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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
General Debate

1432nd Meeting, 7 October 1966

BELGIUM

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1432

7 October 1966

Ph.P/sr

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

BELGIUM

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, M. Pierre Harmel, addressed the General Assembly on 7 October 1966 (A/PV.1432).

UN ORGANIZATION

The Secretary-General

Mr. Harmel thanked U Thant for his accomplishments and hoped to prevail upon him to continue in his present post.

Belgium would accordingly like to refer to a number of points in the Secretary-General's Annual Report, i.e. to support his proposal for a study of the consequences of nuclear weapons and follow the Secretary-General in his search for a strategy of peace, to study the means of calling upon those who had not as yet subscribed to the Charter and to see to it that those who deserved the confidence of the Organization were not denied it.

Membership

Once the PRC gave a concrete sign of contributing to the security of Asia, Belgium would be anxious to have the PRC associate itself more broadly with peaceful construction within the United Nations. At that time nobody should act as if the 13 million of Taiwan Chinese did not count as against the 700 million of Continental China. A country like Belgium could not accept such "sordid calculations".

OTHER AGENDA ITEMS

Disarmament and related items

The two European groups must foster, if possible for the world at large and in any case in Europe, an effort in the three directions of non-proliferation,

underground tests and a stabilization, followed by a reduction - progressive and necessarily parallel - in armed forces and military budgets.

Belgium, for her part, was ready to subscribe to a non-proliferation treaty establishing an acceptable balance between the present nuclear powers. She appealed to such powers to speed up the signing of such an agreement.

In the very spirit of the European détente Belgium wanted, in harmony with the efforts of her allies and to the degree that the détente would benefit thereby, to stabilize her armed forces and military budget.

Economic development and trade

There should be several approaches to development and yet overall co-ordination at the world level. In this light Europe attached particular significance to the work of UNCTAD. The second conference should lead to precise results, influencing world trade with a view to supplementing the effects of technical assistance and financial aid.

Belgium's effort of assistance and co-operation was proportionately equalled by few countries. For historical reasons an important part of that effort was concentrated in the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, in spite of the difficulties encountered.

Yet Belgium was not indifferent to the economic and social problems of other countries, whether in Asia, Africa or Latin America. Within the limits of her means and in the respect of her commitments Belgium would more broadly cooperate with an ever greater number of countries.

Regional cooperation and the U.N.

Mr. Harmel endorsed the statements of previous speakers who have urged regional cooperation in the area of economic development. Noting the geographical and historical factors which should make regional cooperation advantageous, he suggested that the UN should give its moral support and material aid to the regional groupings in the developing countries and should use them as a channel for its activities.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS NOT ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA

Viet-Nam

It should be noted that the United States and other countries were giving aid, as requested, to the Government of South Viet-Nam, as they could not let South Viet-Nam be crushed. On the other hand, North Viet-Nam was helping

the NFL and was struggling so as not to yield its independence to its neighbours.

The United States had unequivocally stated its position and its sincerity could not be doubted. Mr. Goldberg asserted that his country was ready to end the bombing of North Viet-Nam if this should be promptly followed by corresponding de-escalation by the other side. He suggested that a gradual, controlled withdrawal of all foreign forces could be arranged through a negotiated timetable. He declared that his country was ready to negotiate with the opponent a settlement based on a strict respect of the Geneva agreements.

The Secretary-General had recommended a cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam followed by a substantial reduction in military activities of all the parties interested in South Viet-Nam as a prelude to a negotiated settlement with the participation of the NFL.

Mr. Gromyko insisted on the unconditional cessation of bombings, a withdrawal of the forces of the United States and its allies and the need to guarantee that the Vietnamese people themselves could solve their problems.

While these positions were still far from one another, they were not irreconcilable and were not therefore ruling out any hope of a negotiated settlement.

The time has come when a major choice must be made, more political than military, as was described by President Kennedy in the autumn of 1963. He, more than anyone else, embodied the courage which is needed so much by the leaders and heads of great powers and states who carry an extraordinary burden of responsibility. President Kennedy perceived that it would necessary, in the light of global policy, to come to the conclusion:

"We are now very close to that critical moment of the final choice between the risks of a more total war and those of a reciprocal de-escalation and a negotiated solution".

Once the first step was taken, there must be a realistic discussion. At that critical point the great powers committed in Asia, the USSR and China, must act, to strengthen the side which would take the first peaceful step.

In order to make that second step easier, the United Nations should make a collective, solemn appeal for a negotiation between the interested parties, making it clear that negotiation was not surrender. It was not too early to

examine the terms of such an appeal. The first act of de-escalation should permit a negotiation which should be prepared now.

Security in Asia

Mr. Harmel observed that there is no machinery at the present time to maintain security in Asia. He noted that President Johnson and the Secretary-General had asserted that security in Asia could not be achieved without China. He went on to suggest that China should reassure its neighbours that it does not intend to carry out acts of aggression in their territories as to overthrow their regimes. The Foreign Minister opined that China's contribution to world peace should begin with China's contribution to security in Asia.

Question of a détente in Europe - Peaceful coexistence

Europe was experiencing no acute conflict. On the contrary circumstances were conducive to an improvement in relations between countries with different political systems and, even better, an increase in exchanges of all kinds, with a view to creating the climate that would permit a settlement of the Continent's great problems such as Germany.

The favourable circumstances were as follows: a will to peace and need for peace shared by all the peoples of Europe and their common anxiety in the face of a deterioration of the world situation and awesome means of destruction; the strengthening of some regional solidarities, ending a dispersal of sterile nationalistic policies; a tuning down of ideological confrontation due to peaceful coexistence and a relative balance between the two defensive systems. Defense was better organized within large frameworks; and Atlantic collective security had increased mutual respect.

A quieter Europe should therefore set an example of peaceful collaboration, a détente and increased co-operation - internal and external.

Europe should participate in world development, and the two rival groups should set an example in the field of disarmament, at least as far as Europe and her Governments were concerned.

Belgium believed that there were three conditions for peace on a particular continent: appropriate military defense; political conditions based on the Charter, social conditions requiring a multiplication of exchanges, and the golden rule of a refusal of preventive or ideological wars.

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Date:

10 Oct. 1966

CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

A.E. Nesterenko,
Under-Sec'y, PSCA.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

10 October 1966
PhP:pmm

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1432nd Meeting, 7 October 1966

YUGOSLAVIA

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

YUGOSLAVIA

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, M. Marko Nikezic, addressed the General Assembly on 7 October 1966 (A/PV.1432).

UN Organization

(a) General

Although the work of the General Assembly was normalized at the 20th session, subsequent developments had not seen improvement in the role of the United Nations, which was unable to defend Members subjected to pressure and attempts at foreign intervention.

The facts and views expressed by "our eminent Secretary-General" in the Introduction to the Annual Report confirmed the gravity of the situation and a need for re-establishing confidence in the United Nations.

While in earlier crises the United Nations was in a better position to intervene, there were in recent years a trend towards solving major political questions outside the United Nations. The reason was primarily that certain Powers had reservations as to a more active UN role. Yet the major Powers had every possibility under the Charter to protect their legitimate interests. At the same time they were duty-bound to help make the United Nations more efficient. Efforts by certain Powers to force solutions upon other countries were neither in keeping with a stabilization of the international situation nor their own interests.

All countries, rich or poor, needed the United Nations, which could but work in conformity with the principles of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation on a basis of equality.

The maintenance of peace and the liquidation of foreign domination could only be secured through an implementation of the Charter and peaceful coexistence.

Such was the objective of the non-aligned countries. Many newly independent nations had adopted this policy and other countries while still members of alliances were showing attitudes close to non-alignment.

(b) Universality of Membership - China

The basic international problems could not be solved without the participation of the widest group of countries. Absence of the PRC was the Organization's main shortcoming, and its right could only be questioned at the expense of peace and the other States' own interests. Yugoslavia accordingly supported the PRC Government's right to represent that country in the Organization.

Since universality was indispensable in the United Nations, Yugoslavia had always favoured the admission of all States. Conditions were now ripe for all divided countries also to become Members if they so desired.

Other Agenda Items

(a) Colonialism and related items

The colonialists and the various interests allied to them had entrenched themselves notably in the south of Africa and were trying to resume an offensive. Either all African peoples would be free or emancipation itself would be questioned again everywhere. The peoples of Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, Aden, South Africa and South West Africa were compelled to struggle for their elementary rights and the United Nations had a duty to help them acquire independence.

It was disappointing that the International Court of Justice had turned a deaf ear to the claims of the peoples of South West Africa. Racial discrimination and apartheid were a challenge to the international community and the United Nations should consider appropriate measures and adopt a programme of action.

(b) Disarmament and related items

An absence of political will had prevented an agreement on disarmament. Even the poorer countries were spending more on armaments.

Practical efforts should be made towards partial measures, on which the viewpoints were closer. First, it was necessary to stop proliferation. Then new possibilities should be sought for dealing with general disarmament. One such path was through a world conference.

(c) Economic Development and related problems

In view of the problems facing newly independent States, and other developing countries, and of outside pressure and intervention, the United Nations should

consider a wider programme in the political, economic, social and educational fields so that the international community may efficiently guide those countries.

A joint action should be discussed at this session.

The new international development policy had not always achieved practical results, due mainly to a lack of political will on the part of some industrialized countries. Such matters were pressing, and the Geneva Conference would have a decisive importance, mainly in the implementation of the various initiatives already taken.

Political problems not on the General Assembly's agenda

(a) Viet-Nam

While a policy of strength and efforts at domination based on pressure, including armed force, were noticeable elsewhere in Asia and Africa, the war in Viet-Nam remained the major problem - and a world problem since the great Powers' interests were involved and the conflict reflected the great dilemma of our time. Foreign intervention had not so far broken the will of the Vietnamese people, confirming that force would not prevent the peoples from securing independence and choosing their social regimes.

Yugoslavia which had always supported the right of the people of Viet-Nam to solve their own internal affairs, condemned foreign intervention and the bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, a sovereign, independent country.

Yugoslavia had always held the view that it was possible to end the war, while guaranteeing the Vietnamese people the attainment of independence and a choice of their internal system. Inasmuch as US armies were on foreign soil, it was up to the United States to take the first step, i.e. a final cessation of the bombing of the DRV and recognition of the NFL as partner in the negotiations. It would then be possible to seek a solution on the basis of the Geneva Agreements.

In order to envisage a political solution, foreign troops must leave, as stated on 21 January 1966, by the Yugoslav Government. Unless the United States committed itself to withdrawing its forces within a given period of time, what guarantees would the Vietnamese people have - if there was negotiation in the presence of foreign troops without any prospect of their withdrawal?

Further, all interested parties must declare their readiness to accept any internal political solution which the people of South Vietnam would freely choose, without foreign interference.

Should the Vietnamese people be in a position freely to decide their own fate, and should there be military disengagement of external Powers in former Indochina, while those countries refrained from participation in military alliances - a new era of development and cooperation could open.

Neither the American people could want this war, nor could its ending harm US interests, or the fact that the Vietnamese people freely decided their own fate hurt US prestige. On the other hand a continuation of the war did hurt US prestige - as well as that of the United Nations.

(b) East-West relations, detente in Europe

There had been in the past few years less tension in East-West relations, and the advent of new independent States was a positive factor, as well as the fact that obstacles to independent policies were diminishing.

This was true above all in Europe where several countries, although belonging to certain alliances, were collaborating economically and politically, in their own interests and those of peace in Europe.

While great problems remained unsolved, there was a feeling that the future did not belong to military blocs, even though these could not be expected simply to disappear.

The strengthening of peace in Europe could but improve the situation in other regions as well, and prospects for greater European assistance to developing countries.

Yugoslavia, which has never believed in the usefulness or future of military blocs, has long since been working for bilateral cooperation while at the same time participating in efforts for a solution at the European level. The co-sponsors of the draft of resolution 2129 (XX) were now preparing a meeting of the representatives of European Parliaments and were ready to take new initiatives. There were new moods and new paths were opening up.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1434th Meeting, 10 October 1966

SWEDEN

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
General Debate

SWEDEN

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Torsten Nilsson, addressed the General Assembly on 10 October 1966 (A/PV.1434).

UN Organization

General

The United Nations could not, he said, be in the midst of a crisis as long as Members used it for consultations and for joint action. Yet, it was faced with almost supra-human tasks.

The Secretary-General

The office of Secretary-General occupied a vital position for the functioning of the United Nations. U Thant, a man of rare skill and deep wisdom, enjoyed the respect and affection of all. Sweden hoped that U Thant would find it possible, and all Members would do what they could to make it possible for him, to continue in office.

Membership

It would not be in the UN interest that a Government which for almost two decades had ruled the mainland of China should not also be allowed to take China's United Nations place.

Peace-keeping

The Committee of 33 on Peace-keeping had not achieved any results. The smaller powers have failed to commit themselves on questions where the opinions of the great Powers differed.

The General Assembly and other UN organs, should make new, careful attempts to improve UN capacity to work actively for peace. If the United Nations were to let it be understood that no new peace-keeping operations were ever possible, or even desirable, the Organization would be deprived of one of its most valuable instruments.

Other Agenda Items

Colonialism and related problems

There was a set of interrelated problems in Southern Africa. South Africa had sympathy for the Smith regime. Portugal had friends in Pretoria. The South

African Government was so blind in its racial policy that South-West Africa had reached a tragic stage.

Southern Rhodesia

While Sweden was not in favour of calling for the use of force in Southern Rhodesia, economic sanctions should now be used fully. Sweden had broken all relations with the Rhodesian regime since, in her view, sanctions must be applied completely and consistently. Since the beginning of the crisis Sweden found it justified to describe the situation in Southern Rhodesia as a threat to the peace, in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter.

The slow effect of sanctions was due to the fact that they had been largely ignored by South Africa and Portugal and not consistently applied by other countries. The Security Council would be justified in deciding upon mandatory economic sanctions.

South-West Africa

South Africa by its deeds had forfeited every right to administer this territory. The United Nations should accordingly revoke the mandate. How the United Nations should fulfill its responsibility for the territory was a question that should be carefully studied.

Apartheid

In addition to tension in Africa, co-existence of different races in the future was at stake. Apartheid must therefore be considered a threat against international peace and security.

The Security Council should tackle the problem anew, on the basis of the Expert Committee's report. A study should be made of the problem of equitable sharing of the economic burdens resulting from sanctions. While large economic interests were involved, it would be possible through international co-operation and solidarity to master these economic consequences.

Sweden was prepared to increase its contribution to UN activities for help to the victims of apartheid and for training. Sweden along with the other Nordic countries would make proposals regarding co-ordination of the various programmes.

Disarmament

Concerning non-proliferation, the respective positions had been more clearly defined. The non-aligned delegations in Geneva had concentrated on certain other partial measures which might be important to stop further spread of nuclear weapons in the form of national production, and which would also comprise certain obligations on the part of the nuclear powers. National production of nuclear weapons would, of course, become impossible in case of a test ban treaty

covering all tests and of a ban on production of fissionable material for military purposes.

Much of the preparatory work for a comprehensive test ban treaty was already completed. Sweden had worked on an international exchange of seismological data.

While the ENDC had not reported concrete results, Sweden suggested that its mandate should be renewed as it was useful for technical discussions and reminded the great Powers of their particular responsibilities.

Sweden approved the proposal of the Secretary-General on an extensive study of nuclear weaponry, since there may be a tendency to under-estimate the horrors of a nuclear war.

Economic Development

Four-fifths of UN staff were active in economic and social development, on which financial contributions were overwhelmingly spent.

As the gap between the richer and poorer countries was widening, and the population explosion threatened to nullify efforts to raise the per capita income, efforts should be intensified to assist the developing countries to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth.

Political problems not on the Agenda

Vietnam

If the United Nations was to continue as an effective instrument of international security, it must face every situation that endangered peace, that is inter alia try to contribute to a peaceful solution of a conflict which paralyzed progress in other fields.

The war in Vietnam brought untold suffering and destruction to the people and threatened peace in Asia and possibly in the whole world. There was in international public opinion an overwhelming "No" to a continuation of the conflict, and an affirmative reply to a return to the basic Geneva principles, to be reinforced by additional guarantees.

It was for the people of South Vietnam to decide their own future, their form of government and social structure. The question of unification should be kept open, to be decided by the people themselves. The difficulty was to ensure that the result of a popular consultation should be recognized by all. No real consultation could take place in the presence of foreign troops and in circumstances of intimidation and terror.

The North was unwilling to talk until it trusted US willingness to withdraw and to respect South Vietnamese neutrality, once peace was restored. The United States was unwilling to commit itself to a timetable for withdrawal without previous guarantees that the people of South Vietnam should be allowed to express their own will freely and under appropriate international supervision. In order to make negotiations possible, Sweden shared the Secretary-General's views. Firstly a cessation of the bombing might provide a key to a peaceful solution. Secondly, further escalation must be avoided and a gradual reduction of military activities be initiated. The US offer must be seriously considered by all.

Was it unreasonable to suggest that the party disposing of a clear numerical superiority take the first step? Was it then unreasonable to suggest that a response be given by the other parties?

Thirdly, all belligerent parties, including the NLF, should participate in the negotiations if these were to lead to a durable solution.

The US statement encouraged Sweden to believe that a solution along these lines would ultimately prove to be within the realm of the possible. The United States had expressed a desire to see the conflict ended. If the Secretary-General's conditions were fulfilled, the hope would grow that peace in freedom would come to the people of Vietnam.

Détente in Europe

In spite of the increased international tension caused largely by the war in Vietnam, no lowering of the political temperature had been registered in Europe where there was increased mobility and rapidly increasing contacts, not least between the Eastern and Western peoples. Sweden considered this trend worth encouraging.

ROUTING SLIP

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A: The Secretary-General

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Date:
11 Oct. 1966
CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:
DE A.E. Nesterenko,
Under-Secretary, PSCA.
A.E. Nesterenko

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1434th Meeting, 10 October 1966

POLAND

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1434

11 October 1966

Ph.P/flr

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

POLAND

The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Jozef Winiewicz, addressed the General Assembly on 10 October 1966 (A/PV.1434).

UN ORGANIZATION

Secretary-General

Against the background of the South-East Asia crisis, U Thant's attitude could be better understood. He had played a useful role in the United Nations and enjoyed trust and confidence. His departure would be a great loss, and Poland would rejoice if he continued in office.

Membership

The principle of universality still awaited its implementation. The refusal to admit the representatives of the PRC - inhabited by one quarter of world's population - while those from Taiwan who represented nobody were seated, undermined UN authority and effectiveness.

In accordance with the principle of universality, Poland supported the application of the GDR - a State with a highly developed economic potential, stabilized internal situation and policy of peace.

Every State should be permitted to take part in UN work at least through an observer. As U Thant rightly stated, this should be beneficial both for the States concerned and the Organization as a whole; and it was time to abolish limitations that made the realization of this unquestionable requirement impossible.

Peace-Keeping

Although UN shortcomings and failures had been ascribed to the lack of an institutionalized form of UN intervention in international conflicts, U Thant had pointed out that UN weaknesses and shortcomings lay not in the UN structure but in world circumstances.

A return to the Charter and the full application of its principles should be the greatest UN concern.

Once an end was put to real violations of the Charter, the whole discussion on peace-keeping would become pointless.

OTHER AGENDA ITEMS

Korean Question

The situation in South Korea whose occupation by American troops made peaceful unification impossible is incompatible with Charter principles on national independence and sovereignty.

Colonialism and related items

[US] policy from the position of strength emboldened regimes based on exploitation and racial discrimination - those in South Africa and Rhodesia; made it possible for South Africa to defy the whole civilized world on South West Africa; led to an extension of military bases on foreign territories including Non-Self-Governing Territories, contrary to UN decision; and ran counter to the legitimate and lawful movement for national and social liberation in Vietnam.

The Charter prohibited interference in other States' internal affairs and provided for the observance of sovereignty and national independence, as well as respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. Yet the colonial system was still maintained in large areas and attempts were being made to subject newly emerged States to economic and other means of neo-colonial pressures.

Disarmament

While Poland supported regional, collateral measures (see Europe below), she consistently supported general and complete disarmament. Yet the armaments race was gaining speed.

The question of a general treaty on non-proliferation was most ripe for a solution. It should exclude proliferation in any form, ruling out the creation of a third category of States which would have, through military alliances, access to nuclear weapons, would keep the finger on the nuclear trigger or influence the decision to use those weapons.

Poland, sparing no effort for disarmament in Geneva and elsewhere, had hosted in Poland the 1966 Pugwash Conference.

The voice of scientists was as important as that of statesmen and politicians; and public opinion should also be made aware of the effects of weapons of mass destruction. A Polish draft resolution in the First Committee would, eventually, deal with this question.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS NOT ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA

Viet-Nam

While no UN discussion could fail to reflect the world crisis, the United Nations was not called upon to solve the problem and for well-known reasons should refrain from taking any formal steps, resolutions or declarations on the matter.

Some statements had distorted the question, labelling the people of Viet-Nam - fighting for their rights - as the guilty party; aggression by a great power as defence against aggression; violations of DRV sovereignty as actions intended to bring about negotiations; violations of the Geneva Agreements as fulfilment of commitments; the imposition by force of a military junta as self-determination; and mock elections as defence of democracy.

There was nothing new in the US "new" peace proposals; and the mechanics of escalation went on with each so-called peace move. In the words of the New York Times, actions spoke louder than words.

Nevertheless a people liberated from colonial domination would submit to no foreign dictate, and would continue to receive ever-growing support and assistance from all those who cherished progress and peace.

There could be no negotiations as long as bombing continued or a threat to resume it persisted; nor could there be genuine negotiations as long as the aggressor tried to secure in advance what could not be achieved through military means. Finally negotiations had to be conducted with the real parties, the NFL - the only true representative of the interests of the Vietnamese people in the South - and the DRV a sovereign state wantonly attacked. The demands of those whose rights

had been trampled upon by the aggressor should be taken as the basis for any such talks.

US policy in Vietnam carried the menace of spreading war into new regions.

Further a policy from the position of strength encouraged cold war and expansionist forces, as well as colonial regimes.

As indicated by the President of the General Assembly in his opening statement there could be no illusions that the Vietnamese people could be subjugated; and the conflict should be solved in accordance with the Geneva Agreements. As long as it lasted, the crisis was an obstacle to the solution of many international problems in other regions.

Détente in Europe

As made clear in the Bucharest Statement of the Warsaw Pact members, should Nato be dissolved, the Warsaw Pact would cease to exist. Europe's division should be replaced by an effective system of collective security. Yet, as long as the armaments race continued and there were dangers connected with the application of the policy from the position of strength, the East could not weaken their preparedness for defense. They were therefore willing to implement a series of partial, tension-reducing measures, the importance of which would be successively increased. Hence the Rapacki and Gomulka plans, which remained fully applicable to-day.

Poland had also been discussing with her allies and other European governments a regional, controlled agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, simultaneously with reduction of troops, and the summoning of an international conference on security and co-operation in Europe, as suggested by Poland two years ago. Numerous valuable suggestions had been put forward. Encouraged by the interest and understanding in Europe, Poland would continue consultations on a European Conference, which should be carefully prepared and should concentrate first of all on problems of security. At the Conference, a Declaration could be issued on co-operation in maintaining and strengthening European security. Also the mutual relationship among the three existing economic groupings could be discussed, as well as economic co-operation on the basis of mutual benefits, and scientific, technical and cultural exchanges.

Cooperation between all European States, with no exception, and the relaxation of tension could make it possible to deal with so far unsolved controversial political problems. This, however, would not be done before the final stage of the process.

The German problem in the light of the historical experience, must be subordinated to European security; and its solution could be reached only as a result of a historical process - through the lessening of tension, rapprochement of the two German States and the normalization of relations in Europe as a whole. Such an approach meets with an ever increasing understanding, even among those who had opposed it so far.

However the FRG always answers negatively all constructive proposals aiming at starting the process of normalization in Europe; and Bonn statements had been echoed even during the general debate by speakers who had never before indicated interest in European security. This was perhaps the result of FRG propaganda.

The real cause of tension in Europe was not the existence of the two German States but the FRG territorial claims, policy of non-recognition of the GDR and its assertion that it is the sole representative of the German nation, as well as the FRG attempts to obtain access to nuclear weapons, as again made clear on 23 September with a cynical reference to the Charter. Lastly the revival of neo-Nazi forces had alarmed public opinion even in Western countries, although it was the very policy of some of these countries towards the FRG which has encouraged extremist tendencies.

Poland felt that it was high time to encourage forces in the FRG which were striving for peace. The time had come to discard in Europe as elsewhere, the policy from the position of strength, as every progress in Europe was of importance to the whole world.

ROUTING SLIP

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The Secretary-General

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Thanks.
 80/1410

Date:

12 Oct. 1966

FROM:

DE:

A.E. Nesterenko,
 Under-Secretary, PSCA.

CR. 13 (11-64)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1434th Meeting, 10 October 1966

IRELAND

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

IRELAND

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Frank Aiken, addressed the General Assembly on 10 October 1966 (A/PV.1434).

UN Organization

Secretary-General^{1/}

In view of U Thant's magnificent and self-sacrificing work, his decision had caused anxiety. While his office made exceptional demands on the incumbent, it would be of immense value to the Organization and deep satisfaction to Ireland if U Thant felt that he could continue in office.

Ireland strongly supported the suggestion in the Introduction to the Annual Report on a study of nuclear weaponry.

Membership (China)

In 1961 Ireland urged that the United Nations should enter into negotiation in the Far East for securing peace between Peking and Taiwan and settling the question of the two countries' UN representation. A similar suggestion was made by Italy at the 20th Session. If an independent Taiwan became a Member in her own right and left the China seat to be filled by Peking, an area of peace in South East Asia guaranteed by the United Nations and the nuclear powers might be more acceptable.

Again in 1964, Ireland, in the general debate, proposed that the United Nations should negotiate an agreed settlement on the representation of China through the Secretary-General and the four nuclear Powers in the Security Council. In present circumstances it would be more fruitful to have the question explored by the Secretary-General.

^{1/} See also "Membership" for a suggestion that the Secretary-General should explore the question of the representation of China and Taiwan. See "Peace-keeping" for a reference to U Thant's speech of 28 May 1966.

Peace-keeping and UN Finance

A draft resolution similar to that of the ten Powers at the 20th Session would again be tabled at the current session. Mandatory assessments involved the very UN life, otherwise the United Nations would be like a satellite bereft of its source of energy.

On 28 May in Windsor, Ontario, U Thant pointed out that the question was "whether the United Nations would be able to undertake new operations ... when the need ... arises". It should indeed be realized that for a peace-keeping operation costing \$100 million, the assessment would range only from one third of a cent per head for developing countries to 13 cents per head for the five Permanent Members if they all consented, with possible increases for this group with their consent.

Other agenda items

Disarmament (including areas of peace)

The most urgent UN task was to prevent a nuclear spread to new countries and the endless multiplication of stockpiles in nuclear States. Although realization of the danger had increased since 1958, another nuclear power had emerged already.

