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OPERATIONS - GENERAL

9 SEPT - 15 OCT 1994

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

Minute

From: Col J. Arp  
DCOS Ops  
HQ UNAMIR

To: DFC/COS

Date: 15 Oct 94

Subject: MINE AWARENESS/UXO

1. The Canadian EOD Officer has reviewed the draft paper prepared by UNREO and has made several pertinent observations.
2. I would like to draw your attention to sub-paragraphs 2d and 2j. Since we have not received any indication over the last two months that the "Blagden Plan" is being actioned, perhaps consideration should be given to approach UNHQ with a view to request a small EOD troop to establish the Mine/UXO Coordination Cell, provide some EOD capability and conduct Mine Awareness training. It is acknowledged that some of this capability may be available through the anticipated Indian Engineer Company.
3. Your thoughts and direction are solicited.

G8  
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MEMORANDUM

9760-1

11 Oct 94

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COMMENTS ON MINE AWARENESS/UXO PAPER

1. The fol comments are provided as a qualified opinion on the draft paper prepared to try and outline the general mine awareness and UXO situation in Rwanda.

2. Comments will be made on a para by para basis:

- a. Para 1: "few reports of human casualties to date". I disagree. According to several NGO groups there continues to be 5 - 8 victims per week in the Kigali area alone.
- b. Para 1: "there are some mine fields in Kigali, but those are mostly located around former RGF positions, many of which are fenced". I disagree. I spent one month searching for mines and UXO in Kigali and did not find a single fenced minefield. Approx 80% of all UXO and mines found were not around RGF positions. There was no evidence of a deliberate minefield; nuisance mining only was discovered.
- c. Para 2: "2 civilian casualties per day, mostly caused by carelessness with UXO". I disagree. Civilians, especially children are simply ignorant of the mine threat. UXO are almost always surface found, mines are usually buried and untrained civilians are helpless victims at this point, and not careless.
- d. Para 3: "UNAMIR does not have the staff or capacity to adequately address the job". I agree. A proper Mine/UXO Coordination Cell is not a two man job, part-time, and with national contingent responsibilities. An absolute minimum of 6 pers is reqr to receive, catalog, recce and prioritize and direct appropriate action. As well, at least 2 trained EOD teams in the Kigali area alone are required.
- e. Para 4: "Reports from the Cdn Engr in the Ruhengari area indicate that the RPA Engr Bn has conducted UXO disposal operations in the area and that they are burning fields in UNAMIR Sector 5 to get rid of land mines". I disagree. The RPA Engr Bn in Ruhengari was discussed with some sarcasm. If they are burning fields to get rid of mines, then they haven't got a clue what they are doing! Their (RPA) disposal activities consists of

and throwing damaged and burnt UXO in the back of a truck and driving away with a heap.

- f. Para 6: A confirmation of all mines and UXO in Rwanda must be completed before safe and accurate mine awareness trg can be conducted. Info from Somalia is a waste of effort and resource. It is also confusing to anyone trying to develop mine sense.
- g. Para 8: UNAMIR Engr have reported difficulties in finding mines, especially the TS-50 because the ground is heavily contaminated and cluttered with mica and metal fragments. The most prevalent mine found to date is the TS-50, not VS-50. The Canadian Engrs found that hand breaching, in this case, was less tedious and less time consuming than using electrical means.
- h. Mine clearance and ordnance disposal is not the final need. This must become concurrent to all other mine awareness trg as soon as possible. Precisely because of the scattered nature of the problem, this is hardly a limited scope of activity, and yes, large teams could and obviously should be deployed. A relatively small number of EOD personnel will not be able to adequately handle the EOD needs, etc. of Rwanda. Thirty days working in Kigali with 8 trained and experienced personnel proved that.
- j. Para 12: Unless Pilar Aguilan is a trained EOD technician, then her title of Mine Awareness Training Officer is grossly misleading. If she is untrained in this type of EOD, then she would be a coordinator only, not a trainer. Mine awareness is not "distributed", as the subject infers, it is training. By the time contractors come to Rwanda and complete their estimate of work and present their proposed plan, several months will pass. In the interim, several nations with trained EOD pers, specifically in Mine Awareness Training should be considered for the next several months. These countries include Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand, UK, Turkey, and Italy.

3. Many of the statements made in the draft paper seem to be off the mark. I would be more than ready and available to discuss this problem in detail.

*for Clause*  
G. L. Deveau *appt*  
Captain  
MILE



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## BACKGROUND

Rwanda has a serious problem with UXO. RGF forces when they retreated left large piles of unexploded ordnance in Kigali and elsewhere. However, it does not appear at this time that there is a serious problem with uncleared land mines. MSF Switzerland reports that they have received reports of cattle treading on land mines in the area from Kanombe to Ngarāma, in the areas in which it was reported that RGF had laid land mines prior to the war. However, there have been few reports of human casualties to date. There are some mine fields in Kigali, but these are mostly located around former RGF positions, many of which are fenced, and the density of mines in these fields appears to have been low. UNICEF has received a request from the Ministry of Education to survey schools and to clear those schools in which land mines are found. UNICEF is considering hiring Ethiopians and Eritreans to do this. Land Mines do not yet appear to be seriously impeding movement around the country, or the return of refugees, although it is certain that as refugees return reports of land mine casualties will increase. It is the fear of land mines rather than their actual presence, that seems to be having the greatest impact on this society.

The UNAMIR Force Commander has indicated that land mines do not currently impede the execution of military operations, and that most UNAMIR EOD assets are disposing of ordnance for humanitarian reasons. UNAMIR EOD assets are currently sweeping schools in the Kigali area at the request of the Government. Humanitarian agencies and NGO's have indicated that, while the fear of land mines prevents them from using some secondary roads, land mines do not actually impede the accomplishment of their operations. Their major concern is the casualties caused to civilians, especially children. UNAMIR indicates that there are currently about 2 civilian casualties per day, mostly caused by carelessness with UXO.

The UNAMIR Force Engineer is tracking mine incidents and plotting reported mine fields on a country map, and the office keeps a file of mine maps. However the British Engineer Officer in charge of tracking mine incidents has indicated that UNAMIR does not have the staff or capacity to adequately address the job. In addition, it appears that military and humanitarian entities outside of Kigali are unaware of the existence of this capacity, and neither report incidents nor request information on minefield locations from this office.

Reports from outside of Kigali indicate that the RPF are reluctant to permit UNAMIR clearance of mines and munitions, more from pride than for political or military reasons. They have indicated that they wish to do such clearance operations themselves, and it appears that the RPF have in fact begun conducting clearance operations of their own. Reports from the Canadian Engineers in the Ruhengeri area indicate that the RPA "engineer battalion" has conducted UXO disposal operations in the area, and that they are burning fields in UNAMIR sector

to rid the fields of land mines. However, the Canadians indicate that while the RPA engineers are well disciplined and organized, they lack training and equipment. British ODA, at the instigation of Mr. Blagden, have delivered 12 Schiebol mine detectors to UNAMIR for delivery to the RPF.

DHA Land mines consultant Gowdey had a meeting with the American Ambassador on 28 Sept. 94 to discuss US plans to provide mine clearance assistance. The meeting was extremely productive, and the ambassador indicated that he believes the US will conduct mine clearance training for the RPF in the near future. During the meeting he instructed the Defense Attaché, Col. Oldham, to obtain a request from the RPA for mine clearance training. He indicated that the US would be extremely willing to work in a cooperative manner with the UN on mine clearance. He thought that the suggestion that the UN conduct mine awareness training and mine survey work, while the US trained military EOD personnel to do the clearance, was a good arrangement. The Embassy is willing to proceed on this basis, and has told us that they will notify UNAMIR/UNREO if Washington decides not to proceed in this manner.

UNICEF/UNESCO has begun a mine awareness training program, although material seems to have come directly from UNESCO in Somalia, and this raises some doubt about how effective the material will be in the Rwandan setting. Mine Awareness posters I saw are printed with non-UN standard mine marking advice and no information about UXO. Nonetheless, this is the only mine awareness training being conducted in Rwanda, and the campaign, which focuses on children, and the UNICEF side appears to be very well organized. It is imperative that mine awareness training be increased and broadened immediately to cover all facets of Rwandan Society.

#### ANALYSIS

The most critical need in Rwanda at the present time is for mine/munition awareness training. Almost all of the casualties reported to date have been among children and teens playing with unexploded ordnance. Rwanda is an area where a proper mine/munition awareness campaign should be able to cut civilian casualties by more than 50%. A concerted effort by UNICEF/UNREO to provide mine awareness training across the country should be implemented ASAP. It appears that there is significant domestic support for this type of training.

The second most critical need is for an accurate survey and marking program to begin as soon as possible. Unlike other mine infested countries, land mines do not blanket much of the country. UNAMIR engineers report that, while they suspect that there are significant minefields in the northeast, to date the largest mine concentration found outside of Kigali has been 8 mines. Obviously, finding such point mine fields and marking and fencing them, will permit the vast majority of the population to return to normal activity. In addition, the capacity to rapidly inspect buildings such as schools and hospitals to determine if they are mine free is vitally needed. Most such buildings are not

ined, but until they are given a certificate of good health by mine experts, NGOs and civilians will be reluctant to use them. UNAMIR Engineers have reported significant difficulties detecting the VS-50 land mines (that are most common here) with the Schiebol detector. Mica and metals in the soil make it extremely difficult (the Canadians said impossible) to differentiate the signal for a VS-50 from the background interference. On the other hand, there appear to be few impediments to using dogs for detection purposes. Some veterinary support exists in country, including two expatriate veterinarians from Colorado, although it is doubtful whether drugs and food could be found here. This would have to be imported from Nairobi.

The final need is for mine clearance and ordnance disposal itself. Given the scattered nature of the problem and the limited scope of the problem, it appears unlikely that large teams could be deployed. Rather, there is a need for skilled personnel to destroy old ammunition dumps, scattered UXO, and small point minefields. The vast majority of the infrastructure is undamaged and unmined, and is being restored to productive use at the present time. However, some of the refugees, when fleeing, tossed land mines in their garden to discourage the victors from appropriating their premises. This was relatively uncommon, and, as these were mostly private residences, it does not appear critical to clear most of these buildings at the present time. A relatively small number of EOD personnel, such as those the Americans are planning to train, should be able to handle the mine clearance needs, etc. of Rwanda.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

After consultations with the deputy humanitarian coordinator, the UNDP resident representative, the UNAMIR Force Commander, the SRSG's office, the humanitarian agencies, NGO's, and others, I suggest that DHA make the following proposals for a revised mine/munitions plan to DPKO, and seek speedy implementation of the agreed upon elements.

1. A land mine/munitions data base should be established in UNREO, with a survey officer/program manager, as soon as possible. This office should take over responsibility for monitoring and plotting mine reports from the UNAMIR force engineer. UNAMIR is not currently staffed or organized to fulfil this function.
2. A Mine Awareness Training Officer should be designated for Rwanda. I believe that this should be the current UNICEF officer, Pilar Aguilar. With UNREO support, she should be given the resources and responsibility for coordinating a countrywide mine/munitions awareness campaign. Additional DHA funding for mine awareness training should be sought immediately. Mine awareness training for expatriate personnel should also be distributed to minimize mine incidents among expat personnel.
3. A six month renewable contract for the survey and marking



f mine fields and UXO's, using dogs, should be let as soon as possible. These contractors should be under the command of the UNREO survey officer, and should be fully equipped to conduct speedy survey operations and to mark and fence mine fields and UXO dumps. Although minefield survey/marketing will be the primary focus of the contractor, the contractor should also have a limited capacity to do urgent mine clearance of schools, critical buildings, etc. that are needed for the completion of the humanitarian mission. Something along the lines proposed for Georgia, utilizing dogs, is proposed. The contractor should bring all necessary supplies, including appropriate fencing, to execute its contract.

4. Close links must be established between Rwandan authorities and the UNREO program manager to ensure that US trained RPA EOD personnel are directed towards the highest priority EOD problems.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.8 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: FC

Date: 14 Oct 94

Subject: AMENDMENT TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Reference: A. HQUNAMIR OPDIR NO. 2 ROE dated 6 Oct 94

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1. Please find enclosed, for your review and action, an amendment to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) which rationalizes the escalation of force procedures with the concept of minimum force. You are directed to remove the appropriate page and insert the amended page into the Reference. The affected change pertains to the proper sequencing of Sub-paragraphs 14c and 14d.

2. Commanders at all levels are required to:

- a. Have this directive translated and disseminated to every subordinate under their command if other than English/French; and
- b. Ensure that every subordinate under their commands understands the changes to this document.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Enclosures: 2

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*RB*



10. Authority to Detain. Individuals shall only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display hostile intent or carry out any activity which would require that force be used against them under paragraph 8.

11. Once detained, only minimal non-deadly force is authorized to prevent the escape of a detainee, unless there is a necessity to act in self-defence, in which case minimum force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized. However, if the individuals flee and the threat of their use of force has thus been removed, further force of any kind shall not be employed to apprehend them.

12. Any individual detained shall be turned over as soon as possible to appropriate civilian police authorities as designated by the Force Commander. Any weapons seized from detainees shall be confiscated or rendered militarily ineffective.

13. Detainees shall not be subject to intimidation, deprivation or humiliation. Medical care and the attention of medical personnel will be provided when required. Detainees will be given rations and shelter equivalent to that of UNAMIR personnel.

#### CHALLENGE AND ESCALATION PROCEDURES

14. Except where a response is required in accordance with paragraph 15, the following procedures are to be followed:

- a. Verbal or Visual Warning. Warn the aggressor to stop the activity, which in normal circumstances, should follow the following sequence:
  - (1) depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given orally, by a sign or by illumination (ie, hand-held red flares, search-lights, etc.). The issuance of a warning should also be passed up the chain of command with continuous Situation Reports;
  - (2) repeat the verbal or visual warning as many times as is necessary to ensure understanding or compliance;
- b. Charge Weapons. If authorized under State B of ROE No.2 (paragraph 15 refers);
- c. Non-Deadly Force. If warnings are ignored, employ minimal non-deadly force;
- d. Warning Shots. If the threat continues, employ aimed warning shots in a safe direction so that there is no danger of personal injury or collateral damage;
- e. Deadly Force. If minimal non-deadly force is either not feasible or fails, on order and under the control of a superior, minimal deadly force, such as single aimed shots, may be used until the threat is removed;
- f. Escalation of Deadly Force. Escalatory weapons fire with other weapons systems shall only be on the order of the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 6.

- b. Charger les armes. Sur autorisation dans la situation B du Règlement d'Engagement N°.2(référence au paragraphe 15);
- c. Force non-mortelle. Si les avertissements sont ignorés, employer le minimum de force non-mortelle;
- d. Tirs d'avertissement. Si la menace persiste, utiliser des tirs d'avertissement diriger dans une direction certaine afin de ne pas se faire mal ou de causer des dégâts secondaires.;
- e. Force mortelle. Si un minimum de force non-mortelle n'est pas applicable ou n'a pas d'effet, sur ordre et sous le contrôle d'un supérieur, on peut recourir à une force minimale mortelle, notamment des tirs non-automatiques diriger, jusqu'à ce que la menace soit écartée;
- f. Escalade de la force mortelle. L'escalade des armes à feu avec d'autres systèmes d'armes sera placée sous les ordres du seul commandant habilité en conformité avec le paragraphe 6.

TIR SANS AVERTISSEMENT OU ESCALADE.

15. Le seul moment où il est permis de faire usage de force mortelle sans avertissement ou escalade est quand une attaque par un agresseur vient de façon si inattendue que même un petit retard pourrait:

- a. causer la mort ou un dommage grave au personnel de la MINUAR ou à tout autre personnel militaire ou civil autorisé par les Nations unies;
- b. causer la mort ou un dommage grave à des personnes placées sous la protection de la MINUAR; ou
- c. conduire à un dommage ou destruction immédiate des biens de la MINUAR dans les circonstances décrites au paragraphe 8.b(2).

PROCEDURE DANS LE PROCESSUS D'OUVRIR LE FEU.

16. Tout usage d'armes à feu comme moyen d'exercer une force mortelle consistera en des tirs ciblés, c'est-à-dire viser au milieu de la masse visible de la cible. Les tirs doivent être contrôlés pour ne pas tirer aveuglément. Les tirs automatiques ainsi que l'emploi des armes de support ne seront utilisés qu'en dernier ressort et seulement sur autorisation tel que mentionné au paragraphe 6. Les tirs ciblés continueront aussi longtemps qu'il sera nécessaire pour atteindre le but immédiat. A travers des ordres pour contrôler les

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UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
Kigali

/2 October 1994

See Distribution:

ADMINISTRATION ORDER 19

Reference:

A.    Operation Order 20 dated -- October 1994

SITUATION1.    General.    As detailed in Operation Order 20.MISSION

2.    To provide logistic support to UNAMIR forces providing security, assistance and coordination of humanitarian support to participating countries/organizations facilitating the rapid and effective end to the crisis in RWANDA.

EXECUTION3.    General Outline.

a.    Logistic Support.    Support to the Force will be effected by cooperation between the military elements and the civilian contractor at all levels. Work in the areas for which Brown & Root provide services and which are outside the capabilities of the Force Support Elements (FSE) to deal with, should be addressed to the G4 Staff. Logistic Support will be provided by the FSE for each Phase of the UNAMIR mission. These elements include:

- |                  |   |   |
|------------------|---|---|
| (1)    Transport | - | United Kingdom (UK) sub-unit<br>(NE of Amahoro Stadium),<br>Brown and Root (Iveco),<br>Elements      from      Canadian<br>Contingent (3 CSG) |
| (2)    Supply    | - | Canadian (CA) sub unit (Log<br>Base)<br>Ghanaian (GH) sub unit (Butari)<br>Brown and Root (Kigali Airport)                                    |

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- (3) Maintenance - UK sub unit  
Brown and Root (Iveco Complex)
- (4) Medical - Australian (AS) Field Hospital  
(Kigali Central Hospital) and  
in (Butari University Complex)
- (5) General Logistic Services - Brown and Root
- (6) Coordination - G4 Staff in UNAMIR HQ. This is  
a combined military and  
civilian staff

b. Deployment. As detailed in Operation Order 20.

- (1) Phase I. Deployment of UNAMIR contingents into each sector, including MILOBs to aid the secure conduct of humanitarian support and effective re-establishment of normal community services free from interference by subversive and criminal elements.
- (2) Phase II. Handing over of responsibilities in Rwandan to the Broad Based Government of National Unity (BBGNU) agencies and NGOs under general security assistance by UNAMIR to ensure the re-establishment of a routine life sequence and the return of refugees and displaced persons.

c. Supported UNAMIR Forces. The following forces will be supported and should constitute UNAMIR at end state:

- (1) MILOBs with MALAWICOY and MALICOY under OPCON in Sectors 3A and 3B respectively.
- (2) CIVPOL, deployed in all sectors.
- (3) GHANBATT (Mechanized) in Sector 4A to conduct relief in place with ZAMBATT, then redeploy into Sector 2 (Strength 820),
- (4) MALAWICOY (Motorized) in Sector 3A and relief in place by MALICOY Sector 3B (Strength 167),
- (5) MALICOY (Motorized) conduct relief in place with MALAWICOY into Sector 3B (Strength 150),
- (6) ZAMBATT (Motorized) conduct relief in place with GHANBATT into Sector 4A (Strength 800),
- (7) FRAFBATT in Sector 4B (Strength 496),

- (8) ETHIOBATT (Mechanized) Sector 4C (Strength 800),
- (9) TUNBATT (Mechanized) in Sector 5 (Strength 800),
- (10) NICOY (Motorized) in Sector 1 (Strength 358),
- (11) INDBATT in sector 6 (Strength 800),
- (12) CANADIAN Contingent (OP PASSAGE, AMAHORO Stadium) (Strength 380),
- (13) AUSTRALIAN Contingent (OP TAMAR, Kigali Central Hospital and BUTARI) (Strength 303),
- (14) BRITISH Contingent (OP GABRIEL, AMAHORO Stadium, Kitabi) (Strength 594),
- (15) HAC, UNDP building.

MATERIAL AND SERVICES.

4. a. Supply.

(1) General.

- (a) Due to the lack of historical data, consumption rates for all commodities can only be estimated. Adjustment to stock level will be made to reflect new battalion strength in sector.
- (b) Local procurement can only be done through the CAO, and his authorized delegates. A CAO representative will be present in each sector outside the KIGALI. No UN reimbursement will be approved unless this procedure is followed.

