PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[1 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

[5 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG APR 2009

Off of SRSG

Received 4-8-95
2.000
File: Military

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.26(Plans)

To: See Distribution

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 4 Aug 95

Subject: **FORCE STRUCTURE & DRAW DOWN OF UNAMIR FORCES**

References:

A. G3 Plans 5000.26 (Plans) dated 27 Jun'95

B. FC Brief (Re-allocation of the Medical company strength) dated 4 Aug 95

1. At Reference A you were advised of the UNAMIR force structure and draw down plan to comply with the new mandate. In that plan a formed troop strength of 100 personnel was allocated to the medical company replacement for AUSMED. However, due to the inability of the UN to get a military replacement for AUSMED, medical support will be provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (Level 2 hospital) from 23 Aug 95.

2. Therefore, the Force Commander has approved the re-allocation of the medical company formed troop strength (vide Reference B) as follows:

a. INDBATT will maintain their current formed troop strength at 725 by retaining the 65 personnel that were to be repatriated over the period 5 - 8 Oct 95.

b. The Military Police platoon will be maintained at its current strength of 58 personnel by retaining the 13 personnel yet to be repatriated.

c. The staff officer strength of the HQ will be decreased to 42 personnel, instead of 35, to allow extra support to be provided in the area the FMO, G4, etc; and

d. The Indian Movement Control Unit of 15 personnel will remain for the duration of the mission to assist with the final withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda. This is yet to be officially approved by UN HQ New York.

3. Please find enclosed an updated UNAMIR Drawdown and Rotation Plan (effective date 4 Aug 95) for your information.

Distribution List:

List A
List B
List D
List E

INI
GHA
NIC
MAL
MAL
HQ
ENG
SIG
95
MOV
MP
TOTA

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

POUR VOTRE INFORMATION

A: S. BUO

DE: Wilfrid de Souza

Bureau: 4044 Ext: 11001

Date: 4 Août 1995

Incidents

File: Military
2) Incidents

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: RPA LO to UNAMIR **File Reference:** FC/FL/02/OPS

From: G Tousignant
Acting Head of Mission &
Force Commander

Date: 03 Aug 95

Subject: PROTEST AGAINST UNAMIR TROOPS' MISBEHAVIOUR ON THE ROAD

Reference: Your letter dated 01 Aug 95 on above-mentioned subject.

1. With regard to your above-referenced letter concerning the incident of a UNAMIR vehicle running into a Rwandan VIP motorcade, please be assured that those concerned will be reprimanded in order that such an incident does not occur again. It is also unfortunate that the Australian soldiers refused to proceed to the Gendarmerie.

2. The incident is indeed regretted, however, equally regrettable is the behaviour of the RPA soldiers who forcibly removed the UNAMIR troops from their vehicle, assaulted four of them resulting in serious injuries. They also confiscated their personal weapons and radio sets. These acts are a gross violation of the Status of Mission Agreement and this high handed attitude, with scant regard to legal provisions, is unacceptable to UNAMIR.

3. It is requested that the RPA soldiers and the Gendarmerie be instructed accordingly to follow the rules and orders as laid-down, instead of acting arbitrarily. Should there be any further problems or misunderstandings, do not hesitate to approach me in order that these issues can be resolved amicably.

4. Your cooperation in following laid-down procedures when dealing with similar situations in the future would be highly appreciated.

cc: VP/Minister of Defence
RPA COS
N GD COS

file: Military

UNAMIR Humanitarian Support For Rwanda

Transportation:

UNAMIR vehicles provided for:

a. Return of 57,000 IDP's and thousands of refugees;
b. Movement of thousands of orphans to orphanages;
c. Move thousands of loads of foodstuffs/seeds to ensure proper settlement of returnees at home;
d. Nationwide distribution of exam papers;
e. Nationwide distribution of new Rwandese currency;
f. Re-allocation of 2,400 prisoners to less crowded prisons;
g. Evacuation of serious casualties to hospitals;
h. Deliver coffins for genocide anniversary ceremonies;
i. The gift of ten vehicles to the Rwandan government.

Preventive Medical Services:

a. Preventive medical clinics conducted at Kigali, Kilibra, Muyumba and Rilima;
b. Bacterial water analysis, waste disposal advice, vector control programs for orphanages throughout Rwanda;
c. Larvae and fly control, water analysis, waste disposal;
d. Supervision of mass burials and disinfection of grave sites at Kibeho and Gisenyi IDP camps;
e. 6,000 children immunized against meningitis;
f. 800 children immunized against measles.

Medical Treatment:

a. 260,000 Rwandans treated as outpatients (approximately 1,000/day);
b. 2,500 Rwandans treated for dental problems;
c. 2,000 Rwandans treated as inpatients for diagnostic, surgical and intensive care needs;
d. 580 medical evacuations for Rwandans seriously injured by vehicle accidents, mine incidents and serious illness;
e. 330 medical evacuations from Kibeho Camp.

Medical Training:

a. Education of Rwandan medical/nursing staff in dressing, sterilization, surgical and resuscitation procedures, nursing systems and x-ray equipment operation;
b. Course development for training of 500 local nurse auxiliaries.

Demining:

Demining activities conducted in Kigali, Rwamagana and Ndera.

Explosive Ordinance Disposal:

Hundreds of EOD tasks completed rendering many schools, orphanages, churches, government buildings and ministerial residences safe from explosive, [illegible], mortar and rocket ordnance throughout Rwanda.

Roads and Bridges:

Bridges constructed at Busoro, Gatuna and Nyamata and repaired at Nyamata and Mata.

Maintenance and Recovery:

a. Recovery equipment and expertise provided extensively throughout Rwanda to clear wrecked vehicles.
b. Repair of essential Rwandan Government and RPA vehicles.

Communications Support:

a. Repair, maintenance and re-establishing of RwandaTel local lines, Radio Duplexers and VHF radio repeater;
b. Repair of Nyanza satellite equipment;
c. Provision of field cables in home communes and generators on loan to the Rwandan government.

Training:

a. CivPol trained more than 400 Gendarmes whose school was renovated at a cost of $30,000;
b. Training of RPA non-commissioned officers in drill and military music.

Agricultural Activities:

UNAMIR troops have assisted farmers with the weeding, cultivating and harvesting of their crops.

Public Relations:

a. Video and still footage coverage of various governmental functions including International Women's Day and Genocide Anniversary ceremonies;
b. Provided public address systems to local authorities during mass activities like reburial ceremonies.
c. Organized and participated in various sports competitions with the local population and the RPA;
d. Band entertainment at various official functions.

Social Affairs Activities:

a. Aid, food, transport, water, electricity, clothing, toys, playground equipment, medical assistance, pest control and transport assistance provided to many Rwandan orphanages;
b. Prisoner identification project initiated to register all prisoners.

Miscellaneous And Future Tasks:

a. Restoration of water/electrical supplies in Kigali, Cyangugu, Byumba and Kibungo;
b. Bulldozer taskings throughout Rwanda;
c. Track construction and improvement at various sites;
d. Reconnaissance of Nyanza, Kibuye, Gitarama, Gitagana and Nsinda prisons to determine how to improve conditions.

File : UNAMIR Military

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING FAX NO. 3675
MIR NO. 1837
MISC NO.

PAGE 1 OF 7

25 May 1995

TO:	**MR. YASUHIRO UEKI** **OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN** **DPI, UNHQ, NEW YORK**	**FROM:**	**ISMAEL A. DIALLO** **UNAMIR SPOKESMAN** **KIGALI** Adiallo
FAX NO:	**212 963 7055**	**PHONE:** **FAX NO:**	**212-963-3582** **212-963-3090**
SUBJECT:	**SPOKESMAN'S REPORT OF 25 MAY 1995**		

Upon your request please find herewith attached all available information on "the two rwandese fugitives".

Regards.

2/7

BRIEF FOR THE FC AND SRSG
ON
THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE FRGF PERSONNEL

Background

- On 14 May 95 at 0600 hrs two Rwandese reported to a ZAMBATT location in the Rwamiko area and requested protection. The individuals claimed to be Second Lieutenant Faustin Nduwimana (of the Former Government Forces) and Ngabo Yves Bizimungu (the son of the former Rwandan Government Minister of Health) and had been part of the mass flight of IDPs that broke the RPA cordon of Kibeho camp on 22 Apr 95.

- These individuals agreed to be interviewed by UNAMIR regarding the incident at Kibeho camp and to give information about FRGF/Interhamwe activity in the camps. They also volunteered to appear before the International Commission investigating the events of 22 Apr 95 at Kibeho camp. They were then questioned by UNAMIR personnel to establish if they had committed any crimes with a view to handing them to the government if they were suspected. After checking their names against the list held by the International Tribunal it could not be established that they were implicated in the genocide.

- At that stage, because no guilt was suspected, they were informed that UNAMIR could not offer indefinite protection. They were therefore offered the choice of being taken to the Rwandan civil authorities or being allowed to go free. They requested to be taken the Ruhengeri area.

- Subsequently, it has been learnt that the two men have been arrested by the RPA, who suspect that the men did in fact participate in the genocide.

Why they were moved to Kigali

- The individuals were brought to Kigali for interview rather than possibly wasting limited time and resources in sending an interview team from UNAMIR and the International Commission to Rwamiko. It was also the intention to pass these individuals over to Rwandan government authorities if they were found to have been involved in the genocide or insurgent activities.

Why they were taken to the Ruhengeri area

- Once it was established that the individuals had not participated in the genocide and did not need to be handed to the civil authority, they were informed that UNAMIR could not offer indefinite protection. They were therefore offered the choice of being taken to the Rwandan civil authority or being allowed to go free. They requested to be taken to the Ruhengeri area.

- Subsequently, it has been learnt that the two men have been arrested by the RPA, who suspect that they did in fact participate in the genocide.

Brief prepared by LTCOL S.J. Dunn, G3PLANS
In consultation with: G3OPS, PM and SO3 G2
18 May 95

3/7

Mr - Brallo
Jeremiah Hon 14/5/95

When Bizimungu and his guard sought "protection" (or was asylum?) with ZAMBATT, was it known that they were fugitives being sought by the RPA and hence "alleged criminals"?

On 14 May 95 at 0600 hrs two Rwandese reported to a ZAMBATT location in the Rwamiko area and requested protection. The individuals claimed to be Second Lieutenant Faustin Nduwimana (of the Former Government Forces) and Ngabo Yves Bizimungu (the son of the former Rwandan Government Minister of Health) and had been part of the mass flight of IDPs that broke the RPA cordon of Kibeho camp on 22 Apr 95. UNAMIR was unaware that these individuals were being sought by the RPA at that stage.

If so, why was not the normal procedure followed ie. a) report to ICRC, b) interview with Human Rights Monitors, c) handover to civilian prosecutor?

Not applicable.

Who initiated the idea of the two fugitives being brought before the Inquiry Commission (the Commission only wanted witnesses who volunteered). Did the two fugitives demand to go before the commission or was it suggested to them?

The individuals agreed to be interviewed by UNAMIR regarding the incident at Kibeho camp and to give information about FRGF/Interhamwe activity in the camps. UNAMIR asked the individuals if they wished to give evidence before the International Commission investigating the Kibeho incident. They volunteered to give evidence before the commission.

Once they had volunteered, did the Commission ask that they be bought to Kigali? Or was this initiative taken by UNAMIR?

The individuals were brought to Kigali for interview rather than possibly wasting limited time and resources in sending an interview team from UNAMIR and the International Commission to Gikongoro. It was also the intention to pass these individuals over to Rwandan government authorities if they were found to have been involved in the genocide or insurgent activities.

Were the fugitives brought in UNAMIR uniforms? How were they brought? Where did they stay?

When the individuals reported to ZAMBATT they were dressed in dirty civilian attire which they remained in when appearing before the commission and at the time of their release from the TUNBATT location in Matura. At no time were the two individuals given UNAMIR uniforms. A UNAMIR helicopter was used to transport the two from Gikongoro to Kigali and Kigali to Matura. They remained at ZAMBATT Tac HQ Gikongoro on the night 14 May 95 and INDBATT location (SOALTEE) on night 15 May 95.

Was information regarding their presence with UNAMIR conveyed to the government at any stage?

The government was not advised of their presence.

4/7

After their evidence to the commission, why were they taken to Matura? Why were they transported in a helicopter? By now, it must have been evident that they were "criminals" on the run, was it not realised that taking them to Matura (instead of Gikongoro where they reported of even Kigali) and setting them free was tantamount to helping them escape? .

Once it was established that the individuals had not participated in the genocide and did not need to be handed to the civil authority, they were informed that UNAMIR could not offer indefinite protection. They were therefore offered the choice of being taken to the Rwandan civil authority or being allowed to go free. They initially requested to be taken to Zaire, via Burundi, however, this request was refused outright by UNAMIR. They then requested to be taken to the Ruhengeri area. It was assumed that this was the area of their home commune. .

5/7

PRESS RELEASE / draft; not released

On 14 May. 95 two Rwandese Citizens named FAUSTIN NDUWIMANA and NGABO YVES BIZIMUNGU reported to UNAMIR troops in Gikongoro prefecture and volunteered to be interviewed by the International Commission investigating the Kibeho incident. They claimed that they were connected with the Former Government and have been in Kibeho since August 1994. Investigations by UNAMIR revealed Faustin Nduwimana to be a Second-Lieutenant in the Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF) and NGABO YVES BIZIMUNGU to be son of Mr CAZIMIYA BIZIMUNGU, former Rwandan Government Minister of Health.