Should the nuclear powers sign an agreement on non-proliferation, public opinion would prevent non-nuclear States from manufacturing or otherwise procuring ownership or control of nuclear weapons.

Many technically competent States realized the vast difference between a few provocative weapons and the huge arsenals necessary for a people's adequate protection. An inconsiderate step might bring about the very attack which was feared. Moreover, a national stockpile meant a diversion of skills and resources needed to improve the domestic standard of life or help neighbours, and the internal security of nuclear States was a nightmare to their Governments.

Although the retention of existing national arsenals may be unavoidable, until there was an effective collective security system, it would be better if potential nuclear States improved their lives and those of poorer peoples.

International peace should be maintained through neither the extension or perpetuation of power blocs nor their immediate dismantlement, but through "areas of peace". As stated by Ireland since 1958, the United Nations should commence by encouraging and assisting groups of States, particularly in zones of tension, to come together as neutral States and agree not to attack one another and to limit their armaments to police level, on the condition that the

United Nations, backed by the nuclear Powers, would guarantee them against aggression from outside or inside the area.

In 1960, Ireland suggested in the First Committee that an area of law should be considered in South East Asia. On 21 September 1966, the Philippines called the Indonesia-Malaysia agreement "a nucleus of peace and stability". It was hoped that this nucleus would later embrace the lands and seas of South East Asia, including Vietnam.

Economic development and trade
(including liquidity question)

Peace should also be an "enterprise of justice", as a basis upon which to promote the economic, cultural and social problems of all peoples without distinction of race or creed.

In order fully to develop world resources and to make fair trading conditions and additional capital available to the lower income countries, the volume of international money should grow in relation to the increase in output of desirable goods and services. On 28 September 1966, the Irish Minister for Finance urged the planning and putting into operation of a scheme of rational creation of reserve assets, without awaiting the achievement of equilibrium by the two reserve currency countries - which would only accentuate the present difficulties.

The Group of Ten had now agreed that

"... deliberately created reserve assets as and when needed should be distributed to all members of the Fund on the basis of the IMF quotas or some similar objective criteria".

This statement gave hope that the standard of life of low income nations could be raised significantly through a fair system of reciprocal trade and with reasonable aid from the high income States.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1435th Meeting. 10 October 1966

CYPRUS

Meeting No. 1435

12 October 1966

AHO/flr

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

CYPRUS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, addressed the General Assembly on 10 October 1966 (A/PV.1435).

Questions bearing directly on the Organization

(a) General

The United Nations must make sure to avoid the mistakes and unfortunate developments that had led to the collapse of the League of Nations, since this second chance may be the last one. Instead of undermining the authority of the Organization, whether "in connection with the implementation of the Declaration on Colonialism or in connection with reducing the efficiency and role of the United Nations in the field of peace-keeping, ... we must really make a determined effort" to strengthen the United Nations.

(b) The Secretary-General

The Secretary-General's qualities and assets were "more than adequate reasons" for him to retain his post, particularly "at this most difficult time" and because "the United Nations and the world cannot afford to lose his services". Member States must "in turn facilitate his task and assist him to fulfill his great mission". In this, all Member States, in particular the Great Powers, had "a duty to perform".

Items on the Agenda

(a) Colonialism and related matters

While many Non-Self-Governing Territories had been liberated, progress towards the full implementation of the Declaration for the ending of Colonialism had not been sufficient.

It was necessary not to lose sight of the question of the territories under Portuguese administration; the Assembly's attention "rightly focused" on the question of Southern Rhodesia and that of South West Africa which were "doubly obnoxious by being combined with racism". The United Nations "must act beyond adopting well-meaning resolutions" and take "practical steps" for the solution of these questions.

(b) Peace-keeping

A more determined effort should be made "to tackle effectively both the constitutional and the financial aspects" of peace-keeping operations, particularly by the great Powers since they had a special responsibility under the Charter.

(c) Disarmament and related questions

Despite the various efforts at Geneva, complete disarmament remained an "ever elusive goal". While the Partial Test-Ban Treaty had been observed by its signatories, it was disappointing that a formula had not been found for a non-proliferation treaty. The root of the problem was the lack of mutual trust and confidence "in the big and dangerous game of power politics", which the small countries had "to watch patiently and most of the time helplessly in agony".

(d) Economic matters

Although progress had been achieved in the Development Decade, "inequality between the rich and the poor nations" was by and large further increased, and "with it the dangers to the maintenance of peace". Exploitation was still used "at the expense of the poor and the benefit of the rich".

An appreciation was expressed for the manner in which the United Nations Development Programme was carrying out substantial and diverse technical assistance projects in developing countries. The speaker also expressed hope that the programme's activities would increase, since "multilateral assistance given through the United Nations is the most appropriate type of aid to developing countries".

Viet-Nam

Further escalation in the "actual war" in Viet-Nam cannot be ruled out. The extreme gravity of the situation in Viet Nam should oblige the Assembly to consider as a matter of urgency what steps should be taken in order to prevent what might turn out to be a major catastrophe".

The question of who is to be blamed was reduced to a matter of "secondary importance".

Many efforts had been made to meet this situation. In particular, the "most constructive and realistic approach" of the Secretary-General was praiseworthy. His "three points provide the way out from the present tragedy". Nothing could be achieved if each one of the parties involved "waits for the other to take the initiative". One had to "take courageously the first step in the right direction". Surely "a new situation would arise" if the United States "were to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam without any conditions or limitations and while this session of the General Assembly is in progress". From the reaction to such a step "it would be clear to everybody what might or should be done next". There "should be a start and we feel that the most powerful must pave the way". Such a first step would hopefully "create the necessary conditions for the Secretary-General to pursue further his peace-making initiatives".

Other matters

(a) Political questions

Mr. Kyprianou referred to political questions such as the agreements reached between Indonesia and Malaysia and India and Pakistan. Concerning the problem of the Palestine refugees, he said that the situation was "far from satisfactory" and had to be solved since it continued to "present a threat to peace". He added that the "potentially most dangerous problems of Germany and that of the other divided nations have still to be solved".

(b) The Cyprus question

The problem was not on the agenda since the Assembly last year had adopted "a resolution which is in conformity with the principles of the Charter and in accordance with the ideals for which the United Nations stands".

The Cyprus Government wished to express once again its sincere appreciation to all those connected with the direction, composition and financing of UNFICYP. The Government, in co-operation with the Force, had been "doing its utmost to reduce tension and to bring about as much as possible a return to normality". The basic position of Cyprus remained unchanged, namely, that its future "must be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of Cyprus".

In order to facilitate a solution, "the Government had consented, to the confidential talks which were undertaken a few months ago between the Governments of Greece and Turkey". If, as a result of this dialogue, tension in the area "is further reduced and if a solution to the problem of Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter and acceptable to the people of Cyprus, is facilitated, then such a result will be warmly welcomed by my Government". However, "should this effort fail... other initiatives will have to be considered in conformity, always, with the Charter and in the light of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1965". Until the solution is reached, "there seems to be the necessity for the United Nations presence in Cyprus to continue". This specific issue would be taken up by the Security Council in due course.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General
 As:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

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Mar 17/10

Date:

13 October 66

CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE

A. E. Nesterenko
 Under-Secretary, PSCA.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1436th Meeting, 11 October 1966

THE UNITED KINGDOM

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1436

11 October 1966

JJ:mmm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. George Brown, addressed the General Assembly on 11 October 1966 (A/PV.1436). He stated that he agreed with the diagnosis contained in the Secretary-General's Annual Report: the Secretary-General "is acting as the keeper of our conscience", he added. Although the major aspect of the speech dealt with the British proposals for ending the war in Vietnam, he also dealt with issues relating to the UN Organization, the office of the Secretary-General, membership, peace-keeping and peace-making, colonial questions, disarmament and economic issues.

United Nations

Mr. Brown proclaimed the faith of the Labour Government and the United Kingdom in the United Nations and all it stood for. He noted that the United Nations had a moral force in the world, and he appealed to the Members to help in strengthening the Organization. He warned Members not to over-burden the Organization: in this context, he cautioned Members not to think that a resolution which has no connexion with reality is a substitute for action. Finally he appealed to Member States to make the United Nations a centre for harmonizing the interests of its members.

Secretary-General

Mr. Brown noted the intention of U Thant to remain in office until the end of the present Session of the General Assembly, and expressed the wish that the Secretary-General would find it possible to continue in office.

Membership

The Foreign Secretary expressed the deepest conviction that all people of the world should be represented in the United Nations. He urged that the CPR be represented there.

Items on the Agenda

Peace-keeping and peace-making

Mr. Brown suggested that one area in which the United Nations could be strengthened was that of peace-keeping and peace-making. He regretted the lack of progress in the Committee of 33 dealing with peace-keeping operations. He observed that some Members of the UN wanted to make the Organization an effective peace-keeping machinery, while others wanted to circumscribe this role. Noting that it would be difficult to reconcile these divergent positions, he nevertheless put forward the following suggestions which, he said, would replace the present ad hoc basis of peace-keeping organization.

"First, Governments must earmark contingents; second a common military doctrine is required so that the earmarked forces can work together; third, we need a planning organization here in New York at the centre; fourth, more countries should come forward with voluntary financial contributions; I would earnestly ask those who oppose those steps to take another long hard searching look at the problem."

Mr. Brown noted the link between peace-keeping and peace-making -- that is, the settlement of the disputes before they reach the stage of armed conflict, or the removal of causes of conflict once it has broken out. In this connexion he recalled the peace-keeping item introduced by the United Kingdom at the last Session of the General Assembly. He then urged Members to give serious consideration to this item when it is discussed at the present Session.

Human Rights

The speaker called for vigorous action in the field of human rights, and informed the Assembly that the British Government would that day sign the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination.

Colonialism

Mr. Brown asserted that the United Kingdom was rapidly liquidating its colonial empire and that his Government would offer independence to the remaining colonial territories under conditions which would sustain that independence.

-- South Arabia and Aden

Mr. Brown recalled that the United Kingdom had agreed to offer independence to South Arabia in 1968; he also noted that the United Kingdom this year decided to withdraw its military bases from Aden when South Arabia

becomes independent. He informed the Assembly of the United Kingdom's decision to accept the 1963 and 1965 GA resolutions on Aden which, inter alia, called for the withdrawal of military bases. He pointed out that the United Kingdom had also informed the Secretary-General that it would be glad to co-operate with a special commission from the United Nations to recommend political steps for the full implementation of those resolutions. He expressed hope that the Secretary-General would find "the right men" to serve on this commission.

-- Rhodesia

Mr. Brown reiterated his Government's commitment to bring the rebellion in Rhodesia to an end. He recounted the agreements reached at the recent Commonwealth Conference, and then stated the conditions by which Britain hoped to bring about the independence of Rhodesia under majority rule. He told the Assembly that the purpose of the visit to Rhodesia of the UK Attorney General and the Commonwealth Secretary was to make known to the Rhodesians the consequences of failure to end the rebellion. One consequence would be a request by the United Kingdom, with the support of the Commonwealth Members, that the Security Council impose effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

Disarmament

Mr. Brown asserted that the acquisition of nuclear capacity by the CPR and the possibility that more nations might acquire nuclear weapons, were threats to international peace. He went on to suggest that three things could be done to avert the dangers of nuclear conflagration: (a) an agreement on a non-proliferation treaty; (b) an extension of the partial test ban agreement to include underground tests; (c) the participation of the CPR in disarmament negotiations.

Economic questions

Mr. Brown expressed the view that the industrial countries shared a moral responsibility to help new nations; he said that Britain, in spite of her present economic difficulties, would maintain her present level of contributions to multilateral aid programmes. He expressed the hope that progress would be made at next year's UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi on proposals for supplementary financial measures put forward at the 1964 UNCTAD Conference.

Vietnam

Mr. Brown appealed to the Soviet Union, as one of the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, to join Britain in convening a conference to end the war in Vietnam which, he said, could not be solved by military victory but only through peaceful means. He drew attention to what he considered measures taken by the United States to end the war, such as Ambassador Goldberg's proposals in the Assembly. He asserted that the DRV had blocked peaceful settlement in Vietnam by failing to respond to the US "peace" proposals. He then outlined the proposals he made to the Labour Party Conference in Brighton, which, he said, were based on the essentials of the 1954 Geneva agreements. These proposals are as follows:

- A. a conference of the parties to the war and other interested Governments should meet as soon as possible.
- B. As soon as the principle of holding a conference is accepted, the following measures should be carried out:
 - (i) the bombing of North Vietnam by US and South Vietnamese aircraft should cease, and a pledge should be given that bombing would not be resumed unless and until the conference had met and failed, and the war had restarted;
 - (ii) the introduction of US forces and military supplies into South Vietnam should cease, and there should be no further work on military bases;
 - (iii) the dispatch of North Vietnam troops and military supplies to South Vietnam should cease.
- C. As soon as is practicable, the High Command of each side should simultaneously give orders that its forces would not initiate any new aggressive actions. This would be a preliminary to the cease-fire which it should be the first object of the conference to achieve.
- D. While the conference is negotiating the ceasefire, it should also agree on the main principles of a political settlement for Vietnam. This should be based, as both the US Government and the Hanoi Government have repeatedly insisted, on "the essentials of the Geneva Agreement of 1954".
 - (i) there should be free elections held in North and South Vietnam within a specified period -- say two years.
 - (ii) There should be an amnesty for all Vietnamese who have participated on either side and in any capacity, military or civil, in the war. Everyone should be guaranteed personal liberty, safety and civil rights.

(iii) The Government chosen in those elections should freely decide if, when, and on what terms North and South Vietnam should be united as a single State. There should be no intervention by any foreign Power in that decision.

(iv) North and South Vietnam should be neutralized, and should accept obligations not to allow any foreign troops or bases on their respective territories, and not to join any military alliance.

(v) The Governments of the United States of America and North Vietnam should agree on a timetable for the simultaneous withdrawal of their respective forces from South Vietnam, and for the liquidation of any bases they may have established there. A date should be fixed by which this operation would be completed. Again, two years after the ratifications of the political settlement which the Conference drew up would seem to be a good suggestion.

(vi) The armed forces of North and South Vietnam should be reduced and limited by the political settlement drawn up.

Mr. Brown suggested that these measures should be conducted under international inspection and control. He also proposed that when all the measures were implemented, there should be an international campaign of economic and social rehabilitation for North and South Vietnam. He also suggested that the present international Commission of Control could be strengthened by the addition of representatives of other Powers; it could then be made responsible for the execution of the proposed measures. The Commission, he suggested, should have at its disposal an international peace-keeping force similar to those in Sinai and Cyprus.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1435th Meeting, 10 October 1966

GHANA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1435

10 October 1966

C de H/DK:flr

21 ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

GHANA

Major-General E.K. Kotoka, Chairman of the Ghana Delegation, addressed the General Assembly on 10 October 1966 (A/PV.1435). In moderate tones he touched upon all aspects of United Nations activities. Ghana's foreign policy was defined as one of non-alignment and furthering of African unity. In this connexion, the speaker also called for closer co-operation between the OAU and the United Nations and, in particular, between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Office of OAU in New York.

Organizational Questions

(a) Ghana has "always supported U Thant and will continue to support him in his efforts at discharging his great responsibilities as Secretary-General". It is important to create "some of those conditions which will make it possible for him, in good conscience, to accept another term as Secretary-General".

(b) China

The unresolved question of Chinese representation made the solution of the problems in South East Asia more difficult. The principle of universality demanded that "the 700 million people of Mainland China should be properly represented in this Organization. If the problem can be viewed in this way, it can be solved without harming the interests of others".

Items on the Agenda

(a) Disarmament

Because it was disappointed with the progress made so far, the Ghana delegation supported the view held by the Secretary-General and expressed in the Introduction to his Annual Report that "the time had come for an appropriate body of the United Nations to explore and weigh the impact and implications" of all types of weapons.

(b) Peace-keeping

Owing to "financial difficulties and constitutional problems" the United Nations to-day was less equipped to perform this function which, though essential to the existence of the Organization, was even more so "to the integrity and independence of smaller nations". The Ghana delegation will detail its views and endeavours to bring any concrete contributions, together with other smaller Member States, in the appropriate Committee.

(c) Africa

The problems of South Africa are all part of the same problem; colonialism and racism.

(i) South West Africa

The decision of the International Court of Justice has been "a serious blow to efforts aimed at resolving the problem of this mandated territory by peaceful means". As a last chance to solving this problem peacefully, the Ghana delegation introduced the Afro-Asian draft resolution calling for the revocation of South Africa's mandate over South West Africa. The draft resolution outlined the case against South Africa, which had proved itself incapable of discharging its mandate, and prevented the United Nations from exercising its responsibilities over the territory. South West Africa was a colonial territory and therefore the provisions of Resolution 1514, namely, the right to self-determination and independence, were fully applicable.

(ii) Southern Rhodesia

Ghana had always expressed the opinion that the Smith regime could be overthrown only by force. The only effective action, short of the use of force, would be total mandatory sanctions "rigidly and consistently applied" as agreed, even by the United Kingdom, at the Commonwealth conference. The six principles enunciated by the United Kingdom Government as the basis for granting independence to Rhodesia are generally acceptable to Ghana and a special point should be made of withholding independence until majority rule is effectively established. It was up to the United Kingdom now to devise "more effective measures to safeguard the rights of the African majority".

(iii) Portuguese territories

As Portugal will anyhow one day have to leave these territories, "it were better if she left now, gracefully and peacefully".

(iv) South Africa

The speaker was convinced that the situation in South Africa was a threat to international peace and security and that "economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter were the only way of peacefully achieving a settlement". He also commended the efforts of the United States in "heeding the United Nations resolutions banning certain commercial transactions, particularly in armaments".

Other Matters

Viet-Nam

The war should be brought to an end as rapidly as possible but under present circumstances, the United Nations "can do very little to achieve this objective... In such a situation, may not private initiatives and consultations have much better chances of, at least, getting those involved to begin to communicate on the same wave-length about the basic considerations that must go into a negotiated settlement" ?

Social and Economic Questions

(a) Social

Ghana was encouraged about the adoption at the last Assembly of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the measures for its implementation. It hoped that this Assembly would adopt the Draft Covenants on Human Rights.

(b) Economic development

The substantial flow of capital from the developed countries, which characterized the last decade has ironically levelled off since the time the Development Decade started. The difficulties connected with securing capital made the immediate establishment of a Capital Development Fund imperative. Lending conditions should be liberalized in order to ease the burden of debt-servicing, which is off-setting the benefits to be derived from loans. The objectives of the Development Decade could only be obtained if industrialization was accelerated, and the Ghana delegation hoped that the resolution on the establishment of an

Organization for Industrial Development will be adopted unanimously.

Economic development was to be achieved essentially through trade, rather than aid, on terms that will allow developing countries to receive remunerative prices for their exports. In this connexion, the Ghana delegation welcomed the establishment of UNCTAD but deplored that "no systematic programmes have yet been formulated to implement the recommendations of the First Conference" and that subsequently, developing countries' share in world trade continues to decline. It also deplored the failure of the 1966 Cocoa Conference to secure "remunerative, equitable and stable prices" for the product of which Ghana was the biggest exporter.

Legal Questions

Ghana participated in the work of committees set up to study legal matters and "was always ready to co-operate in the development and dissemination of international law as the only sure way to peaceful international order".. In spite of its recent decision, the International Court of Justice should be strengthened to become an "effective instrument for the development of a body of international law... dispensing of justice and equity within the framework of an evolving international morality".

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

13 October 1966
PSM:pmm

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1438th Meeting, 12 October 1966

CHINA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1438
12 October 1966
PSM:pmm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

CHINA

The Chairman of the Chinese Delegation, Ambassador Liu Chieh, addressed the General Assembly on 12 October 1966 (A/PV.1438).

Items on the Agenda

(a) Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

China regretted that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had not as yet been able to reach an agreement on this vital issue. This was particularly so since the People's Republic of China, "contrary to the true interests of the Chinese people has ventured into the nuclear field". Ambassador Liu stated that the Peking Government was "opposed to any plan designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons" and that in consequence all the non-communist countries of Asia, including the non-aligned, had to rely on the United States for their defense.

(b) Economic Development

China recognized that the record of the United Nations in the economic field had been impressive, yet in the face of the actual decline "in the standards of living of the bulk of humanity", it was necessary, as the Secretary-General had pointed out in his Annual Report, that more resources be allocated so as to accelerate the rate of economic growth of the poor countries. Ambassador Liu stated that "the Republic of China is a developing country with a notably high rate of economic growth". He noted that the Asian and Pacific Council of which China was a member had been formed not only for purposes of defense but also to promote the economies of its members. In contrast to the progress achieved "in the province of Taiwan", mainland China could only show "stagnation and want".

(c) The question of China

Ambassador Liu described the situation prevailing in the People's Republic of China as chaotic and indicated that "the unprecedented life and death struggle" that is going on might quite possibly lead to a popular uprising. It was argued that since the official position of the Government of the People's Republic of China is to promote subversion "that menaces the independence of the small and weak nations", they "represent a negation of all the principles and purposes" of the Charter. Thus they should not be admitted into the Organization "as the future of the Organization will be placed in jeopardy".

Other questions

Viet-Nam

The war was described as "an aggression conducted from across the northern border of the Republic of Viet-Nam". South Viet-Nam "though small and militarily weak", with the help of its allies was making "progress in the social, economic and political realms" as attested by the recent elections. The Republic of China was appreciative of the efforts of "various governments and individual statesmen" to bring about a peaceful settlement but stressed that "the independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam cannot be bargained away in the name of peace".

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

12 October 1966
PhP:pmm

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1436th Meeting, 11 October 1966

UKRAINIAN SSR

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

UKRAINIAN SSR

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Mr. Dmitri Belokolos, addressed the General Assembly on 11 October 1966 (A/PV. 1436).

UN Organization

General

The Ukrainian SSR considered the United Nations as an arena for active political struggle against imperialism and aggression and for the cause of peace and security of all peoples.

Secretary-General

In view of the prominent role played by U Thant, if he were to express his willingness to remain for an additional term, such decision on his part would meet with the support of the Ukrainian SSR.

Membership (GDR, China)

No State whose policy was aimed at the achievement of UN purposes should be debarred from participation in the activities of international organizations. The GDR should accordingly be admitted to UN membership. The GDR was a particularly important factor for peace in Europe.

The time was long overdue for ending discrimination against the CPR and expelling the followers of Chiang Kai-Shek.

UN Finance

It was hoped that the useful work of the Committee of 14 would contribute to better co-ordination in the UN family and to greater economies of UN funds.

Other items on the General Assembly Agenda

Korea

The Ukrainian SSR had co-sponsored the consideration of the withdrawal of US forces and dissolution of the so-called UNCURK. Consideration of this question would redress the injustice done to the Korean people and put an end to foreign interference under the UN flag.

Non-intervention

Although interference flowed from the very essence of imperialism, the peoples of the world must create insurmountable barriers.

Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic and Cuba, were examples of armed aggression and interference by the United States. The resolution of the US House of Representatives, of 20 September 1965, legalized both direct and indirect interference. In both Houses of Congress there were periodic acts of interference in Ukrainian affairs with the participation of war criminals and traitors who had fled, together with German fascists, from Ukraine to the United States - as well as to West Germany. Interference had become a customary phenomenon on the part of the Government of the United States.

Threat or use of force

Peace and security would stand only to gain if all Members complied with basic principles. The Ukrainian SSR fully supported the Czechoslovak proposal on this question and will also give its support to all proposals in favour of the sovereignty of States and non-interference.

Disarmament

US aggressive actions in South East Asia, and West German revanchism had had their effects in this field. In the ENDC the Western Powers did not show any interest in constructive talks. While the USSR draft on non-proliferation barred all loopholes, the nuclear aspirations of the FRG were being encouraged by the United States and the United Kingdom. This was the main reason why there was no agreement on non-proliferation.

The Ukrainian SSR therefore attached great importance to the present USSR proposal on this question (item 97).

Foreign Bases

Foreign bases were used as a means of pressure on peace-loving peoples and sometimes as a means of direct intervention. US aggressive actions were intimately connected with the utilization of its military bases. US and British bases were anchor points for colonialism and neo-colonialism. In keeping with the Declaration of the Second Conference of non-aligned countries, held in October 1964 in Cairo, and resolution 2105 (XX), the Ukrainian SSR considered that the USSR proposal on this question (item 98) would be an important contribution to peace. As shown by the Palomares (Spain) incident, strategic aircraft carrying nuclear weapons created a threat of atomic explosion by accident.

World public opinion expected concrete and tangible action on disarmament.

Colonialism

While the United Nations had played a role in the emergence of new States, colonialism was in certain regions engaged in a counter-offensive, particularly by Portugal and South Africa, which obtained assistance from Nato, especially from the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Wilson Government aimed at the intensification of US responsibility east of Suez and was carrying out punitive operations in Southern Arabia and Oman and plans to set up military bases in some islands of the Indian Ocean.

Concerning Southern Rhodesia, the plot went far beyond London and Salisbury. The Imperialists were trying to add Southern Rhodesia to the bastions of South Africa and the Portuguese colonies,

In keeping with resolution 2105 (XX), the present session must declare that the continued existence of colonialism was a direct violation of the Charter. As stated in UN resolutions, notably by the Security Council, colonialism threatened peace and security. The United Nations must assist the colonial peoples in gaining freedom and independence.

Economic development and trade

The recommendations of the 1964 Conference of UNCTAD had not been implemented by the Western Powers.

Although there was talk of revising the principles already approved, the Ukrainian SSR was in favour of their rapid, practical implementation.

The United Nations should take radical measures for strengthening the control by the developing countries over their own national resources.

Political problems not on the General Assembly Agenda

Policy of strength and Viet-Nam war

Having broken the Geneva Agreement of 1954, the US interference in South Viet-Nam had been subsequently converted into open aggression. Yet the people of Viet-Nam would liberate their land from US domination.

By bombing the DRV, the United States had assumed responsibility for escalation with all its possible consequences.

The Vietnamese people was contributing to the struggle of all socialist and democratic, peace-loving peoples. In view of the challenge to all Socialist States, these would continue to give assistance as deemed necessary by the DRV Government.

The people of the Ukrainian SSR who lost several million men in the war against the Hitlerite occupationists fully supported USSR assistance to the Vietnamese people against foreign aggression.

In the general debate the peace-loving peoples had demanded that an end should be put to the US aggression. However, US "peace" proposals were always advanced as further escalation was planned. No sooner had Mr. Goldberg made his statement than Mr. McNamara announced a 30% increase in military aircraft.

Talk in the United States of using atomic weapons, of a blockade and a march to the North gave the impression that the United States Government was following an extreme rightist policy - at the risk of a world war.

The forthcoming Manila conference will be a conclave of aggressors.

The appropriate basis for a solution was contained in DRV and NFL proposals. As stated by the DRV Prime Minister on 2 September, genuine peace could only come when full freedom and independence had been secured.

