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CROATIA

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CROATIA



Stalna misija Republike Hrvatske pri Uredu Ujedinjenih naroda
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations Office
Geneva

25, route de Ferney, 1209 Geneva, Tel: (022) 7403243, Fax (022) 7403251

Za/Att. _____ Datum/Date 20 December, 1993.
Fax br./Fax No. 917 00 79 Od/From _____
Predmet/Subject _____ Br. str./No. of pages 1+1

Poruka/Message:

CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Dear Sirs,

I have the honour to transmit to you, for your information,
the text of the declaration approved by the political parties
represented in the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia.

Sincerely yours

dr. Miomir Žužul
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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HRVATSKA SOCIJALNO-LIBERALNA STRANKA
Glatkovićeva 8, 41 000 Zagreb
telex: 0411/1 44 44; tel: 041-215-704
žiro račun: 30102-670-91 / Devizni račun 30101-620-16/2436740486

Zagreb, 17. 12. 1993.

At this historical moment, crucial for the future of the Croatian people, before the departure of the representatives of the Republic of Croatia for another round of the negotiations within the framework of the London Conference, the Croatian Parliamentary parties express their unanimous views:

1. We fully support the President of the Republic of Croatia and other representatives of the Republic of Croatia in their resoluteness to protect the territorial integrity of the internationally recognised Republic of Croatia and not to accept the proposals on changing the state borders.

2. We condemn the Serbian aggression and reject the proposals which would aim at accepting the results achieved by aggression.

3. We condemn the international Moslem fundamentalistic terrorism, the victim of which have recently been the innocent Croatian workers in Algeria and ask the international community to participate unitedly in the suppression thereof.

Hrvatska socijalno-liberalna stranka (HSLs)
Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ)
Socijal-demokratska partija Hrvatske (SDP)
Hrvatska seljačka stranka (HSS)
Hrvatska stranka prava (HSP)
Dalmatinska akcija (DA)
Crpska narodna stranka (SNS)

**UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR**

Page 1 of 2

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET

OUTGOING FAX NO:	DATE: 20 DECEMBER 1993
TO: STOLTENBERG GENEVA	FROM: THORNBERRY UNPROFOR, ZAGREB <i>J. Auger</i>
FAX NO: (41-22) 917-0079	FAX NO: 38-41-170 199
ATTN:	DRAFTER: /ls
SUBJECT: <u>ELECTIONS IN SERBIA</u>	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	

--- AS REQUESTED, ATTACHED PLEASE FIND SELF-EXPLANATORY FAX ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT.

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BELGRADE RADIO 15:00 hours news**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS in the Republic of Serbia**

According to unofficial results of the elections, almost 70% of the listed voters had voted. The SPS Party is leading, followed by DEPOS, SRS Party, DS Party and the DSS Party.

Ivica Dacic, spokesman of the SPS Party, said that the SPS Party had achieved better results than at the last elections.

Vuk Draskovic, DEPOS leader, said that the opposition had defeated the SPS Party and that it will have some 64% of the seats in the Parliament, the remainder belonging to the SPS Party. The results were below their expectations and they were such as a result of misuse of the media by the leading Party, he said. Draskovic did not want to state with which Party/ies they will form a coalition.

Zoran Djindjic, leader of the DS Party, said that they will not enter any kind of coalition with the SPS Party in the future Parliament.

The Electoral Committee of the Republic of Serbia held a press conference and announced that results of the elections are still incomplete and the first unofficial results will be known sometime during the night. The next press conference is scheduled for tomorrow morning.

Legend: SPS - Socialist Party of Serbia
DEPOS - Democratic Movement of Serbia
SRS - Serbian Radical Party
DS - Democratic Party
DSS - Democratic Party of Serbia

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

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TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY GENEVA

FROM *fx* : STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

DATE : 17 DECEMBER 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-1599

SUBJECT : PODLAPACA

CODE RESTRICTED

1. Podlapaca, near Korenica in Sector South, has enjoyed special protective measures on the part of UNPROFOR for nearly 18 months, such measures having been enhanced last September at the time of the Medak incursion. It contains 116 Croats, the largest remaining concentration in the Sector, and the enhancement took place when the Serb authorities said they would no longer guarantee the safety of the inhabitants. The FC, HCA and Police Commissioner drew up an integrated plan to try to deal with the ensuing emergency, this approach having military, police, political, and public information aspects.

2. Senior UNPROFOR personnel have made regular visits to the village and today, three months after the application of emergency measures, HCA, accompanied by CO Czechbatt and other senior military, police, and civilian personnel, spent several hours in Podlapaca, reviewing the situation, and then meeting with a large section of villagers. While one does not want to tempt fate in a region which continues essentially unstable, it can be reported that this UNPROFOR venture has been successful, so far. Though the villagers had numerous complaints today, the situation is qualitatively different to that of three months ago. But it has been resource-intensive, with the number of UNPROFOR personnel being almost 70% of the village population. No villager has been attacked since September, despite the inflamed atmosphere in the Krajina.

3. Our feeling is, that we should now aim gradually to return to as much normality as possible. This is dictated not only by manpower considerations, but also by our belief that the villagers' best hope of hanging on in Sector South is, to the extent possible, to lead a normal way of life. This will necessitate continuing support, both as to security and in the political arena, and Czechbatt's CO thought today that we should not begin scaling down for another couple of months. We would

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also need to maintain a CIVPOL presence in the village (which is actually a series of hamlets scattered over 20 square kilometres) and to keep visiting, as we did today, the local authorities in Korenica (as well as in Knin, as and when necessary). We believe it will also be necessary now to support and facilitate the transfer of a minority of the inhabitants who are in grave need (e.g. school-age children, who have not been to school in nearly three years, one or two serious medical cases, etc...).

4. We should not be congratulating ourselves on this very much: Too much ethnic cleansing horror has happened. But it is worth studying how the situation has stabilised, in an outstanding example of HQ and Sector cooperation between our various elements. Ethnic cleansing, and its reversal, has security, political and psychological elements, all of which need to be addressed at the same time. We shall continue to work to stabilise the situation.

ENDALL.

16-12-1993 02:09

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P. 01

UNPROFOR**SPABAT**

Page 1 of 7 PAGES

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OUTGOING FAX N°: T-4229	DATE: 152342 A dic. 93
TO: ORCC ZACREB	FROM: SPABAT S-5
	FAX: 642 195
ATTN: MR. THORNVALD STOLTENBERG	FILE REF. N°: S-5/1121 DRAFTER: SGT. MOLLEJA TITLE: AUX S-5
INFO:	RELEASING OFF.: MAJ. FERRER
INT. DIST.:	SIGNATURE:
SUBJECT: RELEASING LETTER FROM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERCEG-BOSNA	

SRSG'S OFFICE

MESSAGE

Date: 16/12/93

SRSG:

DSRSG:

CA:

DRI:

FUERZA DE ACCION RAPIDA
AGT MADRID
5ª SECCIONFecha 15-12-93
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Nº 1121

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AGT. MADRID
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Nº 3178
Fecha 15/12/93

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S-5

CROATIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Ref. Nr : 01-IV 105-01/93
Mostar, 14 December 1993COCHAIRMAN
Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg

Your Excellency,

On behalf of the House of the Representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, we request your approval to Lt. Gen. Brigueant and UN forces to assure the secure transportation of our representatives and political delegates from Central Bosnia through territory occupied by the Muslim Army of BiH for regular session on 22 December 1993 beginning at 10:00 in Mostar.

Their presence is obligate because of attaching special significance to the proposal for ending the war and restoring peace in BiH, since it is an important segment, in entirety and detail, of the present peace process.

We enclose the letter for Lt. Gen. Brigueant with the list of the representatives and political delegates of the Croat people.

Sincerely,



VICEPRESIDENT

Ivan Bender dipl. iur.

Bender

FUERZA DE ACCION RAPIDA

R.C.
AGT, MADRID

ENTRADA

No 53-15

Fecha 17/DEC/93

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REF. NR. : 01-IV-185-01/93
MOSTAR, 14 DEC 1993

COCHAIRMAN
MR THORVALD STOLTENBERG

YOUR EXCELLENCE,

ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA, WE REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL TO LT. GEN. BRIQUEMONT AND UN FORCES TO ASSURE THE SECURE TRANSPORTATION OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES AND POLITICAL DELEGATES FROM CENTRAL BOSNIA THROUGH TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE MUSLIM ARMY OF BIH FOR REGULAR SESSION ON THE 22 DECEMBER 1993 BEGINNING AT 10:00 IN MOSTAR.

THEIR PRESENCE IS OBLIGATE BECAUSE OF ATTACHING SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PROPOSAL FOR ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN BIH, SINCE IT IS AN IMPORTANT SEGMENT, IN ENTIRETY AND DETAIL, OF THE PRESENTED PLAN AND AN ACTIVITY FOR REACHING IMMEDIATE PEACE.

WE ENCLOSE THE LETTER FOR LT. GEN. BRIQUEMONT WITH THE LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES AND POLITICAL DELEGATES OF THE CROAT PEOPLE.

SINCERELY,

VICEPRESIDENT

IVAN BENDER DIPL. IUR.

(3-2)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



R-6093

Ref. No.: 01-IV-185-02/93
Mostar, 14 December 1993

LT. Gen. Francis Briquemont
UN BiH Commander
Sarajevo

Dear Lt. Gen. Briquemont,

On behalf of the representatives of the House of the representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, we request that you ensure the secure transportation of our representatives and political delegates from Central Bosnia through territory occupied by the Muslim Army of BiH for the regular session on 22 December 1993 beginning at 10:00 in Mostar.

Their presence is obligate because of discussing peace efforts and proposals given by the Croatian side.

The following is the list of representatives and delegates of the Croat people from Central Bosnia that we request receive your assistance.

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Ivo Andrić - Lučanski | Tuzla |
| 2. Mijo Anić | Brčko |
| 3. Nikola Bajić | Modriča |
| 4. Jozo Bajić | Vitez |
| 5. Jozo Boro | Kiseljak |
| 6. Nevenka Bošnjak Nijmčević | Bojnica |
| 7. Marinko Bošnjak | Busovača |
| 8. Bernard Čakaric | Busovača |
| 9. Zdravko Frančević | Kreševo |
| 10. Marko Franković | Kiseljak |
| 11. Niko Grubišić | Busovača |
| 12. Antun Krstić Rudić | Usora |
| 13. Miroslav Jovanović | Vitez |
| 14. Marko Jurišić | Gradačac |
| 15. Stjepan Komšo | Kakanj |
| 16. Damir Kordić | Busovača |
| 17. Irfan Košćroman | Kreševo |
| 18. Ivo Lozančić | Žepče |
| 19. Zoran Marić | Busovača |
| 20. Vlado Mišković | Vitez |
| 21. Anto Peččinović | Vareš |
| 22. Željko Pervan | Travnik |

FUERZA DE ACCION RAPIDA

RC
AGT. MADRID

ENTRADA

Nº 5314

Fecha 15/12/93

2

22. IVICA SANJIC

VITEZ

23. Anto Puljić
24. Petar Ravlija
25. Ivo Skopljaković
26. Anton Stipac
28. Stjepan Tunjić
29. Mario Vidak
30. Mato Vukoja Paško
31. Slavko Zalić
32. Pavao Zovko
33. Anto Valenta
34. Dominik Šakić

Busovača
Vareš
Novi Travnik
Busovača
Tuzla
Novi Travnik
Kreševo
Sarajevo
Fojnica
Travnik (Vitez)
Busovača

Sincerely,



VICEPRESIDENT

Ivan Bender dipl. iur.

Bender

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REF. NR. : 01-IV-185-02/93

MOSTAR, 14 DECEMBER 1993

LT. GEN. FRANCIS BRIQUEMONT
UN BIH COMMANDER
SARAJEVO

DEAR LT. GEN. BRIQUEMONT,

ON BEHALF OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA, WE
REQUEST THAT YOU ASSURE THE SECURE TRANSPORTATION OF OUR
REPRESENTATIVES AND POLITICAL DELEGATES FROM CENTRAL BOSNIA
THROUGH TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE MUSLIM ARMY OF BIH FOR THE
REGULAR SESSION ON 22 DECEMBER 1993 BEGINNING AT 10:00 IN MOSTAR.

THEIR PRESENCE IS OBLIGATE BECAUSE OF DISCUSSING
PEACE EFFORTS AND PROPOSALS GIVEN BY THE CROATIAN SIDE.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
DELEGATES OF THE CROAT PEOPLE FROM CENTRAL BOSNIA THAT WE REQUEST
RECEIVE YOUR ASSISTANCE.

