. The success of the operation raised the morale of the troops that participated. They felt a sense of achievement.
- f. UNAMIR has proved that it is not in Rwanda to only make complaints about RPA's rush actions to disperse IDPs from the camps, but that UNAMIR is prepared to take action to improve security throughout the country within its mandate.
- g. The operation has made the RPA show a lot more tolerance towards the IDPs so far as their proposed forceful ejection programme is concerned.
- h. Last but not the least OP HOPE has been a confidence building mechanism for UNAMIR.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

- 7. The following problems were encountered :
 - a. RPA liaison and identification teams were far too inadequate; so were UNAMIR interpreters.
 - b. The secrecy of the operation could not be maintained inspite of best efforts due to the involvement of NGOs at the latter stages of planning of the operation.
 - c. Government judicial authorities were not available as planned, with the result that handing over of detainees was initially a problem. UNAMIR was however able to finally handover the 44 suspects to the public prosecutor and we are maintaining a very close watch over how those suspects are being treated. We are already forwarding periodic reports to DPKO on the suspects.
 - d. UNAMIR lacks second line TCV support which made troop movement from their respective AOR to the mentioned IDP camps a tedious exercise. The vehicle problem if not solved, will result in our operations coming to a complete halt in the first quarter of 1995.
 - e. As at now some of the contingents still do not have basic personal equipment such as flak jackets and ballistic helmets.

CONCLUSION

- 8. The operation was extremely successful, and the morale of troops was very high. RPA exercised remarkable restraint and their conduct during the operation was commendable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 9. For future Force cordon and search operations the following are recommended:

- a. The second line holding of TCVs should not be less than 100.
- b. A Force Military Legal Officer be included in UNAMIR organization and appointed accordingly.

Date.....

HK ANYIDOHO
Brig Gen.
DFC

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER			
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR		
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MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE											
<p>FROM — DE ϕA (UNAMIR TAC HQ BUTUARE)</p> <p>TO — A ϕ (UNAMIR/G3 OPS)</p> <p>SUBJ: OP RETOUR SIT REP. (291200 DEC 94)</p> <p>① FEW I.D.P. TURNED UP FOR MOVEMENT OF COUNTINEOS.</p> <p>② FOOD DISTRIBUTION IS IN PROGRESS.</p> <p>③ UEH STAT: CANADIAN SIGS FIG' ⑤</p> <p>ZAMBATT ⑨</p> <p>I.O.M ⑤</p> <p>INDABATT ⑤</p> <p>IVICOY ③</p> <p>T.C.V (IN ROUTE)</p> <p>④ HEL CAME AS PLANNED</p>											
<p>DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION</p> <p>802 For tomorrow's brief.</p> <p>Roger Sir. <i>[Signature]</i></p>											
DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES						
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL	FR ϕ A Motorola Comm NET						
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR					TO ϕ						
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL	CPL TURNER						
SIGNATURE					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE						



To: **G3 Ops**

From: Force Provost Marshal

Info: UNHRFOR Team Leader Butare (Ms Sofia d'Escato)
Legal Adviser (Mr Minta)
SO2 Legal (Maj Oswald, AUSMED)

Date: 28 Dec 94

Subject: THE DRAFTING OF THE OPERATION RETOUR
SECURITY INSTRUCTION

1. I am not sure that Annex D to the Op RETOUR Security Instruction is as clear as it ought to be. Paragraph f, in particular gives me cause for concern - if not for what it actually says, then for its muddled thought. Not knowing who drafted it, it seems appropriate to route my comments through you.

