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Trip file Atlanta

JH/acb  
26 May 1987

ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
(Atlanta, GA)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Airline &amp; Flt. Number</u>	<u>Equipmt</u>	<u>Stops</u>
Wed. 27 May	LV: New York (LAG) ARR: Atlanta (Hilton Hotel)	1559 1826	EA 571	DC9	0
Thur. 28 May	LV: Atlanta ARR: New York (LAG)	1655 1850	DL 94	L10	0

SGO  
Trip file  
Atlanta

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Subject: Carter Mediation Session Meeting

1. I have informed President Carter's office that it will not be possible because of your schedule to have the session on International Mediation in New York in September. I am now informed that Carter's schedule is free on 4, 5 and 6 November and between 4 and 8 January 1988. Your schedule as of now is free for these same dates but it might be best to aim for the November timing since the January date comes so closely after the new year.
2. Dale Powell from President Carter's staff will be in New York on 10 June to begin making arrangements for the forthcoming meeting. A tentative appointment has been made for her to meet with you at 3:30 p.m. that day. I understand she will have the report on the Atlanta meeting. If you agree to the November time-frame, these dates can be confirmed while she is here.
3. In addition to the date, the format of the next session will need to be agreed. The Carter office would welcome a format under which part of the meetings would be held at Headquarters and part elsewhere. Ms. Powell will be looking into possible near-by accommodations - such as the Rockefeller estate - while in New York. A dinner could be hosted by you for the other Secretaries-General and President Carter the night before the working sessions begin. The first working session could be held at Headquarters followed by lunch in the Delegates Dining Room. The meeting could then adjourn to a conference facility for the remainder of the sessions and meals. Aside from any dinner you might host, the Carter Center will cover all financial costs.

James S. Sutterlin  
8 June 1987



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

5 June 1987

Dear President Carter,


I would like to express my appreciation to you for the session held at the Carter Center last week on International Mediation. It was extremely valuable for me and I believe for all of those who had the privilege of participating. What emerged clearly was the need for understanding and strengthening the particular role that various elements - governmental, non-governmental, and multilateral - can play in the resolution of disputes. It is evident that impressive resources are available. The problem is to ensure their wise and timely application. I found the discussions especially rewarding on this point and I understand from Jim Sutterlin that the further session on Friday morning, when I unfortunately could not be present, provided additional insight drawn from particular conflicts.

The group which you had assembled was extraordinarily well qualified and I am glad to know that, perhaps with a somewhat flexible composition, it will remain in existence. I very much look forward to a meeting here at United Nations Headquarters and I hope that details can be worked out during the next week or so. I believe that Dayle Powell and Jim Sutterlin are already in touch for this purpose.

The Honourable  
Mr. Jimmy Carter  
The Carter Presidential Center  
Atlanta

It was a great pleasure for me to be with you and Mrs. Carter in the Carter Center which is a most impressive and beautiful establishment. I am especially grateful for your gracious hospitality and friendship. I hope you will convey to Mrs. Carter my sincere appreciation and my warm regards.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Javier Pérez de Cuéllar', with a stylized, cursive script.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

5 June 1987

Dear Mr. Secretary,

In your letter of 29 May 1987, you raised a number of questions of immediate and longer-range importance with regard to personnel policies followed in the United Nations. I am pleased to provide information on this subject, which I hope will be of use to you, including an indication of the considerations I must take into account in fulfilling my responsibilities under the Charter in the staffing of the Secretariat.

I would first address the recruitment freeze. You may recall that it was I who introduced the freeze in March of 1986 as an emergency measure. I felt compelled to do so because of the severe financial crisis with which the United Nations was confronted, the origins of which are familiar to you. Given the continuing uncertainty of the United Nations' financial situation, it has been necessary to continue the freeze in 1987 and I see no likelihood, under present circumstances, that it can be lifted in the near future. The freeze was intended as an economy measure and it has produced substantial savings without which I doubt that the solvency of the Organization could have been preserved. A recruitment freeze, however, is a blunt instrument which can quickly jeopardize the efficiency of the Secretariat and lead to distortions in the structure and composition foreseen for the Secretariat in the Charter and in resolutions of the General Assembly. I have sought to implement the freeze in such a way as to achieve the necessary

His Excellency  
Mr. George P. Shultz  
Secretary of State  
Washington

savings and at the same time to minimize such negative consequences. I would emphasize, in this connection, that the freeze was not intended in itself as a staff reduction measure. The reduction in staff was subsequently decided by the General Assembly on the basis of a recommendation of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts. This reduction will be accomplished by the end of 1989 as an important element in the administrative and financial reforms which are now under way.

Exceptions to the recruitment freeze have been largely limited to specialist posts with functions of an essential nature that could not be covered through redeployment within the existing staff. During the 12 months following the implementation of the freeze, 76 persons were recruited under contracts of more than one year for posts subject to geographic distribution. Of these, 29 were from Western Europe, 10 from North America and Canada, 12 from Asia, 8 from Africa, 8 from Eastern Europe, 5 from Latin America, and 4 from the Middle East. I will need to continue to exercise flexibility in order to preserve to the greatest extent possible the capacity of the staff to meet programme requirements and to ensure a distribution of posts according to age, rank, sex, and national origin as required by the General Assembly. The Secretariat has sought to look ahead to assess what the managerial effect of the continuing freeze will be including, for indicative purposes, the range of exceptions that may need to be made. Such calculations have been for planning purposes under circumstances of great uncertainty as to what funds will be available to meet expenditures during the remainder of the current year. Actual decisions on recruitment while the freeze lasts will be made, as they have been until now, only on a case by case basis. Exceptions will be limited to cases that I consider essential, having in mind the considerations I have described.

