

MDR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - AAC

13-15 MAR 1995

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

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May P — This is a new/revised
version
15.3

Strategy for the Southern IDP Camps-15 March 1995

1. The return of IDPs from the camps in Gikongoro to their home communes in Butare, Gitarama, Kibungo, and South Kigali has come to a virtual standstill. While it has been known from the beginning of this operation that the last camps remaining open would contain a high percentage of "hard core" - those who would refuse to return to their communes because of their participation in the genocide - it is generally accepted that there are still large numbers of innocent people in the camp. Because the principal influence on the decision to return home for this latter group has always been information they receive on conditions in their communes, it is assumed that their growing reluctance to return home is based on their perceptions of the security situation there.
2. Certain elements in the camps continue to spread stories of harrasment, arbitrary arrest, and murder, in the home communes. Unfortunately, this deliberate campaign of disinformation has recently been augmented by the reports of people returning to the camps from home communes, fearing for their personal safety. There have even been reports that some people are fleeing communes and entering camps for the first time.
3. The situation is further complicated by heightened concerns on the part of the Government over national security. The IDP camps are considered by the Government to represent a grave threat to internal security because they are perceived to contain members of the Interhamwe (who use the camps for recruitment and training) and others responsible for the genocide.
4. Any strategy which must address the current situation in the southern camps will fail if it does not fully take into account the complexity and magnitude of the IDP problem. The principal task facing the Government can be summarized as follows: it must arrest, prosecute and detain those guilty of genocide, or involved in efforts to destabilize the Government, while at the same time assure the voluntary and safe return of innocent IDPs to their home communes and their reintegration into normal society.
5. The full cooperation of the Government and international organizations at the highest levels is absolutely essential if the separation of the innocent from the guilty, and the proper treatment of the two, is to be carried out humanely and successfully. This will require full participation in planning and implementation by the Ministries of Defence, Interior, and Justice, and will necessitate the involvement of director level representation at essential Integrated Task Force meetings. This will assure that instructions and directives key to the successful implementation of the operation are delivered in a timely manner to both agency and government officials at the regional level.
6. The following strategy was developed in a series of meetings with representatives from the Ministries of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration, Interior, and Defense, as well as UN agencies and multilateral organizations. It is intended to address both the concerns for national security and those of IDP return and reintegration. As soon as it is approved by the Government,

final plans will be drawn up and implementation should start within a week.

7. The operation will begin by assessing the present situation in eleven high priority communes (from where over eighty percent of the IDP population originates), and preparing these communes for the arrival of the IDPs. This will be accomplished by strengthening judicial and security structures in the commune, and ensuring that the increased material needs in the commune are met. At the same time, the information campaign in the camps will be strengthened, and security improved by increasing UNAMIR presence in the camps. Food distribution will be stopped in camps sequentially, starting with Kibeho. Within the camps final distributions will be staggered by commune (see attached schedule). Transportation will then be made available for those unable to walk home.

Operational Outline

8. **Action in the Home Communes**-Approximately eighty percent of the total camp population comes from eleven communes, nine in Butare Prefecture, and two in Kigali Prefecture. To maximise limited resources, the majority of operational efforts will be concentrated in these eleven communes. However, some information activities will be conducted in all affected communes. Prior to the commencement of the operation, activities in the home communes will be focused on explaining the operation to local officials and the local population, and strengthening security and judicial structures in the commune.

9. Preparing people in home communes for the arrival of IDPs is primarily the task of the Rwandan government, with support provided through the IOC. Discussions will take place between local authorities and relevant bodies, based on guidelines established by the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Rehabilitation and Social Integration, on potential problems which might arise from a sudden influx of IDPs into the general population (including disorder and lawlessness, property disputes, intimidation of witnesses to genocide, revenge killings); and local authorities will be provided with methods and resources to deal with such issues.

10. The Rwandan government will ensure that local authorities and local populations are informed of the proper procedures for filing a complaint or conducting an arrest. It is necessary that the perpetrators of the genocide be caught and punished, but it is essential that the innocent feel safe from unwarranted persecution. Arrests, accusations of genocide, or property disputes, will be handled in a legal and transparent manner.

11. The international community will intensify its presence in the targeted home communes, and in these same communes there will be specifically identified "assistance zones", staffed by a committee of relevant local authorities and international representatives, including UN human rights monitors. This committee will be responsible to address the needs faced by bourgmestres in the reception of new arrivals, as well as the security concerns of the returnees.

12. UN Agencies and international organizations, working in cooperation with local authorities, will ensure that food and water supplies in the commune are adequate to handle the expected population increase, and that immediate shelter requirements are met. NGOs will also be encouraged to begin agricultural and development programs which will be of benefit to the entire commune population.

13. A program to strengthen the judicial system in targeted communes will be conducted by the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights to prepare for the increased number of arrests likely to take place in these communes. Temporary offices will be set up and fully equipped so that IPJs can conduct interrogations, and prepare the necessary files and documents on each detainee. With the assistance of UNAMIR civilian police, training programs will be conducted for commune police officers. Where existing detention facilities are expected to be inadequate UNAMIR, under the supervision of UNHCHR, will construct detention centres or camps, which will be staffed by the local authorities. UNHCHR monitors will also supervise the transport of detainees.

14. Roving information teams will visit all of the receiving communes not included in the primary eleven. These teams will be composed of representatives of the judiciary, the RPA, and UNHCHR, and will discuss roles and responsibilities with commune officials, security officers, and NGO and UNAMIR representatives.

15. Protection for the population, and the returning IDPs, will be enhanced by increasing the security presence in each of the primary target communes. This increased presence will consist of RPA and police, UNAMIR troops, CIVPOL, and human rights monitors. Mobil teams will be established to visit other receiving communes.

16. Action in the Camps-It is absolutely essential for the success of the proposed operation that security be improved in the camps, that sources of disinformation within the camps are neutralized, and that accurate and truthful information about Government policies and the situation in the home communes is readily available to the entire camp population.

17. In order to combat the concerted campaigns of disinformation and intimidation waged by certain elements in the camps, and to create an environment where people feel safe to return home, it will be necessary to increase the presence of security forces within the camps, especially during and immediately after final food distributions. The majority of the increased security presence will be in the form of UNAMIR troops.

18. Prior to the commencement of the operation, the Government will conduct an extensive information campaign in the camps. The campaign will explain the plan and rationale for the closure of the camps, and more importantly, will seek to reassure the camp population that the actions being taken are in their own interest.

19. To further improve the security situation in the camps, UNAMIR troops, in cooperation with local authorities, will conduct an operation to arrest known intimidators, and people accused of participation in genocide.

20. People will be informed that subsequent food distributions will take place in the home communes, and that there will be no further registration for food distributions of populations moving to other camps. Camp populations will be assured that the Government wants them to return home to begin the process of normalization and recovery. Government information teams should assure the IDPs that they will be welcomed in the home communes, that property disputes will be settled fairly, and that those who make false accusations for personal gain will be exposed and punished.

21. If any people still remain in a camp four weeks after the final food distribution, they will be registered to determine commune of origin, and will then be interviewed by local authorities (in the presence of international human rights monitors) to determine their reasons for not going home.

22. Transport and Registration-Due to time constraints and lack of resources, it will be impossible to transport all of the IDPs to their home communes. Fortunately, the vast majority of the IDPs come from the nearby prefecture of Butare, and can easily walk home. Transport will be provided for the sick and elderly, and those living in the most distant communes. Whether walking home, or riding trucks and buses, IDPs may be registered when leaving the camps.