Based on their requests, both men were brought to Kigali to testify before the Investigation Commission and later to be released if found uninvolved in criminal activities or, if involved, for handing over to the Public Prosecutor's office. Investigations indicated that these persons had not been participants in the Genocide and were in Kibeho IDP camp on 22 Apr 95 and escaped when the cordon was broken. Later on they were moving around the general area before they reported to UNAMIR troops.

The release of these persons by UNAMIR was on the premise that they were innocent and had requested transportation to the Ruhengeri area. As helicopters were moving in the general area of Mutura, the individuals were helicoptered to that place after which they were free to move wherever they wanted.

This was done in good faith by the staff of UNAMIR with no intentions of being pro-FRGF or anti-RPA. A detailed report on the issue will also be circulated to all affected agencies.

6/7

DAILY REPORT ON RADIO RWANDA PROGRAMMES

Kigali, May 25, 1995 - The Rwandese Vice-President and Minister for Defense, Major-General Paul Kagame on Wednesday returned home from his official visit in Uganda. Asked about the accusations against UNAMIR that it had assisted prisoners to escape from Butare Prison and was collaborating with Interahamwe elements in Zaire, Vice-President Kagame responded that such acts were causing insecurity and were in violation of the Rwandese laws, and said that he would discuss the issue with UNAMIR leaders for such acts not to occur again.

On the question about the extension of UNAMIR's mandate in Rwanda, Paul Kagame said that Rwanda should enjoy its full sovereignty for Rwandese population to deal with their problems but that Rwanda also needed foreign assistance to address its problems. He indicated that the question of UNAMIR's new mandate and the number of UNAMIR troops who would remain in Rwanda would be well discussed and the views of the Government, UNAMIR, and the UN Security Council would be all considered.

- The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Rwanda, Ambassador Shaharyar Khan, on Wednesday at a press conference in Kigali, categorically denied the allegations that UNAMIR had assisted two people to escape from Butare Prison. Mr. Khan explained that three people, including the son of the former
XXXX→ Minister of Health, Casmir Bizimungu, and two guards, had secretly infiltrated into Rwanda from Zaire, and were arrested and put into Butare Prison. The three people managed to escape from the prison and found refuge into Kibeho camp. When the Kibeho camp was closed, one of the three men, a guard, was shot and killed. The two others fled to Zambatt compound to seek protection. They were identified as coming from Kibeho camp and one of the UNAMIR soldiers proposed that the two men be sent to Kigali to give testimony before the international commission on Kibeho incidents. After being heard in Kigali, where they were brought in helicopter, they asked UNAMIR to help them go out of the country. UNAMIR refused. Finally UNAMR decided to bring them to their commune of origin in helicopter, in Mutura, to go out of the country if they wanted, on their own, and they were arrested when they arrived there.

XXXX→ Minister of Health, Casimir Bizimungu, and two guards, had secretly

Mr. Khan recognized that it was a mistake to carry the two men in helicopter, but that higher UNAMIR authorities and himself were not informed.

- Ambassador Khan announced that it was agreed with the Rwandese Government that the mandate of UNAMIR would be extended for another 6 months, but that the number of UNAMIR troops who would remain in Rwanda was still being discussed. He pointed out that under the next mandate, UNAMIR would assist Rwanda in the development of tea plantation projects, and extraction of mines.

Mr. Bro
file: Militar
2) OUT FAX

UNITED NATIONS **NATIONS UNIES**

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING FAX NO. _____ PAGE 1 OF 2

MIR NO. _____

MISC NO. _____

TO: Resident Coordinators of the United Nations - Addis Abeba, Ethiopia - Tunis, Tunisia - Dakar, Senegal - Accra, Ghana	FROM: Dr. Abdul H. Kabia Executive Director Office of the SRSG UNAMIR KIGALI, RWANDA
INFO: SRSG FC CAO AIROPS CDTS Contingents of the countries concerned	DATE: 12 January 1995
ADDIS-ABEBA FAX: (251)-1-514599 TUNIS FAX: (216)-1-560094 DAKAR FAX: (221)-23-5500 ACCRA FAX: (233)-21-773899	PHONE: 212-963-3093 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
EDITOR: B.P. Dessande	SECTION: Protocol
SUBJECT: Visit to the African nations participating in UNAMIR Forces	

AAA. THE ASSISTANCE OF UNDP RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: ETHIOPIA, TUNISIA, SENEGAL ET GHANA, IS SOLICITED TO FACILITATE THE COURTESY VISIT OF UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER WHICH MAJOR GENERAL GUY CLAUDE TOUSIGNANT ENVISAGES FROM 6 TO 12 FEBRUARY IN THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNTRIES. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN AIDE-DE-CAMP, CAPTAIN JEAN-YVES SAINT-DENIS.

BBB. THE PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT IS TO MEET WITH MILITARY OFFICERS FROM EACH OF THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO INFORM THEM OF THE PREVIOUS AND CURRENT PARTICIPATION OF THEIR TROOPS IN THE UNAMIR FORCE AS WELL AS TO SPARK A GREATER INTEREST IN THEIR FUTURE INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA. GENERAL TOUSIGNANT WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH THE CHIEFS OF STAFF AND ALL POLITICAL PERSONALITIES THAT WISH TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY

SITUATION IN RWANDA.

CCC. THE GENERAL WILL TRAVEL VIA A UNITED NATIONS LEAR JET WHOSE CHARACTERISTICS WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO YOU WITH SUFFICIENT TIME LEFT TO SOLICIT ALL REQUIRED AUTHORIZATIONS REGARDING FLIGHTS OVER THEIR TERRITORY AND LANDING FROM THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES.

DDD. THE PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR THIS VISIT IS THE FOLLOWING:

A) ADDIS ABEBA 6 TO 7 FEBRUARY 1995
B) TUNIS 7 TO 9 FEBRUARY 1995
C) DAKAR 9 TO 10 FEBRUARY 1995
D) ACCRA 10 TO 12 FEBRUARY 1995

EEE. WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD 1) INFORM THE GOVERNMENT OF EACH AFOREMENTIONED COUNTRY OF THE DATES OF THE VISIT TO EACH CAPITAL; 2) ASSURE THEIR AVAILABILITY TO RECEIVE THE UNAMIR MILITARY DELEGATION; AND 3) COMMUNICATE TO US BY MAIL THEIR RESPONSES AS WELL AS YOUR OWN COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS.

FFF. THANK YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

File: Military

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: Distribution List

From: COS

Info: FC, DFC

Date: 09 Jan 95

Subject: CONDUCT OF UNAMIR MILITARY PERSONNEL

1. Of late,incidents of UNAMIR Personnel getting involved with RPA are on the increase.Avoidable incidents like overtaking the Presidential or Vice-Presidential convoy, not adhering to existing traffic regulations,carrying out photography in restricted areas like RPA Camps and the Presidential Estate are on the increase. These incidents cause embarrassment to the Force HQ and do not project the right image. Needless to say that in some cases, own troops are not knowingly at fault. There is, therefore, a definite requirement for our troops to understand the Rwandan/RPA apprehensions and conduct themselves in a manner to dispel any suspicion or apprehensions that they may harbor.

2. Suitable instructions on the subject may please be issued to all personnel under your command.

K S Sivakumar
Col
COS

DISTRIBUTION

Lists A, B, D
Manager Canadian Helicopter Team

File: Admin

Public INFO

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: Distribution List

From: Maj Deepak Das
Force Welfare Officer

File: R&W/1

Date: 30 Nov 94

Subject: UNAMIR RECREATION AND WELFARE CLUB

1. It is proposed to start a UNAMIR Recreation and Welfare Club (R&W Club) to enhance leisure and recreational activities of both civilian and military members of the mission.The SRSG is very keen to start these activities at the earliest opportunity and has requested representation from all UNAMIR members.

2. The proposed members of the R&W Club Committee are given below:-

(a)	Chairperson:	Mr Patsy Mullings (BMS)
(b)	Secretary:	Ms Janina Ogtong (ISS)
(c)	Treasurer:	Mr Hudson Mbunya (Finance)
(d)	Property Officer:	Mr Marc Molatte (PCIU)
(e)	Bar Manager:	Maj Ranbir Singh(INDBATT)
(f)	Entertainment Officer:	Mr Jack Parnell(LOG)
(g)	Force Welfare Officer:	Maj Deepak Das (Force Welfare Office)

3. Sports & Leisure. The R&W Club activities would include both outdoor and indoor sports, entertainment, leisure and at a later stage even cultural activities. A large number of voluntary organisers for different disciplines/activities have come forward to start the club. Additional volunteers including those who wish to contribute to the existing or new activities are welcome to forward their names to the Welfare Officer or the CCPO at the UNAMIR HQ at Amohoro Hotel Room No 1050 or 3044. Persons interested in participation in an activity may forward their names to the organising member of that discipline at the Room Nos mentioned against their names given at Paragraph 7 below. Military contingents may forward their names through their respective welfare officers to the Force Welfare Officer.

4. Social Get-togethers. Happy hours on Fri evenings will be organised with a difference, in that stalls for food & drinks of different nationalities would be set up alongwith a short musical/cultural programme at the Belgium Village Restaurant and Pool. Club facilities may also be used for organising X-mas, New Year or National Day celebrations/parties.

5. Library. Once a central place is identified and procured for getting together of the club committee and holding indoor activities, it also proposed to set up a library comprising books, periodicals and magazines in different languages requisitioned by the members and passed by the club committee.

6. Coordination & Publicity. In order to ensure that there are no clash of events all club activities will be coordinated and publicised in the form of a weekly Welfare News Letter by the club committee.All organisers or those who wish to organise a party or event should do so after informing the club chairperson/welfare officer.

7. Activities. The proposed activities planned to be started with the name and address of the organiser are given below:-

SER NO	DISCIPLINE OR ACTIVITY	VOLUNTEER ORGANISER	AMAHORO ROOM NO /TELE
1.	INDOOR Aerobics,Ballroom/Tap Dancing,Taekwondo	Mr Evon Parkes Property Survey Board	1045/ 11188

2.	Bridge	Maj S Agrawal Force Engineer Officer	FEO Ops Branch/ 11161
3.	Chess	Mr Patrick Francis Personnel	1057/ 11128
4.	Ping -pong	Ms Sylvie Nossereau Personnel	1057/ 11128
5.	Mahjong	Ms Emma Silvestre	3044/ 11089
6.	Squash,Dart	Maj Deepak Das Welfare Officer	1050/ 11108
7.	Videotheque	-do-	1050/ 11108
	<u>OUTDOOR</u>		
8.	Athletics	Mr Norris Jorsling Chief Transport Officer Mr Brian Seales BMS	3060/ 11087 3052/ 11098
9.	Badminton	Maj Pankaj Arora G4 Transport	2068/ 11117
10.	Baseball	Maj Steve Moore G4 Transport	2068/ 11117
11.	Basketball	Mr Brian Seales BMS	3052/ 11098
12.	Cricket	Mr Louis Hall Transport Maj Deepak Das Welfare Officer	3060/ 11213
13.	Football	Mr Norris Jorsling CTO Mr Adrian O'Sullivan	3060/ 11087
14.	Golf	Mr James Ifill Maj Ranbir Singh PRO INDIABATT	Rm CC/ 74113 SOALTEE /86976
15.	Trekking(Bird-watching, Picnics,Safari)	Mr Didier Pansiot Claims	3068/ 11103
16.	Tennis	Mr Stanley Oliver Personnel	1057/ 11128

17.	Volleyball	AUSMED/IND[redacted]BATT	ALEXAND -RA/ 76803

4. Thank you and looking forward to happy times.

Maj Deepak Das
Welfare Officer

Distribution List:

Lists A,B and D

Public File: Military Info

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: Distribution List

FROM: DCOS Ops

DATE: 25 Nov 94

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE KENYAN POLICE

1. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) expressing the standard operating procedure (SOP) to be followed by the Kenyan Police authorities when arresting/detaining UNAMIR Military personnel in Kenya was entered into on 22 Nov 94. This document is attached to this memo.

2. It should be noted that the SOP does not cover the situation where a UNAMIR Military member is accused of committing a serious crime under the Kenyan Penal Code. It such a crime were to be committed the matter would be dealt with on a case by case basis.

3. The Deputy Police Commissioner of the Kenyan Police has suggested that all UNAMIR personnel staying in Kenya (whether on leave or duty) should carry their UN ID cards. This would allow the Kenyan authorities to immediately identify the person as belonging to UNAMIR.

J. Arp
Colonel
DCOS Ops

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List

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STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

This Standing Operating Procedure is undertaken between the Police Force of Kenya and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Force Commander, Rwanda.

ARREST AND CUSTODY

1. UNAMIR is principally located in the country of Rwanda. Military members of UNAMIR are subject to national contingent laws and regulations. Military members are also subject to the laws of the country in which they reside and countries in which they are transient.

2. Military members of UNAMIR arrested by civilian police authorities in Kenya and who have been transferred into the custody of the United Nations Military Police or a representative of their contingent will be processed in accordance with the laws of the contingent that the member belongs to.