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------|
| 1. IVO ANDRIC - LUZANSKI | TUZLA |
| 2. MIJO ANIC | BRCKO |
| 3. NIKOLA BAJIC | MODRICA |
| 4. JOZO BEJIC | VITEZ |
| 5. JOZO BORO | KISELJAK |
| 6. NEVENKA BOSNJAK MIJATOVIC | FOJNICA |
| 7. MARINKO BOSNJAK | BUSOVACA |
| 8. BERNARD CAKARIC | BUSOVACA |
| 9. ZORAVO FRANCEVIC | KRESEVO |

10. MANKO FRANKOVIC	KISELJAK
11. NIKO GRUBISIC	BUSOVACA
12. ANTON ERNEST HUDIC	USORA
13. ANTO JOVANOVIC	VITEZ
14. MARKO JURISIC	GRADACAC
15. STJEPAN KOMSO	KAKANJ
16. DARIO KORDIC	BUSOVACA
17. IGNJAC KOSTROMAN	KRESEVO
18. IVO LOZANCIC	ZEPCE
19. ZORAN MARIC	BUSOVACA
20. VLADO MISKOVIC	VITEZ
21. ANTE PEJCINOVIC	VARES
22. ZELJKO PERVAN	TRAVNIK
23. ANTO PULJIC	BUSOVACA
24. PETAR RAVLIJA	VARES
25. ANTON STIPAC	NOVI TRAVNIK
26. ANTON STIPAC	BUSOVACA
27. IVICA SANTIC	VITEZ
28. STJEPAN TUNJIC	TUZLA
29. MARIO VIDAK	NOVI TRAVNIK
30. MATO VUKOJA PASKO	KRESEVO
31. SLAVKO ZELIC	SARAJEVO
32. PAVAO ZOVKO	FOJNICA
33. ANTO VALENTA	TRAVNIK (VITEZ)
34. DOMINIK SAKIC	BUSOVACA

SINCERELY,


VICEPRESIDENT

IVAN BENDER-DIPL. JUR.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

file
010/12

To: Thorvald Stoltenberg
From: Knut Vollebaek 
Date: 10 November 1993
Subject: MEETING WITH MR SARENIC

1. With Gen Pellnas I met Mr Sarenic this afternoon. My intention was to see what comments Sarenic had following the meeting in Norway last week and to see whether he had anything for me to take to the Serbs whom I am meeting in Plitvice tomorrow. However, at the beginning of the meeting Mr Sarenic made some interesting comments about other initiatives that are also being made.

2. Sarenic said that he had just returned from President Tudjman, where they had been talking to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. They had been talking about the highest politics, he said. The Greeks were proposing to arrange a meeting at Thessalonika at which they would invite Tudjman and Milosovic (among others?) to sign three documents:

- a. A global recognition of all countries in the former Yugoslavia.
- b. A document on human rights and the rights of minorities. This would be a general document which would be more acceptable to Milosovic than something specific on Kosovo, since Croatia had Krajina and Milosovic had Vojvodina and Kosovo.
- c. A third document related to matters of succession.

3. Sarenic commented that he and Tudjman had been surprised that Greece was prepared to take such an initiative, because of their relations with FYROM. Greece had said that they would organise the meeting and put the proposal to all the parties. They were acting because they wanted peace in the Balkans. Further more they were very afraid of the possible emergence of a Muslim state in Central Europe. Sarenic commented that this was because of the Muslim minority in Greece on the Greek border with Turkey.

4. Sarenic then said that the German Ambassador had been to see him that morning. He had been very interested to discuss the French/German initiative which now included the solution of the B-H problem, the establishment of a "modus vivendi" in Croatia and an economic package. Sarenic said that he would be very interested to see what they meant by a "modus vivendi". He said that he had wanted to mention these two items because there was a parallel between the French/German initiative and what they were saying to the Greeks.

5. We went on to discuss the ICFY sponsored secret meetings, which Sarenic is keen to continue.

UNITED NATIONS



Office of the
**SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

2 November 1993

Dear President Milosevic,

PEACE INITIATIVE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

I enclose, for your attention, a copy of a peace initiative handed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg, by President Tudjman at a meeting held in Zagreb this morning.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Vigleik Eide', with a checkmark to the left.

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

President Slobodan Milosevic

**PEACE INITIATIVE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
DR. FRANJO TUĐMAN**

Deeply concerned by the impasse at the Geneva Conference on the former Yugoslavia, and by the failure of all other attempts made to stop the war and military conflicts in the area of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I consider it my statesman's duty to suggest to the international community, in particular to all the relevant global factors, a peace initiative which would stop the war and all the associated horrors, and open up the path to peace and understanding, and to a resolution of political and economic problems in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

**I. Proposal for the Implementation of the Peace Plan
in United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia**

In order to achieve the speediest implementation of Security Council Resolution 871 (and all other resolutions referred to in this Resolution), the Republic of Croatia proposes as follows:

1. The Croatian Government is prepared to conclude within 15 days an agreement on the cessation of all hostilities with the representatives of the local Serbs, guaranteeing their local and cultural autonomy.

2. To this end we propose at the same time the renewal of the work of the Joint Commissions in order to resolve all issues enumerated in the Vance Plan, and the implementation of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 871, with the participation of the representatives of UNPROFOR and of the European Community.

3. We propose the immediate normalization of overall social and economic life in the UNPAs through the following:

3.1. The immediate opening of all road and rail communications throughout the Republic of Croatia, and particularly along the routes Zagreb-Knin-Split, Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Županja, Novska-Okučani-Pakrac-Daruvar, Sisak-Glina-Bosanski Novi, Osijek-Beli Manastir-Hungarian border, Osijek-Vukovar, Osijek-Vinkovci-Ilok, etc.;

3.2. The opening of the Adriatic Oil Pipeline and the repair and beginning of regular operation of facilities for oil transport, and power and water supply, throughout Croatia;

3.3. The immediate return, without further delay, of all displaced persons to their homes under the supervision and

with the efficient assistance of UNPROFOR and the authorities of the Republic of Croatia;

3.4. The initiation of all steps necessary for the restoration of normal life in the UNPAs, including the reopening of all communications, the supply of basic human needs to the entire population, i.e., including the Serbian population (without any discrimination) in the forthcoming winter period, the reinstatement of welfare and medical care, normal operation of schools, supply of electric power and other energy sources, the payment of pensions, the employment of all civil servants, and the integration of all other activities into the overall economic and legal system of the Republic of Croatia;

3.5. The preparation of plans and the initiation of steps to achieve the equitable integration of the UNPAs into the economic reconstruction of Croatia.

4. For the sake of the political settlement of the conflict and normalization of overall social life Croatia is prepared, within the scope of its constitutional and legal order, to ensure in the UNPAs the implementation of its regulations, as well as of international conventions concerning the rights and freedoms of the Serbian ethnic community. To this end the following steps will be undertaken:

4.1. The provision of full local autonomy (self-government), within the framework of the Constitutional Law, in the Districts of Knin and Glina in which the Serbs account for the majority;

4.2. The assurance of the right to cultural autonomy of the Serbian ethnic community throughout Croatia, and especially the right to education in their language and script in accordance with special curricula, and the bilingual writing of toponyms in areas in which they are in the majority;

4.3. The scheduling of elections for local - district and municipal - self-governmental authorities under international supervision;

4.4. The establishment of special police administrations in the Districts of Knin and Glina, whereby the national composition of the police force should match the ethnic composition of the population according to the latest censuses.

5. In order to provide for full civil and political equality, and efficient safeguarding of the civil and ethnic rights of the Serbs in Croatia, Croatia is prepared to accept the establishment of a special international supervisory body, and of a special Human Rights Court, to which each citizen will be able to apply after having exhausted the regular legal avenues. In order to safeguard their special rights, the Districts of Knin and Glina will be able to lodge a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia should they

consider that human rights and liberties, or the rights of the ethnic community, have been violated in their areas.

6. In order to create full confidence, Croatia is prepared to propose the use of a special international CSCE supervisory mission for mediation between the minority and the majority population.

7. The Republic of Croatia is prepared to negotiate the political settlement of all outstanding issues except those that may affect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

II. Proposal for the Cessation of War and Establishment of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In this fateful moment when there appears to be no escape from the tragic sequence of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when the orientation to the convening of new, time-consuming international conferences is not likely to produce any results, I propose that international factors revive the work of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the thus far achieved agreements concerning the constitutional arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Union of Republics.

In order to make such a revived Conference as efficient as possible, I suggest the participation, along with the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee, of representatives of States which may have a most efficient bearing on the solution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the former Yugoslavia, i.e.: France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

1. Thus convened anew, the Geneva Peace Conference ought to prevail upon all the three parties in conflict, under threat of sanctions and within 14 days, to:

1.1. sign an agreement on the immediate cessation of hostilities and all military actions, should they fail to do so, the U.N. Security Council should be requested to pass a resolution ordering such cessation under the threat of armed enforcement,

1.2. sign a declaration on the acceptance of the Constitutional Arrangement about the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the annexed agreements.

2. I propose that the controversial issues of delimitation between the Republics of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina be resolved through bilateral negotiations and, if no agreement can be reached, to entrust the final decision to a special (arbitration) body to be nominated by the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee and other Conference participants.

3. I propose that all the parties in conflict should

undertake to immediately:

3.1. assure and guarantee free and unhindered passage of humanitarian aid to all parties in all areas where it is required;

3.2. exchange all detainees and disband all detention centres, and bear full responsibility for their treatment of detainees in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law;

3.3. permit international supervision and freedom of movement to representatives of international agencies who will supervise the implementation of these steps.

4. The peace plan can be implemented by using NATO forces (in the role thus far played by UNPROFOR), with the authority to use force, air strikes included, against all those who violate the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or frustrate the delivery of humanitarian aid and international supervision of the implementation of the achieved agreements.

III. Proposed Steps for the Permanent Consolidation of Peace

If the peace, once achieved, is to be sustained permanently and consolidated, I propose that all the states in the area of the former Yugoslavia should proceed - within the framework of the Peace Conference and under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General and Security Council - as follows:

1. sign a solemn declaration on the reciprocal recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all newly emerged states within their internationally recognized borders;

2. sign within 3 months an agreement on the succession to rights and obligations of all successor states of the former Yugoslavia pursuant to the decision of the Arbitration Commission;

3. start negotiating, within the scope of European integration processes, treaties between themselves and with other European states concerning the regulation and promotion of economic and traffic links and trade, and other matters of interest for relations among sovereign and independent states wishing to establish good neighbourly relations, and also of interest for the stability of the international order in this part of the world;

4. sign, within the framework of the Conference, a solemn declaration on the observance of the rights of national minorities and ethnic communities in accordance with international standards and conventions, with internationally controlled implementation of such an agreement;

5. immediately begin negotiating an agreement on the regional security of countries in the area of the former Yugoslavia within the scope of the general CSCE conventional armaments limitation system;

6. I believe that the U.N. Security Council sanctions enforced in respect to certain states in the area of the former Yugoslavia should remain in force until all the results of the proposed peace process are achieved. As soon as the peace plan is achieved, the sanctions ought to be lifted forthwith.

I urge all international factors to consider these proposals and to take resolute measures to bring a halt to the conflict, and all steps required to bring peace and create the prerequisites for the establishment of a stable international order in the area, for the benefit of all the states in this part of Europe and in the world.

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

DR. FRANJO TUDMAN

Zagreb, November 1, 1993



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Republika Hrvatska / Republic of Croatia

Predsjednik / President

**MIROVNA INICIJATIVA
PREDSJEDNIKA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE
DR. FRANJE TUĐMANA**

Duboko zabrinut zastojem Ženevske konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji i neuspjehom svih drugih nastojanja za zaustavljanje rata i oružanih sukoba na području Republike Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine, smatram svojom državničkom dužnošću predložiti međunarodnoj zajednici, osobito svim relevantnim svjetskim čimbenicima, mirovnu inicijativu kojom bi se zaustavio rat i strahote koje on donosi i otvorio put prema miru i razumijevanju, te rješavanju političkih i gospodarskih problema na području bivše Jugoslavije.

