

[8 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>51062</u>
BOX	<u>9</u>
FILE	<u>1</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0282</u>

TRANSMISSION CHIFFREE

EXP:

PCIAT GOMA

00 871 111 1737 1994-07-23 13:00 CH-48 S #1

H 5021 204 1245

FM GENERAL LAFOURCADE  
TO GENERAL DALLAIRE

GOMA, le 23 juillet 1994  
NMR 1391 /DL

URGENT

CONFIDENTIEL DEFENSE

- 1) - Le problème de traitement et de distribution d'eau potable est actuellement crucial sur l'ensemble de la zone de GOMA.
- 2) - La société SADE dispose à GISENYI et MUKAMIRA de matériels automobile, pelles, groupes électrogènes et produits réactifs qui seraient d'une très grande utilité actuellement.
- 3) - Vous demande solliciter l'accord du FPR pour :
  - reconnaître les dépôts et évaluer leur contenu,
  - transférer certains matériels sur GOMA et sa région.
- 4) - Compte tenu de la gravité du problème, je souhaite une réponse urgente.

Le Colonel LUREAU  
Chef d'Etat-Major





copy

**INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM  
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR**

**CONFIDENTIAL - URGENT**

**12 July 1994**

**TO : Maj. Gen DALLAIRE**  
**Force Commander, UNAMIR, Kigali**

**INFO : A.H. KABIA**  
**Executive Director**

**FROM: Dr. Shaharyar KHAN**  
**Special Representative to the Secretary General**

*Shaharyar Khan*

**SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL LAFOURCADE**

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I have just spoken to Gen. Lafourcade on the wireless, which is operating from the Liaison office of Operation Turquoise. I was glad to establish contact with Gen. Lafourcade who told me that the situation was stable in his zone.

The General asked me to convey the following messages form him to Gen. Kagame.

- a) Gen. Lafourcade would ensure that in accordance with the agreed modalities for the Humanitarian Protection Zone, the pro-government militia/military elements would not be allowed to move out of the zone and would be confined to their garrisons with their arms. The General would like to reassure Gen. Kagame that no armed persons would be allowed to move out of the confined garrisons which are closely guarded by "Operation Turquoise".
- b) In the context of providing evidence to the International Commission of Experts that is to investigate acts of genocide and criminality, Operation Turquoise would provide every assistance to the commission to collect data and to interview the suspects. The suspects would not be allowed to move out of the garrisons and every cooperation will be shown with regard to collation of evidence regarding those responsible for the massacres and related crimes.

I would like to pass this information to General Kagame as soon as possible, if he is not going to be available soon, it may be worth passing the above message in writing to the RPF.

**Best Regards**

COPY

File: OP TURQUISE

CNR 369 P1/4

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 6 July 1994  
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2160  
SUBJECT: Security Council Consultations on Rwanda

1994 JUL -6 P 11:45

... Please find attached a self-explanatory note for the file on today's SecCo Informals on Rwanda, during which the safe zone established by the French-led force was extensively discussed. Best regards.

C

②  
Seco  
Please check if  
SASG is getting  
there. Please give  
copy to DRC/HAC/COO.  
(also see if Mr. Gals is  
getting there).

10  
FR  
7/7

Note for the fileRwanda: Security Council Consultations

The Security Council met in consultations on Rwanda this morning and afternoon. The President called the attention of the Council to the letter which France had sent to the Secretary-General concerning its desire to establish a safe zone southwest of Rwanda.

The President said his consultations had concluded that Members simply wished to acknowledge the letter submitted by the Secretary-General transmitting the French letter without any reference to Security Council resolution 929 (1994).

China stated that it had no objection to a short letter by the President acknowledging the Secretary-General's letter as long as it was understood that the Security Council had no obligation in relation to the creation of the safe zone by France.

France repeated the highlights of Operation Torquise as contained in its report to the Security Council, and argued the case for a safe haven. The zone which they had established stretched from Cyangugu to Kabuye. No military operations would be allowed in the safe zone. Some of the militia in the zone had already been disarmed. France urged that the Special Rapporteur and the High Commissioner for Human Rights visit the zone to interview any criminals that may be in the zone.

In the afternoon session of the consultations various delegations stated their views, summarized below, on the concept of a safe zone.

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

Nigeria described the creation by the French force of a humanitarian safe haven in Southwest Rwanda as a "fait accompli", and referred to Security Council resolution 929 as "the reluctant decision of a divided council". All efforts by the international community should be geared towards deploying an expanded UNAMIR on the ground as soon as possible. The recent letter from France to the Secretary-General on the activities of Operation Torquise was not at variance with Nigeria's position. From a humanitarian point of view, one could not oppose the French intervention, but this should not prejudice UNAMIR. The safe haven should be administered in a strictly neutral manner. Nigeria called for a special statement by the Security Council to the media on this matter, in order to show transparency in the Council's activities.