2. Clearly, the paragraph is not talking about physical protection but this might not be understood by, and should be made clear to, some UNAMIR readers of the Annex. The subject of its discussion is, in fact, the confidence that can be brought to a population by the knowledge that a process of registration and monitoring is taking place; should this not be stated explicitly? A further concern is the suggestion that arrests can take place in an ORC only in the presence "in principle" of UN or ICRC personnel; surely this is not true because Rwanda is a sovereign country and arrests can take anywhere that the lawful agents of the state can operate - including ORCs. Or has an agreement been concluded with the Rwandan authorities that makes ORCs special in some way? And how can we enforce the requirement for someone to sign for arrests that they might have made? On what documentation should they sign? What is the document supposed to prove and for what are signatories signing? When this Annex is redrafted, as I think it must be, it should make clear that the arrests under discussion are by the RPA or Gendarmerie and not to be confused with those that might be made by UNAMIR and require a process of handing over to the civil authority.

3. I hope that this is helpful and stand ready to assist in any way that I can.

M. Cuthbert-Brown

M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM

① PM (Provost Marshal)

Pse see Maj Oswald
the author of the Annex D
for necessary corrections to
be made. Thanks for the
observations.

28/12. G3 Ops

② copy fwd
28/12



From: G3 Ops
UNAMIR HQ

File No: 3000.4(Ops)

To: TAC HQ
GHANBATT
ZAMBATT
INDBATT
FRAFATT
ETHIOBATT
TUNBATT
NICOY

Info: DFC
COS
G3 Air

Date: 28 DEC 94

Subject: HELICOPTER TASKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OP RETOUR

1. Attached please find additional information on tasks that UN Helicopters can undertake in support of OP RETOUR.
2. For your necessary attention.

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.65(G3 PLANS)

To: G3 Air Ops

From: OIC Op RETOUR

Info: FC
DFC
COS
G3 Ops

Date: 26 Dec 94

Subject: **HELICOPTER TASKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OP RETOUR**

Reference: 3000.15 (Ops) dated 23 Dec 94.

1. General. The reference gives details of the security operation to support Op RETOUR. This minute seeks to generate helicopter support for the operation.
2. Tasks. The use of helicopters in support of Op RETOUR will facilitate the following objectives:
 - a. Confidence building in the camps and Home Communes.
 - b. Recce and liaison flights.
 - c. Visits.
 - d. Delivery of information leaflets.
3. Camps. A helicopter presence above target IDP camps will facilitate confidence building and enhance the profile of the operation. Additionally, it will reduce intimidation by extremists, and provide a reaction capability for movement, liaison and CASEVAC tasks. Primary consideration should be given to Cyanika and Rukhondo camps. It is requested that the following be provided:
 - a. Three sorties over both Cyanika and Rukhondo camps, with a minimum presence of 10 minutes per sortie, per day, from 29 Dec, until further notice.

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Opportunity overflights of other IDP Camps in Sector 4A en route to/from other taskings, to include a circuit if possible.

c. Information leaflet dropping missions as and when leaflets become available.

4. Home Communes. The list of Open Relief Centres in Home Communes is at Annex A to the Reference. Confidence building and the provision of aerial surveillance will be critical factors in the development of a positive security environment in the Communes. To that end, it is requested that the following taskings be developed:

a. At least one daily overflight of each Home Commune, to include low-level surveillance flying and coverage of outlying areas in the target Communes.


b. Overflight of target Home Communes on an opportunity basis en route to/from other taskings.

c. Assistance to to MILOB Sector Comds of Sectors 2 and 3, for MILOB surveillance of Home Communes, when requested through normal channels.

5. Routes. IDP convoys will travel on the main routes between Gikongoro, Butare, Gitarama Kigali and Bugasera. They will be distinguishable by the military nature of each convoy/packet and by the presence of both RPA and UNAMIR escorts. On an opportunity basis, it is requested that helicopters routinely overfly convoys, in order to heighten the feeling of security of the IDPs travelling in them.

6. Recce. Liaison and Visits. It is expected that Op RETOUR will generate considerable need for recce and liaison, and for visits by senior members of the humanitarian community. These taskings will be requested in the normal manner.

8. Conclusion. It is hoped to provide a significant helicopter presence in the key areas, throughout the duration of Op RETOUR. If possible, this should be achieved in concert with other taskings, in order to maximise helicopter flying hours efficiently. Should a need for further dedicated taskings become evident, in order for these objectives to be realised, your early advice would be appreciated.