**I. Prijedlog provedbe mirovnog plana na području pod
zaštitom Ujedinjenih naroda (UNPA) u Hrvatskoj**

Radi što hitnije provedbe Rezolucije br. 871 Vijeća sigurnosti UN (i ostalih rezolucija na koje se ta rezolucija poziva), Republika Hrvatska predlaže kako slijedi:

1. Hrvatska vlada spremna je u roku od 15 dana zaključiti sporazum o prekidu svih neprijateljstava s predstavnicima lokalnih Srba dajući im jamstva za lokalnu i kulturnu autonomiju.
2. U tu svrhu predlažemo da se u istom roku obnovi rad zajedničkih komisija za rješavanje svih pitanja koja navodi Vanceov plan, te provedbu odredaba Rezolucije vijeća sigurnosti br. 871, uz sudjelovanje predstavnika UNPROFOR-a i Europske zajednice.
3. Predlažemo da se odmah pristupi normalizaciji cijelog društvenog i gospodarskog života u UNPA i to:
 - 3.1. Otvaranjem, bez odgode, svih cestovnih i željezničkih prometnica na cijelom području Republike Hrvatske, a napose na prometnicama Zagreb-Knin-Split, Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Županja, Novska-Okučani-Pakrac-Daruvar, Sisak-Glina-Bosanski Novi, Osijek-Beli Manastir-mađarska granica, Osijek-Vukovar i Osijek-Vinkovci-Ilok, itd.;

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- 3.2. *Otvaranjem Jadranskog naftovoda i popravkom, te puštanjem u redovni rad, postrojenja za prijenos nafte, električne energije i vodoopskrbe na cijelom području Hrvatske;*
 - 3.3. *Povratkom, bez odlaganja, svih prognanika na njihova obitavališta pod nadzorom i uz djelotvornu pomoć UNPROFOR-a i vlasti Republike Hrvatske;*
 - 3.4. *Poduzimanjem mjera za uspostavu normalnog života u UNPA, uključujući uspostavu svih komunikacija, opskrbu svega, tj. i srpskog stanovništva (bez diskriminacije) u predstojećem zimskom razdoblju, obnovu socijalne i zdravstvene zaštite, normalan rad školstva, opskrbu električnom energijom i ostalim energentima, isplate mirovina, primanje u službu svih državnih službenika, te uključenje svih ostalih djelatnosti u sveukupan gospodarski i pravni sustav Republike Hrvatske;*
 - 3.5. *Izradom planova i poduzimanjem mjera za ravnopravno uključenje područja UNPA u gospodarsku obnovu Hrvatske.*
4. *Radi političkog rješenja sukoba i normalizacije sveukupnog društvenog života Hrvatska je spremna, u okviru svog ustavnopravnog poretka, osigurati u UNPA primjenu svojih propisa ali i međunarodnih konvencija o zaštiti prava i sloboda srpske etničke zajednice. U tom cilju poduzet će se slijedeće:*
- 4.1. *Davanje pune lokalne autonomije (samouprave) u okviru Ustavnog zakona u kotarevima Knin i Glina, u kojima Srbi čine natpolovičnu većinu stanovništva;*
 - 4.2. *Osiguranje prava na kulturnu autonomiju srpske etničke zajednice na cijelom području Hrvatske, a osobito pravo na odgoj i obrazovanje na njihovu jeziku i pismu prema posebnim nastavnim programima, te dvojezično ispisivanje toponima na području gdje imaju natpolovičnu većinu;*
 - 4.3. *Provedba izbora za lokalne - kotarske i općinske - samoupravne vlasti, pod međunarodnim nadzorom;*
 - 4.4. *Osnivanje posebnih policijskih uprava u kotarevima Knin i Glina s tim da nacionalni sastav službenika odgovara nacionalnom sastavu pučanstva prema posljednjim popisima.*
5. *Radi osiguranja pune građanske i političke ravnopravnosti i djelotvorne zaštite građanskih i etničkih prava Srba u Hrvatskoj, Hrvatska je spremna prihvatiti osnivanje posebnog međunarodnog tijela za nadzor, te posebnog Suda za prava čovjeka, kojem će se moći obratiti svaki građanin nakon iscrpljivanja redovnog pravnog puta. Kotarevi Knin i Glina moći će se, radi zaštite*

posebnih prava, obratiti Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske ustavnom tužbom, ako smatraju da su povrijeđene slobode i prava čovjeka ili prava etničke zajednice na njihovu području.

6. Radi stvaranja punog povjerenja Hrvatska je spremna predložiti primjenu posebnog međunarodnog nadzora misije KESS-a za posredovanje između manjinskog i većinskog stanovništva.
7. Republika Hrvatska pripravna je pristupiti pregovorima o političkom rješenju svih otvorenih problema osim onih koji bi dovodili u pitanje njezin teritorijalni integritet i suverenitet

II. Prijedlog za okončanje rata i uspostavu mira u Bosni i Hercegovini

U sudbinskom trenutku kad se čini da nema izlaza iz tragičnog slijeda događanja u Bosni i Hercegovini i kad nije vjerojatno da bi orijentacija na sazivanje novih dugotrajnih međunarodnih konferencija donijela ploda, predlažem da međunarodni čimbenici obnove rad Ženevske konferencije, na dosada postignutim sporazumima o ustavnom uređenju Bosne i Hercegovine kao Unije republika.

Da bi obnovljena Konferencija bila što djelotvornija, predlažem da uz supredsjedatelje Upravljačkog odbora sudjeluju u daljnjem radu predstavnici onih država koje mogu najdjelotvornije utjecati na rješenje krize u BiH i na području bivše Jugoslavije: Francuske, Njemačke, Ruske federacije, Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Turske i Velike Britanije.

1. Novi saziv Ženevske mirovne konferencije trebao bi sve tri strane u sukobu privoljeti, pod prijetnjom sankcija, da u roku od 14 dana:
 - 1.1. Potpišu sporazum o bezuvjetnom prekidu neprijateljstava i svih oružanih akcija bez odgađanja, a ako to ne učine da se od Vijeća sigurnosti UN zatraži donošenje rezolucije kojom se taj prekid nalaže pod prijetnjom oružane prisile;
 - 1.2. Potpišu deklaraciju o prihvatanju Ustavnog sporazuma o Uniji republika Bosne i Hercegovine i sporazuma koji su mu dodani.
2. Predlažem da se sporna pitanja razgraničenja između republika Unije BiH riješe u bilateralnim pregovorima, a ako se ne postigne sporazum da se konačna odluka povjeri posebnom (arbitražnom) tijelu koje će odrediti supredsjedatelji Upravljačkog odbora i ostali sudionici Konferencije.

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3. *Predlažem da se sve sukobljene strane obvežu da će bez odlaganja:*
- 3.1. *Osigurati, i jamčiti slobodan i nesmetan prolaz humanitarne pomoći svim stranama, na svim područjima gdje je to potrebno;*
 - 3.2. *Odmah pristupiti razmjeni svih zatočenika i raspustiti sve zatočeničke centre, te da snose punu odgovornost za postupak sa zatočenicima prema pravilima međunarodnog humanitarnog prava;*
 - 3.3. *Omogućiti međunarodni nadzor i slobodno kretanje predstavnicima međunarodnih organizacija koje će nadzirati provedbu gore navedenih mjera.*
4. *Provedba mirovnog plana može se osigurati upotrebom snaga NATO (u ulozi koju je do sada imao UNPROFOR), s ovlaštenjem upotrebe sile, uključujući zračne udare, prema svima koji prekrše prekid neprijateljstava, ili budu onemogućavali dostavljanje humanitarne pomoći i međunarodni nadzor nad provedbom postignutih sporazuma.*

III. Prijedlog mjera za trajno učvršćenje mira

Da bi se trajno održao i učvrstio jednom postignuti mir, predlažem da sve države s područja bivše Jugoslavije, u okviru Mirovne konferencije i pod pokroviteljstvom Glavnog tajnika i Vijeća sigurnosti UN:

1. *Potpisu svečanu deklaraciju o međusobnom priznanju samostalnosti i suverenosti svih novonastalih država, u njihovim međunarodno priznatim granicama;*
2. *Da u roku od 3 mjeseca potpišu sporazum o sukcesiji prava i obveza svih država nasljednica bivše Jugoslavije na osnovi odluka Arbitražne komisije;*
3. *Da pristupe pregovorima o zaključenju, u okviru europskih integracijskih procesa, ugovora između sebe i s ostalim europskim državama, o uređenju i promicanju gospodarskih i prometnih veza i trgovine i drugih pitanja od interesa za odnose između suverenih i neovisnih država koje žele dobre susjedske odnose, a također od interesa za stabilnost međunarodnog poretka u ovom dijelu svijeta;*
4. *Da se u okviru konferencije potpiše svečana deklaracija o poštivanju prava nacionalnih manjina i etničkih zajednica, prema međunarodnim standardima i konvencijama, uz uspostavu međunarodne kontrole primjene tih sporazuma;*

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5. *Da odmah počnu pregovori o zaključenju sporazuma o regionalnoj sigurnosti zemalja s područja bivše Jugoslavije, u okviru općeg sustava ograničenja konvencionalnog naoružanja unutar KESS-a;*
 6. *Smatram da sankcije Vijeća sigurnosti UN koje su donesene u odnosu na određene države s područja bivše Jugoslavije, trebaju ostati na snazi sve dok se ne ostvare svi rezultati predloženog mirovnog procesa. Čim mirovni plan bude ostvaren, sankcije bi rebalo bez odlaganja ukinuti.*

Pozivam sve međunarodne čimbenike da razmotre ove moje prijedloge i da poduzmu odlučne mjere za zaustavljanje sukoba i sve potrebne korake koji će donijeti mir i stvoriti pretpostavke za stvaranje stabilnog međunarodnog poretka u ovom području na dobrobit svih država u ovom dijelu Europe i svijeta.

Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske



Dr. Franjo Tuđman

U Zagrebu, 1. studenog 1993.



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTER

Original

H.E. Thorvald Stoltenberg
Co-Chairman of the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia
Geneve

2 November 1993

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to forward the Peace Initiative of 1 November 1993 by the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman.

President of the Republic of Croatia, deeply concerned about the stalemate of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the failure of all other efforts to stop the war and armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, wishes in this way to contribute to actions designed to stop the war and pave the way to the establishment of peace, mutual understanding and settlement of political and economic problems in the states created in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

You are kindly requested to forward the text of the Peace Initiative of the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman to the President of the Republic of Serbia Mr. Slobodan Milošević and the President of the Republic of Macedonia Mr. Kiro Gligorov.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dr. Mate Granić
Minister



Republika Hrvatska / Republic of Croatia

Predsjednik / President

**MIROVNA INICIJATIVA
PREDSJEDNIKA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE
DR. FRANJE TUĐMANA**

Duboko zabrinut zastojem Ženevske konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji i neuspjehom svih drugih nastojanja za zaustavljanje rata i oružanih sukoba na području Republike Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine, smatram svojom državničkom dužnošću predložiti međunarodnoj zajednici, osobito svim relevantnim svjetskim čimbenicima, mirovnu inicijativu kojom bi se zaustavio rat i strahote koje on donosi i otvorio put prema miru i razumijevanju, te rješavanju političkih i gospodarskih problema na području bivše Jugoslavije.