I would now turn to the questions of secondment of secretariat staff members, employment on the basis of fixed-term contracts, and the replacement of staff members in certain posts by persons of the same nationality. Secondment and fixed-term contracts are both practices of long-standing, dating from the League of Nations, that are followed throughout the United Nations system. Neither is limited to any one country or regional group, although only in the case of socialist countries, are almost all nationals

in professional posts serving in the Secretariat under fixed-term contracts on secondment from governments. This has been a subject of discussion and debate among Member States throughout the lifetime of the United Nations. While, as you note, a majority of the Group of 18 recommended that no more than 50 per cent of Secretariat employees from any one country serve under fixed-term contracts, no decision has ever been taken in the General Assembly against secondment or fixed-term contracts as such. A resolution (35/210) was adopted by the General Assembly in 1980 without an opposing vote reaffirming that no post should be considered the exclusive preserve of any Member State and requesting the Secretary-General "to ensure that this principle is applied faithfully in accordance with the principle of equitable geographic distribution". This same resolution requests the Secretary-General "to continue to permit replacement by candidates of the same nationality within a reasonable time-frame in respect of posts held by staff members on fixed-term contracts whenever this is necessary to ensure that the representation of Member States whose nationals serve primarily on fixed-term contracts is not adversely affected".

As Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations, I have to take account of the decisions and established practices of Member States relative to the employment of their nationals in the Secretariat, having in mind that the United Nations, by its nature, comprises Member States of widely differing administrative systems. The Secretary-General must, at the same time, be guided by the necessity of securing staff members of the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity with due regard paid to recruiting staff on as wide a geographic basis as possible as the Charter requires. For my part, I believe that the option of recruiting personnel on the basis of secondment is useful in order to provide the possibility of obtaining particularly qualified personnel for limited periods who would not otherwise be available to the United Nations. However, Member States and the Organization would be best served, in my opinion, if the practice were appropriately combined with service on permanent or longer term contracts for staff members of all nationalities. It goes without saying that all staff members, whatever their mode of employment, are subject to the provisions of Article 100 of the Charter and shall not seek or receive instructions



from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. I have made my views on these matters known as appropriate and will continue to do so.

Mr. Secretary, these questions of secondment and fixed-term contracts are significant for the United Nations and its staff and of legitimate concern to every Member State. They can, and no doubt will, continue to be considered in the deliberative inter-governmental bodies of the Organization. I hope that you will be able to bring a better understanding of the situation among those who have voiced concern in Washington. It would be extremely unfortunate if your efforts to ensure that the United States will be able to meet its financial commitments under the Charter should be prejudiced. This is a matter of major importance to the success of the reform process now under way in the Organization.

*yours sincerely*

*Javier Pérez de Cuéllar*

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

(Recd. from. 355 1-6-87)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. Daryl  
✓ 5/29

May 29, 1987.

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

In our conversation on May 6 you expressed a willingness to consult with us further before taking any steps to lift selectively the UN hiring freeze. I appreciate your willingness to do so and have asked Ambassador Walters to review these matters with you. There are several points that I would like to highlight by letter because of their importance to us.

First, concerning the on-going hiring freeze for professional categories subject to geographic distribution, we would be opposed to any premature lifting of the freeze. We also believe there should be only extremely limited exceptions made, and any exceptions should not permit relative advantages to any country or group of countries.

Secondly, as the UN moves ahead with the reform effort, we believe it also is imperative to review the "secondment" issue. The time has come to begin limiting the number of fixed-term Secretariat personnel on secondment from larger representation states, in line with the recommendations of the Group of 18 and in keeping with the concept of a genuine international civil service.

The freeze brings the fixed-term contract problem into the spotlight because of the long-standing practice of the Soviet Union and East Europeans of seconding virtually 100 percent of their nationals on short, fixed-term contracts, resulting in over 60 reassignments each year. This long-standing practice has resulted in the de facto control by these countries of large numbers of UN positions, as their nationals have been short-term contracts. This has created member-state "owned" positions, filled by individuals whose experience with, and basic allegiance to, the principles and processes of the United Nations is open to question. It is difficult to reconcile abuse of the fixed contract system like this with the principles of a genuinely independent international civil service.

His Excellency  
Javier Perez de Cuellar  
Secretary-General of the United Nations,

The recommendations of the vast majority of members in the G-18 Report calls for limiting fixed-term contracts to 50 percent of a member state's positions, and states that "no post should be considered the exclusive preserve of any state or group of states." The United States believes the concept behind these proposals is useful, at least as far as UN members with larger representation on the Secretariat are concerned. The present system, because of the frequent, large transfer costs to the UN for those on short fixed-term contracts, also creates a considerable fiscal burden for the organization. It is an appropriate time, therefore, as suggested by Resolution 41/213, to develop a program to implement these suggested reforms in hiring practices.

Finally, we believe that UN professional positions should be opened to all bidders. There should be no further automatic replacement by co-nationals of vacant positions. When it finally becomes possible to lift the hiring freeze, we believe it would be very damaging to the UN if the previous practice of automatic replacement were to be continued.

I would be most interested in your clarification of what, if any, exceptions you intend to make to the freeze, and how you believe the secondment abuse problem can appropriately be dealt with over the longer term. These are important issues, and we look forward to working closely with you to achieve a system which will best serve the objectives of the Charter, and build upon the success achieved in recent months in revitalizing the UN.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ George P. Shultz



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

5 June 1987

Dear Mr. Secretary,

In your letter of 29 May 1987, you raised a number of questions of immediate and longer-range importance with regard to personnel policies followed in the United Nations. I am pleased to provide information on this subject, which I hope will be of use to you, including an indication of the considerations I must take into account in fulfilling my responsibilities under the Charter in the staffing of the Secretariat.