T A P MULLARKEY
Lt Col
OIC Op RETOUR

DISPLACED PERSONS CAMP SITUATION
GIKONGORO PREFECTURE - SECTOR 4A

AS AT 30 NOV 94

SL	CAMP/GRID	STRENGTH	FOOD	MEDICAL	NON-FOOD	SAN/WATER
+ 101 4A21	MUSANGE/ 5147	NIL		CENS (SAB) CARITAS		
+ 101 A	JENDA/ 5345	2000 NIL	CARE	CARE	CARE	TROCAIRE
+ 102 4A07	KADUHA/ 4743 and 4742	30,000 NIL	CARE	MSF	CARE	MSF
+ 103 4A19	MUKO/ 381414	9,500 8,000 NIL	SOLIDARITE	SCF	SOLIDARITE	TROCAIRE MSF
104 4A25	RUKUNDO/ 5538/5438	43,000	CARE	MSF	CARE	MSF
104 A 4A37	MAKERA/ 578399	700	S A T E L I T E O F 104			
104 B	MAMERESHO 5435	5,000	S A T E L I T E O F 104			
104 C 4A38	KABILIZI 5936 & RUGABANO	4,000 7,569	S A T E L I T E O F 104			
105 C 4A03	CYANIKA/ 5530	26,000	AICF	TROCAIRE/MSF MERLIN/AICF	AICF	AICF
111	NYARUSIZA 552202	3,000				
106 4A35	MBOGO/ 615294	7,600	SOLIDARITE		SOLIDARITE	
107 4A18	KAMWAMBI/ 634309	6,000	SOLIDARITE		SOLIDARITE	
112 4A36	KARAMBI/ 568229	3,000	SOLIDARITE/ CARITAS	CARITAS	SOLIDARITE/ CARITAS	CARITAS

108 4A22	MUSEBEYA/ 3933/ 383321	14,000 (around hospital and in houses	SOLIDARITE/ CARITAS	SCF	SOLIDARITE	OXFAM
109	MBUGA/ 4224	7,500	SOLIDARITE/ CARITAS	SISTER OF CHARITY/LOCAL PERS(Sup by CARITAS)	SOLIDARITE	TROCAIRE
110 4A12	KIRARO/ 515313	7,200	SOLIDARITE/ ICRC	TROCAIRE	SOLIDARITE	TROCAIRE
113 4A32	MURAMBI/ 519289	3,500				SOLIDARITE/ TROCAIRE
114 4A40	NYAMAGABE/ 545274	2,000				
201 4A02	BUSANZE/ 4690	9,000	from 205	MERLIN	FEED THE CHILDREN	
202 4A27	SHORORO/ 4385 45	506	from 205			
203	KANAZI/ 550196	2,600				
204 4A08	KAMANA/ 5197/5096	21,000	ICRC	ICRC	ICRC/SCF	ICRC
205 4A20	MUNINI/ 4800	12,000	ICRC	ICRC	ICRC	ICRC
206 4A14	NDAGO/ 5102	53,000	ICRC/SCF	GOAL	ICRC/ SCF	OXFAM/ MSF
207 4A45	GASHINGE/ 447028	NO CAMP ANY MORE				
208 4A17	MUGANZA/ 436030	NIL		ICRC		
219 4A33	KIVU/ 406052	50				
209 4A11	KIBEHO/ 5007	75,000	ICRC/AICF	ICRC MSF	ICRC	MSF/PWSS/ OXFAM
210 4A26	RWAMIKO/ 497128	4,000	ICRC/SCF	CARITAS	ICRC/SCF	ICRC