(2) Sup Class I (Subsistence).

- (a) Combat Rations. Combat rations will continue to be issued to contingents less MILOBS until the Fresh ration system is introduced. 7 days rations is to be maintained as a reserve stock held at unit level.
- (b) Fresh Rations. Fresh rations will be delivered, by a contractor, directly to the unit HQ locations. Units are to confirm the exact location for rations delivery before delivery will commence. Contingents should hold fresh dry, and canned goods, at sub Unit level. Fresh food will be provided as soon as



refrigeration containers are available. Initially two refrigeration units per contingent will be allocated.

- (c) Drinking Water. Drinking water will be distributed to those units that do not have the facility to collect safe drinking water from a source within their sector. In other instances bottled water or bulk potable water will be distributed to contingents at 3 lt/man/day. 7 days reserve stocks of bottled water will be maintained at unit level.

(3) Sup Class II (General Stores, Clothing).

- (a) General. Demands for Class II items are to be placed with the civilian logistics officer at UNHQ Log Coord Cell. Requests for furniture, stationary, and general cleaning items for buildings and office accommodation are to be placed with the OIC General Services.
- (b) Clothing. Contingents are to provide their own country uniforms and personal issue items. UN accoutrements to be worn at all times. Contingents are to demand for shortfalls in accoutrements to the SO SUP at the Log Coord Cell. Where accoutrements have already been issued and they have been lost or stolen the unit logistic officer is to investigate and forward the investigation to the log coord cell before a replacement can be made. Accoutrements that become unserviceable are to be returned to 3 CSG for a one-for-one replacement. This policy will assist in the prevention of accoutrements falling into other than UNAMIR force members hands.

(4) Sup Class III (Petroleum).

- (a) POL. The Logistic Coordination Cell will arrange for bulk fuel holdings to be established in contingent locations. The holdings will be sufficient for 7 days at normal rate of activity. Retail POL issues for units and contingents in the Kigali metropolitan area will be provided at 3 CSG Log Base for diesoline and at the BRITCON Bulk Fuel installation (BFI) for Gasoline (in the short term). Second line transport is to be refuelled at the BRITCON BFI. BRITCON is responsible to refuel generators in the Kigali



metropolitan area as directed by HQ UNAMIR. This service will be taken over from BRITCON by Brown and Root prior to BRITCON departure from Rwanda. Issues to generators, contingent detachments and any authorized civic organizations are to be made by the major contingent in the sector of that detachment.

(5) Sup Class IV (Construction, and Defence).

- (a) Construction Materials. Units are to submit consolidated demands for construction materials to the civilian logistic officer at the Log Coord Cell. If items are not in store the demand will be forwarded to Chief Building Management Services (CBMS) for appropriate action.
- (b) Defensive Stores. Chief Operations Officer (COO, G3 Ops) is the releasing authority for stocks of defence stores. Demands must be submitted to the Civilian Logistic Officer for onforwarding to the COO for approval.

(6) Sup Class V (Ammunition). Ammunition quantities held at unit level are to be in accordance with national directives. Expenditures to be recorded in accordance with the form "Ammunition Expended For Operational Reason". The criteria, and form for reimbursement of ammunition is attached at Annex A.

(7) Sup Class VI (Personal Demand Items). Class VI items are to be coordinated by contingents using regimental funds and nation arrangements. Limited items may be purchased by the Force Welfare Officer for resale to contingents. All purchases are strictly cash and are required at the point of sale on collecting goods. Units requesting these items are to conduct direct liaison with the Force Welfare Officer.

(8) Sup Class VII (Major End Items). Limited quantities of Major Ends Items will be held by the Brown & Root warehouse located at the Kigali airport. Requests for major end items for specific to nation vehicles should be demanded to the Logistic Coordination Cell. The Logistic Coordination Cell will negotiate such purchases with UN New York and the parent nation utilizing Letter of Assist (LOA).

- (9) Sup Class VIII (Medical Stores) 60 days Class VIII stocks are held with the Australian Field Hospital. Contingents deployed with 90 days Class VIII stocks. A bulk order for 60 days has also been placed for replacement stocks. Requisitions for urgently required Class VIII supplies not able to be satisfied by UNAMIR may be purchased on either an Immediate Operational Requirement (IOR) with a local contractor or LOA with a contingent parent country that can satisfy the demand soonest.
- (10) Sup Class IX (Repair Parts). Contingents deployed with limited first line repair parts. Second and third line repair parts are to be demanded through SO Maintenance through the Logistic Coordination Cell and will be satisfied through Brown and Root.
- (11) Water. Non potable water is to be distributed by Brown and Root Contract in the Kigali metropolitan area. Wherever possible local water is to be drawn in the contingent locations. If contingents identify a water source in the contingent location it is to be tested and declared fit for consumption before it is issued to troops. Testing is effected by providing a water sample to the Logistic Coordination Cell for onforwarding to Brown and Root for testing.
- (12) Garbage. Garbage collection is to be effected in the Kigali metropolitan area by Brown and Root contract. Contingents should liaise with their CAO representative to establish either a local contract or unit collection and delivery to a local rubbish dump site. Rubbish is only to be deposited in the approved garbage sites. Units are not to utilize any dump sites not authorized by UNHQ. No payment is authorized to local authority unless coordinated with the Field Service Assistant (FSA) in that sector.
- (13) Laundry. A laundry contract has been requested with Brown and Root for units in the Kigali metropolitan area. Contingents are to conduct liaison with sector FSA representative to arrange a local laundry contract.
- (14) Waste POL Products. Contingents conducting first and second line vehicle servicing are to contain waste POL products in old POL containers. Waste POL is not to be disposed of locally. Waste POL is to be returned to Brown and Root for disposal/recycling under an UNAMIR contract.

b. Transportation

- (1) Units are to use integral unit First Line Transport where possible to satisfy local tasks. Resupply to contingents will, in most instances be by second line road transport or hired transportation, unless otherwise directed. Second line road transport is controlled by the SO Transport HQ UNAMIR and provides the capability to lift bulk loads and formed bodies of troops within the UNAMIR area of operations. Second Line transport support is allocated in accordance with priorities set by HQ UNAMIR G3 Ops staff. Requests for Second Line Road Transport support are to be submitted direct to the SO Transport by units requiring transport support beyond the capability of their own First Line road transport. Requests for Second Line road transport support will only be accepted on a Transport Task Request form. Requests should be submitted not less than 48 hours in advance of the task. The SO Transport will prioritise the Transport Task Requests and consolidate tasks. Requests should include, in the remarks column, a point of contact at both the pick up point and delivery point where possible. Advice will be provided, within 24 hours, as to whether the Transport Task Request has been approved. If the request cannot be approved (for example, due to a lack of transport resources) an attempt will be made to make alternative arrangements. Alternatives may include providing transport on another day, or exploring other sources of transport support (for example, air transport).
- (2) Movement outside the theater for R and R may be effected by MOVREQ to the Movement Control Cell.
- (3) All traffic accidents are to be reported and investigated in accordance with UNAMIR SOP. Each vehicle must carry an Accident Report Form. Copies are available from the CTO. Whenever a UNAMIR vehicle is involved in an accident, a report must be made to HQ UNAMIR CTO and, in the case of vehicles operated by the military to the SO Transport, within 24 hours. Units are to make four copies of the Accident Report Form and forward a copy to each of the following:
  - (a) SO Transport,
  - (b) Claims Officer,
  - (c) MPs when available, and
  - (e) CTO.

- (4) The action to be taken by a driver and procedures to be followed in case of accident are as follows (except if the driver's life is in danger):
- (a) Stop the vehicle and secure it and its contents against pilferage or tampering.
  - (b) Give first aid to any injured persons as far as possible.
  - (c) Report the accident to the nearest UNAMIR Military Police (MP) detachment when available or to the drivers unit as soon as possible.
  - (d) Give the operator of the other vehicle (or owner of the property, or the person(s) involved) name, rank, ID card number, location of parent unit and the UNAMIR vehicle number.
  - (e) In exchange, obtain the equivalent details from the other party as well as the name, number and parent police station of the policeman investigating, if any.
  - (f) Except for the information referred to above, the driver is not to admit liability on the part of the driver or UNAMIR. Any statements required from the vehicle operator or of any other member of UNAMIR travelling in the vehicle will be made only to an authorized UNAMIR Officer. The vehicle operator must be careful not to make any statement to the civil police, if present, or any other person unless permitted by and in the presence of the proper UNAMIR authorities.
  - (g) Remain at the scene of the accident until all action is completed, unless personal safety is endangered.
  - (h) A traffic accident form should be completed at the scene of the accident, if possible.
  - (i) After investigations have been completed, the vehicle should be returned to its base. If it cannot be driven, the operator should endeavor to obtain further orders from his superior officer. In any case, the contents of the vehicle should be made secure before leaving it.



c. Maintenance.

- (1) Repairs. The priority of repairs by sector are Sectors 4,1,2,3,5 and 6. The priority of repairs by equipment type are task vehicles, A vehicles and others. The priority will be reviewed as required.
- (2) First Line. Sector HQ are responsible for first line maintenance of all equipment within their sectors. Repairs beyond the capabilities of 1st line are to be recovered by second line assets to second line maintenance facilities.
- (3) Second and Third Line Repairs. Second and third line repairs are to be conducted by BRITCON Maintenance Coy and Brown and Root.
- (4) Recovery.
  - (a) Backloading Point (BLP). BLP are to be sited by sectors and sited in secure locations. Contingents are to notify SO Maintenance of the exact locations of their BLP.
  - (b) Main Recovery Location. BRITCON Maintenance Company.

5. HEALTH SUPPORT.

- a. Medical Plan. Level One medical support is a National responsibility. Level Two medical support is to be provided by AS Medical Support Force (AS MSF) and other National Level Two medical units as allocated under command. Level Three medical support is to be provided by AS MSF located in Kigali and other National Level Three medical support units as allocated under command. HQ UNAMIR Medical Branch is responsible for casualty regulation in theater and evacuation out of theater to Destination Medical facilities

(DMF) in Nairobi. Repatriation is a National responsibility.

b. Casualty Evacuation. Casualty evacuation is to be conducted as follows:

- (1) Casualty regulation is the responsibility of the Force Medical Branch.
- (2) Priority One (Immediate) and Priority Two (Urgent) casualties will normally be evacuated by air.
- (3) Priority Three (Routine) casualties will normally be evacuated by road.
- (4) Casualty evacuation to a Level One facility is a national responsibility.
- (5) AS MSF and other National Level Two medical units, as allocated under command, are responsible for road evacuation from Level One to Level Two.
- (6) AS MSF is responsible for road evacuation from Level Two to Level Three.

c. Aero Medical Evacuation. Aero medical evacuation (AME) is to be conducted as follows:

- (1) Forward and tactical AME in theater is to be provided by one UH 60 helicopter under operational control of force Medical Branch.
- (2) Tactical AME to Nairobi is to be provided by one C130 aircraft under operational control of Force HQ.
- (3) AS MSF and CANSIGS are to provide AME teams as directed.
- (4) Strategic AME to National DMF is a National responsibility.

d. Force Holding Policy. The following casualty holding policy is to occur:

- (1) Level One - 12 hours;
- (2) Level Two - 72 hours;



(3) Level Three - 28 days; and

(4) Out of theater - as determined by the Force Medical Officer (FMO) or as coordinated by National Command Elements.

e. Preventative Medicine. Preventative medicine and hygiene is a National responsibility. The Force health surveillance plan is the responsibility of the Force Medical Branch.

f. Dental. Level One dental support is a National responsibility. AS MSF is to provide Level Two dental support to the force.

g. Medical Resupply. Contingents are to have arrived in theater with 90 days medical stocks as directed by UNNY. AS MSF is responsible for the maintenance of 60 days Force medical stocks as directed by HQ UNAMIR Medical Branch. Level One and Two medical units are to maintain a minimum of 14 days medical stock in the field. Replenishment is to be initiated using message demand procedures in accordance with (IAW) directions issued from the force Medical Branch.

h. Health Reports and Returns. Health reports and returns are to be maintained IAW directions issued from the force Medical Branch.

6. PERSONNEL.

a. Amenities. Queries relating to amenities are to be directed to the Force Welfare Officer located in UNHQ room 1045.

b. Messes and Institutes. Messes and institutes (wet canteens), may be established as authorized by the Force Commander on request from Contingent Commanders.

c. Out of Bound Policy. Out of bounds areas will be notified as determined by Force Commander.

d. Finance. UN pay is to be effected in location. Advances and finance queries should be directed to the Force Finance Officer located at UNHQ.


- e. Postal. Mail may be posted in the UNHQ building in the welfare office. Contingents should send mail back with resupply convoys for onforwarding. Distribution of mail will be by FSE (Transport) and delivered to outlying contingents on routine resupply convoys. Individual contingents may make arrangements for their own national mail system. Such systems are independent of the UN mail system.

7. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

a. Location of HQ.

- |              |   |
|--------------|---|
| (1) Force HQ | AMAHORO HOTEL, Kigali                             |
| (2) TAC HQ   | Butari (Junction Butari/Gitarama/Gikongoro roads) |
| (3) CLOGO    | AMAHORO HOTEL, Kigali                             |
| (4) FSE      | As per paragraph 3a                               |

- b. Communications. Signals Operating Instructions are to be issued separately by Force Signal Officer.



G. C. TOUSIGNANT,  
OMM, CD  
MAJ GEN  
Force Commander

Annex:

- A. Ammo Expenditure Form and Criteria

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AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE FORM AND CRITERIA

**General**

1. It is a contingents responsibility to obtain ammunition from the home country.
2. Ammunition used for training purposes is a contingents responsibility and will not be paid for by the United Nations.

**Ammunition Reimbursed by the United Nations**

3. Ammunition used for the following purposes is to be reimbursed by the United Nations:
  - a. When so instructed by the Mission. Operations branch will in all cases submit written orders to contingents concerned in advance.
  - b. Ammunition used in incidents authorized under the Rules Of engagement, this includes the loss of ammunition.
  - c. Pyrotechnics, flares etc used as surveillance means in action or when patrolling.
  - d. Special ammunition necessary for demolition purposes.

**Procedures**

4. Claims for ammunition expended in accordance with Para 3C and D should be raised by the home countries authorities and forwarded to New York.
5. Attached to the claim must be at least one of the following documents:
  - a. A written order from the Mission for the use of the same amount of ammunition.
  - b. Quarterly report of ammunition holdings which are certified by the Mission that the amounts of ammunition in the column quantity expended (OPS) has been expended for operational purposes.
6. Contingent Commanders are responsible for raising the necessary documents and submitting them to their home countries.



AMMUNITION EXPENDED FOR OPERATION REASONS

Contingent: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Period Covered: \_\_\_\_\_

SERIAL	TYPE OF AMMUNITION	PRICE US\$	QTY EXPENDED

OPS APPROVAL: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG APPROVAL: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

CPO CERTIFICATION: \_\_\_\_\_ CERTIFICATION: \_\_\_\_\_

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT:

Contingent: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_



UNAMIR-MINUAR

UNAMIR  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : D COS OPS  
FROM : GHANBATT HQ  
INFO : DFC/COS  
AUSMED  
CANSIGS

GH1/069/Q

DATE : 12 OCT 94

SUBJECT : TERMS OF REFERENCE GHANBATT EOD TEAM

Reference: Your Memorandum on subject dated 27 Sep 94.

1. Responsibilities. A Ghanbatt EOD Team is responsible for providing EOD services to the Unit.
2. The Ghanbatt EOD Team will provide clearance capabilities and disposal of mines, booby traps and UXO in any Ghanbatt area of operation.
3. Tasking. The Ghanbatt EOD Team shall be tasked only by the Commanding Officer of Ghanbatt.
4. It must be noted that the Ghanbatt EOD Team is essentially a part of Ghanbatt organisation and shall always be based at Ghanbatt HQ. Any requirement outside Ghanbatt area of operation will be considered in emergencies only, and only if no other contingent EOD Team is available to provide assistance.

MA

this is ok  
JG

19/10  
DFC/COS/CONTIGS

Mr Age Jr,  
JG 19/10

UN RESTRICTED

JN ADINKRAH  
Lt Col  
Commanding Officer



To: DFC

From: Capt Greiner (Press Officer)

Will discuss this write up with at about 050900 hrs

5 The Fox  
Rla  
10/10

SUBJECT: ASSISTANCE REQUIRED BY UNAMIR

1. REFERENCE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FC UNAMIR AND COMD US FORCES THE FOLLOWING ASSISTANCE IS URGENTLY REQUIRED:

- A. AIRLIFT OF ETHIOPIA BATTALION OF 800 STRENGTH WITH STORES AND 20 X BTR 80 APCS TO BE IN PLACE BY 19 AUG FOR HAND OVER WITH FRENCH FORCES. THEY ARE READY TO MOVE AS RECCE IS IN MOTION NOW;
- B. AIRLIFT OF TUNISIAN AND ZAMBIAN BATTALIONS OF 800 TROOPS EACH WITH THEIR STORES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE IN LOCATION 30 AUG AND 6 SEP RESPECTIVELY;
- C. AIRLIFT OF AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL COY OF 225 PERSONNEL SOONEST BEFORE THE 19/20 AUG 94. THEY ARE READY TO MOVE;
- D. AIRLIFT OF 50 X M113 APC BEING OFFERED TO UNAMIR FROM GERMAN FORCES FOR EITHER ZAMBIA OR TUNISIA BATTALIONS;
- E. AIRLIFT OF 40 x APCs BEING OFFERED TO UNAMIR BY ITALY;
- F. AIRLIFT OF BETWEEN 200 AND 300 TROOPS (COYS) EACH FROM NIGERIA, MALI AND MALAWI. MALAWI READY TO MOVE WITH BELGIQUE EQUIPMENT DURING THIRD/LAST WEEK OF AUG (RECCE PARTY HERE NOW). NIGERIA IS ALSO READY TO MOVE NOW. MALAWI IS NOT CLEAR ON DETAILS;
- G. 45 X LONG RANGE NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS FOR USE AT STATIC OBSERVATION POSTS. 55 X LIGHT INDIVIDUAL NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS FOR CHECK POINTS AND VULNERABLE POINT GUARDS;
- H. FOUR X LIGHT HELICOPTERS (LIGHTLY ARMED) WITH NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS FOR CONVOY OVER WATCH AND OBSERVATION TASKS;
- I. FOUR X UTH. (WITH TROOP LIFT MEDEVAC AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT CAPABILITIES);
- J. EQUIPMENT AND CAPABILITIES TO CONSTRUCT THREE X BAILEY BRIDGES OF 4 M, 12 M AND 20 M WIDE RESPECTIVELY;
- K. ENGR EQUIPMENT FOR GRAVEL/DIRT ROAD IMPROVEMENT TO INCLUDE GRADING AND CONSTRUCTION OF CULVERTS FOR A MAXIMUM OF 350 KM OF LATERAL ROADS BETWEEN MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES; AND
- L. FRAGMENTATION JACKETS AND HELMETS FOR ABOUT 3000 TROOPS.

16/11/94  
8-11

M. A FLEET OF APPROXIMATELY 120 1/4 TON TO 1 TON UTILITY VEHICLES (FIFTY PERCENT WITH SINGLE RADIO INSTALLATIONS AND A FLEET OF APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY FIVE 4 TO 5 TON CARGO VEHICLES OF WHICH 30 ARE TO BE FUEL AND/OR WATER BOWSERS. APPROXIMATELY 50 TRAILERS UTILITY OF 1 1/2 TON CAPACITY. THESE VEHICLES WILL ENHANCE THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS FIRST LINE LOGISTIC LIFT CAPABILITIES.

GPB

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
OPS BRANCH

15 Oct 94

3000.4(CASO)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF AIR OPS CELL OPERATION

1. You are hereby directed to prepare a plan to hand over the responsibilities to the Rwandan authorities and a plan to gradually reduce the Air Ops Cell manning and operation. You may discuss the matter with the appropriate authority as soon as possible.
2. The activities of the Air Ops Cell should be closed no later than 31 Oct 94. However, a MILOB Team comprising of approximately 3 MILOBs should be deployed at KIA for observing, monitoring and liaising on behalf of UNAMIR. You are requested to discuss the matter with MILOB HQ for the command and control relationship of this team.
3. It is requested to ensure that remainder of MILOBs of the Air Ops Cell are returned to MILOB HQ for reassignment after completion of handing over their present responsibilities.