I would first address the recruitment freeze. You may recall that it was I who introduced the freeze in March of 1986 as an emergency measure. I felt compelled to do so because of the severe financial crisis with which the United Nations was confronted, the origins of which are familiar to you. Given the continuing uncertainty of the United Nations' financial situation, it has been necessary to continue the freeze in 1987 and I see no likelihood, under present circumstances, that it can be lifted in the near future. The freeze was intended as an economy measure and it has produced substantial savings without which I doubt that the solvency of the Organization could have been preserved. A recruitment freeze, however, is a blunt instrument which can quickly jeopardize the efficiency of the Secretariat and lead to distortions in the structure and composition foreseen for the Secretariat in the Charter and in resolutions of the General Assembly. I have sought to implement the freeze in such a way as to achieve the necessary

His Excellency  
Mr. George P. Shultz  
Secretary of State  
Washington

JH/acb  
26 May 1987

ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
(Atlanta, GA)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Airline &amp; Flt. Number</u>	<u>Equipmt</u>	<u>Stops</u>
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Thur. 28 May	LV: Atlanta ARR: New York (LAG)	1655 1850	DL 94	L10	0

International Mediation Working Session  
May 28 - 29, 1987  
Tentative Agenda

*Dinner by Pres. & Mrs. Carter*

Wednesday, May 27 - ~~Participants Arrive at the Hotel~~

Thursday, May 28

8:45 am	Shuttle Departs for The Carter Center
9:00 - 9:30 am	Continental Breakfast (Lobby Adjacent to Seminar Room - Pavilion A)
9:30 am	Convene at The Carter Presidential Center (Seminar Room - Pavilion A)
9:30 - 12:00 pm	International Mediation: What has Worked? What has Not? ...What Might?
12:00 - 1:30 pm	Lunch - (Lobby Adjacent to Pavilion A or Executive Dining Room)
1:30 pm	Developing the Field of International Mediation: What are the Obstacles? What Might be the Ingredients of Success?
4:00 pm	Adjourn
4: <sup>55</sup> <del>25</del> pm	<del>Shuttle to Hotel</del> <i>Leave for NY</i>
<del>6:45 pm</del>	<del>Shuttle to Center</del>
<del>7:00 - 9:00 pm</del>	<del>Working Dinner</del> <del>Carter Presidential Center Executive Conference Room - Presidential Pavilion</del>

Sir,

In the event that your 5 p.m. visitor raises the subject of your attendance at the symposium he is organizing at the end of May, I have spoken to Gianni about the scheduling of a meeting with President Evren of Turkey on Fri. 29 May and Gianni informs me that it was his understanding that a meeting would take place before the luncheon which you will host - say, at around 12.00 noon.

I have asked John to see what the availability of return flights from Atlanta is for both Thurs. 28 May in the evening and for Fri. 29 May in the morning and I attach the possible itineraries.

If you decide not to stay for the working dinner on Thurs. evening, you could catch a return flight leaving Atlanta at 1745 hours as the meeting will adjourn at 4.00 p.m.

If you wish to remain in Atlanta for the dinner on Thurs. evening, you have two flights to choose from on Friday morning, although the one arriving at 11.18 a.m. may be cutting it rather fine for you to meet with President Evren at 12.00 noon.

In any case, it would appear that you will miss the morning session on Fri. 29 May.

Françoise  
1 April

I am also attaching the letter regarding the symposium in case you need it.

Regarding invitation from President Jimmy Carter for the SG to attend a symposium entitled "An International Mediation of Conflicts" at the Carter Presidential Center in Atlanta, Georgia, on Thurs. 28 and Fri. 29 May:

↓  
DAY PRES. OF  
TURKEY WILL BE  
IN NEW YORK.

Contact nos. Faye Dill  
President Carter's Personal  
Secretary  
(404) 331-3900

(away from Sun. 15/3)

To call after Ms. Dayle Powell *Hilton Hotel*  
Sun. 15/3 (404) 522-8900 *659-2000*

(this lady is helping Pres.  
Carter organize the event)

*Tues. Wed Th.*  
*26 & 27 & 28*

Françoise  
12 March

4.45 p.m.



Telephone conversation between the Secretary-General and President Jimmy Carter on Thursday, 12 March 1987 at 3.15 p.m.

President Carter informed the Secretary-General that he is currently working, through the Carter Presidential Center in Atlanta, with experts at Harvard and other universities on the theory of conflict resolution. He then extended an invitation to the Secretary-General to meet in private session with a small group of eminent persons who have held public office (including Willi Brandt and Pierre Trudeau) and academics, to try to help resolve the disputes which have caused so much bloodshed in the world. The dates proposed by President Carter for this symposium entitled "An International Mediation of Conflicts" were 21 and 22 May.

The Secretary-General thanked President Carter for the invitation saying he would be delighted to attend this symposium but added that he would be out of the country on an official visit to China at that time. The Secretary-General went on to say that he would be available to join this group during the week of 25 May.

President Carter said he would try to change the dates to accommodate the Secretary-General and that he would be back in touch in due course.

\* \* \*

Note: President Carter's office was subsequently in touch with me to offer the dates of Thursday, 28 and Friday, 29 May. His secretary confirmed that the symposium would take place at the Carter Presidential Center in Atlanta, Georgia.

Françoise Letellier  
12 March 1987

THE  
CARTER CENTER  
OF EMORY UNIVERSITY



Sy  
RECEIVED  
MAR 13 1987  
Jm

March 13, 1987



To Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar

I would like to invite you to join me May 28 - 29, 1987, at The Carter Center for a small working session on international mediation. The workshop is a collaborative effort by the Carter Center of Emory University and the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.

Our purpose is to reflect on our experiences in mediating international conflicts and to draw lessons as to the obstacles facing development of the field and the options to advance the field.

On my part, the impetus comes from my experience in the Middle East peace process and our commitment to international conflict resolution at The Carter Center.

At the Program on Negotiation a group of faculty have been meeting regularly to study cases of success and failure in international mediation and to discuss proposals for the establishment of an international mediation service.