211 4A05	RURAMBA/ 488172	4,300	ICRC	GOAL	ICRC/SCF	ICRC/GOAL
212	GISUNZU/ 418176	5,000	ICRC	ICRC		
220	BIVUMU/ 434230 local name "GISUNZU"	3,000				
213 4A01	BUHORO/ 4621	4,200	ICRC	CARITAS	ICRC	ICRC/CARIT
214 4A24	NYAMIGINA/ 4523	8,000	ICRC	CARITAS	ICRC	ICRC/CARITA
221 4A09	KAMEGELI/ 495240	NIL				
215 4A43	BWAMA/ 528237	N O C A M P A N Y M O R E				
216 4A13	KIZI/ 544234	2,080	AICF	CARITAS	CARITAS	SAN:CARITAS
217 4A16	MUGANO/ 564225	4,500	SOLIDARITE/ CARITAS	CARITAS	SOLIDARITE/ CARITAS	CARITAS
218 4A15	MUDASOMWA/ 423223	6,000				
	KINAZI 622285	2663	AICF	CARITAS		
	NYARUSIZA 523203	3000	AICF	CARITAS		

NOTE :

- Information are not available at present are indicated by ? sign
- Other information as asked will be sent after confirmation.

Handwritten signature
(LENNHARD, 4/75)



To: SRSG, DFC
From: Force IM, SC2, CI Discipline
Info: ED, COS, MA/FC, DCOS Ops, CMPO
Date: 23 Dec 94
File: FPM/5

Scm
27/12.

Subject: OPERATION HOPE - 3RD REPORT ON THE HANDLING OF
DETAINEES BY RWANDAN CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1. On Fri 23 Dec, in the company of an interpreter provided by HRFOR field officers, I visited Mr Aloys Havugiyaremye, the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro. I met him in the prison to check on his progress in dealing with the 44 people taken into detention by UNAMIR during Op HOPE, all of whom are still held by the civil authorities. I found that:


a. Mr Havugiyaremye has now interviewed all 44 detainees.

b. He is planning a schedule of visits to the home communes of the detainees and has confirmed his intention to start with those facing lesser accusations. He has no car and has requested assistance from UNAMIR in making his visits; the granting of this request seems reasonable in the circumstances and would greatly speed up the processing of his caseload.

2. The new prison governor, Mr Emmanuel Muragijimana (he was appointed on 30 Nov) is evidently trying to improve conditions in the prison and was happy to show me round it. I found it visibly cleaner than at the beginning of the week and that the governor is trying to allocate more space to prisoners. I was able to greet each of the 44 detainees in the presence of the governor and of the public prosecutor and see that all are in reasonable shape; most responded warmly to my simple (and, no doubt, badly pronounced) greeting in Kinyarwanda. One made a complaint in English that they are short of blankets, soap and eating utensils but I have seen the delivery note relating to 100 bars of soap and 70 blankets delivered to the prison by ICRC last week; I could not find out what has happened to them. Both ICRC and Caritas have made significant deliveries of food to the prison (part of a consignment of more than 1,800 kg from the latter was being delivered whilst I was there).

3. The detainees were allowed free use of the alleys between the prison cells and to mix with other non-military prisoners during my 2-hour visit and seemed in altogether better shape than at the beginning of the week. I was told that the balance between the 2 cells on which I commented on 20 Dec was the result of the detainees' own choice but I repeated my suggestion - and again received agreement to it - that 22/22 is a better split than 17/27.

4. I have arranged to visit Mr Havugiyaremye again on Fri 30
Dec and will submit another report subsequently.



M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR MINUAR

To: Comd Sector 4, C MILOBS

From: G3 Ops

Info: COS, Force PM

Date: 25 Dec 94

Subject: OPERATION HOPE - FOLLOW UP ACTION IN THE HANDLING OF
DETAINEES BY THE RWANDAN CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1. It has become apparent that the work of the Gikongoro Public Prosecutor (Mr Aloys Havugiyaremye) in dealing with the 44 detainees for whom he has become responsible as a result of Op HOPE is being hampered by his lack of transport.

