

[13 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120

BOX 68

FILE 6

ACC. 1998/0278



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 426

UNAMIR

MOST IMMEDIATE

1995 DEC -6 P 4: 14

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN/AIME, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 6 DECEMBER 1995

NO.:

MIR

4115

NO. OF PAGES: 3

SUBJECT: UNAMIR MANDATE

I. I discussed the Rwandese and UK, US, German draft resolutions with FC Gen. Tousignant today. The following are our comments/recommendations relating to the two draft resolutions:

- a) Basically, we should continue to hold out for a 3 month continuation of the status quo in formed troop strength. We could reduce MILOBs and CIVPOL. If the status quo is not accepted, we may phase-out as recommended in Secretary-General's report. It should be made clear that we are doing so at the request of the Rwandese Government.
- b) If, however, a reduction is found to be unavoidable, the figure of 800 proposed by Rwanda is not feasible and should not be accepted. The following is a table that we consider to be bare minimum:

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UNAMIR

C.R.N 426

<u>Existing Strength</u>		<u>Minimum Possible</u>
Engineers	203	200
Logistics	85	85
Communications	125	50
Military Police	38	10
HQ Staff	36	20
Protection Guard		
[593 (Rest), 123 (Tribunal)]	716	715
4 Sectors of Company Strength	600	0
(125 each)		
Milobs	285	100
CIVPOL	85	0
Miscellaneous	-	20
<hr/>		<hr/>
<u>2173 approx</u>		<u>1200</u>

2. You will see that the main difference would be in the Kigali guard unit. For these guard duties our requirement is 125 (company strength) for the Tribunal and 590 for other duties. The Rwandese have told us that the Tribunal should be guarded by UN Security Police (and not by UNAMIR) and that for the remaining guard duties in Kigali only 200 are needed. This rationalisation is not acceptable. A reduction to 1200 is the maximum possible. This would mean no presence in the prefectures, no CIVPOL and thinning out of MILOBS to about one third of their current strength.

3. The reference to the equipment issue in the UK draft is appropriate, although Rwanda will want to maintain its formulation. The issue would, in any case, have to be decided by the General Assembly and Rwanda can take it, even now, to the Fifth Committee for an appropriate resolution.

4. It is important to confirm the existing SOFA.

5. It would be advisable to build into the resolution a reference to UNAMIR being given a reasonable period (71 days) to phase-out its troops and equipment after the completion of the 3 month mandate.

6. It is also suggested that UNAMIR may be given a role to play in the refugee camps in order to encourage voluntary repatriation which implies crossing the borders. In this context Radio UNAMIR's important role as a channel of communication with the refugees could be mentioned in the resolution.

7. If there are further points, I shall convey them on the telephone.

Best regards.



UNAMIR MINUAR

CRN-420

UNAMIR

1995 NOV 28 P 6:31

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 28 November 1995

NO.: MIR 4035

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: Weekly Meeting with Dusaidi on Mandate 28 November, 1995

1. Please refer to code cables on the above subject. The following are the salient points of the meeting on November 28.

Mandate

2. I informed Dusaidi that the Rwanda Foreign Minister's letter had been sent by fax to New York and that Secretary-General's report due on 1 December, was expected to reflect the G-10 position as also Rwanda's formal response. Dusaidi reaffirmed Rwanda's position on UNAMIR. He repeated that UNAMIR must first close and "another mission" could be opened thereafter.

Equipment

3. I informed Dusaidi that the equipment/material loaned to Rwanda could be adjusted against the Trust Fund. I gave Dusaidi a list of loaned items. The Rwandese reply was that while they appreciated the offer, some of the equipment was out of order while other items were



UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN/406

1995 NOV 20 P 3: 20

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 20 NOVEMBER 1995

NO.: MIR 3957

NO. OF PAGES: 6

SUBJECT: UNAMIR MANDATE - WEEKLY MEETING WITH DUSAIDI - 20TH NOVEMBER 1995

1. Today's weekly meeting on UNAMIR's mandate was attended by a full delegation from the Rwandese side, especially with the presence of Col. (Dr.) Emmanuel Ndahiro who is known as Vice-President Kagame's closest adviser and alter-ego.

2. On the basic issue of the mandate, Dusaidi made the following concise responses to the G-10 proposals I had conveyed in previous meetings:

- a) UNAMIR's future mandate had been discussed by Rwandan authorities at the highest level. They had authorised Dusaidi to convey the Rwandan Government's reactions.

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UNAMIR

- b) The Rwandan position was that, when renewing UNAMIR's mandate on 9th June, it had been made very clear that UNAMIR would phase-out after the current mandate. In the interim period, the Rwandan Government saw no serious reason to revise its earlier decision. Accordingly, when the mandate was completed on December 8, UNAMIR should phase-out.
- c) In Rwanda's view, if UN still had a role to play in the country, it was in the practical field of providing Rwanda the support to bridge the gap created by last year's events in the form of technology, rehabilitation, doctors, agricultural experts, technicians, etc. As these activities could not be part of UNAMIR, it was best for it to close down after 8th December.
- d) Dusaidi wished to put on record the government's appreciation for the sacrifices and contributions that UNAMIR personnel had made during their tenure in Rwanda. He said that their efforts, often made in difficult conditions, had contributed significantly to Rwanda's reconstruction.

3. I thanked Dusaidi for this statement which clarified Rwanda's response to the basic issue of UNAMIR's future mandate. Force Commander, Gen. Tousignant added that he would pass on Dusaidi's message of appreciation to his soldiers. He said that it meant much to the soldier in the field that his efforts at helping fellow Africans had been appreciated. Gen. Tousignant stated that the phase-out process would take between 71-97 days. I concluded by stating that despite Rwanda's anguish at UN's role during the post April 6 events of last year, UNAMIR II was gratified at its contribution to Rwanda since July 1994 and would leave the country having successfully fulfilled its mandate.

4. At the beginning of the meeting, I had clarified two points with Dusaidi as stated in your code cable 3595. I stated that we were ready to start negotiations on SOFA either in Kigali, as proposed earlier, or in New York. Dusaidi replied that the discussions could begin at sub-committee level in Kigali. He requested our written reaction to Rwanda's proposal which I intend to give him based on the brief cleared by OLA.