Europe

In the new Washington-Bonn axis there was the atomic weapon at one end and revanchism at the other. A 500,000-strong FRG Army was at the service of a policy of liquidation of the GDR, and revanchism, as noted in a recent report to the twenty-third congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Revanchist circles in the FRG were talking of Western Ukraine as a "negotiable item". The Ukrainian SSR stated that the question of its borders had been settled once and for all.

The problem of European security was essentially that of the creation of a system preventing war. An important aspect was the peaceful settlement of the German problem, that is, the signing of a peace treaty between the two German States, the existence of which was a political reality of post-war Europe.

At the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, a constructive programme had been advanced to strengthen peace and security in Europe.

There was a gratifying increase in the trend in Europe to eliminate barriers in the way of pan-European cooperation and settle issues in a spirit of understanding - the key to collective security in Europe.

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead.

TO: The Secretary-General

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Ther
9/11/66

DATE:
14 Oct. 1966

FROM:

A.E. Nesterenko,
Under-Sec'y, PSCA.

A.E. Nesterenko

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1440th Meeting, 13 October 1966

BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1440

13 October 1966

PhP:mmm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.

The Foreign Minister of the Byelorussian SSR, Mr. Anatoly Gurinovich, addressed the General Assembly on 13 October 1966 (A/PV.1440).

His statement contained both a re-assertion of the common positions of Socialist countries, on agenda issues and on Vietnam, and special emphasis on a proposal to entrust the UN Secretariat with a study of methods used by Western countries in their economic and international trade policies vis-à-vis the developing countries.

United Nations

General

At the 20th Session a number of positive decisions had been made, including resolution 2131(XX) on the inadmissibility of intervention, resolution 2028(XX) relating to the negotiation of a treaty "void of any loopholes" on non-proliferation, and resolution 2105(XX) which requested the colonial powers to liquidate existing military bases in colonial territories and to refrain from creating new ones.

However, there now was an increase in international tension brought about by expanding US aggression in Vietnam, US aggressive actions in Laos and Cambodia, and US provocation of Cuba.

The imperialists and colonialists were ruthlessly dealing with national liberation movements.

The revanchist attitude of the West German militarists, who had US support, threatened the cause of peace.

The present Session could take measures to build on the foundations laid by earlier resolutions; and the Byelorussian SSR would do its utmost to ensure that this Session should contribute to relaxation of international tension and to co-operation among all peoples.

Universality - Membership

In conformity with the principle of universality, the German Democratic Republic should be admitted to membership. The United Nations could only gain by the admission of the first state of workers and peasants in German history -

a peace-loving State strictly adhering to Charter principles.

It was high time that the followers of Chiang Kai-Shek be expelled, and the lawful rights of the PRC be restored.

Other items on the agenda

Korea

The Byelorussian SSR had co-sponsored the consideration of Item 93 on the withdrawal of foreign forces from South Korea and dissolution of UNCURK. Measures to this effect would strengthen peace and UN prestige.

Prohibition of threat or use of force

The Byelorussian SSR approved the decision by Czechoslovakia to submit Item 92.

Non-intervention

The applause greeting the adoption of resolution 2131(XX) had been drowned out by US bombing in Vietnam (see Vietnam below).

Constant interference by the imperialist powers in the affairs of other States called for a warning that those who continued armed intervention and aggression assumed responsibility for all the consequences. The Byelorussian SSR supported the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367).

Disarmament

-- Non-proliferation

The Byelorussian SSR was a co-sponsor of draft resolution (A/C.1/L.368 and Add. 1). Failure of the ENDC to reach agreement was due primarily to US attempts to include provisions which would open the way for West German revanchists to gain access to nuclear weapons, as acknowledged by Senator Clark on 15 July 1966.

-- Underground tests

This problem should be solved by using national means of detecting such explosions.

-- Other disarmament questions

The General Assembly, at the present Session, should call upon the nuclear powers to take upon themselves the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Also important were proposals by Socialist countries on nuclear-free zones, an undertaking by the German States not to acquire nuclear weapons, prohibition of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, etc.

If these partial measures were adopted, and if a world conference on disarmament was summoned, the United Nations would have proceeded from words to deeds.

Foreign Military bases

These were used for the repression of national liberation movements, and not only as a constant threat to neighbouring countries, but for actual aggression against them.

States in which such bases existed could be drawn into military conflicts, and the risk existed of accidental losses of hydrogen bombs. Also, huge spaces were lost for agriculture.

The USSR proposal (A/C.1/L.369) would be a most important step towards total elimination of the problem.

Colonialism and related items

Almost six years after the adoption of resolution 1514(XV), the United Nations had increased its membership and adopted a series of decisions in which colonialism and apartheid were declared a threat to international peace and security, and against mankind. Yet the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, South-West Africa, Aden, Oman and other territories were still under colonial domination.

The Western powers, and even the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, continued providing financial assistance to Portugal and South Africa.

The General Assembly should solemnly censure the colonialists for their failure to carry out UN decisions and should call for their immediate implementation. The year 1967 should become that of the complete liquidation of colonialism.

The General Assembly should ask the Security Council to take charge of the implementation of relevant UN decisions, and to apply the means provided for in Chapter VII to the colonial powers and regimes which do not implement those decisions.

Development and related items

After the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance was set up, to which the Byelorussian SSR had contributed in increasing amounts, there was a sharp increase in the regular programme. Most of these expenses went not to assistance, but to the maintenance of a bureaucratic machinery. Frequently the programme was directed to activities incompatible with the developing countries' sovereign rights.

Further, the Byelorussian SSR had subscribed to the Special Fund, assuming that it would deal with investments. Yet the Special Fund was merged with

the Expanded Programme and, after the merger, all activities were still essentially concentrated upon pre-investment.

The General Assembly should decide that, within the Expanded Programme, surveys and investigations should be subordinated to concrete development plans in the developing countries' interests. The infrastructure should serve the national economy, not foreign capital interests.

The attitude of the Byelorussian SSR in this matter was based on its own experience in restoring its national economy.

Need for UN Study

On the basis of UN figures, developing countries had lost more than \$20,000 million annually as a result of plundering by foreign monopolies. With a view to the protection of the developing countries being ensured by the United Nations, the UN Secretariat should be entrusted with the preparation of a report dealing with the means and methods used by Western countries in their trade and financial policies, resulting in distorted prices in international trade, super profits of invested capital, usurious interest rates, high freight and insurance rates and other methods used to plunder developing countries. A study should also be made of the drain of qualified personnel into the capitalist countries.

The Socialist countries which had no responsibility for the economic backwardness of the developing countries, were assisting them on the basis of the principles of internationalism, equality and mutually profitable co-operation.

Political problems not on the GA Agenda

Vietnam

The United States, although its representative voted in favour of resolution 2131(XX), continued to wage a policy of intervention in Vietnam, which was dangerous to peace. How could US Statements on a peaceful solution be reconciled with bombing of the DRV and escalation? There was in South Vietnam about one US interventionist for 40 inhabitants and, as pointed out in the October 1966 issue of Foreign Affairs, US bombs dropped in Vietnam would, by the end of 1966, exceed the total tonnage of the Pacific campaign in World War II.

Not only had the United States violated the Geneva Agreements, it had drawn into its venture the South Koreans, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines which had already sent troops to South Vietnam, and some Asian countries whose bases were utilized by the US aggressors.

The United States had decided to paralyze the life of the DRV and was committing systematic destruction in the South, using even napalm and poison gases,

prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Agreement.

The United States, instead of accepting the proposals of the DRV and NLF, stated that they were prepared to stop bombing of the DRV if the patriotic forces of the South would capitulate. The United States was allegedly prepared to withdraw its troops as other foreign troops were withdrawn. Yet in South Vietnam there were only the forces of the United States and its co-aggressors.

While many representatives, reflecting the will of their peoples, had called for the immediate cessation of US aggression, others had been less consistent. Thailand had tried to justify the hostile action of the United States and her own violations.

The Byelorussian SSR demanded the immediate cessation of the bombing of the DRV and the withdrawal of the US and Allied troops from South Vietnam so as to create conditions under which the Vietnamese people could decide their own affairs.

The German Question

The Federal Republic of Germany's nuclear ambitions were linked with its policy of revision and revenge.

Since 1955 the Bundeswehr had been increased ten times and now attained the striking force of the Wehrmacht. Together with the activities of militaristic neo-Nazi organizations, West German rearmament brought fear among the European peoples.

The Byelorussian SSR which had lost some 2,500,000 men in World War II, supported the programme for the solution of European problems adopted in July 1966 at Bucharest by the Warsaw Pact members.

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The Secretary-General

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15.10.66

CR.13 (11-64)

FROM

DE:

A. E. Nesterenko
Under-Secretary, PSCA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

15 October 1966
PhP:pmm

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1441st Meeting, 13 October 1966

ITALY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1441
13 October 1966
PhP:pmm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

ITALY

The Chairman of the Delegation of Italy, Senator Attilio Piccioni, addressed the General Assembly on 13 October 1966 (A/PV.1441).

UN Organization

Secretary-General

Italy noted with satisfaction U Thant's decision to remain in office until the end of the Assembly and his promise to give serious consideration to the Security Council appeal.

This appeal no doubt recognized U Thant's great services - notably his visit and address to the Council of Europe - and a fear of a replacement's consequences for the UN future.

Precisely because Italy sympathized with U Thant's reasons in his statements and report, Italy believed that the present crisis could only be overcome by a common effort in which his assistance would be extremely desirable.

Membership

As pointed out by Italy at the 20th session, the entire community must be present within the UN family and all Members must fulfil Charter obligations.

As regards China, present procedures were inadequate. The attitude of Peking on disarmament and current conflicts was not conducive to removing objections to its admission.

In the circumstances those who underestimated the gravity of the situation should induce Peking to change its position.

Secondly those who held the problem to be almost insoluble should consider the use of appropriate procedures and instruments, new if necessary, to permit the Organization discreetly to investigate the problem, and the conditions, means and time needed to resolve it while maintaining UN principles.

UN Finance

Italy had welcomed the decision to establish the Committee of Experts. In a spirit of cooperation, the Committee under Italy's chairmanship had done a serious piece of work and its conclusions offered an excellent basis for discussions.

In connection with both reports (A/6289 and A/6343) Italy's concern was to seek areas of convergence and, secondly not so much to seek economies as, above all, to promote economic practices in the use of available resources.

UN resources were slender in relation to the needs. Hence adherence to strict rules, a simplification of procedures and economic practices should guide the General Assembly, which should accordingly endorse the conclusions of the Fourteen.

Above all, in the light of the first report, Members which had not yet offered the required voluntary contributions should delay no longer and respond to the Secretary-General's appeals of 1 and 18 September. Thus the Secretary-General would have reason to change his pessimistic stand.

Peace-Keeping

The problems of finance and peace-keeping could not be settled independently of each other. There was a deadlock in this field also, in spite of the patient and constructive efforts of the Chairman of the Committee of 33 and his immediate assistance. The Assembly must now tackle the problem in substance in spite of difficulties. It should also show both imagination and a sense of balance in exploring every possible avenue in order urgently to provide the Organization with machinery, both institutionally and financially, which allowed it to carry out its statutory functions in maintaining peace and security. Italy would contribute to the achievement of this objective.

If the Organization had the capacity and means of intervention, the majority of Members would have a guarantee not only of security but of independence and freedom. Italy therefore hoped that the position of some States would be less rigidly inspired by considerations of doctrine and prestige. Some ideals should be common to all, in the spirit of the [Pope's] message of 4 October 1965.

Other Items on the General Assembly Agenda

Disarmament

Italy would give active support to any genuine, fair agreement on this subject.

While general and complete disarmament was the long-term goal, partial agreements were urgent.

The ENDC had not worked out substantive draft treaties either on underground testing or non-proliferation.

Italy, which had made every possible effort in Geneva, believed that there were substantial areas of agreement, at least on non-proliferation. Referring to her memorandum (ENDC/179), Italy suggested that some articles of the treaty should be drawn up at once.

Hoping for a solution in the near future, Italy endorsed the USSR draft resolution A/C.1/L.368. If, however, a formal treaty was delayed, Italy's proposal for a nuclear moratorium could be brought up to date by herself, in the light of other delegations' remarks.

Italy attached special attention to the Memorandum of the eight non-aligned delegations at Geneva.

A ban on underground testing and the US proposals for freezing stocks which would open up new prospects, were particularly important questions.

In short, ENDC had produced a basis for further advances and maintained a dialogue. This contact should be pursued and developed.

Development and Related Subjects

In spite of UN efforts, the flow of capital to developing countries and these countries' conditions of exchange and rate of economic growth had not reached planned objectives.

Yet substantial theoretical programmes had proved successful, and UN organs, particularly the new ones, should now transform ideas into action.

Colonialism

In connection with Mr. Vinci's statement on South West Africa (item 25), Italy reaffirmed her attitude of complete cooperation on decolonization.

As regards Rhodesia Italy hoped that the rebellion would be speedily ended within a constitutional evolution recognizing majority rights; then the Security Council would not have to adopt the drastic measures which would otherwise be called for.

Rhodesia represented basically an extension of apartheid which the United Nations must strive to eradicate.

Other Questions

Status of the German-speaking inhabitants of the Province of Bolzano

Italy confirmed that, as stated by the Austrian representative, favourable prospects were in view during the mutual contacts. In December 1964, at a Paris

meeting of the two Foreign Ministers, it seemed that the two countries were on the eve of finding good possibilities of settling the international dispute, but, in her communication of 30 March 1965, Austria showed that she did not appreciate these possibilities.

While Italy agreed to subsequent meetings, the recent recrudescence of tension had caused indignation in Italy, obviously with unfavourable repercussions.

The Austrian Government had formally condemned these acts of terrorism. Minister Toncic had made statements to this effect in the General Assembly. As Italy notified Austria on 6 October 1966, she expected these statements to be followed by appropriate action aimed at preventing acts which might impair mutual relations, the proper maintenance of which was the main object of paragraph 3 of resolution 1497(XV).

Viet-Nam

There had been particularly frequent debates on Viet-Nam in the Rome Parliament. In the United Nations all the speakers had expressed a wish for an end to the war. Yet many of them added a condition: the victory of one side.

Instead, peace must be sought in the particular interest of all concerned. Mr. Goldberg had indeed stated that the United States was seeking a political solution. Moreover his position on the three essential points did not differ greatly from that of impartial, objective world figures.

Although a basis existed for peace talks, the main obstacle was mistrust, which could only be removed through a suitable exchange of ideas.

Lastly there was uncertainty about final objectives which, again, would only be dispelled by means of a new, appropriate procedure.

European Security

In Western Europe, while there had been little substantial progress towards political unification, EEC had consolidated itself.

At the same time there had been exchanges with Socialist countries, in which Italy had actively participated and which, in several cases, had reduced the gap between the respective positions.

In this new context, there was a better prospect of an agreement on European security which should include a satisfactory solution in the matter of German reunification, without which the situation in Europe could not be permanently stabilized.

Latin America

Political contacts between Italy and Latin America had been especially frequent in 1966. The Rome Institute for Latin America would strengthen Latin America's ties with Europe.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

17 October 1966
PhP:pmm

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1442nd Meeting, 14 October 1966

ROMANIA

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

ROMANIA

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, Mr. Corneliu Manescu, addressed the General Assembly on 14 October 1966 (A/PV.1442).

Romania laid special emphasis on the role and responsibilities of individual nations, and on the progress achieved in inter-European cooperation. The liquidation of military blocs was advocated.

As regards non-proliferation, there were the usual Romanian reservations as to its significance in the whole disarmament process and an emphasis on the guarantees to be given to non-nuclear Powers.

General

Nations, far from being outdated, would, for a long time yet, be the basis for the evolution of society. History showed that, at the roots of wars and crises, there were attempts at foreign domination and intervention. Peace could only be based on the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality of rights and non-intervention in domestic affairs.

UN Organization

The Secretary-General

The Annual Report gave information on a broad range of problems requiring energy, zeal, dedication; to the solution of these problems U Thant had offered a remarkable contribution which Romania wanted to be continued.

Membership

In order to improve UN functioning, the first requirement was universality. In conformity with the views of many delegations and Romania's constant position, she firmly demanded that the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations and other international organizations should be restored and the emissaries of Chiang Kai-shek be expelled.

A discussion on this item should result in ending an abnormal situation as intended by the sponsors of item 90, including Romania.

Romania supported the GDR's application. The admission of the two German States would be an important contribution to the strengthening of peace and security.

Other Items on the General Assembly Agenda

Non-intervention (Item 96)

Romania supported the USSR proposal A/C.1/L.367.

Korea (Item 93)

Due attention should be paid to this item placed on the agenda at the request of 10 States, including Romania.

Disarmament and Non-proliferation

Nuclear disarmament was particularly urgent. The essential measures were the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stocks. An agreement on non-proliferation, although not setting aside the nuclear danger, would be a first step towards a detente, provided it was followed in the disarmament process by the above-mentioned essential measures.

As shown by the work of ENDC, a non-proliferation treaty must strike a balance between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers so that all countries may be offered guarantees of security. Obligations should not be unilaterally imposed on non-nuclear Powers. Nuclear Powers must accept certain commitments, since guarantees to non-nuclear Powers would encourage the latter to renounce the acquisition of weapons.

Denuclearized zones in Europe and elsewhere, strengthened by the nuclear Powers' commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries, would be a useful transitional measure.

In order to set aside the causes of tension, Romania was in favour of liquidating the anachronistic system of military blocs.

Foreign Military Bases

Romania was in favour of dismantling foreign bases and withdrawing armed forces from other States' territories (item 98).

Colonialism

The struggle for national liberation and the changes in the economic, political and social life of newly-independent countries were most important aspects in progress.

Romania had relations of friendship with the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and paid great attention to the question of cooperation with the young States.

Liquidation of colonialism was taking place too slowly for comfort.

In the interest of peace and security, Romania, like the whole world, was condemning apartheid. She supported the liberation struggle of the peoples of South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

Economic Development

A prerequisite to an active, create role was for a State independently to consolidate its economy, on the basis of historical conditions and its own aspirations.

Such a result could only be achieved through industrialization which had come to be synonymous with development. Thus Romania's industrial production was now six times as large as fifteen years ago. Her national income had increased four times during the same period.

Romania was accordingly in a position to increase her international economic cooperation.

While no international machinery could replace the initiative of a State, the United Nations had developed programmes and institutions which usefully supplemented bilateral relations.

The present session had the responsibility of putting to work a new agency, UNOID, in a vital sector - industrialization. A prerequisite to the achievement of UN objectives was an improvement of its assistance to developing countries.

In view of the problem's complexity, a coordination of the various UN activities was of the essence.

Other Questions

Viet-Nam

Romania firmly condemned the US war of aggression which threatened world peace. Population centers and economic targets were being bombed by the United States which was assuming grave responsibilities.

Intensification of the war and bombing of the DRV blatantly contradicted Mr. Goldberg's assurances of good intentions.

Romania was in full sympathy with the Vietnamese people and would continue to give them full material and political support.

The only path to a solution was that indicated by the DRV and the NFL.

US bombing of a sovereign State, the DRV, including air attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong, was in contradiction with international rules and UN principles, and must be ended - immediately, unconditionally, finally. The United States having committed aggression must take this measure, as demanded by world public opinion with a view to ending the Vietnamese conflict.

European Security

This question affected the international situation as a whole and should be solved in the light of European past contributions and war experiences. There still remained sources of tension and danger in Europe.

Yet a desire for inter-European cooperation and rapprochement had been noticeable. As stated in the Bucharest Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Powers, European States and peoples had a common cause against the forces of aggression.

There now was a possibility to solve the problem of European security through a gradual process, notably by encouraging contacts of all kinds.

Romania was developing her bilateral relations with European countries, irrespective of political and social systems, notably in the Balkans, in the wider interest of peace and security. A better knowledge had been acquired of the various viewpoints and interests and, in a climate of confidence and cooperation, bilateral agreements had been reached, with repercussions on the international climate.

In this connexion, Romania attached particular significance to resolution 2129 (XX) concerning actions on the regional level to improve relations among European States having different social and political systems, the value of which had been confirmed by subsequent developments.

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TO:

The Secretary-General

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Thanks.
21/10

DATE:
19 Oct. 1966

FROM:
A.E. Nesterenko,
Under Sec'y, PSCA.
A. Nesterenko

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1446th Meeting - 18 October 1966

HUNGARY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1446

18 October 1966

PhP:mm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

HUNGARY

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic, Mr. János Péter, addressed the General Assembly on 18 October 1966 (A/PV.1446).

General

The four crucial, interdependent problems were Vietnam, the "third world", European security and the United Nations role.

UN Organization

Having survived its political crisis at the 19th Session, the United Nations could now see its limitations and possibilities.

The Secretary-General

U Thant had revealed which present international problems had prompted him to withdraw his candidacy. Hungary hoped that he may deem it possible to reconsider his decision. In the light of the response to his appeals, and the confidence of the Members, he may now have even greater possibilities to serve UN principles.

Membership

A founding Member and permanent Member of the Security Council, the PRC was still not represented, although the United Nations could not go very far until this problem was solved.

Peace-keeping and UN finance

In whatever way the findings of the 33 and the 14 could be judged, there was common ground to hope that in the future the United Nations may function with greater assurance and with less failures for the purpose of bringing all Members closer on world problems.

Other issues on the Agenda of the General Assembly

Korea

Most Members probably did not realize that the United Nations was still a belligerent party, subject to the armistice, in relation to the DPRK. In Panmunjon, US representatives sat behind the UN flag. Fourteen years after the armistice, the United Nations should rid itself of this shame. Already Item 93, aiming at the withdrawal of foreign forces and the dissolution of UNCURK, had

been included in the agenda. If UNCURK members were to resign, it would be beneficial to the Organization. The Korean people was able to deal with reunification effectively if only foreign interference was stopped.

Disarmament and outer space

Following a USSR initiative, general and complete disarmament had emerged as the sole guarantee against a thermonuclear holocaust. Although, in view of the escalation of aggression in Vietnam, conditions were not favourable for major steps, there were still good hopes for partial agreement, at least for curbing the arms race in certain respects - non-proliferation - and not extending it to further dimensions - outer space. This offered good prospects for the present Session. UN Members, through their common efforts, may be powerful factors in dealing with the obstacles to disarmament.

Colonialism and related problems ("third world")

Even if, as one must hope, the dangers of a major war emerging from South East Asia may be overcome, the fate of the world would hinge on international co-operation to solve the problems of the vestiges of colonialism, and of the dangers of neo-colonialism and racial oppression.

In and around South Africa, South-West Africa and Southern Rhodesia, turmoil would result from unsolved problems if the United Nations proved to be unable, in the foreseeable future, to find rightful solutions on the basis of human rights and decolonization. In view of the African States' resoluteness at this Session, the goal may not be out of their reach. Newly independent nations, which had played a great role in rescuing the United Nations at the 19th Session, were now charting a brighter future for all of the United Nations.

Other questions

The Vietnam war

Escalation of the aggression in Vietnam weakened constructive initiatives coming from other parts of the world.

All Powers of goodwill must therefore co-operate in stopping the aggression and search for a solution.

In full and true knowledge and understanding of the opinions of the DRV and the NLF, Hungary stated that no real and valid peace offer had so far been made on the US part. The so-called peace proposals had the following shortcomings that made them ineffectual.

Firstly, any offer for the abandonment of the bombing of the DRV, if it were subject to any conditions whatever, revealed the lack of peaceful intentions. The bombing of the DRV should be stopped without delay and without any threat of possible renewal;

secondly, a correction of the violation of the Geneva Agreements through the presence of US bases and troops, no more than an unconditional stopping of US bombing, could be considered a unilateral concession. US involvement went back to 1954 and had grown both in quantity and in quality from intervention to aggression. This was the basic factor in the present South-East Asia situation. The withdrawal of US military bases and personnel should be properly guaranteed. Any other proposal revealed the lack of peaceful intentions;

thirdly, any proposal that did not give due consideration to the programme of the NLF was directed against the true interests of the people of South Vietnam and it was the duty of all peace-loving nations to support their struggle.

If and when the US proposals approached and met the DRV and NLF proposals, peace may be restored and the nations of South-East Asia may make a new start towards implementation of the Geneva Agreements.

European Security

There was a process of easing tensions and growing stability in Europe. The Warsaw Pact members in July 1966 in Bucharest had offered new initiatives for a real and effective European security system. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations were going on to this end. In the Danube valley new prospects of peace were held out by the Socialist community. Relations between European States having different social and economic systems were widening in all fields of interstate contacts.

Yet, West German policy, protesting the status quo and seeking free access to atomic weapons, together with the help of those allies which supported it, may give rise to new tensions. Positive developments may prove to have been superficial, transitory phenomena.

It was therefore necessary to strengthen the contacts between States with different social systems. The United States, which had made positive statements regarding East-West relations in Europe, could, together with West European countries, strengthen the present stability by establishing and developing contacts with the GDR from economic and cultural fields towards de

facto and de jure recognition. European security and peaceful reunification of Germany could not be approached without the recognition of both German States.

Hungary, together with Europe's other Socialist States, was ready to take part in any bilateral or multilateral co-operation and even to propose such forms of co-operation as may prolong the present stability.

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TO: The Secretary-General

	APPROVAL		YOUR INFORMATION
	MAY WE CONFER?		AS REQUESTED
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	NOTE AND FILE		REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE
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	YOUR COMMENTS		ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

Thanks. Mary 24/10

DATE:
14.11.66

FROM
A. E. Nesterenko
PSCA

[Handwritten signature]

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

27 October 1966

PhP/flr

VIEWS IN THE GENERAL DEBATE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY - 21ST SESSION

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

QUESTIONS COVERED IN THE PRESENT SUMMARY

I. UN ORGANIZATION

Secretary-General

Membership

Peace-keeping and UN Finance

II. OTHER ITEMS ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA

Korea

Non-intervention

Disarmament (and related)

Colonialism (and related)

Development (and related)

III. OTHER POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Viet-Nam

Europe.

EUROPEAN STATES COVERED IN THE PRESENT SUMMARY

Nato Members

Belgium
Denmark
France
Greece
Iceland
Italy
The Netherlands
Norway
United Kingdom

Non-committed countries

Austria
Cyprus
Finland
Ireland
Sweden
(Yugoslavia) *

Socialist countries

Albania
Bulgaria
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Ukrainian SSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(Yugoslavia) *

* Depending on the items, Yugoslavia was regarded as "socialist" or "non-committed".

VIEWS IN THE GENERAL DEBATE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY - 21ST SESSION

EUROPE

Secretary-General

Warsaw Pact members

1. The Soviet Union commended the great positive role played by U Thant. Poland referred to the "background" of U Thant's decision - the South-East Asia crisis. Hungary, also noting that the Secretary-General had revealed which problems had prompted his decision, hoped that he may now have greater possibilities to serve UN principles.
2. All active members of the Warsaw Pact spoke on the problem and said that they would support a decision by U Thant to continue in office.