2. Please conduct urgent liaison with each other and with Mr Havugiyaremye to determine how best we can help him travel around the Gikongoro and Butare areas (including Ndago and Kibeho) in order to speed up his investigations. You should give him whatever assistance he needs and keep the Provost Marshal at HQ UNAMIR - whose next visit to Mr Havugiyaremye is scheduled for Fri 30 Dec - informed of his movements.

3000.15/1

FROM: HQ UNAMIR OPS
TO: GHANBATT (4A S AND 2)
ZAMBATT (4A N)
TAC HQ BUTARE
SECTOR 3

DATE: 27 DEC 94

SUBJECT: OP RETOUR

1. FOR SPECIAL INVOLVEMENT OF RPA ELEMENTS IN YOUR RESPECTIVE SECTORS, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO GIVE A COPY OF THE SECURITY INSTR FOR OP RETOUR TO RPA COMDS IN YOUR SECTOR.

2. A COPY OF THE MENTIONED INSTR HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE RPA LO AT THIS HQ BUT THIS WILL TAKE TIME TO GET TO YOUR SECTORS.

3. FOR YOUR NEC ATTENTION AND ACTION PSE

Thur
3020RS

3000.15 OPS
FROM: G3 OPS
TO: TAC HQ
SECTOR 3
GHANBATT
ZAMBATT

DATE: DEC 94

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT TO SECURITY INSTRUCTION OP RETOUR

1. Ref our Draft Security Instr. 3000.15 (OPS) dated 23 Dec 94.
2. You are requested to carry out the following amendments in the Security Instruction:
 - a. Page 6. Delete task at para 4 (a) (ii) (ab) under Sector 3 and insert as para 3 (a) (ii) (ae) under GHANBATT.
 - b. Page 12. Amend para (a) to read Schedule . See Annex B.
 - c. Page 12. Delete para (5).
3. Amended and signed Security Instructions for OP RETOUR follows.
4. Ack.

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS *Enfile* File No: 3000.15/1/OPS

TO: SECTOR 3

ZAMBATT

GHANBATT

INDBATT

MILOB GP HQ

ETHIOBATT

FRAFBATT

TUNBATT

INFO: AUSMED

CANSIGS

DATE: 21 DEC 94

SUBJECT: OP RETOUR

1. Op RETOUR is an operation planned for the return of IDPs to their home communes. The operation aims at relocating IDP population, mainly concentrated in the Prefecture of GIKONGORO to their home communes, principally in the Prefectures of Gitarama, Butare and South Kigali.

2. The mentioned operation will be preceded by an information campaign to be conducted in the targeted camps commencing 19 Dec 94.

3. Four teams consisting of representatives from Rwandese government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR will be deployed as follows:

- a. KIBEHO and NDAGO (4AS).
- b. CYANIKA and RUKONDO (4AN).
- c. BIVUMU, BOHORU, RURAMBA and RWAMIKO (4AN).
- d. KAMANA and MUNINI (4AS).

4. Units responsible for the Sector in which the above mentioned camps are allocated are requested to provide the following to each deployed team:

a. 1 x LO.

b. Military Escort (strength depending on security situation in camp).

5. Both military elements mentioned in para 4a and 4b will need to be self sufficient in terms of:

a. Transport.

b. Ration and water.

c. Accommodation.

6. Briefings will be conducted on a daily basis by the team coordinators located in Gikongoro. All teams are required to attend an initial briefing to be held at the UNREO Field Office located in Gikongoro on 20 December starting at 1230 hrs. The point of contact at this briefing will be the UNREO Field Officer in Gikongoro, Mr Tim Meisburger.

7. Attached are Concept for Security Operations and Information Plan for your necessary attention.

**CONCEPT FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF
OPERATION RETOUR**

General

1. The aim of Operation RETOUR is for the displaced persons and refugees of Rwanda to return home from the camps which they currently occupy. In essence, the concept provides for:
 - a. The preparation of Home Communes;
 - b. The establishment of conditions in the Camps which are conducive to voluntary vacation;
 - c. The safe movement of IDPs/refugees to overnight way stations (OWS);
 - d. Processing and provisioning of IDPs/refugees in OWSs; and
 - e. Movement to Home Communes or Open Relief Centres (ORC).
2. A fundamental component of the operation is to ensure that adequate security is provided in order to:
 - a. Prevent intimidation and harassment in Camps by extremists;
 - b. Enhance confidence amongst the population;
 - c. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes; and
 - d. Reduce the conditions for violence in home communes during the community reintegration process.