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Air Ops UNAMIR, KIA

Info:

DFC/COS

CMO/MILOB Gp HQ

*DCOS OPS*  
*I would like a briefing*  
*on this*  
*fyi*  
*16/10/94*  
*DFC/OPS*

*[Signature]*  
J. ARP  
Col  
DCOS OPS

*for copy fwd to*  
*DCOS OPS as directed*  
*9*  
*16/10*

*15/10*

618

MEMORANDUM

9760-1

11 Oct 94

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE CANSIGS EOD TEAM

1. Responsibilities:

- a. Capt GL Deveau (MILE) is responsible to provide emergency EOD capabilities to CANSIGS.
- b. Assisting will be 1 x MCpl (MOC 041) and 3 x Cpl (MOC 041).
- c. The CANSIGS EOD Team will provide clearance capabilities and disposal of mines, booby traps and UXO in any CANSIGS area of operation.

2. Taskings:

- a. CANSIGS EOD Team will be tasked only by the Commander of Canadian Contingent in conjunction with the Commanding Officer of 1 Canadian Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment.
- b. Any requirement outside of CANSIGS area of operation will be considered a dire emergency only, and only if no other contingent EOD Team is available to provide assistance.

M. E. Hanrahan  
LCol  
CO  
1 CDHSR

Dist List

Action:	Info:
Comd CC	AUSMED
DFC/COS	Ghanbatt

File *the* *SL* *ms 18/10*

MA  
What is Ghanbatt's  
reply? see me.  
// 7/9  
16/10  
DFC/WR

Sir,  
Ghan Batt has  
responded and  
you are yet to  
receive a reply.  
the  
in

2  
12/10



MEMORANDUM

27 Sept 94

Distribution List

TASKING AND TERMS OF REFERENCE OF EOD TEAMS

1. Contingents COs are kindly requested to send terms of reference of their EOD teams to this HQ. I hope that clarification of the matter will eliminate confusions about who is entitled to task contingents EOD teams and which type of tasks is allowed to be carried out by them.

2. Regards.

*J. Arp*  
J. Arp  
COL  
D COS OPS

DISTRIBUTION LIST

<u>Action</u>	<u>Info</u>
AUSMED	DFC/COS
CANSIGS	
GHANBATT	

② Opst  
Action.

MTIS  
May  
Opst  
30 Oct 94.

③ NTP  
copy pass  
to engr o  
curating detail  
EF  
Opst  
1 Oct 94

9/8

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G2 Cell  
HQ UNAMIR

10 Oct 94

G2/6000

See Distribution

LIST OF ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

1. The following list of alleged war criminals appeared in the newspaper "Imbaga y'Urwanda" on 3 Oct 94 under the heading "Genocide in Rwanda WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?"

a) Administrators

<u>Names</u>	<u>Positions</u>
1. Rhigiria Enoch	Presidence - Member Escadron de la mort
2. Sindikubwabo Theodore	President (former) CND
3. Agatha Habyarimana	Wife of late Habyarimana
4. Kambanda Jean	PM- MDR Power
5. Munyazensa Faustin	Minister - Inter. & Member Escadron de la mort
6. Ntamabyariro Agnes	Minister - Justice
7. Mugenzi Justin	Minister - Commerce & Trade
8. Bizimana Augustin	Minister - Defence & Member Escadron de la mort
9. Niyitegeka Eliezer	Minister - Info
10. Ruhumuriza Gasparo	Minister of Mineto
11. Habineza Jean de Deiu	Minister of Minitraso
12. Bizimumgu Casimir	Minister of Health
13. Ngirabatware Augustin	Minister of Miniplan
14. Bicamumpaka Jerome	Minister of Foreign Affairs
15. Ntagerura Andrew	Minister of Minitransco
16. Mbangura Andrew	Minister of Minesupres
17. Mugiraneza Prosper	Minister of Minifope
18. Mbonanpeka Stanislas	Ex-minister Justice
19. Nyiramansuhuko Paulina	Minister - Women Affairs
20. Nsabumbukunzi Staraton	Minister - Minigri
21. Rwamakuba Andre	Minister - Miniprisee
22. Nkundabahinzi Emmanuel	Minister - Minifin
23. Nahimana Ferdinand	Ex-orinfor- Member Escadron de la Mort
24. Nzabonimana Callixte	Minister of Mijeuma
25. Nahimana Theoneste	Minifin - Member Politicians
26. Barayagwiza Jean Bosco	Minaffet - CDR & Member Escadron de la mort
27. Bagaragaza Michel	OCIR - THE - Member Escadron de la mort
28. Musabe Pasteur	BACAR - Member Escadron de la mort

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10/10/94

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29. Uwiringiyimana Juvenal	ORTN - Member Escadron de la mort
30. Nyandwi Charles	DEPUTE Kigali - Member Escadron de la mort
31. Munyampundu	DEPUTE Kibuye - Member Escadron de la mort
32. Mme Karwera Sperancie	Presidence - MRND - Member Escadron de la mort
33. Karemera Edward	Ex-Secretary General MRND - Member Escadron de la mort
34. Mugesera Leon	MRND - Member Escadron de la mort
35. Kabagema Ferdinand	MRND - Vice Chairman
36. Ngirumpatse Mathieu	MRND President
37. Barahinyura Shyirambere	Exile in Germany
38. Nzabagerageza Charles	Ninitrasco
39. Nzirodera Joseph	MRND - Secretary General
40. Col Simba Aloys	MRND - Gikongoro
41. Nteziryayo Simeon	MRND - Cyangugu
42. Banzi Wellars	MRND - Gisenyi
43. Ruzindana Agustin	MRND (ex Governor Central Bank)
44. Bicomupaka Jean Bosco	MRND - Ruhengeri
45. Murengo Donat	MDR - Extremist
46. Karamira Froduald	MDR - Extremist
47. Mpamo Esdras	MRND - Extremist
48. Rutaganda Georgies	MRND - Kigali
49. Mupende	President CDR Kacyiru
50. Samvura B.	CDR - Gisenyi
51. Claude	President MRND Kacyiru
52. Nsengiyumva Rafiki	Minitrape Member PSD
53. Ndugutse Francois	PSD
54. Semanza Laurent	MRND Kigali - Ex-bourg Bicumbi
55. Hategekimana Samuel	MRND Kigali - Ex-bourg Ngendo Youth Wingers (Militia)
56. Phenias Rhumuliza	Interahamwe Leader Kgl
57. Kayonde Enoch	Interahamwe Leader Kgl
58. Kajuga Robert	Interahamwe Chairman National
59. Hangimana F. Xavier	MDR - Extrimist Kigali
60. Karekezi Amry	Nyamirambo (Interahamwe)
61. Ndayitabi Swedi	Nyamirambo (Interhamwe)
62. Gitonga Gihungu Hadji	Gitega-Kigali
63. Gashirabake (Feresi)	Gitega-Kigali
64. Gakuba Eugene Claude	Kacyiru-Kigali
65. Turatsinze J. Croix	Kicukiro-Kigali (CDR)
66. Kibata Ksuma	Biryongo
67. Turatsinze	Nyamirambo

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b) Territorial Administrators

68. Col Renzaho Tharcisse	✓ Prefect Kigali Ville- Member Escadron de la Mort
69. Bizimungu Come	✓ Ex Prefect Kigali rural
70. Karera Francois	✓ Prefect Kigali rural & Membre Escadron de la mort
71. Bucyibaruta Laurent	Prefect Kigongoro
72. Bagambiki Emmaneul	Prefect Kikongoro
73. Kayishema Clement	Prefect Kibuye
74. Habiya mbere Joseph	Prefect Gisenyi
75. Bariyanga Sylvestre	Ex-Prefect Ruhengeri- Membre Escadron de la mort
76. Ruzindana Godefroid	Ex-Prefect Kibungo
77. Rudakubana Anaclet	Prefect Kibungo
78. Rugambarara Juvenal	Bourgmaster Bicumbi
79. Bizimana Jean	Bourgmaster Nyarugenge
80. P. Claver	Bourgmaster Kachiru
81. Twizeyimana	Bourgmaster Mbogo
82. Hitimana Alexandre	Bourgmaster Shyorongi
83. Rusatsi Donatien	Bourgmaster Mugambazi
84. Balinda Theoneste	Bourgmaster Rutongo
85. Rureranganizi Valens	Bourgmaster Rubungo
86. Ntviuma Francois	Bourgmaster Gashora
87. Ruberangondo Stonislas	Bourgmaster Butamwa
88. Bisengiman Paul	Bourgmaster Gikoro
89. Karenkenzi Jean C.	Bourgmaster Tare
90. Kanyamibwa A.	S/Prefect Murambi
91. Sekagina Fuastin	S/Prefect Rushashi & Member Escadron de la mort
92. Bishokaninkindi Mathias	Bourgmaster Nyabikenke
93. Habarugira J.B.	Bourgmaster Taba
94. Habimana Bonaventure	Ex-Secretary General MRND
95. Nkurunziza Emmanuel	Bourgmaster Mugina
96. Semanyenzi Straton	Bourgmaster Kigembe
97. Gasana J.B.	Bourgmaster Kigembe
98. Ngiruwonsanga Vincent	Bourgmaster Nyabisindu
99. Habumugisha Micheal	S/Prefect Nyabisindu
100. Ndikumana Origeme	Bourgmaster Kivu
101. Sibomana Boniface	Bourgmaster Nshili
102. Biniga Damien	S/Prefect Munini
103. Gatabazi Emmanuel	Bourgmaster Gatara
104. Mayira Mathias	Bourgmaster Kirambo
105. Sewabeza J.P.	Bourgmaster Kagano
106. Mubirigi Justin Napoleon	Bourgmaster Kamembe
107. Gakwaya Callixte	Bourgmaster Gisuma
108. Natete Fulgence	Bourgmaster Karengera
109. Habiya mbere Fabien	Bourgmaster Cyimbogo
110. Rwanzegushira Juvenal	Bourgmaster Kivumu
111. Bugingo Joseph	Bourgmaster Gisovu-Kibuye
112. Simbizi Stanis	V/Chairman CDR
113. Bakive J.B.	Bourgmaster Mutura-Gisenyi

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114. Butsingiri Alphonse	Bourgmaster Rwerere-Gisenyi
115. Bangamwabo	Bourgmaster Giciye-Gisenyi
116. Zibukira C.	Bourgmaster Gaseke-Gisenyi
117. Nzabanita Theogene	Bourgmaster Ramba-Gisenyi
118. Karemera Egide	Bourgmaster Nyamyumba-Gisenyi
119. Maburakindi Isidore	Bourgmaster Kirilira-Gisenyi
120. Sindibona V.	Bourgmaster Kibilira-Gisenyi
121. Rukabukira Ildephonse	S/Prefect Ngororero-Gisenyi
122. Kajerijeri Juvenal	Bourgmaster Mukingo-Ruhengeri Membre Escadron de la mort
123. Mpiranyi Mathias	Bourgmaster Ruhondo-Ruhengeri
124. Nsabimana J.B.	Bourgmaster Ruhondo-Ruhengeri
125. Munyazesa E.	Bourgmaster Cyeru-Ruhengeri
126. Gatete Jean Baptiste	Ex-Bourgmaster Murambi-Byumba, Membre Escadron de la mort
127. Bizimana J. Baptiste	Bourgmaster Rutonde-Kibungo
128. Mutambaruka Sylvain	Bourgmaster Sake-Kibungo
129. Tahimana Melchiade	Bourgmaster-Rukira-Kibungo
130. Niyonshuti Moise	Bourgmaster Rukira-Kibungo
131. Col Bagasora Theoneste	Membre Escadron de la mort
132. Col Buregeya Bonav	Member of Escadron de la mort
133. Col Nsengiyumva Anatole	Member of Escadron de la mort
134. Capt Simbikangwa Pascal	Member of Escadron de la mort
135. Lt Bizumuremyi	Member Escadron de la mort
136. Col Rwagafilita C.	Member Escadron de la mort Retired from the Army
137. Maj Karangwa G2 GN	Retired from the Army
138. Maj Magenzi (Presidence)	Gendarmerie
139. Col Serubuga	Retired from the Army
140. Major Mpiranyi Protais	Presidential guard
141. Capt Murenzi Evariste	Presidential Guard
142. Col Bizimungu Augustin	Chef D'Etat Major
143. Col Kabiligi Gratien	CMDR Rhengeri Zone
144. MGen Ndindiliyimana	Head Gendarmerie
145. Col Rutayisire	Head Intelligence Gendarmerie
146. Maj Mugemana Theo	Presidence
147. Maj Barihenda August	COMDR BN Gako
148. LCol Nkundiye Leo	COMDR OPNS Mutara
149. Col Muberuka Felicien	COMDR OPNS Kigali
150. LCol Nzabanita Inn	Camp Colonel Mayuya
151. Zigiranyirazo Protais	Brother-in-law of late

UN UNCLASSIFIED

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152. Rwabukumba Seraphin

153. Mr. Ntirivamunda  
Alphonse

President Habyariman  
Brother-in-law of late  
President Habyarimana  
Related to late  
Habyarimana RTLM Share-  
holder

c) Others

154. Kabuga Felicien

155. Ngeze Hassan

156. Bamwanga Jean Baptiste

157. Kantano Habimana

158. Hitimana Noel

159. Gahigi Gaspard

160. Hatari Augustin

161. Basabose Pierre

162. Sekamonyo

163. Kalimunda Pierre

164. Munyampeta Gabriel

165. Mbyaliyehe Gabriel

166. Nteziryayo Simeon

167. Nsabimana Sylvane

168. Uwizeye Fidele

169. Dr. Zirimwabagabo

Charles

170. Nsabumugisha Basile

171. Nyirimibibi Elie

172. Kagimbagabo Andre

173. Bagaragaza Micheal

174. Higaniro Alphonse

175. Bikindi Simon

176. Jyambubandi J. Bosco

177. Kazare Faustin

178. Mukama Reverien

179. Bizumungu Telesphore

180. Dr. Rwamucho Eugene Prof

181. Buroko Ernest

182. Karamira J. Bosco

183. Nyirabagenzi

184. Ndamiye J.C.

Businessman KGL - Purchased  
RTLM

Kangura Newspaper Staff &  
Chief Editor

Radio Rwanda

RTLM

RTLM

RTLM

Radio Rwanda

Businessman-Kigali

Businessman-Kigali

Businessman-Kigali

Businessman-Kigali

Businessman-Kigali

Businessman-Kigali &

Director Sonarwa

Now Prefect Butare

Now Prefect Gitarama

Now Prefect Gitarama

Now Prefect Gisenyi

Now Prefect Byumba

Ex-Prefect Cyangugu

Director Ocic, Escadron  
de la mort

Director Sorwal

Irindiro Culture Troop,  
CDR

Deptue MRND-Kibungo

Mineprisec-Byumba

Attorney General

RTLM Shareholder -BP  
699 Kigali

UNR Butare - RTLM  
Shareholder

BP 198 Kigali - RTLM  
Shareholder

C/O ORINFOR/TV-RTLM  
Shareholder

BP 27 Kigali-RTLM  
Shareholder

BP 479 Kigali - RTLM  
Shareholder

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
185. Sebatware Marcel (Ingenieur)	BP 644 Kigali - RTLM Shareholder
186. Kazungu Gaspard	BP 21 Cyangugu-RTLM Shareholder
187. Mushimiyimana	BP 1876 Kigali-RTLM Shareholder
188. Kabonabake Thomas	Journalist RTLM
189. Bemeriki Valeri	Journalist RTLM
190. Rucogoza Emmanuel	Journalist RTLM
191. Habyarimana Jean	President Interahamwe Kigali Tow
192. Major Ndekezi	Ops Kibungo
193. Lt Karekezi Baturatura	Ops Kibungo
194. Nzabandora Celestin	CDR Lawyer
195. Hategekimana Jean	President tribunal lere Instance Kigali
196. Ntahomvukiye Simon	President Cour D'Appel Kigali
197. Misago Antoine	CDR (Comite)
198. Karushara Rose	Conseilleur MRND Kimisagara
199. Nkulikiye	President Interahamwe Muhima
200. Mme Habyarimana	Mama Euphorsine Conseiller MRND Muhima
201. Kamana Claver	Entrepreneur
202. Sebulikoko Celestin	Entrepreneur
203. Mpamba Jean	Bourgmestre Rukara-Kibungo
204. Nkurunziza Claude	Bourgmestre-Muhazi
205. Habimana Chrysante	MDR-Mugesera
206. Ngirabatware Venant	Businessman Kigali
207. Ngirabatware Aloys	Businessman Kigali
208. Gatarama Alphonse	Businessman Kigali
209. Tegera Pierre	PNAP-Ruhengeri
210. Major Ngira	Ex-OPS Byumba
211. Hategekimana Damascene	Director General Caisse Sociale
212. Mumyemana Justin	Conseiller Juridique a la Presidence
213. Ntirigirimbabzi Denis du Rwanda	Gouverneur, Banque Nationale
214. Mvuyekure	Director General Banque Commerciale du Rwanda
215. Kalinganire Joseph	Professeur Universite Nationale du Rwanda, Membre Forum, Paix et Democratie
216. Nsabimana Alexis	Professeur Universite Nationale du Rwanda, President PRD (Parti du Renouveau Democratique) et membre de Forum Paix et Democratie

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217. Shingiro Mbonyumutwa	MDR Extrimist
218. Nyirasafari Guadence	Director General ONAPO
219. Nkurunziza Andre	Marfot & RTLM
220. Runyinya Barbwiliza	Conseiller Presidency

It is stressed that the above list of names comes from a newspaper report and can not be relied upon to be accurate, however, it is interesting to note that of the 220 names listed only 25 are members of the former RGF or gendarmarie.

  
S H MOORHOUSE  
Capt  
For FC

Distribution:

External:

Information:

Human Rights

Internal:

Information:

MA/FC

MA/DFC & COS

DCOS Ops

List D

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9/8

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Minute

From: Col J Arp  
DCOS Ops  
HQ UNAMIR

Ext No: 11186

To: DFC/COS

Date: 10 Oct 94

Subject: OP HOMEWARD AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. As per your request at the morning brief today, Maj. Mullarkey has produced a synopsis of lessons learned re Op Homeward.
2. I believe that we should pursue a follow on plan for after the rainy season(s). The next version should be designed and coordinated by the SRSG's office in order to devise a strategic plan that includes BBGNU and RPA support, direction to UNREO, support from NGOs, a coordinated information campaign and minute to minute C<sup>2</sup> by an UNAMIR HQ such as Tac (or the "son of Tac").
3. Request your views and the FC prior to pursuing version #2 of my brain child, providing we continue to have transportation resources that we can devote to it in the future.

(2)

DCOS OPS

I agree entirely with your line of thinking. I am forwarding it to FC for his views. I hope you have by now received my comments on the report from TAC HQ.

11/10

DFC/COS

Col

(1)

FC

May we have your views please

11/10

DFC/COS



UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.1.2 (G3 PLANS)

To: DCOS Ops

From: G3 Plans 3

Re: G3 Plans  
Tac HQ  
HAC  
BRITCON  
Information Consultant

Date: 7 Oct 94

Subject: OP HOMEWARD - COMMENTS

Reference: Tac HQ Op HOMEWARD report dated 29 Sep 94.

---

#### GENERAL

1. You asked for comment on Ref A and Op HOMEWARD:
2. The paper reflects accurately the dynamics of Op HOMEWARD and the difficulties which Tac HQ staff have addressed and largely overcome. As an exercise in military C2 and in giving a clear demonstration to NGOs of UNAMIR's commitment, Op HOMEWARD was highly successful, under the circumstances.

#### COMMENTS

m. While the aim quoted was to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of DPs, the overarching point of the operation was to encourage many others to walk home. Despite the obstacles, discussed below, it is now clear that the chances of a strategic effect developing from a low-level tactical aim, is little more than wishful thinking. To generate the type of result desired, high-level direction and the coordination of assets at national-strategic level would be required. While it is accepted that there will never be "Unity of Command", much greater coordination of resources, backed by wholehearted UN commitment, will be needed before any real impact can be anticipated. This is a blunt lesson.

4. Timing. The timing of Op HOMEWARD was dictated by the availability of transport, which generated the offer of support to the UNHCR and the NGOs. In retrospect, the timing could not have been more inappropriate. The operation began the week after the rainy season was expected - that it arrived late merely provided a short period in which some progress could be made. It now seems that few people would wish to move home so close to the start of the rainy season. Crop planting is less effective now; the comfort of the camps contrasts sharply with the (many) uncertainties of returning home - this must be a major consideration before the long rainy season.