Nato members

3. Britain said that the United Nations and the world needed U Thant.
4. Italy recalled U Thant's great services, notably his speech in the Council of Europe.
5. France would welcome U Thant's change of mind, but would respect his final decision.
6. In the hope of prevailing upon the Secretary-General to continue in his post, Belgium declared her support of specific policies or proposals of U Thant, such as his proposal for a study of the consequences of nuclear weaponry.
7. Similarly Norway called upon UN Members to give U Thant the necessary tools.
8. Like all other Nato members who spoke in the general Debate, Denmark, Iceland and the Netherlands hoped that the United Nations would not be deprived of U Thant's inestimable services ^{1/}.

Non-Committed countries

9. Austria praised U Thant's outstanding services and Ireland his magnificent work. Sweden called him a man of rare skill and deep wisdom. Finland completely supported the Secretary-General. Cyprus said that it was the duty of all Members, in particular the Great Powers, to assist U Thant to fulfill his great mission.

^{1/} Greece followed with particular solicitude and appreciation the efforts undertaken on Viet-Nam by the Secretary-General, and lent him her full support.

Membership

Socialist countries

10. The principle of universality was endorsed.
11. The Soviet Union was in favour of finally putting an end to an unnatural situation by restoring the legitimate rights of the PRC and expelling the Chiang Kai-Shek clique which was now being kept by a foreign power.
12. Albania declared that the PRC was playing an important part in safeguarding peace in Asia and the world, and that, without the participation of a strong socialist country inhabited by seven hundred million men, the United Nations could not enjoy the confidence of the world popular masses.
13. Bulgaria emphasized that for seventeen years non-recognition of the PRC had been an obstacle to UN efficiency.
14. All European socialist countries favoured the admission of the PRC and most of them explicitly rejected the two-China theory.
15. The two Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania declared themselves in favour of the admission of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).
16. Poland added that every State should be permitted to take part in UN work at least through an observer; and Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria also said that they took a positive attitude, with reservations, on the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany.
17. Yugoslavia said that conditions were now ripe for the admission of all divided countries.

Nato members

18. In connexion with the question of China's membership, Italy stated that present procedures were inadequate and favoured the use of appropriate procedures and instruments, new if necessary.
19. Belgium said that, once the PRC gave a concrete sign of contributing to the security of Asia, Belgium would be in favour of having the PRC associate itself more broadly with UN work. At that time the Taiwan Chinese should be taken into consideration.

20. Britain said that the UN was not a club solely for those who thought alike. A way must be found urgently to seat the PRC representative so that 700 million Chinese could be heard. On the other hand there were other absentees who could not be in the UN. The British representative, as a European, regretted that a reunited Germany could not yet add its political and economic strength to the UN.

21. France said that, in view of the Viet-Nam war, the problem of China's voice in world affairs could not be settled either to-day or to-morrow in order to introduce into the Organization an element of realism.

Non-Committed countries

22. Ireland was in favour of the Secretary-General exploring the question of the representation of China.

23. Finland re-asserted the principle of universality, and her long-standing view that the seat of China belonged to the PRC. She supported U Thant's views on the observer question.

24. Sweden declared that the PRC should take China's place, in the United Nations' own interest.

25. Austria said that the principle of universality, which she supported, would become a reality only if accomplished in accordance with the basic Charter principles.

Peace-keeping and UN Finance

Non-committed countries

26. This group regarded these issues as extremely important not only for the United Nations but for all States, big or small.

27. Ireland said that mandatory assessments involved the very UN life and that contributions for peace-keeping operations need not be an unduly great sacrifice for any Member. A draft resolution on this matter, similar to that introduced at the 20th session, would be tabled again this year.

28. Austria said that the UN role in peace-keeping should be strengthened, and stressed both the primary responsibility of the Security Council and the residual functions of the General Assembly. She also emphasized the importance of peaceful settlement of disputes.

29. Sweden declared that the United Nations should not waive its right to undertake peace-keeping operations.

30. Finland noted that the primary responsibility of the Security Council had been generally recognized, and that, in practice, important operations had continued.

31. Cyprus said that a more determined effort should be made to tackle effectively both the constitutional and the financial aspects of peace-keeping operations, particularly by the great Powers since they had a special responsibility under the Charter.

Nato members

32. Britain regretted that the Thirty-Three had failed to reach any conclusions. There was a fundamental difference between those, including Britain, which saw an essential UN task as "keeping the peace" and those which seemed to think that the United Nations should remain carefully circumscribed in its vital peace-keeping role. Britain listed four requirements for giving the UN an effective peace-keeping capability. Further, just as important as peace-keeping was peace-making. Britain asked the Assembly to look carefully at the British proposal on the peaceful settlement of disputes and to take the appropriate steps.

33. France noted that the two parts of the report of the Fourteen were inter-connected; with this reservation, France would consider the report, and would wish to participate, jointly with all, in the necessary measures. As regards peace-keeping, while France could not forget that some friendly delegations, primarily Canada and Ireland, were especially interested in solving these questions, she was well aware that no new intervention was envisaged by anyone and would not be, she hoped, for a long time.

34. Italy favoured "economic practices" and said that the Organization should have the capacity and means of intervention.

35. Greece deplored that the number of those who carried the financial burden of peace-keeping operations was far short of the totality of UN membership and stated that it was of primary importance that a mechanism be set up to serve as an effective instrument for the maintenance of peace.

36. The Netherlands believed that rigid rules on peace-keeping would be harmful; and that a whole strategy could be devised on UN finances through a complete survey of UN Agencies.

37. Denmark stressed the importance of peaceful settlement of disputes, and warned against a solution on peace-keeping that would not be approved by a large majority including all permanent members of the Security Council.

38. Norway said that UN peace-keeping functions should be improved in accordance with the Secretary-General's 1964 proposal, and she associated herself with Canada's views on peace-keeping.

39. Iceland recalled her financial contributions to UN peace-keeping and, like other Nordic countries, stressed the importance of peace-keeping among all UN activities. She stated that the maintenance of a UN mobile military force should not be an insurmountable obstacle for 119 nations and that the allocation of the cost of peace-keeping activities ought not to be an impossible task.

Socialist countries

40. Socialist countries, on the whole, were less concerned with these questions than with the cases of "intervention" such as the Viet-Nam war. In the words of Bulgaria, the reasons which obstructed UN activity should not be sought mainly in UN organizational weaknesses or financial difficulties, but in the policy of violation of Charter principles.

41. Poland similarly referred to U Thant's remark that UN weaknesses and shortcomings lay not in the UN structure but in world circumstances.

42. Socialist countries accordingly recommended a return to the Charter and the full application of its principles - as understood by them - rather than a discussion on peace-keeping, as a remedy to the evils that harmed the Organization.

43. In direct reference to peace-keeping issues, Czechoslovakia declared that she would not permit any by-passing of the Charter provisions on the exclusive competence of the Security Council concerning the use of armed forces.

44. A confident view of the UN future was taken by Hungary, stating that, in whatever way the findings of the Thirty-Three and the Fourteen could be judged, there was ground to hope that in the future the United Nations may function with greater assurance and with less failures for the purpose of bringing all Members closer on world problems.

II. OTHER ITEMS ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA

Korea (Item 93)

Socialist countries

45. Albania charged that the United States, in co-operation with Japan, was turning South Korea into a base for an aggression against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

46. While all other Socialist countries explicitly supported the purposes of the sponsors of item 93, there were variations as to the tone and length of the statements and the emphasis on various legal and historical aspects of the problem.

47. The Hungarian representative, on the basis of his personal experience in Panmunjom, deprecated the use of the UN flag by US forces there.
48. Poland said that the situation in South Korea was incompatible with Charter principles on national independence and sovereignty.
49. Czechoslovakia referred to the memorandum of 21 July 1966 from the PDRK as a reasonable basis for a just solution.
50. Romania and the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSR recalled that they had co-sponsored item 93. Romania added that the measures requested would strengthen peace and UN prestige, and the Ukrainian SSR that the injustice done to the Korean people must be redressed.

Nato members and Non-Committed countries

51. European countries in these groups refrained from referring in the general debate to this controversial, non-European issue .

Non-intervention (Item 96)

Socialist countries

52. The Soviet Union was in favour of placing at the center of the session activities the question of protecting the peoples from encroachments upon their sovereignty and independence.
53. Although most references under this item were to the Viet-Nam war, there were also frequent mentions of US "interference" in the Dominican Republic and Cuba.
54. In addition, the Ukrainian SSR made charges of periodic acts of US interference in Ukrainian affairs by both Houses of the US Congress.
55. The Byelorussian SSR called for a warning that those who continued armed intervention and aggression assumed responsibility for all the consequences.
56. Czechoslovakia declared that certain States continued to carry out policies which were at variance with resolution 2131 (XX).
57. Romania declared that nations would for a long time yet be the basis for social evolution and that, at the roots of wars and crises, there had been attempts at foreign domination and intervention. Romania supported the USSR proposal A/C.1/L.367.
58. Bulgaria in addition to dealing with US policies in Viet-Nam as a specific violation of resolution 2131 (XX) referred to the situation in Cambodia and Laos, the

Dominican Republic and Cuba, and said that, in certain respects, the situation in South Korea was similar to Viet-Nam.

Nato members and non-committed countries

59. Although France refrained from dealing with this item as such, she emphasized that the situation in Viet-Nam required prohibitions against foreign interference, in keeping with the Geneva Agreements.

60. On the whole, European members in these two groups did not deal with item 96 in the General Debate.

Disarmament (and related)

Nato members

61. Britain suggested that the United Nations should do three things: recognize that the most immediate risk was the spread of nuclear weapons and agree on a non-proliferation treaty; extend the partial test-ban treaty to underground explosions; bring the PRC into the international community, especially into regular and effective disarmament negotiations.

62. While the other Nato powers, on the whole, did not deal with disarmament at great length, there were detailed references to concrete disarmament issues, notably by Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Italy. The four statements contained either references to earlier proposals, largely by those Governments themselves or, in the case of Belgium, a new emphasis on a regional stabilization of armaments in Europe.

63. Norway supported the Secretary-General's suggestion that an appropriate body should study the implications of nuclear weapons. Further, Norway discussed the question of non-proliferation in its relation to existing and future alliances. She agreed with Canada that a definition of proliferation preventing nuclear weapons from passing into the control of additional States would not be inconsistent with legitimate measures of collective defense. Consultations between alliance members on basic strategic questions could take place without any transfer of the control of nuclear weapons within the alliance. While, ideally, there should be concurrent agreements on non-proliferation and a comprehensive test ban, the most realistic procedure, Norway stated, was to accept partial solutions. Norway had previously proposed that States which did not possess nuclear weapons should voluntarily place all their peaceful nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards system. For her part, Norway was prepared to do so.

64. Denmark stressed the usefulness of a standing conference such as ENDC. She referred to the June 1966 proposal of the unofficial Scarborough Conference on a time-limited moratorium of underground tests, which could be combined with an experimental implementation of the verification by challenge procedure suggested by Sweden.

65. Belgium placed the emphasis on the European area where, if world-wide measures did not prove practicable, an effort could be made to stabilize, then reduce armed forces and military budgets. Belgium, for her part, was ready, in harmony with her allies, to act along these lines.

66. Italy, on the subject of proliferation, referred to her memorandum (ENDC/179) and suggested that some articles of a treaty should be drawn up at once. If, however, a formal treaty was delayed, Italy's earlier proposal for a nuclear moratorium could be brought up to date by herself in the light of other delegations' remarks.

67. Greece said that substantial and concrete progress could be achieved on certain points especially in respect of collateral measures. This task rested primarily with great Powers.

Socialist countries

68. The views of most of the Socialist countries on the importance of non-proliferation conflicted with those of Albania. While Romania's was, in some respects, an intermediary position, she acknowledged the possible usefulness of an agreement on non-proliferation as a first step towards disarmament.

69. It was pointed out that, in the words of the Ukrainian SSR, US aggressive actions in South East Asia and West German revanchism had had their effects in this field; and that in the ENDC the Western Powers did not show any interest in constructive talks.

70. As stated by Bulgaria, the US Government had no intention of taking disarmament measures, but, on the contrary, extended its military actions and kept up the armaments race. Given US good will, and even in the present international context, a measure of agreement could be achieved.

71. Hungary declared that, in spite of the escalation of aggression in Viet-Nam, there were still good hopes for partial agreement.

72. It was generally pointed out that, in the words of Poland, the question of a general treaty on non-proliferation was most ripe for a solution. It should rule out proliferation in any form, preventing the creation of a third category of States which would have, through military alliances, access to nuclear weapons, would keep the finger on the nuclear trigger or influence the decision to use nuclear weapons.

73. The Soviet Union said that immediately after resolution 2028 (XX) certain Powers started to search for the very loopholes against which the UN had pronounced itself.

74. The main reason why there had not as yet been an agreement on non-proliferation was, according to the Ukrainian SSR, that the nuclear aspirations of the FRG were being encouraged by the United States and the United Kingdom. Czechoslovakia declared that the United States was proceeding with plans that would make it possible for the FRG to gain access to nuclear weapons within the NATO framework.

75. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, as well as Yugoslavia, favoured the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

76. Yugoslavia deplored that even the poorer countries were spending more on armaments.

77. Albania declared that the United States was not in favour of disarmament, inasmuch as the power of the Imperialists was always based on the force of arms and only the common struggle of all the peoples could make them disarm. As regards the present negotiation between the great powers on non-proliferation, this was a trap against the sovereignty and the sovereign equality of States. The fate of peace and international security must not be left in the hands of two great powers. Albania reaffirmed her complete support of the PRC's proposal for a summit conference of all countries to study the question of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.

78. Romania declared that the essential measures were the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stocks. An agreement on non-proliferation could be a first step. However, obligations should not be unilaterally imposed. Non-nuclear powers would be encouraged to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons if they received certain guarantees.

79. Poland announced that she would submit in the First Committee a draft resolution on the effects of weapons of mass destruction so that world public opinion should be better informed on this subject.

80. On a related item the Socialist countries recommended the liquidation of foreign military bases. The Soviet Union said that this question first concerned the United States which had established hundreds of military bases and strong points beyond its borders, and referred to resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and the first Cairo Conference. Bulgaria pointed out that, while the liquidation of all the bases throughout the world would be preferable, Bulgaria, taking into account inter alia the US position, would welcome as a first step a partial solution; adoption of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.369) and its implementation, would greatly facilitate the final solution of this problem.

81. The Byelorussian SSR pointed out that the bases were used for the repression of national liberation movements; that the States in which they were situated could be drawn into military conflicts; that there was a risk of accidental losses of hydrogen bombs and that huge spaces were lost for agriculture.

82. Romania also was in favour of dismantling foreign bases and withdrawing armed forces from other States' territories.

Non-committed countries

83. Ireland and Sweden supported the Secretary-General's proposal on a study of nuclear weaponry.

84. Austria and Sweden referred to the contribution of non-aligned countries to ENDC's work, particularly to Sweden's own approach to the question of an exchange of seismological data - a field in which Finland also recalled that she had been active.

85. Ireland strongly pleaded for the non-nuclear powers not to use their skills and resources for setting up a stockpile of nuclear weapons. She stressed the difference between a few provocative weapons and the huge arsenals necessary for a people's real protection. Although the retention of existing nuclear arsenals may be unavoidable until there was an effective collective security system, it would be better if potential nuclear States improved their lives and those of poorer peoples. Further, Ireland declared that international peace should be maintained neither through the extension or perpetuation of power blocs nor through their immediate dismantlement but through "areas of peace", as suggested by Ireland since 1958.

86. Cyprus regretted that the small countries had to watch most of the time helplessly the big game of power politics.

Colonialism (and related)

87. While the views expressed on matters of principle were generally unanimous, for instance on the condemnation of racial discrimination, there were differences on issues of timing and practicability.

Nato members

88. Britain stood ready to give independence to territories that wanted it and could sustain it. United Nations' help was welcome provided it was offered impartially and objectively. As regards South Arabia, Britain had undertaken that it would become totally independent by 1968, and accepted the 1963 and 1965 resolutions. Britain would be happy to co-operate with a special UN mission. Concerning Rhodesia, Britain, given the full support of the Commonwealth representatives at the UN, would inter alia join in sponsoring, before the end of the year, a resolution on effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions.

89. Otherwise there was no extensive coverage of these issues in the general debate. Belgium and Norway made no reference to colonialism.

90. France, in a brief statement of a general character, said that, on the basis of her own respect of the right of men to dispose of themselves, she was in sympathy with Africa's anxiety. The question was to ascertain what was useful, practical and efficient in the framework of UN principles and in conformity with the rules of the Charter.

91. Italy reaffirmed an attitude of complete co-operation as far as decolonization was concerned, and referred to her delegation's statement on the South West Africa item. As regards Rhodesia, the hope was expressed that the rebellion would be speedily ended within a constitutional evolution recognizing majority rights, so that the Security Council may not have to adopt drastic measures. Further, Rhodesia represented basically an extension of apartheid which the United Nations must strive to eradicate.

92. As regards South West Africa, the Netherlands expressed a belief in the supremacy of international law, but did not rule out the possibility that the Charter may have to be amended, perhaps by giving the United Nations as such locus standi before the International Court of Justice.

93. Concerning South Africa, Denmark declared that her vote last year in the General Assembly on resolution 2054 (XX) in no way implied a departure from the Charter principle that action under Chapter VII could be taken only by the Security Council. Secondly, while economic sanctions were the proper means, there would be no sense in applying sanctions as long as the major trading partners did not co-operate. The General Assembly would get no further by just adopting resolutions. The report of the Expert Committee should be considered by the Security Council and special attention should be paid to the principle of an equitable distribution of burdens.

Non-committed countries

94. Statements by these countries were, on the whole, longer and stronger than those from the Nato group, although Ireland did not deal with these matters.

95. Austria, invoking the conscience of all nations, said that the United Nations should without further delay undertake all efforts for the full realization of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, particularly in Southern Africa. Secondly, Austria had not recognized the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority regime in Rhodesia. Thirdly, Austria, which continued to regard South West Africa as a non-self-governing territory to which the principle of self-determination fully applied, trusted that it would be possible to find a solution corresponding to the international obligations regarding this territory and in particular to the wishes of its peoples.

96. Sweden said that the Security Council should consider again the problem of apartheid on the basis of the report of the Expert Committee, (resolution S/5773). The problem of economic burdens resulting from sanctions should be met through international solidarity. As regards South-West Africa, the United Nations should revoke the mandate and study carefully the question of fulfilling its responsibilities. Concerning Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council would be justified in deciding upon mandatory economic sanctions.

97. Finland declared that the time had come to consider new international measures to combat racial discrimination. Responsibility for carrying out the will of the General Assembly rested with the Security Council.

98. Cyprus said that the United Nations should not lose sight of the question of territories under Portuguese administration and must act beyond adopting well-meaning resolutions and take practical steps.

Socialist countries

99. It was stated by the Ukrainian SSR that a counter-offensive of colonialism was being abetted by Nato powers, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. Poland declared that the regimes based on exploitation and racial discrimination were emboldened by the US policy of a position of strength.

100. The Soviet Union, the Byelorussian SSR and Czechoslovakia demanded that 1967 should be the year of the final liquidation of colonialism. As recalled by the Ukrainian SSR, various UN resolutions had stated that colonialism threatened peace and security. Bulgaria stated that the General Assembly must ask the Security Council to adopt effective decisions, including sanctions under Chapter VII.

101. A specific reference to Chapter VII was also made by the Byelorussian SSR which stated that the means provided therein should be applied by the Security Council to the colonial powers and regimes which did not implement UN decisions.

102. The Soviet Union was prepared to support the independent African states that sponsored the South West Africa item. The UN must also firmly and resolutely oppose all manifestations of the policy of neo-colonialism .

103. In the words of the Ukrainian SSR the present session must declare that the continued existence of colonialism was a direct violation of the Charter.

104. Albania said that numerous UN resolutions concerning inter alia the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Oman were trampled upon by the colonial powers without effective measures being taken against them. It would be so as long as the Organization was under direct US control.

105. Yugoslavia declared that the Colonialists and the various interests allied to them were trying to take the offensive. Either all African peoples would be free or emancipation would be questioned again everywhere. The United Nations had a duty to help peoples to acquire independence, as well as to consider appropriate measures and adopt a programme of action against racial discrimination and apartheid.

Development (and related)

Socialist countries

106. The Soviet Union noted that the first UNCTAD meeting had elaborated principles of equal trade relations. To a large extent this was the result of co-operation between Socialist and developing countries. However certain Powers retained a long standing habit of using trade as a method of looting economically less developed countries.

107. The Byelorussian SSR deplored that most of the expenses of the regular programme of technical assistance went to the maintenance of a bureaucratic machinery; and that, following the merger of the Special Fund with the Expanded Programme, activities were still concentrated on pre-investment instead of concrete development plans in the developing countries' interests.

108. The Ukrainian SSR warned against revising the principles of the First Conference of UNCTAD, and called for their rapid, practical implementation.

109. Bulgaria also said that the Second UNCTAD Conference would have to take additional measures to carry out the recommendations of the First.

110. Romania, in connection with the setting up of UNOID, emphasized the importance of industrialization for a country's development.

111. Czechoslovakia declared that the economic situation of developing countries would remain alarming until the advanced capitalist countries that bore the responsibility for their plight took adequate steps. Increased Czechoslovak co-operation with developing countries was announced.

112. Yugoslavia said that, in view of the problems of developing countries, and of outside pressure, the United Nations should consider a wider programme in various fields so that the international community may guide those countries. Until now, there had not always been practical results due mainly to a lack of political will on the part of some industrialized countries. The next Geneva Conference would have a decisive importance, mainly for the implementation of earlier initiatives.

Non-committed countries

113. On the whole, controversial issues were avoided, but references were made to each Member's own efforts and contributions in this field.

114. Austria was ready to offer Vienna as a possible site for UNOID if a majority of Members wanted its Secretariat outside UN Headquarters. Further, Austria was prepared to make contributions to development proportionate to her economic strength.

115. Finland intended substantially to increase her contribution to the UN Development Fund. She had already joined the Asian Development Bank.

116. Sweden gave figures illustrating the relative importance of economic and social development in the whole of UN work, and said that UN efforts in this field should be intensified in view of a widening gap between the richer and poorer countries and of the population explosion.

117. Ireland concentrated on the "liquidity" issue, referring to a statement of 28 September by her Finance Minister.

118. Cyprus approved both of the principle of multilateral assistance and of the manner in which the Development Programme was carrying out substantial and diverse projects.

Nato members

119. There were specific suggestions or broad appraisals, some times critical or gloomy, on UN development work, as well as reports of increased national contributions and efforts.

120. Britain said that her capacity to assist developing countries in the future must depend on the strength of her recovery. She was strongly in favour of multilateral aid. Much would depend on the confidence which international staff would create amongst donor countries. The recommendations of the Fourteen could help in this respect. Britain paid tribute to the ECOSOC and the ESA staff. As regards the next UNCTAD Conference, she hoped for progress on supplementary financial measures and commodity agreements.

122. The Netherlands suggested that, in the next three years, a new infrastructure of co-operation should be built, linking all participating agencies, and that a master plan should be drafted for ten years. In 1967, The Netherlands would further increase her spending on development aid.

123. Belgium reported that her contribution in this field was proportionally equalled by few countries. Although Belgian efforts were, for historical reasons, largely concentrated on the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, Belgium was not indifferent to the economic and social problems of other countries, with which she would more broadly co-operate within the limits of her means and in the respect of her commitments.

124. France regretted that the results of the 1964 Conference in Geneva had been less than satisfactory. She took a rather pessimistic view of immediate possibilities due to a lack of co-operation between the major Powers in a tense international situation.

125. Italy noted that planned objectives had not been reached and urged UN organs, particularly the new ones, to convert ideas into action.

126. Greece stated that, while greater efforts were needed on the part of the industrialized nations, the essential effort must come from the developing countries.

127. Iceland suggested that the United Nations pay attention to the problem of conserving the resources of the sea.

Viet-Nam

Socialist countries

128. (i) It was pointed out by Poland that, while the General Debate could be expected to reflect the world crisis, the United Nations for well-known reasons could not take any formal steps - resolutions or declarations - on the matter.

129. Albania declared that the United Nations had no right to intervene in the question of Viet-Nam, which would be contrary to the interests and rights of the Vietnamese people.

130. (ii) The US "peace" statement in the General Assembly was regarded as mere words contradicted by US war actions in South-East Asia. The Soviet Union stated that Mr. Goldberg's statement meant that the US Government defended its aggressive course in the Viet-Nam question. Hungary declared, that, in full knowledge of the DRV and NLF positions, she could state that no real and valid peace offer had so far been made by the United States; the bombing of the DRV should be stopped without conditions and finally; the withdrawal of US bases and troops was not negotiable and, thirdly, any proposal that did not give due consideration to the NLF programme was contrary to the South Vietnamese people's interests.

131. Poland made the point that the United States wanted to secure in advance of negotiations what could not be achieved through military means. Bulgaria condemned a US policy of diktat, ultimatum and the creation of faits accomplis. According to the Byelorussian SSR, the United States was only ready to stop bombing of the DRV if the patriotic forces of the South would capitulate.

132. Albania said that, through escalation of the war against North Vietnam, the United States was endeavouring to thrust upon the Vietnamese people the swindle of "peace negotiations".

133. Yugoslavia condemned a policy of strength and efforts at domination based on pressure including armed force. Inasmuch as US armies were on foreign soil, it was up to the United States to take the first step, i.e. a final cessation of the bombing of the DRV and recognition of the NLF as partner in the negotiations. In order to envisage a political solution, foreign troops must leave, as stated on 21 January 1966 by the Yugoslav Government.

134. (iii) US war actions in Viet-Nam were considered both from a legal viewpoint and on the basis of their destructiveness. The Ukrainian SSR stressed that US actions in Viet-Nam reflected a policy of strength; and it was repeatedly stated, for instance by Czechoslovakia and Romania, that fundamental UN principles were being violated, and indeed flouted, by the United States in Viet-Nam. Bulgaria emphasized the violation of resolution 2131 (XX) on the inadmissibility of intervention.

135. The question of the violation of the Geneva Agreements by the United States was dealt with at some length by Bulgaria.

136. On the factual side, the Soviet Union spoke of the intervention of more than 300,000 American soldiers and officers in Viet-Nam. The Byelorussian SSR quoted figures on the proportion of US interventionists to the total South Vietnamese population; referred to a "Foreign Affairs" article on the tonnage of US bombs dropped on Viet-Nam and condemned the use of napalm and poison gas. Romania condemned the bombing of population centers and economic targets.

137. The Ukrainian SSR said that talk in the United States of possible use of atomic weapons gave the impression that it was following an extreme-rightist policy.

138. (iv) The conflict should be solved in accordance with the Geneva Agreements, Poland, for instance, declared. The Soviet Union said that if the United States had not acted counter to the Geneva Agreements, there would be no war in Viet-Nam today. The appropriate basis for a solution was contained, the Ukrainian SSR stated, in the DRV and NLF proposals which, according to Romania, were the only path to a solution, and which Bulgaria fully supported.