23. Schedule for Final Food Distributions-The following is a proposed schedule for stopping food distribution in the camps. It may change slightly to accommodate new population information, and existing food distribution schedules. The eleven priority communes are marked with an asterisk.

WEEK	CAMP	COMMUNE	POP.	
=====				
1	Kibeho	Runyinya*	17,000	
		Ngenda*	12,500	29,500
2	Kibeho	Gishamvu*	10,000	
		Gashora*	5,000	
		Nyakizu*	9,000	
		Ntyazo*	6,200	30,200
3	Kibeho	Huye*	6,000	
		Muyira*	5,700	
		Mbazi	5,500	
		Mugusa	5,800	
		Ngoma*	3,500	
		Maraba*	700	
		Kigembe*	3,200	30,400
4	Kibeho	Rusatira	3,600	
		Shyanda	3,700	

		Muyaga	2,300	
		Sake	2,200	
		15 OTHERS	14,200	
	Buhoro	Ngenda*	400	
		Ntyazo*	350	
		35 OTHERS	3,250	30,000
5	Ndago	Nyakizu*	16,500	
		Gishamvu*	7,200	
		Ngoma*	6,400	30,100
6	Ndago	Kigembe*	5,000	
		Runyinya*	3,500	
		Gashora*	2,500	
		Ndora	2,200	
		19 OTHERS	10,000	
	Nyamigina	Huye*	300	
		34 OTHERS	2,000	
	Bivumu	Muyira*	400	
		32 OTHERS	3,500	29,400
7	Munini	Ngenda*	5,500	
		Nyakizu*	5,200	
		Gashora*	2,400	
		Kigembe*	1,000	
		Runyinya*	750	
		Kigali-ville	600	
		22 OTHERS	5,000	
	Rwamiko	Runyinya*	5,100	
		Huye*	650	
		Gishamvu*	650	
		49 OTHERS	3,600	30,400
8	Kamana	Nyakizu*	8,500	
		Ngenda*	5,100	
		Gashora*	2,600	
		Butare	1,000	
		Muyaga Sud	1,000	
		12 OTHERS	6,100	
	Ruramba	Runyinya*	3,100	
		Huye*	400	
		Maraba*	250	
		36 OTHERS	1,300	29,350

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

File: 5000.59 (Plans)

To: COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
FMO
MA to FC
G3 OPS

From: G3 PLANS

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Dum' or similar, written over the 'From: G3 PLANS' line.

Date: 14 Mar 95

Subject: DISCUSSIONS ON A STRATEGY FOR THE SOUTHERN IDP CAMPS

Please find attached a Strategy for the Southern IDP Camps. It is requested that you review the document and be prepared to discuss your views at a conference to be held at 1400 hrs on Fri 17 Mar 95 in the Briefing Room. Would you confirm your attendance to G3 Plans by COB 15 Mar 95.

- "Op Hope" - by Zambattag/wk prior? / by commune-hil
IAW Schedule.
- Prep of aerial photos / schematic.

Strategy for the Southern IDP Camps.

1. The return of IDPs from the camps in Gikongoro to their home communes in Butare, Gitarama, Kibungo, and South Kigali has come to a virtual standstill. While it has been known from the beginning of this operation that the last camps remaining open would contain a high percentage of "hard core" - those who would refuse to return to their communes because of their participation in the genocide - it is generally accepted that there are still numbers of people in the camps not guilty of such crimes. As the principal motivation for people to return home has always been information on conditions in their communes, it is assumed that the growing reluctance of non-criminal IDPs to return home is based on serious concern over the security situation in their commune.
2. The group consists of mostly women and children, who are either closely associated with the hard core and those who fear arbitrary arrest and detention in their commune. These perceptions of arbitrary justice in home communes is further fueled by recent reports from the camps that people from communes are returning or entering camps for the first time, fearing for their personal safety.
3. This situation is further complicated by heightened concerns on the part of the government over national security. The death of the Prefet of Butare and increased reports of a possible destabilization campaign by the former government have put more pressure on national security forces to control their borders and the population within. In this regard the IDP camps are considered the greatest threat to national security inside the country.
4. Any strategy which must address the current situation in the southern camps will fail if it does not fully take into account the complexity and magnitude of the IDP problem. The principal task facing the government now can be summarized as follows: The arrest, prosecution and detention of those guilty of genocide or involved in efforts to destabilize the government, while at the same time assuring the voluntary and safe return of innocent IDPs to their home communes and their reintegration into normal society. Without the full cooperation of the government and organizations at the highest levels, the separation of the innocent and the guilty and the proper treatment of the two will be impossible.

5. The following strategy was developed in a series of meetings with representatives from the ministries of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration, Interior, and Defense, as well as UNREO, UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, and UNAMIR. It is intended to address both the concerns for national security and those of IDP return and reintegration. As soon as it is approved by the government final plans will be drawn up and implementation should start within a week.

6. The operation will begin by assessing the present situation in eleven high priority communes (where over eighty percent of the IDP population originates), and preparing these communes for the arrival of the IDPs. This will be accomplished by strengthening judicial and security structures in the commune, and ensuring that the immediate material needs of the returning IDPs can be met. At the same time, the information campaign in the camps will be strengthened, and security improved by increasing UNAMIR presence in the camps. Food distribution will be stopped in camps chronologically, starting with Kibeho. Within the camps final distributions will be staggered by commune (see attached schedule). Transportation will then be made available for those unable to walk home.

Operational Outline

7. **Preparation of the Home Communes**-Approximately eighty percent of the of the total camp population comes from only eleven different communes, nine in Butare, and two in Kigali. To maximise limited resources, it is suggested that the majority of our efforts be concentrated in these eleven communes, however, some information activities will be conducted in all affected communes. Prior to the commencement of the operation, activities in the home communes will be focused on increasing the information available to local officials and the local population, and strengthening security and judicial structures in the commune.

8. Preparing the people in the home communes for the arrival of the IDPs is primarily the task of the Rwandan government, with support provided by the IOC. Local authorities will be briefed on the potential problems which might arise from a sudden influx of IDPs into the general population (disorder and lawlessness, theft, property disputes, intimidation of witnesses to genocide, revenge killings), and provided with methods and resources to deal with them.

9. The Rwandan government will assure that local authorities and local populations are informed of the proper procedures for filing a complaint or conducting an arrest. In the past there have been incidents where returning IDPs were arbitrarily arrested and jailed, simply because they were IDPs. It is necessary that the perpetrators of the genocide be caught and punished, but it is essential for reconciliation and peace that the innocent feel safe from unwarranted persecution. Arrests, accusations of genocide, or property disputes, must be handled in a legal and transparent manner.

10. The international community will intensify its presence in the targeted home communes, and in these same communes there will be specifically identified "assistance zones", staffed by a committee of relevant local authorities and international representatives. This committee will be responsible to address the needs faced by bourgmestres in the reception of new arrivals, as well as the security concerns of the returnees.

11. Roving information teams will visit all of the receiving communes not included in the primary eleven. These teams will be composed of representatives of the judiciary, the RPA, and UNHCHR, and will brief commune officials, security officers, and NGO and UNAMIR representatives, about their roles and responsibilities.