5. Other Constraints. Other constraints on the success of the operation as originally envisaged were:

a. Staging. Slow RPA clearance procedures, in most areas, coupled with our own constraints on operating at night meant that staging was required, even for relatively short moves. This effectively caused a one day move on occasions to extend to two days, halving the lift capacity. There are two points of interest:

(1). The RPA are clearly not universally supportive of the operation. Their contribution is at best desultory. This lack of commitment is inconsistent, with the UN effort.

(2). The "Concern" Way Station at Butare is inadequate for the task. Either the capacity should be increased or an alternative opened by another NGO. This constraint (coupled to RPA intransigence) can drive the capacity of the whole operation. If a larger operation is ever to succeed, the highest resource priority must be allocated by NGOs to these "bottlenecks".

b. Commodity Distribution. NGO concerns that inadequate reception arrangements were in place limited the number of personnel that UNHCR was prepared to sponsor. That NGOs must shift their emphasis from the camps to the home communes in order to provide reception arrangements - seeds and tools, food, water and medical supplies, is self evident. Equally, it is clear that they have no intention of doing so - it is much easier to service a centralised camp, than to administer an agrarian commune. Changing the NGO perception of this problem has to become a major UN priority, or the UNHCR will never sanction plans to move large numbers of people, by vehicle or on foot.

c. Efficiency. The total system can only sustain a limited throughput. Limitations on UNHCR registration, convoy capacity, RPA checkpoint procedures, and reception arrangements, within daylight and/or staging limitations will inevitably reduce efficiency. Nevertheless, to accomplish even the limited success so far, has been a major achievement.


6. Cooperation. Op HOMEWARD has demonstrated to the civilian agencies the advantages of flexible military C2. That progress has been made here is of immense significance, and to retain the trust of these organisations, a wider plan needs to be developed as soon as possible. We should use the current rainy season to plan a larger operation between December and March.

7. Information Operations. By far the most important lesson arising out of Op HOMEWARD is the control of information. We must foster a proper understanding of the communication mechanisms at work in Rwanda's Oral Society. The development of an

information strategy is the most pressing need, and the support of UNHCR and UNREO will be critical for success. There is universal agreement on this point within UNAMIR and we must capitalise on what we have learnt thus far.

8. Conclusion. Op HOMEWARD, although of limited success, has been very useful. It has provided evidence to the NGOs of UNAMIR's capability to coordinate complex projects. More important, it has demonstrated several areas in which improvements must be made if subsequent operations are to succeed. In summary these are:

- a. Central strategic direction is required if DP repatriation is to be achieved on a large scale.
- b. We should use the rainy season to plan a major effort in the New Year.
- c. Throughput is dependant on the efficiency of certain bottlenecks, which must be improved.
- d. NGO perceptions on their role in the repatriation plan must be changed. Op HOMEWARD has gone some way to developing a relationship in which this point could be driven home.
- e. Understanding and utilising the characteristics of the Oral Society, through information operations is the key to further progress.



T A P MULLARKEY  
Maj  
G3 Plans 3





## UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE OPERATION IN RWANDA

### INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

**TO:** CSS

**INFO:** A/FC AND DCOS Sp

**FROM:** Maj Plante *Plante*

**DATE:** 10 OCT 94

**SUBJECT:** UNAMIR MP COMPANY

**REF:** My Memo of 7 OCT 94

1. Further to my memo of 7 Oct 94, I now realize that I have forgotten some very important items regarding the formation of the UNAMIR MP Coy. Please note the following additional requirements:

- a. three Traffic Investigation Accident Kits;
- b. one Drug Identification/Investigation Kit;
- c. dozens of "accident/emergency scene flares";
- d. ten Traffic Control fluorescent vests;
- e. "POLICE TAPE" use to seal-off crime scene areas;
- f. 10 flashlights;
- g. 50 UN MP Armbands; and
- h. 50 Police Notebooks;

2. Your cooperation is appreciated.

*Senji*  
10/10  
DTC/wo

2  
G/H



## UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE OPERATION IN RWANDA

### INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

**TO:** A/FC  
**INFO:** FC, DCOS Sp  
**FROM:** Maj Plante, Force Provost Marshal *Plante*  
**DATE:** 7 OCT 94  
**SUBJECT:** UNAMIR MP COY  
**REF:** MY MEMO OF 7 OCT 94

1. As stated at ref, the formation of a UNAMIR MP Coy is in progress. While the logistical requirements are being looked after, the question of MP personnel remains to be adequately addressed.

2. At the present time I have the following MPs:

- a. Nigeria 10; and
- b. Ghana 2 (I must have more)

3. In order to have a credible and efficient Military Police Force, all or at least most of the contributing contingents must have MPs as part as the MP Company. Consequently, MPs from Australia, UK, Canada, Ethiopia and other contingents must be temporarily attached to the MP Company. Later on, upon the arrival of permanent MPs for the company, those policemen could then be returned to their respective contingents. As an urgent basis, they must also be given the necessary powers which are outlined in the Force Commander's Policy Directive which I prepared concerning the various powers required for the UNAMIR MP personnel.

*See above on  
File 110  
13/14*

4. While I appreciate and understand that some Contingent Commanders may have reservations, not to say outright reticence, in providing MPs, on a temporary basis, to UNAMIR HQ, they must understand that the priority of the Mission is more important than their respective contingent. Moreover, I can assure you, that based on my experience (with four UN MP Companies), the company will experience major difficulties unless we have representation from the major contingents.

5. Police business is very delicate and as an example, take the case where we could have two Nigerian MPs interpellating one or more drunken soldiers or officers from one or more contingents. Such situations could very quickly degenerate into trouble for everyone. Even more so if the Shift Commander is also from Nigeria. Yet, this MP Force must get operational very soon.

6. Submitted for your consideration, Sir.

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

FROM: FC

TO: DFC  
DCOS OPS  
DCOS SP  
DCMO  
HAO  
UNCIVPOL  
CLO  
FMO  
MA TO FC  
MILITARY SPOKESPERSON


INFO: SRSG

DATE: 07 OCT 94

SUBJECT: MANIPULATION OF INFORMATION SEMINAR

1. Due to the ever changing situation in a bureaucratic environment such as ours, I request all action addressees to attend a one hour seminar, given by Mr Nick Harman, on the manipulation of information.

2. The Seminar will take place in the UNAMIR conference room at 1330 hours 13 Oct 94.



GC TOUSIGNANT  
MGen  
Force Commander

MA

Remind me  
J. G. L.

10/10  
DFC/LOS

8/10  
6-8



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE OPERATION IN RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: A/FC

INFO: FC, CSS, DCOS Sp

FROM: Maj Plante , Force Provost Marshal *Plante*

DATE: 7 OCT 94

SUBJECT: UNAMIR MP COY

REFS : A: CONVERSATION MAJ PLANTE, MR HORNSBY CSS , AND  
MR ETSSELL ENGINEERING SERVICES, 6 OCT 94

B: OUTGOING FAX 1447 OF 27 AUG 94

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1. I have been tasked by the FC to organize a UNAMIR MP Company. Furthermore, the company has to be operational as soon as possible, at least with a small MP element capable to conduct criminal/security/administrative investigations as well as being able to respond to contingent requests 24/7. We already have a back log of pending cases waiting to be investigated.

2. At the present time, I have been given 13 MP all from Ghana and Nigeria. Needless to say that in order to have a balanced Military Police Force, I will urgently require MPs from all other contingents now serving with UNAMIR. Ref B, which is UNAMIR's formal request to UNNY for the formation and implementation of a MP Coy must be pushed very hard specially in the light of the FC's comments made on the morning of 7 Oct 94.

3. As soon as I receive the basic required logistical support, (I will address specific requirements in paras 4 and 5), I will

*DFG*



implement the following procedures at least pending the arrival of the remaining members of the company:

- a. two criminal, security and administrative investigation teams to immediately begin investigating the most urgent pending cases;
- b. two mobile patrol teams, capable to respond to emergencies on a 24/7 basis as well conducting patrols throughout Kigali and wherever the need would be;
- c. an administrative cell to process all the paper work; and
- d. a small headquarters headed by the Force Provost Marshal (intensive police liaison will have to be conducted).

4. in order to get the nucleus of the company operational, the following items are our most immediate requirements:

- a. a police station/headquarters in Kigali: (as discussed at Ref A, we are in the process of identifying a suitable building):
- b. living quarters for MPs: (as per para 4 a.);
- c. vehicles: we have an immediate requirement for five radio equipped vehicles, two for the criminal investigation teams, two for the mobile patrol teams and one for the administration cell;
- d. communication equipment: three radio base stations in the police headquarters:
  - a. one for the company HQ;
  - b. one for the criminal/security/administration section;
  - c. one for the patrol section; and
  - d. We will also require five Handi Talkie radio set for our investigation/patrol teams;
- e. ADP equipment: four computer terminals to be used as follows:

- (1) patrolmen;
- (2) investigators;
- (3) administration staff/clerk; and

(4) Company HQ.

- f. furniture: enough to furnish nine offices;
- g. stationary, proper UN Military Police Forms for Statements, etc: I have already received the basic "police forms" from the Canadian Contingent MPs; and
- h. UNAMIR Military Police Identification Card.

5. The following police equipment will have to be purchased:

- a. police emergency flashing lights;
- b. sirens;
- c. Crime Scene Police Identification Kit (this is to identify and lift fingerprints etc);
- d. metal handcuffs;
- e. plastic retaining handcuffs;
- f. two camera:
  - (1) Polaroid type for minor cases such; and
  - (2) a good .35 MM for serious criminal cases.
- g. one police radar;

Note: I would be available at any time, if need be, to provide guidance on the technical aspect required for some of that equipment.

6. Radio Frequency. Because of the nature of our work, the MP Company will eventually require the use of its own radio frequency.

7. As discussed at Ref A, Mr Hornsby has been very receptive to my verbal requests and he is awaiting to receive the degree of priority that you wish to give to the creation of the MP Company. Following your guidance, Mr Hornsby will do its utmost to action my requirements.

8. For those who would be tempted to assume that there is no urgency in getting this MP organization off the ground, one only has to drive in and around Kigali after 2200 hrs or speak to the military guards employed at our various barriers.

9. Please note that members of the MP Company must not be treated second to the CIVPOL organization.

10. Submitted for your action, Sir.



File No 5000.8 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: DFC/COS *Hick*

Date: 6 Oct 94

Subject: OFFICER TRAINING - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT(ROE)

Reference: A. HQUNAMIR SOP, SECTION 9, OPDIR NO. 2 ROE  
dated 6 Oct 94

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1. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the means by which the UN can provide to commanders at all levels the political and legal direction and guidance on the use of force by UN personnel. It follows that the staff must also have a clear understanding of ROE. To this end, a one hour period of training for all UNAMIR staff officers will be conducted on Sunday 16 Oct 94.

2. Addressees are requested to ensure maximum attendance. Training will commence at 1130 hours in HQ UNAMIR TV room.

3. Attendees are encouraged to read the Reference prior to the training session.

Distribution List

Action

DCOS OPS  
DCOS SP  
FMO  
MA/FC  
FSO

Info

FC

G-8  
1000.3(MA)

7 Oct 94

COS

TERMS OF REFERENCE - FORCE COMMANDER'S OFFICE

Reference:

A. UNAMIR Force Standard Operating Procedures.

1. Below are draft TORs for FC's office for inclusion in Force SOPs.
2. Military Assistant (MA). The MA is FC's personal staff officer. He is to provide advice on the conduct of military operations within the context of Security Council Resolutions. He is to accompany the Commander on meetings and visits as required. He is to monitor and control the flow of staff work affecting the Commander. He is authorised to draft matters of policy for staffing, and to sign routine correspondence on the Commander's behalf. In the course of his duties he is to maintain close liaison with SRSg's and CAO's staff, HAC, CIVPOL and HQ Milob. He is to provide advice on protocol to the Commander and his staff. He is to supervise the Commander's retinue.
3. A/MA and Visits Officer. A/MA is to assist MA and assume his responsibilities in his absence. To this end he is to maintain a current understanding of the political and military situation and be prepared to give advice to the Commander. Routinely A/MA is principally responsible for the coordination of all visits to UNAMIR. Prior to arranging a visit, he is to receive guidance from MA. For visits by contributing states' military staff to their contingents he is to liaise with the sponsor officer over HQ UNAMIR controlled facilities and Command briefings, and be responsible for the coordination of their delivery. For visits by UN, external political or military figures, he is to liaise with the Chief Protocol Officer and coordinate the provision of the military and security aspect of the visit. On the provision of aircraft and security he is to operate under guidance from D Cos Ops. A/MA is to be assisted by a Visits Warrant Officer. He is to supervise that officer's work.
4. Visits Warrant Officer (VWO). The VWO is to work under the direction of A/MA. He is responsible for the detailed coordination of visits. He is to carry out the duties of Office quartermaster, and is responsible for the material state of the office spaces and furniture. In the course of this he will maintain a furniture register and building maintenance record. He will also assist within the Force Commander's



Office as required.

5. Public Affairs Officer (PAffO). The PAffO is responsible for providing the Commander with advice on the public affairs impact and applications inherent in planned and implemented operations. He is to inform the Commander on public affairs policy directives as they affect UNAMIR, and comply with them. He is to liaise closely with the UNAMIR Spokesman, and is authorised to brief press and media on the military aspects of UNAMIR's operations and the application of military force. In the course of this he is to anticipate and to respond to media needs. He is also to disseminate public affairs information to the military element of UNAMIR. He is to ensure that information for public dissemination is reviewed for compliance with security and policy requirements. He is to liaise with media representatives, to provide them access as appropriate, escorts and transport on such occasions as the military situation dictates. He is to prepare the public affairs portion of operational plans, orders and SOPs.


6. Executive Assistant (EA). The EA is to be prepared to undertake such special projects as the Commander requires. In this regard he is to maintain a working knowledge of all staff areas and the operational situation. He is also to be prepared to assume the responsibilities of other members of the Commander's Office in their absence.

7. Aide de Campe (ADC). The ADC will perform such duties as the Commander directs. He is to provide for the personal well-being and security of the Commander, relieving him of trivial duties so that the Commander can concentrate on the duties of his office. He is to prepare and organise the Commander's programme. He is to organise and oversee the itinerary of any trip undertaken by the Commander, and accompany him when required. He is to assist MA in the reception and hosting of visitors to the headquarters, and is to be responsible for the reception and hosting of visitors at the Commander's Residence. He is to assist in the coordination of protocol activities, as they affect the Commander. He is to supervise the Commander's other personal staff, including driver, bodyguard and house manager. He is responsible for supervising the control and maintenance of the Commander's vehicles, and for the prompt reporting of building defects at his Residence.

8. Personal Assistant (PA). The PA is responsible for the production of such documents and letters as the Commander requires, from transcripts, notes or dictation. She is to record and file all written material that passes through the Commander's Office. She is responsible for maintaining

the Commander's schedule, and is the point of contact within the headquarters for enquiries in that regard. She is responsible for the translation of material as necessary and is to oversee the work of the Commander's translator. She is to provide the Commander's Office advice on the organisation of the civilian administration, to facilitate the staff process. She is to advise the Commander on terms of employment of civilian staff.

9. Outer Office NCO. The Outer Office NCO is responsible for the initial reception of any caller to the Commander's Office. She is to man the counter and take telephone and personal calls as necessary. She is to identify any visitor, inform the appropriate office, and escort the person to the office. She is responsible for the dispatch and collection of internal mail, and to this end is to carry out regular checks on all mail trays. She will assist the Office with typing and reproduction of papers as required. She is responsible for the production of graphical support for presentations. To this end she is to be capable of operating computer graphic programs. She is responsible for the appearance and tidiness of the Commander's Conference Room and Waiting Room.



F HADDOW  
Lt Col RM  
MA to FC

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDE0011 2761950-UUUU--UCCVVDA UCCVVDB.

ZNR UUUUU

P 031948Z OCT 94

FM UCCVVDE/GHANBATT HQ//GIKWNGLOD

TO UCCVVDA/FORCE HQ/KIGALI//G3 PLANS

INFO UC#yVDB/FORCE TAC HQ/BUTARE//G3 OPS

UCCVVDA/GHANCON HQ//KIGALI

BT

UNCLAS GH1/235/G(OPS)

SUBJECT: TAKING OVER OF CHAD COY AO.

PLEASE BE INFO GHANBATT PRESENTLY STRETCHED IN VIEW OF PRESENT  
DEPLOYMENT IN SECTOR 4A AND SECTOR 2. ADVISE CHAD AO BE TAKEN  
OVER BY ZAMBATT AFTER RELIEF IN PLACE COMPLETED BETWEEN GHANBATT  
AND ZAMBATT////

BT

#0011

Received 10-03-1994 20:04 46

ZEU-2006

5/10



FILE

DATE: 1 October 1994  
REF: 1000.7(DFC)/G/8

TO: Force Commander  
Executive Director

INFO: DCOS OPS

FROM: MA to DFC/COS *[Signature]*  
*[Signature]*

SUBJECT: DETAILS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DFC/COS  
SATURDAY, 1 OCT 1994

1. Yesterday, 30 Sep 1994, the DFC and his delegation visited Mungaga refugee camp in Goma. The population of Mungaga camp is estimated to be 200,000, including an undetermined number of RGF soldiers and their families. The RGF commanders were not present in the camp at the time of the DFC's visit. However, the delegation did meet with some young men who are acting as the Prefects of the camp.

2. The delegation held discussions with the Prefects lasting about two and a half to three hours. Issues discussed related to the general security of refugees in the camp and the possibility of repatriation to Rwanda. The Prefects informed the delegation of the following:

- a. They do not want the RGF soldiers in the camp to be separated from the civilians;
- b. If there is any repatriation, both civilians and soldiers should be repatriated together;
- c. Schools have been opened in the camp;
- d. A Security Commission, comprising the young men in the camp, has been set up to protect the inmates.

3. The Prefects also told the delegation that the refugees would remain in Zaire until the situation in Rwanda changes. They stressed that the RPF is an invading force and therefore expects the international community to take care of it. UNAMIR in general, and Gen Dallaire in particular, were held responsible for the overthrow of the former legitimate Rwandan Government. UNAMIR was branded as being pro RPF. The Prefects further requested that the UN place an embargo on the present BBGNU in Rwanda and pursue the Arusha Agreement. The delegation, in response to this request, reminded the Prefects that, despite the existence previously of the Arusha Agreement, the Civil War had still broken out. They questioned whether the terms of the Arusha Agreement would now be viable for Rwanda and be acceptable to all factions.



4. Yesterday evening, the delegation met with General Bizimungu, the exiled RGF Chief of Staff. During their discussions, Gen Bizimungu appeared to take a hard line, declaring that the war was by no means over, nor was the RGF defeated. When asked about the possibility of his returning to Rwanda, the General replied that that would be dependent on the present personal security situation of two other RGF generals who had previously returned, one of whom was Brig Gasenzi, RGF leader for the tripartite cease-fire talks. General Bizimungu then asked for information regarding the personal security of the two generals.

5. The delegation is planning to visit other areas today. A detailed ~~inter~~<sup>in</sup> briefing will be given by the DFC tomorrow evening upon his return.

HQ UNAMIR

28 Sep 94

G2/2000

See Distribution

PASSAGE OF INFORMATION

1. The Force Commander has expressed his concern about the flow of information through UNAMIR as whole. It is the function of the G2 Cell within this HQ to establish and maintain a system for the collection, collation and dissemination of all military information within UNAMIR.

2. It cannot be over emphasised that all information needs to be passed quickly and accurately to the G2 Cell in order that they are able to fulfil their task of keeping the Force Commander and the remainder of UNAMIR as fully informed on the situation as possible. There are, however, a number of particular points to which I would ask particular attention be paid.

MASS GRAVES

3. MILOB Gp HQ s asked to compile a list of all mass graves and massacre sites identified thus far. The list should be forwarded to this HQ with a grid reference, approximate number of bodies contained therein and a description as to whether the bodies are buried or on the surface.

BANDITRY

4. This HQ receives occasional reports of incidents of "banditry". The details are often vague and contain little in the way of facts. It is requested that MILOBs be tasked to ask specific questions of people reporting such incidents in order to ascertain exactly what happened, where and when. It is also important to determine whether or not the person who reported the incident is an eye-witness or merely passing on information from a third party.