Attached is a tentative agenda and a list of the invited participants.

I sincerely hope you will be able to join me in this working session.

Sincerely,

*Jimmy Carter*

Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar  
Office of the Secretary General  
United Nations  
New York, New York 10017

*We're delighted  
that you'll be  
with us!*

International Mediation Working Session  
May 28 - 29, 1987  
Participant List

- (1) Jimmy Carter  
39th President of the United States
- (2) Pierre Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada
- (3) Willy Brandt  
Chancellor of West Germany
- (4) Javier Perez de Cuellar  
Secretary General of the United Nations
- (5) Tommy T. B. Koh  
Singapore United Nations Ambassador
- (6) David Hamburg  
Carnegie Foundation
- (7) Roger Heyns  
Hewlett Foundation
- (8) Ruth Salinger  
The Greely Foundation
- (9) Warren Salinger  
The Greely Foundation
- (10) Earl Foell  
Christian Science Monitor
- (11) Brian Urquhart  
Ford Foundation
- (12) Leopold Senghor  
President of Senegal

- (13) Joao Clemente Baena Soares  
Secretary General of the Organization  
of American States
- (14) Julius K. Nyerere  
President of Tanzania
- (15) Shridath Ramphal  
Secretary General of the British Commonwealth
- (16) Harold H. Saunders  
Ambassador
- (17) Lord Carrington  
Secretary General of NATO
- (18) Sol M. Linowitz  
Ambassador
- (19) Louis B. Sohn  
Woodruff Professor of International Law  
University of Georgia
- (20) Jack P. Etheridge  
Judge  
The Law School, Emory University
- (21) Larry Suskind  
Associate Director  
Harvard Program on Negotiation
- (22) Cynthia Sampson  
Harvard Program on Negotiation
- (23) William Ury  
Associate Director  
Harvard Program on Negotiation
- (24) William J. Spencer  
Interaction Associates
- (25) Dayle E. Powell  
Associate Director, Fellow for Conflict Resolution  
The Carter Center of Emory University

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Subject: Mediation Session at the Carter Center

1. You are scheduled to participate in an International Mediation Working Session at the Carter Center of Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, on 27 and 28 May. You will depart from La Guardia via Eastern Airlines at 3:59 p.m. on the 27th, arriving in Atlanta at 6:26 p.m. You will return the next afternoon, leaving Atlanta at 4:55 p.m. and arriving at La Guardia at 6:50 p.m. Mr. Goulding is also participating in the meeting and will be travelling on the same flights as will I. You will stay at the Hilton Hotel in Atlanta along with the other participants in the meeting.

2. On Wednesday evening, 27 May, President and Mrs. Carter have invited you, the OAS Secretary-General, and the Commonwealth Secretary-General to dinner at the Carter Presidential Center. There will be no other guests. Wives, other than Mrs. Carter, are not expected to attend. The Carter Center will have a limousine at the airport to take you directly to the dinner. The dinner was scheduled for 6:30 p.m. but the Carters are aware that your plane arrives only at 6:26 p.m. and dinner arrangements are taking that into account. The working sessions will begin at 9:30 a.m. on 28 May. The agenda is attached together with the list of participants. Since you will be leaving after the afternoon session on Thursday, the agenda is being modified to ensure that the discussion of the "next steps" in international mediation will take place while you are still present.


3. The working sessions are to be quite informal. Participants include a) international practitioners, b) resource invitees, and c) the process team which is headed by Professor William Ury, Associate Director of the Harvard Program on Negotiation. Professor Ury and the other Process Team Members will introduce the subject of each working session. President Carter will preside and invite the comments of the participants. Participants are not expected to make formal presentations. The discussion will be completely off-the-record although a rapporteur will take notes for an eventual report on the meeting.

4. A paper on strengthening international mediation (copy attached) is intended to provide the focus of the meeting. It was drafted by Professor Ury who gave you a copy when he and other team members visited you at Headquarters. The paper covers familiar ground, stressing the importance of "third parties" in mediating disputes and of moving early to head off conflicts. The possibility of establishing some form of international mediation service is broached but it is acknowledged that formal mechanisms established in the OAS, for example, have not been used. (The experience in the United Nations has been the same.) The paper recommends that emerging and existent conflict situations be monitored and that advantage be taken of the information, analysis, and suggestions available from a standing "network" of practitioners and theorists.

5. You will be able to emphasize the importance which you attribute to early preventive diplomacy and to obtaining the best information and analysis possible for this purpose. It would be useful, in this connection, to mention the Office for Research and the Collection of Information which you have just established. The Office is intended to perform many of the functions suggested in Professor Ury's paper. In addition to collecting and processing information on possible conflict situations from wide public sources for the purpose of early warning, it will establish and maintain contact with universities and research institutes in order to bring together for the use of the Secretary-General the theories, knowledge, analyses, and suggestions available from these sources.

6. You may wish to refer to the ever-present danger of regional disputes or nuclear incidents escalating to involve the major nuclear powers. You might suggest the desirability of devoting study to the establishment of multilateral instrumentalities within the United Nations framework to reduce this risk such as the nuclear alert centre which you proposed in your last Annual Report and the multilateral war-risk reduction centre that Gorbachev suggested in supporting your proposal. The prospectus of a possible conference that would bring practitioners and theorists together on this general subject is attached for your background information (funding has not yet been obtained).

7. President Carter can be expected to concentrate on the Middle East - from where he recently returned - and on the Camp David experience. He favours an international conference convened on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. He sees the conference as a necessary umbrella for negotiations between Jordan and Israel (with Palestinian participation) and Syria and Israel. He believes that an agreement on the West Bank and Gaza could emerge which would be quite similar to the solution foreseen in the Camp David Accords. The participants in the session will place much value on hearing your assessment of Middle East negotiation possibilities as well as an account of the techniques you have pursued in efforts to resolve the Afghan situation, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the Falklands/Malvinas war. On the last-named, you could mention that you sought to assist the mediation efforts of Secretary Haig as long as they continued while preparing to assume the responsibility should this be required. Professor Ury specifically recommends this approach in the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 7 of his paper.