139. Albania, also, supported the four points of the DRV and the five points of the NLF, which the Soviet Union called "simple and logical".

140. Yugoslavia declared that, once preliminary steps had been taken by the United States, as outlined above ^{2/}, it would then be possible to seek a solution on the basis of the Geneva Agreements.

141. (v) Continued and intensified assistance to the Vietnamese people was pledged by the Socialist countries. The Soviet Union said that those who carried the responsibility for the Viet-Nam war should duly weigh the significance of the Bucharest Statement's warning. Romania declared that she would continue to give

^{2/} I.e. a final cessation of the bombing of the DRV and recognition of the NLF as partner in the negotiations.

the Vietnamese people full material and political support. Poland said that the Vietnamese people would continue to receive ever-growing support and assistance from all those who cherished peace and progress.

Non-committed countries

142. Ireland did not speak on this issue as such ^{3/}, and Austria briefly urged a political solution of the conflict, before it extended further, in keeping with the parties' legitimate interests and the desires of the Vietnamese people.

143. Sweden supported U Thant's plan, and Finland voiced strong opposition to military means and violence. Further, Sweden placed the emphasis on the need for a popular consultation which, she stated, could not take place in the presence of foreign troops and in circumstances of intimidation and terror; and Finland said that a negotiated settlement based on the Geneva Agreements could enable the people of Viet-Nam to settle their future without interference or pressure from outside.

144. Cyprus said that the Secretary-General's three points provided the way out from the present tragedy. Nothing could be achieved if each one waited for the other to take the initiative. A new situation would arise if the United States were to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam without any conditions or limitations and while this session of the General Assembly was in progress. Such a first step would hopefully create the necessary conditions for the Secretary-General to pursue his peace-making initiatives.

Nato members

145. Belgium suggested that the United Nations should make a collective, solemn appeal for a negotiation between the interested parties.

146. A number of European Nato members stressed the importance of the US proposals and/or supported other aspects of the US position. Britain said that Hanoi had blocked the way to progress through negotiations and a political settlement. One had looked in vain for a response to various US statements. Britain invited the Soviet Union to join her in reconvening the Geneva Conference and gave an outline of a possible settlement. Denmark said that the next step ought to be taken by the DRV.

^{3/} Ireland recalled her earlier suggestion for the establishment of an area of law in South-East Asia; noted the agreement between Malaysia and Indonesia; and expressed the hope that this "nucleus of peace" would grow into a wider area including, of course, Viet-Nam.

Greece was disappointed that the repeated efforts of the United States and certain others for the cessation of the conflict had found no response on the other side. On the other hand, Belgium implied that the United States should take a first peaceful step; and France declared that the greater the power, the greater the responsibilities.

147. The Netherlands deplored that exhortations were usually addressed to the United States only and thus ignored the serious US peace proposals, which had been repeatedly turned down by the other side. The Netherlands hoped that the new US proposals would be seriously studied.

148. Italy said that the US position on the three essential points did not differ greatly from that of impartial, objective world figures. Similarly Norway noted that, on the basis of Mr. Goldberg's statement, a cessation of the bombing might follow any indication of a possible approachement from the other side. If this were correct, the US position would now be approaching the three points of the UN Secretary-General. Denmark said that the US statement was a considerable approximation to the Secretary-General's three steps.

149. Belgium declared that the United States was giving aid, as requested, to the Government of South Viet-Nam, as they could not let South Viet-Nam be crushed. The sincerity of the recent US statement could not be doubted. At the same time, Belgium said that the moment had come for the United States to make a major choice, more political than military, as described by President Kennedy in 1963; and that the Soviet Union and China must act to strengthen the side which would take the first peaceful step - apparently the United States.

150. France asked whether the survival of the Vietnamese people was not in question; said that an overture could come only from the great Power whose intervention had been a basic factor in the escalation; and declared that the Geneva Agreements were, although not implemented, at least valid and applicable. Hence the United Nations could not intervene formally, all the less as only one of the parties was a UN member. A return to the Geneva Agreements would mean withdrawing all foreign forces and prohibiting their return as well as any foreign interference. The Vietnamese should settle - or in the case of the North Vietnamese continue to settle - their own affairs.

Europe

Warsaw Pact members

151. The Soviet Union pointed out that even when other centres of international tension appeared, Europe still remained the barometer of the world's political weather.

152. Statements on these matters were, on the whole, two-fold, an indictment of FRG policies, and an outline of the Socialist proposals on Europe, as recently brought together in the Statement issued after the July 1966 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact.

153. West German rearmament in the conventional field was described, for instance, by the two Soviet Socialist Republics, with financial and numerical data.

154. As regards the nuclear ambitions of the FRG, Poland referred to an official FRG statement of 23 September 1966. In addition, Poland listed two other FRG policies which were said to be at the root of European tensions, the West German territorial claims and, secondly, the West German policy of refusing to recognize the GDR and asserting that the FRG was the sole representative of the German nation.

155. It was repeatedly noted that, in the words of Czechoslovakia, aggressive circles in the United States were leaning on reactionary elements such as the present FRG leadership.

156. Hungary said that the United States, which had made positive statements regarding East-West relations in Europe, could, together with West European countries, strengthen the present stability in Europe, by establishing and developing contacts with the GDR from economic and cultural fields towards de facto and de jure recognition.

157. Concerning the question of German reunification, and its relationship to European security, Poland declared that the German problem, in the light of historical experience, must be subordinated to European security; and that it was not the existence of two German States that was the real cause of tension in Europe. While a détente could make it possible to deal with so far unsolved political problems, this would ^{not} be done before the final stage of the process.

158. The German question notwithstanding, Bulgaria and Romania respectively noted an improvement in East-West relations in Europe through trends towards a better co-operation in various fields, and a desire for an inter-European rapprochement.

159. With a view to furthering such trends, all Warsaw Pact members referred to the Bucharest Declaration which recommended inter alia the holding of a European Conference, collateral disarmament measures in Europe and recognition of the European territorial status quo; and Bulgaria declared her readiness to participate in all constructive initiatives in that Declaration's spirit, with a view to Europe becoming a true factor of peace and understanding in the world.

160. Poland dealt at some length with the question of a Conference on security and co-operation in Europe. The Conference should be carefully prepared and should concentrate first of all on problems of security. A Declaration could be issued on co-operation in maintaining and strengthening European security. Further, European economic co-operation could be discussed at such a Conference.

161. The Soviet Union excluded no European State from these negotiations, including the FRG if it expressed readiness to participate.

Nato countries

162. European affairs were not, on the whole, dealt with at such length.

163. Belgium and the Netherlands noted a lesser emphasis on ideological differences and an increase in contacts and exchanges across ideological barriers. Italy recalled that there had been West European exchanges with Socialist countries, in which she had actively participated.

164. France similarly paid tribute to a general desire of normalization and an assertion of national personalities.

165. Greece recalled that last year she had informed the General Assembly of significant progress in relations with her neighbours. She announced that further steps had been taken since then; ^aseries of bilateral agreements had been signed with Romania.

166. Belgium declared that the improvement was partly due to Atlantic collective security, and listed appropriate military defense as a prerequisite to peace on any continent.

167. France expounded a view, not dissimilar from the Socialist approach, that increased all-European exchanges could lead to a discussion on the great problems, primarily Germany. On the other hand, Italy took a position closer to that of the FRG, by stating that the situation in Europe could not be permanently stabilized without a satisfactory solution in the matter of German reunification. Although these views were not necessarily irreconcilable, there was greater emphasis in

the French statement on the need for an "opening up of Europe" and satisfaction with "the evolution that was beginning to take place".

Non-committed countries

168. Austria, Finland and Sweden, respectively noted an encouraging trend towards greater political stability in Europe, a further improvement in European relations, and increased contacts in Europe, not least between East and West.

169. Austria placed the emphasis on good-neighbourly relations. In this connexion, Finland recalled that she had sponsored resolution 2129 (XX).

170. Yugoslavia placed economic and political collaboration in Europe in the framework of a general, world-wide decrease in tension in East-West relations during the past few years. Yugoslavia also reported that the sponsors of resolution 2129 (XX) were now preparing a meeting of the representatives of European Parliaments and that new paths were opening up.

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AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
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NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POUR INFORMATION

*Thanks.
 Nov 27/66*

Date:
 23 Nov. 1966

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM
 DE: A.E. Nesterenko,
 Under-Sec'y, PSCA.

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

18 November 1966

PhP/flr

NOTE ON ALL-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

(including the German Question)

(October 1966)

I. GENERAL COMMENTS

1. As pointed out by the Soviet Union in the general debate, "even when other centres of international tension appear, Europe still remains the barometer of the world's political weather".
2. At the same time as the United States, in President Johnson's speech of 7 October ^{1/}, acknowledged the European détente and sought to take the lead in a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the European Governments proceeded with their own reconciliation efforts both on their Continent and at the United Nations.
3. An informal East-West meeting was held on 4 October at UN Headquarters by nine European countries - a cross-section of Continental positions from the diplomatic and ideological viewpoints, as well as the sponsors of the draft of resolution 2129 (XX) on good-neighbourly relations in Europe.
4. The visit of Premier Zhivkov to France was the first official visit of a Bulgarian head of government to a Western country since World War II and the first such visit to France in history. While problems relating to French-Bulgarian cultural and economic exchanges occupied most of the conversations, this visit appeared to be a further step in strengthening East-West links.
5. A prominent article by Gaullist Louis Terrenoire in "La Nation" of 11 October praised the achievements of the 10th Congress of the Pan European Union, a Western non-governmental organization with limited following. The Congress advocated a united Europe, the neutrality of which would be guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union. M. Terrenoire's article was a sign of the ambiguity in the Gaullist view of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Europe, which the phrase "Europe to the Urals" failed to dispel.
6. There were new nuances in the political relationship of two non-committed countries with Warsaw Pact members. In the words of Neue Zürcher Zeitung there was a "rapprochement" between Finland and the Soviet Union, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) scored a "success" in improving its relations with Yugoslavia.

^{1/} See East-West Note.

7. In the German question the developments in October did not affect the basic positions of either side. No Nato member gave any sign of contemplating recognition of the GDR, supporting its application for UN membership or, in any way, heeding U Thant's plea for UN universality.
8. The remark in the September survey that the Germans themselves failed to follow up on earlier attempts at a rapprochement between the two States was no longer true in October, in view of efforts by SPD (Social-Democratic) Vice-Chairman Herbert Wehner to promote the two ideas of an all-German economic community ("Wirtschaftsbund" or "Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft") and a non-aggression declaration of the FRG to what they called "the Soviet Zone".
9. As a means of promoting their plans, the Social-Democrats used direct contacts with the Soviet Union. On 12 October in East Berlin, SPD Chairman Brandt, the Chief West Berlin Burgomaster, had his first official contact with the USSR Ambassador to the GDR, P. A. Abrassimov.
10. The Socialist Unity of Germany (SED) Party of the GDR invited the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) to political negotiations and they regarded the SPD proposal of an economic community, which they rejected, as due to pressure by the SPD membership in favour of an alternative to Christian-Democratic foreign policy.

II. EUROPE - EAST AND WEST

11. In addition to the visit of Premier Zhivkov of Bulgaria to France, there was, in the general debate at the 21st session, a thorough and, on the whole, sanguine review by European Members of pan-European relations.

General Debate

12. While all European representatives who referred to the situation on their Continent agreed that an improvement was taking place, there were different interpretations of the nature of such developments, and conflicting positions on the security problem's relationship to the German question. Nato countries, with the exception of France, did not place much emphasis on European developments. Yet Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands either noted the diminishing importance of ideological differences or referred to West European contacts, including their own, with Socialist countries. Italy declared that the situation in Europe could not be permanently stabilized without a satisfactory solution in the matter of German reunification.
13. Some non-aligned countries - Sweden, Austria and Finland - noted encouraging trends in European relations, the last two delegations stressing the importance of good-neighbourly relations.

14. Warsaw Pact members placed the emphasis on what they regarded as dangerous FRG policies, notably its alleged nuclear ambitions and its territorial claims; and they stated that the German problem must be subordinated to European security. While a détente could make it possible to deal with so far unsolved political problems, this would not be done before the final stage of the process.

15. France expounded the view, not dissimilar from that of the Socialist countries, that increased inter-European exchanges could lead to a discussion on the great problems, notably Germany.

16. Yugoslavia regarded a European détente not primarily as a regional problem, but as part of a general, world-wide decrease in tension in East-West relations during the past few years.

17. It should be noted that, although Warsaw Pact members saw a general deterioration in the international situation due to the Viet-Nam war and other US policies, they did mention a widespread desire for an inter-European rapprochement. Moreover, Bulgaria specifically regarded such developments as an improvement in "East-West relations" in Europe.

Bulgarian visit to France

18. Premier Zhivkov spent three days in Southern France, then, on 13 October, he was received by President de Gaulle at the Elysée Palace. In an after luncheon speech, President de Gaulle said ^{2/} in part:

"In order to help the new Europe, modern evolution, world peace, Bulgaria and France have every reason practically to organize their friendly co-operation in the political, economic ^{3/} and cultural fields".

19. Like other such conferences the Bulgarian-French summit meeting was meant to serve an East-West rapprochement, as well as bilateral relations. According to Le Monde ^{4/}, whereas other People's Democracies - Romania, for instance - were particularly interested by France's example of national independence, Bulgaria, which "unhesitatingly followed the Soviet line", was most appreciative of the fact that

^{2/} Le Monde, 14 October, p. 6.

^{3/} Le Monde pointed out that, whereas Bulgaria bought French equipment goods and iron products, she sold less tobacco to France than before; and a list of Bulgarian products likely to interest French importers ought to be drawn up. (14 October, p. 1, leader).

^{4/} Le Monde, 16 - 17 October, p. 2.

French diplomacy "advocated a negotiated settlement of all differences and sought an entente between the two parts of Europe. They can all the more easily cultivate the friendship of France as General de Gaulle is in good terms with the Soviets".

20. The joint Bulgarian-French communiqué issued on 15 October read ^{5/} in part:

"Progressive normalization of the relations between the various countries of Europe, based on the respect of the independence of all the States and non-intervention in their internal affairs, should make possible a fruitful co-operation of the whole of Europe and create favourable conditions for a discussion of the great outstanding problems the solution of which is a prerequisite to the establishment of a lasting peace on the Continent".

III. THE GERMAN QUESTION

Social-Democratic (SPD) initiatives - plan for an all-German Economic Community, proposal of renunciation of force in "internal" German relations and Herr Brandt's meeting with Ambassador Abrassimov.

21. On 11 October Herr Wehner, the Social-Democratic (SPD) Vice-Chairman, gave an interview which was published on the following day by the West German periodical "Deutsches Panorama". The SPD leader proposed inter alia the setting up of an economic community (Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft) between the two parts of Germany, with a view to removing the German question from its impasse.

(i) Four-Power responsibility

22. Herr Wehner explained his initiative by stating:

"The Four-Power responsibility cannot be an excuse for us not to do everything that is in the power of the Germans".

23. At the same time Herr Wehner assumed that Four-Power consent would be necessary for the proposed community, since it was a matter of an arrangement preliminary to a peace treaty; and that silence from the Powers could be interpreted as indicating consent.

(ii) Conduct of negotiations

24. The negotiations were to be conducted at various levels, not ruling out the highest. For instance, a talk between the FRG Minister for All-German Affairs and the GDR All-German State Secretary was "conceivable". On the other hand Wehner rejected a recognition of the GDR since this would finally put a "seal" on Germany's division.

^{5/} Le Monde, 16 - 17 October, p. 2.

(iii) Methods

25. Herr Wehner suggested that one should act gradually beginning with the easiest things, and then, step by step, proceed to the solution of the next problems without any constraints:

"My basic rule for these proposals would be that neither side should, figuratively speaking, put a rope around the other's neck - so that each side could retain a certain freedom of movement".

(iv) Objectives

26. A beginning could be made by regulating means of payment gradually and through mutual agreement so as to create a free monetary circulation. It should not be ruled out that, in this way, progress could be achieved towards the joint appearance of the two parts of Germany on the world market. Another possible field for linking the two parts of Germany was that of the sources of energy including long-term agreements for the supply of coal by the FRG. In the long run, and similarly with the European Economic Community (EEC), all-German economic authorities could be established, in addition to the authorities in Bonn and East Berlin, "as soon as there have been certain mutual political experiments". Herr Wehner said that he had in mind the most far-reaching Federal merger.

(v) Limitations

27. The notion of a German economic community or a still closer association such as a German Federation should not be discredited, Wehner said, by identifying it with Ulbricht's proposal for a Confederation. In Wehner's words,

"We say frankly and freely that we do not want to become Communists; at the same time we do not demand that the Communists should cease being Communists before certain arrangements can be made".

28. In their efforts to find new approaches to the German question, the West German Social-Democrats had a high-level contact with the Soviet Government. The report in the London Times of a five-hour meeting on 12 October in East Berlin between Herr Brandt and Mr. Abrassimov, the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR, read ^{6/} in part:

^{6/} The Times, 14 October, p. 8.

"Herr Brandt was understood to have mentioned some of the ideas on future relations between the two parts of Germany set out in a much-criticized newspaper article by Herr Herbert Wehner, the deputy chairman of his party. Though rejected by the Bonn Government, these suggestions interested the Russians".

29. In addition to the "Economic Community" scheme, the Social-Democrats made another proposal concerning relations with East Germany. On 15 October, Herr Wehner, in an interview with "Neue Rhein-Ruhr Zeitung", declared ^{7/} himself in favour of a West German Declaration of renunciation of force against the "Soviet zone". In the Social-Democratic leader's view, there was no objection to the search for a formula making it indisputably clear, even for ill-intentioned people, that "on internal German territory also there was for us no use of force". ^{8/} The declaration of renunciation of force against "Pankov" could be deposited in a neutral place, together with the "clause de sauvegarde", stating that there were in Germany two governments which had irreconcilable conceptions of their roles.

FRG Government reaction and West German public opinion

30. The SPD "economic community" plan was attacked and rejected by the FRG government. In an interview with Hamburg's "Welt am Sonntag", Chancellor Erhard called ^{9/} that proposal "illusory". The Chancellor said in part:

"In all time and in the whole world it had proved impossible to link together two wholly different economic and social systems, or even to find as much as a middle course of co-operation".

31. It was therefore ruled out, according to Chancellor Erhard, that a totalitarian and a democratic system should build a community on the basis of different social and legal principles. For instance, a combination of free and state-manipulated currencies would make a free exchange of goods - the first basis for an economic community - impossible.

32. Chancellor Erhard further predicted that, whereas the FRG had never been lacking in good will and efforts to enable free movement of all men in the whole of Germany, those in power in the GDR, under a humanitarian cloak, would seek ever more openly "to perpetuate the partition of Germany".

^{7/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 October.

^{8/} The FRG Government in diplomatic Notes of 25 March 1966 to governments "throughout the world" proposed to exchange declarations on a renunciation to force with the Soviet Union and East European states.

^{9/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 October.

33. Yet, in their rejection or suspicion of the SPD initiatives, the Christian-Democratic (CDU) leadership was going against "the tide of public opinion", in the view of The Times of London which wrote inter alia:

"Recognition [of the GDR] is still out of the question. But gradually and recently the view had begun to spread that the old road to reunification - via Russian sacrifice of Herr Ulbricht in return for concessions for security - is now blocked, that new ideas are needed, and that the two parts of Germany may have to learn to live together for some time".

34. As regards Herr Brandt's meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR, the FRG Government's attitude, although less openly negative than in respect of the economic community scheme, was apparently quite critical. On 18 October, in West Berlin, Chancellor Erhard and Herr Brandt had a one and a half hour talk. At a subsequent press conference, Herr von Hase, the FRG Government chief spokesman, on being asked whether his Government approved of further meetings between the Chief Burgomaster and Ambassador Abrassimov, declared 10/:

"I think I can say that there are no basic objections. The question of the frequency of such talks will be an important factor".

35. As pointed out by Herr Hase, it was agreed that the Chief Burgomaster could not negotiate or do anything that impaired Allied rights.

36. On the other hand, West German public opinion was favourably impressed by Herr Brandt's as well as Herr Wehner's initiatives. In the view of the London Times, 11/ the move by the SPD leader "startled German opinion", all the more as this was "the first time Herr Brandt had crossed the wall since it was built in 1961".

37. In this light, and in view of Herr Wehner's proposals, The Times wrote 12/ in part:

"The events of the past three days have sharpened the image of the SPD as the party most ready and willing to take a practical initiative towards the reunification of Germany, and of the ruling CDU as the one which is lagging behind... People are sick of the old official gramophone record about reunification in peace and freedom, and want action. The Social-Democrats imply they will give it".

10/ The Times, 19 October, p. 8.

11/ 15 October, p. 7.

12/ 15 October, p. 7.

Attitude of the SED (Socialist Unity of Germany) Party

38. On 14 October a West German newspaper close to the SPD, Neue Rhein-Ruhr Zeitung published ^{13/} an interview with Herr Ulbricht. The SED First Secretary inter alia stated:

"We are ready for all negotiations between the two German States. We do not set any conditions. On the other hand, in order to arrive at concrete results, those who have the power must talk together".

39. Herr Ulbricht pointed out that, in economic questions, the power did not belong to SPD Vice-President Wehner, but to men like Herr Mommsen, ^{14/} and other men who controlled West German means of production. Herr Ulbricht added:

"With those we have long since been doing business".

40. Further, Herr Ulbricht rejected the possibility of negotiations between technical commissions or Secretaries of State:

"On these fateful German questions telephone operators and postal employees cannot decide - this is a thing for Governments".

41. At the same time as it rejected Herr Wehner's proposal, the SED leadership was apparently still interested in contacts with the Social-Democrats, under specific conditions. On 14 October, Neues Deutschland, the central organ of the SED, blamed the SPD leadership for not answering earlier proposals, and again called upon the Social-Democrats to enter into political negotiations with the SED. Neues Deutschland further stated that the SPD must abandon their policy of "community" with the Christian-Democrats (CDU) if they really wanted to give up the position of the cold war. This meant, according to the SED organ, a renunciation of the FRG claim to exclusive representation /of the whole of Germany/, a recognition of the existence of two German states and negotiations on an equal footing between the Governments of the two German States.

^{13/} Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 October; The Times, 15 October, p. 7.

^{14/} Member of the Board of Directors of Thyssen Röhren Werke A.G.

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FOR INFORMATION	X	POUR INFORMATION

Thanks -
5/11/67

Date:
30 Dec. 1966
5/11/67
CR. 16 (11-64)

FROM:
DE: A.E. Nesterenko
Under-Secretary
PSCA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
Political Affairs Division

CONFIDENTIAL

15 December 1966
PhP:pmm

SURVEY ON ALL-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
(INCLUDING THE GERMAN QUESTION)

(November 1966)

SURVEY OF ALL-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
(INCLUDING THE GERMAN QUESTION)

(November 1966)

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. In spite of differences on the German question, which were again reflected in the UN debates and documents, the trend towards greater cooperation between Socialist and other European countries was confirmed by developments in November.
2. Some issues arose from Austria's intention to associate herself with the European Economic Community (EEC) of which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is a member and from uncertainty as to the attitude of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, which, Pravda stated, should confirm a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union.

EUROPE - EAST AND WEST

(i) Agreements

3. On 9 November in Paris Herve Alphand, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, and USSR Ambassador Valerian Zorin signed an agreement for the establishment of a direct teleprinter line between the Elysee and the Kremlin. This measure had been agreed in principle during the visit of President de Gaulle to the Soviet Union in June-July 1966. ^{1/}

(ii) Visits

Austria-USSR

4. President Podgorny paid an official visit to Austria on 14-20 November. The question of Austria's intentions to become an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) of which the Federal Republic of Germany is a member was one of the major topics in the discussions. On 20 November in a televised speech President Podgorny declared:

^{1/} European Survey for June, paragraph 67, page 17.

"Any arrangement between Austria and the Common Market, no matter what form it would take, would result not only in economic but also in specific political bonds for Austria. This, in turn, would intentionally or unintentionally lead away from the state treaty and the proven neutral course, which is of great benefit to the Austrian people."

The final communique of 21 November stated that the state treaty and the permanent neutrality of Austria represented a positive contribution to the cause of lessening international tension; and the Soviet side declared that Austria's efforts to strengthen its position as a neutral sovereign state would continue to enjoy Soviet support. Further, both sides agreed that convening a well-prepared European conference on European security and cooperation would considerably contribute to the cause of normalizing the situation in Europe.

Finland-Soviet Union

5. On 3 November, a communique was published at the close of conversations between a visiting CPSU delegation ^{2/} and Finnish Communist leaders. A mention was made of proposals by the Communist Party of Finland for cooperation between the two countries for the setting up of a first nuclear plant in Finland, the building of an underground railway line in Helsinki and research work on mineral resources in North and East Finland.

6. As reported in Neue Zurcher Zeitung, such matters were again taken up during the visit of Prime Minister Rafael Paasio to the Soviet Union on 14-19 November. ^{3/} Other topics of discussion were reportedly the German question and

^{2/} The delegation was received by President Kekkonen on 1 November.

^{3/} Mr. Paasio saw Premier Kosygin but not CPSU leaders, an omission for which he was reportedly blamed by some leading Finnish Social-Democrats.

Nordic security problems.^{4/} As stated by Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, on 14 November, the cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union in the economic sector would now enter a "new phase", which should enable the two countries to come to grips with problems, the solution of which had previously been regarded as unthinkable.

7. On 15 November in Moscow at a luncheon in honour of Mr. Paasio, Mr. Kosygin stated:

"(The Soviet Union) attaches great importance to the Kekkonen proposals designed to strengthen peace in the North of Europe."

8. It was further reported that, during the Soviet-Finnish meetings, the Soviet side had expressed the hope that an all-European security conference would be held in the near future.

9. On 18 November in Moscow a Soviet-Finnish communique was issued in which the good relations between the two countries were underlined; it was announced that Chairman Kosygin had accepted an invitation to visit Finland, and that mutual trade would be increased in the coming year.

10. A Congress of the Social-Democratic Party ^{5/} of Finland was followed with great attention in the Soviet Union; in an editorial in Pravda, on 25 November, it was stated that the Party Congress beginning on 26 November could be a test of whether that Party really wanted friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but that

"Solid positions are still held by Rightist forces in the Social-Democratic Party of Finland, which are closely linked with foreign and internal reaction and are seeking to put the brakes on the process currently taking place in the party and to make it hold on to the old positions."

Hungary-United Kingdom

11. On 30 October-2 November the British Minister for European Affairs, George Thompson, was in Budapest on an official visit. In conversations with Prime Minister Kallai, Foreign Minister Peter and Deputy Foreign Minister Szilagyi, Mr. Thompson respectively dealt with world problems, European security questions and bilateral relations.

^{4/} The Soviet Government reportedly expected Finland to exercise more influence on her Nordic neighbours, with particular reference to the Finnish plans for a frontier agreement with Norway - neutralizing Northern Scandinavia - and a Nordic nuclear-free zone (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 16 November).