- 2 -

Russian Federation stated that the safe haven zone should be completely demilitarized, and only the French and Senegalese troops therein should bear arms. In this context, it did not understand why the French had allowed armed (Rwandan Interim Government military) units within the zone. Armed units responsible for past massacres should not be present in the safe zone, as such presence could rekindle the conflict. Russia believed that an area comprising one third or one quarter of a country was not a safe area. It was "something else", and the size of the area should be reduced. It requested from the Secretariat an explanation of how the safe area would affect the deployment of UNAMIR.

Argentina stated that the establishment of the safety zone was aimed at a real need - the flow of refugees to that area and their need for protection. It suggested a UNAMIR observer presence in the area, and offered to provide medical assistance within the zone.

New Zealand recalled that it had abstained from resolution 929 out of concern for its possible effects on UNAMIR. Although it was now reassured by the French report to the Security Council, New Zealand had not foreseen that the Security Council would authorize the setting aside of such large tracts of land for a safe area. It endorsed the request by Russia for an explanation from the Secretariat on the implications of this development for UNAMIR.

Spain expressed its view that the expression "all necessary means" in resolution 929 included the right to create a humanitarian safe area. Spain believed that Operation Torquise had so far proceeded in an evenhanded manner and in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

United States in its statement took note of French assurances of a neutral non-interpository role by its forces. It was encouraged to learn that the inflammatory radio broadcasts condemning UNAMIR had stopped within the last 24 hours, and urged the quick deployment of UNAMIR II.

Brazil expressed doubts as to whether the concept of safe zones was envisaged by resolution 929, but regarded the creation of the zone as a present "fact of life". However, it did not exclude the need for a new resolution on this subject at an appropriate time.

Czech commended France for its "timely initiative" and said the multinational force was saving lives. Noting that certain sentiments had been expressed concerning the motives of France, Czech said that two weeks into the operation, it saw no evidence that the operation was anything other than humanitarian. It therefore supported the French intervention, and also endorsed

- 3 -

the request for an explanation by the Secretariat on the implications of the safe areas for UNAMIR.

United Kingdom agreed with Nigeria that deploying an expanded UNAMIR was a matter of priority, and assessed the present situation in Rwanda as being "much less depressing" than hitherto.

France, responding to the various statements, thanked those who supported its recent actions, and challenged anyone to prove that its intentions were contrary to its stated humanitarian objective. Its position was that the Security Council had in advance (in resolutions 925 and 929) authorized safe areas under the phrase "all necessary measures" and so a new authorization was unnecessary. France responded specifically to various statements by Nigeria and Russia, and estimated the size of the safe area to be 15 per cent of Rwandan territory, which was "not that big". It denied knowledge of any Rwandan armed groups near the French troops. If such armed groups existed, they would be neutralized.

Oman expressed concern about the RPF's intention to form a government, and stated that a message should be sent to the RPF that any government to emerge in Rwanda should be in consonance with the Arusha Agreement.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

*Kingsley Moghalu*  
Kingsley Moghalu  
6 July 1994

UNAMIR

94 JUL -6 13 52

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, RIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 5 July 1994  
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2153  
SUBJECT: Report on operation "Turquoise"

1994 JUL -5 17 10:00

... Please find attached a report on operation "Turquoise" submitted by the French Permanent Mission, in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 929 (1994). This report and the map annexed to it were received here this evening and will be issued as a Security Council document tomorrow. Regards.

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Ple note and  
return  
le  
P.C.  
7/7



## **OPERATION TURQUOISE**

### **1 - DISPOSITIF**

Le dispositif de l'opération TURQUOISE est placé sous les ordres du Général LAFOURCADE qui dispose d'un Poste de commandement interarmées de théâtre (PCIAT) implanté à GOMA et relié au Centre opérationnel interarmées de PARIS.

Ce dispositif comprend les éléments suivants :

- un sous-groupement de forces NORD de 3 unités de combat à KIBUYE,
- un sous-groupement de forces SUD de 2 unités de combat à CYANGUGU,
- un sous-groupement spécialisé constitué de 4 éléments à BUKAVU,
- un déploiement d'avions de combat à KISANGANI,
- trois bases de transit à BANGUI, LIBREVILLE et DOUALA.

Le dispositif dispose actuellement d'un effectif de 2300 militaires français et 32 sénégalais.

### **2 - COMPOSITION DE LA FORCE (effectifs prévisibles)**

#### **2.1 - Moyens Interarmées**

- un poste de commandement interarmées (PCIAT - effectif 305),
- un élément militaire médical d'intervention rapide (EMMIR - effectif 46),
- un détachement spécialisé disposant de 5 hélicoptères (effectif 220)
- trois détachements du Service des essences des armées (effectif 35)

#### **2.2 - Moyens de l'Armée de l'air et de la Marine nationale**

- un élément de 4 MIRAGE FICR, 4 MIRAGE FICT, 1 ATLANTIC, 2 C135FR, 2 CASA 235, 5 avions cargo tactiques (C130, C 160), 2 hélicoptères SA330 (SAR). L'effectif total est de 340.