5. Secondly, I informed Dusaidi that on the equipment issue, UN New York was carefully examining the Foreign Minister's letter to Secretary-General and that a response would be given by New York. Dusaidi then gave me a list of equipment that the Rwandan Government would like UNAMIR to leave behind. He added that the request was being made so that "UNAMIR does not give us equipment we do not want". At a glance, the equipment covers most of the equipment available with us. [Letter attached].

6. Dusaidi then raised the issue of "equipment under negotiation" being transferred out of Rwanda. I told him that equipment that was required by other Peace-keeping Missions would not, in any case, be left behind and was the only equipment that was being transferred. I told him that in order to ensure compliance with our understanding, equipment trans-shipment orders would, henceforth, be given after clearance by SRSG.

Other issues

7. It was agreed that a repairs sub-committee would be set up. Dusaidi also indicated that the Ministry of Finance had set up a Committee to appraise taxes etc. from Brown & Root, Economat, etc. Finally, Gen. Tousignant mentioned that the only outstanding item with him was the destruction of ammunition which had been ordered by UNHQ but had been stopped by the Government of Rwanda.

8. The meeting lasted one hour. On the way out, Claude Dusaidi and Dr. Ndahiro both mentioned to me that they hoped UNAMIR could transform itself under a different title and stay on to meet Rwanda's practical needs. All meetings, so far, have been held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere.

Best regards.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA



VICE-PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE ET
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
CABINET DU VICE-PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
B.P 23 KIGALI

P4/2
CRN406

20th November, 1995,

H.E. Ambassador Shariyar Khan,
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General,
UNAMIR,
KIGALI.

Your Excellency,

Further to the Rwandese Foreign Minister's letter of 13th August 1995 to the United Nations Secretary General, requesting the transfer of UNAMIR's equipment to the Government of Rwanda, please find attached to this letter a list of equipment the Government of Rwanda wishes to request from the United Nations.

Please accept, your Excellency, my compliments and highest regards.

Yours Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Claude DUSAIDI'.

Claude DUSAIDI
POLITICAL ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Enc.

P5/6
CRN 406

A. UN HOSPITAL

WITH ALL ITS EQUIPMENT

B. TELECOMMUNICATION

- MOBILE & PORTABLE RADIOS
- REPEATER SYSTEMS
- HF SSB RADIOS
- SATELLITE SYSTEMS (VSATS, INMARSATS)
- MULTIPLEX EQUIPMENT
- TELEPHONE PABXS
- TELEPHONE RURAL LINKS
- METERING, TEST EQUIPMENT & TOOLS
- SPECTRUM ANALYSERS

C. BROADCAST EQUIPMENT

- RADIO UNAMIR + ACCESORIES

D. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

- BONOCULARS
- NIGHT VISION GOGGLES
- DIRECTION FINDERS
- MOBILE RADAR/RADAR GUN
- MINE DETECTORS
- METAL DETECTORS (PORTABLE & WALK THROUGH)

E.. GENERATORS

- VARIOUS SIZES (LARGE, MEDIUM, AND SMALL)

F. OFFICE EQUIPMENT

- COMPUTER
- PRINTERS
- OFFICE FURNITURE
- SHREDDERS
- FAX MACHINES
- COPY WRITERS

P6/-
CRW 40.5

G. VEHICLES

- **HEAVY DUTY VEHICLES**
- FORKLIFTS
- GRADERS
- CRANES
- DOZERS
- GARBAGE COMPACTORS
- SEWAGE TRUCK
- VIBRATOR ROLLER
- BUMP TRUCKS
- LOW LOADERS
- UTILITY VEHICLES (HEAVY) * see attached
- **TRANSPORT VEHICLES**

H. UTILITY UNITS

- WATER PURIFICATION SYSTEMS
- TENTS
- PREFAB UNITS
- PUMPS, TANKS, BLADDERS
- TRAFIPRO COMPLEX
- MAINTENANCE WORKSHOP

I. ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS
(APCs)

CNR-330 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1995 NOV 18 A 7 01

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK,
DATE: 17 November 1995
NUMBER: 3596

SUBJECT: UNAMIR's mandate

RECEIVED

18 NOV 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

We have perused with great interest your very useful series of cables about UNAMIR mandate. As you realize, this issue will very much be the focus of attention here during the coming weeks and your analysis will help us greatly in shaping our approach. We have followed your advice in convening another meeting with troop contributors and donor countries on Tuesday 21 November. We will of course keep you currently informed of developments in this connection. Best regards.

5/11

E)

Reçu le 18 NOV. 1995



OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 13 NOVEMBER 1995

NO.: MIR _____

NO. OF PAGES: 9

SUBJECT: UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. UNAMIR's mandate after 8th December is now the central subject of discussion in diplomatic and Rwandese circles. As a result of our discussions with Dusaidi's team, Vice-President's Kagame's views expressed to important visitors and G-10 reactions in New York, the issues are now in sharper focus. The recent visits to Rwanda of Gen. Van Kappen and Ms. Lindenmayer have also helped us to see issues more clearly. In this report, I shall attempt an analysis and conclusions.

2. Basically, there are four options in play:

A. **The status-quo option.** This option envisages the continuation of our present format for the next mandate. Minor variations on this option are: a) the possible reduction

of Milobs from 320 to around 240 and a cut of Civpol from 120 to 55; b) the status-quo remaining for 4 months and the phase-out being completed by 8th June (and not, as at present, after the completion of the mandate). The mandate itself would need to be fine tuned so that the continuation of our formed troops in Rwanda is given some relevance. Proposals for fine-tuning the future mandate are being sent separately. In essence, they aim to make para 3 (b) of the existing mandate more specific so that UNAMIR formed troops have actual tasks to perform.

- B. **The Half-way option.** This option has as its central theme a proposal, [seemingly accepted by Kagame in London and which the Rwandan Government had favoured during the previous negotiations], of UNAMIR maintaining a small "emergency" force of 2 or 3 companies in Kigali (presumably backed-up by the specialized units of engineering, logistics, communications). This would result in an approximately 50% cut in our strength bringing it down to around 900. The number of formed troops, Milobs and Civpol could be varied. The civilian contingent would remain in harness.
- C. **The Observer option.** This option would see formed troops along with specialised units phase out altogether and only Military Observers left behind to help monitor human rights etc. Civpol and Civilian contingent would also remain.
- D. **The Civilian Option.** This option envisages UNAMIR phase out its military component altogether (ie formed troops, military observers and civpol) and leave behind a purely civilian mission with a revised mandate.