^{5/} The Social-Democrats are now represented in a coalition Cabinet which also includes the Agrarians and the Communists.

USSR-Norway

12. On 13-18 November Foreign Minister John Lyng was on an official visit to the Soviet Union. On 14 November he had a two-hour meeting with Mr. Gromyko, during which Viet-Nam and European security questions were taken up. At a luncheon in the Kremlin Mr. Gromyko reportedly expressed satisfaction with the over-all state of the bilateral relations, although Norway's Nato engagement prevented a wider development of these relations; and Mr. Lyng pointed out that in the years since World War II a leit-motiv of Norwegian foreign policy had been to avoid conflicts with the USSR and maintain friendly relations.
13. On 15 November Mr. Lyng was received by Chairman Kosygin.

USSR-United Kingdom

14. On 23-25 November ^{6/} Foreign Secretary George Brown was in Moscow. During a three-hour discussion with Mr. Gromyko in the afternoon of the 23rd, Mr. Brown discussed, in the main, Viet-Nam and disarmament matters. European security was taken up at dinner on the same day and discussed again on the 24th during a 90-minute conversation. As reported by The Times, on 25 November,

"Mr. Brown is believed to have pointed out that a European security conference proposed by the Soviet side would need careful preparations. If it were held prematurely, positions might solidify and progress be retarded." ^{7/}

(iii) Statements

France

15. On 3 November 1966, in the French National Assembly, M. Couve de Murville declared that Europe was "in motion" and he underscored the evolution in French relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, particularly since the journey to the Soviet Union of the President of the Republic and the Foreign Minister's own trips to Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia:

"Thus a whole set of new relations are perhaps beginning to take shape in our Continent, which would be likely to forecast what the Europe of tomorrow could be - what, in our opinion, she should be - if she has in mind both to establish a lasting internal peace and play her part in the world... Even if the path can be regarded as well marked, there is of course an immense task remaining to be accomplished."

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- ^{6/} Mr. Brown was to have left Moscow on the 24th, but stayed on for an interview with Chairman Kosygin on the 25th.
- ^{7/} It was confirmed in Le Monde on 22 November that European security matters were of present significance for the British in preparation for the Nato Council in December and a series of meetings between Mr. Wilson and the Heads of Government of the Six EEC countries.

Bulgaria

16. At the ninth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, on 14 November in Sofia, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, the Prime Minister and First Secretary of the Party, declared, inter alia, that the Balkans occupied an important place in Bulgaria's foreign policy and the government would persevere in its efforts to turn the region, whose nations were bound by historic and cultural links, into a zone of peace and cooperation.

17. In the report from the Central Committee, presented by Mr. Zhivkov, Bulgaria's relations with other Balkan States were dealt with as follows:

"The development and strengthening of Bulgaria's cooperation with Romania and Yugoslavia ^{8/} and the improvement of her relations with Greece and Turkey, have had a favourable influence on the general political climate in the Balkans. Bulgaria has also on her part taken steps with a view to normalizing her State to State relations with Albania."

18. As regards relations with Western States, particularly France, it was stated:

"The policy of peaceful coexistence with the States of the capitalistic world - a policy which Bulgaria is consistently following - is giving positive results."

"The traditional friendship between the Bulgarian and French peoples has recently been consistently strengthened and this fact has also found its expression in the similarity of the two governments' positions in the face of a number of international problems - notably concerning European security."

(iv) Leaders and other newspaper articles of particular significance

French-Soviet relations

19. On 12 November in Le Monde, Andre Fontaine wrote that "generally well-informed persons" in French official circles stated that there was no truth in rumours of a new French-Soviet Pact and that "the signing of any treaty between the two countries was absolutely out of the question". In Fontaine's view, what particularly interested the Soviet Government - in addition to the development of French-Soviet mutual cooperation in all fields - was to secure French support for a European security conference and to prevail upon France to take part in the

^{8/} There have been Western reports of renewed differences between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over the question of Yugoslav Macedonia, together with acknowledgments that relations between the two countries had altogether improved.

negotiations of a multilateral treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear armaments. Yet, there was no expectation of very meaningful developments on either point.

20. On the basis of information secured by M. Fontaine, General de Gaulle was personally quite opposed to a non-proliferation treaty for two main reasons. It would result, according to the French President, in a strengthening of the military, and therefore political, superiority of a small number of countries - even if France should be one of them - and, secondly, the treaty would be almost totally devoid of effect inasmuch as the nations that really wanted it could not be prevented from securing nuclear weapons.

British interpretation of Albanian speech

21. As interpreted in the London Times on 3 November by its correspondent in Vienna, a speech by General Enver Hoxha, on 1 November in Tirana, offered the following possibilities:

"General Hoxha's long report indicated that on the international ideological front there was to be no change, but on purely business relations with the non-ideological world in general, and with the Balkan region in particular, he seemed to be slightly more encouraging than hitherto. Although he was just as unyielding towards his Yugoslav neighbours, he did indicate that he is ready to explore possibilities of closer cooperation between Balkan nations."

THE GERMAN QUESTION

(1) UN documents

22. There were again references to the German question ^{9/} in connexion with the GDR renewed application for membership in September 1966 ^{10/} and with the question of the threat or use of force (item 92).

23. On 11 November 1966, the USSR representative, Mr. Fedorenko, in the debate on item 92 declared: ^{11/}

^{9/} Various aspects of the German question had already been frequently mentioned in the general debate at the 21st session.

^{10/} S/7580 and S/7599.

^{11/} A/PV.1461, pp. 28-30.

"In Europe, Washington's aggressive course is supported by the militarist circles in Bonn, which nurture plans for the use of force in order to revise the results of the Second World War and alter the frontiers that have emerged in Europe. Those revanchist and aggressive circles are striving to lay their hands on nuclear weapons in order to carry out their plans for revenge. The cause of European security demands the prohibition of the use of force in Europe, as well as in other parts of the world."

(ii) Notes

24. As reported on 25 November from Berlin in The Times of London, the Government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Notes to the three Western Allies through the good offices of the Czechoslovak Government demanded that the Allied accounting office for posts and telecommunications, and the Allied committee responsible for the office should be dissolved by 1 January 1967. ^{12/}

25. The GDR Foreign Minister reportedly asked the FRG Government and Herr Brandt, the Chief West Berlin Burgomaster, to support the GDR proposal.

(iii) Visits

GDR-USSR

26. A delegation of the CPSU led by alternate member of the Politburo P. N. Demichev stayed in the GDR from 26 to 31 October at the invitation of the Central Committee of the SED (Socialist Unity of Germany) Party.

27. According to a communique published on 31 October, both parties were agreed that "ideological-theoretical cooperation in the individual fields of agitation, sociological research, Marxist-Leninist propaganda, education and cultural activities is to be considerably expanded and systematically organized..."

Romania-GDR

28. The Chairman of the State Council of Romania, Chivu Stoica, was in the German Democratic Republic on a holiday in the first week of November.

(iv) Meetings

29. On 31 October the FRG Ambassador in Moscow, von Walther, was received by Mr. Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, for the first time since the Ambassador arrived in Moscow six months ago.

(v) Statements

30. On 4 November in Dresden on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the

^{12/} The GDR declared itself ready to settle by negotiation whatever questions may arise from the closure.

reopening of the Technical University, Walter Ulbricht, the Chairman of the GDR State Council, made a speech in which he dealt, inter alia with the German question, as follows:

"The basic prerequisite for maintaining and securing the peace and the first step of all for a peaceful development in Germany is a detente in relations between the two German States - which cannot be arrived at through measures tending to exclusive representation [of all Germany by the FRG] in law, through the Hallstein doctrine in diplomacy, in sport and in international scientific relations...

"If we are asked how the reunification of the two German States takes place, I can only repeat: the only way is that of peaceful coexistence of the two German States on the basis of the status quo, the way of normalization of relations between the two governments, which by way of disarmament and West Germany's renunciation of revanchism leads to a confederation. Such is the task of the peace-loving, humanistic and progressive forces."

(vi) Press

Interview with GDR Foreign Minister

31. On 31 October Paris-Presse ^{13/} published an interview with Otto Winzer, the GDR Foreign Minister, under the heading "The Shortest Way from Paris to Moscow Runs Through East Berlin", which read in part:

"In certain fields, on definite questions there is a greater conformity of views between the two countries than between Paris and Bonn."

32. Herr Winzer suggested that economic missions, then consulates should be exchanged between the GDR and France. ^{14/}

FRG Land elections

33. The results of the elections in Bavaria and Hesse ^{15/} were widely commented upon in Western Europe. For instance, Neue Zurcher Zeitung listed the following contributing factors to the comparative success of the NDP in Hesse:

^{13/} An evening newspaper generally regarded as "pro-Gaullist".

^{14/} He also advocated cooperation in electronics and chemical industry; and demanded an end to discrimination against the GDR by the Allied "Travel Board" in Berlin and in cultural matters, and recognition of the Oder-Neisse line.

^{15/} On 6 November, the National Democratic Party (NDP) secured 8 seats out of 96 in the Landtag of Hesse (7.9% of the votes as compared with 2.5% in September 1965 in Federal elections in the same Land). In the Bavarian Land elections on 20 November, the National Democratic Party (NDP) obtained 15 seats, as compared with 110 CSU (Christian Social Union) and 79 SPD (Social Democratic) seats (7.6% of the votes). For earlier reports on extreme right-wing activities in the FRG, see previous European Surveys, notably, March 1966, paras. 28-30, p. 6, and May 1966, para. 15 and footnote 6, p. 4. For reactions in Socialist countries see Note on their foreign relations (October-November 1966).

"The split in the Western alliance, the stalemate in European unification, inaction of the great Powers in the German question, the example of Gaullist policy of national independence and an open 'sacred egoism' have unmistakably given a new impetus to Nationalism in Germany."

34. The Times of London on 29 November had the following editorial comments:

"The excuse that Bonn is in a mess is not good enough. There is a perfectly good opposition party - the Social Democratic ... nor is everything excused by blaming the division of Germany, or alleged neglect by her allies. One of the signs of a healthy country, as of a healthy person, is that it can meet disappointment in a rational way. It is true that West Germany's allies, including Britain, have not always been as tactful as they might have been, particularly over the recent problems of financing Nato forces, but there has been nothing to stop West Germany from defending her interests in a sensible manner and helping to evolve new policies for Nato."

35. A widely held view in the Western press was that, while the success of the extreme nationalistic party was a timely warning, "it would be a mistake to get things out of proportion". ^{16/}

FRG political crisis ^{17/}

36. A favourable report on Dr. Kurt-George Kiesinger ^{18/} was given by The Times of London on 11 November, by its "own correspondent". Noting that the CDU candidate for Chancellor had been "well liked and esteemed by British delegates during his term as vice president of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe" in 1955-58, The Times wrote that "if he can survive the expected outcry about his past, then his political maturity, experience, and eloquence should make him a first-class leader for West Germany".

37. On the other hand, on 10 November the GDR press service (ADN) stated in part:

"Should Kiesinger be appointed Chancellor, a second heavily incriminated Nazi would rise to political leadership in West Germany."

^{16/} Christian Science Monitor, 9 November.

^{17/} The Christian Democrats (CDU), Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FDP) respectively, hold 245, 202 and 49 seats in the FRG Bundestag.

^{18/} The Chief Minister of Baden Wurtemberg was chosen on 11 November by the CDU Parliament members by 137 out of 244 votes in the third round of voting.

38. A comparison was recently made ^{19/} between circumstances in 1956 and now:

"Adenauer was then able to act successfully against the architects of all-German plans, in the context of a Soviet threat and Western integration, the security policy, Europe, the Western Alliance, and four-power responsibility. Today, however, where are the common security policy, European integration, solidarity of the Alliance and a true responsibility of the powers for Germany?"

^{19/} Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 30 October.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General
A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	XX	POUR INFORMATION

Thats. Not 2/1/67

Date:

20/1
CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE: A.E. Nesterenko

A. E. Nesterenko

AA-35

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

10 January 1967
PhP:pmm

SURVEY OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS
(INCLUDING THE GERMAN QUESTION)

December 1966

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(INCLUDING THE GERMAN QUESTION)

December 1966

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. There was greater recognition in Socialist, Nato and neutral countries alike of the increasing response with which efforts at a rapprochement between Socialist and non-Socialist European countries had met in recent months.
2. Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, was in Turkey on 20-27 December. This was the first time a Soviet Premier went to Turkey. Even though the Soviet-Turkish meetings coincided with reports of delivery of Czechoslovak arms to Cyprus, the two countries expressed satisfaction with the results of the talks. The visit, which was in line with Turkey's new independent foreign policy announced by Foreign Minister Caglayangil on 17 June 1966, appeared likely to further mutual cooperation, particularly in the economic field.
3. Note was taken, in a joint communique of 25 November of an inter-governmental Soviet-Italian cooperation commission, that economic, scientific and technical relations between Italy and the Soviet Union "became considerably more active in recent years".
4. France and the Soviet Union were, during this period, at a more advanced stage in their cooperation, as reflected during the visit of Chairman Kosygin to France on 1-9 December. The Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence between different social and political systems is in general in harmony with France's objective to serve "peace and human progress" and the two countries are drawn closer by similar official and public reactions to the war in Viet-Nam. Although the two sides have different positions on the questions of nuclear proliferation and the status of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), their views are similar on other aspects of the German question - frontiers and nuclear armament. The question was raised during the visit of a pan-European conference on security and cooperation as proposed in the Bucharest declaration of the Warsaw Pact members (July 1966). While France seems to favour in principle such a conference, she reportedly holds the view that it should not take place unless there exists in advance some prospect for an agreement.

5. Different approaches to the detente were still noticeable in Europe. In the Declaration of 9 December on the Soviet visit to France, a development of European relations was advocated in all spheres and between all the countries in the image of the developing Soviet-French cooperation; while the Secretary-General of Nato, Signor Manlio Brosio, on 13 December declared that exchanges of views within Nato would make it possible for European and American allies, acting in common agreement, to find solid bases for a detente. The final communique of 16 December on the Ministerial meeting of the Nato Council took note of the detente and stated that the alliance had created the conditions that had made it possible.
6. All Nato members except France participated in discussions, and associated themselves with a decision by the Nato Council at the above meeting to establish a nuclear planning group including the FRG as a permanent member. It was stated in Izvestia on 20 December that the group was a concession to FRG "atom-mongers" and any move was condemned which gave FRG Generals access to nuclear weapons.
7. Conflicting attitudes towards the Federal Republic of Germany - its regime and policies - were in evidence respectively in a note verbale of 6 December from Bulgaria to the Secretary-General (S/7629) in connexion with the GDR application for membership and a statement of the same date by Mr. Brown, the British Foreign Secretary.
8. The Federal Republic of Germany under its new coalition government of the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social-Democrats (SPD) is seeking to improve its relations with France. Chancellor Kiesinger in his statement of 13 December to the Bundestag, said that the decisive role for Europe's future depended on the development of "German-French relations", and that the Munich Agreement which came into existence under the threat of force was no longer valid. This went further than the statement in the FRG Notes of 25 March 1966 "to the United States and other governments throughout the world", that the Munich Agreement "no longer has any territorial significance", and "the Federal Government, therefore, as it has often declared, does not assert any territorial claims against Czechoslovakia".
9. It was deplored in Czechoslovakia that the FRG did not accept the Czechoslovak position that the Munich Agreement was null and void from the start.

EUROPE - EAST AND WEST

VISITS

Chairman Kosygin to France (1-9 December)

10. On 1-9 December Chairman A. N. Kosygin, accompanied by high-ranking Soviet officials, paid a visit to France. In addition to meetings with General de Gaulle and other French leaders, the delegation saw places of interest in France. A joint Declaration of 9 December referred to Viet-Nam, the United Nations, disarmament and to French-Soviet, European and world-wide relationships.
11. The paragraph in the Declaration relating to the United Nations read:

"As for the United Nations, France and the Soviet Union consider that this Organization must function on the basis of a strict respect for the principles and provisions of the Charter, as well as its universal character. Noting the usefulness of French-Soviet consultations on the problems of the Organization and its work, the two Governments confirmed their intention of developing their contacts in the future on all questions of mutual interest."
12. Concerning disarmament, it was stated that, bearing in mind the capital importance of the nuclear problems, not only as to the non-dissemination of atomic weapons, but also to the prohibition of their production and destruction of existing stocks, the necessity was recognized for Powers with nuclear arms to discuss the proper means of insuring in this field a true disarmament.
13. The Declaration of 9 December also announced or recorded agreements prepared by the visit of President de Gaulle to the Soviet Union on 20 June-2 July 1966 and by intervening negotiations. On 9 November 1966 an agreement had been signed for the establishment of a direct teleprinter line between the Elysee and the Kremlin. As stated on 9 December, it would now be possible to exchange views and send messages at the highest level at any time it would appear necessary. In economic affairs, following a visit of M. Debre to Moscow in November 1966, the Declaration announced agreement on a permanent mixed Committee and Chamber of Commerce. Mixed working groups are also foreseen to solve scientific and technical problems and organize a broad exchange of information. The Declaration expressed satisfaction with the development of French-Soviet cultural relations and the intention of promoting reciprocal teaching of the two languages and intellectual and artistic exchanges. It was recalled that a Consular Convention was signed on 8 December.

14. In the political sphere, the usefulness of regular consultations between the two Governments was stressed, so as to contribute to the detente and the strengthening of peace. Visits of Messrs. L. I. Brezhnev and N. V. Podgorny to France would take place on dates to be agreed upon later and M. Pompidou accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union at a time suitable for him.

15. In the wider European context, a development of relations in all spheres and between all countries in the image of the developing French-Soviet cooperation was advocated so as to create favourable conditions for the discussion of the great European problems and, finally, for an understanding as to their settlement.

16. The Declaration affirmed the principles of territorial integrity, national sovereignty, non-use of force and non-interference in a State's internal affairs. The reference to national sovereignty may bring to mind the two sides' conflicting views as to whether the German Democratic Republic is a sovereign State. On the other hand, as regards territorial integrity, it may be recalled that President de Gaulle on 25 March 1959 said that he was in favour of the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent frontier.

17. The visit was also an occasion for important addresses both on the German question (see below), and on the significance of French-Soviet relations in European and world affairs.

18. In an after-dinner speech of 1 December, Chairman Kosygin made the following points:

- (1) It was hard to over-estimate the part that President de Gaulle played in the field of the French-Soviet rapprochement.
- (2) The Soviet Union regarded as most important that France had decided to assume her own role in Europe and the world since the Soviet Union believed in the French people's desire for peace, traditional friendship with the Soviet Union, and their aversion towards military adventure and any claim to world hegemony;
- (3) Frankness, mutual comprehension and increasing agreement marked French-Soviet relations;
- (4) While Soviet and French positions did not coincide on all international problems, their respective positions were considerably closer than one or two years ago on many important problems of the day.

19. On the same occasion, President de Gaulle explained how, in his opinion, a European whole (un ensemble europeen) could be created:

"This implies first a detente, i.e., between all the States of our Continent a deliberate practice of normal relations in all respects. It implies an entente, in other words, a possibility objectively and jointly to consider all subjects of common interest, notably, of course, those of the fate of Germany and of security which are obviously linked and without the settlement of which, taking into account the terrible wounds which the world wars have inflicted upon our Continent, the latter could not find harmony and stability. Lastly, for a re-joined Europe to appear, she must have ambitions. Which? Those that our time prescribes - in the framework of scientific, technical, economic development on which today everything depends and which is the best ground for international agreement (convergence). Outside Europe, her ambitions must be, in addition to exploring space - a pursuit in which a united Europe would have unlimited chances - joint assistance, everywhere in the world, to the progress of peoples who are lagging behind as well as to the maintenance of peace."

Chairman Kosygin's Visit-to-Turkey (20-27 December)

20. During his visit Mr. Kosygin was accompanied by a large group of Soviet officials. Bilateral talks were held on 20-22 December, and on 23-27 December the Soviet officials visited Izmir and Istanbul.

21. Among topics taken up were bilateral relations and the questions of Viet-Nam, disarmament, European security, the Near and Middle East, Cyprus and the recent Czechoslovak shipment of arms to Cyprus.

22. The Joint Communique issued on 27 December stated, inter alia, that the two countries confirmed their desire to continue, "guided by the traditions established during the days of V. I. Lenin and Ataturk", their efforts to develop friendly relations and to strengthen mutual confidence on the basis of full equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and "mutual respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity".

23. The Communique included the following points:

(i) United Nations

The two Governments agreed on the need to strengthen the United Nations "so that it could more effectively discharge its duties of safeguarding peace on the basis of the strict observance of the United Nations Charter".

(ii) Viet-Nam

The two Governments expressed "deep alarm over the dangerous situation in South East Asia" and outlined their "corresponding positions on

the Vietnamese question". They regarded the 1954 Geneva Agreement as the basis for settlement and held that the Vietnamese people should be given the right to determine their destiny "freely and independently".

(iii) Disarmament

The two Governments noted with full agreement "the importance of general and complete disarmament under effective international control for the establishment of a lasting peace"; expressed their desire "to contribute to the implementation of partial measures which would facilitate the solution of this key problem"; agreed on the urgency to solve the question of nuclear non-proliferation and that, "prior to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, no State should take actions which are liable to interfere with the conclusion of this treaty"; favoured an agreement to discontinue all types of tests, and agreed that in addition to the work already carried out on general and complete disarmament, "progress in this sphere would be promoted by the calling of a world disarmament conference".

(iv) European security and cooperation

The two Governments exchanged views on the question of European security and expressed "their desire to contribute in every way possible to the development of all-European cooperation in different spheres". It was reported in the Western press that the Soviet Union asked Turkey not to accept the stationing of US nuclear arms on its soil.

(v) Middle East

Both Governments confirmed "their sincere desire that the Near and Middle East should become a zone of peace and security".

(vi) Cyprus

The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers had confirmed the Soviet Union's attitude on the question as outlined in Soviet statements and also in the Joint Soviet-Turkish Communiqué issued in 1965. The parties had again declared that "it is necessary for all States and Members of the United Nations, in conformity with the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, to refrain from actions liable to aggravate the situation in Cyprus".

(vii) Bilateral relations

Both Governments expressed satisfaction with recent positive developments in their relations, and recognized the usefulness of continuing discussions on international problems and questions of bilateral relations. Confirming their adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence of States with different social systems, they favoured the solution of international disputes "by peaceful means, through negotiations". The invitations extended

to the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey to visit the Soviet Union were "accepted with gratitude". In the economic and commercial field, the parties expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved in their exchanges and agreed that further expansion in this regard would be mutually beneficial.

24. In connexion with the part of the communique relating to Cyprus, it was regretted in Athens that the Soviet Union by confirming earlier statements had once more rejected the possibility of Enosis with Greece (Le Monde, 30 December).

OTHER MEETINGS

Council of Europe

25. On 12-13 December in Paris ^{1/} the Committee of Ministers of the eighteen-member Council of Europe discussed East-West relations in Europe and European economic problems. All participants noted "a trend towards a detente". The Committee renewed instructions to the Secretary-General, Peter Smithers, to further, as much as possible, arrangements for technical cooperation between the members and East European countries.

26. On 13 December the Committee of Ministers held its yearly "colloque" with the presidents and representatives of the Consultative Assembly and its committees. In the words of the current President of the Committee of Ministers, Herr Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, the Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Council, while aware of an atmosphere of detente which was beginning to be noticeable in relations with the East, did not regard it as opportune at present to take part in this dialogue.

Nato Ministerial Council (13-15 December)

27. In advance of the meeting, Signor Manlio Brosio, the Nato Secretary-General, set forth on 13 December his Organization's approach to relations with Warsaw Pact countries as follows:

"The Ministers will begin with a review of the international situation, the state of the alliance, and in particular East-West relations. These have constantly improved in the past few years. Bilateral contacts between the free Nato countries of the West and the Warsaw Pact countries have been taken in the economic, cultural, scientific and touristic fields.

^{1/} While the headquarters of the Council of Europe is in Strasbourg where the meetings of its Consultative Assembly take place, the Committee of Ministers held its December meetings at the Centre de conferences internationales, avenue Kleber.

"One cannot force this trend towards a detente but it has to be understood so that confusion may be avoided: aims, conditions and limits must be examined having in mind to reach a common viewpoint. I am convinced that the impending sincere exchanges of views will make it possible to find out that solid bases for a detente can be found by the European countries and their American allies, acting in common agreement."

28. At the Ministerial meeting of 15-16 December, the Nato Council acknowledged the detente in Europe, but stated that the alliance had created the conditions thereof. Paragraph 3 of the communique read as follows:

"By setting aside the threats against peace and safeguarding the security of the Atlantic Zone, the alliance has given the proof of its value. By endowing itself with the necessary power for defending itself, including the means for efficient deterrence, it has created, while firmly maintaining its cohesion, the conditions which have permitted the notable detente currently ascertained in Europe and which remain essential for the security of the alliance and for the realization of progress towards a peaceful settlement of outstanding problems, and notably that of Germany."

29. The Council associated itself with the views expressed in^a/four Western Power Declaration on Germany (see paragraph 33 below).

30. A French interpretation of the meetings of the four Western Powers and Nato, as stated by M. Couve de Murville in a radio and television interview summarized by Le Monde on 18-19 December, was that, as regards relations between East and West Europe, the Western viewpoints were getting closer, and that France had now been rejoined by her partners, although "she seemed two years ago isolated in a search for a detente and cooperation with the East".

31. In conjunction with the Nato meeting, the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey met to review the progress made so far over the question of Cyprus. After a protracted session, it was announced that no solution had been found but that negotiations would continue at the ambassadorial level.

GERMAN QUESTION

UN DOCUMENTS

32. In a note verbale of 6 December addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7629) Bulgaria referred to allegations in a note verbale of the three Powers (S/7580) that the GDR "does not exist" and it was stated inter alia:

"These allegations are absolutely incompatible with the international reality and with the objective historical fact of the existence of the two German states since 1949, namely the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Each of the two German states has ever since

established and developed its own statehood and international personality."

Further it was stated:

"[The] attributes of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign and independent state, its persistent policy of peace and international cooperation and its willingness to accept and conscientiously to fulfill the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, prove that it meets all relevant requirements for membership in the United Nations. Therefore, the allegation that the German Democratic Republic is not eligible to be admitted into the United Nations is unjustified and is inconsistent with the principle of universality and with the interests of the United Nations.

"Equally groundless and legally irrelevant is the claim that the Federal Republic of Germany has the right to represent the whole German people in international affairs."

The Note concluded by declaring that:

"The assertion contained in the three-Power note can only encourage the revanchist and expansionist aspirations of the ruling circles in Western Germany, which became more impudent and alarming."