***I. Prijedlog provedbe mirovnog plana na području pod
zaštitom Ujedinjenih naroda (UNPA) u Hrvatskoj***

Radi što hitnije provedbe Rezolucije br. 871 Vijeća sigurnosti UN (i ostalih rezolucija na koje se ta rezolucija poziva), Republika Hrvatska predlaže kako slijedi:

- 1. Hrvatska vlada spremna je u roku od 15 dana zaključiti sporazum o prekidu svih neprijateljstava s predstavnicima lokalnih Srba dajući im jamstva za lokalnu i kulturnu autonomiju.*
- 2. U tu svrhu predlažemo da se u istom roku obnovi rad zajedničkih komisija za rješavanje svih pitanja koja navodi Vanceov plan, te provedbu odredaba Rezolucije vijeća sigurnosti br. 871, uz sudjelovanje predstavnika UNPROFOR-a i Europske zajednice.*
- 3. Predlažemo da se odmah pristupi normalizaciji cijelog društvenog i gospodarskog života u UNPA i to:*
 - 3.1. Otvaranjem, bez odgode, svih cestovnih i željezničkih prometnica na cijelom području Republike Hrvatske, a napose na prometnicama Zagreb-Knin-Split, Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Županja, Novska-Okučani-Pakrac-Daruvar, Sisak-Glina-Bosanski Novi, Osijek-Beli Manastir-mađarska granica, Osijek-Vukovar i Osijek-Vinkovci-Ilok, itd.;*

- 3.2. *Otvaranjem Jadranskog naftovoda i popravkom, te puštanjem u redovni rad, postrojenja za prijenos nafte, električne energije i vodoopskrbe na cijelom području Hrvatske;*
 - 3.3. *Povratkom, bez odlaganja, svih prognanika na njihova obitavališta pod nadzorom i uz djelotvornu pomoć UNPROFOR-a i vlasti Republike Hrvatske;*
 - 3.4. *Poduzimanjem mjera za uspostavu normalnog života u UNPA, uključujući uspostavu svih komunikacija, opskrbu svega, tj. i srpskog stanovništva (bez diskriminacije) u predstojećem zimskom razdoblju, obnovu socijalne i zdravstvene zaštite, normalan rad školstva, opskrbu električnom energijom i ostalim energentima, isplate mirovina, primanje u službu svih državnih službenika, te uključenje svih ostalih djelatnosti u sveukupan gospodarski i pravni sustav Republike Hrvatske;*
 - 3.5. *Izradom planova i poduzimanjem mjera za ravnopravno uključenje područja UNPA u gospodarsku obnovu Hrvatske.*
-
4. *Radi političkog rješenja sukoba i normalizacije sveukupnog društvenog života Hrvatska je spremna, u okviru svog ustavnopravnog poretka, osigurati u UNPA primjenu svojih propisa ali i međunarodnih konvencija o zaštiti prava i sloboda srpske etničke zajednice. U tom cilju poduzet će se sljedeće:*
 - 4.1. *Davanje pune lokalne autonomije (samouprave) u okviru Ustavnog zakona u kotarevima Knin i Glina, u kojima Srbi čine natpolovičnu većinu stanovništva;*
 - 4.2. *Osiguranje prava na kulturnu autonomiju srpske etničke zajednice na cijelom području Hrvatske, a osobito pravo na odgoj i obrazovanje na njihovu jeziku i pismu prema posebnim nastavnim programima, te dvojezično ispisivanje toponima na području gdje imaju natpolovičnu većinu;*
 - 4.3. *Provedba izbora za lokalne - kotarske i općinske - samoupravne vlasti, pod međunarodnim nadzorom;*
 - 4.4. *Osnivanje posebnih policijskih uprava u kotarevima Knin i Glina s tim da nacionalni sastav službenika odgovara nacionalnom sastavu pučanstva prema posljednjim popisima.*
 5. *Radi osiguranja pune građanske i političke ravnopravnosti i djelotvorne zaštite građanskih i etničkih prava Srba u Hrvatskoj, Hrvatska je spremna prihvatiti osnivanje posebnog međunarodnog tijela za nadzor, te posebnog Suda za prava čovjeka, kojem će se moći obratiti svaki građanin nakon iscrpljivanja redovnog pravnog puta. Kotarevi Knin i Glina moći će se, radi zaštite*

posebnih prava, obratiti Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske ustavnom tužbom, ako smatraju da su povrijeđene slobode i prava čovjeka ili prava etničke zajednice na njihovu području.

6. Radi stvaranja punog povjerenja Hrvatska je spremna predložiti primjenu posebnog međunarodnog nadzora misije KESS-a za posredovanje između manjinskog i većinskog stanovništva.
7. Republika Hrvatska pripravna je pristupiti pregovorima o političkom rješenju svih otvorenih problema osim onih koji bi dovodili u pitanje njezin teritorijalni integritet i suverenitet

II. Prijedlog za okončanje rata i uspostavu mira u Bosni i Hercegovini

U sudbinskom trenutku kad se čini da nema izlaza iz tragičnog slijeda događanja u Bosni i Hercegovini i kad nije vjerojatno da bi orijentacija na sazivanje novih dugotrajnih međunarodnih konferencija donijela ploda, predlažem da međunarodni čimbenici obnove rad Ženevske konferencije, na dosada postignutim sporazumima o ustavnom uređenju Bosne i Hercegovine kao Unije republika.

Da bi obnovljena Konferencija bila što djelotvornija, predlažem da uz supredsjedatelje Upravljačkog odbora sudjeluju u daljnjem radu predstavnici onih država koje mogu najdjelotvornije utjecati na rješenje krize u BiH i na području bivše Jugoslavije: Francuske, Njemačke, Ruske federacije, Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Turske i Velike Britanije.

1. *Novi saziv Ženevske mirovne konferencije trebao bi sve tri strane u sukobu privoljeti, pod prijetnjom sankcija, da u roku od 14 dana:*
 - 1.1. *Potpisu sporazum o bezuvjetnom prekidu neprijateljstava i svih oružanih akcija bez odgađanja, a ako to ne učine da se od Vijeća sigurnosti UN zatraži donošenje rezolucije kojom se taj prekid nalaže pod prijetnjom oružane prisile;*
 - 1.2. *Potpisu deklaraciju o prihvatanju Ustavnog sporazuma o Uniji republika Bosne i Hercegovine i sporazuma koji su mu dodani.*
2. *Predlažem da se sporna pitanja razgraničenja između republika Unije BiH riješe u bilateralnim pregovorima, a ako se ne postigne sporazum da se konačna odluka povjeri posebnom (arbitražnom) tijelu koje će odrediti supredsjedatelji Upravljačkog odbora i ostali sudionici Konferencije.*

3. *Predlažem da se sve sukobljene strane obvežu da će bez odlaganja:*
 - 3.1. *Osigurati, i jamčiti slobodan i nesmetan prolaz humanitarne pomoći svim stranama, na svim područjima gdje je to potrebno;*
 - 3.2. *Odmah pristupiti razmjeni svih zatočenika i raspustiti sve zatočeničke centre, te da snose punu odgovornost za postupak sa zatočenicima prema pravilima međunarodnog humanitarnog prava;*
 - 3.3. *Omogućiti međunarodni nadzor i slobodno kretanje predstavnicima međunarodnih organizacija koje će nadzirati provedbu gore navedenih mjera.*
4. *Provedba mirovnog plana može se osigurati upotrebom snaga NATO (u ulozi koju je do sada imao UNPROFOR), s ovlaštenjem upotrebe sile, uključujući zračne udare, prema svima koji prekrše prekid neprijateljstava, ili budu onemogućavali dostavljanje humanitarne pomoći i međunarodni nadzor nad provedbom postignutih sporazuma.*

III. Prijedlog mjera za trajno učvršćenje mira

Da bi se trajno održao i učvrstio jednom postignuti mir, predlažem da sve države s područja bivše Jugoslavije, u okviru Mirovne konferencije i pod pokroviteljstvom Glavnog tajnika i Vijeća sigurnosti UN:

1. *Potpisu svečanu deklaraciju o međusobnom priznanju samostalnosti i suverenosti svih novonastalih država, u njihovim međunarodno priznatim granicama;*
2. *Da u roku od 3 mjeseca potpišu sporazum o sukcesiji prava i obveza svih država nasljednica bivše Jugoslavije na osnovi odluka Arbitražne komisije;*
3. *Da pristupe pregovorima o zaključenju, u okviru europskih integracijskih procesa, ugovora između sebe i s ostalim europskim državama, o uređenju i promicanju gospodarskih i prometnih veza i trgovine i drugih pitanja od interesa za odnose između suverenih i neovisnih država koje žele dobre susjedske odnose, a također od interesa za stabilnost međunarodnog poretka u ovom dijelu svijeta;*
4. *Da se u okviru konferencije potpiše svečana deklaracija o poštivanju prava nacionalnih manjina i etničkih zajednica, prema međunarodnim standardima i konvencijama, uz uspostavu međunarodne kontrole primjene tih sporazuma;*

5. *Da odmah počnu pregovori o zaključenju sporazuma o regionalnoj sigurnosti zemalja s područja bivše Jugoslavije, u okviru općeg sustava ograničenja konvencionalnog naoružanja unutar KESS-a;*
6. *Smatram da sankcije Vijeća sigurnosti UN koje su donesene u odnosu na određene države s područja bivše Jugoslavije, trebaju ostati na snazi sve dok se ne ostvare svi rezultati predloženog mirovnog procesa. Čim mirovni plan bude ostvaren, sankcije bi rebalo bez odlaganja ukinuti.*

Pozivam sve međunarodne čimbenike da razmotre ove moje prijedloge i da poduzmu odlučne mjere za zaustavljanje sukoba i sve potrebne korake koji će donijeti mir i stvoriti pretpostavke za stvaranje stabilnog međunarodnog poretka u ovom području na dobrobit svih država u ovom dijelu Europe i svijeta.

Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske



Dr. Franjo Tuđman

U Zagrebu, 1. studenog 1993.

PEACE INITIATIVE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
DR. FRANJO TUĐMAN

Deeply concerned by the impasse at the Geneva Conference on the former Yugoslavia, and by the failure of all other attempts made to stop the war and military conflicts in the area of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I consider it my statesman's duty to suggest to the international community, in particular to all the relevant global factors, a peace initiative which would stop the war and all the associated horrors, and open up the path to peace and understanding, and to a resolution of political and economic problems in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

I. Proposal for the Implementation of the Peace Plan in United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia

In order to achieve the speediest implementation of Security Council Resolution 871 (and all other resolutions referred to in this Resolution), the Republic of Croatia proposes as follows:

1. The Croatian Government is prepared to conclude within 15 days an agreement on the cessation of all hostilities with the representatives of the local Serbs, guaranteeing their local and cultural autonomy.

2. To this end we propose at the same time the renewal of the work of the Joint Commissions in order to resolve all issues enumerated in the Vance Plan, and the implementation of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 871, with the participation of the representatives of UNPROFOR and of the European Community.

3. We propose the immediate normalization of overall social and economic life in the UNPAS through the following:

3.1. The immediate opening of all road and rail communications throughout the Republic of Croatia, and particularly along the routes Zagreb-Knin-Split, Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Županja, Novska-Okučani-Pakrac-Daruvar, Sisak-Glina-Bosanski Novi, Osijek-Beli Manastir-Hungarian border, Osijek-Vukovar, Osijek-Vinkovci-Ilok, etc.;

3.2. The opening of the Adriatic Oil Pipeline and the repair and beginning of regular operation of facilities for oil transport, and power and water supply, throughout Croatia;

3.3. The immediate return, without further delay, of all displaced persons to their homes under the supervision and

with the efficient assistance of UNPROFOR and the authorities of the Republic of Croatia;

3.4. The initiation of all steps necessary for the restoration of normal life in the UNPAs, including the reopening of all communications, the supply of goods to the entire population, i.e., including the Serbian population (without any discrimination) in the forthcoming winter period, the reinstatement of welfare and medical care, normal operation of schools, supply of electric power and other energy sources, the payment of pensions, the employment of all civil servants, and the integration of all other activities into the overall economic and legal system of the Republic of Croatia;

3.5. The preparation of plans and the initiation of steps to achieve the equitable integration of the UNPAs into the economic reconstruction of Croatia.

4. For the sake of the political settlement of the conflict and normalization of overall social life Croatia is prepared, within the scope of its constitutional and legal order, to ensure in the UNPAs the implementation of its regulations, as well as of international conventions concerning the rights and freedoms of the Serbian ethnic community. To this end the following steps will be undertaken:

4.1. The provision of full local autonomy (self-government), within the framework of the Constitutional Law, in the Districts of Knin and Glina in which the Serbs account for the majority;

4.2. The assurance of the right to cultural autonomy of the Serbian ethnic community throughout Croatia, and especially the right to education in their language and script in accordance with special curricula, and the bilingual writing of toponyms in areas in which they are in the majority;

4.3. The scheduling of elections for local - district and municipal - self-governmental authorities under international supervision;

4.4. The establishment of special police administrations in the Districts of Knin and Glina, whereby the national composition of the police force should match the ethnic composition of the population according to the latest censuses.

5. In order to provide for full civil and political equality, and efficient safeguarding of the civil and ethnic rights of the Serbs in Croatia, Croatia is prepared to accept the establishment of a special international supervisory body, and of a special Human Rights Court, to which each citizen may apply after having exhausted the regular legal course. In order to safeguard their special rights, the Districts of Knin and Glina will be able to bring a constitutional action to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia should they

consider that human rights and liberties, or the rights of the ethnic community, have been violated in their areas.

6. In order to create full confidence, Croatia is prepared to propose the use of a special international CSCE supervisory mission for mediation between the minority and the majority population.

7. The Republic of Croatia is prepared to negotiate the political settlement of all outstanding issues except those that may affect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

II. Proposal for the Cessation of War and Establishment of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In this fateful moment when there appears to be no escape from the tragic sequence of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when the orientation to the convening of new, time-consuming international conferences is not likely to produce results, I propose that international factors revive the work of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the thus far achieved agreements concerning the constitutional arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Union of Republics.