Outline Tasks

3. Allocated tasks are as follows:
 - a. Provide security in Home Communes;
 - b. Provide a strong security presence on the camps;
 - c. Establish a high security environment in the OWSs;
 - d. Provide route security between Camps, OWSs and Home Communes or ORCs; and
 - e. Provide a reactive security capability during the Operation.

Mission

4. UNAMIR is to provide security in support of Operation RETOUR.

Concept

5. The provision of security will be effected as follows:
 - a. IDP Camps Camp security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
 - b. OVS OVS security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
 - c. Escort IDP convoy escort will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located. The escort, augmented by a RPA liaison element, will remain with the convoy from the originating camp to the destination Commune/ORC. A Ready Reaction Force is to be established in all sectors through which the convoy is transiting;
 - d. Route Security Route security will be provided by RPA troops;
 - e. Commune/ORC Commune/ORC security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the destination commune/ORC is located.

Relocation Schedule

6. Efforts to encourage IDPs to relocate will be concentrated on the camps identified in the schedule detailed at Annex A.

Execution

7. Upon advice from the Op RETOUR Task Force that the schedule at Annex A is to be executed, UNAMIR will issue orders to the responsible troops to carry out the tasks outlined at Paragraph 5 above. In the event that the troops to task requirements exceed the capacity of the in place force, troops from the adjacent sector will be tasked to reinforce.

ANNEX A

OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
CYANIKA (27,000)												
RUHKONDO (50,000)												
KIZI (2,500)												
KINAZI (2,500)												
MUGANO (3,000)												
KANYINYA ((4,000)												
NYASISUYA (1,000)												
KARAMBI (2,000)												
BUHORO (3,000)												
GISUNZA (3,500)												
NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
KIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2)												
NDAGO (55,000)												
MUNINI (12,000)									43			
KARANA (21,000)									43	47		
BUSANZE (9,000)										47-9		
MUSABEYA (14,000)										49	53	
REFUGEES												+

Notes:

1. All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.
2. From D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

information campaign / idps issue

Monday 19 December and Tuesday 20 December 1994 a.m.

Visits to local authorities to inform them on the info campagne in South-Kigali, Butare, Gikongoro, Gitarama and Kibungo.

Tuesday 20 December / p.m.

Visits to camps begin:

Team 1: Kibeho and Ndago
Team 2: Cyanika and Rukondo
Team 3: Kamana and Munini
Team 4: Bivumu and Bohoro

Wednesday 21 December 1994 THRU Sunday 1st of January 1995

a.m. Team 1: Kibeho and Ndago
Team 2: Cyanika and Rukondo
Team 3: Kamana and Munini
Team 4: Ruramba and Rwanika

p.m. Team 1: Kibeho and Ndago
Team 2: Cyanika and Rukondo
Team 3: Kamana and Munini
Team4: Bivumu and Bohoro

Every evenings at 18h00 the 4 team members will be meeting at UNREO Field Office in Gikongoro to exchange members from one team to the other as well as informations.

IF necessary or possible, the teams will be rotated by December 25th. The exchange of information will be done the same night between the 2 groups of teams at UNREO field office.

Each teams will be composed as follow:

1 rep. of Min. of Rehabilitation
1 rep. of Min. of Justice
1 rep. of Min. of Defence
1 rep. of Min. of Interior
1 rep. of Human Rights

1 rep. of UNDP / for 1 team only
1 rep. of LWF / for 1 team only

To be part of some team on an irregular basis:

1 rep. of local authorities (Prefet, bourgmesters, chief of sectors, etc.)
1 elderly person from home communes
1 returnee from camp now in home communes

Monday, 2 January at Amohoro Stadium in Kigali at 14h00

All actors of this mission are requested for a final evaluation

Thems of the information campaign

Security: In the camp, convoys, on the road and upon arrival, monitoring system, arrest procedures, mines awareness

Food assistance: procedures -- communes level, rations, etc.