3. Kenyan Police will notify the UNAMIR Provost Marshall within 24 hours of the arrest and custody of a UNAMIR military member. The UNAMIR Provost Marshal will dispatch a UNAMIR military police person with a receipt for the person in custody and assume custody of the arrested person. On release from Kenyan custody, the arrested person will be transferred to his/her national contingent for processing.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

4. The Kenyan arresting authority will contact the UNAMIR Military Police Provost Marshall at UNAMIR HQ, Kigali, Rwanda or the United Nations Senior Administrative Officer in Nairobi as soon as practicable but no later than 24 hours from the arrest of a UNAMIR military member. A receipt for personnel in custody will be provided by UNAMIR military police at the time of transfer. The Kenyan arresting officer will provide a report of the incident which resulted in the arrest complete with witness and accused statements.

UNAMIR FORCE PROVOST MARSHALL

5. The UNAMIR Force Provost Marshall's office is located at UNAMIR HQ, in Kigali, Rwanda. Kenyan Police authorities are requested to contact the Force Provost Marshall's office, Room 1050, Kigali, Rwanda, telephone: 001-250-84265, extension: 11108, or, the UN Senior Administrative Officer, Q Building, Room Q238, Gigiri, Nairobi, Kenya, telephone: 623140, with notification of the arrest of the UNAMIR military member, name and nationality of the member, location of the arrested person and a brief description of the reason for the arrest.

6. This Standard Operating Procedure will be reviewed from time to time and amended as necessary.

Dated this 22nd day of November, 1994.

Colonel DCOS Ops UNAMIR

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FORCE COMMANDER OF UNAMIR

Received the document from Major Oswald of (UNAMIR) based in Rwanda. The document does not supercede our own Police Regulations

Yobesan - SIAC

KENYAN POLICE COMMISSIONER (J. K. Arap KOSKEI)

File: Military
PUBLIC INFO

UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Distribution List

FROM: Maj J-G Plante
Force Provost Marshal

DATE: 19 Nov 94

SUBJECT: ESTABLISHMENT
UNAMIR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

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1. The Kigali MP Detachment of the UNAMIR MP Company is now in operation 24/7.

2. It is located 500 meters East of the UNICEF Building on the road to the Airport (across from the Nobiscum Restaurant).

3. The Detachment presently operates on Channel 7, Call Sign "Golf Hotel Zero". The telephone number of the MP Desk Officer is 86855.

4. The telephone number of the FPM is 86856.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action	**Information**
List A,B,C,D and E	SRSG and EX Director FC and DFC

file: Military

Public Info

UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Distribution List

FROM: Maj J-G Plante
Force Provost Marshal

DATE: 19 Nov 94

SUBJECT: LAW ENFORCEMENT-
RWANDA

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1. Following a discussion with members of the Rwanda Gendarmerie (Rwanda Police Force), I learned that they are now issuing Traffic Violation Tickets to UN/NGOs offenders.

2. A simple traffic violation can cost $50.00 and has to be paid immediately at the Gendarmerie Brigade HQ.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action	**Information**
List A,B,C,D and E	SRSG and EX Director FC and DFC

FOR INFO
File, Military

5000.45 (Plans)

7 Nov 94

Distribution List

FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE NO 01/94
ON
UNAMIR CONDUCT, DRESS AND WEAPON CARRIAGE POLICY

References:
A. Force Routine Order No 12 - Commander's Policy on Alcohol
B. Status of Mission Agreement
C. UNAMIR Driving Regulations
D. UNAMIR Standard Operating Procedures

GENERAL.

1. This document states the current UNAMIR policy on conduct, dress and the carriage of personal weapons. It will be updated from time to time, and must be read in conjunction with current ROE.

2. All members of UNAMIR are required to be aware of this policy. Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads are to ensure that their personnel are fully briefed on the contents of this document, are kept current on any reviews which might take place, and that personnel rotating into Rwanda are briefed on arrival. It should be noted that this Directive sets a minimum standard. As such, it is intended to augment, not replace Nationally imposed contingent regulations. Any reduction in standards to conform with this Directive is not required.

CONDUCT

3. Image. All personnel in Rwanda represent their units, their countries and the UN. Considerable effort must be expended to ensure that the best possible image is conveyed to the local population and civilian agencies with which they may come in contact. Personnel are particularly reminded that they should:

a. Adhere to all local laws which have been enacted by the legitimate government.

b. Deal courteously and politely with those with whom they come in contact.

c. Avoid any source of conflict in which a dispute might develop.

d. If employing Rwandan personnel, provide fair and honest terms of service.

4. Behaviour. UNAMIR personnel should be aware that their behaviour can affect the success of the UN mission. Many hours of patient work can be eroded by one thoughtless act; the efforts of many can be undone by the poor behaviour of a few. All personnel should be reminded to act maturely and professionally at all times, whether in or out of uniform. This should particularly apply to:

a. Driving. UNAMIR personnel must drive carefully and use the road with courtesy. They are to adhere to Reference C.

b. Alcohol. Personnel are reminded that their behaviour must not be impaired by alcohol. All personnel must be briefed on UNAMIR alcohol policy, which is outlined below and whose tenets are:

(1). No drinking and driving.

(2). No driving for eight hours after consuming alcohol.

(3). No drinking in unit messes when in the possession of ammunition/weapons (depending on unit policy, patrons of unit messes may be required to secure weapons or ammunition).

(4). No drinking in other areas when in the possession of weapons.

(5). No drinking to excess.

5. Other Countries. The conduct of UNAMIR personnel in Other Countries, such as Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, must be impeccable. UNAMIR personnel represent the Mission abroad in Africa and only the highest standards will be accepted. UNAMIR has no special legal relationship with Other Countries in the region. Any alleged offence committed by UNAMIR personnel abroad will be dealt with under the civil law of that country and may lead to prosecution by the civil authority. Individuals from UNAMIR who find themselves in such a position should contact their national consulate, embassy or High Commission immediately. They should also contact the UN representative in that country. It is anticipated that Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) can be signed with the governments of Other Countries in the region, to cover the contingency of legal proceedings being conducted against UNAMIR individuals. DCOS (Ops) is to ensure that appropriate MOU are drafted in consultation with Other Countries' governments.

DRESS & BEARING

6. Deportment. All personnel are to ensure that their deportment meets the highest possible standards. A smart, well-groomed alert appearance and a helpful and positive demeanour are essential elements of this.

7. National Uniform. National uniform is to worn in accordance with Part 8, Section 6, of Reference D.

8. UN Accoutrements. UN accoutrements are to be worn in accordance with part 8, Section 6, of Reference D.

9. Ballistic Helmet/Body Armour. When ballistic helmets and body armour are ordered to be worn, UN blue covers are also to be worn.

10. Webbing. Policy on the wearing of webbing, or its equivalent, and rucksacks it to be ordered by Commanding Officers/Contingent Commanders. Personnel are to wear and carry personal equipment sufficient to fulfil their mission.

11. Wearing of Uniform on Duty. All UNAMIR personnel are on operations and are considered to be on duty at all times in Rwanda. Under the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), Reference B, UNAMIR personnel who are not wearing uniform carry minimal authority and may not be fully protected under the terms of the Agreement. For the purposes of participating in organised sport or PT, the sporting clothing authorised by Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads is deemed to be uniform. UNAMIR military personnel are only permitted to wear civilian clothes in the following circumstances:

a. Within the confines of a unit or mess location which is guarded by armed guard(s); and

b. At the discretion of Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads.

12. Other Countries. Under certain circumstances, UNAMIR personnel are on duty in Other Countries. When on duty, UNAMIR personnel are to wear uniform in accordance with Paragraphs 6 and 7 above.

CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS

13. MILOBS. Under Article VI of the UN Convention, defined in Reference B, MILOBS are described as "experts". They do not carry weapons and further policy, described below, on the Carriage of Weapons, does not apply to them.

14. Principle. As UNAMIR military personnel are on duty at all times, and as they are entitled to carry weapons for their own protection, or the protection of those whom they have a duty to protect, the principle to be applied is that UNAMIR military personnel will carry weapons when so issued. Current ROE further dictate the readiness of UNAMIR personnel. This policy does not apply to medical and religious personnel. The protection of those personnel will be as directed by the Contingent/Unit Commanders.

15. Exceptions. The occasions on which military UNAMIR personnel are prohibited from carrying weapons are as follows:

a. When consuming alcohol; and

b. When leaving Rwanda.

16. Consumption of Alcohol & Carriage of Weapons. UNAMIR personnel are not to consume alcohol when carrying weapons. Alcohol may only be consumed in the following circumstances:

a. In a unit location or mess which is guarded by armed guard(s); or

b. At the discretion of Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads.

17. Carriage of Weapons. UNAMIR personnel are not permitted to carry weapons abroad. Personnel who are going abroad must be afforded Personal Protection, consistent with the provisions of paragraphs 16 and 17 above, to their point of departure, and on return to Rwanda, from their point of return. Should it become necessary to authorise the carriage of weapons to Other Countries, HQ UNAMIR will issue appropriate instructions. Personnel departing Rwanda on duty, CTO or leave will ensure the security of their personal weapon through their respective Contingent/Unit Commander.

18. Personal Protection. Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads are to ensure that adequate protection is provided for themselves and their subordinates during social and recreational activities.

19. Level of Personal Protection. Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads are to determine the level of personal protection afforded. The minimum alert/readiness requirements are detailed at Annex A to UNAMIR Rules of Engagement. Additional requirements are detailed at Annex A.

20. Restrictions. The establishment **Kigali Night** is out of bounds to all UNAMIR personnel. ~~Contingent/Unit/Sector Commanders who identify other local establishments which constitute a~~ similar security risk may recommend to the FC the imposition of a commensurate restriction.

GC TOUSIGNANT
MGen
FC

Distribution:

External:

Action:

List D

Internal:

Action:

List A
List B

ROE STATE	RESPONSE
GREEN	All movement between 2300 hrs and 0600 hrs to be restricted to essential duty or, when specifically authorized by Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads. Personnel on essential duties are to be armed and in uniform. Continuous (radio) communications with Sector Net Control Station is to be maintained. PT and sporting activities outside unit perimeter to be restricted to daylight hours.
YELLOW	All movement between 1800 hrs and 0600 hrs to be restricted to essential duty. All UNAMIR military personnel are to be continuously armed and in uniform. Alcohol consumption is permitted in unit messes only. PT and sporting activities restricted to unit perimeter.
RED	All movement is restricted to essential duty only. All UNAMIR military personnel are to be continuously armed and in uniform. Alcohol consumption is prohibited. PT and sporting activities restricted to unit perimeter.

PUB INFO
File: Military

3 November 1994

2000-1

Distribution List

FC DIRECTIVE ON THE LEGAL JURISDICTION APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR AND RWANDAN AUTHORITIES

References:

A. Section 9: Op Directive No 2 Rules of Engagement

B. FC Directive for the Handling of Detainees dated 28 Sep 94

C. FC Directive on Conduct, Dress and Weapon Carriage Policy to be issued

1. General. In the conduct of their duties, UNAMIR personnel may be required to hand over individuals to the Government of Rwanda. This hand over may occur as a result of Rwandan authorities seeking legal jurisdiction over foreign or Rwandan nationals.

2. Definitions.

a. "appropriate authority" at this stage, refers only to the Prosecutor's Office. Further changes to this definition will be notified in writing by the FC

b. "Civilian component" consists of UN officials and of other persons assigned by the Secretary-General to assist the SRSG or made available by participating States to serve as apart of UNAMIR.

c. "Detainee" is any person who is held for committing a hostile act or hostile intent against any of the categories of people referred to in paragraphs 5 c or 5 d below

c. "Hand over" is the formal procedure detailed in Annexes C and D.

d. "Legal Jurisdiction" includes but is not limited to those situations where Rwandan authorities seek to take a foreign or Rwandan national into custody.

e. "Military personnel of national contingents" includes military staff at UNAMIR HQ.

f. "Official capacity" for UNAMIR troops is any time soldiers are in uniform or, by exception, in civilian clothes (see Reference C).

g. "Visitors" includes, but is not limited to, journalists, tourists, dignitaries representing national governments and non-UNAMIR personnel permitted to enter UNAMIR premises.

3. Aim. The aim of this Directive is to outline the procedures for handing over individuals or groups of people to the Rwandan authorities.

4. Foreign Nationals and Rwandan Jurisdiction. Rwandan authorities may seek jurisdiction over the following categories of foreign nationals:

a. SRSG, Force Commander and the Police Commissioner of CIVPOL;

b. UN civilian officials assigned to the civilian component to serve with UNAMIR;

c. United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), Civilian Police (CIVPOL) and civilian personnel from overseas who are employed by the UN specifically for this mission but who are not UNAMIR staff (eg consultants) (hereinafter referred to as "experts on mission");

d. military personnel of national contingents who are a part of UNAMIR;

e. personnel of UN specialised agencies;

f. personnel of NGOs; and

g. visitors.

The legal status of these categories of personnel and the hand over procedures for them are detailed at Annexes A and C respectively.

5. Rwandan Nationals and Rwandan Jurisdiction. Rwandan authorities may seek jurisdiction over the following categories of Rwandan nationals:

a. Locally recruited personnel who are working for the UN;

b. Displaced persons, refugees and civilians in sites or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces. This category includes any person who seeks protection in a UNAMIR installation because they fear for their safety;

c. Rwandans who are detained by UNAMIR personnel for committing or who are suspected of committing a hostile act or a hostile intent (as defined in Reference A) against:

(1) One's self and the personnel in one's unit,

(2) other UNAMIR military or civilian personnel,

(3) non-UNAMIR humanitarian aid personnel,

(4) displaced persons, refugees and civilians in sites or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces,

(5) other UN-authorized military or civilian personnel; and

d. Rwandans who are detained for stealing and/or damaging property, or are suspected of stealing and/or damaging property belonging to, or in the care of, UNAMIR, UN humanitarian organisations or UN protected sites (see Reference A paragraphs 3.b and 8).