3. The relative merits of each of the above options may be assessed against the filter of the following major considerations.

Refugees

4. How important is the continued presence of UNAMIR formed troops in the prefectures (ie the Status-Quo Option [A]) in persuading the refugees to return? The Rwandese position is that it makes no difference. The US Embassy in Kigali feels that UNAMIR's presence has, at best, a marginal effect on refugee return. The Americans point to the fact that despite UNAMIR's presence, voluntary refugee return has never been more than a trickle and that refugees prefer to wait and see what conditions will be like after UNAMIR leaves.

5. These arguments miss the essential point. UNAMIR's presence in the prefectures has never been seen as the critical factor that would induce refugees to return. There are three crucial obstacles - intimidation in the camps, fear of persecution in Rwanda and the relative good life in the camps - which must be overcome before the refugees return in large numbers. The real point at issue is that, under the threat of forced repatriation from Zaire and Tanzania, UNHCR, the international community, neighbouring governments and Rwanda are currently making a supreme effort to persuade the refugees to return voluntarily. This effort must be seen in the time-frame of the next 3-6 months. In this period, UNAMIR's presence would act as a positive - though not crucial - factor in encouraging refugee return. UNAMIR's presence must, therefore, be viewed in the time-frame of this supreme effort for a major refugee lift-off. It is not an open-ended time-frame but one restricted to the next 6 months.

6. Moreover, looking at the reverse side of the coin, for UNAMIR to be seen walking away at the very time when a concerted effort is being made to persuade the voluntary return of refugees would send negative signals to the refugees and to Zaire/Tanzania who regard UNAMIR's presence as an important factor in encouraging refugee return. Finally, if this supreme effort fails to induce voluntary repatriation and Zaire/Tanzania decide on forced repatriation leading to a mass return of refugees, would not UNAMIR's presence be useful in helping the Rwandese Government to receive and settle them in their communes? There is no guarantee of success for the voluntary repatriation effort but, either way, UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda to help settle the voluntary or forced repatriation of refugees in the coming months would be desirable.

7. The Half-way option [B] reduces UNAMIR's capacity to play a helpful role in encouraging refugee return since UNAMIR formed troops would not be visible in the prefectures. However, it does not undermine it completely. In this option, UNAMIR would retain the specialised units (logistic, engineers etc.) and would be able to provide some practical assistance to returning refugees. However, the fact that UNAMIR would not have a presence in the prefectures would react negatively on the overall confidence and security that our formed troops provide in the prefectures where they are present. This impression would be only partially compensated by the presence of Milobs in the prefectures.

8. Of course, in the Observer [C] and Civilian [D] options, UNAMIR's capacity to assist in the return, both in psychological and practical terms, would be withdrawn completely.

Security

9. It is impossible to measure or quantify the degree of security that our formed troops provide in the region where they are present. In the absence of tangible evidence, a subjective assessment becomes the only substitute, as follows:

- a) There is a marked difference in the security conditions between the prefectures where our formed troops are present and where only Milobs are stationed. The insecurity in the latter prefectures is not only felt by Milobs but by Human Rights Monitors, Agency Representatives and NGO's. It follows that the majority population would reflect similar views regarding the presence of our formed troops in the prefectures. For instance, in Gitarama where only Milobs are present, our Milob headquarters is subjected to robbery and banditry at an average of once every 3 days. Similarly in Kibuye, the conditions are so insecure and human rights violations so prevalent that the Force Commander has had to station a section strength force of formed troops to back-up the Milobs. There is no doubt in our minds that UNAMIR formed troop presence makes an important difference in the security and behaviour pattern of the Rwandese army and administration.
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- b) Milobs without formed-troop support would not be able to provide a security back-up. Their presence would be mainly decorative and not substantive from a military point of view.
- c) Gen. Kagame does not accept the reasoning at 8 (a) above and in fact regards the presence of UNAMIR formed troops as an obstacle to Rwanda's capacity to provide security.

10. The Status-Quo Option [A] would enable UNAMIR to continue providing a modicum of security. Their presence would not guarantee good behaviour or compliance with human rights requirements but would reduce violations. Conversely, the withdrawal of UNAMIR formed troops is likely to lead to an increase in such violations and to a downward spiral of ethnic tension.

11. Undoubtedly Milobs, Human Rights Monitors, Agency Representatives and NGO's find a marked improvement in the security climate as well as in the attitude of government representatives in prefectures where formed troops are present. I have no doubt that the withdrawal of our formed troops from the prefectures would lead to increased insecurity being felt by UN and NGO representatives in the prefectures and would affect their capability.

The Observer Option

12. I have also no doubt that Milobs, without formed troop back-up, would make little or no difference to the security situation. Moreover, Milobs have no military mandate such as monitoring cross border infiltration or cease-fire violations. In fact, their current "mandate" overlaps with that of the Human Rights Observers. In short, neither the Half-way [B] nor the Observer Mission [C] option helps in maintaining security. In my view, these middle options would induce the expectation of security which UNAMIR would be incapable of delivering on in a crisis. The advantage of these middle options is that the UN would be visible, without necessarily being effective.

Crisis management

13. Given the known volatility of the region and the fact that tension persists around the borders of Rwanda, there is constant danger of a crisis re-surfacing in Rwanda. In such an event, UN must have a sufficiently effective presence to prevent another humanitarian disaster. For UN to be present (Milobs, inadequate formed troops) and unable to take preventive action would result in a situation like the post-April 6, 1994 syndrome when acrimonious accusations were made against the UN from all sides. Militarily, UNAMIR has scarcely the capacity to address such a crisis even under the Status-Quo option and certainly not under the Half-way and Observer Options. It would, therefore, be advisable for UN to opt for the Civilian Option so that with the complete withdrawal of the military contingent there is no expectation of UNAMIR taking preventive action in a crisis.