BORDERS

5. The state of the borders between RWANDA and neighbouring countries is of interest to this HQ and it is requested that the daily SITREP issued by MILOB Gp HQ be augmented by a statement declaring the borders to be open or closed to UNAMIR, refugee or NGO traffic.

*DCOS SP*  
*M/Ltd with*  
*subfunction*

*[Signature]*  
K P O'KELLY  
Col  
Acting DCOS Ops

*29/9*

*8<sup>th</sup> copy made*  
*for DCOS SP*  
*5/10/94*

*05/10*  
*DFC*

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MILOB Gp HQ

Information:

List D

Internal:

Information:

FC (through COS)  
DCOS Ops

8 30 0000  
Col  
Action 1000 00

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.7 (PLANS)

01 03 271000Z SEP 94 PP UUUU

PLANS 017

HQ UNAMIR

LIST A

LIST B

LIST C

UNCLAS PLANS 017

SUBJ: ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON UNAMIR PERSONNEL OPENING FIRE

REFS: A. HQ UNAMIR OP DIRECTIVE 02 - ROE - 22 JUL 94.

B. AMENDMENT 1 TO REF A DATED 10 SEP 94.

1. THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED IN THE EVENT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL  
OPENING FIRE IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. HQ UNAMIR DUTY OFFICER IS TO BE INFORMED THAT THE EVENT HAS  
OCCURRED BY THE FASTEST POSSIBLE MEANS. THE SECTOR COMMANDER OR  
COMMANDING OFFICER CONCERNED IS TO FOLLOW THIS UP:

- (1) WITH A DETAILED REPORT WITHIN ONE HOUR OF THE EVENT.
- (2) WITH A WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN 3 HOURS OF THE EVENT.

B. DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS, THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO INFORM:

- (1) DCOS OPS OR HIS SUBORDINATE.
- (2) MA/FC OR MA/DFC.
- (3) CONTINGENT COMMANDER CONCERNED, IF HE IS NOT ALREADY

MA  
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DFC/COS

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28/9



AWARE OF THE INCIDENT.

C. IN SILENT HOURS, THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO INFORM:

- (1) FC OR DFC.
- (2) DCOS OPS OR HIS SUBORDINATE.
- (3) CONTINGENT COMMANDER CONCERNED IF HE IS NOT ALREADY AWARE OF THE INCIDENT.

2. THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO LOG AND DISTRIBUTE SUBSEQUENT REPORTS FROM THE SECTOR COMMANDER/COMMANDING OFFICER TO THOSE LISTED ABOVE, AS THEY ARE RECEIVED.

3. SECTOR COMMANDERS/COMMANDING OFFICERS ARE TO BE PREPARED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION IF ORDERED BY HQ UNAMIR. THEY SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY AWARE OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR:

- A. PRESERVING/RECORDING EVIDENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT.
- B. WITNESS LISTS.
- C. WITNESS STATEMENTS.
- D. STATEMENTS BY THE INDIVIDUAL(S) WHO OPENED FIRE.
- E. MP INVESTIGATION UNDER NATIONAL AND/OR UNAMIR AUSPICES, AS ORDERED BY HQ UNAMIR.

4. ADDRESSEES ARE REMINDED OF THE NEED FOR ALL PERSONNEL TO BE FULLY

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5000.7 (PLANS)

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UUUU

PLANS 017

BRIEFED ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER CURRENT ROE, REFS A AND B.

MAJ T.A.P. MULLARKEY, G3 PLANS 3

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS

*for Jettys'.*

UNCLASSIFIED



From: Col K P O'Kelly  
DCOS (Sp)  
HQ UNAMIR

To: DCOS (Ops)

Copy to: Office of SRSG  
MA to FC  
MA to DFC/COS

File Reference: 2000.1/CMPO/MISC

Date: 23 Sep 94

Subject: CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS OUTSIDE RWANDA

1. You are aware that I have recently issued guidance on the entry regulations for various countries which UNAMIR personnel might have to visit in the course of their duties and that the matter of clearance for the carriage of weapons in Zaire is being pursued separately.

2. I am now being asked for advice on the circumstances under which arms and ammunition may be carried in other countries surrounding Rwanda. My advice has been that I believe this to be an Operations matter; my staff can obtain advice on regulations and procedures, process requests for documentation etc, but the decision on whether carriage of arms is necessary or desirable in any particular circumstances is one for your staff to determine.

3. You will appreciate that this is a very sensitive issue and UNAMIR will not wish to antagonize the governments of states whose cooperation we need, still less cause a diplomatic incident involving a member of the Mission. I therefore suggest that you should issue appropriate instructions.

4. For what it is worth, my view would be that no member of UNAMIR, on or off duty, should carry arms outside the borders of Rwanda without exceptional authority obtained through the Operations staff in this headquarters, excepting whatever standing instructions may become operative following discussions to take place on the particular situation in Zaire. It may be that this matter is so sensitive that the Force Commander will reserve that authority to himself but it must be controlled at a senior level. Each case should be reviewed on its merits, but it might well be appropriate, when giving authorities, to strictly limit the extent that weapons should be visible to the local population etc.

5. It may be appropriate that you, a representative of SRSG, the Civilian Administration and I should meet to discuss whether UNAMIR personnel necessarily required to carry weapons in neighbouring states should follow the normal procedures for gaining clearance for the import of weapons or whether alternative arrangements should be made through diplomatic channels. I suspect that the circumstances which might require the carriage of arms would be so extraordinary that alternative arrangements would be more appropriate, in view of both the circumstances themselves and the urgency with which authority might be required.



K P O'KELLY  
Col  
DCOS (Sp)





From: Col K P O'Kelly  
DCOS (Sp)  
HQ UNAMIR

To: Office of SRSG

Copy to: MA to FC  
MA to DFC/COS  
DCOS (Ops)

File Reference: 2000.1/CMPO/MISC


Date: 23 Sep 94

Subject: CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS IN ZAIRE

1. At the Force Commander's briefing this morning, your representative undertook to investigate the situation regarding the carriage of weapons in Zaire.

2. You will be aware from previous correspondence on this subject that arms and ammunition may not normally be imported into Zaire without appropriate documentation from the Zairian authorities but that it is considered that the circumstances pertaining at the moment make this procedure inappropriate. The Force Commander's view is that UNAMIR soldiers require some form of standing authority to carry arms while on duty in Zaire and your representative agreed that this was a matter which should be pursued through diplomatic channels although it will be raised by DFC/COS during his forthcoming visit.

3. I shall be writing separately on the subject of the carriage of arms over other borders.

  
K P O'KELLY  
Col  
DCOS (Sp)

22/9

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDH0067 2650828-UUUU--UCCVVDA.

ZNR UUUUU

P 220828Z SEP 94

FM SECTOR 5 GISENYI//SEC CMD//

TO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//COS//COO//

BT

UNCLAS DSIG

SUBJ: MOVEMNT OF RGF TROOPS IN GOMA AREA

1. I HVE RECEIVED REPORTS FROM TWO NGO SOURCES OPERATING IN GOMA AREA THAT INDICATE A LARGE SCALE MOVEMENT OF RGF PERS FROM THIS AREA TOWARDS BUKAVU.

2. I WILL MEET WITH SECURITY ADVISOR IN GOMA THIS MORNING TO DICUSS AND VERIFY THIS INFO.

3. I HAVE NOT ADVISED LOC RPA COMDS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT RPA HAS INITIATED ANY HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF SECURITY.

BT

#0067

Received 09-22-1994 08:33:50

*DCos ops  
Seen. Pse follow-up  
and let us have the  
confirmation.  
JG  
22/9  
DFC/WS*

*22/9/94*

3000.20 (OPS)

From: *Dr* DCOS OPS *Dr Jell*

To: GHANBATT  
ETHIOBATT  
FRAFBATT  
MALAWI COY  
NI COY  
TUNCOY  
ZAMBATT  
G4

Info: **DFC**

SUBJECT: **LIAISON OFFICER - UNAMIR HQ**

1. ALL FORMED UNITS ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE ONE OFFICER EACH TO SERVE AS LIAISON OFFICER AT FORCE HQ. OFFICER TO BE OF THE RANK OF CAPT/MAJ. FRAFBATT LIAISON OFFICER TO BE A LIEUTENANT COLONEL.
2. LIAISON OFFICERS TO REPORT TO FORCE HQ NOT LATER 25 SEP 94.
3. G4 TO ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION AND FEEDING FOR 07 OFFICERS.
4. ACK.

*Seen*  
*19/9*  
*DFC/WS*

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
OPS BRANCH

19<sup>th</sup> September 1994

3000(Ops)


See Distribution:

SUBJECT: PURCHASE OF UNAMIR ITEMS OF IDENTIFICATION BY EX RGF PERSONNEL

1. Reports reaching Force HQ indicate that ex-RGF personnel may attempt through other locals or Zairian nationals to purchase or acquire UNAMIR items of identification or accoutrement for possible future insurgent activity in Rwanda.

2. In view of the above, all UNAMIR units/cells are advised to educate their troops/personnel about the serious potential implications to UNAMIR and the stability of this country, of selling or giving away items such as UN insignia, head gear and contingent uniforms etc which associate individuals with the UN to unauthorised persons as souvenirs.

3. For your necessary action.

  
H. ANYIDHOHO  
Brig-Gen  
DFC/COS

Distribution:

External:

Action:

US Forces  
Canadian Contingent  
AUSMED  
BRIT CON  
MILOB GP HQ  
Sector 1  
Sector GHANBATT  
Sector MALAWI COY  
Sector ZAMBATT  
Sector FRAFBATT  
Sector ETHIOBATT  
Sector TUNBATT  
UNCIVPOL

Internal:

Information:

SMSG's Office

*Seen*  
*H. Anyido*  
*19/9*  
*DFC/COS*



18 Sep 94

3000.15 (Plans)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER TO OPERATION ORDER NO 18 - OP HOMEWARD

References:

- A. 3000.15 (Ops) dated 31 Aug 94. (Op Order No 18).
- B. 3000.15 (Ops) dated 31 Aug 94. (FCs Directive on Transportation of Refugees/Displaced Persons).

SITUATION.

- 1. General. As given in Reference A.
- 2. Specific. UNAMIR remains committed to assisting in the relocation of refugees and displaced persons throughout the AOR. The occupants of some camps in Sector 4A have demonstrated a clear desire to return home to the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures. UNAMIR currently has considerable transport assets available to support such an operation. Op HOMEWARD coordinates UNAMIR support for a movement plan scheduled to begin before the wet season.

MISSION

- 3. To assist in the transportation of refugees from Sector 4A to the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures.

EXECUTION

- 4. General Outline. UNAMIR will provide support as follows:
  - a. HAC Coordination for the move.
  - b. C2 facilities at Tac HQ.
  - c. Movement Control.
  - d. Transport resources.
  - e. MILOB support.
- 5. Tasks.
  - a. HAC.
    - (1). Coordinate NGO requests for transport.
    - (2). Screen refugees/displaced persons in concert with RPA before loading on vehicles.
    - (3). Establish final destinations of refugees/displaced persons and allocate transport

accordingly.

(4). Liaise with RPA for movement through RPA checkpoints in accordance with Reference B.

(5). Establish route planning information and pass to Movement Control.

b. Tac HQ.

(1). Coordinate UNAMIR resources.

(2). Command Op HOMEWARD.

(3). Provide C2 facilities at Butare.

c. BRITCON.

(1). Provide Movement Control Organisation.

(2). Execute movement plan as directed by Tac HQ.

(3). Coordinate UNAMIR transport resources in support of Op HOMEWARD.

(4). Provide BRITCON transport resources as available.

d. ZAMBATT. Provide transport resources as requested by Movement Control.

e. MILOB Comds Sectors 3, 4A and 4B.

(1). Liaise with RPA commanders as arranged by HAC.

(2). Provide escorts to all convoys.

(3). Clear and supervise checkpoint procedures.

(4). Establish communications links from Convoys to Movement Control at Tac HQ.

(2). Liaise with local Prefectures to establish reception arrangements for refugees/displaced persons.

f. G4. Augment transport resource requirements for Op HOMEWARD.


6. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Coordination Meeting. Action addressees are to send a suitable representative to attend a coordination meeting, chaired by HAC at Tac HQ on **Tue 20 Sep 94, at 1000 hrs.**

Timings. Not known at this stage. Op HOMEWARD should commence before the wet season begins.

7. Command and Signal. Op HOMEWARD will be commanded by the COO at Tac HQ. C2 will be effected as follows:

- a. HAC to provide direction and civil liaison function.
- b. CO BRITCON to provide OIC Movement Control, to be co-located with COO at Tac HQ.
- c. MILOB HQ to control RPA liaison and UNMO escort requirements. During Op HOMEWARD, authority is granted to cross Sector boundaries.



G C TOUSIGNANT  
Maj Gen  
Force Comd

Distribution:

External

Action:

Tac HQ  
MILOB HQ  
BRITCON  
ZAMBATT

Information:

GHANBATT  
ETHIOBATT  
FRAFBATT  
MALAWICOY

Internal:

Action:

HAC  
G4

Information:

FC  
DFC/COS  
DCOS Ops  
DCOS Sp  
G3 Plans

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA  
MINISTRY FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS  
AND COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT  
B.P. 446  
KIGALI

Kigali, 17th September 1994

No. 1/00104-99.01h

To His Excellency the Special Representative of the  
the Secretary General  
KIGALI

Excellency,


As discussed with the Deputy Force Commander of the UNAMIR today,  
this is to confirm that the Government of Rwanda is ready to receive from UNAMIR the stock  
of arms and military equipment seized by the UNAMIR so far.

We have agreed that the handing-over ceremony would be a brief and  
low-key ceremony entailing the handing over of the arms and equipment with at any appropriate  
within the week starting on Monday 19 September 1994. Needless to say that we will keep our  
joint effort in ensuring that all arms which may be in unauthorized hands are recovered so that  
they can be redirected to the use they are meant for in ensuring security for all the Rwandese  
people under very strictly controlled conditions of use.

While awaiting for your confirmation on the date of the handing over  
ceremony within the next week, I remain

Yours sincerely

SETH SENDASHONGA  
Minister



CC:

- His Excellency the President of the  
Republic of Rwanda, Kigali
- His Excellency the Prime Minister, Kigali
- His Excellency the Minister for Defence, Kigali
- His Excellency the Minister for Justice, Kigali
- His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs and  
International Cooperation, Kigali

29/9  
018-600





UNAMIR - MINUAR

Office of the DFC/COS  
UNAMIR Force HQ  
KIGALI  
Rwanda

1000.7(DFC)/G/1

17<sup>th</sup> September, 1994

Force Commander

**RE-APPRAISAL OF UNAMIR'S ROLE  
IN THE AFTERMATH OF A SUCCESSFUL  
TAKE-OVER OF SECTOR 4 BY THE RPA  
AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES**

**OVER-VIEW**

1. Sector 4 of UNAMIR's operational area is the portion of Rwanda in which the French Operation "TURQUOISE" took place. France's operations effectively terminated on 22 August, 1994 when the control of the area was successfully transferred to UNAMIR.

2. Prior to handing over the area, there was a lot of apprehension in many circles as to what Sector 4 would look like following the end of French mandate in Rwanda. Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June granted the French force two months within which it should complete its humanitarian operations in the South-western sector of Rwanda. Whilst UNAMIR had a lot of set-backs in receiving troops for the Sector, a daring effort was made in commencing deployment of the only battalion on the ground then (Ghanbatt) on 10th August, 1994. By a stroke of luck, the Government in Kigali accepted the retention of the Franco-African Battalion that co-operated with France's Coalition Forces in Operation "TURQUOISE". With a lot of desperation, the Ethiopian Battalion commenced deployment in the Cyangugu area just before 22nd August, 1994. UNAMIR then felt confident we would be able to take control of Sector 4 from the French since the government in Kigali was very vehemently opposed to their continued stay in that part of Rwanda. So far, the sector has been without any serious incidents. The isolated cases of murder and arrests occurring in the sector are also happening in other sectors of the country.

**INTRODUCTION OF RPA AND PREFECTS  
INTO SECTOR 4**

3. Accordingly, UNAMIR in a planned programme with the government in Kigali started introducing RPA soldiers into Sector 4 from Tuesday 6th of September, 1994. By the third week of September, Gikongoro, Kibuye and Cyangugu prefectures would have each had a battalion of RPA in their locations. In addition, new prefects were appointed to the three areas with the first elements of RPA offering them intimate protection.

4. We in UNAMIR have observed with satisfaction that the introduction of RPA in the South-western Sector did not cause any violent re-action or panic from the mainly Hutu population. Rwandese are staying where they have been. Others are leaving the displaced people's camps for their homes, even though in small numbers.

CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TROOPS  
IN SECTOR 4

5. The question that UNAMIR needs to address now is if the RPA assumes full security duties in Sector 4, is there still the requirement for our formed troops to be in the Sector? The obvious answer is no. However, immediate pull out of the troops will not be viewed kindly by the mainly HUTU population in the zone. The Franco African Battalion is already questioning the rapidity with which RPA is getting into the zone. We should therefore be working towards the end of the year before considering pulling out our troops completely. Indeed the eventual programme of leaving the zone should be that of a gradual and spaced out withdrawal not pulling out all the troops at once.

REQUIREMENT FOR FORMED TROOPS AFTER  
STABILIZATION IN SECTOR 4


6. After stability is achieved in Sector 4, I envisage the following duties to be performed by formed troops in Rwanda as a whole.

- a. Monitoring of Rwanda's borders with her neighbours to check infiltration of arms and ammunition. Observer group alone will not be the answer. UNOMUR in Uganda never succeeded in checking arms flow into Rwanda.
- b. The formed troops will protect refugees in various part of the country.
- c. Protection of Human Rights monitors is another task they can undertake.
- d. The troops will give confidence to the returnees so that they can feel free to live in their own country.
- e. Through arrangement with Rwandese authorities, the formed troops can help in restructuring the Rwandese Army.
- f. Development assistance, for example, artisans of various grades among the formed troops in support of NGOs and the world bank can carry out a lot of repairs on existing infrastructure.

g. Training of the military to perform civilian duties is another area that can be handled by formed troops. Presently the RPA soldier does not seem to be aware of his civic responsibilities. Hitherto, he has only been taught to handle weapons. Formed troops from countries that had taken the lead in their own countries in such roles can also lead the RPA to rise up to the occasion.

7. It must be emphasised that, there should not be a rush in pulling out the formed troops completely from Rwanda. The fact that BRITCON has set up itself a target date of 17 Nov 94 and CANSIGs are likely to leave in January 1994 does also not mean UNAMIR does not require assistance in the fields being covered by those contingents. In addition, formed troops should be replaced by new ones from the troop contributing countries. After such a bitter civil war, it will be perhaps wrong to assume that all will be well too soon. In South Lebanon, there are at times over three months without any incident occurring but UNIFIL is still in position to ensure stability. A hasty withdrawal will negate the gains so far made. It must be borne in mind that Rwandese government itself has set a target period of 5 years transition. They will need the UN for a long time. It could be that the battalions will be reduced in numbers and a call for Specialist Units in the battalions to support the infantry role will be encouraged. G3 Plans will be tasked to start working out a new organisational diagram with these points in mind.

8. MILOBS & CIVPOL. These groups will remain in Rwanda for a long time to come. It will depend basically on how quickly gendarmerie can be trained in sufficient numbers. That is the only way law and order can be restored. I foresee the mission changing at one stage to an Observer Mission even though not so suddenly.



HK ANYIDOHO  
Brig Gen  
DFC/COS

Info:

DCOS OPS

G2 Cell  
HQ UNAMIR


17 Sep 94

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See Distribution

RPA/UNAMIR LIAISON

1. In order that our HQ can fulfil the terms of the UN mandate more effectively it is requested that the RPA provide HQ UNAMIR with the locations of formation HQs down to Battalion level.
2. The information will be passed to our Military Observers (MILOBs) in order that they are able to liaise more effectively with RPA units on the ground.



S H MOORHOUSE  
Capt  
SO3 G2

Distribution:

Internal:

Action:

RPA LO

Information

FC  
DFC  
DCOS Ops  
MA to FC

*Seen  
JGL*

*19/9  
DFC/WS*



UN UNCLASSIFIED

G2 Cell  
HQ UNAMIR

16 Sep 94

G2/7000

DFC

SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN SECTOR 4 ON 15 SEP 94

1. ETHIOBATT report that 40 refugees have left sector 4C for Zaire. In addition to this it is reported that people in the MURURU displaced persons camp (Sector 4C, GR 7622) are afraid of the RPA forces in the area and have sent some elders to gain assurances from the RPA for their safety.