The legal status and hand over procedures for Rwandan nationals is at Annexes B and D respectively.

6. Any persons in the care of UNAMIR troops are to be treated humanely, ensuring that they are provided with food, drinking water and that they are afforded safeguards in terms of health, hygiene and protection against the rigours of climate and the dangers of armed conflict.

7. Reference B is now cancelled. Annexes E and F will be issued when details are known.

G. C. Tousignant
Major-General
Force Commander

Annexes:

Annex A - Foreign Nationals and Rwandan Jurisdiction

Annex B - Rwandan Nationals and Rwandan Jurisdiction

Annex C - Procedures for Handing Over Foreign Nationals

Annex D - Procedures for Handing Over Rwandan Nationals

Annex E - Prosecutors Offices in Rwanda

Annex F - ICRC Representatives in Rwanda

Annex G - Hand Over Proforma

Distribution List:

Internal:

List A (less 9 - 10)
List B (less 23 - 30)
Provost Marshal

External:

List C (less 43 - 50)
List E (less 74 - 80)

ANNEX A TO LEGAL JURISDICTION APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR AND RWANDAN AUTHORITIES
DATED 3 Nov 1994

FOREIGN NATIONALS AND THEIR LEGAL STATUS IN RWANDA

CATEGORY	LEGAL IMMUNITY	AUTHORITY FOR HAND OVER
SRSG, FC, POLICE COMM OF CIV POL	ACCORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND PRIVILEGE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW	NOT TO BE HANDED OVER TO RWANDAN AUTHORITIES UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES
UN CIVILIAN OFFICIALS ASSIGNED TO THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT TO SERVE WITH UNAMIR	IMMUNE FROM LEGAL PROCESS FOR ALL ACTS PERFORMED BY THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SRSG
UNMO, CIVPOL AND CONSULTANTS	* IMMUNE FROM LEGAL PROCESS FOR ALL ACTS PERFORMED BY THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY * IMMUNE FROM PERSONAL ARREST OR DETENTION AND SEIZURE OF THEIR PERSONNEL BAGGAGE	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FC AND/OR THE SRSG
MILITARY PERS OF NATIONAL CONTINGENTS WHO ARE A PART OF UNAMIR	IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS IN RESPECT OF ACTS PERFORMED BY THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FC AND THE CONTINGENT COMMANDER
PERSONNEL OF UN SPECIALIST AGENCIES	IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS IN RESPECT OF ACTS PERFORMED BY THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE HEAD OF THE AGENCY
PERSONNEL OF NGOs	NO IMMUNITY UNLESS THEY HAVE ENTERED INTO A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE HEAD OF THE NGO

VISITOR	NO IMMUNITY UNLESS THEY HAVE ENTERED INTO A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FC AND/OR SRSG

ANNEX B TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION
APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR
AND RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES
DATED 3 Nov 1994

RWANDAN NATIONALS AND THEIR LEGAL STATUS IN RWANDA

CATEGORY	LEGAL IMMUNITY	AUTHORITY FOR HAND OVER
LOCALLY RECRUITED PERS	IMMUNE FROM LEGAL PROCESS IN RESPECT OF ALL ACTS PERFORMED BY THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY NOTE: THIS PROTECTION DOES NOT EXTEND TO ACTS COMMITTED BEFORE THEIR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE UN	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SRSG
REFUGEES, DISPLACED PERSONS AND CIVILIANS IN SITES OR AMONG POPULATIONS UNDER THE PROTECTION OF UNAMIR	UNDER PROTECTION AS STATED IN ROE IN REFERENCE A	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER AT AN OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
RWANDAN NATIONAL DETAINED BY UNAMIR AUTHORITIES	TREAT HUMANELY	ONLY TO BE HANDED OVER AT AN OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

ANNEX C TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION
APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR
AND RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES
DATED 3 Nov 1994

PROCEDURES FOR HANDING OVER FOREIGN NATIONALS

1. UN Civilian Assigned to the Civilian Component to Serve with UNAMIR.

a. As soon as a Rwandan authority seeks legal jurisdiction over a UN civilian assigned to the civilian component to serve with UNAMIR, the SRSG, or his representative, HQ UNAMIR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) must be notified. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch Military Police (MP) or CIVPOL to the site.

b. UNAMIR soldiers are not to allow the Rwandan authority(s) to take custody of the UN civilian unless the SRSG has given permission for this to occur. UNAMIR troops are to allow MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan authority(s).

c. If the Rwandan authority(s) uses force to attempt to take custody of the UN civilian, UNAMIR troops are authorised to use force in accordance with Reference A.

d. If authority is given for the hand over, the UN civilian must be taken to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The ICRC are to be notified as far as possible in advance and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's Office to whom the hand over is made.

e. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2, G3 Ops and the Force Provost Marshall:

(1) name of person handed over,

(2) location where the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(3) crime person was accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person(s) who was present when the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(5) date and time the person was handed to the Prosecutor's office, and

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

2. UNMOs, CIVPOL and Experts on Mission.

a. As soon as a Rwandan authority seeks legal jurisdiction over an UNMO, CIVPOL or an expert on mission, the FC or his representative, the SRSG or his representative and the ICRC must be notified. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch MP or CIVPOL to the site. The Rwandan authority is to be reminded that these members are, under Rwandan and international law, immune from arrest, detention or the seizure of their baggage.

b. UNAMIR soldiers are not to allow the Rwandan authority(s) to take custody of an UNMO, CIVPOL or an expert on mission unless the FC and/or the SRSG has given permission for this to occur. UNAMIR troops are to allow MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan authority(s).

c. If the Rwandan authority(s) uses force to attempt to take custody of the UNMO, CIVPOL or expert on mission, UNAMIR troops are authorised to use force in accordance with Reference A.

d. If authority is given for the hand over, the UNMO, CIVPOL or consultant must be taken to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The ICRC are to be notified as far as possible in advance and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's Office to whom the hand over is made.

e. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2, G3 Ops, and the Force Provost Marshall:

(1) name of person handed over,

(2) location where the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(3) crime person accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person(s) who was present when the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(5) date and time the person was handed to the Prosecutor's office, and

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

3. Military Personnel of National Contingents Who are a Part of UNAMIR.

a. As soon as a Rwandan authority seeks legal jurisdiction over military personnel of national contingents who are a part of UNAMIR, the FC or his representative, the appropriate contingent commander and the ICRC must be notified. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch MP or CIVPOL to the site. The Rwandan authority should be reminded that military members of the military component of UNAMIR shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating states in respect of any criminal offences which may have been committed by them in Rwanda.

b. UNAMIR soldiers are not to allow the Rwandan authority(s) to take custody of another UNAMIR soldier unless the FC and the appropriate contingent commander have given permission for this to occur. UNAMIR troops are to allow MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan authority(s).

c. If the Rwandan authority(s) uses force to attempt to take custody of the UNAMIR soldier , UNAMIR troops are authorised to use force in accordance with Reference A.

d. If authority is given for the hand over, the UNAMIR soldier must be taken to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The ICRC are to be notified as far as possible in advance and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's Office to whom the hand over is made.

e. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2, G3 Ops, and the Force Provost Marshall:

(1) name of person handed over,

(2) location where the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(3) crime person accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person(s) who was present when the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(5) date and time the person was handed to the Prosecutor's office, and

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

4. Personnel of UN Specialised Agencies.

a. As soon as a Rwandan authority seeks legal jurisdiction over a member of a UN specialised agency, the SRSG or his representative, the appropriate head of the agency and the ICRC must be notified. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch MP or CIVPOL to the site.

b. UNAMIR soldiers are not to allow the Rwandan authority(s) to take custody of a member of a UN specialised agency unless the SRSG and the appropriate head of the agency have given permission for this to occur. UNAMIR troops are to allow MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan authority(s).

c. If the Rwandan authority(s) uses force to attempt to take custody of a member of a UN specialised agency UNAMIR troops are authorised to use force in accordance with Reference A.

d. If authority is given for the hand over, the person must be taken to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The ICRC are to be notified as far in possible in advance and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's Office to whom the hand over is made.

e. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2, G3 Ops, the Force Provost Marshall and the UN agency concerned:

(1) name of person handed over and the agency they work for,

(2) location where the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(3) crime person accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person(s) who was present when the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(5) date and time the person was handed to the Prosecutor's office, and

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

5. Personnel of NGOs.

a. As soon as a Rwandan authority seeks legal jurisdiction over a member of an NGO, HQ UNAMIR, the appropriate head of the NGO agency and the ICRC must be notified. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch MP or CIVPOL to the site.

b. UNAMIR soldiers are not to allow the Rwandan authority(s) to take custody of a member of an NGO unless the appropriate head of the NGO has given permission for this to occur. UNAMIR troops are to allow MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan authority(s).

c. If the Rwandan authority(s) uses force to attempt to take custody of a member of an NGO, UNAMIR troops are authorised to use force in accordance with Reference A.

d. If authority is given for the hand over, the person must be taken to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The ICRC are to be notified as far as possible in advance and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's office to whom the hand over is made.

e. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2, G3 Ops and the Force Provost Marshall:

(1) name of person handed over and the NGO they work for,

(2) location where the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(3) crime person accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person(s) who was present when the Rwandan the Government sought jurisdiction,

(5) date and time the person was handed to the Prosecutor's office, and

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

6. Visitors

a. As soon as a Rwandan authority seeks legal jurisdiction over a visitor, HQ UNAMIR and the ICRC must be notified. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch MP or CIVPOL to the site.

b. UNAMIR soldiers are not to allow the Rwandan authority(s) to take custody of a visitor unless the FC or his representative and/or the SRSG or his representative has given permission for this to occur. UNAMIR troops are to allow MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan authority(s).

c. If the Rwandan authority(s) uses force to attempt to take custody of a visitor UNAMIR troops are authorised to use force in accordance with Reference A.

d. If authority is given for the hand over, the person must be taken to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The ICRC are to be notified as far as possible in advance and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's office to whom the hand over is made.

e. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2, G3 Ops and the Force Provost Marshall:

(1) name of person handed over and their affiliation or nationality,

(2) location where the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(3) crime person accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person(s) who was present when the Rwandan the Government sought jurisdiction,

(5) date and time the person was handed to the Prosecutor's office, and

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

ANNEX D TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION
APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR
AND RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES
DATED 3 Nov 1994

PROCEDURES FOR HANDING OVER RWANDAN NATIONALS

1. Locally Recruited Personnel.

a. As soon as a Rwandan authority seeks legal jurisdiction over any locally recruited personnel, the SRSG or his representative and the ICRC must be notified. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch MP or CIVPOL to the site.

b. UNAMIR soldiers are not to allow any Rwandan authority(s) to take custody of locally recruited personnel unless the SRSG has given permission for this to occur. UNAMIR troops are to allow MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan authority(s).

c. If the Rwandan authority(s) uses force to attempt to take custody of locally recruited personnel, UNAMIR troops are authorised to use force in accordance with Reference A.

d. If authority is given for the hand over, the person must be taken to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The ICRC are to be notified as far as possible in advance and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's Office to whom the hand over is made.

e. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2, G3 Ops, and Force Provost Marshall:

(1) name of person handed over,

(2) location where the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(3) crime person accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person(s) who was present when the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(5) date and time the person was handed to the Prosecutor's office, and

[redacted]

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

2. Refugees, Displaced Persons and Civilians in sites or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR.

a. As soon as a Rwandan authority seeks legal jurisdiction over refugees, displaced persons, and/or civilians in sites or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR, the FC or his representative and the ICRC must be notified. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch MP or CIVPOL to the site.

b. UNAMIR soldiers are not to allow any Rwandan authority(s) to take custody of refugees, displaced persons and/or civilians in sites or amongst populations under the protection of UNAMIR unless the FC has given permission for this to occur. UNAMIR troops are to allow MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan authority(s).

c. If the Rwandan authority(s) uses force to attempt to take custody of refugees, displaced persons and/or civilians in sites and or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR, UNAMIR troops are authorised to use force in accordance with Reference A.

d. If authority is given for the hand over, the person must be taken to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The ICRC are to be notified as far as possible in advance and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's Office to whom the hand over is made.

e. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2, G3 Ops and the Force Provost Marshall:

(1) name of person handed over,

(2) location where the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(3) crime person accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person(s) who was present when the Rwandan Government sought jurisdiction,

(5) date and time the person was handed to the Prosecutor's office, and

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

3. Persons detained by UNAMIR troops

a. They are to be searched, disarmed and segregated. At all times they are to be treated in accordance with the principles of minimum force as detailed at Reference A. UNAMIR HQ is to be notified immediately of the circumstances surrounding the detention. HQ UNAMIR is to dispatch MP or CIVPOL to the site. UNAMIR troops are to allow the MP or CIVPOL to liaise with the Rwandan Authority(s).

b. They are to be identified and their personal details recorded.

c. A safe and secure place is to be arranged as a temporary place of custody. Detainees are to be kept in custody by UNAMIR troops for the minimum time necessary. Detainees are to be provided with food, water, shelter and medical attention as required. ICRC is to be informed immediately and is to be allowed to have access to these detainees.

d. Detainees and the property found in their possession are to be handed to the appropriate Prosecutor's Office (details of these offices are at Annex E). The detainee is to be allowed to keep all property essential for his/her comfort and survival (eg food and water).

e. The ICRC are to be notified and, if possible, are to be present during the hand over. The proforma at Annex G is to be completed and signed by the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over and the person in the Prosecutor's Office to whom the hand over is made.

f. Detainees are not to be handed to any other RPA authorities. A Prosecutor's Office is the only authorised Office for the processing and handing over of detainees in Rwanda.

g. A report detailing the following is to be submitted to UNAMIR HQ, attention G1 Pers, G2 , G3 Ops and the Force Provost Marshall:

(1) name of the detainee,

(2) location where person was detained,

(3) crime person accused of,

(4) name of the UNAMIR person who detained the detainee,

(5) date and time the detainee was handed to the Office of the Prosecutor, and

(6) whether an ICRC representative was present during the hand over and if not, why not.