12. Protection for the population, and the returning IDPs, will be enhanced by increasing the security presence in each of the primary target communes. This increased presence will consist of RPA and police, UNAMIR troops CIVPOL, and human rights monitors.

13. Preparation in the Camps-Absolutely essential to the success of the proposed operation is that security be improved in the camps, that sources of disinformation within the camps are neutralized, and that accurate and truthful information about government policies and the situation in the home communes is readily available to the entire camp population.

14. At present, representatives and sympathizers of the former government control much of the camp population through concerted campaigns of disinformation and intimidation. In order to create an environment in the camps where people can feel safe in making the decision to return home, it will be necessary to increase the presence of security forces within the camps, especially during and immediately after the final food distributions. The majority of this increased security presence will be in the form of UNAMIR troops.
15. To further improve the security situation UNAMIR troops, in cooperation with local authorities, will conduct an operation in the camps to arrest known intimidators, and people suspected of participation in genocide.
16. Prior to the commencement of the operation, the government will conduct an extensive information campaign in the camps. The campaign will explain the plan and rationale for the closure of the camps, and more importantly, will seek to reassure the camp population that the actions being taken are in their own interest.
17. People will be informed that subsequent food distributions will take place in the home communes, and that there will be no further registration for food distributions of populations moving to other camps. Camp populations will be assured that the government wants them to return home to begin the process of reconciliation, that they will be welcomed in the home communes, that they will be safe from arbitrary arrest, that property disputes will be settled fairly, and that those who make false accusations for personal gain will be discovered and punished.
18. **Transport and Registration-**Due to time constraints and lack of resources, it will be impossible to transport all of the IDPs to their home communes. Fortunately, the vast majority of the IDPs come from the nearby prefecture of Butare, and can easily walk home. Minimal transport will be provided for the sick and elderly, and those living in the most distant communes. Whether walking home, or riding the buses, all IDPs will be registered when leaving the camps.

19. Schedule for Final Food Distributions-The following is a proposed schedule for stopping food distribution in the camps. It may change slightly to accommodate new population information, and existing food distribution schedules.

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		Ntyazo*	6,200	30,200
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		Mbazi	5,500	
		Mugusa	5,800	
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	Ruramba	Runyinya*	3,100	
		Huye*	400	
		Maraba*	250	
		36 OTHERS	1,300	29,350

NOTE FROM THE UN HEADS OF AGENCIES

In reviewing the present situation regarding the return of internally displaced persons in camps in Rwanda to their home communes, the UN Heads of Agencies recommend the following actions for the consideration of the Government of Rwanda:

1. While recognizing the Government's concerns about the implications of internally displaced persons camps in the south-west of Rwanda, UN agencies are gratified that the Government remains determined to uphold the principles that underscored the IDP returnee operation to date.
2. The main principle as mentioned in several reports of the UN Secretary General which were endorsed by the UN Security Council, remains the principle of voluntary return in conditions of safety and dignity. This principle is also contained in the Plan of Action of the Bujumbura Conference on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, in which the Rwandese Government took part.
3. The UN agencies fully recognize that the prolonged existence of camps inside Rwanda is not a humane option for the persons living in these camps, and can moreover generate serious problems of security. The UN agencies remain therefore committed to assist the Rwandese government in finding a solution to this situation. However, utmost care should be applied so as to avert further compelled population movements inside Rwanda, or across the border into Burundi and beyond.
4. The UN agencies believe that it is essential to intensify and extend the present information campaign in the IDP camps to encourage people to return to their home communes. This information campaign should be based, inter alia, upon extensive use of radio transmissions as well as visits by Government officials to the camps, preferably at Ministerial or senior level.
5. The principle of voluntary return in conditions of safety and dignity applies only to internally displaced persons who have not committed crimes in the past, and who do not resort to harassment and intimidation in the camps. Known suspects of participation in genocide should, as a first step, be isolated by
 - publishing and widely disseminating their names, as soon as possible
 - excluding them from any role whatsoever in the camps (food distribution etc.).

6. Furthermore, at short notice the possibility should be examined by UNAMIR, in consultation with the relevant Rwandese authorities, to undertake another law and order action to apprehend at least the known intimidators in the camps.
7. At the same time, it is vital that the camp populations will be reassured, through the information campaign and especially through high level visits to the camps, that all those who are innocent will not have to fear to be arrested and will be welcomed by the authorities in their home communes.
8. As part of the information campaign, the camp populations, are to be informed about the objective to close all camps, and to ensure security and assistance in the home communes. Instead of abrupt camp closures, there should be a gradual reduction in food assistance, on a commune by commune basis if possible. Populations from camps targeted will be informed (a) that subsequent distributions will take place in the respective home communes and (b) that there will be no registration for food distribution of populations moving to other camps.
9. At the same time, the international community will intensify its presence in targeted home communes for a period still to be determined. In these same communes, there will be specifically identified "assistance zones", staffed by a committee of relevant local authorities and international representatives. This committee will be responsible for addressing the needs faced by bourgmestres in the reception of new arrivals, as well as the security concerns of returnees. These initiatives, which will have to be implemented with all due speed, will also be reflected in the intensified information campaign.
10. In presenting this proposal, the UN Heads of Agencies would like to draw to the attention of the Government that since the next planting season is at least six months away, the continued arrival of returnees who have not sowed crops will lead to an increasingly significant food requirement in home communes. The disincentive of returning to communes with limited food stocks and the problems associated with new arrivals is of paramount importance. In light of the depleted food stocks of international organizations special initiatives, such as food for work programmes, will need to be developed in cooperation with government agencies.

11. The UN agencies look forward to their efforts with the Government to ensure the humane and expeditious return home of the internally displaced. They recognize the complexity of the operation and also its direct relationship with the return of refugees in neighboring countries. Steady progress to bring people home must be made, recognizing the need for careful planning and implementation. An essential element in this process will be clear cooperation between the international community, including UNAMIR, and the RPA to provide security in the home communes.
12. To facilitate the operation, the UN agencies amongst other things have committed themselves to strengthening the Justice and Security Cells of the Integrated Operations Centre, and to do all in their power to provide the material required to enhance services in targeted home communes.

Project to facilitate the return of IDP's

CONSIDERING IDP camps will be closed inevitably.

CONSIDERING a massive influx of IDP's in communes after this closure will occur.

CONSIDERING that numerous people amongst IDP's will be arrested and accused of genocide participation under Rwandese law.

CONSIDERING the lack of resources to treat these cases judicially and subsequently to detain the accused.

We propose to establish temporarily judicial assistance in communes to facilitate proper and prompt processing of these cases. This assistance will consist on the following elements:

1. So called assistance centres, where returning IDP's will be received.
2. Temporary offices, fully equipped, where IPJ's could conduct interrogation, prepare necessary files or documents on each detainee.
3. A number of IPJ in proportion to the number of cases expected (minimum 5 per commune) under authority of the bourgmestre.
4. A number of communal police men, who can assist in arrest and detention.
5. Temporary detention centres to be set up by UNAMIR near existing facilities, but under the authority of the local government.
6. Transport of detainees from temporary detention centres to the prefecture prisons.

This project can only be effective in conjunction with the juridical assistance programme that aims to rehabilitate the judicial system of Rwanda. At the same time a solution must be found to provide permanent and adequate detention centres, with sufficient capacity

A very close collaboration with authority, civilian and military, and different international organisation is indispensable for the success of this project.