#### **2.3 - Moyens de l'Armée de terre**

- quatre compagnies d'infanterie motorisée (effectif 580),
- un escadron d'automitrailleuses légères de 12 véhicules (effectif 130),
- une section de mortiers lourds de 6 pièces (effectif 70),
- une section de génie (effectif 25),

- un bataillon de soutien logistique partiellement acheminé et en cours de déploiement (effectif prévu 450),
- un détachement de l'Aviation légère de l'armée de terre (ALAT) disposant de 3 hélicoptères PUMA (effectif 60),
- deux états-majors tactiques (effectif 62),
- une compagnie de commandement et de service (effectif 150).

#### 2.4 - Moyens de la Gendarmerie nationale

- un détachement prévôtal (effectif 10).

#### 2.5 - Moyens étrangers

- une section d'infanterie sénégalaise (effectif 32).

D'autres éléments fournis par divers pays d'Afrique pourraient être intégrés à la force. Une antenne chirurgicale belge est attendue.

### 3 - LIEUX ET MODE DE DEPLOIEMENT

Initialement mise en place à GOMA et BUKAVU le 22 juin 1994, la Force a ensuite reconnu plusieurs axes :

- au nord, à partir de GOMA, en direction de KIBUYE et du col de NDABA,
- au sud, à partir de BUKAVU, dans le secteur de la forêt de NYUGWE et jusqu'à GIKONGORO et BUTARE.

L'opération a comporté :

- des actions préliminaires (mesures d'alerte et de prépositionnement de moyens en Afrique centrale) du 16 au 21 juin 1994,
- des actions initiales :
  - \* mise sur pied d'une base opérationnelle avancée à GOMA et d'une plate-forme aérienne à KISANGANI du 21 au 24 juin 1994,
  - \* reconnaissance de camps de réfugiés à CYANGUGU et dans l'ouest du RWANDA du 22 au 25 juin 1994,
  - \* déploiement progressif de la force sur les axes de progression précités du 24 juin au 4 juillet 1994.

### 4 - EVALUATION DE LA SITUATION

La mission à but humanitaire confiée à la France s'avère délicate, notamment dans le centre et le sud de la zone reconnue par la Force TURQUOISE.

Jusqu'au 2 juillet 1994, nos troupes ont pu agir sans incident à l'intérieur de la zone gouvernementale à partir des villes zaïroises de GOMA et BUKAVU.

Par la suite, la poussée du Front patriotique rwandais a provoqué un nouveau flux de réfugiés. Ceci nous a conduit à définir une zone humanitaire sûre pour les réfugiés à l'intérieur du triangle CYANGUGU-KIBUYE-GIKONGORO.

Le problème humanitaire dans cette zone atteint aujourd'hui des proportions considérables qui exigent l'implication de l'ensemble de la communauté internationale. Des centaines de milliers de personnes déplacées tutsies et hutues ont besoin d'une aide urgente. La protection apportée par la France devrait permettre son déploiement le plus rapidement possible.

## **5 - ACTIONS HUMANITAIRES ENTREPRISES**

### **5.1 Protection et Organisation des camps de réfugiés :**

La force TURQUOISE mène une action de protection autour de 2 camps :

5.11 NYARUSHISHI, camp déjà existant et regroupant 8 000 personnes (Tutsis). La garde est assurée par les Forces armées rwandaises et les soldats TURQUOISE (1 section).

5.12 BISERERO, camp créé et protégé par les forces françaises (1 000 tutsis depuis le 1er juillet).

### **5.2 Activités humanitaires :**

#### **5.2.1 Situation générale :**

Depuis l'entrée au RWANDA de la force TURQUOISE, on estime à 850 000 le nombre de réfugiés répartis en plus de 50 camps en zone gouvernementale.

An sud du pays, de nombreux réfugiés se déplacent vers GIKONGORO (mouvements vers l'ouest) et vers le BURUNDI (mouvement vers le sud).

Lors de sa visite sur place, M. ARTURO HEIN, directeur du bureau d'urgence de l'ONU pour le RWANDA, (en poste à NAIROBI) a fait part de son appréciation très favorable sur la mission et les modes d'action de l'opération TURQUOISE.

#### **5.2.2 Actions entreprises :**

Installation d'un élément médical militaire d'intervention rapide (EMMIR) à CYANGUGU (depuis le 5 juillet).

Livraison de 37t de fret d'aide humanitaire gouvernementale française et distribution dans les régions de KIBUYE et GIKONGORO. 400 tonnes sont prévues dans les jours à venir.

Evacuation de 1 325 personnes.

Les moyens suivants ont été demandés à l'UEO .

- un stock de 35t de médicaments (renouvelable toutes les 3 semaines),
- 400t de vivres non périssables,
- vêtements et couvertures pour 200 000 personnes.

### 5.3 Domaine des droits de l'homme :

Des violations flagrantes des droits de l'homme ont été constatées directement par le soldats français ou ont fait l'objet de récits par les populations civiles. Ainsi, les forces TURQUOISE ont découvert des charniers dans les régions de CYANGUGU et KIBUYE. Par ailleurs, des corps appartenant vraisemblablement à des personnes d'origine tutsie ont été trouvés près de BISESERO.