ORCs: What are they?, emphasis on its temporary status, services offered, etc.

Health and Water: Health and water situation in home communes, utilisation of existing structures, etc.

Unaccompanied Children/ family: Importance of keeping the families together, assistance for needy families at home communes level, do not leave your kids behind, keeping children/families together until we find real families, etc.

campagne d'information / dossier des PDI

Lundi 19 decembre et mardi 20 decembre 1994 a.m.

Visites aux autorites locales pour les informer de la campagne d'information dans les camps dans les prefectures du Sud-Kigali, Butare, Gitarama, Gikongoro et Kibungo.

Mardi 20 decembre / p.m.

Debut des visites dans les camps:

Equipe 1: Kibeho et Ndago
Equipe 2: Cyanika et Rukondo
Equipe 3: Kamana et Munini
Equipe 4: Bivume et Bohoro

Mercredi 21 decembre AU dimanche 1er janvier 1995

a.m. Equipe 1: Kibeho et Ndago
Equipe 2: Cyanika et Rukondo
Equipe 3: Kamana et Munini
Equipe 4: Bivumu et Bohoro

Tous les soirs a 18h00 les 4 equipes se rencontreront au bureau-terrain UNREO de Gikongoro pour echanger informations et membres d'equipe entre elles.

SI cela s'avere necessaire et/ou possible, une rotation des equipes aura lieu le dimanche 25 decembre. L'echange d'information entre les 8 equipes se fera ce soir-la au bureau-terrain UNREO de Gikongoro.

Chaque equipe sera composee de la maniere suivante:

1 rep. du Min. de la Rehabilitation
1 rep. du Min. de la Justice
1 rep. du Min. de la Defense
1 rep. du Min. de l'Interieur
1 rep. des Droits Humains
1 rep. du PNUD / pour 1 equipe seulement
1 rep. de LWF / pour 1 equipe seulement

Sur un base irreguliere:

1 rep. des autorites locales (Prefet, bourgmestre, chef de secteur, etc.)
1 "vieux sage" des communes d'origine.

1 PDI de retour dans sa commune

Lundi 2 janvier 1995

Tous les acteurs de cette campagne devront se presentes au Stade Amohoro a Kigali a 14h00, porte # 10 pour une evaluation finale de la campagne.

Themes de la campagne:

Securite: dans les camps, en convois, sur la route et a l'arrivee, systeme de surveillance et procedures d'arrestations et sensibilisation aux mines

Assistance alimentaire: procedures -- voies communales, rations, etc.

Sante et eau: situation des secteurs de sante et d'eau dans les communes d'origine, utilisation des structures communales deja en place, etc.

Enfants non-accompagnes/familles: l'importance de garder la famille unie -- ne laissez pas vos enfants derriere vous, assistance dans les communes pour les familles necessiteuses, les noyaux enfants/famille seront respectes jusqu'au retracement des familles veritables, s'il y a lieu, etc.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: SRSG, DFC
From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline
Info: ED, COS, MA/FC, ~~DCOS Ops~~, CMPO
Date: 20 Dec 94
File: FPM/5

(2)
This is really good
and shows concern by
one human being for
~~another~~ other human
beings. ~~11~~
21/12

Subject: OPERATION HOPE - 2ND REPORT ON THE HANDLING OF
DETAINEES BY RWANDAN CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1. On Mon 19 Dec, in the company of 3 UNHRFOR officials, I visited Mr Aloys Havugiyaremye, the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro to check on his progress in dealing with the 44 people taken into detention by UNAMIR during Op HOPE. I found that all 44 are still held in Gikongoro prison and that:

Think
SO2OPS
21/12

a. Mr Havugiyaremye has written to the authorities in Butare to check on the credentials of the commune bourgermestres with whom he will have to deal in Ndago and Kibeho camps.

b. He intends starting to interview the detainees today and anticipates completing this initial investigation at the rate of 6 or 7 a day.

c. Having interviewed the detainees, he will travel to the camps to interview witnesses identified by the bourgermestres. He will then be in a position to determine the validity of the allegations that have been made and may be able to release some of the detainees.