2 Dated
9 Dec 91

TO NDAGO


REPORT LINE 4
(LAST STAND)

REPORT LINE
2
(APPLE-PIE)

REPORT LINE 1
(MANGO - GROVE)

PWSS

Dated 08 Dec 9



AN APPRECIATION ON NIGHT PATROLLING

INTRODUCTION

1. Patrolling is a military op by which areas of interest are dominated by the periodic physical presence of tps. This op is essentially mobile in nature and can be done on foot or in vehs. There are a no of different types of patrols with different aims in mind and the composition of each patrol would depend upon the visualised task.

2. Patrolling can be carried out by day and night and each has its advantages and disadvantages which shall be discussed in detail in this appreciation. However, irrespective of whether patrolling is to be done by day or night, a very high level of planning and coordination is required to ensure that the task allotted to the patrol is achieved in an acceptable time-frame and with minimum or no casualties.

3. A large area of ops cannot be covered only by observation posts and check-points alone; thus to ensure that the remotest area in the AOR is dominated, patrolling is an absolute prerequisite in any insurgency environment.

SITUATION

4. The sit, based on which this appreciation has been written, is as it actually exists in Rwanda in the post-war period. Rwanda has been divided into 9 distinct areas of responsibility, each of which has been allotted to contingents. Between 01 Jan 95 and 09 Feb 95, there were 101 attacks reported the majority of which, occurred between the hours of 1100 and 0500 in sectors 4B,4C and 5, the primary motive being banditry with livestock, cash, food and household belongings being stolen. Because of the threat posed at night, a large segment of the population in the lakeside communes vacate their homes every night and move upto 10 km East, to spend the night in the bush and return each morning to their houses.

5. The lakeside communes of Lake Kivu between the Gafunzo Peninsula and Kibuye have been targeted by bandits/threat force elements from Ijwi island in Zaire since late last year. Again, the majority of these attacks have been at night and theft oriented; though a number appear to have been directed against specific individuals or families for reasons other than theft. A number of reports have indicated that recent returnees from the displaced persons camps have been subjected to a number of these attacks.

6. As the area to be protected by the UNAMIR tps is vast and the strength of the tps inadequate, as also the fact that the acts of

banditry and killings occur mostly under the cover of darkness, patrolling by night assumes greater importance in Rwanda than ever before.

7. The current problems in Rwanda can largely be attributed to the FRGF, militia and the Interhamwe who are based in the refugee camps in the neighbouring countries of Zaire to the west, Burundi to the south and Tanzania to the east, as also the elements based in the various IDP camps within Rwanda. It is these elements who are well armed and organised that perpetrate the acts of wanton killings and looting with the aim of trying to destabilise the existing govt in power as also to prevent the refugees from returning to their homes in an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity.

8. Based on the statics of banditry activities which have taken place in the country in various sectors , the priority of the various sectors as far as patrolling is concerned, is as under:

- A. Sector 4C.
- B. Sector 4B.
- C. Sector 5.
- D. Sector 4A.
- E. Sector 3A.
- F. Sector 3B.
- G. Sector 2.
- H. Sector 1.
- J. Sector 6.

9. Although sector 6 is last in the priority as far as patrolling is concerned, its importance cannot be undermined as it is the capital of the country and houses the seat of power. In fact , if the security situation in the country warrants the extrication of UNAMIR personnel, Kigali assumes overriding importance as the airfield located there.

AIM

10. The aim of this appreciation is to assess the feasibility of conducting night patrols by UNAMIR tps in UNAMIR AOR with the following limitations :

- A. Foot patrolling will be carried out at night only in areas where they can be safely conducted.

- B. The minimum strength of a foot patrol will be one section.
- C. Patrol paths/routes will be based on existing mine cleared tracks only.
- D. High visibility measures will be taken in areas where deemed necessary.
- E. Radio contact with the controlling HQ will be maintained at all times by all patrols.
- F. Tactical formations will be used by all patrols at all times.
- G. A comprehensive and well rehearsed reinforcement plan will be worked out by all controlling HQ and tps will be specifically tasked for the same.
- H. The minimum strength of a mobile patrol will be two vehicles.
- I. Armoured and soft skinned vehicles will be used for night patrolling.
- J. All vehicles must fly the United Nations flag which should be illuminated by night.
- K. Units whose AORs are very sensitive, are restricted to night patrolling by armoured vehicles only.
- L. MILOBS will carry out patrolling by night, only with the unit mobile patrols.
- M. "Blocking Patrols" along possible infiltration routes will be inserted by all units.

FACTORS

Advantages and Disadvantages of Night Patrolling

11. Night patrolling, with all its advantages, has a considerably large element of danger of which each one must be made aware of so as to guard against any mishap which may jeopardise the very aim of the op. Some of the dangers of night patrolling are as under:

- A. Innocent civilian population becoming casualties.
- B. Danger of own tps becoming casualties by friendly fire.

- C. Identification friend or foe problems.
- D. Danger of losing one's way in the dark.
- E. Own patrols clashing with one another.
- F. "High Visibility Lighting" tactics result in the loss of surprise and making the patrol an easy target to identify.

12. Deductions. Considering the dangers of night patrolling, it becomes important to ensure that a very high degree of coordination and training is achieved by the tps who carry out patrolling at night.

13. Advantages of Night Patrolling.

- A. Complete surprise is maintained.
- B. Aimed fire on own tps by the bandits is not possible.
- C. Small body of tps can depict a larger number of tps.
- D. Casualties to own tps will be lesser.
- E. As movement of population is minimal at night, chances of any innocent local becoming a casualty is minimal.
- F. "High Visibility" tactics would act as a major deterrent without the tps having to actually get into a firefight with the bandits.

14. Disadvantages of Night Patrolling.

- A. Command and control is difficult.
- B. Navigation is a major problem.
- C. Difficult to pick up pinpoint targets and bring down aimed fire.
- D. Greater chances of own patrols clashing with each other due to IFF difficulties at night, which can result in increased number of casualties to own troops.
- E. Use of night vision devices imposes strain on the individual soldier thus reducing his capability to operate over a long period of time.
- F. "High Visibility" tactics would result in loss of surprise and may result in the patrols becoming easy targets.

15. Deductions. Seeing the fact that the advantages of night

patrolling far outweigh its disadvantages, it becomes obvious that all UNAMIR formed tps must resort to night patrolling so as to ensure that their respective AORs are kept free from criminal elements thus allowing the local populace to continue their daily lives in a atmosphere free of fear and tension.

16. The concept of high visibility lighting should be tried out by all units while carrying out patrolling at night, as this would act as a major deterrent to the bandits. While the disadvantages of the patrol losing surprise and becoming a sitting target for the bandits cannot be lost sight of, the fact that it would curtail banditry activity without the UNAMIR tps having to actually get into a firefight, means that units should adopt this procedure during night patrolling.

17. Problems of conducting Vehicle Patrols at night. Given the size of the area to be covered by patrols in the various AORs, it is obvious that vehicles would be needed to patrol as well as to move troops out to a patrol base of some kind. However, there are some major problems involved in this kind of patrolling which are highlighted in the following paragraphs:

- A. Travel on secondary roads would be slow and difficult.
- B. Slow moving vehicles are easy to evade and ambush.
- C. Vehicle mounted patrols are unlikely to find the criminal elements.
- D. Risk of patrol being drawn into action well beyond what is permitted in the current ROE.
- E. "High Visibility Lighting" tactics by the patrols may result in the loss of surprise as also the fact that the patrol may become an easy target.