L'ensemble des informations pertinentes recueillies sera ultérieurement transmis aux experts de la Commission d'enquête créée par la résolution 935 et au Rapporteur spécial.

## 6 - APPRECIATIONS SUR LE DEROULEMENT DE L'OPERATION ET EVENTUELLES DIFFICULTES RENCONTREES

L'opération TURQUOISE se déroule conformément à la résolution 929 de l'ONU.

Les forces françaises ont fait preuve d'impartialité sur le terrain en sauvant de nombreux rwandais hutus ou tutsis d'une mort certaine. Cette impartialité commence à être reconnue par le FPR qui a laissé se réaliser l'évacuation de 1000 personnes de BUTARE même si un incident mineur a eu lieu.

Certaines difficultés demeurent. Pour l'instant, les ONG et les institutions internationales relaient très peu l'action des forces TURQUOISE, notamment dans le sud. Dans ce domaine, comme dans celui de la participation au soutien logistique de notre intervention, peu de promesses se sont concrétisées. Même si il est dissuasif vis-à-vis des milices ou des forces armées impliquées dans le conflit, notre dispositif n'en demeure pas moins insuffisant au regard du nombre de personnes déplacées à soutenir.

\* D'autre part, les difficultés pour maîtriser la situation militaire extrêmement tendue ne sont pas négligeables. Ainsi, l'hostilité possible des Forces armées rwandaises (FAR) et des milices hutues à notre égard pourrait multiplier les risques qu'encourent déjà nos forces du côté du FPR. La participation de pays tiers à l'opération constituerait une aide appréciable à nos efforts.

Enfin, l'effort militaire supporté presque intégralement par la France ne saurait se prolonger sans l'espoir sérieux d'une relève par la MINUAR II. Or, la plupart des offres de contribution demeurent incertaines ou assorties de conditions ou de délais peu compatibles avec une prise en charge de notre mission dans les deux mois qui viennent. La France en appelle donc à l'ensemble des Etats membres pour que le déploiement de la MINUAR renforcée devienne rapidement une réalité.

**ZONE HUMANITAIRE SURE AU RWANDA**

**DISCTRICTS DE CYANGURU, GIKONGORO ET MOITIE SUD DE CELUI DE  
KIBUYE, INCLUANT L'AXE KIBUYE-GITARAME JUSQU'AU COL DE N'DABA  
COMPRIS**

oOoOoOo

**HUMANITARIAN SAFE AREA IN RWANDA :**

**DISTRICTS OF CYANGUGU, GIKONGORO AND SOUTHERN HALF OF  
KIBUYE DISTRICT INCLUDING KIBUYE - GITARAMA ROAD UP TO N'DABA  
PASS.**


CHR 368 P7/7

# RVANDA

- Capitale d'Etat
- Plus de 10 000 hab.
- Ville importante
- Aire locale et lieu
- Rue de viabilité
- Provenance
- Aire locale
- Piste
- Aéroport
- Ligne de frontière
- Parc National
- Trains

Bulape C. d. J. de préfecture

0 10 20 km



YK 654

UNAMIR  
PAGE 1 OF 3  
194 JUL -3 19 06**OUTGOING FACSIMILE  
PERSONAL ONLY**ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE  
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
OUTGOING FAX NO: 1	DTG: 031402 NYT JUL 94
TO: GEN. ROMERO DALLAIRE (PERSONAL ONLY)	FROM: UN HQ - DPKO SITUATION CENTRE
FAX NO: 3-3090	FAX NO: (212)-963-9053
SUBJECT: CONFIRMATION TO THE FRENCH OPERATION AREA.	
ATT: GEN. BARIL	DRAFTER: Maj. E. Kesh SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO: REF NO:	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE:	

**MESSAGE**

ACCORDING TO THE LETTER THAT WE RECEIVE FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE WE NEED CONFIRMATION ABOUT THE FRENCH OPERATION AREA, BECAUSE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE FAX THAT YOU SEND US ON 02 JULY 1994 AND THE MAP THAT YOU INCLUDED.

- 
- The map displays the geographical layout of Rwanda, including its international borders with Uganda to the north, Tanzania to the east, and Burundi to the south. Major administrative regions such as Kigali, Butare, Gisenyi, and Cyangugu are labeled. A network of roads and a prominent thick black line are shown. Several military-related locations are marked, including UNAMIR Force HQ, Kigali Sector HQ, and MII Obs HQ. Two specific areas are highlighted with large circled numbers: '1' in the northern region near Kigali and '3' in the southern region near Butare. The map also shows various lakes, rivers, and smaller towns throughout the country.





- 1.- AREA ESTIMATED TO BE UNDER RGF AND RPF CONTROL:
- 2.- FRENCH OPERATION AREA ACCORDING YOUR FAX

UNAMIR

PAGE 1 OF 4

194 JUL 02 20 21  
**OUTGOING FACSIMILE  
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OUTGOING FAX NO: 2	DTG: 021618 NYT JUL 94
TO: GEN. ROMERO A. DALLAIRE	FROM: MR. I. RIZA
FAX NO:	FAX NO: (212)-963-9053
SUBJECT: PERSONAL LETTER	
ATT:	DRAFTER: Mr E. RESKE SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO: REF NO:	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE:	

**MESSAGE**

THIS IS A PERSONAL LETTER FROM MR. I. RIZA TO GENERAL ROMERO A. DALLAIRE ONLY.





LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL

Le 2 juillet 1994

Monsieur le Président,

Je vous prie de trouver ci-joint la lettre par laquelle le gouvernement français me fait part de son intention de créer dans le sud-ouest du Rwanda une zone de protection humanitaire conformément à la Résolution 929 du Conseil de sécurité.

Je vous serais obligé de bien vouloir porter cette lettre à la connaissance des membres du Conseil de sécurité.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Boutros Boutros-Ghali".

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Jamsheed K. A. Marker  
Président du Conseil de sécurité  
New York

*Mission Permanente de la France  
auprès des Nations Unies  
L'Ambassadeur Représentant Permanent*

*One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza  
245 East 47th Street, 8th Floor  
New York, N.Y. 10017*

le 1er Juillet 1994

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

J'ai reçu instruction ce matin de vous faire part de la très vive préoccupation des autorités françaises devant la dégradation de la situation au Rwanda et les risques d'un nouveau drame humanitaire dans ce pays.

Au cours des derniers jours, les combats se sont intensifiés au-delà de la capitale et sont en train de s'étendre au sud dans la région de Butare, non loin de la frontière du Burundi, ainsi qu'à l'ouest semble-t-il, en direction de Kibuye. D'ores et déjà nos éléments, en place dans la région en application de la résolution 929 du Conseil de sécurité, ont effectué des reconnaissances à Butare. Ils ont constaté l'afflux de dizaines de milliers d'habitants fuyant les combats, qui s'ajoutent à plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes déplacées dans cette partie du pays. La poursuite des combats est en passe de créer dans le sud-ouest du Rwanda une situation qui sera à très brève échéance totalement incontrôlable sur le plan humanitaire. Si aucune mesure n'est prise pour y remédier, toute cette partie du pays va être le théâtre de désordres considérables, avec des mouvements de centaines de milliers de personnes fuyant dans le plus grand désespoir, et des risques d'élimination physique des minorités sur place qui se sont déjà matérialisés au cours des mois d'avril et mai. Il est à craindre que toutes ces personnes cherchent à trouver refuge dans les pays avoisinants, notamment au Burundi, aggravant une situation dont la fragilité vous est bien connue.

La France considère qu'il est de sa responsabilité d'alerter la communauté internationale à travers vous-même, afin de l'informer de la situation qui exige, comme cela avait été demandé par les Nations Unies et l'OUA, un cessez-le-feu immédiat. L'arrêt des combats est en effet le seul moyen véritablement efficace pour stabiliser la situation humanitaire et ouvrir la voie à une reprise des discussions avec l'aide des pays de la région en vue d'un règlement politique, à partir des accords d'Arusha dont bien entendu doivent être exclus les responsables des massacres et notamment des actes de génocide.

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI  
Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation  
des Nations Unies  
Bureau S-3800

Si le cessez-le-feu ne pouvait être obtenu immédiatement, la France se trouverait confrontée au choix suivant :

- soit se retirer en dehors du territoire rwandais, en s'efforçant, ce qui serait extrêmement difficile et limité, de sauver par des actions ponctuelles, des vies humaines.
- soit en s'appuyant sur les résolutions 925 et 929, organiser une zone humanitaire sûre où les populations seraient à l'abri des combats et des conséquences dramatiques qui en découlent dans ce pays. Les forces franco-sénégalaises veilleraient, dans le cadre du mandat qui est le leur, à ce que ne s'exerce dans cette zone ou à partir de cette zone, aucune activité de nature à porter atteinte à la sécurité de ces populations. Cette zone devrait être centrée sur la région où les problèmes humanitaires sont les plus aigus, suffisamment vaste compte-tenu du nombre de personnes concernées et d'un seul tenant pour stabiliser les populations sur place et faciliter l'acheminement des secours humanitaires.

Sur la base des informations en notre possession, cette zone devrait comprendre les districts de Cyangugu, Gikongoro et la moitié sud de celui de Kibuye, incluant l'axe Kibuye-Gitarama jusqu'au col de N'Daba compris.

La France estime que, sur la base des résolutions 925 et 929, elle est autorisée à organiser cette zone humanitaire sûre. Elle souhaiterait néanmoins que, par votre intermédiaire, l'Organisation des Nations Unies exprime son appui à la création d'une telle zone.

Je me permets d'attirer à nouveau votre attention sur l'urgence de la situation et de souligner qu'à défaut de pouvoir organiser une zone humanitaire sûre avec le soutien de la communauté internationale, la France n'aurait d'autre choix que celui de se retirer très rapidement du territoire rwandais.

Je ne verrais que des avantages à ce que cette lettre soit diffusée aux membres du Conseil de sécurité.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, en l'expression de ma haute considération.