MEETINGS

Four Western Foreign Ministers

33. On 14 December the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the FRG met in Paris on the eve of the Nato meeting "with a view to discussing the situation in Germany". In the words of the Declaration issued on the same day, the three Western Powers took note of the FRG intention to develop contacts in the human sphere as well as in the economic and cultural fields between the two parts of Germany. Further:

"The Ministers have re-affirmed that the solution of the German question is one of the essential problems in the relations between East and West. This settlement can only intervene through peaceful means, on the basis of the principle of self-determination, and through the establishment of a climate of detente on the Continent in conditions ensuring the security of all States."

Nato Meeting - Question of FRG Nuclear Armament

34. As announced in the Nato communique of 16 December, fourteen Nato members in the planning committee on 14 December decided to set up a committee for nuclear defense affairs^{2/} and, subordinated thereto, a permanent "nuclear

^{2/} While this Committee was open to all members, France, Iceland, Luxembourg and Norway decided not to participate.

planning group". This group was to include seven members, i.e., four permanent members, including the FRG, and three non-permanent members.

35. On 20 December Izvestia published an editorial under the heading "Concession to the Bonn militarists", in which it was stated inter alia:

"Some newspapers in the West seek to give the impression that the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries give tacit agreement to the decisions of the Nato session. It is absolutely not so. The Soviet Union, the States of the Warsaw Pact have a clear position. They condemn whatever efforts in whatever shape to give the Bonn revanchists access to the atomic weapon."

STATEMENTS

During Chairman Kosygin's visit to Paris

36. In his speech of 1 December in Paris, Chairman Kosygin in apparent reference to the Federal Republic of Germany, declared:

"In Europe there are still forces at work which think that their interests are best served not by a detente and a strengthening of security but by new complications."

37. On the following day, at the Paris Hotel de Ville, Mr. Kosygin referred to the various aspects in the German question as follows:

"The demands for a revision of the frontiers arising from the war - which demands are accompanied by nuclear pretensions - keep up a threat of disturbing the balance and peace in Europe ... Inviolability of the existing borders, notably the Oder-Neisse frontier and that between the two German states, as well as denying West Germany access to the nuclear weapons in any form, are the basis for the programme [of the Warsaw Pact powers as set forth in Bucharest in July 1966]."

British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons

38. On 6 December, in the House of Commons, Mr. George Brown, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, referred to the German question. His statement was reported in The Times of London of 7 December, as follows:

"Among the many problems that divided east and west none was greater than the division of Germany. He knew many people had fears, and in the light of her tragic history in the last half century that was at least understandable; but he believed the Germany of today was a country in which the vast majority of public opinion backed their genuinely democratic, inter-nationalist leaders. He welcomed the new German Government and, in particular, the new Foreign Minister. The Germany of today, he said, does not stand for aggressive, resurgent nationalism but accepts and desires to be a part of a larger European and international grouping. No assessment of her position could fail to show her that in any European war her position in the centre would lead to her complete destruction. The concept of a revanchist war does not in the last analysis stand up to examination, but we cannot deny that fears of Germany do exist."

FRG Government programme and reactions
in the GDR and Eastern Europe

39. The main subjects dealt with by Chancellor K~~i~~ssinger in his Bundestag statement of 13 December outlining his new coalition government's programme included the following:

(i) FRG relations with East Europe

"For centuries Germany was the bridge between East and West Europe. We would like to fulfill this role in the present age and are therefore interested in improving relations in all fields of economic, cultural and political life with our Eastern neighbours who have the same desire, and even opening diplomatic relations with them whenever the circumstances allow it."

(ii) FRG relations with Poland

"Wide sections of the German people have a lively desire for reconciliation with Poland, whose tragic history we have not forgotten and whose desire to live in a state with secure frontiers we understand better than before, in view of the present fate of our divided people. But the boundaries of a reunified Germany can be laid down only in an agreement concluded freely with an all-German government, an agreement creating conditions approved by both peoples for a lasting and peaceful relationship of good neighborliness."

(iii) FRG relations with Czechoslovakia

"The German people would also like to reach agreement with Czechoslovakia. The Federal Government condemns the policy of Hitler, which aimed at the destruction of the Czechoslovak state union. It agrees with the view that the Munich Agreement, which came into existence under the threat of force, is no longer valid. However, there are still problems requiring a solution such as that of the right to nationality. We are aware of our duty to protect the Sudeten German people like all refugees and expelled persons, and we take this duty seriously."

40. The Chancellor dealt with the FRG relations with the United States and with Nato, saying that the alliance would continue to be "of vital importance to us ... in the future as far as we can foresee".

41. As regards France, Herr Kiesinger declared:

"The decisive role for Europe's future depends on the development of German-French relations. The peaceful European order desired by East and West is unthinkable without a close and trusting relationship between Germany and France. Far-sighted statesmen in our neighbouring countries, in the United States and in the Soviet Union, have acknowledged this elementary fact, if from different viewpoints."

42. Among the considerations guiding the FRG attitude towards France, the FRG Chancellor said, were their "high measure of common interest"; their common belief that a solid alliance between Europe and the United States was "irremissible"; and the value of "German-French cooperation ... when it comes to improving relations with our East European neighbours".

43. The FRG accordingly would circulate proposals "to make the greatest possible use of the opportunities for coordinating policy" contained in the French-FRG Treaty of 22 January 1963 on mutual cooperation.

44. The Chancellor denied that this was the hour of birth of a new nationalism in Germany ^{3/} pointing out that, even in the recent Hesse and Bavaria elections, the democratic parties had received the support of the "overwhelming majority of the electors"; and that such parties "in the last two decades have brought about a democratic state and the incorporation of the FRG into the European, the Western family of nations whose ideals and political ethos we share".

45. On 15 December the 14th meeting of the Central Committee of the SED (Socialist Unity of Germany) Party opened in Berlin. Speaking on the first point on the agenda, the report of the Politburo, First Secretary Ulbricht made a statement in which he took a stand on the above FRG Chancellor statement. Herr Ulbricht, introducing GDR proposals for a minimum programme, inter alia made the following points:

(i) FRG development is determined by the reactionary forces of armament capital and militarism;

(ii) West German monopolies play with three balls - CDU-CSU, the party of finance capital; SPD to exercise pressure on the Unions and the NDP to tie down lower middle class (Kleinburgerliche) circles to the ruling system;

(iii) The foreign policy conception of Kiesinger resembles that of his predecessor like a bad egg another bad egg;

(iv) The position that Bonn alone has the right to represent Germany was also assumed by the new government;

(v) SPD (Social-Democratic) Ministers in the Bonn Government have now given an unmistakable answer to the GDR question: what sort of Germany do you want? They answered in the sense of the domination of monopoly-capital and its militarism over the whole of Germany.

^{3/} For electoral gains by the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP) see European Survey for November 1966 (with reference to earlier surveys). (Footnote 15, p. 8)

46. First Secretary Ulbricht then listed the SED proposals for a minimum programme as follows:

"1. A demand for the conclusion of an international treaty, containing a prohibition of the transmission (Weitergabe) of nuclear weapons in any form;

"2. A demand for the holding of a Security Conference of all European States, with a view to guaranteeing peace and security for all European peoples and States;

"3. Assuming and maintaining normal and correct relations between the Governments of the two German States with a view to their living as neighbours and together in peace and equality of rights;

"4. An agreement curtailing the armament budget in the West German Federal Republic, as also in the GDR, by 50 percent;

"5. An understanding on the neutrality of the two German States guaranteed by the Powers. This in the SED opinion would also constitute decisive progress on the path of a peaceful settlement of the German question."

47. In Czechoslovakia, the Radio-Prag correspondent in Bonn raised the question whether the Chancellor's remark on the Sudeten right to citizenship did not imply a reassertion of Chancellor Erhard's position that the Munich agreements had been valid for a while. Similarly the official agency Ceteka stated that the new formulation differed little from earlier statements; while the agreement was now called a diktat, it was not acknowledged as null and void from the beginning as demanded by Czechoslovakia.

48. Another Czechoslovak source, the newspaper Mlada Fronta, saw "certain positive elements" and "a progressist trend" in the FRG statement.

49. On 22 December on the Yugoslav television, Foreign Secretary Mario Nikezic said that he believed that "certain new stresses" were noticeable in the FRG declaration. While he could not as yet give an overall judgment, Mr. Nikezic declared:

"If the new government has really the intention to improve its relations with the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, notably by re-establishing diplomatic relations, I think that we will then be able quickly to make progress."

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:

The Secretary-General

A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	x	POUR INFORMATION

Thanks.
 16/2/67

Date:

16 Feb. 1967

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

A.E. Nesterenko,
 Under-Sec'y, PSCA.

AA-36

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

1 February 1967
PhP:pmm

SURVEY OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS

(January 1967)

SURVEY OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS

(January 1967)

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. As the pace of the European rapprochement quickened, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) sought relations with Eastern Europe, the German question remained a source of bitterness and controversy. ^{1/}
2. Contacts were made during the month between European Governments which are politically furthest apart, and new Nato or allied countries participated in efforts towards a rapprochement across ideological frontiers. Romania received the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, on 11-15 January and signed an agreement on consular and commercial relations with Spain on 5 January. Poland received the visits of Premier Krag of Denmark on 3-7 January and Defence Minister Poswick of Belgium on 10-14 January, and sent Foreign Minister Rapacki to France on 26-28 January. There was the first visit of a Soviet Head of State to Italy and an unprecedented audience of President Podgorny with Pope Paul VI on 30 January. Progress was thereby achieved towards "political tolerance" and "tempering the violence of ideological differences" as recommended by the UN Secretary-General on 3 May 1966 in the Council of Europe; and, as stated by Mr. Luns, smaller countries were aware of their ability at this stage to influence "greater" States. Belgium, in the words of Foreign Minister Harmel, was working towards "parallel reduction of armaments" to be achieved "progressively in each camp". In Warsaw M. Poswick reportedly found out that Poland would consider a scheme for reciprocal inspection of military installations by neutrals. Finland pressed for the adoption of her Nordic security proposals.
3. The nine European Governments, ^{2/} which sponsored the draft (A/C.1/L.357) of RES/2129(XX) on good neighbourly relations in Europe, pursued joint efforts. Austrian Foreign Minister Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, in an interview reported on 6 January, announced that the nine Foreign Ministers may meet this year. The President of the Yugoslav Parliament, Edvard Kardelj, drew the attention of the European Parliaments to the adoption by the "club of nine" in Belgrade in September 1966 of a Yugoslav proposal for an all-European Parliamentary Conference.

^{1/} Developments on which adequate information was not available by the end of the month, including an exchange of statements between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, will be dealt with in the next Survey.

^{2/} Four neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia), two Nato countries (Belgium and Denmark) and three Warsaw Pact members (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania).

4. Europe still reflected, on a smaller scale, the triangular world relationship. In unison with PRC positions an Albanian newspaper condemned the Vatican as an active instrument in "the Soviet-American plots and collaboration" (Zeri i Popullit, 18 January).

5. There were also reminders of persisting or even increasing danger for Europe, due to her own outstanding problems, or from the outside. Foreign Minister Lyng of Norway on 6 January pointed out that a superficial European detente was hiding a series of controversial problems which could lead to new, great conflicts. In the words of President Tito, in a television interview reported on 5 January, "the tension which used to be constantly present in Europe ... has moved", yet "wherever war expands, it concerns us too".

6. France's differences with her Nato allies, including the "Five" ^{3/} continued to limit in Western Europe her influence derived from a policy of European "reconciliation". Although Belgium pursued objectives similar to President de Gaulle's, she was in favour of a method of negotiation and agreements between the two alliances as such, Nato and the Warsaw Pact - a procedure which had been unacceptable to France even before she left the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Foreign Secretary Brown, in an interview published on 22 January in Paris, said that the closest ties between Western Europe taken as a whole and the United States "were required for peace and progress in the rest of the world".

7. From the UN viewpoint of the maintenance of peace and security, the German question remained crucial and, in this field also, "political tolerance", as advocated by U Thant in his Strasbourg speech, appeared of the essence. In conformity with the FRG intention to be "the bridge between East and West", as declared by the Chancellor on 13 December, Foreign Minister Brandt on 9 January said that, wherever possible, the FRG wanted to establish diplomatic relations with East European countries. Chancellor Kiesinger on 18 January stated that it was the aim of his government to relax and remove tensions with East European countries and the Soviet Union.

8. Socialist countries demanded again that the FRG should recognize "reality", i.e. existing frontiers and the existence of the GDR and give up any attempt to secure access to nuclear weapons in any form. They deplored the statement of 12 January by FRG Defence Minister Schroeder that the FRG had a great interest in influencing, with others the Nato alliance's "nuclear planning and strategy".

^{3/} In addition to France, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Community for Atomic Energy (EURATOM).

Mr. Brezhnev in his Gorki speech of 14 January said that FRG intentions consisted for the time being in words; while the USSR would support whatever was reasonable in favour of peace in Europe, including possible FRG measures, the atomic weapon must be finally denied to "German imperialism".

9. The GDR continued to regard West Berlin as a separate entity - not a Land of the FRG - as indicated by a GDR press dispatch of 29 December advocating a normalization of relations between West Berlin and the GDR, and by GDR protest against a visit of Chancellor Kiesinger to West Berlin on 24 January.

10. There were contacts between the FRG and Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary mostly on the question of establishing diplomatic relations. Officials of the Foreign Ministries of Czechoslovakia and the FRG, on 9-13 January in Prague, discussed problems of relations between the two countries, and it was stated that the mutual exchange of views was useful and would continue. A FRG Foreign Ministry delegation was in Romania on 7-18 January on an "information journey" and on 31 January the two Governments agreed to exchange Ambassadors. On 23-25 January State Secretary Lahr was in Budapest and, on the 25th, he said that the FRG and Hungary were prepared to exchange embassies.

11. The GDR policy of rapprochement between the two German States took the form of a ten-point programme by Herr Ulbricht, the First Secretary of the Socialist Unity of Germany (SED) Party, published on 1 January and aiming at an all-German Confederation. In connexion with the contacts between the FRG and some Socialist countries, a spokesman for the GDR Foreign Ministry stated on 25 January that in no circumstances did peaceful co-existence demand respect for the revanchist stance of the FRG.

12. Following the visit to France of the new FRG Chancellor Herr Kiesinger, and in spite of unsatisfactory relations between France and the FRG's closest ally, the United States, there was a warmer climate in French-West German relations. Partly as a result, old differences on West European integration were so far being reconsidered without acrimony. Preparations were made for the tenth anniversary of the signing on 25 March 1957 of the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Community for Atomic Energy (EURATOM); and there was renewed discussion on the shape and extent of a united Western Europe. President de Gaulle has in the past favoured a loose form of Confederation, while the "European" movement for a West European Federation enjoys some support from the five other Governments and influential circles everywhere, including France, in the Communities.

13. Britain, having decided in principle to apply for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), sought whether conditions were ripe for negotiations. Her bid, generally viewed with sympathy by "the Five", was discussed during Chancellor Kiesinger's visit to France and British "soundings" of Italy and France. Italian backing for what President Saragat called a British "contribution to our European venture" was strong, or at any rate warm. The new FRG Government apparently held the view that much would depend on Britain's own attitude. President de Gaulle continued to emphasize the "continental rapprochement"^{4/}
14. On the related question of "political cooperation of the Six", as of any West European group, M. Couve de Murville in an interview of 7 January said that the main thing was to ascertain whether the Governments in question had similar conceptions on the detente, relations with the East and the German problem.
15. Within the rival West European economic group of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) ^{5/} the remaining custom duties on industrial products were abolished as of 31 December 1966.

I. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE GERMAN QUESTION

GDR ten-point programme (1 January 1967) and GDR-FRG exchange of statements in this connexion

16. In his New Year message published on 1 January by Neues Deutschland, Herr Ulbricht, in addition to appealing inter alia for closer relations with France, set forth a ten-point programme as a first stage towards a Confederation of the two German States as follows: ^{6/}

The Governments of the two German States should

- 1 & 2. Conclude agreements respectively on the establishment of normal relations with each other and containing the renunciation of the use of force in their relations with each other;
3. Recognize in agreed statements the established frontiers in Europe;
4. Contractually agree to reduce armament expenditure by 50 per cent;
5. Renounce the possession, control or co-control of nuclear arms; and assure in identical and simultaneous statements their readiness to participate in an atom-free zone in Europe;

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- ^{4/} The French President accepted an invitation to visit Poland.
- ^{5/} Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland with Finland as an associate member.
- ^{6/} Foreign Affairs Bulletin published by the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, January 16, 1967.

6. Advocate normal and diplomatic relations of the two German States with all other European States;
7. Conclude a treaty in which both undertake to simultaneously accept a status of neutrality to be guaranteed by the Powers;
8. Sign a treaty in which they respect the development of West Berlin as a special, independent (eigenständig) entity.

Further,

9. The Government of the GDR and the Senate of West Berlin should conclude a Treaty in which the Senate undertakes to stop the cold war against the GDR, and the Government of the GDR undertakes to assure transit traffic and transport to and from West Berlin until a German Confederation is established.
10. The Governments of the two German States should empower a Commission composed on a parity basis of plenipotentiary representatives to ascertain to what extent the basic provisions of the Potsdam Agreement which were to guarantee the security of peace and democracy in Germany had been carried out in the two German States. This Commission would publicly issue reports on the results of the investigation and make proposals for eventually necessary measures.
17. The reaction of the FRG, while quite critical, was not totally negative. Herbert Wehner, FRG Minister for All-German Affairs, on 7 January in a radio address (FBIS, 9 January), described as "a suggestion worth considering" Herr Ulbricht's proposal to set up a Commission of plenipotentiaries from both sides on a basis of parity. If Herr Ulbricht was interested in certain aspects of the Potsdam Agreement, the question arose, Herr Wehner said, whether it would not be worthwhile to make a few other aspects of this agreement the subject of practical considerations and proposals for eventual necessary measures. Any further discussion of this matter appeared to be useful only if the impression was removed that Herr Ulbricht was really concerned only with having an effective platform from which to attack the Federal Government. In other respects Herr Wehner condemned Herr Ulbricht's statements, stating that he had given "the impression of being inaccessible to all suggestions for easing tension in divided Germany made by the West in a factual and practical manner".
18. Herr Czepuck, an editor of Neues Deutschland, the SED (Socialist Unity of Germany) Party newspaper asked that Herr Wehner should demonstrate that the FRG would "renounce force in the settlement of the German question".
19. On 14 January Herr Wehner declared that the FRG was ready not only to exchange declarations of renunciation of force with European Communist Governments

but also to include the "unsolved problem of the division of Germany in his offer" of renunciation of force.

West Berlin

20. Prominent as the question of the GDR status may be, West Berlin remains potentially as serious an issue. While the FRG regards West Berlin as a Land, the GDR press agency ADN on 29 December demanded a normalization of relations between West Berlin and the GDR and recalled that invitations and proposals to this effect had been made by the GDR Government (Le Monde, 30 December). This was in keeping with the position of the Socialist countries that West Berlin was a separate entity.

21. On the same grounds, Neues Deutschland, the SED (Socialist Unity of Germany) Party newspaper, on 30 December deplored "contacts" between the new West Berlin Chief Burgomaster Heinrich Alberz and the FRG Government,^{7/} and that Herr Alberz, at a press conference, should have declared himself in favour of maintaining ties with the FRG (FBIS, 4 January).

22. On 24 January Chancellor Kiesinger paid an official visit to West Berlin.^{8/} He told West Berlin officials that the FRG Government would do everything in its power to strengthen the FRG ties with West Berlin.

23. A communique from the GDR Government stated inter alia:

"The visit of Kiesinger to such a neuralgic spot as West Berlin is in contradiction with the efforts towards a detente in Europe."

24. The communique further declared that the visit was "a threat to European security" and would result in "a worsening of tension between the two German States". The Berlin authorities were blamed for approving the visit "which could but complicate the situation in West Berlin and have serious consequences for the city".

Question of FRG-GDR Post and Telecommunications relations

25. As reported on 8 January from Berlin, the GDR representatives on the Allied Committee for posts and telecommunications were withdrawn as of 6 January 1967. This report followed a previous announcement (European Survey for November, paragraph 24, p. 7) of a GDR demand that the Allied Committee, together with the Allied Office for which it is responsible, should be abolished by 17 January 1967. While, under the existing arrangements, post and telecommunications of the FRG and GDR are regarded as an internal German matter, the GDR is now requesting that an

^{7/} Herr Alberz declared on 29 December that he "contacted the appropriate organs" of the FRG on the question of passes for urgent family affairs.

^{8/} Following a protest by 24 West Berlin cultural personalities, including the writer Guenter Grass, one of two visits by the Chancellor to memorials in honour of the victims of Nazism was cancelled (Le Monde, 25 January).

account should be made of each side's receipts on the grounds that two independent States are involved (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 and 9 January).

European Security

(Questions of Nordic nuclear-free zone, European security conference, the role of Nato and FRG access to nuclear weapons)

26. In the face of proposals for new arrangements on European security, and some measure of acceptance in the West, notably on the Conference plan, the need for Nato was reaffirmed on that Organization's side. The question of FRG access to nuclear weapons remained the sharpest issue.

27. On 6 January, President Kekkonen of Finland again outlined his plan for a permanent nuclear-free zone in the Nordic region and for a pact making the frontier between Finland and Norway an area of peace. It was unofficially stated in Norway that Mr. Kekkonen had again failed to submit a concrete proposal which would warrant a reply by the Norwegian Government (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 9 January).

28. The proposal for a European security conference, which had already received qualified, conditional support from Denmark^{2/} and France, was also favoured in principle by Belgium. Foreign Minister Harmel on 24 January, in a speech before the Belgium-American Society, said that he hoped to see progress in the Atlantic Alliance towards a European security conference, a non-aggression treaty with the Warsaw Pact countries and a general solution of European political problems.

29. The trend towards greater acceptance of the European security conference was countered in some Nato countries and circles by declarations in favour of that Organization.

30. On 6 January in a television interview, Foreign Minister Lyng of Norway said that his country was seeking, as it developed its relations with its Western allies, also to normalize its relationship to Eastern Europe - as the other Nato countries were doing. As regards the Nato Treaty, the Government would make no proposal for its denunciation in 1969; an initiative must eventually come from the members of the Storting. Mr. Lyng was apparently not in favour of a popular referendum on either membership in Nato or accession to EEC (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 9 January).

31. On 22 January Herr Brandt told US television correspondents that the US presence was necessary for the security of Western Europe and that the existence of Nato was a prerequisite to a successful policy of detente.

2/ See Visit of Premier Krag to Poland, paragraph 78 below. See also Italy's position (Joint USSR-Italian Communique, paragraph 89 below).

32. On 18 January Signor Manlio Brosio, the Nato Secretary-General, warned against any European security plan that would replace Nato. A system resting exclusively on Pacts and mutual confidence could result in Europe falling into the hands of the Soviet Union (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 January).

33. As regards the question of FRG access to nuclear weapons, there were three important FRG statements which differed between themselves, in tone if not in substance.

34. On 4 January in Bonn the FRG spokesman Herr von Hase said (Frankfurter Rundschau, 5 January) that his Government, of course, wanted to make the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty easier rather than more difficult. It was, however, known that the FRG would regard three points as important in connexion with the signing of such a treaty:

(i) the security requirements of the Powers which did not have nuclear weapons at their disposal must be taken into consideration. This would be above all important in respect of the situation - not to be overlooked - which, in view of the Chinese progress in atomic weapons, was developing in China, particularly for the neighbouring States;

(ii) the right of collective self-defense of all States must be guaranteed;

(iii) a reservation must be made in respect of the security decision of a future united Europe. The door must in any case remain open for the freedom of decision of united Europe in respect of the non-proliferation of atomic weapons.

35. Defense Minister Schröder in a statement of 12 January said, inter alia,^{10/} that the FRG was greatly interested in influencing, with others, atomic planning and strategy, since nuclear weapons could be engaged both from German territory and against it.

36. On 24 January in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Herr Brandt stated:

"As far as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is concerned, the FRG shares the mutual interests of other non-nuclear countries and has no particular interests."

37. Chairman Brezhnev, in his speech on 14 January in Gorki, emphasized the need for "finally denying German imperialism" access to the atomic weapon.

^{10/} See also paragraph 43.

Visit of Chancellor Kiesinger
to France (13-14 January)

38. The visit of Chancellor Kiesinger to Paris took place in a context of sharpening differences on Viet-Nam between France and the FRG's closest ally, the United States, and closer cooperation between France and a severe critic of the FRG regime and policies, the Soviet Union. Yet, as a result of the visit, there was a definite improvement in the climate of FRG-French relations, largely due to the declared FRG intention to evolve a common policy with France. As stated by the Chancellor in his after-luncheon speech of 13 January,

"In the past there has been much talk about French-German cooperation and friendship. We have explicitly dealt with this in our Governmental declaration 11/. But the important thing for us consists in practical measures and demarches such as to lead our two peoples towards a common policy in Europe and for Europe wherever their interests coincide."

39. Another favourable circumstance was that, in advance of the visit, the new FRG Government found its way clear to altering the traditional FRG position on the relationship between reunification and a detente in Europe. On 11 January FRG spokesman von Hase, referring to President Johnson's State of the Union Message, stressed that there was agreement to improve international cooperation, and the cold war, develop relations with the East and give a peaceful conclusion to the Viet-Nam war (Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 January).

40. As stated by the Chancellor in his press conference of 16 January, held in Bonn upon his return from Paris, the most fruitful field for an immediate French-FRG collaboration lay in the achievement of relaxation with Moscow and with Germany's eastern neighbours. The Chancellor said that "only in this development is there a chance to solve the Germany problem". 12/

41. As reportedly stated in Paris by members of the FRG delegation to the press, there would be consultations with the aim of collaboration in the "East policy", and France had undertaken to interpret the FRG position to the Eastern States. Neue Zürcher Zeitung added that this was merely FRG "expectations" (16 January).

11/ European Survey for December, paragraphs 41-43, pp. 11-12.

12/ It may be recalled that Herr Schröder, the Foreign Minister in the previous FRG Government, on 6 October 1965 declared that "the solution of the German question cannot and must not be left for a long-range allegedly natural process" [such as envisaged by General de Gaulle]. More recently the FRG Government in Notes of 25 March 1966 to "Governments throughout the world", stated that its own proposal for a reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in Europe should be linked with essential progress in the solution of political problems in Central Europe".

42. The question of frontiers was reportedly not taken up at plenary sessions during the visit and it was not known whether the Chancellor and the President had discussed it privately. The questions of non-proliferation and Nato were discussed but there was apparently no rapprochement of the respective positions.^{13/}

43. Note was taken on the Soviet radio (Tass International Service, 13 January) of a statement by Defence Minister Schröder on the eve of the FRG-French talks in which, inter alia, he expressed interest in the FRG participating in Nato nuclear policy and strategy, took a position against FRG renunciations of parts of their country and said that the price for the detente in Europe must not consist in the renunciation by the Germans of their security or reunification. The conclusion was drawn that FRG assurances of its resolve to contribute to a settlement in Europe "contradict the facts", and that the FRG leaders, by themselves or together with France, should work out a "really new policy".