ANNEX E TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION
APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR
AND RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES
DATED 3 Nov 1994

PROSECUTOR OFFICES IN RWANDA

TOWN	PROSECUTOR'S NAME	ADDRESS
KIBUNGO	MUSHUMBA, Jean Baptiste	
KIGALI	NSANZUWERA, Francois	
RWANAGANA	GATAMBIYE, Sylere	
KIBUYE	TUYISENGE, Cyprien	
GITARAMA	KAYIBANDA P. Celestin	
NYANZA	HARELIMANA, Simon	
BUTARE	GATSIMBANYI, Callixte	
GIKONGORO	HAVUGIYAREMYE, Aloys	
CYANGUGU	NYANDWI, Viateur	
GISENYI	HARERIMANA, Charles	
RUHENGERI	UWIYINGOMA, David	
BYUMBA	MUSUHUKE, Francois	

NOTE: IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL SECTOR COMMANDERS TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THE ABOVE OFFICES ARE LOCATED.

ANNEX F TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION
APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR
AND RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES
DATED 3 NOV 1994

ICRC REPRESENTATIVES IN RWANDA

TOWN	ICRC REPRESENTATIVE'S NAME	ADDRESS
KIBUNGO		
KIGALI		
RWANAGANA		
KIBUYE		
GITARAMA		
NYANZA		
BUTARE		
GIKONGORO		
CYANGUGU		
GISENYI		
RUHENGERI		
BYUMBA		

NOTE: IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL SECTOR COMMANDERS TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THE ABOVE OFFICES ARE LOCATED.

ANNEX G TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION
APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR
AND RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES
DATED 1994

HAND OVER PROFORMA

I, ...(1), A MILITARY MEMBER OF
UNAMIR/MINUAR HAVE HANDED OVER.....(2)
TO THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF .....(3).

SIGNED THIS DAY OF 19

.....
UNAMIR

.....
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

(1) Insert here the name of the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over.

(2) Insert here the name of the person being handed over

(3) Insert here the name of the Prosecutor's Office.

PUB.INFO
File: Security

3000.12 (PLANS)

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

22nd October 1994

Distribution List

SUBJECT: **INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND NGO INSTALLATIONS IN KIGALI CITY**

Ref: A. Op Dir No. 2 Rules of Engagement dated 6 Oct 94
B. HQ UNAMIR FC Directive On the Handling of Detainees (to be revised)
C. HQ UNAMIR Op Instruction 3000.12 (Ops) dated 30 Aug 94

GENERAL

1. UNAMIR and NGO installations in KIGALI are vulnerable to trespass by armed or unarmed unauthorised personnel; there have been attempted encroachments in the past. The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) has been constituted to provide a direct response to this threat. On order, INDBATT will assume RRF responsibilities from GHANBATT, AUSMED and CANCON.

MISSION

2. To protect UNAMIR and NGO installations in Kigali against unauthorised encroachments.

EXECUTION

3. **General Outline**. The RRF is a motorised platoon. It is capable of responding to an immediate threat at section level, and to augment that force as required, up to platoon level. INDBATT will assume full Sector 6 RRF responsibilities on order.

4. **Groupings and Tasks**.

a. INDBATT.

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks

(a) Assume responsibility for RRF.

(b) Detail one infantry section as RRF.

(c) Undertake the following on order:

(i) Guard threatened UNAMIR/NGO installations,

(ii) Provide sentries for unmanned UN property,

(iii) Protect NGO facilities,

(iv) Escort unauthorized persons out of UN property or installations, and

(v) Arrest and handover trespassers to local authorities with the assistance of UNAMIR Military Police, in accordance with Ref B.

(vi) Escort HQ UNAMIR civilian staff to respective homes during the hours of darkness.

(d) Be prep to reinforce RRF section with up to two Inf Sections.

(e) Be prepared to reinforce or provide guards at the installations indicated at Annex A.

(f) Be prepared to protect VIPs.

b. AUSMED.

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Task

(a) Discontinue RRF responsibilities.

(b) Handover designated responsibilities to INDBATT.

c. CANCON.

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Task

(a) Discontinue RRF responsibilities.

(b) Handover designated responsibilities to INDBATT.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Section at 30 mins NTM daily.

(2) First reinforcement section at 60 min NTM.

(3) Reinforcement section 2 at 90 min NTM.

(4) Assy area - sect location.

(5) Rules of Engagement as per Ref A.

SERVICE SUPPORT

5. Wpn/Ammo. Tps are to carry personal wpns and first line ammo.

6. Med.

a. First line - Coy Aid Post.

b. Second/Third line - Central Hospital Kigali

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

7. Control. Authority to deploy RRF to be exercised by Ops Duty Officer (UNAMIR HQ).

8. Radio. RRF Comd to be on Force Coord Net channel 7.

a. Callsigns

(1) INDBATT RRF Section - RR1;

(2) INDBATT Reinforcement Section 1 - RR2; and

(3) INDBATT Reinforcement Section 2 - RR3.

9. Codewords.

Codewords	Meaning	Issued By
RANGER	Require RRF	HQUNAMIR Duty Officer
COOLER	Withdraw RRF	HQUNAMIR Duty Officer
ZOOM	Move to Force HQ	HQUNAMIR Duty Officer

10. NICKNAMES. Annex A.

11. Ref C is cancelled.

HK ANYIDOHO
Brig Gen
DFC/COS

Annex:

Annex A - List of Installations and Nicknames

Distribution:

External:

Action:

AUSMED
CANCON
GHANBATT
INDBATT

Info:

BRITCON
HAC
MILOB GP HQ

Internal:

LIST A
LIST B

ANNEX A TO
3000.12 (PLANS)
DATED 22 OCT 94

LIST OF INSTALLATIONS AND NICKNAMES

	LOCATION	NICKNAME
1.	UNAMIR HQ (Amahoro Hotel)	HOME RUN
2.	Kigali Airport/Warehouse	POT BELLY
3.	Amahoro Stadium (CANCON/BRITCON)	PALM WINE
4.	500 man transit camp	BIG HOUSE
5.	Log Base (Rwandex)	GOOD HOPE
6.	Communications compound	CAPE FEAR
7.	MAN Diesel compound	SNAKE CHARM
8.	Kigali Central Hospital	RED RAIN
9.	Belgian Village (UNAMIR staff)	SINGLE FILE
10.	MT compound (Workshop)	WILD WEST
11.	UNICEF Bldg (UNAMIR)	IVORY TOWER
12.	UNDP Bldg (UNHCR)	COW LEG
13.	Hotel Meridien (MILOBs)	HIP BONE
14.	Military Academy	LOW BROW
15.	MILOB GP HQ/CIVPOL HQ	COLD SHOWER
16.	IVECO compound (Brown & Root)	BIG HAMMER
17.	Chez Lando (UN civilians)	LONG JUMP
18.	TRAFIPRO COMPOUND	APPLE PIE
19.	Spare	TOM THUMB
20.	Spare	LIGHT HOUSE
21.	Spare	CRAZY HORSE

File: Military/Rules of Engagement

UNITED NATIONS **NATIONS UNIES**
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.8 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: FC

Date: 6 Oct 94

Subject: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Reference: A. HQUNAMIR OPDIR NO. 2 ROE dated 22 Jul 94
B. HQUNAMIR Amendment 1 to OPDIR NO. 2 dated 10 Sep 94

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1. Please find enclosed, for your review and action, the revised Rules of Engagement (ROE) which incorporates the amendments of Reference B into Reference A and adds minor grammar changes to the french version.

2. Commander's at all levels are required:

   a. to have this directive translated and disseminated to every subordinate under their command; and

   b. to ensure that every subordinate under their command understands the contents of this document.

3. References A and B are cancelled.

G.C. Tousignant
Major-General
Force Commander

Enclosures: 2

Distribution List

Action

MA/FC
MA/DFC & COS
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
HAC
Tac HQ
List B
List D

SECTION 9:

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NO. 02

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

PART I

1. The conduct of military operations is controlled and regulated by the provision of international and national law, conventions and precedence. In the case of a United Nations (UN) conducted operation, it is the responsibility of the UN to set the parameters within which UN Forces will operate. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the means by which the UN can provide to commanders at all levels the political and legal direction and guidance on the use of Force by UN personnel. ROE are drafted by the Force Commander, but are approved by the UN and may only be changed with UN authority.

2. These UNAMIR ROE are provided for UN Forces operating under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 June 1994, which states in paragraph 4 that:

> "... the consolidated mandate of UNAMIR includes the following:
>
> (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
>
> (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations; and
>
> (c) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire;...".

Paragraph 5 of the resolution particularly recognizes that:

> "UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief." Therefore circumstances could arise where the use of force by UNAMIR personnel could be necessary and justified.

PART II

DEFINITIONS

3. The following key definitions must be clearly understood by all personnel in UNAMIR:

a. Force. The use of physical means to impose one's will. Military force is the use of the physical means provided by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of troops under unified command to achieve the same end and generally implies the potential to use significant levels of violence.

b. Self-Defence. The use of force to protect:

(1) oneself and the personnel in one's unit,

(2) other UNAMIR military or civilian personnel,

(3) non-UNAMIR humanitarian aid personnel,

(4) displaced persons, refugees and civilians in sites or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces, or

(5) other UN-authorized military or civilian personnel, against a hostile act or hostile intent, where there is no other choice or time for deliberation.

c. Hostile Act. A hostile act is an attack or other use of force against those entities listed in paragraph 3.b. above.

d. Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is the threat of the imminent use of force against those entities listed in paragraph 3.b. above.

e. Minimum Force. The minimum degree of authorized force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.

f. Collateral Damage. Damage to persons or property adjacent to, but not part of an authorized target.

g. Non-deadly force. Any physical means of forcing compliance that does not pose a risk of death or serious bodily harm to the individual against whom the force is directed. This is usually through the use of physical force short of the use of firearms or other deadly weapons. Examples include: pushing and lesser forms of striking or hitting, and physically or mechanically restraining persons. Warning shots are non-deadly force, even though they involve the use of firearms.

h. Deadly Force. This is the ultimate degree of force. Deadly force is that level of force which is intended or is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm regardless of whether death or serious bodily harm actually results.

PART III

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE

APPLICABILITY

4. The ROE stated in this directive apply to all personnel provided by nations participating in UNAMIR under the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 June 1994. These ROE are written in the form of either prohibitions or permissions. Issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Issued as permissions they are guidance to commanders that certain specific actions may be taken if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the mission.

COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITY

5. Commanders at all levels are required:

   a. to have this directive translated and disseminated to every subordinate under their command; and

   b. to ensure that every subordinate under their command understands the contents of this document.

AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

6. The use of deadly force for the different types of weapons will be authorized as follows:

   a. Force Commander or His Delegate:

      (1) heavy support weapons (ie. rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc.); and

      (2) heavy machine guns or cannons (.50 cal, 20mm, etc.);

   b. In situations which are life threatening to UNAMIR troops, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, soldiers may use the following weapons:

      (1) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M60, etc.)

      (2) light machine guns; and

      (3) all personal weapons on automatic or single shot fire.

   c. In situations which are not life threatening to soldiers, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, the use of deadly force for different types of weapons will be authorized as follows:

      (1) Sector Commanders:

         (a) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M60, etc.),

(b) light machine guns; and

(c) all personal weapons on automatic fire.

(2) Battalion Commander Down to NCO Level at the Scene of a Threat.

(a) Personal weapons for single shot fire.

NOTE: Commanders should be aware when using weapons of the principles of military necessity and proportionality.

PRINCIPLES FOR USE OF FORCE

7. When an incident occurs that requires the use of force, the following principles will be adhered to:

a. if possible, negotiation and warnings must be exhausted before any use of force is initiated;

b. only the minimum non-deadly and deadly force consistent with achieving the immediate aim shall be employed;

c. except where authorized under paragraph 11, the escalation of force procedures pursuant to paragraph 14 must be exhausted before the use of any deadly force is initiated;

d. deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed;

e. escalation of the level of violence is to be minimized;

f. collateral damage is to be minimized;

g. the use of force in retaliation is prohibited; and

h. use of force shall be controlled by the on-scene commander and is to cease once the aim has been achieved.

AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE

8. Force may be used as follows:

a. Non-Deadly Force. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use non-deadly force in the following circumstances:

(1) in self-defence (as defined in paragraph 3.b.) against unarmed aggression;

(2) against unarmed attempts at infiltration or envelopment of UNAMIR units, compounds or locales;

(3) when UNAMIR premises are violated in unarmed attempts to steal UNAMIR property or property under the protection of the UN;

(4) when unarmed attempts are made to abduct or detain UNAMIR civilian or military personnel; and

(5) when unarmed attempts are made to prevent UNAMIR personnel from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.

b. Deadly Force. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use deadly force in the following circumstances:

(1) in self- defence (as defined in paragraph 3.b.) against persons committing a hostile act or exhibiting hostile intent;

(2) to protect from damage or destruction, property or installations belonging to or under the protection of UNAMIR, including protected sites and the means for the distribution and delivery of humanitarian relief:

(a) which have been designated by the unit Commanding Officer, in consultation with the Force Commander, as essential to the success of the UNAMIR mission,

(b) which justify protection through the use of deadly force, and

(c) where there is no way to prevent the damage or destruction;

(3) to overcome forcible attempts to prevent UNAMIR Force discharging its duties, when authorized by the Force Commander;

(4) to resist armed attempts to disarm, abduct or detain UNAMIR military or civilian personnel;

(5) to resist armed attempts to compel UNAMIR personnel to withdraw from protection areas they were ordered to occupy by the Force Commander or his delegate; and

(6) to resist armed attempts to cut off a UNAMIR force.

AUTHORITY TO SEARCH AND DETAIN

9. Authority to stop and Search. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to stop all individuals attempting to enter or who are discovered inside any facilities under UNAMIR protection and to request that the individual submit to a consensual search of himself / herself and his/her vehicle where applicable. Any individual not willing to be searched shall be denied access, escorted from the premises or detained as appropriate. Searches of persons and their property are also authorized for the purpose of security. Such searches may be conducted with the minimal use of force necessary.

10. Authority to Detain. Individuals shall only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display hostile intent or carry out any activity which would require that force be used against them under paragraph 8.

11. Once detained, only minimal non-deadly force is authorized to prevent the escape of a detainee, unless there is a necessity to act in self-defence, in which case minimum force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized. However, if the individuals flee and the threat of their use of force has thus been removed, further force of any kind shall not be employed to apprehend them.

12. Any individual detained shall be turned over as soon as possible to appropriate civilian police authorities as designated by the Force Commander. Any weapons seized from detainees shall be confiscated or rendered militarily ineffective.

13. Detainees shall not be subject to intimidation, deprivation or humiliation. Medical care and the attention of medical personnel will be provided when required. Detainees will be given rations and shelter equivalent to that of UNAMIR personnel.

CHALLENGE AND ESCALATION PROCEDURES

14. Except where a response is required in accordance with paragraph 15, the following procedures are to be followed:

a. Verbal or Visual Warning. Warn the aggressor to stop the activity, which in normal circumstances, should follow the following sequence:

(1) depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given orally, by a sign or by illumination (ie, hand-held red flares, search-lights, etc.). The issuance of a warning should also be passed up the chain of command with continuous Situation Reports;

(2) repeat the verbal or visual warning as many times as is necessary to ensure understanding or compliance;

b. Charge Weapons. If authorized under State B of ROE No.2 (paragraph 15 refers);

c. Warning Shots. If the threat continues, employ aimed warning shots in a safe direction so that there is no danger of personal injury or collateral damage;

d. Non-Deadly Force. If warning shots are ignored, employ minimal non-deadly force;

e. Deadly Force. If minimal non-deadly force is either not feasible or fails, on order and under the control of a superior, minimal deadly force, such as single aimed shots, may be used until the threat is removed;

f. Escalation of Deadly Force. Escalatory weapons fire with other weapons systems shall only be on the order of the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 6.

OPENING FIRE WITHOUT WARNING OR ESCALATION

15. The only circumstance under which it is permissible to open fire without warning or escalation is if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that even a moments delay could:

a. lead to death or serious injury to UNAMIR personnel or to other UN-authorized military or civilian personnel;

b. lead to death or serious injury to persons who are under the protection of UNAMIR; and

c. lead to the immediate damage or destruction of UNAMIR property in the circumstances described in paragraph 8.b.(2).

PROCEDURE DURING FIRING

16. Any use of firearms as a means of applying deadly force, shall be aimed fire, ie, fired at the centre of the visible mass of the target. Fire must be controlled and will not be indiscriminate. Automatic fire and firing of support weapons will only be used as a last resort and only as authorized under paragraph 6. Fire for effect will only continue as long as it is necessary to achieve the immediate aim. Through fire control orders, the commander on the scene will indicate and control the fire, preferably directed at the leaders or instigators of the threat. Regular situation report will be forwarded through the chain of command.

17. Whenever possible, each escalation in the use of force should be authorized by the chain of command of UNAMIR. A request in clear by radio for authorization to fire can have a calming effect on its own. Permission to use higher level of force must be obtained from the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 6. The on-scene commander is responsible for assessing the situation and taking action appropriate to the situation.

PROCEDURE AFTER FIRING

18. After firing, commanders should ensure the following actions are taken.

a. Medical. Any wounded, including those fired upon by UNAMIR personnel will be given first aid, if such an action can be done without further endangering the lives of UNAMIR personnel.

b. Recording. Details of the incident will be recorded, including:

(1) date, time and place of firing;

(2) unit and personnel involved;

(3) the events leading up to the firing;

(4) why UNAMIR personnel opened fire;

(5) who or what was fired on;

(6) the weapons fired; and

(7) the apparent results of the firing.

c. Reporting. The above information and the current situation will be reported through the chain of command to Force HQ ATTN Force Commander and Deputy Chief of Staff Operations.

PART IV

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

19. Rule No. one: Authority to Carry Arms

a. State A: No authority; and

b. State B: Authority granted to carry weapons.

20. Rule No. Two: Status of Weapons

a. State A: Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.

b. State B: Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.

21. Rule No. Three: Response to Hostile Intent or Hostile Act without the Use of Fire

a. State A: Observe and report but will withdraw in order to preserve own force.

b. State B: Stay in place. Make contact and establish liaison with opposing force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.

c. State C: Observe and Report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.

d. State D: Observe and Report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means. Demonstrative use of fire is authorized.

22. Rule No. Four: Disarmament of Paramilitary Personnel or Civilians

a. State A: No authorization granted.

b. State B: Authorization is granted. In doing so, use minimum force and escalate to include use of deadly force if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authority at the earliest opportunity.

23. Rule No. Five: Intervention and Warning Shots

a. State A: Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.

b. State B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process.

24. Rule No. Six: Control of Weapons Systems

a. State A: Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.

b. State B: Designated activity in the presence of the forces in conflict is permitted but will be specified by the following notes:

(1) Man (type of system);

(2) Prepare (type of system);

(3) Move (type of system); and

(4) Fire (type of system).

25. There are three ROE states that may apply in any given sector in Rwanda. These states are GREEN, YELLOW and RED and are described on UNAMIR Levels of Readiness/Alert pages in Annex A. In normal circumstances, the ROE status shall be GREEN.

Note: Changes in the normal status of the ROE for UNAMIR Forces as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or his delegate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status of the ROE for their sectors, if authorized by the Force Commander or his delegate. Contingent Commanders will inform or, if necessary, seek approval from national authority for the change in status.

PART V

CONCLUSION

26. The aim of this directive is to provide guidance to commanders and soldiers at all levels in the use of force. However, no definitive directive can be created that can detail every possible course of action for every possible situation. It is critical and mandatory that all members of UNAMIR understand these ROE and apply them to any and all situations that develop requiring the use of force.

27. Amendments to this directive will be issued as required and as approved by the UN.

Annex:

Annex A Aide-Memoire for Members of UNAMIR.

ANNEX A TO
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
DATED 6 OCT 94

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNAMIR MILITARY COMPONENT REGARDING OPENING FIRE IN RWANDA

1. You are to avoid the use of force, if it is possible to do so, and your conduct must cause the least possible concern, fear or danger to the local population.

2. Your immediate commander will order any change in the states of weapon readiness. While your commander will normally issue the order to open fire, you have the right to use appropriate force in self-defence to protect yourself and those it is your duty to protect. Whenever possible a warning should be given before opening fire (see over).

3. If you have to use force, you must only use the **MINIMUM FORCE** necessary. **MINIMUM FORCE** normally involves the following sequential actions:

a. open display of weapons.

b. verbal warning.

c. barring access to the point being protected.

d. physical restraint.

e. warning shots.

f. pointing weapons, and

g. firing weapons.

WARNINGS

4. **WARNING BEFORE FIRING.** Whenever possible a warning should be given before firing. The warning should be given in a loud clear voice in ENGLISH/ FRENCH or KINYARWANDA:

STOP-HANDS UP/ ARRETEZ LEVEZ LES MAINS/
HAGARARA, AMABOKO HEJURU

(PAUSE)

STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/ ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE/
HAGARARA, CYANGWA BAKURASE

ANNEX A TO
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
DATED 6 OCT 94

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNAMIR MILITARY COMPONENT REGARDING OPENING FIRE IN RWANDA

1. You are to avoid the use of force, if it is possible to do so, and your conduct must cause the least possible concern, fear or danger to the local population.

2. Your immediate commander will order any change in the states of weapon readiness. While your commander will normally issue the order to open fire, you have the right to use appropriate force in self-defence to protect yourself and those it is your duty to protect. Whenever possible a warning should be given before opening fire (see over).

3. If you have to use force, you must only use the **MINIMUM FORCE** necessary. **MINIMUM FORCE** normally involves the following sequential actions:

a. open display of weapons.

b. verbal warning.

c. barring access to the point being protected.

d. physical restraint.

e. warning shots.

f. pointing weapons, and

g. firing weapons.

WARNINGS

4. **WARNING BEFORE FIRING.** Whenever possible a warning should be given before firing. The warning should be given in a loud clear voice in ENGLISH/ FRENCH or KINYARWANDA:

STOP-HANDS UP/ ARRETEZ LEVEZ LES MAINS/ HAGARARA, AMABOKO HEJURU

(PAUSE)

STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/ ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE/ HAGARARA, CYANGWA BAKURASE

5. **FIRE AFTER WARNING.** After warning you may fire on a person in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm only if:

a. the person is carrying a dangerous weapon (e.g. firearm, improvised firing device or machete); AND

b. you believe the person is about to attack you, your unit, or any person it is your duty to protect; AND

c. the person refuses to stop when called upon to do so; AND

d. you believe there is no other way of stopping the person.

6. **FIRE WITHOUT WARNING.** You may fire without warning on a person in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm only if that person:

a. has used or is using a fire arm or other dangerous weapon against you, your unit or persons it is your duty to protect; OR

b. is carrying what you believe to be a dangerous weapon, AND is clearly about to use it, AND you believe that there is no other way to protect yourself, your unit, or the persons it is your duty to protect.

7. If you have to fire, you must account for all rounds expended in an after action report submitted in writing to your immediate commander.

UNAMIR LEVELS OF READINESS/ALERT

SER	STATUS	UNITS/HQ	ACTION
1	GREEN	ALL	1. Normal activities 2. **ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status A, Rule 3-Status B, Rule 4-Status A, Rule 5-Status A, Rule 6-Status A.**
2	YELLOW	HQ	1. Planning for next higher status commences. 2. Liaison increased. 3. VIP visits postponed. 4. No leave granted except on compassionate grounds.
		UNITS	1. Precautionary stage. 2. Double sentries. 3. Night movement restricted. 4. Test shelters. 5. Stand To/Local alarm practice. 6. No leave granted except on compassionate grounds. 7. Backup comms/units/wpns. 8. Reserves put on 3 hrs notice to move.
		ALL	**ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status B, Rule 3-Status C, Rule 4-Status A, Rule 5-Status A, Rule 6-Status A.**
3	RED	HQ	1. General Alert. 2. VIP visits cancelled. 3. No leave granted. 4. Emergency movement only.
		UNITS	5. Special SITREPS to UNHQ. 6. Civilian evacuation if the situation warrants
		ALL	1. Troops in defensive positions. 2. Troops in Stand To positions. 3. Reserves put on one hour notice to move. 4. No leave granted. 5. Troops on duty outside to wear flak jackets. **ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status B, Rule 3-Status D, Rule 4-Status B, Rule 5-Status B, Rule 6-Status B.**

AIDE MEMOIRE - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

NOTE: GREEN status indicated in boxes

RULE ONE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS

STATE A: No authority granted.

STATE B: Authority granted to carry weapons.

RULE TWO: STATUS OF WEAPONS

STATE A: Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.

STATE B: Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.

RULE THREE: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT WITHOUT THE USE OF FIRE

STATE A: Observe and report but will withdraw in order to preserve own forces.

STATE B: Stay in place. Make contact and establish liaison with opposing force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.

STATE C: Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.

STATE D: Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means. Demonstrative use of fire is authorized.

RULE FOUR: DISARMAMENT OF PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL OR CIVILIANS

STATE A: No authorization granted.

STATE B: Authorization is granted. In doing so, use minimum force and escalate to include use of deadly force if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authority at earliest opportunity.

RULE FIVE: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS

STATE A: Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.

STATE B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process.

RULE SIX: CONTROL OF WEAPON SYSTEMS

STATE A: Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of forces in conflict is prohibited.

STATE B: Designated activity in the presence of the forces in conflict permitted but will be specified by the following notes:

(1) Man (type of system);

(2) Prepare (type of system);

(3) Move (type of system); and

(4) Fire (type of system).