Jean-Bernard MERIMEE

*Handwritten signature and initials*

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UNAMIR  
PAGE 1 OF 3

194 JUL -3 19 06

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
OUTGOING FAX NO: 1	DTG: 031402 NYT JUL 94
TO: GEN. ROMERO DALLAIRE (PERSONAL ONLY)	FROM: UN HQ - DPKO SITUATION CENTRE
FAX NO: 3-3090	FAX NO: (212)-963-9053
SUBJECT: CONFIRMATION TO THE FRENCH OPERATION AREA.	
ATT: GEN. BARIL	DRAFTER: Maj. E. Reake SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO: REF NO:	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE:	

**MESSAGE**

ACCORDING TO THE LETTER THAT WE RECEIVE FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE WE NEED CONFIRMATION ABOUT THE FRENCH OPERATION AREA, BECAUSE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE FAX THAT YOU SEND US ON 02 JULY 1994 AND THE MAP THAT YOU INCLUDED.

- JUL-03-1994 14:58 FROM UNNY SITUATION CENTRE





- 1.- AREA ESTIMATED TO BE UNDER RGF AND RPF CONTROL:
- 2.- FRENCH OPERATION AREA ACCORDING YOUR FAX



UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES


**UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE  
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA  
(UNREO)**

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**FAX MESSAGE**

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<p><b>TO :</b> MGEN DALLAIRE FC, UNAMIR KIGALI</p> <p><u>Personal and confidential for Addressee</u></p> <p><b>Fax No:</b> 1-212-963-3090</p>	<p><b>Date :</b> 28/06/1994</p> <p><b>No. of pages:</b> 4</p> <p><b>File :</b></p>
<p><b>From :</b> Mr. Arturo HEIN  UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR UNREO, NAIROBI</p>	<p><b>Drafted by :</b> BT/DB</p> <p><b>Account to debit :</b></p>
<p><b>Subject:</b> RELATIONS WITH FRENCH COMMAND</p>	

**ALL ATTACHED PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

1. Forwarded herewith for your personal attention is information provided on request of Mr. Peter HANSEN, DHA, New York, for reference in his 27 June 94 discussions with H.E. Ambassador (to the UN) MERIMEE.

2. Looking forward to your arrival Nairobi.

Best regards.

② PA   
3/7

## OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS

1. When/where will new safe havens be established ?

Comment/Discussion : early identification of anticipated safe havens will permit deliberate planning for potential aid and logistical requirements on part of the NGO's, Agencies, other organizations. While the deliberate establishment of displaced camps is not advocated or promoted by UNREO or UN Agency heads in Nairobi, such likelihood must be planned for.

2. Will forces provide security for pre-existing safe areas/camps ?

Comment/discussion : Security within existing displaced and refugee camps is essential to continued provision of relief aid. Establishment of new camps, if necessary, must not be permitted to detract from security arrangements currently in place or planned.

3. What is the criteria for safe haven establishment ?

Comment/discussion : Selection of safe haven(s) based solely on security considerations will not satisfy myriad humanitarian requirements of the internally displaced who will populate them. Close consultation with the local Humanitarian Relief Community representatives through the UNREO liaison officer will aid in identification of pertinent issues in this regard.

4. Will forces provide security for existing UNHCR refugee (Burundi) camps?

Comment/Discussion: Pre-existing UNHCR camps providing for refugees from Burundi require a secure environment in order to continue effective support.

5. What specific humanitarian aid/support will be provided by French Forces:

- Food/non-food items (What types)
- Transport of displaced to safe havens
- Security/Escort for displaced/NGO's/Agencies
- If camps established, will heavy equipment (engineer) and construction material be available to assist as required.

Comment/Discussion : Security of humanitarian relief workers from all organizations/agencies is paramount to successful aid provision. A clear understanding of the relief community requirements and the force capability to provide mandated support is essential.

Further, early identification of projected French Force relief aid will assist HRO's in determining food/non-food item pre-positioning requirement and minimize redundancy of effort. Finally, though UNREO and UN Agencies of Nairobi do not promote camp establishment, if such becomes the reality, French force engineer equipment and construction material may prove to be invaluable in camp erection and maintenance.

6. Will French Forces administer any aspects of the camps, if established, beyond security?

Comment/Discussion : Camp administration is a complex issue, well beyond provision of internal and external security. Any capability to assist in in/out-processing of displaced, camp maintenance and medical aid, if such becomes necessary, may be of significant value to the humanitarian effort.

7. Will movement into camps be strictly voluntary ?

Comment/Discussion : In some instances, threatened/vulnerable persons discovered by French forces may not desire removal to established safe havens. In these cases, consideration must be given to the wishes of said persons.

8. Will French forces support movement of humanitarian relief and agricultural material with their resupply aircraft ? If yes, where will A/C operate from/to ?

Comment/Discussion : In the interest of cooperation of all elements engaged in humanitarian relief operations, assistance in expeditious movement of relief supplies and material to the mission area is of significant importance. In instances where space on French force aircraft and ground transport is made available, said space may be utilized to its fullest capacity by all relief organizations and agencies. Close coordination between the UNREO Liaison Officer and Humanitarian/Military Liaison cell is required.