  
James S. Sutterlin  
26 May 1987

**Final Agenda**  
**International Mediation Working Session**  
**May 28-29, 1987**

Wednesday,  
May 27

Participants Arrive at the  
Hilton Hotel, 225 Courtland  
Street, N.E., Atlanta,  
Georgia, 30043,  
404/659-2000, Telex 80-4370

Thursday,  
May 28

8:45

AM

Shuttle Departs for The  
Carter Presidential Center,  
One Copenhill, Atlanta,  
Georgia, 30307,  
404/331-3900, 404/522-8900

9:00

AM

Arrive Executive Offices in  
Pavilion C - The Carter  
Presidential Center

**NOTE:** Please pick up your  
identification badges as  
you enter Pavilion C.  
These must be worn at all  
times.

9:00 - 9:30

AM

Continental Breakfast -  
Lobby Adjacent to Zaban  
Room - Pavilion A

9:00 - 9:10

AM

Briefing for Resource  
Invitees - Zaban Room -  
Pavilion A

9:30 - 9:40

AM

Welcome, President Carter

9:40

AM

Remarks, Dayle E. Powell

9:45

AM

Remarks, William Ury

9:50

AM

Remarks, William Spencer

9:55

AM

Introductions

10:20

AM

**WORKING SESSION I**  
International Mediation  
Present Opportunities:  
What has worked?  
What has not?  
What might?

12:00 - 1:30	PM	Lunch - Lobby Area Adjacent to Zaban Room
1:30	PM	Brief Review of Morning Session
		Brief Review of Afternoon Agenda
		WORKING SESSION II Developing the Field of International Mediation: What are the obstacles? What might be the ingredients of success?
4:00	PM	Adjourn
4:15	PM	Shuttle Departs for the Hilton Hotel
6:15	PM	Shuttle Departs for The Carter Presidential Center
8:30	PM	Tour of Museum
7:00	PM	Cocktails - Library Terrace
7:30	PM	Dinner Under the Stars (Weather Permitting)
9:00	PM	Adjourn
9:15	PM	Shuttle Departs for the Hilton Hotel
<u>8:15</u>	AM	Shuttle Departs for The Carter Presidential Center*
8:30	AM	Continental Breakfast - Lobby Adjacent to Zaban Room - Pavilion A
9:00	AM	Convene - Zaban Room
		WORKING SESSION III Advancing the Field of International Mediation: What are the next steps we can take?

Friday,  
May 29



Page 3

12:00	PM	Lunch - Executive Dining Room
1:30	PM	Adjourn
<u>2:00</u>	PM	Shuttle Departs for Airport

\*Participants should check out before leaving the Hilton and bring their baggage to The Carter Presidential Center.

4/29/87

International Mediation Working Session  
May 28 - 29, 1987  
Participant List

International Practitioners

- (1) Jimmy Carter  
39th President of the United States
- (2) Javier Perez de Cuellar  
Secretary General of the United Nations
- (3) Marrack Goulding  
Under Secretary General for Special Political  
Affairs  
United Nations Headquarters
- (4) Brian Urquhart  
The Ford Foundation
- (5) Joao Clemente Baena Soares  
Secretary General of the Organization  
of American States
- (6) Shridath Ramphal  
Secretary General of the British Commonwealth
- (7) Harold H. Saunders  
Ambassador
- (8) Sol M. Linowitz  
Ambassador

Resource Invitees

- (9) David Hamburg  
Carnegie Foundation
- (10) Ruth Salinger  
The Greely Foundation
- (11) Warren Salinger  
The Greely Foundation
- (12) Earl Foell  
Christian Science Monitor

- (13) Harry Belevan McBride  
Minister  
Aide to Joao Clemente Baena Soares
- (14) Robert Pastor  
Fellow and Director for the Latin American Programs  
The Carter Center of Emory University
- (15) Jack P. Etheridge  
Judge  
The Law School, Emory University
- (16) Larry Suskind  
Associate Director  
Harvard Program on Negotiation
- (17) Cynthia Sampson  
Harvard Program on Negotiation

Process Team

- (18) William Ury  
Associate Director  
Harvard Program on Negotiation
- (19) William J. Spencer  
Interaction Associates
- (20) Dayle E. Powell  
Associate Director, Fellow for Conflict Resolution  
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### STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

The world is torn by political conflicts that threaten to spill over into civil strife and war or have already done so. Some of these conflicts are potential breeding grounds for a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union that could imperil the world. The task of international conflict resolution has never been so urgent.

A few instances of success -- or partial success -- in the peace process have occurred in recent years. One thinks of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, of the transfer of power in Zimbabwe, and of the settlement of the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and Argentina. In all of these instances, third parties -- mediators -- were actively involved. This is no coincidence. Mediators can be enormously useful in aiding nations and groups in conflict to communicate accurately, to explore potential common ground, and to save face before their constituencies -- just to cite a few valuable roles.

Yet mediation and other forms of third party assistance take place mostly on an ad hoc basis. While certain justly celebrated examples have captured the imaginations of the public and of scholars, the question arises as to whether the world community is making full use of this important method for dealing with conflicts. Many opportunities to advance the peace process

may as yet lie unrealized.

Following are six recurrent opportunities:

1. Starting without being asked.

Often, third parties will wait to engage themselves until they receive a formal invitation from the parties in conflict. Yet this invitation typically comes very late if at all. There are many good reasons why the parties do not seek the involvement of a third party: It may not look good to some domestic constituency, it may be taken as a sign of weakness, it may seem unlikely to help.