SECTION 9:

DIRECTIVE OPERATIONNELLE NO. 02

REGLEMENT D'ENGAGEMENT

1 ère PARTIE

1. Le commandement des opérations militaires doit être contrôlé et réglementé par la clause de loi, de convention et de jurisprudence nationale et internationale. En ce qui concerne l'opération sous le commandement de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), il est du ressort de l'ONU de déterminer les paramètres dans lesquels doivent opérer les Forces de l'ONU. Les Règles d'Engagement (RDE) est le moyen employé par l'ONU pour fournir, aux commandants de tous les niveaux, des conseils et des instructions politiques et légales concernant l'usage de la Force par le personnel de l'ONU. Les RDE sont préparées par le Commandant des Forces; de plus elles doivent être approuvées par l'ONU et ne peuvent être modifiées que sous l'autorisation des Nations unies.

2. Ces Règles d'Engagement de la MINUAR sont prévues pour les Forces de l'ONU opérant sous les auspices de la Résolution no.925 du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU, Résolution datant du 8 Juin 1994, qui stipule dans son paragraphe 4 ce qui suit:

> "... le mandat consolidé de la MINUAR comprend les clauses suivantes:
>
> (a) contribuer à la sécurité et à la protection des personnes déplacées, des réfugiés et de personnes menacées au Rwanda, y compris, dans la mesure du possible, l'établissement et le maintien de zones humanitaires sûres;
>
> (b) garantir la sécurité et l'assistance pour la distribution de l'aide ainsi que pour les opérations d'aide humanitaire; et
>
> (c) agir comme intermédiaire entre les parties en essayant de garantir leur accord de cesser-le-feu;...".

Le paragraphe 5 de la résolution reconnait particulièrement que:

> "La MINUAR peut être obligé de prendre une action d'auto défense contre des personnes ou même des groupes s'attaquant soit à des sites ou des populations protégés, soit au personnel humanitaire ou des Nations Unies ou soit aux autres équipements de livraison et de distribution de l'aide humanitaire." Par conséquent, des circonstances peuvent surgir où l'usage de la force par le personnel de la MINUAR pourrait être nécessaire et justifié.

DEUXIEME PARTIE

DEFINITIONS

3. Les définitions clés suivantes doivent être bien comprises par tout le personnel de la MINUAR:

a. La force. L'usage des moyens physiques pour imposer sa volonté. La force militaire est l'usage des moyens physiques fournis par des corps de troupes formés, armés et disciplinés sous un commandement unifié pour atteindre une même fin, ceci impliquant généralement la possibilité de l'usage de la violence à des niveaux importants.

b. Auto- défense. L'usage de la force pour protéger:

(1) soi-même et le personnel de son unité,

(2) autre personnel militaire ou civil de la MINUAR,

(3) le personnel d'assistance humanitaire n'appartenant pas à la MINUAR,

(4) des personnes déplacées, réfugiées ou civiles se trouvant dans des sites ou parmi des populations sous la protection des forces de la MINUAR, ou

(5) autre personnel militaire ou civil autorisé par les Nations Unies, contre une intention ou un acte hostile où l'on n'a pas d'autre choix ni le temps de délibérer.

c. Acte hostile. Un acte hostile est une attaque ou autre emploi de la force contre les entités énumérées au paragraphe 3.b. ci-dessus.

d. Intention hostile. Une intention hostile est une menace d'usage imminent de la force contre les entités énumérées au paragraphe 3.b. ci-dessus.

e. Force minimale. Le degré minimum de force autorisée qui est nécessaire, raisonnable et légale dans les circonstances.

f. Dommage collatéral. Dommage causé aux personnes ou aux biens adjacents mais ne faisant pas partie de la cible autorisée.

g. Force non-mortelle. Tout moyen physique pour contraindre à accepter qui ne comporte pas de risque de mort ou de dommage physique grave contre l'individu sur lequel la force est exercée. Il s'agit généralement de l'usage de la force moins l'emploi des armes à feu ou d'autres armes mortelles. Les exemples comprennent le fait de pousser et donner des formes de coups légers, contraindre des personnes par des moyens physiques ou mécaniques. Des tirs d'avertissement relèvent de la force non-mortelle même si ça comporte l'usage des armes à feu.

h. Force mortelle. C'est le dernier degré dans l'usage de la force. Il s'agit de ce niveau où la force exercée vise à causer ou peut causer la mort ou un dommage corporel grave indépendamment de l'effet réel qui en résulte.

TROISIEME PARTIE

INSTRUCTIONS SUR L'USAGE DE LA FORCE

DOMAINE D'APPLICATION

4. Les Règles d'Engagement citées dans cette circulaire s'appliquent à tout le personnel fourni par toutes les nations participant à la MINUAR selon les dispositions de la Résolution 925 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies du 8 Juin 1994. Ces Règles apparaissent sous forme d'interdiction ou de permission. Sous forme d'interdiction, elles sont des ordres de ne pas mener des actions spécifiques. Sous forme de permission, elles servent de guide aux commandants sur certaines actions qui peuvent être menées si elles sont jugées nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs de la mission.

LA RESPONSABILITE DES COMMANDANTS

5. Les commandants à tous les niveaux sont chargés de:

a. faire traduire cette circulaire et la diffuser à chacune des personnes sous leurs ordres; et

b. s'assurer que toute personne sous leurs ordres comprend le contenu du présent document.

NIVEAUX D'AUTORISATION POUR FAIRE USAGE DE LA FORCE

6. L'usage de la force mortelle avec les différents types de systèmes d'armes sera autorisé comme suit:

a. Le commandant de la Force ou son Représentant

(1) Armes de couverture lourdes (càd lance-roquettes, pièces d'artillerie, mortiers légers, etc.); et

(2) Mitrailleuses lourdes ou canons (.50 cal, 20mm, etc.).

b. Dans des situations où leurs vies, celle des membres de leurs unités ou de ceux qu'ils sont chargés de protéger sont menacées, les soldats peuvent utiliser les armes suivantes:

(1) mitrailleuses moyennes (càd. FN MAG, M60, etc);

(2) mitrailleuses légères; et

(3) toute arme personnelle automatique ou non-automatique.

c. Dans des situations où leurs vies, celle des membres de leurs unités ou de ceux qu'ils sont chargés de protéger ne sont pas menacées, l'usage de la force mortelle avec les différents types d'armes sera autorisé comme suit:

(1) Commandants de Secteurs :

(a) mitrailleuses moyennes (càd. FN MAG, M60, etc.);

(b) mitrailleuses légères; et

(c) toute arme personnelle automatique.

(2) Du commandant de bataillon au Sous-Officier se trouvant sur la scène de menace:

(a) Armes personnelles non-automatiques.

NOTE: Au moment de l'utilisation des armes, les commandants doivent se souvenir de la nécessité et la proportionnalité militaires.

PRINCIPES REGISSANT L'USAGE DE LA FORCE

7. Quand un incident survient où l'usage de la force est nécessaire, l'on devra s'en tenir aux principes suivants:

a. Si possible, les moyens de négociation et d'avertissement doivent être exploités à fond avant de commencer tout usage de la force;

b. Il faudra employer seulement le minimum de la force mortelle ou non-mortelle requis pour atteindre l'objectif immédiat;

c. Excepté là où c'est autorisé sous le paragraphe 11, l'échelle des procédures de force selon le paragraphe 14 doit être épuisée avant de faire appel à l'usage de la force mortelle;

d. La force mortelle est justifiée seulement dans des conditions d'extrême nécessité et en dernier ressort quand tous les moyens plus simples ont échoué ou ne peuvent pas être pratiquement employés;

e. La violence utilisée doit être réduite au minimum;

f. Les dommages secondaires doivent être réduits au minimum;

g. L'usage de la force en représailles est interdit; et

h. L'usage de la force est contrôlé par le commandant présent sur la scène et il doit cesser une fois que l'objectif a été atteint.

PERMISSION DE FAIRE USAGE DE LA FORCE

8. La force peut être employée comme suit:

a. La force non-mortelle. Le personnel de la MINUAR est autorisé à faire usage de la force dans les circonstances suivantes:

(1) en cas d'auto-défense(telle que définie au paragraphe 3.b.) contre un groupe non-armé;

(2) contre des tentatives non-armées pour infiltrer ou encercler des unités, enceintes ou locaux de la MINUAR;

(3) quand les bâtiments de la MINUAR sont violés dans des tentatives non-armées pour voler les biens de la MINUAR ou des biens placés sous la protection des Nations Unies.

(4) contre des tentatives non-armées pour enlever ou détenir le personnel militaire ou civil de la MINUAR; et

(5) quand des tentatives non-armées sont faites pour empêcher le personnel de la MINUAR d'exécuter les ordres de leurs commandants.

b. Force mortelle. Le personnel de la MINUAR est autorisé à faire usage de force mortelle dans les circonstances suivantes:

(1) en cas d'auto-défense (telle que définie au paragraphe 3.b.) contre des personnes qui posent un acte hostile ou montrent une intention hostile;

(2) pour protéger, contre dommage ou destruction, des biens ou installations appartenant à ou placés sous la protection de la MINUAR, y compris des sites protégés ainsi que les moyens de livraison et de distribution de l'aide humanitaire:

(a) qui ont été jugés essentiels pour le succès de la mission de la MINUAR par l'officier chargé du commandement de l'unité en consultation avec le Commandant de la Force,

(b) qui justifient la protection moyennant l'usage d'une force mortelle, et

(c) là où il n'y a pas d'autre moyen d'empêcher le dommage ou la destruction;

(3) pour maîtriser des tentatives armées voulant empêcher les Forces de la MINUAR de remplir leurs devoirs, quand ils sont autorisés par le commandant de la Force;

(4) pour résister à des tentatives armées voulant désarmer, enlever ou détenir le personnel militaire ou civil de la MINUAR;

(5) pour résister à des tentatives armées voulant contraindre le personnel de la MINUAR à se retirer des régions sous sa protection occupées sur ordre du Commandant de la Force ou de son représentant; et

(6) pour résister à des tentatives armées voulant couper la Force de la MINUAR.

AUTORISATION DE FOUILLE ET DE DETENTION

9. Autorisation de stopper et de fouiller. Le personnel de la MINUAR est autorisé à arrêter tout individu qui tente d'entrer ou qui est découvert à l'intérieur des bâtiments sous la protection de la MINUAR et d'exiger de lui ou d'elle de se soumettre à une fouille unanime de soi-même et de son véhicule, le cas échéant. A toute personne qui n'accepte pas d'être fouillée on lui refusera l'accès et elle sera conduite hors du bâtiment sous escorte ou détenue selon les normes en vigueur. Des fouilles de personnes

ainsi que de leurs biens sont aussi autorisées pour les besoins de la sécurité. De telles fouilles peuvent être menées avec le minimum nécessaire d'usage de la force.

10. Autorisation de détention. Les personnes ne seront détenues que quand elles auront commis un acte hostile, affiché une intention hostile, mené toute activité qui requérait l'usage de la force contre elles tel que stipulé par le paragraphe 8.

11. Une fois que quelqu'un est détenu, seule une force minimale non-mortelle est autorisée pour prévenir son évasion, à moins qu'il y ait une nécessité d'agir pour s'auto-défendre, dans lequel cas une force minimale est autorisée, y compris la force mortelle. Cependant, si des gens parviennent à s'enfuir et que par conséquent la menace de leur usage de la force est éloignée, aucune force de quelque nature que ce soit ne peut plus être exercée pour les appréhender.

12. Tout détenu sera remis aussitôt que possible aux autorités de police civile habilitées désignées par le Commandant de la Force. Toutes les armes saisies sur des détenus seront confisquées ou rendues militairement inefficaces.

13. Les détenus ne doivent pas être soumis à l'intimidation, la privation ou l'humiliation. Les soins médicaux ainsi que l'attention du personnel médical seront accordés chaque fois que de besoin. Les détenus auront droit aux mêmes rations et abris que ceux du personnel de la MINUAR.

PROCEDURES DE DEFI ET D'ESCALADE

14. Sauf dans le cas où une riposte s'avère nécessaire en conformitant avec le paragraphe 15, autrement les procédures suivantes doivent être suivies:

a. Avertissement verbal ou visuel. Avertir l'agresseur d'arrêter son activité, ce qui, dans des circonstances normales, devrait suivre la séquence suivante:

(1) selon les circonstances, un avertissement peut être oral, un signe ou une illumination(càd des feux signalisateurs tenus en mains, des lampes-torches, etc.). Le fait de donner un avertissement devrait être communiquér au niveau supérieur de commandement accompagné de rapport continuel sur la situation;

(2) répéter l'avertissement verbal ou visuel autant de fois que nécessaire pour s'assurer qu'il est compris ou accepté;

b. Charger les armes. Sur autorisation dans la situation B du Règlement d'Engagement N°.2(référence au paragraphe 15);

c. Tirs d'avertissement. Si la menace persiste, utiliser des tirs d'avertissement diriger dans une direction certaine afin de ne pas se faire mal ou de causer des dégâts secondaires.;

d. Force non-mortelle. Si les tirs d'avertissement sont ignorés, employer le minimum de force non-mortelle;

e. Force mortelle. Si un minimum de force non-mortelle n'est pas applicable ou n'a pas d'effet, sur ordre et sous le contrôl d'un supérieur, on peut recourir à une force minimale mortelle, notamment des tirs non-automatiques diriger, jusqu'à ce que la menace soit écartée;

f. Escalade de la force mortelle. L'escalade des armes à feu avec d'autre systèmes d'armes sera placée sous les ordres du seul commandant habilité en conformité avec le paragraphe 6.

TIR SANS AVERTISSEMENT OU ESCALADE.