Walking away from Rwanda/Africa

14. Opting for the Civilian Option [D], opens the way for criticism by the International Community and particularly by African countries that the UN is walking away from Rwanda and Africa. This criticism can be met only by providing the remaining Civilian mission with an effective mandate to engage in a post peace-keeping, peace-building role. Simply to leave Rwanda in the hands of the traditional role of the UN Agencies [UNDP, World Bank, UNHCR, etc.] to attend to its socio-economic requirements would neither satisfy Rwanda nor the African countries. Instead, an effective, re-structuring role needs to be given to the "Civilian UNAMIR" which would aim to address specific targets on a short time-frame basis such as:

- a) Re-habilitation of refugees;
- b) Revival of judicial process, including gendarmerie, communal police and prisons;
- c) Repair and restructuring of socio-economic base destroyed by genocide/civil war;
- d) Reconciliation at all levels;
- e) Effective disbursement of pledged assistance;

15. If the Civilian Option is accepted, UN should project the image of a successful phase II of UNAMIR's mandate having been completed to be followed by a Phase III - Civilian - reconstruction

mandate. UNAMIR's military withdrawal should be amicable and tension-free to project the successful conclusion of the mandate. This cannot be taken for granted and would require meeting some of Rwanda's expectations from a departing military contingent. Rwanda is capable of making UNAMIR II's departure rancorous and difficult if the government feels that the UN has not treated it fairly.

Conclusions

16. Against this background the following conclusions may be drawn:

- a) The international community and the Agencies have already indicated their preference for the Status-Quo Option related essentially to the effort to encourage the return of refugees. The UN Agencies support this stand as does OAU Secretary-General Salim A. Salim.
 - b) Vice-President Kagame has indicated his opposition to the Status-Quo Option. The Rwandese Government has made it clear that it is prepared to bargain on the next mandate by resisting on the Status-Quo Option and aiming to settle for either the Half-way [B] or Observer [C] Options. It would also accept the Civilian Option [D] provided it had a clear mandate to "assist" Rwanda in its immediate needs;
 - c) The international community, however, is too diffused and not sufficiently united to press for its maximal position. Nor is the international community and UN geared to engage in "hard-ball" negotiations with Rwanda. Faced with Rwanda's intransigence, the Security Council is likely to veer towards accepting the Half-way [B] or Observer [C] Options, especially as the Civilian Option "D" is coloured by the "walk-away" from Africa factor.
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- d) The quid-pro-quo that Rwanda expects in return for an accommodating approach towards UNAMIR's next mandate is the disposal of equipment while UN phases out. However, in the event the Civilian Option being agreed, it expects the mandate to provide effective powers and financial capability to the mission to address Rwanda's immediate, post-conflict needs.
- e) Both middle Options [Half-way and Observer] raise expectations of UN being able to handle a crisis because UN Blue Helmets would still be visible in Rwanda. However, under these Options, UNAMIR would not be able to meet a crisis. These two options are, therefore, dangerous for the UN.
- f) Accordingly, if the Status-Quo option is not acceptable to Rwanda, the UN must make it clear to G-10 and to the Rwandan Government that the middle options are not acceptable, militarily. The UN should then clearly favour the Civilian Option.
- g) The impression that UN was turning its back on Rwanda/Africa may be countered by providing the Civilian Option an effective mandate relevant to meeting Rwanda's immediate needs.

Recommendations

17. In view of the above assessment and as less than a month remains for the mandate to be renewed, the following recommendations are submitted:

- a) UN may inform G-10 and Agencies of the four options. We may further inform them that UN would not find the Half-Way [B] and Observer [C] Options militarily viable.
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- b) If, as expected, the Government of Rwanda opposes the Status-Quo option that has already been conveyed to it, we may inform G-10 and UN Agencies accordingly so that they make their own final efforts, jointly or bilaterally, to persuade Rwanda to accept the Status-Quo Option.
- c) From the outset UN should make its own position clear that it is ready and willing to withdraw its military contingent after December 8 and that it would accept a Civilian Mission thereafter.
- d) The Civilian Option should be provided an appropriately effective mandate in consultation with G-10 so as to meet Rwandese expectations as also counter-possible criticism of UN walking away from Rwanda/Africa.

Best regards.

RECEIVED

CNR-316 P1/2

04 NOV 1995 3 18:50

OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE UNAMIR

1995 NOV -4 A 7:19
IMMEDIATETO: UNITED NATIONS
FROM: KHAN UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
3 November 1995

NUMBER: 3454

SUBJECT: Meeting with Member States on the Future of UNAMIR

1. As planned, we had an informal meeting on the future of UNAMIR on 2 November with the following countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Netherlands, Nigeria, United Kingdom and United States.

2. We shared the content of your most recent cable (MIR-3738) with the participants, emphasizing the position of the Rwandese Government that it is for the UN to take the initiative of proposing a continued UN role in Rwanda. A strong consensus developed in favour of maintaining the presence of UNAMIR in view of its contribution towards confidence-building and stability, as well as security for the international tribunal and Human Rights monitors. The need for a UNAMIR role in the event of a massive influx of refugees was also emphasized.

3. While some Member States felt that there might be room for a redefinition of the mandate, leading to some troop reduction, it was generally considered that it would not be wise to reduce the force below its "critical mass". We explained that this limit had in fact been reached when the force was reduced to 1,800.

4. In view of the present delicate situation, the US proposed that we again engage the Rwandese, by suggesting, as a first step, the maintenance of the status quo as regards the mandate and troop strength of UNAMIR. This idea commanded general support. The UK, which initially reiterated its proposal for

Reçu le 4 NOV. 1995

CNR-316 P2/2

- 2 -

converting UNAMIR to an observer mission, also accepted the above course of action.

5. Accordingly, we would like you to convey this proposal to the Rwandese authorities and seek their reaction. We rely on your diplomatic skills to make it clear to your interlocutors that this is not our initiative but the consensus view which interested Member States and major donors have requested us to convey.