On the other hand, there is a great deal a third party can do on its own initiative without ever wearing the formal hat of "mediator". It can talk with the parties in an effort to understand their perceptions -- and to share these perceptions with the other sides. It can map out the interests of each party and areas of possible agreement and disagreement. It can float trial balloons in the form of "What would be wrong with this idea?" And this is just the beginning.

2. Catching conflicts before they heat up.

Oftentimes, the international community focuses on a conflict only when it is in its most advanced stages and on the verge of hostilities. While the threat of war may make the parties more willing to consider negotiating, by this time the conflict may be more bitter and intractable.

A valuable opportunity lies in identifying and working on an emerging conflict long before it escalates. In the words of William Shakespeare, "a little fire is quickly trodden out, which, being suffered, rivers cannot quench". Even in those cases where it takes a crisis or war to render the parties willing to negotiate in earnest, it can be invaluable for a third party to have done the necessary groundwork in advance.

3. Getting parties to the table.

Negotiation among parties in conflict is not likely to succeed -- and indeed may not even begin -- without an effective "pre-negotiation" process. The parties need to develop a sufficiently common perception of the problem that talks can proceed. In addition, they need to develop the modicum of trust necessary to assume the risks of negotiating. They need to come to appreciate the benefits of negotiating and the costs of the alternative courses of action.

A significant opportunity for third parties lies in encouraging and engaging in this often slow, lengthy, and painstaking pre-negotiation work. Governmental third parties often lack the time, interest, or political staying power to persist in this work. Nongovernmental third parties can perhaps make their most useful contributions at this stage.

4. Trying out innovative mediation techniques.

New techniques, processes, and resources may lie untapped.

Currently, there is a whirl of activity in the field of conflict resolution. Many innovative procedures and techniques are being developed and tried out. -- often with success. Instances which come readily to mind are the summit mediation at Camp David; the use of the "single negotiating text" procedure at the Law of the Sea negotiations (as well as at Camp David); and the use of computer modelling to help resolve a critical dispute again in the Law of the Sea talks. Other techniques much discussed in the academic literature include GRIT (engaging in a step-by-step process of independent reciprocated initiatives intended to reduce tensions and to build confidence) and unofficial problem--solving workshops.

A genuine opportunity exists in learning from these successes -- as well as from the failures -- in order to adapt them for possible use in other international conflicts.

##### 5. Coordinating third party efforts.

Although in any particular instance, the third party may have many of the critical ingredients necessary for success, it may lack one or more of them. Those ingredients may include:

- a) legitimacy in the eyes of the parties
- b) skill in the process of mediation
- c) leverage
- d) knowledge in the history and specifics of the conflict
- e) financial resources to carry on
- f) time and staff

g) flexibility to change roles and structure

A third party may, for instance, have the legitimacy and leverage, but not the process skills or the time to follow up.

A significant opportunity lies in coordinating, for any given conflict, the various existing third party efforts -- governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental -- so that they build on each other's strengths and compensate for each other's weaknesses. Nongovernmental parties may make their most useful contribution in the pre-mediation phase whereas governmental or intergovernmental parties may be necessary to carry out the actual mediation.

A parallel opportunity exists in connecting existing efforts with needed resources such as funds, staff, experts in the substance of the dispute and in the process of mediation so as to provide all the ingredients necessary for success. One might even think of building a "mediation team", whose different members would bring to it the perceived legitimacy, the mediation process skills, the substantive knowledge about the conflict in its various dimensions -- political, economic, and cultural -- as well as the other resources that would enable a long-term effective third party effort to be carried on.

#### 6. Following up after a mediator has left.

Often, even when a mediation effort does take place, it is short-lived. Those with the stature that gives them entree usually do not have the time or inclination to invest years



in patiently pursuing the peace process. If and when an agreement is reached, the international spotlight quickly moves on to another conflict and there is often little follow-up. The result is slippage or at least the loss of an opportunity to move forward.

An opportunity exists to take advantage of the momentum generated by a mediation effort or a mediated agreement. A third party may follow up with an attempt to monitor compliance with the agreement or by trying to take the agreement -- or lack of agreement -- to the next stage in the peace process.

The theme that runs through all of these opportunities is to take the international mediation that now goes on ad hoc and to begin to render it systematic. It would appear that it is now no one's job to systematically improve and extend the practice of international mediation. In an ideal world, these six recurrent opportunities or tasks would be performed by constituted governments and intergovernmental organizations. In reality, this does not always prove possible. The question then becomes: if and when this happens, how is the gap to be filled?

#### An international mediation service?

Struck by the need to extend and improve the practice of international mediation, statesmen and scholars have put forward proposals to create an international mediation service, either global or regional in scope. This idea was implicit in parts of

the charter of the United Nations as well as in many other international conventions and treaties.

All of these proposals remain largely on paper, yet to be realized. Numerous obstacles have blocked their progress. Most of these obstacles stem from two common features of the proposals: the notion that such a service ought to be a formal, usually intergovernmental, institution and the notion that the service itself ought to mediate.

Numerous attempts have been made to formalize a mediation function within, for example, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, or as a mechanism for dispute resolution in treaties and international accords. Experience has shown that formal mechanisms have not often been used. In the case of the OAS, for instance, a successful ad hoc approach, once formalized, promptly fell into disuse.

The proposal that a neutral service could mediate has encountered much skepticism from experienced political leaders and diplomats. They have asked: What standing would such a service have to be accepted by the nations and groups in conflict? Without clout or significant financial resources, could such an institution be effective in inducing the parties to come to the table and ultimately to come to agreement?

#### An informal approach

Without deciding on the merits and feasibility of a formal service to mediate international disputes, one is left wondering

whether a different tack might be tried to strengthen and extend the practice of international mediation. That tack is to take an informal approach and to seek not to mediate actual conflicts but to support and supplement those existing actors who currently are engaged in mediation and those emerging actors who might be so engaged in the future. Rather than create a new organization in potential competition with existing ones, one might start with what already exists and build from there.