2. MILOBs report that local people in the KIBUYE (Sector 4B, GR 2771) area are also afraid of the RPA.

3. In GIKONGORO (Sector 4A, GR 5127) the RPA is occupying former government quarters and forcing the occupants (former government employees) to leave. The occupants were not allowed to take any personal possessions with them.

4. ASSESSMENT

The RPA are failing in their aim of attempting to reassure the population of Sector 4 that they mean them no harm. It is assessed that the flow of refugees from Sector 4 will not stop until the RPA change their tactics and approach. This exodus of 40 refugees should also be taken in context with 613 refugees returning to Sector 4C through RUSUZI 1 alone. The general trend continues to be one of more refugees returning than are leaving.

17/9  
DFC/ces

*Kamange*  
C E KAMANGE  
Maj  
SO2 G2

UN UNCLASSIFIED



UNAMIR - MINUAR

1000.7/DFC/COS

15<sup>th</sup> September, 1994

See Distribution

**TOWARDS THE RE-TRAINING OF  
PERSONNEL OF THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY**

1. The war in Rwanda is over for now and things are beginning to take shape, even though at a pace slower than expected. All the same, if the government in Kigali can receive massive international financial support, the situation in Rwanda will normalize sooner than expected. It is therefore imperative, at this early stage, that the government of Rwanda takes certain concrete steps to start streamlining things in order to reduce the burden on the country's scarce resources.
2. It is a fact that the recent war situation in Rwanda has contributed immensely to an over-established Rwandese Patriotic Army. It is this army that is going to form the nucleus of a new and revitalized Rwandese Government Force, a force that must necessarily be structured with ethnic balance in mind to ensure lasting peace in Rwanda. But, before this restructuring takes off, there is an urgent need to carry out a demobilization exercise to trim down the number of troops to a manageable level that can easily be sustained by the economy.
3. Added to the over-bloated strength of the RPA is the question of the numerous youths that found themselves in the army as a result of the war. Their very young faces tell the story of people who have not completed formal education. Neither do they have any trade training that can give them self-employment when they finally get demobilized. With the war over, most of these "kid-soldiers" have no proper employment and they take delight in roaming the streets with weapons, a sure way of getting themselves involved in mischief. Serious efforts need to be made to teach these youths to "beat their swords into plough shares".
4. The future of Rwanda certainly lies in the hands of these youths and if their generation is allowed to carry on the way they do now, then there is nothing to hope for in this country. A serious look must therefore be taken at evolving re-training programmes that can cater for all the categories of RPA soldiers who must necessarily be demobilised. For the demobilisation programme to be popular and attractive to the youths, training schemes designed to satisfy their needs, as well as those of the country, must be fully put in place.

5. Towards this end, international assistance must be sought for the establishment of Youth Leadership Training Schools and vocational/trade training institutes. These institutes can concentrate on training in trades like carpentry, masonry, plumbing and the likes. These trades will eventually make their beneficiaries self-reliant and ease the burden on the government. There is evidence that the RPF has encouraged this type of training in the past as the example of the Rehabilitation school established in Cyondo (near Mulindi) easily comes to mind. The trade institutes can be structured along the lives of the Cyondo school.

6. This is the way I foresee the system working out. Demobilisation will commence with the categorization of the youths into various groups, documentation and then, for some re-training can start. Those categorised as falling within the school-going age must be encouraged to go to school, where they rightly belong. But those who fall outside the school going age, but have not had the benefits of formal education (and are interested in pursuing some level or formal education) must be given, for example, 2 years of adult education. Those with higher IQs in this category should be encouraged to go further after the initial two-year period. Others not interested in schooling but have other skills or interests can go directly into the institutes so established for various trades.

7. Since agriculture is the life-line of this country, some amount of emphasis must be placed on training in this area. The youths who are interested in agriculture can be encouraged and assisted to form Mobilization Squads (Mobisquads) or co-operatives. These squads/co-operatives can help a lot in revamping the tea plantations of this country, for example.

8. Another aspect of life which must be instilled in the people of Rwanda which eventually will help the rate of development is the spirit of self-help. The people of Rwanda must be encouraged and tutored in the ideals of learning to do things for themselves without necessarily waiting for the government to do it for them. For example, there is still a great amount of filth around, following from the war. Nobody seems to care and people are content to live with this filth forever. The Political leaders of this country must very quickly learn to bring themselves down to the level where they can lead their subordinates in cleaning up the environment. If they take the lead, no doubt, the people will follow them. And if this goes on for some time, and the people realise the benefits, they will automatically pick it up. The concept of self-help projects can be extended to other aspects of national development with some assistance from the government.

9. I am at this stage tempted to suggest that, one of these days, UNAMIR takes the initiative by taking a day off to do

some cleaning in the city of Kigali. With proper publicity and maximum participation from members of government the clean-up campaign idea should be able to catch on soon and we would get a cleaner environment for it.

10. By way of conclusion, I must stress that the demobilisation and re-training issues raised earlier on in this document cannot succeed without outside assistance. So, while efforts are being made to sell the idea, equal thought should be given to soliciting international assistance for the programme.



HK ANYIDOHO  
Brigadier-General  
DFC/COS

**Distribution:**

Action:  
SRSG  
FC  
Executive Director



*file psc  
ma*

RPA INCIDENTS INVOLVING CIVILIANS

*DCOS OPS  
I collected this also  
from TAC HQ.  
I think they are  
doing a useful  
work  
10/10  
DJ/w*

1. 15 SEPT 94  
CYANGUGU  
4C MILOB REPORT

RPA ARRESTED MEMBER OF PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT MR. RYCHAGU BONIFAS. NO FURTHER DETAILS (NFD).

2. 18 SEPT 94  
GAFUNZO GR 9035  
ETHIOBATT REPORT

A MAN AND HIS WIFE WERE TAKEN BY RPA FROM GAFUNZO.(NFD).

3. 18 SEPT 94  
NSHILI GR 3996  
GHANBATT

AT 181500B MISTER MURA SANDONYIPILIP, BURGERMEISTER FOR NSHILI AND PRESIDENT OF MRND, REPORTED ARRESTED BY RPA. AN RPA OFFICER DENIED THIS BUT THE FAMILY OF SUBJECT INSISTED IT WAS TRUE AND CLAIMED HE WAS TAKEN WITH 1.4 MILLION FRANCS.

4. 19 SEPT 94  
RWAMIKO GR 4913  
MILOB REPORT

REPORTS RECEIVED OF MOLESTATION OF REFUGEES BY 5 RPA SOLDIERS AT THE RWAMIKO CAMP. THE RPA BATT COMDR WAS INFORMED.

5. 20 SEPT 94  
GIKONGORO  
MILOB REPORT

RPA CONDUCTED CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATION IN GIKONGORO FROM 200300-201000 HRS. THE LOCALS WERE FRIGHTENED AND REPORTED LOSSES OF POSSESSIONS AND UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE. TWO YOUNG MEN ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF MILITARY STYLE BOOTS. A LOCAL DR. HIGIRU CELESTIN WAS ARRESTED.(NFD).

6. 20 SEPT 94  
KIBUYE  
4B REPORT

BURGERMEISTER OF KIBUYE ARRESTED.

7. 21 SEPT 94  
BUSANZE GR 4591 AND REMERA GR 4192  
4A REPORT

LOCALS FROM THESE TWO AREAS VACATE THEIR HOMES AT NIGHT THROUGH FEAR OF RPA ACTIVITY.

*G-8/14/10  
DJ*



8. 21 SEPT 94  
SOUTH EAST OF GIKONGORO GR 556224  
4A REPORT

8 RPA SOLDIERS ARRIVED AT A HOUSE AT 212200 HRS AND TOOK A YOUTH "TO LOAD BAGS OF RICE". ATTEMPTED TO DO THE SAME AT ANOTHER HOUSE. LOCALS SURROUNDED RPA WHO FIRED SHOTS INTO THE AIR. THE COMMENT WAS MADE THAT AN RPA SOLDIER OWNED THE LAND WHERE THE REFUGEES WERE STAYING.

9. 21 SEPT 94  
GAFUNZO GR 9035  
4C REPORT

DWELLERS AROUND GAFUNZO REPORTED TO BE MOVING TOWARDS ZAIRE FOR FEAR OF THE RPA.

10. 22 SEPT 94  
GIKONGORO  
GHANBATT

RPA CONDUCTED INTENSIVE CORDON SEARCH FOUR PEOPLE DETAINED.(NFD).

11. 22 SEPT 94  
CYANGUGU  
ETHIOBATT

RPA ARRESTED FOUR PERSONS IN NYARIUSHISHI REFUGEE CAMP AND CYANGUGU.(NFD).

12. 23 SEPT 94  
GIKONGORO  
GHANBATT/MILOBS

AT 231700 HRS SEPT AN RPA SOLDIER KILLED TWO LOCALS WITH A GRENADE. POSSIBLY RESULT OF AN ARGUMENT. SOLDIER WAS DETAINED AT RPA BATT HQ.

13. 23/24 SEPT 94  
BASARENDA GR 4122  
MILOBS 4A

DR. MUAVYTORE SEBASTIN OF KEBYAGIRA NEAR BASARENDA WAS ARRESTED BY RPA FOLLOWING CORDON AND SEARCH. HE WAS ACCUSED OF KILLING HIS TUTSI WIFE DURING THE WAR AND WAS DETAINED AT GIKONGORO.

14. 23 SEPT 94  
RUSIZI I  
SECT 4C

MR GACUBA ETIENE, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE ST FRANCIS HOSPITAL WAS TAKEN AWAY BY THE RPA. NFD.

15. 25 SEPT 94  
GIKONGORO  
GHANBAT

DR RWAYITAR ETIENNE OF KIGEME HOSPITAL WAS ARRESTED AT A CHECK POINT BETWEEN GIKONGORO AND KIGEME. NFD.

- 16 25 SEPT 94  
RWAMIKO GR 4913  
GHANBAT

POPULATION COMPLAINING OF INSECURITY FOLLOWING THE CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS IN GIKONGORO AND KIGEME. AN EXODUS OF LOCALS WAS REPORTED FROM RWAMIKO 4913 TO BURUNDI.

17. 25 SEPT 94  
CYANGUGU/KAMEMBE  
ETHIOBATT

RPA DEPLOYED AT NIGHT TO CONDUCT CHECKS OF CIVILIAN HOUSES. THEY ARRESTED 14 MEN AND 1 WOMAN SUSPECTED OF HIDING WEAPONS. ETHIOBATT TROOPS OBSERVED 1X PPS WEAPON, 1 TAPE RECORDER, 2 TELEVISIONS, AND 40 FRENCH UNIFORMS.

18. 26 SEPT 94  
RWAMIKO GR 4913  
GHANBATT

RPA ARRESTED BURGERMEISTER OF RWAMIKO, SILAS MUGIRANGABO FOR CRIMES OF GENOCIDE. LOCALS EXPRESS THE DESIRE TO TRAVEL TO BURUNDI IF NOTHING IS DONE BY UNAMIR TO RESCUE HIM.

19. 26 SEPT 94  
RURAMBA GR 4716  
MILOB 4A

REPORTED THAT ON 22 SEPT THREE RPA AND TWO EXPATRIATES POSS FROM A POLISH RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION, VISITED THE REFUGEE CAMP AT RURAMBA. THE RPA APPEARED TO THREATEN REFUGEES. CAMP LEADER CLAIMED THAT 3000 LEFT THE CAMP IN THE FOLLOWING DAYS FOR BURUNDI. ALSO 700 REPORTED TO HAVE LEFT RWAMIKO 4813 AND 100-1000 LEFT KIBEHO. THEY DO NOT USE ROADS SO THAT THEY EVADE THE RPA CHECKPOINTS, AND TRAVEL VIA THE NYUNGWE FOREST.

20. 26 SEPT 94  
BUTARE  
MILOB 4A

REPORTED THAT SOME RESIDENTS OF BUTARE ARE RETURNING TO REFUGEE CAMPS BECAUSE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RPA.

21. 26 SEPT 94  
MBAZI GR 7177  
MILOB 4A

A GIRL REPORTED TO A BRITISH MEDICAL TEAM THAT, ON 24 SEPT, IN HER VILLAGE OF KABAKONO 6917, NEAR MBAZI, AN RPA VEHICLE WITH SOLDIERS AND A CIVILIAN -JEAN PAUL HABIMISAMTI- TOOK 10 PEOPLE AWAY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT 3 OF THEM WERE KILLED INCLUDING THE GIRLS FATHER.

22. 26 SEPT 94  
RWISHYWA GR 3706  
MILOB 4B

TWO RESIDENTS OF RWISHYWA WERE RIDING A BICYCLE RETURNING FROM BURUNDI ON 26 SEPT WHEN THEY WERE SHOT BY RPA SOLDIERS. ONE ESCAPED BUT THE OTHER WAS KILLED. LOCALS BELIEVE THE BODY WAS BURIED BY RPA SOLDIERS AT THE EDGE OF THE FOREST.

23. 27 SEPT 94  
MUGANZA GR 4305  
GHANBAT

A WOMAN REPORTED SHOTS BY THE RPA AT MUGANZA AND CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE SHOOTING INDISCRIMINATELY.

24. 23-28 SEPT  
KARAMBO-BOLI 9122 AND MWEZO 9221  
MILOB 4C

A SPECIAL SITREP REPORTING THE ADVERSE EFFECT THE RPA'S ACTIVITIES WAS HAVING ON THE POPULATION. THE LOCALLY EMPLOYED CIVILIANS FROM THE HOSPITAL AT RUSIZI HAD NOT BEEN SEEN FOR 6 DAYS. LOCALS AT KARAMBO-BOLI CLAIMED HARASSMENT BY RPA FROM MWEZO. THE POPULATION WAS FRIGHTENED AND THOSE WORKING FOR NGO'S WERE NOT TURNING UP FOR WORK.

25. 27 SEPT 94  
MURAMA GR 6648 AND KABILIZI GR 5935  
MILOB 4B

FOUR REFUGEES IN THE KABILIZI DP CAMP REPORTED THAT THEY HAD RETURNED TO MURAMA A FEW WEEKS AGO WHERE THEY WERE BEATEN BY THE RPA. THEY WENT BACK TO THE REFUGEE CAMP. HEALING INJURIES WERE VISIBLE.

26. 28 SEPT 94  
KRAMBO-BOLI GR 9122  
4C MILOBS

RPA PATROLLING THE ZAIRE/BURUNDI BORDER THREATENED LOCALS IN KRAMBI-BOLI MARKET THAT THEY HAD TO REPORT WANTED PERSONS.



27. 28 SEPT 94  
CYANGUGU  
4C MILOBS

THREE FEMALES - GATORANI GADI, NYIRAYAMBERE MARIE AND MRS GASHARAKADANZI WINIFRED - WHO WERE DRIVING A VW VEH NO EB 1338 FROM GISAKURA TO CYANGUGU WERE ARRESTED BY THE RPA ON 16 SEPT. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN SEEN SINCE. THE VEH NOW BEING USED BY THE RPA IN CYANGUGU.

28. 28 SEPT 94  
MURAMA GR 6648 AND NYABISINDU GR 7138  
SECTOR 3 MILOBS

INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT (SERIAL 25 ABOVE) REVEALED THAT SIMILAR INCIDENTS WERE TAKING PLACE. RPA REPORTED TO USE TUTSI GUIDES WHO KNOW THE AREA. OF CONCERN WERE THE PRISON AT MURAMA AND THE VILLAGES OF NYABISINDU WHERE EVIDENCE OF FRESH MOLESTATIONS AND BEATINGS WERE OBSERVED.

29. 28 SEPT 94  
RUKONDO GR 5538 AND NYABISINDU GR 7138  
GHANBAT

TWO DISPLACED PERSONS (NAMED) AT RUKONDO CAMP REPORTED THAT HUTU DP'S WHO RETURNED TO NYABISINDU COMMUNE WERE HARASSED BY RPA AND LOCALS. THE TWO ESCAPED LEAVING THEIR FAMILIES BEHIND.

30. 29 SEPT 94  
RUGABANO GR 4268  
FRAFBAT

AN RPA COY COMD ARRIVED AT THE DP CAMP AT RUGABANO TO CONDUCT A SEARCH (291940 SEPT). THE REFUGEES WERE ARMED WITH MACHETES AND REFUSED TO BE SEARCHED. THE RPA COMD FIRED INTO THE AIR 10 TIMES AND RETREATED, SAYING HE WOULD BE BACK THE NEXT DAY TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH.

31. 29 SEPT 94  
GR 8231 (NEAR NTYAZO)  
MALAWI COY

LOCALS AT GR 8231 REPORTED THAT THE RPA HAD ARRESTED 4 PEOPLE FROM THEIR VILLAGE AND ALSO STOLEN 4 COWS FROM THE SAME VILLAGE.

32. 30 SEPT 94  
GIKONGORO  
GHANBAT

AN RPA MEMBER EXHORTED 36 000 R Fr FROM A MONEY CHANGER IN GIKONGORO. THE RPA LO ASSISTED IN RETURNING IT.

33. 30 SEPT 94  
MBASA GR 5411  
GHANBAT

GHANBAT RETURNED 15 COWS AND 2 SHEEP SEIZED BY RPA SOLDIERS AT  
THE CHECK POINT AT MBASA OFF 5 LOCALS FROM KIBEHO.



MEMORANDUM

5001-1 (CC)

15 Sep 94

Distribution List

ACCESS TO UNAMIR HQ

Ref: FC policy on Access to UNAMIR HQ Dated 6 Sep 94.

1. As mentioned in Ref, procedures have been outlined for who may or may not be authorized access to UNAMIR HQ. It is paramount that all personnel become aware and assist with the implementation of the policy.

2. Find enclosed the Camp Post Orders which emphasise the guidelines to be complied by all and enforced by our Defence and Security Platoon.



P. Rutherford  
Maj  
Camp Commandant

Enclosure: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Dist List A

# DFC

## CAMP POST ORDERS - UNAMIR HQ

1. Personnel and vehicles must have proper ID to gain access or will be considered as a visitor.
2. All visitors will be escorted and must observe all rules and regulations applicable to the HQ if it is determined by the Officer in Charge or his delegate that the visitor has a legitimate reason to visit someone in this HQ.
3. Proper compliments will be paid to all national officers.
4. RPA soldiers requesting access to the HQ must be accompanied by an RPA Liaison Officer (RPA LO) and will be escorted throughout the HQ. RPA officials (ie. dignitaries, the President, the Vice-President, or the Ministers) do not require a RPA LO to accompany them, however, the entourage will be escorted.
5. All weapons will be unloaded and cleared at a clearing pit prior to entering the HQ.
6. Any significant incidents will be reported up the chain of command for further action and entered in a log book.
7. Perimeter will be checked at random timing at least every two hours.
8. Parking allocation has been identified, approved and labelled within the HQ. All non-listed vehicles will park in designated visitor parking area at risk of being towed away.

MA  
related but wrongly  
pinned together  
JG

16/9  
DFC/CO



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

13 September 1994  
MCC/OPS/85

TO: Chief of Operations

THRU: Mr P Hornsby  
Chief of support Services

FROM: Mr K Gleeson  
Chief of Movement Coordination Centre

SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF NON UN PERSONNEL ON UNAMIR AIRCRAFT

1. Since early April 1994 UNAMIR has been the only means of air travel between Nairobi and Kigali. As a result it has been moving personnel and cargo that otherwise UNAMIR would not be moving. This situation was allowed based on humanitarian grounds and the economic reasons for the rebuilding of the infrastructure of Rwanda.

2. United Nations regulations state that UN aircraft are not permitted to fly non -UN personnel. As the situation in Rwanda is returning to normal this regulation will be implemented on 1 October 1994, with 30 September being the last flight being available. As of these dates all NGO and other organizations should make alternative plans to travel between Nairobi and other destinations.

3. Early advice indicates that soon commercial flights will be operating between Nairobi and Kigali, however a firm date is yet to be announced. Should this commercial system commence operation then UNAMIR will cease seat and cargo allocation to the NGOs and other organizations, so as to fall in line with the above procedures.