6. You may also wish, at the appropriate time, to advise the Rwandese authorities that any continued role of UNAMIR must be based on the clear acceptance by the Rwandese Government of the Model Status of Forces Agreement which reflects the customary principles and practices of UN peace-keeping operations, as developed over the past 40 years. The current SOFA is fully consistent with the Model agreement which is firmly based on well-established principles of international law and cannot be tampered with, since it directly affects the ability of the Mission to effectively perform its mandated tasks. You may wish to point out, in this connection, that the fundamental nature of the changes to the SOMA proposed by Rwanda has raised serious doubts, both among some major donors and at this Headquarters, about their willingness to accept the presence of UNAMIR beyond 8 December.

Good luck and best regards.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Vu 10-11-95
W.S.

OUT-GOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shaharyar Khan*
DATE: 10 November 1995
NO: MIR _____
NO. OF PAGES: 3
SUBJECT: JOINT CONSULTATIONS HELD BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

1. Please find attached a signed copy of the minutes of a meeting held between representatives from UNAMIR and the Government of Rwanda on 1 November 1995 to discuss various aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations.

2. Best regards.

I have already sent a telegram on this meeting. It looks ridiculous that we are sending this meeting minutes now. This document is for the record (since it is signed). It should go by pouch. No need for a cable -

Shah

*ED
Caton*



**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 1 NOVEMBER 1995**

1. On 1 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Higiro Thaddée	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Ministry of Transport and Communications
Mr. Mushyo Kamanzi	Ministry of Defence
Lt. Karenzi Karake	Ministry of Defence
Maj. Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Matthew	Chief Administrative Officer
Col. David Kattah	Deputy Chief of Staff - Operations
Mr. Mamady Condé	Senior Political Affairs Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to the SRSG
Ms. Ladan M. Rafii	Political/Legal Officer

2. The SRSG began the meeting by reviewing issues related to UNAMIR's mandate. He stated that when the current mandate expires on 8 December 1995, UNAMIR was prepared to phase out completely unless indications were received to the contrary, and that UNAMIR was not in Rwanda to perpetrate its presence within the country. He added that in the absence of any agreement, UNAMIR was ready to withdraw and, in fact, the latest indications from New York were that it should be prepared to withdraw after the termination of its current mandate. In the mean time, he stated that it was up to the Security Council and the Government of Rwanda to define the terms of UNAMIR's future mandate. The SRSG emphasized that although UNAMIR was, in conjunction with the Rwandese Government, providing security to United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda, this should be regarded as only an incidental task and not UNAMIR's main role. He stated that he could not envisage the Security Council or the United Nations agreeing to maintain a force in Rwanda solely for the purposes of protecting United Nations staff and installations.

3. With regard to the assistance part of the mission, the SRSG mentioned that what the the Rwandese Government was seeking from UNAMIR was understandable, but he explained that UNAMIR was essentially conceived of as a peace-keeping operation. The assistance portion of UNAMIR's mandate would normally be undertaken by other United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda whose functions were purely civilian in nature.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

1995 NOV -1 P

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UNAMIR

1995 NOV -1 P 4:43

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 1 November 1995

NO.: MIR -3738

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: Discussions on Mandate

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WS

1. At Wednesday 1 November's meeting with the Rwandese delegation, I made the points contained in your code cable no.3380 dated 26 October. I clarified that UNAMIR was now preparing to leave immediately after 8 December.

2. In reply Dusaidi made the following points:


- a) As far as the Rwanda Government was concerned, UNAMIR's mandate would end on 8 December which was in accordance with the understanding on the renewal of the current mandate.
- b) The initiative for a change in this understanding lay with UN. In the absence of such an initiative, Rwanda expected UNAMIR to phase out from 8 December.
- c) The onus for taking the initiative lay with UN. If such an initiative was forthcoming, it would need to state the rationale for the change.

d) Dusaidi concluded by stating that a final decision on this issue had not yet been taken by the top leadership.

3. On the issue of leaving behind material Dusaidi clarified that Rwanda was not making the request in order to hasten UNAMIR's departure. The request was made on the basis of material to be left behind whenever UNAMIR left Rwanda. He added that Rwanda was a particularly deserving case for UN to leave behind material that was essential to its needs. Rwanda had been devastated by the civil war, most of its equipment had been looted and taken across to Zaire and had not been returned. Rwanda was in dire need of the items utilised by UNAMIR, such as computers, vehicles etc. He pleaded that the rules be relaxed so that the UN could leave the 'bulk if not all' the items used by UNAMIR.

4. I replied that I would convey the Rwandese Government's request to New York. The regulations regarding the leaving behind of material were drawn up by the UNGA and had a sanctity that left little flexibility. However, within the regulations Rwanda's request would be considered sympathetically.

Best regards.



OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CNR 309 P 1/3

FC
ED

UNAMIR

195 OCT 27

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TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 26 October 1995

NUMBER: 3380

SUBJECT: UNAMIR's Mandate

[Handwritten signature]

27/10

13 OCT 26 P 9:25
OPERATIONS

1. Many thanks for your very useful MIR-3675 of 24 October 1995. Indeed time is pressing and it is necessary that specific progress be achieved very soon in your current consultations with the Government of Rwanda on the future of UNAMIR. We hope that our comments below will prove helpful in the forthcoming meeting with your Rwandese interlocutors on 31 October.

2. Concerning your para. 2 (i), you may wish to remind the Rwandese that UNAMIR, though called an "assistance" mission, was obviously never intended to be a channel for humanitarian or development aid. It was designed to help implement the military/security aspects of the Arusha Agreements. The type of assistance which the Rwandese seem to have in mind is a function of UNDP and the UNations agencies, not of peace-keeping and certainly not of Milobs.

3. Concerning your 2 (ii), we consider that it is important to disabuse the Rwandese Government of the notion that the UNations

CNR 309 P 2/3

- 2 -

is pressing for an extension of the mandate and is prepared to make concessions to the Rwandese in exchange for their consent. It may be useful to remind the Rwandese that peace-keeping operations are not deployed as "a favour" to the international community, but at the request of the host country in response to a particular need. You may in fact wish to point out to your interlocutors that, in the absence of such a request, we will have no choice but to proceed with preparations for the withdrawal of UNAMIR after 8 December. At a time of increasingly scarce resources, there should be no misunderstanding on this point. We are not there to "drum up" business for ourselves and would certainly be ready to phase out at any time, should that be the wish of the Government of Rwanda.