One might begin with an informal support network among those interested and engaged in international mediation. Possible functions range from the more easily doable to the more ambitious. A menu of possible models, none of them exclusive of the others, follows:

*These are all functions  
foreseen for the new  
Office for Research and  
the Collection of Information*

#### #1. Sounding-board

Practitioners and theorists might gather together occasionally at the behest of one of the members to examine in confidence some conflict in which that member is engaged as a third party or considering such an effort. The purpose would be to learn from other experiences so as to offer advice to an actively involved third party.

#### #2. Interchange of practical knowledge

Small conferences might be held in which practitioners and theorists could share useful lessons and techniques. The network could thus promote the accumulation of knowledge about what has

worked and what hasn't in hopes that successes could be replicated and failures avoided. The practice of international mediation could thus be improved.

### #3. Spotlight

With the aid of its staff, the members of the network could monitor existing and emerging conflicts worldwide, scanning for opportunities to catch a conflict before it heats up, encourage pre-negotiation work, or do critical follow-up work after a mediation mission has ended. More ambitiously, the staff could keep track of efforts being made to assist in a given conflict and could identify gaps in coverage, such as needs for information, funds, leverage, or new process techniques.

Through small invited conferences, among other means, the attention of potential third party actors and of those who could provide the necessary resources could be drawn to critical opportunities. Some members might feel impelled to act together to highlight a particular opportunity by, for instance, writing an op-ed article together or making a joint appeal, private or public, to particular governments in a position to move the peace process forward.

### #4. Clearinghouse

A small network staff could identify sources of information -- papers, books, people and organizations -- that could be of use to those engaged in international mediation.

#### #5. Referral service

Aided by its staff, the members of the network could compile lists of potential third parties and their characteristics, of experts knowledgeable about various conflicts, of experts knowledgeable about the processes of negotiation and mediation, of potential funding sources, and of potential available staff for a mediation venture. The network could serve a referral and brokering function, putting potential third parties in touch with nations and groups in conflict as well as with those who could supply needed information, skills, advice, and funds.

#### #6. Support staff

Often parties who are called upon to play a third-party role find themselves hampered by a lack of information about the specific conflict, advice about tactics and strategy, and staff. The network might have on call experts in the substance of any given conflict, experts in process, and staff who can help with everything from organizing meetings and writing reports to taking notes and making plane reservations.

#### #7. Pre-mediation service

In certain conflict situations, the staff might be directed to carry out specific pre-mediation tasks such as mapping out the perceptions and interests of the various parties and helping them to develop a sufficiently common perception of the problem that

fruitful talks can proceed. In essence, the staff would be doing some of the work preparatory to a third party effort by one or more of the members of the network. Analogous work might also be performed after a full-fledged mediation effort such as monitoring agreements reached and assisting the parties in dealing with disputes over compliance.

Any of these models can be pursued in tandem with any other. There are undoubtedly other options as well so these must be considered illustrative of what might be done. Such an informal approach to improving and extending the practice of international mediation would not preclude the eventual creation of a more formal organizational structure at some point should that be deemed useful. Indeed, it might prepare the way. If it is too soon to know whether or how a more formal service should be designed, perhaps the soundest way to begin is with a loose network offering an array of support services that can grow organically as it proves useful.

# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WAR PREVENTION DIPLOMACY IN A MULTI-NUCLEAR WORLD

MAY 1987

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## INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WAR PREVENTION

### DIPLOMACY IN A MULTI-NUCLEAR WORLD

## CONFERENCE GOAL

The goal of the conference is to explore and initiate a on-going study on how the risk of nuclear confrontation can be reduced by improving the means of preventing or limiting regional conflict and of controlling random nuclear incidents. The two major nuclear powers have developed complex mechanisms to prevent unintentional firing of nuclear warheads and a system of rapid bilateral communication for use in nuclear-threatening situations. They also, however, have alert systems that, once triggered, may proceed with a high degree of automaticity. Emphasis will be placed on (a) defining potential catalysts, external to the control of the two major nuclear powers, that could activate these alerts or otherwise bring these powers to the point of nuclear exchange; and b) mechanisms and techniques to reduce their danger, including a multilateral nuclear alert center as proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General in his 1986 Annual Report to the General Assembly and a multilateral war risk reduction center as suggested by General-Secretary Gorbachev in supporting the Secretary-General's proposal (speech to the Indian Parliament, 27 November 1986).

## THE CONFERENCE TITLE

The title of the conference suggests the search for a more extensively integrated multilateral diplomacy when many factors that might lead to nuclear war are outside the control of the major nuclear powers, an important issue not yet adequately addressed in any forum.

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#### KEY OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFERENCE

1. To define incidents or a complex of events external to the bilateral relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States that could lead immediately or ultimately to nuclear exchange.
2. To consider how such developments could be prevented, or quickly ended and kept from leading to a major power confrontation, focussing primarily on multilateral techniques and instrumentalities.
3. — To examine, in this context, the requirements for ~~strengthening the preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution capacity of the United Nations Secretary-General,~~ with special attention to his role in the Iran-Iraq and Afghan hostilities.
4. To initiate among influential scholars and practitioners an on-going process of discussion, research, and analysis relative to multilateral crisis management and preventive diplomacy.
5. To stimulate sustained public interest and scholarly research with regard to the role and potential of multilateral instrumentalities in limiting the risk of war, especially nuclear war.

#### SITE OF THE CONFERENCE

The Conference Planning Committee has received an initial indication that the Finnish Institute of International Affairs would host the Conference in Helsinki. Other possibilities include Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, and New York.

#### TENTATIVE CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

A three-day conference is planned for the spring or summer of 1988. The panels outlined in the tentative agenda will not be open to the public, but papers resulting from the sessions will be made available to anyone interested at the close of the conference.