C.C.  
Flight Booking Centre - Nairobi  
Movements Officer Kigali Airport  
Air Operations Kigali

(3)  
DCOS *[Signature]*  
*[Signature]*  
*[Signature]*  
14.09.94

(2) *[Signature]*  
DFC  
G3 Air

DCOS OPS  
I agree entirely  
With the proposal.  
*[Signature]* 16/9  
DFC/OPS

1. I believe this to be a reasonable approach providing commercial flights resume as per anticipation.  
2. G3 Air will promulgate pol to HAC for NGOs and RPA LO for BBGNU officials and citizens if you concur.  
*[Signature]*  
DCOS OPS  
14.9

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5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

01 03 131430Z SEP 94 PP RR UUUU

PLANS 007

UNAMIR HQ

GHANBATT SECTOR 4A

FRAFBATT SECTOR 4B

ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C

INFO ZAMBATT

TUNBATT

NICOY

MALAWICOY

AUSMED

CANCON

BRITCON

MILOB GP HQ

UNCIVPOL

*added with  
reservation.  
H. J. L.  
15/9  
DFC/COJ*

UNCLAS PLANS 007

SUBJ: REINTEGRATION OF SECTOR 4 - FORCE COMMANDERS GUIDANCE

REF: A. OPORD 19 DATED 4 SEP 94

B. OPORD 18 DATED 31 AUG 94

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE INTRODUCTION OF BBGNU ADMINISTRATION  
AND RPA FORCES TO SECTOR 4 IS NOW WELL UNDER WAY. ALTHOUGH THE

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TRANSITION HAS NOT PROGRESSED AS SMOOTHLY AS ANTICIPATED FROM A UNAMIR VIEWPOINT, IT MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT UNAMIR IS COMMITTED IN ALL RESPECTS TO THIS REINTEGRATION

2. THE DEPLOYMENT OF RPA FORCES TO SECTOR 4 MEETS THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:

- A. PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- B. PROVISION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
- C. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
- D. REESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIAL ORDER

3. IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY ACCOMMODATE THE RPA DEPLOYMENT, SOME MODIFICATION TO THE CONDUCT OF UNAMIR OPERATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY. IN ESSENCE, UNAMIR MUST COMPLIMENT RPA OPERATIONS. TASKS LISTED AT REF B APPLY, HOWEVER, UNAMIR FORCES MUST BE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE RPA TO TAKE THE LEAD TO THE EXTENT OF RELOCATING UNAMIR TROOPS IF NECESSARY. NO TYPE OF JOINT OPERATION WILL BE UNDERTAKEN. IF IT IS NECESSARY FOR UNAMIR TPS TO WITHDRAW, OBSN/LIAISON SHOULD BE MAINTAINED TO MONITOR AND ENSURE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS/CIVILIANS

4. FURTHER GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED AS RPA INTENTIONS ARE MADE



KNOWN. IN THE MEANTIME, CONTINUED TACT, DIPLOMACY, COOPERATION AND  
INITIATIVE IS EXPECTED OF COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS

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G2

G3 OPS

G3 PLANS

G4

G6/FSC

FMO

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

  
MGEN G.C. TOUSIGNANT, FC

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MEMORANDUM

3000.5/OPS/FEO

12 Sept 94

Distribution List

ENGINEERING RECCE OF WATER PROBLEMS IN BYUMBA

Ref: D COS OPS' verbal order, dated 8 Sept 94.

1. 10 Sept 94 I visited TAC HQ in Butare, where I was briefed by both HAC LO Maj Pazik and Lt Singh about all water problems in Byumba. The following facts were settled on :

a. The Prefect of Butare has been replaced recently, and new one is not well informed about that issue. There is nobody who deals with that matter in the Prefecture and UNICEF.

b. In the vicinity of Butare, at KADAHOKA there is a pump station, 80 kW generator and approx. 1,000 ltrs fuel tank. No crew on the spot. It is estimated that 45 workers, incl.:

- 10 operators (water distribution);
- 5 electricians;
- 5 mechanics;
- 5 plumbers; and
- 5 chemical engineers.

would resolve the problem after being trained. One submerge motor pump is now repaired by ELECTROGAZ in Kigali and one water valve must be replaced.

c. 250 kW generator is installed in Malawi, Australian and Ghanian compound. Its fuel consumption is about 300 ltrs per day. There is water tank also with appropriate water tank and water pumps which require 200 ltrs of diesel oil per day.

d. There is no running water at TAC HQ even so they have got 5,000 ltrs bladder. It is caused by lack of pressure water tank and booster water pump.

2. Conclusions:

a. G3 Engr/FEO is going to discuss the problem of the Kadahoka pump station with the Management of ELECTROGAZ in Kigali.

b. It seems that resupply of generator and

G3 Engr/FEO

1. Who actually is the action addressee?

2. See my annotation at para 1a.


J Li

17/9  
DFE/ko

I think you  
me in Butare.

water pumps (500 ltrs per day), mentioned above, should resolve the problem also in MILOBS' villa, where there is no power supply from outside. The gas station located almost vis a vis of TAC HQ should be used as a fuel store for UNAMIR's units.

- c. Purchase of a pressure water tank and a booster water pump could improve water pipe line system at TAC HQ and supply water to all taps.



J. Maczka  
Maj  
G3 Engr/FEO

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Force Engr Coy (9 Para Sqn RE)



File No 5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

To: Distribution List

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 12 Sep 94

Subject: FORCE COMMANDERS O GP

Reference: Plans 004 of 110850Z Sep 94

Due to changes in helicopter pickup timings of Sector 4 COs, the subject O Gp will now be held 130930B Sep 94.

A. Brimelow  
LCol  
G3 Plans

Distribution List

Action

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ZAMBATT  
GHANBATT

Seen  
Hgw  
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DFC/Lor

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5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

01 03 110850Z SEP 94 RR

UUUU

PLANS 004

HQ UNAMIR

TACHQ//COO//

MILOBGPHQ/CMO//

FRAFBATT//CO//

ETHIOBATT//CO//

CANCON//CO//

BRITCON//CO//

AUSMED//CO//

MALAWICOY//OC//

NICOY//OC//

ZAMBATT//ADV PTY/OC//

GHANBATT//CO//

UNCLAS PLANS 004

SUBJ: FORCE COMD O GP.

1. SUBJECT O GP WILL BE CONDUCTED AT HQ UNAMIR AT 130900B SEP 94.

ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE TO ATTEND

2. FORMAT AS FOLLOWS:

A. G2 BRIEF

B. COMMANDING OFFICER BRIEFS TO INCL:

*MA*  
*Noted. Demand me*  
*is stand if tan around.*  
*1/19*  
*DTC/COS*

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- (1) BRIEF SUMMARY OF LAST 10 DAYS OPS
- (2) DETAILED BRIEF ON CURRENT OPS TO INCL:
  - (A) TROOP DISPOSITIONS
  - (B) ACTIVITIES
  - (C) AREAS OF OP CONCERN
  - (D) AREAS OF ADMIN CONCERN
- (3) OVERVIEW OF FUTURE INTENTIONS

C. G3 PLANS - FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS

D. FORCE COMD COMMENTS

E. ANY OTHER BUSINESS

3. HEL SP AVAILABLE FOR FOLLOWING PERS: CO FRAFBATT PLUS ONE. CO ETHIOBATT. CO GHANBATT. AT FOLLOWING TIMES: KIBUYE 0700 HRS. CYANGUGU 0720 HRS. GIKONGORO 0745. BUTARE 0800 HRS. ARR KIGALI 0830 HRS. REMAINDER TO TRAVEL BY ROAD

4. G4 TO COORD TPT FROM AIRPORT AT 0830 HRS. APPROX TIME OF RETURN 1130 HRS

5. ACK

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5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

03

UUUU

PLANS 004

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FMO  
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CC LOG O

MAJ MULLARKEY  
G3 PLANS 3

COL J ARP  
DCOS OPS

*[Signature]*  
G3 PLANS

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DFC

1. Thanks for your comments which I as usual take in very high regards.
2. The Headquarters is to remain in Butare.
3. It will assume the responsibility of Sector 3 Headquarters and become the focal point for The South.

*[Signature]*  
FC 14.04.94

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: FC

1000.7 (DFC) /G/1

From: DFC/COS *[Signature]*Date: 11<sup>th</sup> September, 1994Subject: UNAMIR TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS  
BUTARE

1. I paid a dawn working visit to the Tactical Headquarters today 11 Sep 94 to purposely find out information on conditions pertaining in Sector 4 following the deployment of RPA troops and the appointments of Prefects to the three PREFECTURES.

2. I made the following observations after a thorough briefing from the Staff Officers at the HQ:

a. Gikongoro. There is a very cordial working relationship between the RPA, the Prefect and the UNAMIR troops in the area. Since Gikongoro is not far from Butare, the Prefect consults quite often with the staff at the TAC HQ. Discussions are held daily between the Rwandese Authority and UNAMIR personnel for the appropriate liaison to facilitate a better conduct of operations in the area.

b. Kibuye. Normal routine has continued since the Prefect and his Protection Party arrived there.

c. Changuu. There is very little personnel movement between Zaire and Rwanda. This seeming stalemate in personnel movement may be attributed to the fact that Rwandese on both sides of the lake are as it may, "waiting to see what happens next". The only reported act of violence in the area was the shooting incident at the bridge at RUZIZI I.

2. Whilst at the TAC HQ, I seized the opportunity to listen to the views of the Staff Officers in view of the fact that there seem to be plans to either re-organize or close down the HQ. From the information gathered, the following are obvious:

a. That there is constant consultation between the RPA authorities and the TAC HQ regarding RPA's Operations and movement in the Sector. This established machinery is presently working without fault. And that it is even in the interest of UNAMIR that this healthy close liaison with RPA exists.

*From this morning BGP it appears that there is not*

*The case. However, if relations are not good, we must keep working at it<sup>1</sup> and therefore the TAC HQ may have a good purpose.*

*MA  
Let me carry this on my next visit to Butare  
15/9  
DFC*

b. That the TAC HQ serves as the contact Point for all NGOs operating in the area from Butare through to Sector 4. This is evidenced by the sight of numerous articulated vehicles belonging to NGOs parked at the TAC HQ.

c. That the HQ acts as a center where all information concerning Human Rights abuses and other vital information on any major events taking or yet to take place are reported.

d. There is in location a Senior civilian administrative officer who is giving the necessary direction to the field officers serving the battalions in Sector 4.

e. The TAC HQ serves as a Transit Point for UNAMIR convoys travelling South to and from Kigali.

f. UNMOs and troops are deployed in the immediate vicinity of the TAC HQ - BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures.

3. It is worth mentioning that on my way to Kigali after my tour of the TAC HQ, I monitored on the radio the presence of RPA officers at the TAC HQ for a co-ordinating conference/meeting with our Staff Officers concerning the pending deployment of additional RPA troops in Sector 4. This information was duly relayed to the Ops Room at the FHQ.

4. Whilst I am not in any way attempting to vainly support the continued existence of the Tactical Headquarters, I wish to re-iterate the fact that the establishment is serving a very good purpose and therefore it is my candid suggestion that the HQ is maintained until such a time that the emergency situation in the Sector 4 and its immediate surroundings normalizes. It is also suggested that all the necessary requirements are provided to the HQ to enable it function more effectively. I further maintain that the TAC HQ will continue to serve a very useful purpose whether it is designated a 'Liaison Office' or which ever name it may assume later even after normalization in Sector 4.

5. Again, status of officers at the HQ having changed from Staff Officers to MILOBS should not be a reason for closing down the TAC HQ. As the situation stands now, Command has no other choice but to use MILOBS as Staff Officers for the simple reason that since the UNMOs terms and conditions of service are more attractive than that of a Staff Officer, troop contributing countries do not seem too eager to send staff officers but UNMOs. Therefore the only way one can continue the mission is to use <sup>with</sup> MILOBS on the ground for staff duties. This is the situation we have found ourselves for sometime now.

6. The above are my humble observations and suggestions. I shall avail myself for any further discussion on the issues raised.




7. I had wanted to discuss these issues personally with you before writing the report but upon my arrival in the afternoon you were not immediately available and the fact that I have to leave with the SRSB for Zaire tomorrow, I decided to put my thoughts on paper for your consideration.

8. Submitted for your information and consideration, please.

# UNAMI COMMAND AND CONTROL

ANNEX D TO  
OP ORDER 18  
DATED SEP 94



MEMORANDUM

9270-1 (Sig Ops)

10 Sep 94

D COS Ops

ASSESSMENT OF USE OF CYPHER ON FORCE COMD NET

THREAT

1. Given the current technology and it's avail, there is no doubt that both the RPA and the RGA have the capability to monitor UNAMIR's VHF and HF nets. Receivers/scanners covering the military VHF band are commercially avail anywhere. Whether either side is actually listening is unknown.

2. The RPA has little to gain from monitoring our comms other than satisfy a national reqr to monitor all foreign radio communication operating within its sovereign territory. All Force level info is already avail to the RPA LO at UNAMIR. The RGA/Interamwee, on the other hand, can draw tremendous int from monitoring UNAMIR's communications. Info on refugee movements and concentrations, food convoy schedules, actual names of refugees seeking relatives, UNAMIR's own int on RGA and Interamwee activities are but a few examples of the type of radio traffic that is being passed routinely on the Force Comd Net. Soon, as the RPA progressively takes over sect 4, UNAMIR comms will no doubt make ref to RPA tp mov and concentrations as well. This kind of int is of great value to any organized group determined to undermine UNAMIR's efforts and reputation. It could assist them greatly in concentrating their forces wherever they feel they can best disrupt UNAMIR's work. Quite possibly, refugees could be killed as a direct consequence of intercepts done on our Comd Net.

3. In UNFICYP and UNDOF, the use of CYPHER by UN forces automatically triggers a barrage jamming targeted at UN nets. I have no information to believe that the RPA/RGA forces have such a capability. Furthermore, RWANDA does not have the stability that currently prevails in Cyprus and on the Golan Heights.

UN CONSIDERATIONS

4. Up until today, UN forces have always operated their radio nets in PLAIN mode (except in some very specific cases in UNPROFOR and UNISOM where Canadian soldiers were in danger). This is aimed at promoting a climate of confidence and to demonstrate openness. Operating UNAMIR's command net in CYPHER could possibly raise suspicions.

5. The UN requirement to openness and confidence is valid and should be an overwhelming consideration when all parties of a given conflict have demonstrated their willingness at establishing peace. It is not the situation here in Rwanda. The UN policy to operate in PLAIN has not evolved with the various situations it's missions must deal with. In UNAMIR's case, operating in the plain could jeopardize the success of the Force.

6. UNAMIR's impartiality is not automatically compromised by our use of CYPHER nets. The parties involved would now get no information from our radio communications as opposed to all of them having access to

② DRE/COS

1. I tasked FSO to do this assessment to determine best option.

2. Cypher would be in our best interest as well as the RPA's; but would they "buy" it? Giving the LO a remote could placate them.

3. Your thoughts and dir pls.

1/2

DCOS ops  
10.9

DCOS OPS  
A few points came to my mind  
a. Do we have enough personnel to handle the cyphers for Comd in the field?  
b. Do the bns have cypher qual-ified personnel?  
c. What about FRATEBAST?  
the idea is good anyway  
Pse let my chief  
H. S. W. g  
DRE

it. The openness that UNAMIR should show to the legitimate government of the country is maintained through the RPA LOs at UNAMIR. It could be further enhanced, if we were to go CYPHER, by providing the LO with a remote off our Comd Net.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

7. CYPHER

a. Advantages

- (1) Preserves impartiality; and
- (2) Denies int source to forces that have already demonstrated their intentions at undermining UNAMIR's efforts and credibility, and

b. Disadvantages

- (1) Departs from a long established UN SOP, and
- (2) Creates an impression of secrecy which could be misinterpreted.

8. PLAIN

a. Advantage. Preserves impartiality, and

b. Disadvantage.

- (1) Provides a recognized hostile force with int that can be used to disrupt UNAMIR efforts.
- (2) UNAMIR could be effectively used by one party against the other.



P Rutherford  
Maj  
OC Force Signal squadron  
2012

MEMORANDUM

1000-1 (Camp Commandant)


9 Sep 94

DFC/COS

WPNS CLEARING BAY PROPOSAL/ UNAMIR HQ

Ref: Inter-Office Memo 1000.7(DFC)/G/1 dated 7 Sep 94

1. Attached is the proposed loc of clearing bays for UNAMIR HQ. Of note is the new loc of the bays at the front gate, the western entrance to the bldg, and the north eastern portion of the main parking lot.
2. It is realized that the wpns clearing bay at the entrance to the HQ is of primary concern due to a number of recent discharges. Direction will be given to complete this task away from the bldg. However it is felt after further review that the loc of the bay at the main entrance is a reminder to all entering the bldg to clear their wpns. The bay when properly constructed serves the purpose it is intended for and there should be no fears of injury or accident.
3. It is my recommendation that we commence a re-education of UNAMIR pers to clear their wpns away from the HQ bldg. Concurrently I also recommend that the wpns bay at the entrance remain there for the time being until all pers are aware of the new loc to clear their wpns.
4. The education process will be initiated at the front gate by the Defence and Security pers. All Contingents will be informed in writing subsequent to your approval.


  
P. Rutherford  
Maj  
Camp Commandant

Enclosure: 1

*Camp Commandant*  
*I agreed on your proposals*  
*Pse go ahead w/ bny for the delay*  
*1 wks max. H/L*  
*15/9*  
*DFC/COS*



# CLEARING PIT PROPOSAL



MEMORANDUM


9 Sept 94

Distribution List

EOD ACTIVITY

Ref: GH1/EOD/1/G, dated 3 Sep 94.

1. Please be advised that there are precautions to be taken to destroy the unexploded ordnance mentioned in subparas a - f of your letter. The demolition must be carried out with the concurrence of local authorities and using relevant security measures.

  
J. Arp  
COL  
D COS OPS

DISTRIBUTION LIST

<u>Action</u>	<u>Info</u>
GHANBATT	DFC/COS

Seen  
HJ  
10/9  
DFC/COS

**MEMORANDUM**

9 Sept 94

Distribution List

**MEETING OF ALL ENGINEERING REPRESENTATIVES**

1. Please be advised that a meeting of all engineering representatives is scheduled for 13 Sept 94, at 1100 hrs, at UNAMIR FHQ Conference Room.

Presence of the following persons is expected:

- a. D COS OPS;
  - b. FHQ Engr SO's;
  - c. Britcon, Cansigs, Ausmed Representatives;
  - c. Battalions' Representatives;
  - d. Sectors' Representatives;
  - e. NGOs'/HAC's Representatives; and
  - f. Civ Log Offr, B&R as well as Facilities Management Representatives.
2. The aim of the conference is to determine:
- a. In theatre, capability of each element (pers & equipment);
  - b. Review the task table and establish priorities;

- c. Identification of engineering resources and source of resources; and
- d. Establish weekly engineering meetings to review progress of tasks.

*J. Arp*  
J. Arp  
COL  
D COS OPS

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action            Info

EXTERNAL            COS/DFC

TAC HQ  
Sector 1  
Sector 2  
Sector 3  
Sector 4A  
Sector 4B  
Sector 4C  
Sector 5  
MILOB HQ  
CANSIGN  
BRITCON  
AUSMED  
UNDP

INTERNAL

HAC  
Civ Log Offr  
Brown & Root  
BMS

*Seen*  
*10/1*  
*DFC/OPS*

MEMORANDUM


9 Sept 94

Distribution List

AIRSTRIp DAMAGE

Ref: A letter from ETHIOBATT, dated 4 Sep 94.

1. Attached herewith the msg from FEO, dated 2 Sept 94 concerning data required from ETHIOBATT. Information received in the reference regarding the damage recently is not sufficient. Your prompt attention and cooperation is requested to avoid further delay of the CYANGUGU airstrip repair.