In order to make such a revived Conference as efficient as possible, I suggest the participation, along with the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY, of representatives of States which may have the most effective influence on the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the former Yugoslavia, i.e.: France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

1. Thus convened anew, the Geneva Peace Conference should prevail upon all the three parties in conflict, under threat of sanctions and within 14 days, to:

1.1. sign an agreement on the immediate cessation of hostilities and all military actions, should they fail to do so, the U.N. Security Council should be requested to pass a resolution ordering such cessation under the threat of armed enforcement,

1.2. sign a declaration on the acceptance of the Constitutional Arrangement and the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the annexed agreements.

2. I propose that the controversial issues of delimitation between the Republics of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina be resolved through bilateral negotiations and, if no agreement can be reached, to entrust the final decision to a special (arbitration) body to be nominated by the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY and other Conference participants.

3. I propose that all the parties in conflict should undertake to immediately:

3.1. assure and guarantee free and unhindered passage of humanitarian aid to all parties in all areas where it is required;

3.2. exchange all detainees and disband all detention centres, and bear full responsibility for their treatment of detainees in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law;

3.3. permit international supervision and freedom of movement to representatives of international agencies who will supervise the implementation of these steps.

4. The peace plan can be implemented by using NATO forces (in the role thus far played by UNPROFOR), with the authority to use force, air strikes included, against all those who violate the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or frustrate the delivery of humanitarian aid and international supervision of the implementation of the achieved agreements.

III. Proposed Steps for the Permanent Consolidation of Peace

If the peace, once achieved, is to be sustained permanently and consolidated, I propose that all the states in the area of the former Yugoslavia should proceed - within the framework of the Peace Conference and under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General and Security Council - as follows:

1. sign a solemn declaration on the reciprocal recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all newly emerged states within their internationally recognized borders;

2. sign within 3 months an agreement on the succession to rights and obligations of all successor states of the former Yugoslavia pursuant to the decision of the Arbitration Commission;

3. start negotiating, within the scope of European integration processes, treaties between themselves and with other European states concerning the regulation and promotion of economic and traffic links and trade, and other matters of interest for relations among sovereign and independent states wishing to establish good neighbourly relations, and also of interest for the stability of the international order in this part of the world;

4. sign, within the framework of the Conference, a solemn declaration on the observance of the rights of national minorities and ethnic communities in accordance with international standards and conventions, with internationally controlled implementation of such an agreement;

5. immediately begin negotiating an agreement on the regional security of countries in the area of the former

Yugoslavia within the scope of the general CSCE conventional armaments limitation system;

6. I believe that the U.N. Security Council sanctions enforced in respect to certain states in the area of the former Yugoslavia should remain in force until all the results of the proposed peace process are achieved. As soon as the peace plan is achieved, the sanctions ought to be lifted forthwith.

I urge all international factors to consider these proposals and to take resolute measures to bring a halt to the conflict, and all steps required to bring peace and create the prerequisites for the establishment of a stable international order in the area, for the benefit of all the states in this part of Europe and in the world.

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

DR. FRANJO TUDMAN

Zagreb, November 1, 1993

010/12

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONSUNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

93 OCT 30 17:25

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CODE RESTRICTED

OUTGOING

Page 1 of 4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM : ^{For} STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

DATE : 30 OCTOBER 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 1373

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL

CZ N-1370

CZ G-1236

f. Anyas

... Attached for your attention please find self-explanatory letter to the President of the Security Council from the "Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RSK".

UNPROFOR, JAH
Palais des Nations

93 OCT 30 18:06

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DISTRIBUTION:	
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COMMUNICATIONS

ENDALL

993-10-30 18:27

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UNPROFOR ZAGREB

016

30-OCT-1993 18:22

UNPROFOR BELGRADE

30 11 1993 18:22

P.01

FROM : REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

PHONE No. : 38 011 324 573

OCT 30 1993 1:39 PM P03



РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА КРАЈИНА

The Republic of Serbian Krajina

Министарство за иностране послове

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

KINJ. KRALJA PETRA I OBLONODTOCA 27

TEL: 011-235-16-72

0780-60-126 / 078-719-023

FAX: 078-719-023

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

OFFICE IN BELGRADE

TERAZIJE No 3/1

TEL (011) 3221-3251 3226-778; 3227-346

FAX: (011) 3224-573

YUGOSLAVIA

Off.No.2117-99

CODE RESTRICTED

30 OCTOBER 1993

HIS EXCELLENCY
RONALDO MOTA SARDENBERG
PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL
NEW YORK

Your Excellency,

I would like to draw your attention to communication No.S\26588 which the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations transmitted to your Office on 15 October 1993, regarding the activities of "Serbian insurgents" on the territory of Croatia.

My Ministry is having difficulty in ascertaining the identity of these so-called "insurgents" of Serbian nationality in Croatia, since UNPROFOR situation reports make no mention of them.

If, however, Ambassador Mario Nobilo is thinking of the Serbian people of Krajina, whose ancestors are recorded by Byzantine sources of the early Middle Ages as being solely resident where their descendants are now, then he is very much mistaken, since a constituent ethnic group cannot exert an act of aggression against ones own land.

I presume that the Croatian representative to the UN was thinking more in the terms of the servicemen of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, who are indeed very much present on the territories of the RSK, doing their utmost in preventing another act of Croatian aggression. The memories of the Medak genocide of 09 September 1993 are still fresh, not to mention the earnest comments of General Jean Cot, exclaimed upon his inspection of the desolated villages which incurred Croatian interpretation of international law (no doubt General Franjo

1993-10-30 18:27
30-OCT-1993 15:23

6035473

UNPROFOR RELIEFIVE

UNPROFOR ZAGREB

016

From : MIP REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA

PHONE No. : 38 011 324 573

Oct. 30 1993 1:40PM P04

BEZ 417

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Z-1373

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Off.No.2117\98

Tudjman got somewhat carried away last September, apparently longing for the aims and methodology of the 1941 - 1945 period, when the German - Croatian - Muslim alliance massacred 1.250.000 Serbs - old habits have difficulty in fading away).

It is strange that Ambassador Nobile should speculate on the identity of the Serbs coming into the Republic of Serbian Krajina, openly concluding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was acting contrary to the relevant Security Council resolutions, and supposedly endangering the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the non-existent Socialist Republic of Croatia, which implemented an act of secession from the Yugoslav federation in 1991.

Your Excellency,

You must certainly by now be familiar with the Report (No.S\25777) which the Secretary General of the United Nations, HE Boutros Boutros Ghali submitted before the Security Council on 15 May 1993, by which he stated that 251.000 Serbs were expelled by the authorities of Croatia. The actual number is more than 300.000, not including the hundreds of thousands resident and employed in Western Europe and the overseas countries prior to the 1991 act of Croatian secession.

Yes, it is certainly true that after the Medak massacre and genocide the Parliament of the Republic of Serbian Krajina declared a general mobilization, calling on its citizens resident abroad to return and defend the sovereignty of their country. This call is indeed being answered, not least by the very people expelled by General Tudjman in 1991/1992 and confirmed by the United Nations. It is therefore totally absurd to involve the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the workings of both the Army and Parliament of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, both of whom fully respect the Vance Plan and its stipulation that a political solution of the Croatian - Krajina conflict will not be prejudged. Unfortunately, the Croatian aggressions of 22 January 1993 and 09 September 1993 against the RSK and the UNPROFOR contingents maintaining the peace are not only negating the Vance Plan, but exceeding all bounds of tolerance by a people being forced to mourn the loss of hundreds of their compatriots slain since the arrival of UN

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peace keeping contingents.

In such circumstances, with Croatia still refusing to withdraw from territories occupied on 22 January 1993, as stipulated by Security Council resolutions 802 (1993) and 847 (1993), with military provocations on a daily scale, sustained by a continuous general mobilization, one can hardly expect the Army and Parliament of the RSK to do anything other than take adequate steps in protecting their state.

I would like to reiterate once more that in the former Croatia the Serbian people had the status of a constituent ethnic group, and not that of a national minority. This status was a logical result of the 1945 incorporation of Krajina into Croatia. The fact that the present Croatian - Krajina conflict is not going to be politically prejudged by the UN contingents is in its self a logical stipulation of the Vance Plan, which has directly confirmed the aforementioned facts, providing for a political and territorial separation of the two ethnic communities.

I avail my self of confirming my highest esteem



Yours sincerely,

Slobodan Jarevcic
Slobodan Jarevcic
Minister of Foreign Affairs

cc.

HE Boutros B. Ghali
Secretary General
New York

General Jean Cot
UNPROFOR Commander
Zagreb

OFFICE OF THE SRSG

Page 1 of 8

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG	DATE/TIME: 25 OCT 93
TO: SRSG, GENEVA	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: BRIG WILSON	FILE REF. NO.: <i>[Signature]</i> DRAFTER : Maj J Harja SO to MA/SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 871	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	

MESSAGE:

SIR,


1. ATTACHED PLEASE FIND A COPY OF THE INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM OF THE FC'S OFFICE OF THIS DATE ABOUT THE ABOVE MENTIONED SUBJECT FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

DISTRIBUTION:	
ACTION	INFO
Jwl	WS

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : SRSG
HCA
DFC
COS

FROM : MA/FC



DATE : 25 OCTOBER 1993

SUBJECT : IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 871

PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE FC'S LETTERS TO MR SARINIC, GENERAL NOVAKOVIC AND THE ANSWER OF MR SARINIC CONCERNING THE ABOVE SUBJECT.



General JEAN COT
Force Commander UNPROFOR

Mr Hrvoje Sarinic
National Security Officer
Zagreb

Gen. Denis SARINIC

21 October 1993

You will wish to be aware that I have today issued to my Sector Commanders a directive for short term measures to implement Security Council Resolution 871 which was adopted by the Security Council on 4 October. A report on progress made in the implementation is due on 30 November.

Before informing you of the measures I am initiating there are 4 underlying points I must make, which without your full co-operation we will be unable to achieve any progress. What I earnestly ask of you are:

1. To cancel any military plans for offensive action you may have in mind.
2. To initiate immediately a comprehensive cease fire plan throughout Croatia.
3. To give firm instructions to allow UNPROFOR total freedom of movement throughout Croatia especially in the area of the lines of confrontation.
4. To order the cessation of the unhelpful media campaign against UNPROFOR.

I am totally committed to the return of peace and normality in Croatia and my initiatives are aimed at creating the peaceful environment in which a political solution can be reached. To achieve this I intend:

1. To revive the Joint Commission
2. To negotiate the cessation of hostilities with the military commanders of the warring factions at all levels and interpose UNPROFOR troops, establishing OPs as necessary.
3. To ensure, with your co-operation, that UNPROFOR has freedom of movement to achieve their peaceful aims.



General JEAN COT
Force Commander UNPROFOR

General Mile Novakovic
Commander
Knin

23 October 1993

Dear General.

You will wish to be aware that I have today issued to my Sector Commanders a directive for short term measures to implement Security Council Resolution 871 which was adopted by the Security Council on 4 October. A report on progress made in the implementation is due on 30 November.

Before informing you of the measures I am initiating there are 4 underlying points I must make, which without your full co-operation we will be unable to achieve any progress. What I earnestly ask of you are:

1. To cancel any military plans for offensive action you may have in mind.
2. To initiate immediately a comprehensive cease fire plan.
3. To give firm instructions to allow UNPROFOR total freedom of movement throughout UNPAs especially in the area of the lines of confrontation.
4. To develop the MIRANJE Check Point into a full crossing.
5. To establish a logistic crossing point at MALJKUVO with a view to converting it to full crossing status in due course.

I am totally committed to the return of peace and normality in Croatia and my initiatives are aimed at creating the peaceful environment in which a political solution can be reached. To achieve this I intend:


1. To support the work of the Joint Commission
2. To negotiate the cessation of hostilities with the military commanders of the warring factions at all levels and interpose UNPROFOR troops, establishing OPs as necessary.

3. To ensure, with your co-operation, that UNPROFOR has freedom of movement to achieve their peaceful aims.
4. To seek to provide the return of normal economic life by facilitating the re-opening of the oil pipeline, main highways, railway lines, opening all crossing points at one end of the scale, down to negotiations for farmers to plant their fields and collect their late harvest at the other end.
5. To establish hot telephone lines to immediately contact both sides if hostilities should break out.
6. To initiate a pro-active public information campaign to make sure all press, radio and TV coverage is accurately and fairly reported without bias.

I have to end in making 3 final major points to you:

1. We are totally committed to supporting your efforts to achieve peace. We can not make peace for you.
2. Fundamental to the success of the peace process will be your guaranteeing us freedom of movement. Without it we will fail.
3. You have everything to gain from continuing with your total cooperation with UNPROFOR.