44. Following the French Cabinet meeting on 18 January, M. Bourges, the Secretary of State for Information declared:

"These meetings have marked a progression towards a European detente and a progress in practical cooperation between France and Germany in the fields in which it had already been undertaken." ^{14/}

45. Although the following remarks made by M. Couve de Murville on 18 January, on the question of France's relations with the GDR, were couched in moderate terms, France continued to maintain the common Western stand of non-recognition: ^{15/}

"We have established, since the beginning, relations with West Germans, with what is called the FRG, and it would not have been normal at the same time to establish relations with the other part of Germany, with the government that is called the government of the GDR. It is moreover a government that certainly has - I think this is the least one can say - other characteristics than the Government of the FRG, and it is also one of the reasons for which we do not have relations therewith."

46. Also on 18 January Chancellor Kiesinger in the Bundestag declared that the outcome of his meeting with General de Gaulle was more than a mere improvement of the climate. In comparing their mutual positions and interests, nuances and

^{13/} The Times of London added European integration to the list of questions on which France "did not seek in the talks to impose" its stand and that the FRG "remained attached to the principle of integration and to a security based on cooperation in Nato" (16 January).

^{14/} It was also announced that a French-FRG commission on technology had been established.

^{15/} As reaffirmed in a note verbale of 19 December by the three Western Powers, (NV/47) which was countered by a Soviet Note verbale of 5 January (NV/48).

divergences had appeared, but they had agreed that in no field were there basic contradictions of their interests and conceptions that could prevent cooperation according to the spirit and contents of the Treaty of 1963. This was also true in respect of the special relations of the Federal Republic with Britain and the United States. The most important result for the future of Germany was FRG-French cooperation in the wider field of a "European Eastern policy" (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 January; FBIS, 19 January).

FRG policy on relations with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe and reactions thereto

47. Foreign Minister Brandt, in an interview with Welt am Sonntag on FRG relations both with the USSR and East European countries (FBIS, 9 January), said that there was no bypassing the Soviet Union in the solution of German problems and described as one of the objectives of the FRG in 1967 the improvement of the relationship with the eastern neighbours "in all spheres of economic and cultural as well as political life".

48. On 18 January in the Bundestag Chancellor Kiesinger referred to what historian Toynbee called "the historic challenge to nations" and he declared:

"We see such a challenge, the great task of our generation, in the peaceful rebuilding of our relations with the East, including a solution to the German problem. It is the aim of this Government to relax and remove tensions from our relations with the Eastern European countries and with the Soviet Union. This is not aimed against anyone, also not against the Russians. ... Precisely our collaboration with France, whose peaceful intentions can be doubted by no one, should prove to our Eastern neighbours our honest desire to find solutions to the urgent problems that still exist between us. We think it is time that our Eastern neighbours should no longer suspect our clear policy - devoid of mental reservations - as if it were ill-willed revanchism."

49. On 22 January Herr Brandt said that there should be bilateral discussions with East European countries so as to arrive at diplomatic relations; and that, as regards relations with Poland, the question of the Oder-Neisse line should be settled through a peace treaty, at the same time as that of the two Germanies.

50. Further, the FRG Vice-Chancellor declared himself in agreement with President de Gaulle's rapprochement policy and he said:

"I think that we will achieve progress in this question and that we will arrange for the two Germanies to live together under a common roof."

51. Nato Governments reacted favourably to the FRG initiative. On 24 January in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe French Secretary of State

Jean de Broglie said France was supporting and aiding the FRG initiative which served the interests of Europe and of peace. As stated on 4 January at a press conference in Warsaw by Foreign Minister Krag, whereas Poland remained skeptical towards the intentions of the FRG, Mr. Krag was inclined to regard certain new lines of the FRG foreign policy as important; and the conception of the West German Government should be regarded as "serious".

52. While, on the whole, skepticism prevailed in Socialist countries ^{16/} and neutral Finland, the Soviet Union gave an indication of readiness to support constructive steps, if any, by the FRG.

53. On 1 January President Novotny of Czechoslovakia declared that the policies of the new Government in Bonn showed "no change".

54. The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Janos Peter, in his end-of-the-year message declared: ^{17/}

"General uncertainty as to whether the new government policy of the FRG offers encouragement in regard to the endeavours aimed at solving both the German question and the European problems, can be answered by practice alone... On the basis of the existence of two Germanies the Hungarian People's Republic, as the loyal ally of the GDR, in case of appropriate circumstances is prepared to cooperate in the establishment of normal relations also with the FRG. Development of the relations of the FRG with the GDR, and with the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe in general, furthers the organization of a European peace and security system."

55. On 6 January in Vaasa President Kekkonen of Finland declared:

"When one made a West German policy of strength directed against the Soviet Union into a basis for unification of Germany and one planned West German participation in nuclear armament, this aroused in me as a Finn deep unrest, since this neither was nor is a real defense policy but a war policy. With the help of such a policy one cannot set aside tensions in Europe."

56. A Soviet appraisal of the FRG's approach to the German question was given by B. Orlov in Izvestia as follows (FBIS, 10 January):

"In what way is the Federal Government trying to solve questions connected with the German settlement? Can the Federal Government really believe that it can be done behind the back and at the expense of the GDR? It is the same hopeless line that was followed for fourteen years by the Adenauer government and for more than three years by the Erhard government."

^{16/} See also Note on their Foreign relations and Statements made by Mr. Rapacki during his visit to Paris, paras. 94-97.

^{17/} As interpreted by Frankfurter Rundschau (6 January) Czechoslovakia and Hungary were not demanding that the FRG should necessarily establish diplomatic relations with the GDR, but that the FRG should respect the European realities, that is, the frontiers and the fact that a second German State had emerged.

57. An article in Pravda condemned the FRG "bankrupt policy" of trying to isolate the GDR (FBIS, 13 January):

58. On 14 January in Gorki Mr. Brezhnev, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, declared:

"The danger of a West German revanche is still a first class problem in Europe... It is nevertheless true that the new German Government expresses an intention to contribute to the detente in Europe. However, all that, for the time being, consists only in words. It is obvious that we shall support whatever is reasonable in favour of peace in Europe, including the measures that could be taken in this respect by the FRG; but we will not for one moment desist in our efforts for access to the atomic weapon to be finally denied to German imperialism."

59. Chancellor Kiesinger in his Bundestag speech of 18 January welcomed the passage in Mr. Brezhnev's above statement relating to USSR support to possible FRG enterprises in favour of peace.

Contacts between the FRG and
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania

60. The FRG established diplomatic relations with Romania and pursued contacts with Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

61. In FRG relations with Czechoslovakia, the main issue remained that of the Munich Agreement which, Chancellor Kiesinger declared on 13 December, was "no longer valid" and, as Czechoslovakia maintained, was null and void from the start. The FRG Foreign Ministry was reportedly considering the possibility of entering into legal talks with Czechoslovakia on the matters of compensation for the Sudeten Germans, whose property was confiscated by Czechoslovakia, and of their nationality. In the FRG view, such talks could begin before diplomatic relations were established between the two countries (Le Monde, 30 December).

62. The Chairman of the FRG Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Bundestag, Kopf, (Christian-Democrat, CDU), announced that an invitation had been extended to his opposite number in Czechoslovakia, Kriegel. On the Czechoslovak side it was stated that the invitation had been accepted (Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 January).

63. On 13 January a joint communique issued in Prague on a visit of FRG foreign ministry officials stated that they had held talks with officials of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs "as a continuation of previous contacts. They exchanged views and clarified standpoints on various problems of relations between the two countries. It was noted by both sides that the mutual exchange of views is useful and that it will continue" (FBIS, 16 January).

64. As stated by the FRG spokesman von Hase on 19 January, a FRG delegation, headed by Dr. Hans Helsmuth Rute, Director of the West-East Division in the foreign ministry was in Bucharest on 7-16 January on an "information journey". On the 19th, Foreign Minister Brandt reported on the contacts to the Cabinet and to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag. It was then expected in Bonn that Foreign Minister Manescu would visit the FRG in February and that, on the occasion, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two Governments would be announced. The FRG Cabinet, on 26 January, reportedly agreed to this procedure. ^{18/}

65. On 19 January the Yugoslav Government spokesman welcomed the FRG Chancellor's statement at his recent press conference that the FRG Government wished to develop and normalize the relations with Yugoslavia, and recalled that the Yugoslav Government had repeatedly expressed the same wish.

66. On 23-25 January State Secretary Lahr was in Budapest. As officially stated in Bonn the conversations were to deal with a development of economic and cultural relations. Authorized sources in Bonn let it be understood that there would be "soundings" on the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations. In the joint communiqué issued on 25 January, the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations was mentioned and it was stated that the two parties "had mutually made known their views and had agreed to study further" the respective proposals (Le Monde, 27 January).

II. RELATIONS BETWEEN WARSAW PACT MEMBERS AND WESTERN STATES

67. The common enterprise of a European rapprochement should not obscure differences in methods, and indeed purposes. The Socialist countries and France are seeking to restrict what they regard as US interference in European affairs; while Governments like the Netherlands and Spain, which had shown little or no active interest in the detente until the United States officially sponsored it, want this process to take place either through Nato or, at least, in close liaison with the United States, whose political influence they regard as beneficial and which alone, in their opinion, can match Soviet power.

^{18/} The visit of Mr. Manescu took place earlier than expected and on 31 January the FRG Foreign Ministry announced that the two Governments had established diplomatic relations and agreed to exchange Ambassadors.

Hungarian Foreign Minister's New Year Message

68. In an article published in Nepszabadsag on 25 December 1966, Mr. Janos Peter wrote that the United States was taking part "in the present conflict between war and peace while relying upon comparatively not much international experience". Soviet-French relations represented "an event of decisive importance on the road leading toward the organization of peace and security in Europe".

Mr. Peter further wrote:

"The developing of cooperation between neighbour countries, both those of identical and those of a different social system, gradually and organically will lead to the forming of a system of European peace and security. Accordingly, in the course of our continually renewed talks with the Austrian government we search for opportunities of a cooperation between the peoples of Central Europe and the valley of the Danube. And in relation to the French Government we try to clarify the concept of a European Europe. We carefully study every suggestion pointing toward the shaping of a European security system. We readily take part in every international conference, for example in the meeting of the foreign ministers from nine European countries during the last UNO session, if we think that meeting could pave the way toward an All-European security conference."

President de Gaulle on "Continental rapprochement" (31 December 1966)

69. In his New Year's Eve speech General de Gaulle stated in part:

"France, which has recovered its independence and is providing itself with the means of this independence, will continue to act for a Continental rapprochement. It will do so by cultivating friendly and fruitful relations with the USSR. It will do so by renewing the close relations that once existed with Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania. It will do so by cultivating cordial contacts with each one of its neighbours and by working to build an economic grouping of the six Western states. All this will be done to help our continent to rally all of its states, little by little and from one end to the other, so as to become a European Europe."

Romania's foreign relations

70. Romania had contacts during this period with two Western States which, until now, had largely kept away from the current detente - the Netherlands, a close ally of the United States, and a sharp critic of French policies, notably on West European integration and relations with the "Anglo-Saxons", and Spain.

(1) Establishment of Consular and Commercial Relations with Spain (5 January 1967)

71. As reported in the Western press (New York Times, 6 January), in October 1966 in Madrid a Romanian delegation to an Oceanographic Congress held talks with Spanish officials. Early in December four officials of the Spanish foreign ministry, led by Senor Antonio Garcia Lahiguera, the Director-General for Consular

Affairs, went to Bucharest. On 23 December the Spanish Government approved the plan for the establishment of relations.

72. On 5 January the two Ambassadors in Paris, Pedro Cortina y Mauri and Victor Dimitriu, signed the agreement establishing full consular and commercial relations. As reported from Bucharest (FBIS, 11 January),

"... the agreement stipulates that the representations will carry out consular functions recognized by international practice and will attend to the implementation of the trade and payments agreements and of any other economic, industrial and technical collaboration agreements existing or which will be signed between the two States. The representations also will encourage and promote cultural, scientific, and touristic exchanges between the two countries."

73. It appears that the Government of Spain, in addition to a concern for trade interests, was encouraged by the United States' declared policy of Western "bridges" with Socialist countries. According to Western press reports, consular relations were also to be established soon between Spain and Poland and Hungary, and similar agreements with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria may follow.

(ii) Visit of Dutch Foreign Minister Luns

74. On 11-16 January the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands was in Romania. Mr. Luns was received notably by Mr. Nicolas Ceausescu, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and Mr. Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and he had talks with his counterpart, Mr. Corneliu Manescu. A cultural agreement was signed on 13 January. The final communique (FBIS, 17 January) reaffirmed the importance of the United Nations as an instrument of international cooperation and favoured a strengthening of its activity in conformity with Charter principles. The intensification of Romanian-Dutch relations, serving the interests of both peoples, was said to be at the same time a contribution to an improvement of the climate in Europe and to the cause of cooperation and understanding among all States.

Visit of Premier Krag of Denmark to Poland (3-7 January)

75. Premier and Foreign Minister Krag had a three-hour meeting with Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz on the world situation in general and Viet-Nam and European security in particular (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 January), and was received by Party Secretary Gomulka (FBIS, 10 January).

76. The final communique of 7 January, in which the two Governments also confirmed their support of the United Nations, referred to disarmament (FBIS, 9 January):

"[The two Governments] also discussed the problem of disarmament, expressing satisfaction at the resolution adopted by the United Nations on the peaceful use of cosmic space. They also stressed the value of steps for partial disarmament which can pave the way to general and complete disarmament under international control.

"Both governments welcomed with satisfaction the U.N. resolution dealing with the renunciation of all steps which could impede the conclusion of a treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons."

77. As regards bilateral relations, the following was stated:

"During the talks, an all-embracing review of Polish-Danish relations was carried out, noting with satisfaction their successful development in the spirit of good neighbourly cooperation and mutual benefits. The great importance of long-term trade agreements was stressed. The problems concerning the further development of cultural relations and the broadening of scientific-technical cooperation between both countries also were discussed."

78. The most important parts of the communique appeared to be the paragraphs on European security which read:

"A considerable part of the discussion was devoted to European problems. It was agreed that the relaxation which is visible in relations between European states should be further developed and deepened to build a durable security in Europe. Both sides recognized bilateral contacts between European countries as a condition and a useful contribution to the achievement of these aims.

"Both Governments confirmed their conviction that it would be useful to convene an international conference on the security and cooperation in Europe."

79. Denmark, however, shared the reservations made by the Western Governments most favourably disposed towards the conference proposal. Premier Krag at a press conference on 6 January declared that a conference on European security would be desirable if it was properly prepared and if preparations showed that there existed realistic promises that it would end in a positive manner.

Visit of Belgian Defence Minister to Poland

80. On 10-14 January Charles Poswick, the Belgian Minister of Defense, was in Poland on the invitation of his opposite number, Marshal of Poland Marian Spychalski. M. Poswick was received by Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz. Upon his return to Brussels the Defence Minister said that his visit had contributed to the detente between East and West (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 16 January).

Foreign Minister Rapacki's visit to France (26-28 January)

81. Mr. Rapacki had talks with his counterpart Couve de Murville and on 27 January he was successively received by Premier Pompidou and President de Gaulle.

82. On 27 January at a dinner of diplomatic correspondents, Mr. Rapacki dealt with the questions of European frontiers, diplomatic relations between the FRG and Socialist countries, and German reunification. The Polish Foreign Minister declared that "the Oder-Neisse line is irreversible and stronger than ever, and we have no reason to be concerned about its inviolability". Governments that "fail to recognize" this border and "insist on treating the existence of East Germany as a State secret", Mr. Rapacki said, merely gave encouragement to those West Germans who "nourish the dangerous illusion that the existing order can be changed by force".

83. Concerning the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Socialist countries and the FRG, Mr. Rapacki said that each country had its own position. Poland, for her part, would only envisage this issue on the basis of the FRG's attitude towards nuclear armaments, frontiers - in particular the Polish-German frontier - and, thirdly, the methods of settlement of the German question. Mr. Rapacki again noted the "negative, even hostile attitude of the FRG towards the GDR".

84. The way to German reunification, Mr. Rapacki declared, was through gradual rapprochement of the two German States, if they so desired, and the neighbours of Germany and all interested countries were in agreement.

President Podgorny to Italy and the Vatican (24-30 January)

85. While the visit of Mr. Nicolas Podgorny to Italy was largely devoted to economic affairs, his statements on 25 January included the following references to the German question and European security. In the afternoon, at a ceremony on the Capitol, the USSR President declared:

"The recent regional elections in West Germany have well shown the increasing influence of the neo-Nazis, and in order to fight against such dangers the European nations which want peace must invite and organize a solid system of collective security."

86. In an after-dinner speech President Podgorny said that one of the main causes of apprehension was that some refused to take into consideration the fact that two German States were in existence.

87. The final communique of 30 January dealt with mutual relations, world affairs including Viet-Nam, and Europe. A wish was expressed to extend relations under the present commercial agreement and protocol for technical and scientific cooperation.

88. Secondly, the two countries affirmed the principles of non-intervention and respect for other countries' sovereignty as established in the United Nations; appealed for non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the destruction of existing ones and for a world conference on disarmament; and expressed concern over Viet-Nam.

89. Thirdly, the European security conference prospect remained actual, but required preparation, so as to become "an appropriate forum" in which the participants may pursue harmonious efforts. The two Governments were keeping in touch for this purpose.

90. While Mr. Podgorny's private audience with Pope Paul VI on 30 January assumed great significance, adequate information has not so far been made available.

Albania

91. Albania, which remained apart from the current European trends, called the recent PRC nuclear explosion "a great success of the Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Forces" (FBIS, 4 January). Defence Minister Beqir Balluku visited the PRC in mid-January. On 18 January Zeri i Popullit wrote that "the Vatican had become an active instrument in the machinery of the Soviet-American plots and collaboration", and that "the participation of the Pope was part of the global counter-revolutionary strategy of US imperialism" (Le Monde, 20 January).

III. QUESTION OF WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Question of political cooperation

92. On 3 January the Italian Ambassadors in the five other EEC countries handed invitations to a celebration of the 10th anniversary on 25 March 1967 of the Treaties establishing EEC and EURATOM. As reported from Rome, it was hoped that a summit meeting could be held and afford an opportunity to re-open discussion on political cooperation between the Six. ^{19/}

93. On 4 January in Paris, M. Bourges, the State Secretary for Information, stated that if a summit meeting of the Six was held General de Gaulle would attend. On 7 January Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, in a radio interview, said that, as regards political consultations between the Six, it was a matter of

^{19/} Negotiations in 1959-62 failed to bring agreement on a "Fouchet plan" which envisaged, inter alia, periodical consultations on the pattern later adopted by France and the FRG in their Treaty of Cooperation of 22 January 1963.

ascertaining whether the six countries "have similar conceptions regarding the detente, the end of the cold war, relations with the East and, finally, the possible direction, in the future, of a discussion and of a settlement of the great European problems, beginning with the German problem".

94. The two issues of the size and institutions of Western Europe may soon become more clearly related. The Government of the Netherlands reportedly believed that political unification of Europe could only proceed after Britain joined EEC (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 4 January).

Question of Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC)

95. On 1 January, the Sunday Times published an interview with Prime Minister Wilson. While not wanting to predict the result of forthcoming visits by the Foreign Secretary and himself to EEC countries, Mr. Wilson said that, if Britain did not join EEC, it would not be for lack of efforts or determination on her part. The British Government was very serious in this connection, and would not take no as an answer from President de Gaulle in a first series of talks nor would be easily discouraged.

96. On 2 January in Taormina (Sicily), Herr Brandt, the FRG Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, at a press conference said that the cooperation between Italy and the FRG was at present particularly important in order to pave the way for Britain's access to EEC (Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 January).

97. The position that "the Five" should strengthen their solidarity in the face of Gaullist policies, notably on the issue of Britain's position in Europe, was strongly represented at the Conference of Socialist leaders of 14 European countries. On 5 January in Rome, Signor Pietro Nenni, the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, declared:

"... If the French elections in March leave the political situation in France unchanged, or almost unchanged, the Five plus Great Britain and the other countries ready to join the Common Market must take the path of political and economic integration. They should not let themselves be stopped by General de Gaulle as they have done after the 1963 veto."

98. In The Times of London, Lord Gladwyn on 12 January wrote that the European "Community, when formed, though genuinely autonomous in all spheres, should be at least within the framework of [the] Atlantic Alliance", and stated:

"We are back in our island. So too France, 'the mother of arts, of arms and of laws', whose voice is now rightly heard and respected abroad, must surely renounce individual grandeur and glory. For it is only by combining with Britain as an equal in a new Europe that she can possibly fulfil the promise of a new French renaissance."

Visit of Chancellor Kiesinger to France (13-14 January)

99. As reported in the London Times of 16 January, Herr Kiesinger repeated the FRG view that it was economically and politically desirable that Britain should enter the Common Market, because of his country's close commercial links with England and of the approaching end of the most vital period in EEC; but the FRG delegation "seemed to have derived the marked impression that French misgivings and objections remained as strong as in 1963". Foreign Minister Brandt reportedly told his French counterpart, M. Couve de Murville, that FRG exports to the Sterling bloc would make up for FRG contributions to the EEC Agricultural Fund - an institution which to a large extent worked in the interest of France (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 16 January).

Visit of Prime Minister Wilson to Italy (15-17 January 1967)

100. At the airport in Rome the two leaders emphasized the political significance of the question of Britain's entry into the Common Market. At the meetings on the 16th, Mr. Brown made a fifty-minute speech on Britain's attitude to the common agricultural policy. Mr. Wilson dealt with the political aspect of the problem as he declared in a luncheon speech:

"... What we are trying to do is to make a practical reality of a vision - a vision of Europe which, strong and united, will be able to play an effective part in the world."

101. On the same day President Saragat at a dinner for Mr. Wilson declared:

"... You know, Mr. Prime Minister, with what enthusiasm Italy has started on the road which will lead to the unification of our continent. You also know that Italy has always sincerely wished that the United Kingdom may give its own contribution to our European venture."

102. As reported in the press, on 17 January, the last day of the visit, Mr. Wilson said that the previous negotiations led by Mr. Heath had failed to concentrate on the main issues, and Premier Moro declared that "the path to British entry into the Community was open".

103. On 19 January in the House of Commons, Mr. Wilson pointed out that approximately half of the conversations in Rome had been dedicated to the agrarian problem in which field there were "great difficulties" to a British entry into EEC.

Mr. Wilson's statement in the Consultative Assembly
of the Council of Europe on 23 January in Strasbourg

104. The British Prime Minister was, in some respects, conciliatory towards President de Gaulle. He pointed out that this was still an age of nation-states.

Recalling Britain's loyalty to Nato and the Atlantic Alliance, he said that loyalty must never mean subservience. At the same time, European effort on behalf of the new nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America were only possible if Europe herself was united and strong, that is, if a new unity was created out of the nation-states. The British Government meant business, Mr. Wilson stated, in view of the advantages which wider markets, and the skill, the expertise, the science and technology of millions would bring to "the existing communities, and because of the interests of Europe as a whole". Moreover a powerful Atlantic partnership could be realized only when Europe could speak from a position of strength in industrial affairs. Britain, on her part, would gain from entry into EEC, but she would also contribute. The financial deficit would be eliminated in 1967 and the face and structure of British industry was being changed. While the Treaty of Rome had difficulties for Britain these problems were there to be overcome, the Prime Minister declared. ^{20/}

Mr. Wilson's visit to Paris (24-25 January)

105. In a statement at a meeting with President de Gaulle on the morning of the 24th, Prime Minister Wilson voiced Britain's will to safeguard Europe's independence in the face of a risk of domination of the old world by the United States. The two leaders compared their views on relations with the East, which were reported to be very close. President de Gaulle was said to have expressed a wish that, irrespective of the outcome of the discussions on Britain's EEC membership, French-British cooperation should develop in all fields, including technology (Le Monde, 26 January).

106. In the afternoon of the 24th, Prime Minister Pompidou pointed out that the precarious position of the pound sterling may affect Britain's possible role in EEC, and the Community's own financial situation. The British delegation, in answer, gave technical explanations on the sterling area.

107. At the meetings on 25 January Foreign Secretary Brown dealt with the problem of EEC's agricultural policy; and Mr. Wilson emphasized the importance which he attached to technological cooperation with France. It was pointed out by the British leaders that the present stage was that of "soundings", and that no final decision on whether to apply for EEC membership would, in any event, be taken until a few weeks.

^{20/} On 25 January, the Consultative Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming Britain's move towards joining EEC, and expressing the hope that membership or association would be extended to the other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

108. On 25 January Prime Minister Wilson at a press conference in Paris said that, while the French Government obviously still saw great difficulties involved, many of its anxieties were disposed of and some were reduced:

"... Our hosts were impressed with our depth of purpose in everything we said and our desire to join the EEC. We did not come to ask the French Government to answer yes or no, or to put any particular questions to it. This is one of six visits and it was always understood that when our talks were over the six governments would wish to consult together before taking a final decision."

109. Mr. Wilson made it clear that any extension of technological cooperation would be dependent on Britain becoming a member of the Common Market so as to be assured of sales outlets.

CONCLUSION

110. High-level contacts between the West and Warsaw Pact members in January only involved Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union on the one side and Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain and ^{The} Holy See on the other. Yet France's continued emphasis on relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was resented by influential circles in the West. According to Le Monde, there was almost unanimous criticism in Strasbourg of the fact that, in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Secretary of State de Broglie refrained from dealing with Mr. Wilson's speech and belaboured France's policy "beyond the iron curtain" (26 January).

111. The FRG Government apparently believes that it can significantly improve its relations with Eastern Europe without giving up basic positions on frontiers, the status of the two Germanies, participation in Nato nuclear affairs and the question of a future united Europe's right to have nuclear weapons at its disposal; and the FRG may be encouraged in this expectation by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania.

112. In the East European view, the new FRG campaign for an opening to the East results from a contradiction, pointed out by Mr. Rapacki, between traditional FRG diplomacy and current trends in the rest of Europe which include greater independence from the United States and concern with its South-East Asia policy.

113. It is not as yet clear how diplomatic relations between the FRG and close partners of the GDR may affect the German question. An unofficial French inter-German interpretation of FRG motives was that "the new/policy's main goal is to isolate the

GDR, which runs the risk of drawing Soviet reaction against such an attempt at dissolving their camp" (Le Monde, 26 January). On the other hand it is the FRG which has made exceptions to the Hallstein doctrine of no relations with States - other than the Soviet Union - which recognize the GDR, in that the doctrine would now be applied only to non-European countries; and this may also be interpreted as a step towards greater recognition of Central European "reality".

114. In the West the sincerity of Britain's intention to be part of "Europe" was acknowledged in Gaullist circles, but practical difficulties, relating to Britain's financial and agricultural affairs, loomed larger. West German industrial interest in the British market, and the FRG's desire to work in close cooperation on this issue with Italy - Britain's warm defender - were counter-balanced by the Kiesinger Government's declared policy of improving its overall relations with France.