18. Deductions. Despite the problems involved in the conduct of vehicle patrols at night, the vital advantages of being able to cover a much larger area as also the capability to react to a situation much faster, make mobile patrols at night a must. In order to off-set the disadvantages, these patrols should be done in conjunction with normal foot patrols ; what it entails is that when foot patrols are operating, the vehicle patrols supplement them and also act as a "Rapid Reaction Force" within the AOR.

Security of UNAMIR AOR at Night.

19. The bandits who are carrying out the acts of killing, looting and terrorism are essentially the FRGF, militia and the Interhamwe. These bandits are well armed and organised and are essentially based in the refugee camps in Zaire and in the DP camps within the country. It is from these camps that they cross into Rwanda either

by boat across Lake Kivu or through inaccessible terrain where UNAMIR tps cannot patrol. The bandits who operate from the DP camps within Rwanda, tend to use the hours of darkness to slip out; carry out their banditry activities in the neighbouring areas and before first light, get back into the camp with the booty.

20. The weapons that the bandits use are as under:

- A. Hand grens.
- B. AK 47/56 Rifles.
- C. Machine guns.
- D. Machetes/Spears/Swords.

21. These bandits usually prefer to operate by night so as to avoid UNAMIR patrols. They recce the intended target 2-3 days prior to the actual raid and during the actual conduct, they indulge in killing the inmates and steal household items, cattle and other valuables and then melt away from the scene of the crime before the RPA or the UNAMIR security forces can react.

Deductions.

22. Seeing the tactics of the bandits of operating by night, it is incumbent on all UNAMIR contingents to carry out a systematic and well coordinated domination of the respective areas of responsibility by night patrolling. This would act as a deterrence and consequently, foil the bandits design to create havoc in the countryside.

23. Since the bandits are armed with state of the art weapons, it can be deduced that UNAMIR tps who carry out night patrolling, must be adequately armed with close quarter battle weapons and automatics. At the same time, units must ensure that the wpns are used as per the existing ROE and that too only in self defence. The principle of minimum force must never be lost sight of and wpns must be used with that aim; at the same time tps must be ready to shoot to kill if so justified in escalation of ROE.

RPA.

24. It must be appreciated that at present , the night belongs to the RPA. They have a very active and aggressive patrol programme in all the sectors. They generally patrol on foot in small groups led by NCOs and have orders to take quick and violent action when faced with a problem. They seldom have a means of communication with them once deployed. Their main aim is to prevent the growth of a clandestine movement and to reduce criminal activity.

25. The RPA do not conduct mounted patrols at night though they

may move patrols to drop off points in vehicles. The reason for not conducting mounted patrols is due to the impossibility of dealing effectively with persons on foot, as a person on foot can see and hear a vehicle long before they can be seen by the people in the vehicle.

26. The RPA, inspite of the fact that they have just won a war, are still very much an ad hoc army. In an attempt to boost up the numbers in its cadre, it has resorted to large scale recruitment all over Rwanda. This has resulted in dilution of standards as far as discipline and fighting standards go. It must be remembered that most of the fresh intake are those people who have lost their entire families in the genocide, and thus their sole motivation to join the ranks of the RPA is to try and seek personal vendetta against the genocide perpetrators.

27. As regards training, the RPA has no formal military training and thus as of date, they are at best a guerrilla army. However, their leadership cadre is extremely competent and rule with an iron fist. The reaction of the RPA towards UNAMIR till date has been positive and cooperative. They are however, likely to react in a hostile manner towards UNAMIR patrols at night as IFF is a major problem at night and unless a detailed coordination is carried out between the RPA and UNAMIR tps, it may lead to clashes between the two, which must be avoided at all costs.

28. Deductions. It will be appreciated that well- planned and detailed coord between the RPA and the UNAMIR forces is absolutely critical for the success of any patrolling done in the present insurgency environment. This coordination if properly done, would also ensure that the meagre resources of manpower that are available in Rwanda, both, that of RPA as well as that of UNAMIR tps, are utilised judiciously and to the fullest extent so as to avoid duplication of effort. At the same time, given the level and scope of the RPA patrolling activities, their lack of radios at lower levels and the language difficulties involved in any attempt at close cooperation, the hazards of trying to patrol in the same areas as the RPA are so great , that either joint patrolling is undertaken by the RPA and UNAMIR , or UNAMIR may have to be given sole access to certain zones.

29. Before any night patrolling is undertaken by units, it is of vital importance that adequate liaison and coordination is carried out between the RPA and the UNAMIR tps in all sectors in Rwanda. Since the RPA is the army of Rwanda, its sources of information from the local population as also its knowledge of the terrain would be important inputs for the planning of night patrolling by the contingents.

30. Some of the important coordination that needs to be done with the RPA with regards to patrolling by night, is given in the succeeding paragraphs:

- A. Routes in and out of the various patrols in the AOR.
- B. Timings of the patrols.
- C. Areas of patrolling of the various patrols in the AOR.
- D. Call signs and frequencies used.
- E. Method of identification friend or foe between RPA and UNAMIR formed tps.
- F. Exchange of patrolling programmes between the RPA and the unit carrying out patrolling in the AOR.
- G. Incorporation of an RPA representative in UNAMIR formed tps patrols and vice versa.
- I. Coordination of the information gathering and dissemination systems of both the RPA as well as the formed tps.

31. One important aspect that must not be lost sight of is that the final responsibility to ensure the security and the safety of the people of Rwanda, is that of the RPA and not of UNAMIR tps. This must be explained to each and every soldier that the UNAMIR tps are there only to assist the RPA to achieve their aim, and are not there to perform the RPA tasks of actively getting involved with the bandits.

Own Troops.

32. UNAMIR formed tps, consist of contingents and MILOBS who have been distributed into the various sectors, based on the size of the AOR and the threat perception. The entire UNAMIR AOR, has been divided into 6 sectors as under:

- A. Sector 1(Byumba) - NICOY.
- B. Sector 2(Kibungo) - GHANBATT.
- C. Sector 3(Butare and Gitarama) - MALAWI and MALI COYS.
- D. Sector 4A(Gikongoro) - ZAMBATT.
- E. Sector 4B(Kibuye) - FRAFBATT.
- F. Sector 4C(Cyangugu) - ETHIOBATT.
- G. Sector 5(Gisenyi) - TUNBATT.
- H. Sector 6(Kigali) - INDBATT.

33. The terrain differs in the various sectors of Rwanda, in that, the accessibility to remote areas is limited due to lack of roads and tracks. Metalled roads are few and tracks are generally impassable to vehicles during the rainy season. The resources in terms of manpower and equipment also impinge on the type of patrol, its conduct as well as its intended area of ops. Keeping in view the above constraints, the following types of ptls could be conducted by UNAMIR tps:

- A. Foot Patrols.
- B. Vehicle Patrols.
- C. A combination of foot and vehicle patrol.

Curfew Implications.

34. Whenever the RPA declares curfew in a area, it normally lasts from last light to first light the next day. This is done with the aim to ensure that the locals are kept indoors which would make the identification of bandits easier, as anyone who is found moving about during the curfew hours, is automatically taken to be a bandit and dealt with accordingly.

35. Deductions. The implication of curfew for UNAMIR tps would be that no movement will be permitted after last light. Incase patrols do move out at night, it may result in clashes between the RPA and own patrols which is not acceptable at any cost. Thus coordination with the RPA must include that curfew is not applicable to UNAMIR patrols. As mentioned earlier, elaborate and foolproof methods of IFF must be evolved for night patrolling between the RPA and the formed tps.