9. Will French Forces provide ground transport for forward movement of humanitarian relief supplies and agricultural inputs from Zaire and western Rwanda bases on a space available or dedicated space basis ?

Comment/Discussion : see # 8 above.

10. Will the French Forces commit to a collaborative relationship to exchange pertinent humanitarian information with relief organizations ?

Comment/Discussion : Open exchange of information and close coordination between the forces and all elements of the relief community is critical to a successful operation. An UNREO Liaison Officer will work with the forces, NGO's and UN Agencies to facilitate coordination and minimize duality of effort. Respectfully recommend forces recognize and support UNREO liaison support coordination role.

General Comment : UNREO and UN Agencies are sensitive to the departure intentions of the French Forces and the UNAMIR, NGO and UN Agency positions in a longer term relief effort. Long term difficulties as a fallout of even the perception of close association/collaboration with the forces on the part of any relief organization is problematic and open to conjecture at this time.

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26/6/94

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Fc

This is a very excellent analysis of the situation. We should pursue the action under the same conditions as we already under-way. JFC 26/6 SFC

②  
Dec

It will be going over this with him on the way to Nairobi. Finally the initiative times are opportunity. 27/6

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NOTE TO THE ACTING CHIEF OF MISSION

1. With the launching, on 23 June 1994, of "Operation Turquoise" following the adoption, on 22 June, of Security Council resolution 929 (1994) authorizing the French-led multinational humanitarian operation in Rwanda, the Rwandese situation has entered an uncertain, yet potentially critical phase.
2. If it meets its objective of "contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda", and especially if it does so within the time-frame set by the Security Council and with minimal or, better, without armed confrontations, the operation could impact positively, even decisively, on broader efforts to end the war and to re-launch the peace process. If, on the other hand, the operation gets sidetracked, bogged down or slips into a deepening and widening quagmire in the already complex Rwandese conflict, the result could be a situation a great deal more vexatious and perhaps even more dangerous.
3. That the multinational operation is controversial has been evident from the moment the idea was first broached by France publicly nearly two weeks ago. Among some of the arguments advanced by the operation's critics is the concern that the mission could, by default or by design, assist or be seen assisting one of the belligerent forces in the ongoing civil war, specifically the RGF which is widely believed to be losing in the fighting. This concern has led the other belligerent force, the RPF, to oppose the French initiative ardently from the very beginning. The fear has also been expressed, especially by Africans, that the Security Council's approval of the operation could be interpreted as legitimizing or presaging increased external interference in, or neo-colonial domination of, African countries.
4. Like other members of the international community, African countries have genuinely been horrified by the magnitude of the violence in Rwanda and would like to see the damage brought to an immediate end. The fact that they have generally reacted coolly to an operation which France maintains is purely humanitarian and is aimed at saving lives might be a reflection of the depth of feeling and concern over foreign military intervention in the region outside of a United Nations peacekeeping context.

5. The failure by France to consult adequately with African countries and the OAU prior to launching its initiative might partly be responsible for the reserved African response. Taken by surprise when the proposal was first announced, African countries were left largely unsure of the details of the initiative, including its specific objectives. As France has lately increased and intensified consultations with various African leaders, more of them are now reported to be supporting the multinational operation. This experience would thus seem to underscore the importance of proper consultations with the its parties or countries in a position to influence developments on a particular issue. This is certainly the case with the OAU and various member states in particular Rwanda's neighbours whose support and cooperation, as recognized in pertinent Security Council resolutions, is essential for the realization of genuine and lasting peace in Rwanda. With the bulk of UNAMIR's expanded force expected to come from African countries, and with regional states continuing to host hundreds of thousands of Rwandese refugees, Africa has indubitably attained a prominent place in international efforts to find a workable solution to the Rwandese problem. Close cooperation and consultation between the United Nations and African countries, including the OAU, could therefore help advance these efforts.

6. It is also important to bear in mind that Africa's ability to exert or impose its position even on African issues such as the Rwandese question is not only subject to but is frequently constrained by geo-political and economic realities. Thus, despite the harsh opposition of the RPF and the generally unenthusiastic reaction of most African countries, France has not only proceeded to deploy "Operation Turquoise", but obtained Security Council approval for the mission with the support of two (Djibouti and Rwanda) of the three African members of the Council (Nigeria abstained). The reality is that France is a global economic and military power with a proven record of using its power to defend its vast interests in Africa. As defiance or confrontation in the face of such a powerful reality is generally viewed as unproductive and doomed to fail, many African states have frequently opted for the more pragmatic path of accommodation. The RPF's recent decision to soften its initial opposition to the French-led multinational operation can be seen in this light. The RPF may have concluded that continued opposition to a project France is committed to carrying out would not only be gratuitous, but could in the long term prove costly for the Front if France, a great power and a permanent member of the Security Council, decides to become an active foe of the RPF.