Sincerely yours

A long, sweeping handwritten signature in dark ink, starting from the left and ending with a large, stylized flourish on the right.

Jean Cot
General
Force Commander
UNPROFOR

Zagreb, 23th October 1993

GENERAL J. COT
FORCE COMMANDER UNPROFOR

Cher Général Cot,

Following our meeting of October 21st 1993 and Your letter dated the same day, I feel free to inform You of the following, referring to the paragraphs of Your letter:

Concerning 1. and 2., I repeatedly assure you, General, that Croatia is making efforts to resolve the issue of the so-called Krajinas and Pink Zones peacefully and in the spirit of, as well as following the stipulations of the UN Security Council Resolution 871., and the other Resolutions predecesing that one which concern the same problem.

Therefore, Croatia is not planning any offensive actions and is trying not to respond to the incessant provocations of the Serbs of the "Krajinas". Croatia is also counting with the UNPROFOR presence in the UNPA zones, which can and should control and prevent military activities of the Serb units in the so-called Krajinas.

Concerning 3., the UNPROFOR troops, military equipment, convoys carrying equipment, etc., already have a high degree of freedom of movement on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. It is the UNPROFOR's duty to report all their movement and submit themselves to the control of the Croatian authorities when required. Croatia will continue doing all in her power to facilitate to the UNPROFOR the realization of its mission. As far as I know the initial problems have been resolved and the situation is mostly satisfactory.

As regards 4. - in order for the relations between the Republic of Croatia and the UNPROFOR to be at a satisfactory level, that, of course, depends on both sides. Croatia is not sparing efforts, and will continue along the same lines, to make these relations as good as possible. I also think that our joint appearance before the TV audiences on October 21st 1993 has contributed to the creation of the climate of confidence between the two factors working at the same task.

As regards the rest of Your letter dated October 21st 1993, please General, note our positions:

- article 7 of the UN Security Council Resolution 871 stipulates as the foremost priority the reestablishing of the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the "Pink zones". In that regard Croatia welcomes the renewed work of the joint commissions and in that respect we await Your concrete suggestions.

From our part, we propose that the UNPROFOR immediately render possible the traffic and put into operation the roads and railway lines and use them in the first stage for their own purposes (until the normalization of relations).

For such an UNPROFOR action Croatia is prepared to offer any kind of necessary assistance.

I trust, general, that we shall, by this kind of specific action which is in harmony with Your mission, start the still "machinery" and succeed in our mutual endeavours.

We find all other suggestions contained in Your letter of October 21st 1993, acceptable for the Republic of Croatia and in that sense please count with our most efficient cooperation.


I inform You, General, that we agree with Your suggestion that You personally establish dialogue with the military commanders of the Corps Areas of the Croatian Army, and I hereby list their names, ranks and Corps Areas they are in charge of:

- Brigadier Pavao Miljavac, Commander of the Corps Area Karlovac
- Brigadier Ante Gotovina, Commander of the Corps Area Split
- Brigadier Veselko Gabričević, Commander of the Corps Area Gospić
- Major General Petar Stipetić, Commander of the Corps Area Zagreb
- Major General Đuro Dečak, Commander of the Corps Area Osijek
- Brigadier Josip Tomšić, Commander of the Corps Area Bjelovar

Major General Petar Stipetić who is in charge of the military issues in the Commission for Relations with UNPROFOR of the Republic of Croatia has been authorized to establish the necessary contacts between the UNPROFOR and the above listed officers of the Croatian Army.

I remain, Dear General, respectfully Yours,

Bien à vous



Hrvoje Šarinić
Head of the Commission for
Relations with UNPROFOR

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MOST IMMEDIATE

Palais des Nations

CZG= 1210

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 OCT 24 10:02 MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, SRSG, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, SRSG, ZAGREB

INFO: SECTORS SOUTH, NORTH, EAST, and WEST (BY CRYPTO FAX)

FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 24 OCT 93

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z- 1346

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GENERAL M. NOVAKOVIC IN TOPUSCO
23 OCTOBER

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION INF

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1. As per my request, I met with General NOVAKOVIC to discuss implementation of Resolution 871. He was accompanied by Admiral RAKIC, the recently appointed Minister of Defense. General Pellnas was with me.

2. As I did with Mr. SARINIC, I presented my views on implementation of Resolution 871. I explained that my aim was to implement the "small steps" approach at the local level in order to create the conditions for a cease-fire, to be negotiated under the auspices of ICFY. These conditions will subsequently facilitate implementation of the cease-fire. I gave General NOVAKOVIC a letter outlining my goal in terms similar to those used in the letter to Mr. SARINIC.

3. General NOVAKOVIC replied with a few comments on Resolution 871, stating that it was favorable to the Croats but that that was not new. He then explained at length what in his opinion was possible within the framework of the small steps approach, with which he agrees completely. He said that the first step was to establish buffer zones, starting with non-contested areas. In his opinion, a great deal could be achieved through such local arrangements by December 5th.

4. In response to my question on the revival of the Joint Commission, he said that this was certainly possible, but that the answer would be given after the meeting of the Defense Committee, scheduled for Thursday October 26. This process, he added, was not tied to the meeting of the Assembly. His concrete proposal was to meet on Wednesday October 27, in order to follow up with military meetings in the different sectors by next week.

5. I seized this opportunity to raise the problem of the village of PODLAPAC and of the recent confiscation of equipment by Serb authorities. General NOVAKOVIC replied that he understood how much this sort of attitude by the local authorities did a disservice to the Serb's reputation. He said that the rights of minorities are essential and that he would help to resolve the problem.

6. The meeting then broke into a smaller group, and General PELLNAS asked on behalf of Ambassador VOLLEBAECK what the Serb position was concerning a meeting to discuss the cease-fire. The reply was that due to the political situation in the KRAJINA, nothing was to be expected before November 15th.

Seen 24/10
V.D.

COMMUNICATIONS

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UNUG Telecomm. Unit

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'93 OCT 22 -9 108 MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, SRSG, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, SRSG, ZAGREB

FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 22 OCTOBER 93

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z- 1340

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR. SARINIC ON OCTOBER 21 1993

DISTRIBUTION:

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S.C.

1. As per my request, I met with Mr. SARINIC for one hour to discuss implementation of Resolution 871.

2. I gave Mr. SARINIC a letter in which I set out my views on implementation of Resolution 871. UNPROFOR's work precedes that of ICFY on the overall cease-fire. It is up to UNPROFOR to create the conditions on the ground which will make it possible to reduce tensions and initiate dialogue. Furthermore these conditions will subsequently facilitate implementation of the cease-fire. The parties' support of UNPROFOR is essential to achieve these objectives, and I requested the Croatian side to facilitate freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, the opening of new crossing points, the access of UNMOs outside of the UNPAs and generally speaking contacts with local commanders.

3. Mr. SARINIC responded that he fully agreed with this approach, which is aimed at improving liaison and contacts between UNPROFOR and the Croatian side. He asked for more specifics and indicated that General STIPETIC was probably the most appropriate point of contact for UNPROFOR in this regard.

4. I consequently replied that I would request that a meeting be held with General STIPETIC to give him the list of items requiring action by his staff. I furthermore stressed that my goal was to restore the balance in UNPROFOR's contacts with both parties by increasing contacts with the Croatian side, given that contacts with the Serb side are necessarily more numerous as a result of geographical proximity in the UNPAs.

5. On the issue of negotiations on the cease-fire, Mr. SARINIC stressed that the problem would be finding Serbian interlocutors in the current state of confusion in the Krajina. He said that the Croatian side is ready to start negotiating and in addition is already at work on an autonomous status for the regions of Knin and Glina. The problem of Western Slavonia and Baranja is different, he added.

6. In closing, Mr. SARINIC noted that Serbian television was making flattering comments about me daily, to which I responded that I hoped to achieve the same with the Croats and that this was part of the improved relations which would necessitate his assistance to achieve.

CODE RESTRICTED

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1343MEMORANDUM

To: Charles Kirudja, CAC SN

From: Mark Baskin, CvAO, Petrinja Substation



22 October 1993

Subject: The HDZ Convention and the Prospects for a Settlement

1. The official Croatian mass media have confidently declared that the Second HDZ Congress on 15-16 October was a major victory for President Tudjman and the party center and that the "movement is successfully transforming into a modern party" with a Christian-Democratic orientation. It adopted a new program and its leading bodies appear balanced between the party's three wings -- "nationalist," "technocratic," and "Christian-Democratic." Nonetheless, it appears as if the Congress was a major victory for the party's nationalist right wing and for the second generation of HDZ *apparatchiki*. The outcome of the congress could well complicate efforts of UNPROFOR and ICFY to find a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans. ICFY and UNPROFOR might consider a range of positive and negative incentives to appeal to those party leaders with a stake in the international community.

2. The Congress wore a decidedly populist and anti-intellectual tone and provided little place for the party's "political moderates." President Tudjman's frontal attacks on 6 prominent, liberal intellectuals as "pharisees" for publishing a letter calling for his resignation opened the congress to ritualistic "intellectual-bashing" throughout the proceedings. With this attack, HDZ attempted to identify its own partisan interests with those of the Croatian nation while it demonized opponents as enemies of the state. By contrast, nationalist and populist leaders, such as Branimir Glavaš, enjoyed great popular appeal at the congress.

3. President Tudjman prevented the congress from becoming a complete rout by the nationalist right with a successful "centrist" coup. First, Glavaš overwhelmingly carried

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the entire congress for his radical initiative to deny voting rights to non-elected members of the presidency -- members by virtue of government position who currently happen to fall in the party's "moderate" wing. Tudjman then openly appealed to the floor of the congress and reminded the party faithful that the eyes of the world were on them. He submitted his own list of candidates for the highest offices and partisans of the "right" and "left" withdrew their candidacies from the presidency and the vice-presidency. The only candidate on Tudjman's list who lost was Hrvoj Šarinić, now Chairman of the Croatian government committee for relations with UNPROFOR and a former (weak) prime minister. The composition of the leading bodies of the party (see para 5) is seemingly well-balanced between the various wings of the party.

4. HDZ adopted a "Christian Democratic" program that would link the "most exemplary spirit of the Croatian nation" to the tradition in modern West European Christian Democracy. To the leaders of HDZ, "Europe" is a symbol of all that is modern and good. Similarly, they view "Christian-Democracy" as an international conservative tradition that provides an antidote to 45 years of official Marxism and international communism. However, appearances may be deceiving: if HDZ has not yet been accepted by the European Christian Democratic Union, "Europe" still does not represent a practical policy option -- such as membership in the EEC -- in the near term. Worse, this Christian-Democratic program seems to hide a project that is based on fiscal austerity, political authoritarianism, a commitment to "Greater Croatia" in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the "liberation of occupied territory" in AVNOJ Croatia.

5. Who won?

Presidency These individuals have not received much previous, broad public exposure and are not well-known to ICFY and UNPROFOR. With the exception of Vrdoljak, they are "second generation" *apparatchiki* who are geographically balanced throughout the republic. They have little foreign policy or international experience. This is a populist presidency of "organization men."

4/20
1343PRESIDENCYVOTES

Duro Decak - 1000	From Viroviticko-Podravska Zupanija; arrested in 1991 over the Špegelj affair in smuggling weapons.
Duro Broadarec - 787	From Sisak. Zupan in Sisačko-Moslavacko zupanije; former chief of police in Sisak.
Antun Vrdoljak - 707	From Imotski. Former director of partisan films; director of HTV;
Hrvoje Hitrec - 685	From Zagreb. Loose cannon who made speech at the convention attacking Tudjman's authoritarian tendencies in HDZ. Defeated Šarinić in the voting.
Ivić Pašalić - 674	From Hercegovina. Past President of HDZ's Executive Council. Considered a moderate, Christian Democrat.

Vice-Presidents

The members of the newly expanded vice-presidency all have important posts in the government, and have already acquired popular constituencies and well-known track records as policy makers. These potential successors to Tudjman's throne should play important roles in their particular areas of expertise and can appeal to public directly.

VICE-PRESIDENTSVOTES

Mate Granić - 1151	From the coast. Foreign Minister whose genuine popularity emerges from high-profile success. Christian Democrat.
Gojko Šušak - 1120	From Hercegovina. Hard-line Minister of Defense linked to emigre capital and financing of army.
Franjo Gregurić - 1097	Successful socialist businessman; Prime Minister of coalition government during the first phase of the war; current head of INA and a leading technocrat; most popular member of the party leadership in Globus poll.

5/20
1393VOTES

Marijan Šunjić - 785 Rector of the University; Natural Scientist with international contacts and active in the propaganda war.