#### BUDGET

The estimated cost of the conference is \$115,000. A seed grant of \$5,000 has been received from the International Year of Peace Secretariat of the United Nations and a grant of \$25,000 (Canadian) for the conference has been received from the Canadian Institute for International Peace and



Security. Should the Finnish Institute for International Affairs confirm an earlier offer of sponsorship, it would cover the cost of lodging, meals, and meeting facilities, estimated at \$20,000.

TENTATIVE AGENDA

PANEL I

Reducing the Possibility of Nuclear War

a) Consideration of events external to the central bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union that could lead to nuclear exchange, e.g.:

1. Regional conflicts
2. Firing of nuclear weapons by unidentified agent by accident or intent (terrorists, nuclear or near-nuclear powers other than US or USSR)
3. Nuclear proliferation

b) Identification of methodologies and instrumentalities of a multilateral nature to prevent or limit the adverse effect of such events, e.g.:

1. Multilateral war-risk reduction center
2. Multilateral nuclear alert centre.

Chair: Paul Warnke (USA)  
Papers: Evgeny Primakov (USSR)  
Daniel Frei (Switzerland)  
James S. Sutterlin (USA and UN)

PANEL II

The Role of Third Parties

The role of third parties in the prevention, management, and resolution of regional conflicts. In this context, special attention will be paid to the role of the United Nations, but also to the role of regional organizations (e.g. Organization for African Unity). Various ad hoc intermediaries (e.g. the Contadora Group) and specific groups of countries (e.g. neutral and non-aligned countries) will be evaluated.

Chair: Brian Urquhart (UK and UN)  
Papers: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (USA)  
Raimo Väyrynen (Finland)  
A Third World participant

Two discussants will be appointed for each of the plenary sessions. After these sessions, the participants will be divided into two working groups which will, in one full day, discuss in greater depth the themes of plenary sessions. Each working group will receive detailed instructions and the results of their work, to be summarized by two rapporteurs, will be reported and assessed in the final plenary. The chairperson of the working groups will be two of the following:

Dieter Senghaas	(FRG)
Bruce M. Russett	(USA)
Lazlo Valki	(Hungary)
Adam Rotfeld	(Sweden)

#### Participants

There will be about 40 participants altogether in the conference. This figure includes some 12 North Americans, about 10 West Europeans, 6-8 Soviet and Eastern Europeans, and 4-5 host country participants in addition to 4-6 participants from outside Europe and North America.

Additional North American and West European participants to be invited - most of whom have confirmed already their willingness to take part - include the following experts:

Dr. Barry Blechman	Georgetown University
Professor Paul Bracken	Yale University
Christopher Bertram	Die Zeit, Hamburg FRG
Professor Lawrence Freedman	Kings's College, University of London, UK
Professor Alexander George	Stanford University
Professor Robert Jervis	Columbia University
Sverre Lodgaard	SIPRI, Stockholm, Sweden
Dr. John Simpson	University of Southampton, UK
Strobe Talbott	Time Magazine
Professor Peter Wallensteen	Uppsala University, Sweden
Dr. Jean Klein	The French Institute of International Affairs, Paris
Mr. Robert Bell	Staff Member, US Senate Armed Forces Committee

Outside North America and Europe invitations will be sent to comparable authorities in:

Australia (Professor Desmond Ball, Australian National University)

Brazil or (Professor K.P. Mishra, Jawaharlal Nehru  
Argentina University, Delhi)  
China  
India

Japan (Professor Seizaburo Sato, University of Tokyo)

and The Middle East

Strong interest in participation both in the conference and in the follow-up activities has been evinced from the USSR.

Plans are underway to select an appropriate person to deliver the keynote address. Among those being considered are the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of Finland, and Dr. David Owen of Great Britain.

#### FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES

Conference planners have identified the following specific follow-up activities to be discussed in detail during the last session of the Conference:.

##### I. Publications:

- A. An edited volume of conference papers and other materials will be prepared for publication.
- B. An executive summary of the conference discussions and recommendations will be distributed immediately following the conference to the media, interested organizations, and individuals.

##### II. Projects:

Selected feasibility studies are projected, including:

- A. The establishment of multi-national centers, to deal with methods and procedures to reduce the possibility of nuclear conflicts and to put into place effective communications systems among the centers and between them and crisis contact points in nuclear-power capitals.
- B. Enhancement of the role of third parties in preventive diplomacy, with emphasis on the need to clarify and expand upon the definition of "third parties".

- C. The development of a model curriculum for the study of preventive diplomacy.

III. Meetings:

The planning committee anticipates that follow-up seminars and workshops will be organized to explore further ideas and recommendations emerging from conference discussions.

CONFERENCE BUDGET ESTIMATES

(Based on Helsinki locus)

Travel Costs      (37 people)

North America	(16 x \$2,000)	\$32,000
Western Europe	( 8 x     800)	6,400
Eastern Europe	( 7 x     700)	4,900
Other Areas	( 7 x 3,000)	<u>21,000</u>

\$ 64,300

Conference Support costs - U.S.

Programme Administration	(\$4,000)
Secretariat Services	( 2,500)
Communication and Supplies	( 5,000)

\$ 11,500

Conference Committee Meetings

\$ 2,000

Conference Support Costs (Helsinki)

Lodging and Meals for participants;  
meeting rooms and other facilities  
Additional local costs

(\$20,000) \*  
\$ 5,000

Honoraria

Paper Writers	(9 x \$750)	\$6,750
Session Chairs	(6 x \$500)	3,000

\$ 9,750

Conference Report

Preparation, publication and dissemination

\$ 4,500

Contingency and Follow-up Planning      \$ 7,500

Administrative Overhead

\$104,550  
10,455  
\$115,005

TOTAL

\* To be contributed in kind by the  
Finnish Institute for International Affairs.