2. I reminded Mr Havugiyaremye of the breadth of the range of allegations and asked him to prioritize his work - suggesting that he should deal first with the cases of those accused of minor crimes (such as simple possession of a weapon) or of non-crimes (identification as a member of the former Government's Forces) and that he should deal with allegations - that appear to have some substance - of participation in mass murder later. He accepted this principle and also the idea that some of those facing minor allegations should be bailed - although he could not give a certain date for any release on bail that might ensue.

3. I visited the 44 detainees and:

a. Found that they are held in 2 cells, each of about 10 by 15 feet; ventilation is by way of a 2 x 4 foot window and a small aperture in the steel door. Obviously, the detainees have little room to move and the atmosphere is very warm and stale. At the time of my visit, 27 were in one cell and 17 in the other: it appeared that this imbalance might be the result of some categorization by the prison authorities but I asked if the numbers could be balanced and was given a positive reply.

b. Was told that the only exercise that they are given is en route to a lavatory once a day.

c. Was told that food has been provided by the ICRC. I was told by HRFOR officers that the first consignment was rejected by the prison governor because it was too good and he did not want the prisoners to expect such a standard in future; I was told that the detainees are given a warm meal of beans each morning.

d. ICRC has provided blankets (a quantity of 70 according to HRFOR officers) but there were few in evidence in the 27-man cell - perhaps because the heat made them unnecessary?.

e. At least 2 individuals need regular medication, one for malaria. Medicines are being provided by ICRC.

I did not see a representative of ICRC during my visit but was told that visits are being made daily. I spoke to the detainees through a French-speaking HRFOR officer and was asked if we would arrange notification of their whereabouts to their families and for cooking and eating utensils; HRFOR personnel undertook to pass these requests to the ICRC representative in Gikongoro.

4. I will visit Mr Havugiyaremye and the detainees again on Fri 23 Dec and will submit another report on my return.



M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

1 PDI de retour dans sa commune

Lundi 2 janvier 1995

Tous les acteurs de cette campagne devront se presentes au Stade Amohoro a Kigali a 14h00, porte # 10 pour une evaluation finale de la campagne.

Themes de la campagne:

Securite: dans les camps, en convois, sur la route et a l'arrivee, systeme de surveillance et procedures d'arrestations et sensibilisation aux mines

Assistance alimentaire: procedures -- voies communales, rations, etc.

Sante et eau: situation des secteurs de sante et d'eau dans les communes d'origine, utilisation des structures communales deja en place, etc.

Enfants non-accompagnes/familles: l'importance de garder la famille unie -- ne laissez pas vos enfants derriere vous, assistance dans les communes pour les familles necessiteuses, les noyaux enfants/famille seront respectes jusqu'au retracement des familles veritables, s'il y a lieu, etc.

5. Next ORCs. Details of the next ORCs to be opened, primarily based on the population distribution for Rukhondo camp, are being developed by UNREO staff. This information will be promulgated as soon as it is ready.

6. Reporting. During Op RETOUR, UNAMIR daily reports on the progress of the operation will be required for the following information:

- a. Any security incidents in camps, on routes, or in ORCs/Home Communes, and how they were resolved.
- b. Number of IDPs who seek security assistance in ORCs/Home Communes, and what assistance was given.
- c. Relations with the RPA, particularly where notably successful or unsuccessful liaison took place.
- d. As available, any new ideas on how Op RETOUR procedures can be improved.

T A P MULLARKEY
Lt Col
OIC Op RETOUR