  
J. Arp  
COL  
D COS OPS

DISTRIBUTION LIST

<u>Action</u>	<u>Info</u>
ETHIOBAT	DFC/COS

Seen  
HJ  
10/9  
DFC/lw



MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - COTE DE SECURITE				FILE - DOSSIER		
PAGE	DATE-TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE - HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L' DIFF	CAI IAM	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE - TIME DATE - HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO					
OF DE										
BOOK DOSSIER	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS - INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE									URGENT

FROM - DE : FEO

TO - A : ETHIOBATT 40

URGENT 02 SEP 84 10.50 B

SUBJECT : AIRSTRIP DAMAGE

1. REGARDING YOUR MSG DATED 01 SEP 84 1200 B,  
IT IS HIGHLY ADVISED TO USE ETHIOPIAN  
ENGINEERS : CAPT SHFERAW SIRAW AND LT  
BRHANE MALESELAIE FOR DAMAGE ASSESSMENT  
OF THE CYANGUGU AIR-STRIP.  
IT WILL SPEED UP REPAIR CONSIDERABLY.
2. EXACT DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE IS REQUIRED  
INCL :
  - a. TYPE AND QUANTITY OF MATERIAL AND IF  
THERE ARE ANY RESOURCES.
  - b. SPECIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NOT  
AVAILABLE IN CYANGUGU
  - c. MANPOWER ASSESSMENT INCL. YOUR ENGI-  
NEERS TO BE USED.
3. REGARDING THE ENGINEERING RECD IN CYAN-  
GUGU, NO BASIC INFORMATION CONCERNING YOUR  
ELECTRICITY AND WATER-PIPELINE SYSTEM  
PROBLEMS WAS SENT BY ETHIOBATT TO UNAMIR-  
HQ SO FAR. THEREFORE WE CAN NOT PROVIDE  
ANY ASSISTANCE
4. REGARDS

DISTRIBUTION - DIFFUSION

DRAFTER - REDACTEUR			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS - DIRECTIVES SPECIALES	
NAME - NOM	OFFICE - BUREAU	TEL - TEL	Pass msg 011110 Sept 2/84	
RELEASING OFFICER - L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR				
NAME - NOM	OFFICE - BUREAU	TEL - TEL		
SIGNATURE			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - COTE DE SECURITE	

2) DECS 025

I suggest we  
discuss this before  
leaving the FC. I seem  
to agree entirely with  
the option of

J. S.  
10/19/65

①

HQ UNAMIR II

**FROM:** MAJ H.W. NICHOLSON *H.W. Nicholson*  
**TO:** DCOSOPS  
**FOR INFORMATION:** CLOGO  
**DATE:** 9 SEPTEMBER 1994  
**SUBJECT:** **DISPOSAL OF AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS LEFT OVER  
FROM THE RWANDAN CIVIL WAR**

1. ENCLOSED FIND A REPORT COMPLETED BY AN AMMUNITION TECHNICAL OFFICER FROM BRITCON ON THE AMMUNITION LOCATED IN SEA CONTAINERS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL HANGAR AND AT 3 CSG. ALSO LISTED IN THE REPORT ARE A SMALL NUMBER OF WEAPONS THAT WERE TAKEN FROM THE AIRPORT AND THE AMAHORO STADIUM.

#### AMMUNITION

2. AT THE AIRPORT THE AMMUNITION IS LOCATED SOME 100M FROM THE UNAMIR HELICOPTER TERMINAL. THE TERMINAL OPERATIONS ARE SUCH THAT BOTH HELICOPTERS AND BULK FUEL ARE STORED THERE AND THE PERSONNEL WHO OPERATE THE HELICOPTER SLEEP IN THAT LOCATION. AT 3 CSG THE AMMUNITION IS ALSO STORED IN SEA CONTAINERS NEXT TO A BULK FUEL STORAGE FACILITY AND NEXT TO 3 CSG PERSONNEL SLEEPING ACCOMMODATION. AS CAN BE SEEN THIS IS A SAFETY HAZARD.

3. THE PROBLEM FACING UNAMIR IS WHAT TO DO WITH THE AMMUNITION NOW. I BELIEVE THERE ARE FOUR OPTIONS. THESE OPTIONS ARE DISCUSSED BELOW

#### OPTIONS ONE

4. *STORE ALL THE AMMUNITION FOR FUTURE USE.* THIS OPTION IS A VERY COSTLY ONE IN THAT A SUITABLY SECURE AND SAFE LOCATION WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND, AS THE TWO CURRENT LOCATIONS ARE NOT SAFE. IN ADDITION A GUARD WOULD HAVE TO BE PLACED ON THE AMMUNITION TO STOP THEFT. IT IS ALSO DOUBTFUL THAT UNAMIR HAS A FUTURE USE FOR AMMUNITION OF THESE NATURES.

#### ② DFC/COS

1. *Suggest we exercise recommended option 4.*
2. *I have att a copy of the FC's dir re confiscated wpns. Accordingly, suggest we dir BritCon to turn wpns to BBGNU officials.*

*DC*  
*DCOS OPS*  
*10.9*

## **OPTION TWO**

5. *ISSUE THE AMMUNITION TO CONTINGENTS.* WHILST THIS OPTION SOLVES AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IT ONLY CREATES A PROBLEM FOR CONTINGENTS. FURTHER, GIVEN THE CURRENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, CONTINGENTS WILL HAVE NO REQUIREMENT FOR MANY OF THESE NATURES OF AMMUNITION AND INDEED UNNY MAY QUESTION WHY WE HAVE ARMED THE CONTINGENTS WITH SOME OF THESE MUNITIONS.

## **OPTION THREE**

6. *ISSUE THE AMMUNITION TO CONTINGENTS FOR TRAINING.* THIS OPTION OFFERS A BONUS FOR CONTINGENTS AND GAINS SOME TRAINING VALUE FROM THE AMMUNITION. IT WOULD ALSO OFFER A TRAINING OPPORTUNITY FOR SOME CONTINGENTS NOT AVAILABLE IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THE DISADVANTAGE TO THIS OPTION IS ONE OF SAFETY AND:

- A. A CONTINGENTS ABILITY TO SAFELY CONDUCT THE RANGE PRACTICES;
- B. THE AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE RANGES, AND
- C. THE LIABILITY OF THE UN IF A SOLDIER WAS INJURED OR KILLED DURING ONE OF THESE PRACTICES.

## **OPTION FOUR**

7. *DESTROY MORE HAZARDOUS NATURES, ISSUE THE MAJORITY OF SMALL ARMS AND STORE A SMALL AMOUNT OF THE SMALL ARMS.* THIS OPTION IS A VERY SAFE OPTION FOR UNAMIR. IT WOULD INVOLVE DESTROYING ALL NATURES EXCEPT:

- A. SMALL ARMS TO 50 CALL AND 14.5 BALL CHAIN.;
- B. SMOKE GRENADES SIGNAL;
- C. SMOKE POT; AND
- D. SIGNAL FLARE.

8. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE ABOVE NATURES AND TYPES CAN BE STORED SAFELY AND USED TO EFFECT BY UNAMIR. IT WOULD ALLOW UNAMIR TO MAKE ISSUES TO CONTINGENTS THAT ARRIVE WITHOUT THEIR AMMUNITION AND IN ADDITION THE SMOKE GRENADES, POTS AND SIGNAL FLARES CAN BE EMPLOYED

IN HELICOPTER RESCUE AND AME OPERATIONS. THIS OPTION IS BELIEVED TO BE THE BEST OPTION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

- A. IT IS THE SAFEST OPTION WITH REGARD TO UNAMIR PERSONNEL;
- B. IT ALLOWS STORAGE OF SMALL QUANTITIES OF SMALL ARMS IN 3 CSG WITH LITTLE TO NO THREAT TO THE DEPORT PERSONNEL WITHOUT AN ADDITIONAL REAL ESTATE OR SECURITY BILL;
- C. IT IS BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A MORE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR UNNY; AND
- D. IT IS BY FAR THE LESS COSTLY METHOD TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

9. I RECOMMEND THAT OPTION FOUR BE APPROVED FOR THE REASONS STATED. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT BRITCON BE TASKED WITH THE DISPOSAL OF THE NATURES OF AMMUNITION LISTED IN THE ENCLOSURE LESS THE ITEMS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 7. THE PRIORITY FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE AMMUNITION SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE AMMUNITION LOCATED AT THE AIRPORT AS THE SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT IS NOT SATISFACTORY. THE AMMUNITION AT 3 CSG AT 3 CSG SHOULD THEN BE DISPOSED AS RECOMMENDED IN OPTION FOUR. I ALSO REQUEST YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE ISSUE OF THE REMAINING SMALL ARMS TO CONTINGENTS.

#### **WEAPONS**

10. THERE IS A SMALL NUMBER OF WEAPONS THAT WERE COLLECTED AND ARE NOW STORED AT 3 CSG. I AM UNAWARE ON THE UN POLICY CONCERNING THE DISBURSEMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF CAPTURED WEAPONS. THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF ISSUING THE WEAPONS TO THE RPA OR BY GIVING THEM TO CONTINGENTS IS UNKNOWN. I REQUEST YOUR GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER



1390/8

HQ UNAMIR  
KIGALI

HQ BRITCON  
KIGALI

7 SEP 94

UN AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS HELD  
AT 3 CSG AND KIGALI AIRFIELD

AMMUNITION

CURRENT SITUATION

1. Attached to this letter are the details of the ammo held at both 3 CSG and KIGALI airfield. The ammo held at 3 CSG was found within the AMAHORO STADIUM by CANSIGs and was left behind by the BANGLADESHI contingent to UNAMIR ONE. The ammo held in the ISO containers adjacent to the PRESIDENTIAL HANGER at the airport was left by the BELGIAN contingent to UNAMIR ONE. Both caches were left in a state of disarray by forces who left in considerable haste during the civil war. Consequently, not all the ammo is in a serviceable condition. This unserviceable ammo has been identified, segregated and is to be disposed of explosively by the BRITCON EOD team.

2. Although there has been no scope for a full technical inspection of the ammo, it has been checked for safety by a BRITISH AMMUNITION TECHNICAL OFFICER (ATO). The storage facilities within UNAMIR are not ideal and the different regulations employed by the various contingents may lead to differing views as to the use and distribution of the ammo. This report therefore is based on BRITISH regulations with a technical appraisal of in theatre expediences.

3. All the ammunition is safe and may be safely stored in its present location until more suitable arrangements have been made. Neither locations are ideal and it should be noted that ammo of HD 1.1 (representing a mass explosion hazard) is stored at both locations. This means that although there is little chance of the ammo exploding, any event/accident involving the storage locations could become catastrophic. An accident involving the ammo at either location could result in mass explosions coupled with a projection hazard ranging out to 300m.

4. A full inspection of the ammo could be performed only if a team of ATOs is established with specific responsibilities to inspect, repair and repack UNAMIR/indigenous ammo. This team would require basic tools and equipment coupled with materials to allow them to repackaging substantial amount of the loose ammo.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that no action be taken until all the unserviceable ammo has been destroyed and any issue of ammo there after, from either location, be coordinated by BRITCON. This

will ensure that no unserviceable ammo is mistakenly issued to a UNAMIR contingent.

6. To store the ammo safely, it is recommended that it be stored in lockable/secure container, under armed guard, located a minimum of 400m from living accn and other hazardous areas such as fuel installations.

7. It is recommended that:

a. The small arms ammo (SAA) is distributed throughout the UNAMIR contingents as its storage is simple and there is no significant hazard.

b. All ammo that is not packed in its primary packaging is destroyed.

c. All white phosphorous filled munitions be destroyed.


d. If safe storage cannot be found for the HD 1.1 natures, then it should be destroyed.

8. All the small arms ammo (SAA) may be distributed throughout the UNAMIR contingents as there is no significant hazard from its storage. Although the majority of the SAA is serviceable, a limited amount requires cleaning which may be done by any competent individual; it should be noted that there may be a high percentage of stoppages experienced with belt fed ammo due to the age/state of the link and feed problems may be experienced with the ball ammo. There is currently no plan for BRITCON personnel to perform a 100% inspection of the SAA.

9. If UNAMIR require a formal inspection of these munitions and any others that may be found, then it is suggested that a team of AMMUNITION TECHNICIANS (ATs) be incorporated into the orbat. This will have to be formally staffed and the adhoc use of technically qualified personnel within UNAMIR should be avoided.

#### WEAPONS

10. None of the weapons were inspected for serviceability, however they were checked to ensure that they were safe. The principles underpinning the distribution of these weapons is a UNAMIR responsibility, however it is suggested that the heavy weapons are incompatible with the current UNAMIR MISSION.

  
A. J. DUNCAN  
Capt  
for COMBRITCON

# AMMUNITION HELD AT KIGALI AIRFIELD

NATURE	LOT/BATCH	QTY	REMARKS
84MM A/TK	DN 68 001	130	OLD AMMO BUT STILL SERVICEABLE 14 RDS ARE NOT BOXED BUT ARE FIT FOR STORAGE.
ROCKET 66MM	IRA 81	65	
81MM MOR HE	22-FZ-64	544	W/PD FZE
81MM MOR SMK	PRB71A	114	WHITE PHOSPHOROUS
81MM MOR ILLUM	8BT71	120	
60MM MOR HE	MA-19-71	577	W/PD FZE, 97 LOOSE AND RECOMMENDED FOR DISPOSAL
60MM MOR SMK	1PRB85/OEPRA 85	226	WHITE PHOSPHOROUS
60MM MOR ILLUM	0A-1-94	144	
GDE SMK M50	ASSORTED	468	WHITE PHOSPHOROUS. STORAGE OF THESE IS DIFFICULT AND IS NOT RECOMMENDED.
GDE M72 HE	ASSORTED	1219	480 IN PRIMARY PACK, 739 PRIMED AND LOOSE PACKED. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE LOOSE PACKED AMMO BE DESTROYED
GDE SMK SIGNAL	ASSORTED	5	ASSORTED COLOURS
SMK POT SIGNAL	ASSORTED	120	ASSORTED COLOURS
FLARE GROUND INDICTING	02FHD82	25	
GDE M41A2 MK2 HE	RA-9-6	100	
HAND THROWER	02PRB82	51	GERMAN WHITE PHOSPHOROUS INCENDIARY
TRIP FLARE	04PRB83	24	
7.62 4B1T	01FNB03	10230	
7.62 1B1T	ASSORTED	15080	
7.62 BALL	1FNB78	6080	

7.62 CLIP	ASSORTED	1230	
.50 LINK 1B1T	37BFN	1700	
9MM BALL	FN34062	3375	
ASSORTED SAA	NA	5000	APPROX, LOOSE



1/9/94

AMMUNITION & WEAPONS SEIZED FROM STADIUM & AIRPORT

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	QTY	LOCATION	COMMENTS
ARGES 84 GRENADE		432	AMMO # 2	
FUSES FOR ARGES 84		140	AMMO # 2	
60mm MORTAR HE TYPE 03		240	AMMO # 2	
40mm ROCKET HEAT TYPE 56		42	AMMO # 3	
40mm ROCKET HEAT TYPE 69		9	AMMO # 3	
26mm SIGNAL FLARE WHITE		70	AMMO # 2	
26mm SIGNAL FLARE RED		59	AMMO # 2	
26mm SIGNAL FLARE GREEN		68	AMMO # 2	
105mm HEAT ROUNDS		48	AMMO # 3	
7.62mm SMG/LMG TYPE 56		53860	AMMO # 2	
7.62mm X 25mm BALL PISTOL		210	AMMO # 2	
14.5mm BALL CHAIN		8510	AMMO # 2	
NOBEL'S EXPLOSIVE C4		10 STICKS	AMMO #1	SEPARATION FOR DISPOSAL
DETONATOR'S		20	WAREHOUSE	SEPARATION FOR DISPOSAL
50 CAL CHAIN USA		89800	AMMO # 4	
50 CAL CHAIN USA		8400	AMMO # 1	
7.62mm X 54mm SMG TYPE 57		14827	AMMO # 2	
7.62mm TRACER NSN 1305-13-112-6095		4280	AMMO # 2	



# AMMUNITION & WEAPONS SEIZED FROM STADIUM & AIRPORT CON'T

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	QTY	LOCATION	COMMENTS
62mm FOR M-59 BELGIQUE		860	AMMO # 2	
62mm FROM GHANA		2000	AMMO # 2	
62mm X 51mm FROM SPAIN		14500	AMMO # 2	
62mm X 38mm		475	AMMO # 2	
62mm BLANKS		21	AMMO # 1	
MG 7.62mm BELGIQUE	M4/40224	1	AMMO # 1	
MG 7.62mm BELGIQUE	M2/1872	1	AMMO # 1	
MG 7.62mm BARREL	402243	1	AMMO # 1	
62mm SPARE BARREL	KH3292	1	AMMO # 2	
62mm SMG BARREL SPARE	82	1	AMMO # 2	
62mm SMG BARREL SPARE	94	1	AMMO # 2	
62mm SMG BARREL SPARE	792186	1	AMMO # 2	
62mm SMG BARREL SPARE	792186	1	AMMO # 2	
81mm MORTAR KIT	151226	1	AMMO # 2	
81mm MORTAR KIT	151226	1	AMMO # 2	
81mm MORTAR KIT	150210	1	AMMO # 2	
81mm MORTAR KIT	150209	1	AMMO # 2	

## AMMUNITION & WEAPONS SEIZED FROM STADIUM & AIRPORT CON'T

[illegible]

1/9/94

3CSG WEAPONS & AMMO

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	QTY	LOCATION	COMMENTS
50 CAL FOR APC	1874707	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	1870635	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	1859413	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	819716	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	3005324	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	1175051	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	101787	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	1364220	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	806498	1	APC C3571	USE FOR CSG DEFENCE FORCE
50 CAL FOR APC	3004742	1	APC MSJ13975	USE FOR CSG DEFENCE FORCE
50 CAL FOR APC	1290060	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	481321	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	825815	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	3001722	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	815662	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	1174383	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	480326	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	3005701	1	AMMO # 1	

DESCRIPTION	SERIAL #	QTY	LOCATION	COMMENTS
50 CAL FOR APC	1438801	1	AMMO # 1	
50 CAL FOR APC	828930	1	AMMO # 1	
BARREL 50 CAL		36	AMMO # 1	
SMG RUSSIAN	NB2081	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG RUSSIAN	NB1309	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG RUSSIAN	NB104	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG RUSSIAN	NB1939	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG RUSSIAN	NB1914	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG RUSSIAN	NB2060	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG RUSSIAN	NB2144	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG RUSSIAN	NB2248	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG BELGIQUE 7.62mm	M4/40224	1	AMMO # 1	
SMG BELGIQUE 7.62mm	M2/1872	1	AMMO # 1	
BARREL 7.62mm SMG	402243	1	AMMO # 1	
14.5mm RUSSIAN / BTR 80	1033	1	AMMO # 1	
14.5mm RUSSIAN / BTR 80	3491	1	AMMO # 1	
14.5mm RUSSIAN / BTR 80	1003	1	AMMO # 1	
14.5mm RUSSIAN / BTR 80	0886	1	AMMO # 1	



### 3CSG WEAPONS & AMMO

[illegible]



UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
Kigali

August, 1994

3000.15(Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: FC DIRECTIVE FOR THE DISPOSAL OF  
SEIZED WEAPONS IN UNAMIR AOR

GENERAL

1. For the return of law and order in Rwanda, it is imperative that the Rwandan population including ex-RGF and self defence groups within the UNAMIR AOR are disarmed.

AIM

2. The aim of this directive is to outline the procedure for disposal of seized weapons within UNAMIR AOR.

DEFINITION

3. Weapon. For the purpose of this directive a weapon will be defined as any object which can be used to cause physical harm to an individual. This includes fire arms, machetes, bows and arrows, knives, swords, bayonets and spears.

DISPOSAL PROCEDURE

4. All unauthorized arms and ammunition and explosives confiscated will be disposed as follows:

- a. All Sectors will set up a secure Weapon Collection Point where seized weapons will be collected within each Sector.
- b. Seized weapons will be made safe and unloaded before transportation to all Weapon Collection Points.
- c. Sector HQs will document all weapons seized in sector and forward a copy of the list to UNAMIR HQ (Operations).
- d. Sector HQ will arrange transportation of weapons under MILOB escort to UNAMIR HQ Weapon Collection Point at Log Base (Rwandex).
- e. Ammunition and explosives will be treated similarly as above, unless dangerous for transportation which will then be

either repacked by a qualified ammunition expert or destroyed by qualified EOD personnel in situ.

f. Subject to the approval of the Force Commander, UNAMIR HQ will handover all confiscated weapons and munitions to the appropriate Rwandan Government agency.

5. This instruction is effective on receipt.

GC TOUSIGNANT  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Sector 1  
Sector 2  
Sector 3  
Sector 4A  
Sector 4B  
Sector 4C  
Sector 5  
MILOB GP HQ  
CANSIGS  
BRITCON  
AUSMED

Internal:

Info:

DFC  
CAO  
DCOS Ops  
Tac HQ  
G3 Plans  
G4 Log  
CMPO  
G3 Engr