36. Safety Regulations. It must be ensured by all tps, that adequate safety precautions are observed in respect of handling of weapons, opening of fire, identification friend or foe and ensuring that innocent locals do not get caught in a cross fire. The safety aspect assumes greater importance during night as navigation, IFF, comd and control, control of fire, pinpoint identification of targets become much more difficult at night than during day. Fire discipline must be rigidly enforced and automatic weapons must be employed only as a last resort.

Courses of Action.

37. There are basically three courses of action available to UNAMIR tps for the conduct of night patrolling . These are as under:

- A. Course 1. Conduct night patrolling only on foot.
- B. Course 2. Conduct night patrolling only in vehicles.

D. Course 3. Conduct joint patrolling at night with the RPA.

C. Course 4. Conduct night patrolling both, on foot and in vehicles.

38. The first two courses have the biggest drawback that the AOR may not be properly dominated by the patrols, as the areas which are inaccessible to the vehicle patrols, will not be covered unless foot patrols are coopted along with them. Similar is the case in areas which are large and cannot be effectively not dominated solely by foot patrols. For course 3 to be adopted, a very high level of mutual understanding and coordination is required between the RPA and the UNAMIR, which, given the present spate of confrontations between the two, is not feasible till the security situation improves in the country.

39. Deductions. In view of the above, it can be safely deduced that in order to ensure effective domination of the various AORs, units will have to undertake patrolling by night, both on foot and in vehicles. This course of action will give the maximum advantages and will assist the units to ensure security of their respective areas of responsibility by night effectively.

Civilian Population.

40. The civilian population of Rwanda are essentially very amicable towards UNAMIR tps. They are extremely cooperative and volunteer information whenever asked to do so. However, the threat of attacks by bandits and reprisals from the RPA, have instilled a feeling of fear in the entire population, with the result that not many people come ahead to volunteer information. In case of an adverse situation, certain minimal help can be counted upon from the locals.

41. Deductions. All patrols must ensure that the locals are treated with respect and dignity. In case of a encounter with bandits, all possible care must be taken by the tps to ensure that no civilian casualty occurs. It must be remembered that the locals are an important source of information and thus if cultivated properly, would prove invaluable for us to achieve the aim of neutralising the banditry activity in Rwanda. Further, identification of suspected bandits/criminals must be done extremely carefully so as to ensure that no innocent person is arrested for crimes that he/she did not commit.

CONDUCT OF NIGHT PATROLLING

42. Responsibility of UNAMIR HQ. UNAMIR HQ has a overriding responsibility in the following areas:

- A. Coord of ptl programme of all units.
- B. Standardisation of plg and reporting procedures.
- C. Advice and guidance on patrolling principles.
- D. Tasking of patrols in specific areas and times.

43. Object of patrolling in UNAMIR AOR. The primary aim of any type of patrol would be to gain info concerning bandits, terrain, population attitude and indicators of potential insurgency, if any. Ptls are also required to be sent to show UN presence and instill a sense of confidence in the population of the AOR. By doing so, info can also be gained of any human rights abuses in the area. Suitable projects can also be picked up for providing humanitarian assistance or carrying out civic action thereby enhancing the image of the UN in the country. Some other aims of patrolling in the UNAMIR AOR, are as follows:

- A. To cover areas not catered for by the existing OPs and Checkpoints.
- B. To gain info of various parties and their activities in the AOR.
- C. To indicate UNAMIR presence to the local population.
- D. To provide a physical link between adjoining but isolated posts.
- E. Carry out mobile "snap" checkpoints on roads and tracks not covered by permanent positions.
- F. Insert "blocking patrols" along possible infiltration lanes.
- G. Carry out observation from isolated temporary OPs;
- H. Provide protection for parties and the local population.

Conduct of Night Ptls.

44. Due to the peculiar environment prevailing in Rwanda and the paucity of UN tpt with the contingents, the conduct of ptls will have to be suitably modified and will also vary from sector to sector. However, some general points that need to be kept in mind by the ptls are listed below:

- A. Patrolling should be done in vehicles with foot patrols being resorted to only in areas inaccessible to vehicles.

- B. All move must be made as that which is distinctly that of UN tps.
- C. All move must be slow and deliberate.
- D. Move must be tactical with full security precautions being observed.
- E. An RRF must be catered for at all times in a ptl to meet any unforeseen contingency.
- F. Ptl's must carry Night Vision Goggles if available.
- G. Ptl moving in sensitive areas, must wear helmets and life jackets and will invariably be armed.
- H. An interpreter/ representative of RPA or Gendarmerie must always accompany a patrol.
- I. Every night ptl must carry a med haversack to provide med aid to any needy civilians so that the ptl is not seen as any suspicious activity.
- J. IFF drills must be worked out in great detail and thoroughly practised.

45. Suggested Conduct of a Night Patrol. In the rural sectors, a ptl of approximate strength of 40 persons in 8 vehicles must move out. The ptl should establish a ptl base close to the area of their interest. The RRF comprising of 10 persons in two vehicles, must stay in the ptl base and from there, three subsidiary ptl of 10 persons in two vehicles each, can go to their respective area of responsibility. They would fall back to the ptl base at the stipulated time where they would be debriefed by the ptl leader. The ptl leader may send a subsidiary again to confirm any info if time permit.

46. If the routes of subsidiary ptls are inaccessible to vehicles, the ptls will shed their vehicle in the ptl base with a protection party of two per vehicles, and then move on foot to carry out their task. The same drill will be followed for debriefing by the ptl leader. On return, the patrol leader will be debriefed at the respective sector HQ location. A detailed patrol report must be prepared and forwarded to the Force HQ.

47. Night patrolling should preferably be conducted in areas where trouble is expected or where the locals are insecure. Coverage of other trouble free areas, could be done by day patrols as hitherto. Rules of engagement, procedures for the apprehension of civilians should be clearly known to the patrols. The local govt officials, gendarmerie and the RPA Comd in the area must be informed well in advance, the details of all patrols planned in

that particular sector so as to prevent clashes between friendly forces.

FUTURE OF UNAMIR IN RWANDA

INTRODUCTION.

1. UNAMIR will complete two years in Rwanda on 17 Aug 95. A lot has been done by the UN in trying to bring a semblance of normalcy to this war-torn country and it is now felt that it was time to assess the future of the mission based on the current situation prevailing.

2. The trouble in Rwanda has been going on between the Tutsis and the Hutus for a good number of years. However the circumstances which forced the International Community to intervene need to be known to carry out a realistic assessment of the future of UNAMIR in Rwanda.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to analyze the options available to UNAMIR in Rwanda keeping in view the latest developments in the country.

SCOPE

4. The scope of the paper will cover the following aspects:

- A. Brief history of the formation of UNAMIR.
- B. Mandate of UNAMIR and its concept of operations.
- C. Prevailing situation in the neighbouring countries and its effects on Rwanda and UNAMIR.
- D. Intentions and Objectives of the Rwandese Govt.
- E. Areas of conflict between UNAMIR and the Rwandese Govt.
- F. Analysis of the factors discussed and important deductions.
- G. UNAMIR's options for the future and recommended option.
- H. Conclusion.

FORMATION OF UNAMIR.