7. The launching of the multinational operation carries risks even for the United Nations. If it succeeds, i.e. avoids major public relations disasters and withdraws on schedule, most of the credit would likely go to France for having initiated it. If, on the other hand, the operation stalls or gets bogged down in controversy and/or combat, the United Nations would probably be criticized for having authorized it in the first place. And, while a successful operation is likely to facilitate efforts to constitute and deploy the expanded UNAMIR force, difficulties with the operation could discourage potential contributors to the UNAMIR force. Moreover, whether the operation succeeds or fails, the perception is likely to persist, even grow, especially among small developing countries, that the United Nations, in the post cold war era, is increasingly being used by its major powers at the expense of weaker or poorer countries. Nevertheless, and on balance, it would appear to be clearly in the Organization's interest for the multinational operation to succeed. If it is conducted in the impartial and neutral manner, and for the humanitarian objectives outlined in Security Council resolution 929, "Operation Turquoise" could be judged a success.

8. Beyond the immediate humanitarian concerns at the heart of its present mandate in Rwanda, the long-term objective of the United Nations in the country, as stated in Security Council resolution 929, is "to contribute to the resumption of the process of political settlement under the Arusha Peace Agreement". In fact, the humanitarian and political objectives are, especially in the Rwandese context, closely inter-linked. As the Security Council, by the same resolution, has determined, "the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security", not only in Rwanda, but in the region as a whole. In this connection, as was observed earlier above, the success of a major humanitarian mission, such as the ongoing French-led multinational operation, could facilitate or contribute to broader efforts to bring peace to Rwanda.

9. It would seem to me, especially against the background of the above considerations, that emphasis needs to be placed, especially at this somewhat uncertain and transitional phase, on vigilance and caution so that such opportunities as are presented can creatively be exploited both to build confidence among the Rwandese parties with a view to advancing peace prospects and to consolidate international support for Rwanda. In this connection, I would like to recommend the following specific measures for your consideration:

- AD-11
- a. Appropriate mechanisms of consultation and coordination between the United Nations and the command of the French-led multinational humanitarian operation should be set up both at UN Headquarters in New York and in the operational area. In this connection, UNAMIR, with its knowledge of the Rwandese situation and experience on the ground, could play a particularly useful role. The primary goal of such consultation and coordination should be to contribute to the successful accomplishment of the humanitarian objectives outlined in the Security Council's resolution and to facilitate the smooth transfer of the humanitarian operation from the multinational force to the expanded UNAMIR force.
  - b. Efforts should be intensified, both at UN Headquarters in New York and in Africa, with a view to having the expanded UNAMIR force brought up to full strength and deployed at the earliest possible opportunity.
  - c. The SRSG should convene a special meeting at UNAMIR Headquarters in Kigali of heads of major humanitarian agencies, both within and outside the United Nations system, to examine the effective coordination and delivery of relief assistance. Such a meeting could serve also to dramatize the international community's profound preoccupation over the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Rwanda and to demonstrate its firm determination to provide assistance to Rwandese in need.
  - d. The SRSG should enter into discreet, broad-based exploratory talks with each of the parties to the Arusha Peace Agreement (the Government of Rwanda and the RPF) with a view to determining elements that could serve as a basis and as an agenda for direct high-level talks between the parties on such issues as: agreement, observance and monitoring of a cease-fire; the refugee and overall humanitarian situation; the security and protection of civilians; the resumption of the peace process, etc.
  - e. The Secretary-General and the SRSG should intensify consultations on Rwanda with regional leaders, including inter alia, the current OAU Chairman, President Ben Ali of Tunisia, the Facilitator of the Rwandese peace process, President Mwinyi of Tanzania, the Mediator, President Mobutu of Zaire, the Presidents of the other neighbouring or nearby states (Burundi, Kenya and Uganda), President




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Mandela of South Africa, the Presidents of Djibouti and Nigeria, two of the three African states currently in the Security Council (the other is Rwanda), and the Secretary-General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim. The primary objective should, in general, be to mobilize and engage these leaders actively in support of efforts to bring peace to Rwanda. Concretely, the leaders could use their influence to persuade or to put pressure on the Rwandese parties to renounce war as an option and to pursue a political settlement.

- ✓ f. In view of the notoriety Rwanda has earned world-wide as a result of recent tragic events, UNAMIR should set up a dynamic public communication and information programme to promote greater awareness of United Nations efforts to contribute to stability, security and peace in the country. Elements of such a programme might include: the establishment of a United Nations radio station in Rwanda, regular contact with UNAMIR troop contributing countries, including periodic reports to the respective governments and invitations to those governments to visit UNAMIR, strengthening of the resources - personnel, material and financial - of UNAMIR's press and information office, etc.

10. In addition to the measures proposed in para. 9 above, you may wish to consider reminding all staff members - military as well as civilian - that as we are in a particularly sensitive security environment, our actions, movements and words are constantly and carefully monitored and scrutinized and therefore that we should, at all times, avoid any actions or statements that could bring discredit to the United Nations or call into question the Organization's strict impartiality and neutrality in the situation at hand.

  
Sammy Kum Buo  
Senior Political Adviser  
26 June 1994

cc: Executive Director  
DFC