4. It is essential for the Rwandese Government to clarify, as soon as possible, its stands on this issue, so that we can proceed with our planning in an orderly manner. The sooner they clarify their position, the better.

5. You might add that the international community is not likely to react favourably to the argument that the quid-pro-quo for accepting a continued UNations presence is a commitment by UNAMIR that it would leave equipment behind upon its withdrawal. In this connection, the decision to relinquish any such equipment upon closure of the mission will, as already discussed, be determined on the basis of well-established UNations rules and

CNR 309 P 3/3

- 3 -

regulations which must apply equally to all peace-keeping operations.

6. Concerning your para. 3, we fully endorse your analysis in 3 (iv) of the reasons why a further reduction of UNAMIR troops is feasible only as part of a complete withdrawal of the formed infantry units. In this connection, the suggestion in 3 (v) for a specific increase in the UNAMIR troop strength cannot be entertained in the climate currently prevailing in the Security Council. We would, however, appreciate clarification of your suggestion for "fine-tuning" the mandate to make our military presence relevant.

7. In the meantime, we will continue to press the Rwandese Permanent Representative here for clarifications on the views of his Government. As indicated in our cable 3316 of 19 October, we expect a reply from the Rwandese Ambassador by end of this week. We shall also continue to seek the views of interested Governments on the future mandate of UNAMIR.

9. We will of course keep you fully informed of developments at this end. Best regards.

FC
Please read and if
you have any corrections
or further suggestions
you may do so and you
may sign on his
behalf. A copy is also
with ED. 11E2
24.10.95

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DA  **NATIONS UNIES**
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

OING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

NG/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1995

NO.: MIR _____

NO. OF PAGES: 4

SUBJECT: UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. Please refer to my previous code cables on the above subject.
2. As we near the date for the conclusion of the present mandate, now only six weeks away, the following parameters have emerged in bolder relief:

i) The Rwandese Government has given no indication that it has changed its position that UNAMIR's present mandate should end after December 9 when the military component (essentially formed troops) should phase out. The Rwandese Government may accept Milobs, some Civpol trainers and possibly a small (300) contingent of formed troops for guard duties. The Rwandese Government feels that UNAMIR should convert itself into a civilian assistance mission aiming to channel UN aid into Rwanda.

ii) **The Rwandese Government** is aware of the positive role that UNAMIR's continued military presence would play in the critical 6-12 months ahead to persuade refugees to return voluntarily. It is aware also that a phase-out of UNAMIR troops at this critical juncture would be viewed with concern by donor countries, UNHCR and other agencies. Rwanda leaves itself "open to persuasion" by the international community for the continuation of the current mandate. Any agreement to continue the mandate would be presented as a "favour" to the international community for which a quid-pro-quo would be expected. This would take the form of matériel to be left behind on conclusion of the mandate.

iii) **Rwanda** feels it is likely to gain maximum advantage by allowing negotiations to take place nearer the time of the mandate's termination.

iv) As far as the UN is concerned, it has a completely neutral view on the extension of the current mandate for a further period. Unlike the negotiations for the present mandate, in June, when the UN had a clear interest in staying on even in reduced form, the UN has no particular preference and would willingly phase out after the current mandate.

v) **Only the donor countries** (minus USA?), UNHCR and UN Agencies appear keen that UNAMIR should continue its mandate as, otherwise refugee return could be adversely affected. Zaire, Tanzania and OAU are likely to adopt a similar approach, as may the non-aligned caucus in the Security Council. Incidentally, the majority of people in Rwanda, though not necessarily the ruling elite, would also prefer UNAMIR to stay on in Rwanda mainly for security reasons.

Conclusion

3. Given the parameters stated above, the following broad conclusions may be drawn:

i) It is in our interest to engage the Rwandese immediately in discussions on the future mandate. The Rwandese Government should be asked to reveal its hand on the issue at all levels, eg, in New York, through friendly delegations and secretariat demarches, and here in Kigali.

ii) The UN may also make it clear to President Bizimungu that it is prepared to phase-out

iii) It should also be explained to Rwanda and to Security Council members that a curtailment of the military contingent is not feasible.

iv) Important donor countries and Security Council members may also take the opportunity of President Bizimungu's presence in New York to inform him of their expectations of Rwanda regarding the future mandate.

v) In Kigali, during my next round of negotiations with the Rwandese delegation planned for 31 October, I may be authorised to make points at para 4 (i-iii) above.

Best regards.

CNR 312 P 1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 27 October 1995
 NUMBER: 3392

SUBJECT: UK position on the future of UNAMIR

1. Mr. Derek Plumbly, Head of Chancery at the UK Mission, came to see us on 26 October to convey the views of his Government concerning the future of UNAMIR. They consider that there is no valid case for the continued presence of formed UNations troops after 8 December. The troops are, in their view, under-employed now and it would be difficult to devise a useful set of tasks for them in the next mandate. On the other hand, the UK feels there would be room for a UNations presence headed by a Special Representative, consisting mainly of Milobs and Human Rights monitors who would act as the eyes and ears of the international community. The British Government did not accept the argument that military observers might be subject to intimidation in the absence of formed troops.

2. Continuing, Mr. Plumbly indicated that there was also a valid case to be made for the protection of the International Tribunal which might require the retention of a small military unit. It was important to avoid giving the impression that the UNations was disengaging from Rwanda. In particular, radio UNAMIR should continue its programmes which were seen as playing a useful role. In the course of his recent visit to London, General Kagame had "conceded" to Lady Chalker that if the international community so wished, some UNations presence could be retained. Concerning the SecGen's forthcoming report to the SecCo, the UK considered that it would be preferable if it contained specific recommendations as to the future of UNAMIR, rather than a list of options. The latter would only result in a protracted debate in the Council. Best regards.

RECEIVED

28 OCT 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG
 UNAMIR

Reçu le 28 OCT. 1995

TOTAL P.01



UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

Date: 4 October 1995

Confidential

To: Ms. Susan Matthew
CAO

From: Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

Shaharyar M. Khan

Subject: Inventory of Equipment

1. The Administration had indicated mid-October as the date when an inventory of equipment would be ready with the following 4 broad categories: a) contingent-owned equipment; b) equipment that UN could effectively use in another operation; c) equipment that was still usable but financially counter-productive to transport out of Rwanda; d) equipment that was ready for write-off.