Nikica Valentić -- 697 Prime Minister. Lawyer in real estate during old regime. Head of INA before becoming PM. Leading Technocrat.

General Secretary The "Stalin" of HDZ, the man in charge of organizational matters.

Jure Radić - 974 From the island of Makarska. Chief of Staff to Tudjman. Centrist. One of the leading Christian democrats.

7. The Convention was clearly a victory for President Tudjman. He controlled its tempo and was able to put his people into the party leadership -- to the chagrin the first-generation players on both sides of the party. Over the past 4 years, he has eliminated all possible opposition, among HDZ's co-founders, to his leadership within the official Croatian nationalism. In his overwhelming public authority and official personality cult, President Tudjman has become the "Croatian Tito." At the congress he played on his own mass appeal to use the Slavonian-Hercegovinian nationalist right to eliminate the "partisan" left and strengthen the "Christian Democratic center" of the party composed of the second generation *apparatchiki*. In the short run, he seems to retain full control over the party -- since his chief of staff has become HDZ's general secretary. The longer-term dynamics of competition will be interesting.

8. The first generation of "partisan moderates" -- Mesić, Degoricija, Manolić and Boljkovac -- suffered a major defeat at the congress. Founding members Mesić and Manolić have ignominiously become non-voting members of the party presidency (akin to candidate members of the politburo). In any case, it would be difficult to place them in the new Christian-Democratic context. For now, they will continue to serve in the government, but since they lack strong support within HDZ, they will have difficulty in advancing a coherent "moderate" program that might include a peace settlement. They will increasingly become "men of the past" who serve as window dressing.

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1347

9. The "technocrats" who won -- Gregurić and Valentić -- have made the Faustian deal to make the economy safe for nationalism. Gregurić is a genuinely popular wartime prime minister. Valentić is testing his career on a set of economic reforms that smell much like Yugoslav Prime Minister Marković's failed reforms in 1990. And the prospects for the success of these reforms are dimmer than they were in 1990. The "technocrats" may seek an alliance with their generational cohorts in the "Christian Democratic" wing of the party based on a genuine search for a solution to the current conflict and inclusion into the western world community.

10. The "Christian Democrats" are relatively young and unknown to the public. They are the first group in the second generation of the party leadership. By virtue of their age and position within the party, these individuals may bear watching over the long run. In the leadership, they are represented by Granić, Radić, Pašalić and, possibly, Šunjić. A trip to Croatia by the pope would clearly strengthen them. Unfortunately, this group may not necessarily prove to be "moderate." Any number of circumstances might drive them from a pragmatic alliance with the "technocrats" into one with the "nationalists."

11. This convention was a big short-term victory for the Right. While the nationalist right did not dominate the party leadership, only President Tudjman had the public authority to limit their gains with the crowd at a party congress. Also, they retain control of a number of regional governments and important ministries, such as Defense. They are clearly in a position to manipulate public opinion and to control the process of decision making within HDZ and within much of the government's daily life. The second generation of nationalists, such as Drago Krpina, are young and ambitious.

12. In this analysis, the HDZ convention should provide little comfort to UNPROFOR and ICFY. Ironically, the convention's winners are sufficiently nationalist and "hard" to cut deals that would lead to a settlement of differences in the UNPAs and in Bosnia without suffering the charge of treason among the party faithful. For the same reason, unfortunately, these groups do not show much interest in serious negotiations. The Slavonians will bargain hard to re-gain all of Slavonia, while the Hercegovinians will control the government's moves over a settlement in Bosnia "in order to protect Croatia's

7/10
1343

back in Dalmatia." So, for the moment, internal political dynamics within HDZ do not favor settlement.

13. As in the past, ICFY and UNPROFOR can expect moderate offers by the Croatian government to be accompanied by deep, provocative subtexts -- against Serbs and against the international community -- which should reinforce Serbian fears of Croatian perfidy. Nationalism remains the one deeply unifying theme both within the HDZ and within the Croatian body politic writ large. The HDZ convention should reinforce the Croatian tendency to seek paper victories in the absence of fertile ground in the UNPAs.

14. Wars do not end by ceasefires alone. A broader solution to the war in the former Yugoslavia should be based on incentives that could convince the new Croatian leadership that the international community is serious about exerting negative and positive incentives.

a. Call the Croatian bluff. Devise a plan to withdraw the mission: publicly search for a new HQ in Hungary or Italy while floating the idea of leaving in diplomatic circles. Investigate the possibility of lifting sanctions on Serbia if possible. Take the Croats directly to task for their Bosnian adventure by action in the Security Council. Begin to build a case against the Croats in public and in the corridors of the UN.

b. Play on the Croatian leadership's desire to "join Europe." Offer incentives to the "Christian Democrats" and the "technocrats" with investment credits, trade deals, memberships and the like. Link these carrots to good behavior.

These incentives may well lay outside the current mandate and past s.o.p., but they may be necessary to convince the emerging HDZ leadership to come seriously to the table. The lesson seems clear.

NATIONS UNIES
HAUT COMMISSARIAT
POUR LES RÉFUGIÉS



UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES

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Téléphone : 739 81 11
Téléfax : 731 95 46

Case postale 2500
CH-1211 Genève 2 Dépôt

IMMEDIATE

TO(AGENCY): SRSB ICFY GENEVA
FOR: Mr THORVALD STOLTENBERG SO TO MA
GENERAL JEAN COT
FAX: 38-41-170155 917-0079

FROM: Wing Commander Mike Allport
UK Representative

FAX NO: (0041) (22) 739 8669/8752/8753
TEL NO: (0041) (22) 739 8663

DATE: 20 October 1993

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET: 2

SUBJECT: CROATIAN NAVAL GUNNERY ACTIVITY 20 - 22 OCTOBER 1993

Information was received this morning about a possible coastal gunnery exercise which was close to the standard departure route for aircraft departing Split Airport. I have attached the details as sent to us and have protected the source.

Under international law, authorities are required to issue a NOTICE TO AIRMEN (NOTAM) which advises both aircrew and air traffic authorities of an area that should be avoided.

As no NOTAM was issued, Split ATC would not agree to non-standard departure procedures and a French aircraft was directed to fly through a "known" danger area.

Please make immediate representations to the Croatian Government at this breach of international law.

DISTRIBUTION:
JW

NOTICE TO AIR CREWS DEPARTING FROM SPLIT

SUBJECT : CROATIAN NAVAL ACTIVITY

A CLOSURE AREA WILL BE IN EFFECT FROM 20th TO 22nd OF OCTOBER, DAY TIME, BOUNDED BY THE FOLLOWING POINTS :

4319.7N/01624.3E 4310.8N/01619.7E
4303.0N/01602.9E 4312.0N/01552.3E
4330.0N/01555.6E 4327.6N/01604.1E
AND 4323.2N/016.12.0E.

THIS AREA MAY BE USED FOR A COASTAL GUNNERY EXERCISE. THE U.S. (U.S.1 017, U.S.2 018, U.S.3 019) AND FRENCH PLANES (FR 101 AND CTM 8002) DEPARTING FROM SPLIT ARE TO REQUEST SPLIT TOWER TO CLIMB THEIR FINAL FLIGHT LEVEL ON A 150 SPL RADIAL TO AVOID ANY CONFLICT.

CAUTION : SPLIT TOWER AND ZAGREB ACC MAY BE NOT SUPPOSED TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT EFFECTIVE ACTIVITY.

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

P1/2
010/12

LZG=1183

IMMEDIATE

'93 OCT 17 12:44

TO : STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

FROM : GÖT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 17 OCTOBER 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 1314

SUBJECT : INCURSION INTO UNPA FROM FRY

IMMEDIATE

1. On 14 October, 1993, I lodged a formal protest with General Momcilo Pericic, Chief of General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, over an incident which occurred on the Batina Bridge (Sector EAST) on 9 October, 1993. I have enclosed a copy of that protest letter. Sixteen armed "Arkan Tigers" forced their way across the bridge from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and, in the process, assaulted UNPROFOR troops who were controlling the crossing point. As a result, three Belgian soldiers were injured and required medical attention. Had the BELBAT soldiers not displayed professional restraint, the incident could have escalated into a major confrontation involving the possible loss of life.
2. At this juncture, I need your maximum political backing and support in order to ensure the protection of my soldiers as they fulfil their tasks. I therefore request your intervention with the highest authorities in Belgrade so as to prevent any re-occurrence of this dangerous incident.

SRSG

INTERNAL: FC, HCA, DFC, COS

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'93 OCT 17 12:52

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations



General JEAN COT
Force Commander UNPROFOR

CZG=1183

P2/2

Zagreb, 12 October 1993

Dear General,

CONFIDENTIAL


INCIDENT AT BATINA BRIDGE ON SUNDAY 9 OCTOBER 1993

I wish to lodge a formal complaint in the strongest possible terms about a disgraceful incident which occurred at 1102 hours on the 9th of October when a party of 16 armed Serbian VIP guards forced their way across the BATINA Bridge from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in the process assaulted the Belgian soldiers controlling the crossing point. Three Belgian soldiers were injured in this vicious attack and required medical treatment.

It would appear that these soldiers were wearing black uniforms with black berets, were armed with AK 47 assault rifles and were escorting a VIP. You will be aware that UNPROFOR have a mandate under Security Council Resolution 769 of 7 August 1993 to prevent the movement of armed personnel from all warring factions into United Nations Protected Areas. The Belgian Battalion were acting totally within this mandate and would have been legally justified in opening fire to prevent this incursion. It is extremely fortunate that in this event this did not occur and there was no loss of life.

As the soldiers are presumably under your command and crossed the BATINA Bridge from your sovereign territory, I hold your authorities personally responsible and ask that those who perpetrated this attack are punished and that all necessary measures are taken to prevent a similar recurrence.

CONFIDENTIAL


Jean COT
General
Force Commander

Momcilo PERICIC
Colonel-General
Chief of General Staff
of the Army of Yugoslavia

22G-1177
22N-1312

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010/9 Rik

010/12

TO : STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB '93 OCT 15 15:08

MOST IMMEDIATE
MOST IMMEDIATE

INFO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW-YORK
HCA, DFC, BHC, COS

FROM : COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 15 OCTOBER 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-1308

SUBJECT: VISIT TO SECTOR NORTH & BIHAC POCKET

I visited Sector North and Bihac pocket in Bosnia 13 and 14 October 1993.

In Sector North, I met with the local military leaders and the discussion stalled on three major points which could be summarized by: there will be no cease-fire negotiations before the result of the Krajina parliament debate on SCR 871 scheduled for the 17 October, the Krajinian Commanders on site could negotiate with UNPROFOR only on points not related to the restoration of Croatian authorities in the UNPA's and there will not be any negotiations under any circumstances, regarding the demilitarisation of the Pink Zone.

In the Bihac pocket, I investigated the allegation of wrongdoing by FREBAT 3 in providing free transportation to local firms to secure humanitarian type of goods in the Bihac pocket. The subject has been covered by media and particularly I saw an article in the Los Angeles Times and the Christian Science Monitor. First of all you must know that over 60% of all goods delivered in the pocket have been transported by the military. In fact, FREBAT 3 has transported 10,000 tons of material and 1,000 tons of fuel into the pocket. From all the comments that I received (including UNHCR and Civil Affairs representatives in the pocket) this operation has played a major role in ensuring the survival of the local population and in stabilizing the military and political environment of the pocket. In order to ensure full transparency of this well recognised humanitarian operation, the local government established from the beginning, a commission to decide, for what and for who, transportation would be provided. That system, agreed upon by all parties ran smoothly without any objections until Mr. Abdic declared the autonomy of the pocket. In my view, this operation was then and still is essential for the economic survival of the pocket. The operation is now being used for petty political gain, regardless of the well being of the local population. During my meetings

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MOST IMMEDIATE

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UNPROFOR ZAGREB

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1993-10-15 15:30

with Mr. Drekovic and Mr. Abdic today, I made it quite clear that FREBAT was not a transportation agency, that I need total assurance that the goods transported by us are made available to everybody on an equal basis in the pocket and that the problem of distribution was theirs to solve; otherwise, FREBAT 3 would not be allowed to resume further delivery. Notwithstanding these comments to the local leaders, I must say that the goods made available through the transportation support established by FREBAT 3 are essential to the pocket. Given the above, this should be continued. Should it be decided to cancel this assistance, it should be borne in mind that such a decision would have a direct impact on the survival of the pocket, and the order should be given by an identifiable source ready to go public.