5. In Oct 1990, the exiled force of Tutsis crossed into NE Rwanda from Uganda but the initial assault was repulsed. This force known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) resorted to guerrilla warfare which only ended in Aug 93 when the warring

factions decided to sign the Arusha Peace Agreement. This peace agreement called upon the UN to place a International peace force known as United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in a 22 month peace process starting from 05 Oct 93. At Arusha, the warring factions agreed to the following:

- A. Install a Broad Based Transitional Govt.
- B. Set up transitional institutions.
- C. Deploy a neutral international force.
- D. Withdraw foreign troops from Rwanda.
- E. Deploy a RPF battalion in Kigali to protect RPF dignitaries involved in the transition process.
- F. Integrate RGF and RPF into the National Defence Force.
- G. Integrate OAU observers into UN observers.
- H. Protect expatriates and ensure security of humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda.
- I. Repatriate refugees and resettle displaced persons.
- J. Ensure a secure atmosphere for a general elections.

6. Based on the Arusha Agreement, the Security Council adopted Resolution 872 which gave UNAMIR a mandate for 6 months. However, in April 94, after the death of the Rwandese President under suspicious circumstances, the Presidential Guard alongwith the Interhamwe went on a rampage killing thousands of Tutsis and their sympathizers. The RPF, appalled at the carnage taking place, broke the cease fire and went on the counter-offensive and stopped only when they reached the French Protected Zone. During the war, the deteriorating situation led to a drastic scaling down of UNAMIR forces who performed the following tasks:

- A. Provision of security to DPs in camps under UNAMIR's care.
- B. Escort duties.
- C. Humanitarian Assistance to Displaced Persons.
- D. Monitoring activities of NGOs.
- E. Security of personnel involved in distribution of humanitarian aid.
- F. Transfer of Rwandese from territory held by either the RGF or the RPF.

7. UNAMIR's mission now is to assist and coordinate the humanitarian support of participating countries and NGOs with the view to bringing to an end the Rwandese crises. As per Security Council Resolution 965 of 30 Nov 94, UNAMIR's mandate is :

A. Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas.

B. Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.

C. Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

D. Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and Human Rights officers, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali.

E. Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force.

8. With that extended mandate, the new concept of ops of UNAMIR aims at:

A. Stabilising refugees and displaced persons in their present locations.

B. Preparing the home communes for their return by helping to improve essential life supporting services in the communes with the assistance of NGOs.

C. Encouraging the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes.

D. Providing transportation, food, water, medical assistance on their way to their homes.

E. Assisting the people to return to their normal life and,

F. Hand over in due course, all humanitarian activities to the Rwandese Govt.

9. Based on the new concept of ops, some of the tasks that formed tps have performed are:

A. Conduct of protective ops such as road blocks, check points, vital points protection, observation posts, cordon and search and patrolling.

B. Provision of security in large towns, villages and in refugee/ DP camps.

C. Denial of insurgent activities in the sectors.

D. Guard UN installations within UNAMIR AOR.

E. Assist local authorities in maintaining law and order

in the camps.

F. Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.

G. Assist the NGOs in the distribution of food, water and medical support.

H. Assist in the coordination of all NGOs activities.

I. Hand over all activities to the Govt and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

10. UNAMIR since 06 April 94, has undergone some very important changes. The force is now over 6000 strong and is pursuing its mandate vigorously to return the country to normalcy. The situation is still far from normal and UNAMIR has a major role to play to try and achieve its goal in the shortest possible time frame.

PREVAILING SITUATION IN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND ITS EFFECT ON UNAMIR AND RWANDA.

ZAIRE.

11. The situation in Zaire is extremely volatile politically as well as militarily. The army has not been paid for the last one year and the civil administration is in shambles. The existing govt is virtually defunct with the result the country's economy has collapsed. Thus, in all probabilities it is safe to assume that the chances of a civil war erupting in the country, are very great. If this eventuality should occur, it possibly would result in a mass exodus of refugees from Zaire into Rwanda, which would further escalate the Rwandese crisis.

12. As of date, there are over 1.2 million Rwandese refugees in Zaire in camps located at Goma and Bukavu. This mass influx of refugees has added a tremendous burden on the already fragile economy of Zaire. The living conditions in the camps are appalling and the time is not far off when these camps would become the bedrock of insurgency in the region. Added to this, is the ever present threat of the volcanos erupting in the Goma region which pose a serious threat to the refugee camps in the region and may result in anything upto 400,000 refugees coming into Rwanda in one go for which contingency planning is already on.

BURUNDI

13. Burundi is also in turmoil. After the April 94 genocide, about 190,000 refugees from Rwanda went into Burundi and are presently located in refugee camps in Magara, Ruvumu, Kibezi, Ntamba, Mugano, Majuri and Rukuramijab.

14. Like Zaire, there is wide spread political unrest in Burundi and if this unrest manifests itself into a civil war, it would result in catastrophic consequences for Rwanda. In fact, as the

genesis of the problem is the same in both the countries, disturbances in one would likely trigger off a spontaneous reaction in the other country.

TANZANIA

15. Tanzania is relatively a more stable country as compared to the others in the region. In Tanzania too, there are about 140,000 Rwandese refugees located in camps in Ngara and Karagwe regions. Although the political atmosphere is much more stable in Tanzania, the mass influx of refugees has imposed a considerable strain on the country's economy and ecological balance, due to which, Tanzania is keen to see the Rwandese refugees leave their soil as early as possible.

EFFECTS ON UNAMIR AND RWANDA

16. From the above facts it is clear that the sub-region is a ticking time bomb that is likely to explode any moment. Any disturbance in the surrounding countries will have a direct bearing on the security of Rwanda and consequently on the task of UNAMIR.

17. Some of the important effects on Rwanda would be as under:

- A. Start of another genocide in Rwanda.
- B. Mass influx / exodus of refugees into and out of Rwanda.
- C. Colossal collateral damage to UNAMIR and Rwandese life and property.
- D. Collapse of the existing govt and resultant anarchy.

INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF RWANDESE GOVT

18. Having won the war against the FRGF at a very heavy cost, the Rwandese Govt has certain aims and objectives laid out for the normalisation of the country and national reconciliation. Some of these are as given in the succeeding paras:

- A. Bring normalcy into the country at the earliest.
- B. Instill a sense of confidence in the minds of the local population towards the new govt.
- C. Establish a viable judicial system in the country at the earliest so as to bring to justice all those persons accused of genocide and other related war crimes.
- D. Empty the IDP camps within the country and resettle the DPs in their Home Communes at the earliest.
- E. Create favourable security conditions within the country so as to encourage the Rwandese refugees in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania to return home in peace and dignity.

- F. Set up the civil administration at the earliest.
- G. Improve the country's economy so as to raise the standard of the Rwandese currency in the world market.
- H. Repair the collateral damage caused by the war.
- I. Gain world financial and technical support in rebuilding the country's economy.
- K. Protect the territorial integrity of Rwanda against attacks by the FRGF and Interhamwe based in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania.

AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN UNAMIR AND RWANDESE GOVT

19. Having seen the intentions and the objectives of the Rwandese govt, it is important to know the objectives of UNAMIR in Rwanda so as to be derive the areas of difference between the two. The major aims of UNAMIR in Rwanda are given in the following paras:

- A. Stabilising the refugees and DPs in the present locations.
- B. Cooperating with the Rwandese govt in creating ideal conditions for the return of the refugees to their home communes.
- C. Assist/augment NGO's in providing tpt, food, water, medicines etc to the DPs and the returning refugees.
- D. In conjunction with the RPA, create secure conditions in various communes so as to act as deterrent to the bandits and Interhamwe from carrying out looting, killings, kidnapping and other such activities.
- E. Protect UN life and property in Rwanda.
- F. Assist all NGO activities in Rwanda.
- G. Assist the civil administration in the maintenance of law and order in various parts of the country.
- H. Hand over all humanitarian activities to the Rwandese govt and the NGOs as the situation keeps on improving.

20. Although at a glance it looks as if both UNAMIR and the Rwandese govt have the same aims and objectives, there are some major points of differences between the two which are as follows:

- A. The Rwandese govt has started regarding UNAMIR as more of a " occupation army" than a peace keeping one. This is due to the fact that they regard the strength of the formed tps to be far in excess of that required to fulfil the given mandate.
- B. The govt firmly believes it has the sole sovereign

right to safe guard the sanctity of the Rwandese borders. They thus have strong objections to the patrolling activities conducted by the formed tps and the MILOBS as they see it as an infringement on their duties. Similarly, objections are raised to UNAMIR providing security to the NGO's as they feel it is their duty to ensure security of all foreign nationals.

C. The biggest complaint that the Rwandese Govt have against the UN in general as an International Body, is that it failed to react to the country's needs to stop the massacres in April 1994. They strongly feel that the UN withdrew in the time of crisis leaving the country at the mercy of the genocide perpetrators. This is one allegation that the UN has not yet responded satisfactorily.

D. UNAMIR's actions of providing sanctuary to the locals who are sought by the RPA for various offenses is seen by them as standing in the way of their system of justice. Similarly, the provision of medical aid to the locals is seen by the Rwandese govt as trying to take over the civil administration of the country as also an attempt to take away the jobs of the Rwandese doctors, pharmacists etc.

E. The Rwandese govt also feels that the presence of UNAMIR is seriously undermining all their efforts to try and bring stability into the country. They feel that with all that UNAMIR has done for the betterment of Rwanda, it has made the locals totally dependent on UN and that the locals no longer regard the govt as an effective one.

F. It is a fact that the presence of UNAMIR formed tps is believed to be vital for the smooth functioning of the various UN agencies and the NGOs as also the Milobs. This is due to the fact that the presence of formed tps gives a sense or aura of security to all the other agencies, but the Rwandese govt still has the objection that providing security is not part of the UNAMIR mandate. Also the question in front of us still remains wether security is really being provided to the locals by the formed tps? This question arises as there is no way that UNAMIR can protect the locals from arrests and detention by the RPA as this would amount to gross interference in the judicial system of Rwanda.

G. UNAMIR has given the reasoning for the presence of the formed tps as to ensure in conjunction with Human Rights, that no violation of Human Rights takes place. The Rwandese govt feels that if it is just a matter of monitoring incidents of human rights violations, then this can be done by increasing the number of Milobs and the involvement of NGOs and concurrently, reduce the numbers of UN formed tps in Rwanda.

21. These differences between the Rwandese govt and the UNAMIR, though working towards a common goal of bringing back normalcy into Rwanda, has created serious doubts in the minds of people, as to wether UN needs to retain a 6000 strong force of formed tps

or can the task be still achieved by a lesser force.

ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AND DEDUCTIONS.

22. Having seen the various factors, certain important deductions can be drawn based on which the options for UNAMIR can be drawn. These deductions are as under:

A. In view of the prevailing internal situation in Zaire and Burundi, there is a definite need for UNAMIR formed tps in Rwanda to cater for any potential fallout from the political turmoil in the region.

B. In case the volcanoes in Zaire erupt, it will result in catastrophic consequences for Rwanda as the mass influx of refugees from the Goma region, will place an impossible burden on the already fragile economy of the country as also the fact that, the security situation would definitely deteriorate. In this eventuality, the presence of UN formed tps as also NGOs in Rwanda will most definitely increase as the present strength would be grossly inadequate.

C. The future working of the NGOs as also the Milobs, depends directly on the prevalent security situation in Rwanda and this safe working environment can only be achieved by the physical presence of formed tps at this time.

D. A much more deeper understanding between UNAMIR and the Rwandese govt is essential to remove the misinterpretations regarding the role of UN tps in Rwanda. It must be made clear to the govt that the UNAMIR tps are not shielding fugitives from justice; rather it is a case of giving refuge to locals who are trying to escape the arbitrary arrests of the RPA as the locals have no faith in the judicial system of the country.

E. As regards the two issues of monitoring of Human Rights violations and whether UNAMIR formed tps are providing any security to the locals against arbitrary arrests by the RPA are concerned, both give an important deduction that the strength of formed tps can be decreased.

FUTURE OPTIONS FOR UNAMIR

23. Based on the above quoted facts and analysis, there are basically three main options for UNAMIR in its peace keeping role in Rwanda. These are as under:

A. Option 1. Maintain status quo as regards the strength of formed tps in Rwanda.

B. Option 2. Reduce strength of formed tps and correspondingly increase the number of Milobs and NGOs in Rwanda.

C. Option 3. Increase the strength of formed UNAMIR tps

in Rwanda.

24. It can be appreciated that option 2 is not a practical one to be implemented in Rwanda at present, primarily because of the following critical factors:

A. The present ethnic and political turmoil in the region.

B. The need to provide a secure environment for the effective working of the Milobs and the various NGOs.

C. The ever present threat of the volcanoes erupting in Zaire and its consequences for Rwanda.

D. Given the present security situation in Rwanda where even UN formed tps are being targeted by FRGF/Bandits as also the spate of arbitrary arrests by the RPA, reduction in strength of formed tps would result in consequences like they existed from April to July 1994.

25. Keeping in view the above facts, it is clear that either option 1 or option 3 needs to be exercised. Option 3 has the disadvantage that it would involve extra expenditure for the UN which, given the present precarious position of the availability of funds, may not be a viable option.

Recommended Option.

26. In view of the above, the recommended option is Option 1 because of the following advantages:

A. No additional expenditure is involved.

B. The present strength of formed tps in Rwanda is sufficient to cater for the contingency of the volcanoes in Zaire erupting as also to cater for any fallout of an ethnic or political turmoil in the neighbouring countries.

C. The current deployment of the formed tps, provides adequate security to ensure the safe working of the Milobs and NGOs.

D. In case of the situation deteriorating to an extent that evacuation of UNAMIR from Rwanda is warranted, the present strength of approx 6100 can easily be evacuated in an acceptable time frame.

27. Although option 2 has the maximum advantages, the issues of UNAMIR's interference with the Rwandese system of justice and other factors which are the bone of contention between the two, have to be addressed at the earliest and sorted out amicably.

CONCLUSION

28. There is no doubt in anybody's mind that UNAMIR has done yeoman service in Rwanda in trying to bring peace to this war

torn country. Repair to roads and bridges, medical assistance, providing security to the local population and assisting in other humanitarian activities, have gone a long way in improving the situation in Rwanda and this proves the necessity of maintaining the presence of formed UN tps till such time that the situation comes to normal.

29. Efforts now need to be made at the highest level of political and military hierarchy, to ensure that the minor misunderstandings between the Rwandese govt and UNAMIR are sorted out, so that the common aim of bringing peace to the country is achieved at the earliest, thus making the UNAMIR one of the most successful UN missions in the world.