2. I would be grateful if this inventory could be projected in a meeting, preferably by the end of this week, as we would need to obtain HQ instructions on its disposal.

cc: FC (for information)
ED (for information)

Reçu le - 4 OCT. 1995

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12-2-96
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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 13 NOVEMBER 1995

NO.: MIR _____

NO. OF PAGES: 9

SUBJECT: UNAMIR'S MANDATE

1. UNAMIR's mandate after 8th December is now the central subject of discussion in diplomatic and Rwandese circles. As a result of our discussions with Dusaidi's team, Vice-President's Kagame's views expressed to important visitors and G-10 reactions in New York, the issues are now in sharper focus. The recent visits to Rwanda of Gen. Van Kappen and Ms. Lindenmayer have also helped us to see issues more clearly. In this report, I shall attempt an analysis and conclusions.

2. Basically, there are four options in play:

A. **The status-quo option.** This option envisages the continuation of our present format for the next mandate. Minor variations on this option are: a) the possible reduction

of Milobs from 320 to around 240 and a cut of Civpol from 120 to 55; b) the status-quo remaining for 4 months and the phase-out being completed by 8th June (and not, as at present, after the completion of the mandate). The mandate itself would need to be fine tuned so that the continuation of our formed troops in Rwanda is given some relevance. Proposals for fine-tuning the future mandate are being sent separately. In essence, they aim to make para 3 (b) of the existing mandate more specific so that UNAMIR formed troops have actual tasks to perform.

- B. **The Half-way option.** This option has as its central theme a proposal, [seemingly accepted by Kagame in London and which the Rwandan Government had favoured during the previous negotiations], of UNAMIR maintaining a small "emergency" force of 2 or 3 companies in Kigali (presumably backed-up by the specialized units of engineering, logistics, communications). This would result in an approximately 50% cut in our strength bringing it down to around 900. The number of formed troops, Milobs and Civpol could be varied. The civilian contingent would remain in harness.
- C. **The Observer option.** This option would see formed troops along with specialised units phase out altogether and only Military Observers left behind to help monitor human rights etc. Civpol and Civilian contingent would also remain.
- D. **The Civilian Option.** This option envisages UNAMIR phase out its military component altogether (ie formed troops, military observers and civpol) and leave behind a purely civilian mission with a revised mandate.

3. The relative merits of each of the above options may be assessed against the filter of the following major considerations.

Refugees

4. How important is the continued presence of UNAMIR formed troops in the prefectures (ie the Status-Quo Option [A]) in persuading the refugees to return? The Rwandese position is that it makes no difference. The US Embassy in Kigali feels that UNAMIR's presence has, at best, a marginal effect on refugee return. The Americans point to the fact that despite UNAMIR's presence, voluntary refugee return has never been more than a trickle and that refugees prefer to wait and see what conditions will be like after UNAMIR leaves.
5. These arguments miss the essential point. UNAMIR's presence in the prefectures has never been seen as the critical factor that would induce refugees to return. There are three crucial obstacles - intimidation in the camps, fear of persecution in Rwanda and the relative good life in the camps - which must be overcome before the refugees return in large numbers. The real point at issue is that, under the threat of forced repatriation from Zaire and Tanzania, UNHCR, the international community, neighbouring governments and Rwanda are currently making a supreme effort to persuade the refugees to return voluntarily. This effort must be seen in the time-frame of the next 3-6 months. In this period, UNAMIR's presence would act as a positive - though not crucial - factor in encouraging refugee return. UNAMIR's presence must, therefore, be viewed in the time-frame of this supreme effort for a major refugee lift-off. It is not an open-ended time-frame but one restricted to the next 6 months.
6. Moreover, looking at the reverse side of the coin, for UNAMIR to be seen walking away at the very time when a concerted effort is being made to persuade the voluntary return of refugees would send negative signals to the refugees and to Zaire/Tanzania who regard UNAMIR's presence as an important factor in encouraging refugee return. Finally, if this supreme effort fails to induce voluntary repatriation and Zaire/Tanzania decide on forced repatriation leading to a mass return of refugees, would not UNAMIR's presence be useful in helping the Rwandese Government to receive and settle them in their communes? There is no guarantee of success for the voluntary repatriation effort but, either way, UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda to help settle the voluntary or forced repatriation of refugees in the coming months would be desirable.

7. The Half-way option [B] reduces UNAMIR's capacity to play a helpful role in encouraging refugee return since UNAMIR formed troops would not be visible in the prefectures. However, it does not undermine it completely. In this option, UNAMIR would retain the specialised units (logistic, engineers etc.) and would be able to provide some practical assistance to returning refugees. However, the fact that UNAMIR would not have a presence in the prefectures would react negatively on the overall confidence and security that our formed troops provide in the prefectures where they are present. This impression would be only partially compensated by the presence of Milobs in the prefectures.

8. Of course, in the Observer [C] and Civilian [D] options, UNAMIR's capacity to assist in the return, both in psychological and practical terms, would be withdrawn completely.

Security

9. It is impossible to measure or quantify the degree of security that our formed troops provide in the region where they are present. In the absence of tangible evidence, a subjective assessment becomes the only substitute, as follows:

- a) There is a marked difference in the security conditions between the prefectures where our formed troops are present and where only Milobs are stationed. The insecurity in the latter prefectures is not only felt by Milobs but by Human Rights Monitors, Agency Representatives and NGO's. It follows that the majority population would reflect similar views regarding the presence of our formed troops in the prefectures. For instance, in Gitarama where only Milobs are present, our Milob headquarters is subjected to robbery and banditry at an average of once every 3 days. Similarly in Kibuye, the conditions are so insecure and human rights violations so prevalent that the Force Commander has had to station a section strength force of formed troops to back-up the Milobs. There is no doubt in our minds that UNAMIR formed troop presence makes an important difference in the security and behaviour pattern of the Rwandese army and administration.

- b) Milobs without formed-troop support would not be able to provide a security back-up. Their presence would be mainly decorative and not substantive from a military point of view.
- c) Gen. Kagame does not accept the reasoning at 8 (a) above and in fact regards the presence of UNAMIR formed troops as an obstacle to Rwanda's capacity to provide security.