Z-1348

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UNITED NATIONS



Office of the
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
For the Former Yugoslavia

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

From: Tom Colborne-Malpas

To: Wegger Stroemmen

Date: 15 October 1993

Subj: Opstina Boundaries

Pages: 3 incl this sheet

- dist to WScary

Please find attached two map sheets depicting the opstina boundaries relevant to Sectors North and South.

The line shading represents the UNPAs. Dot shading represents Pink Zones. The thick Black line is meant to represent the confrontation line, however this is not accurate.

I should mention that the source is a publication from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, however it is a general map and the opstina boundaries should be fine for planning purposes.

This is all I could come up with at short notice. However if you let me know what type of outline maps might be necessary for planning purposes in the coming weeks I will will have a chat with Geo Branch and see what they can do.


Let me know if you need any other material.

Regards.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Tom'.

15/10 '93 15:46 38 41 176709 UNPROFOR-SKSG 002





UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 OCT 13 14:10

IMMEDIATE

C 2G-116

TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: OCT 13, 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-1296

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SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SARINIC, ZAGREB, 12 OCTOBER 1993

1. At his request, the FC met Mr Sarinic for an hour. Mr Sarinic led off by announcing that, as Chairman of the State Commission for Relations with UNPROFOR, he would henceforth be the only channel to the FC.

2. Mr Sarinic then made known his position. The tense relations between Croatia and UNPROFOR had to be forgotten and a fresh start, on a new basis, had to be made, now that a specific framework existed. That framework was Resolution 871, with a report due in two months' time. Since Croatia and UNPROFOR were in the same boat, there was no point in each defending its own position.

3. The FC stressed that if any two positions existed, they were those of the Serbs and the Croats, UNPROFOR being a witness responsible for helping them. While Resolution 871 was difficult, by stiffening, as it did, the Serbian position, it had to be implemented and Croatia's help will be required to do so.

4. Concerning the cease-fire, Mr Sarinic stressed that he left it up to UNPROFOR to define the technical criteria, but on the political side, while he was willing to conduct secret negotiations anywhere, he insisted on a signature in Croatia. He further added that he did not believe in the global approach advocated by Lord Owen, nor in the proliferation of initiatives (Italian, Hungarian, etc.). He felt that the Franco-German initiative held some interest, but had little chance of success.

5. Reverting to the problem of implementing Resolution 871, Mr Sarinic asked the FC what his plans and his schedule for implementation were. Responding, the FC stated that proposals would be submitted, but that the Croatian authorities would also have to facilitate UNPROFOR's work, by opening new crossing points and by granting true freedom of movement. A Note to this effect will be sent to the Croatian authorities.

6. In conclusion, Mr Sarinic asked UNPROFOR to denounce all culprits when incidents occurred. The FC pointed out that UNPROFOR was already doing so, but he said that further efforts would be made in this area.

Annex to Memo
dated 13 Oct 93

Outline for UNMOC

1. Concept. UNPROFOR (Croatia) will be disbanded and armed elements repatriated or deployed to BH Command. UNPROFOR HQ will be re-organized to reflect new command arrangements and retitled UNMFY HQ. Civilian Political and Administrative staff will be retained on a reduced scale reflecting the smaller force but will maintain a similar deployment pattern. UNMO and UNCIVPOL will be reinforced (numbers to be assessed but probably in the order of 500 and 300 respectively) and remain deployed in existing UNPA, Pink Zones and adjacent areas which are controlled by the Croatian Army. They will conduct mobile patrols within their areas of responsibility, report, mediate, facilitate, etc. Some of the existing UNPROFOR logistic component deployed in Croatia will need to be retained to support BH Command operations in Bosnia.

2. Mission. The mission for the United Nations Mission of Observers - Croatia (UNMOC) is to:

- a. Monitor and report on the security situation in areas of Croatia controlled by Serb forces and areas adjacent controlled by the Croatian Army.
- b. To assist the parties through mediation and provision of communications to reach and maintain agreements.
- c. Monitor and report on the humanitarian situation in its areas of responsibility and render assistance where possible.
- d. Assist the Co-Chairmen, ICFY, in their endeavours to mediate a political solution to the conflict in Croatia.

3. Command. UNMOC will be responsible to the SRSG, through the FC United Nations Mission in the Former Yugoslavia (UNMFY), who will also command UN forces deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM.

4. Composition. UNMOC will comprise:


- a. HQ UNMOC newly established;
- b. UNMO, reinforced, from the disbanded UNPROFOR-Croatia Command;
- c. UNCIVPOL, reinforced, as per sub-para 4.b.
- d. UN civilian Political and Administrative staff, tailored and reduced from the disbanded UNPROFOR.

- e. Logistic elements needed to care for former UNPROFOR equipments and to support other UNMFY Commands.

5. Precondition. It would be highly desirable to have in effect a ceasefire between the parties before implementing this change in mandate. It would enhance the security of UNMOC personnel, give pause to the conflict to allow negotiations to take place and provide an instrument on which to base the observing and reporting tasks.

6. Communications and Logistics. The communications and logistics systems in Croatia will be significantly scaled down and simplified. All personnel will be responsible for their own accommodation and rationing. Support will mainly be limited to the provision of transport, working accommodation, simple communications systems and a small range of supplies.

7. Organization. The UNMFY outline organisation will be:



010/12

CNZ 869 CYZ 743 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB ATTN: COT
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1993
NUMBER: 1909
SUBJECT: Letter from the Croatian Government on Demining

We have just received a copy of the attached letter which our demining expert is studying. In the meantime we would appreciate your comments, especially in relation to any possible implications for UNPROFOR.

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	J-PM
	JJD
	JW

93 OCT 12 -4 :20

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ 869 CYZ 743 P2/4

circ'd to all concerned




**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

201 East 42nd street; Suite 3108
New York, NY 10017 USA

Tel: (212) 986-1583
Fax: (212) 986-2011

*cc: Paddy Blyden
for committee
ST PS please
IT
11/X*



New York, 8 October 1993

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the
United Nations
NEW YORK

*cc: 56
only Sukhadol
cc: Severin/Bali
Goulding
Annam
CB/JCA/AS/-
JH*

Your Excellency,

The Republic of Croatia welcomes the initiative of the European Community, to include the topic "Assistance in mine clearance" as a new item on the agenda of the General Assembly. As a country which has been devastated by war, and which continues to experience rehabilitative barriers as a consequence of the prolongation of that war, the Republic of Croatia can verify that there exists a pressing need to establish a mine clearance program, the lack of which holds grave consequences. The efficient implementation of a mine clearance program is vital to the economic recovery of any country struck by war. It is also crucial to post war confidence building measures and particularly important to the return of refugees and displaced persons, which in the Republic of Croatia holds the highest priority in rehabilitation.

To date nearly 1,000 square km. or nearly 300,000 hectares of land on the Republic of Croatia have been mined with an estimate of 3,000,000 mines that vary in destructive potential and design. Nearly 1,400,000 grenades, cannon and mortar shells have been launched at the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Ten percent of these devices have not yet been detonated and cover a surface area of 1,000,000 hectares, stretching from Slavonia to the farthest corners of Dalmatia. Attempts to systematically clear mines and other explosive devices from the terrain, have thus far been fruitless.

In the war against Croatia, the Yugoslav army and Serbian insurgents have frequently used mine tampering and terrorist tactics which do not comply with any international military code thereby complicating the task of classic mine clearance. Practices include (a) strengthening the explosive dosage of TNT, (b) laying phosphorous beneath the mines, (c) shortening the length of the detonation wire on trip mines (d) mining objects of great importance. Such innovative practices hinder early detection and visibility of devices by specialized personnel and have proven to be exceptionally dangerous as well as fatal to civilians. This is why concerned international organizations, such as UNICEF, are working with the Croatian government on developing a campaign which is targeted at informing civilians of such dangers.

The Republic of Croatia is plagued by terrestrial complications due to the passage of two harvest cycles, leaving behind mass amounts of foliage and ground vegetation which hinder detection and can cause accidental detonation. These camouflaged mine fields pose a grave threat to civilians and specially trained field personnel.

Croatia's economic potential is directly hindered because of the existence of land mines. In the field of agriculture Croatia has an annual net loss of 230 million USD because of the great quantity of land that lies useless and paralyzed as a consequence of mines. The logging and tourism industries have also suffered an additional loss of 70 million USD. Such a financial burden has crippled Croatia's potential to independently care for all of its needs and has impaired the post-war recovery process.


After a series of studies, the Croatian Ministry for Reconstruction has compiled a study and a draft proposal of a program for mine clearance. To date, Croatia has independently been able to remove approximately 35,000 mines from its pacified territories. This represents only 1% of the total amount of mines which occupy its land. Funding for this project has been spared by a very limited government budget. In the report "Project: Elimination of Combat Means (mines, dud ordinances) in Croatia as a Precondition to Recover the Country", the Croatian Ministry of Reconstruction has estimated that the program necessary to de-mine the Republic of Croatia would take an estimated nine years and incur an expense of nearly 400 million USD.

The success of a campaign for Assistance in Mine Clearance in the Republic of Croatia hinges upon the international community and their willingness to forward financial, technical and staff support. The draft program for the Republic of Croatia requires a systematic approach for long term assistance, therefore financial aid from the international community is paramount to its execution and successful completion.

CNZ 869 CYZ 743 P4/4

I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 103 and 155 and as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Mario Nobilo
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

UNPROFOR

93 OCT -8 20:04 '93 OCT -8 19:34

CRYPTO CABLE

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Page 1 of 5

TO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
MAZOWIECKI, CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GENEVA

C2N-1280

C2G-1137

FROM : (fn) STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

DATE : 8 OCTOBER 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 1270

SUBJECT: MEDAK REPORT


Edwin Thompson

.... I attach four maps which might be added to the Medak Report.

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MA	JVB
	JW

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CODE RESTRICTED



09 SEP 93 MEDAC OPERATION

PRE OFFENSIVE CROATIAN FRONT LINE —————

POST OFFENSIVE CROATIAN FRONT LINE - - - - -

PRE OFFENSIVE SERBIAN FRONT LINE
 POST OFFENSIVE SERBIAN FRONT LINE - - - - -

UN FORCES

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MEDAC OPERATION DAY 1 15 SEP 93

SERBIAN FRONT LINE AS OF 152359B SEP 93

CROATIAN FRONT LINE AS OF 152359B SEP 93

UN FORCE LOCATIONS



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UN FORCE LOCATIONS

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
MEDAC OPERATION CONSOLIDATION

SERBIAN FRONT LINE AS OF 22 SEP 93 _____

CROATIAN FRONT LINE AS OF 22 SEP 93 _____

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ 859 CYZ 733 P1/1

010/12

216

'93 OCT -8 -5 :16

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB FOR COT

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 7 OCTOBER 1993

NUMBER: 1888

SUBJECT: Medium Term Strategy - Croatia

1993 OCT -7 P 9 53
OPERATIONS

We have examined with close attention and great interest Cot's Z-1235 containing "preliminary ideas" on the above subject. We would welcome continued reflection on the issues raised in this thoughtful cable.

Our own preliminary reaction would be to concur on the role of the media, on more effective monitoring of humanitarian aid, and on new "small steps" towards a cease-fire. We are somewhat more sceptical about the idea of patrolling along the confrontation line, which has always been sought in the past by the Serbs but equally consistently rejected by the Croats, who fear that such deployment would create new "frontiers" and freeze what they consider an unacceptable military situation. We would be interested to know whether this idea has been proposed to Croatian leaders by Cot, and whether the reaction this time has been any different.

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93 OCT -5 21:52
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TO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY GENEVA

FROM : *gn* STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB *Cedric Thornberry*

DATE : 5 October 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-1253-----

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT : Attached Report on the Medak Incursion

... 1. I attach copy of the report drawn up by Civil Affairs on behalf of the various components of UNPROFOR in respect of the incursion into the "Medak pocket" by the Croatian Army on and after 9 September last. It has been endorsed by Force Commander Cot, and Head of Civil Affairs Thornberry, and I have, myself, transmitted it to the Secretary-General.

2. As you will see, it describes a series of grave breaches of international law standards. I endorse the Report's recommendation that it be transmitted to the Human Rights' Commission Special Rapporteur, Mr. Mazowiecki, and to the Commission of Experts on War Crimes, for their consideration.

3. UNPROFOR is considering the issuance of a press statement on the matter tomorrow, 6 October.

4. CPIO Boyd will tomorrow travel to Geneva and will bring copies of all the annexes, which are too bulky for transmission by fax.

5. UNPROFOR can provide details of the senior command structure of the units responsible for the actions described in the report which, as you will see, appear to have been premeditated and planned.

6. Please bring this document to the attention of Mr. Mazowiecki and of the Commission of Experts.

ENDALL

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