10. The Status-Quo Option [A] would enable UNAMIR to continue providing a modicum of security. Their presence would not guarantee good behaviour or compliance with human rights requirements but would reduce violations. Conversely, the withdrawal of UNAMIR formed troops is likely to lead to an increase in such violations and to a downward spiral of ethnic tension.

11. Undoubtedly Milobs, Human Rights Monitors, Agency Representatives and NGO's find a marked improvement in the security climate as well as in the attitude of government representatives in prefectures where formed troops are present. I have no doubt that the withdrawal of our formed troops from the prefectures would lead to increased insecurity being felt by UN and NGO representatives in the prefectures and would affect their capability.

The Observer Option

12. I have also no doubt that Milobs, without formed troop back-up, would make little or no difference to the security situation. Moreover, Milobs have no military mandate such as monitoring cross border infiltration or cease-fire violations. In fact, their current "mandate" overlaps with that of the Human Rights Observers. In short, neither the Half-way [B] nor the Observer Mission [C] option helps in maintaining security. In my view, these middle options would induce the expectation of security which UNAMIR would be incapable of delivering on in a crisis. The advantage of these middle options is that the UN would be visible, without necessarily being effective.

Crisis management

13. Given the known volatility of the region and the fact that tension persists around the borders of Rwanda, there is constant danger of a crisis re-surfacing in Rwanda. In such an event, UN must have a sufficiently effective presence to prevent another humanitarian disaster. For UN to be present (Milobs, inadequate formed troops) and unable to take preventive action would result in a situation like the post-April 6, 1994 syndrome when acrimonious accusations were made against the UN from all sides. Militarily, UNAMIR has scarcely the capacity to address such a crisis even under the Status-Quo option and certainly not under the Half-way and Observer Options. It would, therefore, be advisable for UN to opt for the Civilian Option so that with the complete withdrawal of the military contingent there is no expectation of UNAMIR taking preventive action in a crisis.

Walking away from Rwanda/Africa

14. Opting for the Civilian Option [D], opens the way for criticism by the International Community and particularly by African countries that the UN is walking away from Rwanda and Africa. This criticism can be met only by providing the remaining Civilian mission with an effective mandate to engage in a post peace-keeping, peace-building role. Simply to leave Rwanda in the hands of the traditional role of the UN Agencies [UNDP, World Bank, UNHCR, etc.] to attend to its socio-economic requirements would neither satisfy Rwanda nor the African countries. Instead, an effective, re-structuring role needs to be given to the "Civilian UNAMIR" which would aim to address specific targets on a short time-frame basis such as:

- a) Re-habilitation of refugees;
- b) Revival of judicial process, including gendarmerie, communal police and prisons;
- c) Repair and restructuring of socio-economic base destroyed by genocide/civil war;
- d) Reconciliation at all levels;
- e) Effective disbursement of pledged assistance;

15. If the Civilian Option is accepted, UN should project the image of a successful phase II of UNAMIR's mandate having been completed to be followed by a Phase III - Civilian - reconstruction

mandate. UNAMIR's military withdrawal should be amicable and tension-free to project the successful conclusion of the mandate. This cannot be taken for granted and would require meeting some of Rwanda's expectations from a departing military contingent. Rwanda is capable of making UNAMIR II's departure rancorous and difficult if the government feels that the UN has not treated it fairly.

Conclusions

16. Against this background the following conclusions may be drawn:

- a) The international community and the Agencies have already indicated their preference for the Status-Quo Option related essentially to the effort to encourage the return of refugees. The UN Agencies support this stand as does OAU Secretary-General Salim A. Salim.
- b) Vice-President Kagame has indicated his opposition to the Status-Quo Option. The Rwandese Government has made it clear that it is prepared to bargain on the next mandate by resisting on the Status-Quo Option and aiming to settle for either the Half-way [B] or Observer [C] Options. It would also accept the Civilian Option [D] provided it had a clear mandate to "assist" Rwanda in its immediate needs;
- c) The international community, however, is too diffused and not sufficiently united to press for its maximal position. Nor is the international community and UN geared to engage in "hard-ball" negotiations with Rwanda. Faced with Rwanda's intransigence, the Security Council is likely to veer towards accepting the Half-way [B] or Observer [C] Options, especially as the Civilian Option "D" is coloured by the "walk-away" from Africa factor.

- d) The quid-pro-quo that Rwanda expects in return for an accommodating approach towards UNAMIR's next mandate is the disposal of equipment while UN phases out. However, in the event the Civilian Option being agreed, it expects the mandate to provide effective powers and financial capability to the mission to address Rwanda's immediate, post-conflict needs.
- e) Both middle Options [Half-way and Observer] raise expectations of UN being able to handle a crisis because UN Blue Helmets would still be visible in Rwanda. However, under these Options, UNAMIR would not be able to meet a crisis. These two options are, therefore, dangerous for the UN.
- f) Accordingly, if the Status-Quo option is not acceptable to Rwanda, the UN must make it clear to G-10 and to the Rwandan Government that the middle options are not acceptable, militarily. The UN should then clearly favour the Civilian Option.
- g) The impression that UN was turning its back on Rwanda/Africa may be countered by providing the Civilian Option an effective mandate relevant to meeting Rwanda's immediate needs.

Recommendations

17. In view of the above assessment and as less than a month remains for the mandate to be renewed, the following recommendations are submitted:

- a) UN may inform G-10 and Agencies of the four options. We may further inform them that UN would not find the Half-Way [B] and Observer [C] Options militarily viable.

- b) If, as expected, the Government of Rwanda opposes the Status-Quo option that has already been conveyed to it, we may inform G-10 and UN Agencies accordingly so that they make their own final efforts, jointly or bilaterally, to persuade Rwanda to accept the Status-Quo Option.
- c) From the outset UN should make its own position clear that it is ready and willing to withdraw its military contingent after December 8 and that it would accept a Civilian Mission thereafter.
- d) The Civilian Option should be provided an appropriately effective mandate in consultation with G-10 so as to meet Rwandese expectations as also counter-possible criticism of UN walking away from Rwanda/Africa.

Best regards.