15. Le seul moment où il est permis de faire usage de force mortelle sans avertissement ou escalade est quand une attaque par un agresseur vient de façon si inattendue que même un petit retard pourrait:

a. causer la mort ou un dommage grave au personnel de la MINUAR ou à tout autre personnel militaire ou civil autorisé par les Nations unies;

b. causer la mort ou un dommage grave à des personnes placées sous la protection de la MINUAR; ou

c. conduire à un dommage ou destruction immédiate des biens de la MINUAR dans les circonstances décrites au paragraphe 8.b(2).

PROCEDURE DANS LE PROCESSUS D'OUVRIR LE FEU.

16. Tout usage d'armes à feu comme moyen d'exercer une force mortelle consistera en des tirs ciblés, càd viser au milieu de la masse visible de la cible. Les tirs doivent être contrôlés pour ne pas tirer aveuglément. Les tirs automatiques ainsi que l'emploi des armes de support ne seront utilisés qu'en dernier ressort et seulement sur autorisation tel que mentionné au paragraphe 6. Les tirs ciblés continueront aussi longtemps qu'il sera nécessaire pour atteindre le but immédiat. A travers des ordres pour contrôler les

tirs, le commandant sur place indiquera et contrôlera les tirs dirigés de préférence sur les meneurs ou sur les instigateurs de la menace. Un rapport régulier sur la situation sera transmis à travers la chaîne de commandement.

17. Chaque fois que possible, l'intensification de l'usage de force devrait être autorisée par la chaîne de commandement de la MINUAR. Un appel explicite par radio pour demander l'autorisation d'ouvrir le feu peut à lui seul provoquer un effet pacificateur. La permission de passer à un niveau supérieur de force doit être obtenue du commandant habilité en conformité avec le paragraphe 6. Le commandant sur place est responsable de l'évaluation de la situation et de la prise d'une action appropriée à la situation.

PROCEDURE APRES L'OUVERTURE DU FEU.

18. Après l'ouverture du feu, les commandants devraient s'assurer que les actions suivantes sont menées.

a. Action médicale. Toute personne blessée, y compris celles sur lesquelles le personnel de la MINUAR a tiré, bénéficiera de l'assistance de première nécessité à condition qu'une telle action puisse se faire sans mettre davantage en danger les vies du personnel de la MINUAR.

b. Enregistrement. Les détails sur l'incident seront enregistrés, y compris:

(1) la date, l'heure et le lieu où l'ouverture du feu a eu lieu;

(2) l'unité et le personnel impliqués;

(3) les événements qui ont conduit à l'ouverture du feu;

(4) pourquoi le personnel de la MINUAR a ouvert le feu;

(5) sur qui ou quoi est-ce qu'on a tiré;

(6) les armes utilisées; et

(7) le résultat apparent des coups tirés.

c. Rapport. Les informations ci-haut ainsi que la situation qui prévaut doivent être transmises à travers la chaîne de commandement au Quartier Général de la Force à l'attention du Commandant de la Force et de l'Officier Chef des Opérations.

QUATRIEME PARTIE

REGLES D'ENGAGEMENT

19. Règle No. Un: Autorisation de porter des armes a feu

a. Situation A : Pas d'autorisation; et

b. Situation B : Autorisation accordée de porter des armes a feu.

20. Règle No. Deux: Etat des armes

a. Situation A: Les armes seront portées avec des chargeurs remplis.

b. Situation B: Les armes seront portées chargér mais sécurisér.

21. Règle No. Trois: Riposte à une intention ou un acte hostile sans faire usage des armes a feu

a. Situation A : Observer et transmettre un rapport, mais se retirer en vue de préserver sa propre force.

b. Situation B : Rester sur place. Contacter et établir une liaison avec la(les) force(s) opposée(s) et/ou les autorités locaux concernées.

c. Situation C : Observer et faire un rapport. Rester sur place. Prévenir l'agresseur de votre intention de faire usage de la force et montrer votre fermeté par des moyens appropriés sans ouvrir le feu.

d. Situation D : Observer et faire un rapport. Rester sur place. Prévenir l'agresseur de votre intention de faire usage de la force et montrer votre fermeté par des moyens appropriés. L'usage de l'arme a feu à titre démonstratif est autorisé.

22. Règle No. Quatre : Désarmement du personnel paramilitaire ou des civils.

a. Situation A : Aucune autorisation.

b. Situation B : Autorisation accordée. Au cours du désarmement, faire usage de force minimum et monter jusqu'à l'usage de force mortelle si une intention hostile est demontree ou un acte hostile est commis. Remettre l'affaire à l'autorité appropriée à la première occasion.

23. Règle No. Cinq : Intervention et tir d'avertissement

a. Situation A : L'intervention entre les partis en guerre est interdite.

b. Situation B : Intervenir avec une force mortelle contre des cibles bien identifiées et désignées après que des coups d'avertissement aient été tirés dans le cadre du processus d'avertissement.

24. Règle No. Six : Contrôle des systèmes d'armes

a. Situation A : Il est interdit d'obtenir, préparer, déplacer et de faire usage des armes a feu en présence des forces en conflit.

b. Situation B : L'activité nommée ci-haut peut se dérouler en présence des forces en conflit mais elle sera spécifiée par les notes suivantes:

(1) Obtenir (type de système);

(2) Préparer (type de système);

(3) Déplacer (type de système);

(4) Ouvrir le feu (type de système).

25. Il existe 3 situations de Règles d'Engagement qui peuvent s'appliquer dans n'importe quel secteur du RWANDA. Ces situations sont dénommées VERTE, JAUNE et ROUGE et elles sont décrites sur la rubrique "Niveaux de préparation/Alerte de la MINUAR" qui suit l'Annexe A. Dans les conditions normales, la situation des Règles d'Engagement sera VERTE.

NOTE: Les modifications de la situation normale des Règles d'Engagement pour les Forces de la MINUAR en général seront faites sur ordre du Commandant de la Force ou de son Représentant. Les Commandants des Secteurs peuvent ordonner des changements dans la situation normale des Règles d'Engagement pour leurs secteurs, sur autorisation du Commandant de la Force ou de son Représentant. Les Commandants des Contingents aviseront ou, si nécessaire, requerront l'approbation des autorités de leurs pays pour changer de situation.

CINQUIEME PARTIE

CONCLUSION

26. L'objectif de cette circulaire est de fournir un guide aux commandants et soldats de tous les niveaux en cas d'usage de la force. Cependant, il n'est pas possible de faire une circulaire définitive qui puisse détailler toute action possible pour toute situation possible. Il est important et obligatoire que tout le personnel de la MINUAR comprenne ces Règles d'Engagement et les applique à toute situation qui se produit nécessitant l'usage de la force.

27. Les amendements à cette circulaire seront faits tels que requis et approuvés par les Nations unies.

Annexe:

Annexe A Aide-Mémoire pour le personnel de la MINUAR.

ANNEXE A AUX
REGLES D'ENGAGEMENT
DATE 6 OCT 1994

DIRECTIVES POUR TOUT LE PERSONNEL MILITAIRE DE LA MININUAR CONCERNANT L'OUVERTURE DU FEU AU RWANDA.

1. Vous devez éviter l'usage de la force, si c'est possible de le faire, et votre comportement doit causer le moins d'inquiétude, de peur ou de danger possible à la population locale.

2. Votre commandant immédiat pourra ordonner des changements dans les niveaux de préparation d'armes. Alors que normalement votre commandant donnera l' ordre d'ouvrir le feu, vous avez le droit de faire usage de la force nécessaire en cas d'auto-défense pour vous protéger vous-même et ceux dont il est votre devoir de protéger. Chaque fois que possible,un avertissement devra être donné avant d'ouvrir le feu(voir verso).

3. Si vous devez absolument faire usage de la force, vous ne devez employer que le **MINIMUM DE FORCE** nécessaire. Normalement, le **MINIMUM DE FORCE** implique la sucession des actions suivantes:

a. exhibition d'armes.

b. avertissement verbal.

c. refus d'accès à l'endroit sous protection.

d. restriction physique.

e. tirs d'avertissement.

f. pointer les armes, et

g. faire feu.

AVERTISSEMENTS

4. **AVERTISSEMENT AVANT D'OUVRIR LE FEU.** Chaque fois que c'est possible, un avertissement doit être donné avant de tirer. L'avertissement doit être clairement donné à haute voix en ANGLAIS/FRANCAIS ou en KINYARWANDA:

STOP-HANDS UP/ ARRETEZ, LEVEZ LES MAINS/
HAGARARA, AMABOKO HEJURU
(PAUSE)

STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/ ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE
HAGARARA, CYANGWA BAKURASE

5. **FAIRE FEU APRES AVERTISSEMENT.** Après avertissement, vous pouvez tirer sur une personne afin d'éviter la mort ou un dommage corporel grave si et seulement si:

a. la personne porte une arme dangereuse (ex. une arme à feu, un engin improvisé pour faire feu ou une machète); **ET**

b. vous croyez que la personne est sur le point de vous attaquer vous-même, votre unité, ou toute personne dont il est votre devoir de protéger; **ET**

c. la personne refuse de s'arrêter quand elle est appelée à le faire; **ET**

d. vous estimez qu'il n'y a pas d'autre moyen d'arrêter la personne.

6. **FAIRE FEU SANS AVERTISSEMENT.** Vous pouvez tirer sur une personne sans avertissement en vue d'éviter la mort ou un dommage corporel grave si et seulement si la personne:

a. a employé ou est entrain d'employer une arme à feu ou autre arme dangereuse contre vous, votre unité ou des personnes dont il est votre devoir de protéger; **OU**

b. porte ce que vous estimez une arme dangereuse, **ET** elle est visiblement sur le point de l'employer, **ET** vous estimez qu'il n'y a pas d'autre moyen de vous protéger vous-même, votre unité, ou les personnes dont il est votre devoir de protéger.

7. Si vous devez absolument tirer, vous devez rendre compte de tous les coups tirés dans un rapport rédigé et soumis à votre commandant immédiat après l'action menée.

NIVEAUX DE PREPARATION/ALERTE DE LA MINUAR

No	SITUATION	UNITES/QG	ACTION
1	VERTE	TOUS	1.Activités normales 2.**RDE: Règle 1-Situation B, Règle 2-Situation A, Règle 3- Situation B, Règle 4- Situation A, Règle 5-Situation A, Règle 6- Situation A.**
2	JAUNE	QG	1. Début de préparation pour la situation qui suit. 2. Augmentation des liaisons. 3. Visites des personnalités importantes annulées. 4. Pas de congé excepté pour des raisons humanitaires.
		UNITES	1. Stade de précaution. 2. Double Sentinelle. 3. Restriction du mouvement nocturne. 4. Tester les abris. 5. Alerter les troupes. 6. Pas d'accord de congé sauf pour des raisons humanitaires. 7. Consolider les communications,les unités et les armes. 8. 3 heures de préparation accordées aux troupes en réserve pour se mettre en mouvement.
		TOUS	**RDE: Règle 1-Situation B,Règle 2-Situation B,Règle 3-Situation C, Règle 4-Situation A,Règle 5-Situation A,Règle 6-situation A.**

3	ROUGE	QG	1. Alerte générale. 2. Visites des personnalités importantes annulées. 3. Pas de congé. 4. Seuls les mouvements d'urgence sont permis. 5. Envoi des rapports spéciaux sur la situation au Quartier Général des Nations Unies. 6. Evacuation des civils si la situation le permet.
		UNITES	1. Les troupes en position défensive. 2. Les troupes en position d' alerte. 3. Une heure de préparation accordée aux troupes en réserve pour se mettre en mouvement. 4. Pas d'accord de congé. 5. Les troupes de garde à l'extérieur portent des flak jackets.
		TOUS	**RDE: Règle 1-Situation B,Règle 2-Situation B,Règle 3-Situation D, Règle 4-Situation B,Règle 5-Situation B,Règle 6-Situation B.**

AIDE MEMOIRE - REGLES D'ENGAGEMENT

NOTE: La situation VERTE est encadrée.

REGLE UNE: AUTORISATION DE PORTER DES ARMES A FEU

SITUATION A: Pas d'autorisation.

SITUATION B: Autorisation accordée de porter des armes a feu.

REGLE DEUX: ETAT DES ARMES

SITUATION A: Les armes seront portées avec des chargeurs remplis.

SITUATION B: Le armes seront chargées mais sécurisées.

REGLE TROIS: RIPOSTE A UNE INTENTION OU ACTE HOSTILE SANS FAIRE USAGE DES ARMES A FEU

SITUATION A: Observer et transmettre un rapport mais se retirer pour ses propres forces.

SITUATION B: Rester sur place. Contacter et établir une liaison avec la(les) force(s) opposée(s) et/ou les autorités locaux concernées.

SITUATION C: Observer et faire un rapport. Rester sur place. Avertir l'agresseur de votre intention de faire usage de la force et se montrer ferme par des moyens appropriés sans ouvrir le feu.

SITUATION D: Observer et faire un rapport. Rester sur place. Avertir l'agresseur de votre intention de faire usage de la force et se montrer ferme par des moyens appropriés. L'usage du feu à titre démonstratif est autorisé.

REGLE QUATRE: DESARMEMENT DU PERSONNEL PARAMILITAIRE OU DES CIVILS

SITUATION A:	Pas d'autorisation.

SITUATION B: Autorisation accordée. Au cours de cette activité, faire usage de force minimum et monter jusqu'à l'emploi de la force mortelle si une intention hostile est demontree ou un acte hostile commis. Remettre l'affaire à l'autorité appropriée à la première occasion.

REGLE CINQ: INTERVENTION ET TIR D' AVERTISSEMENT

SITUATION A:	Intervention interdite.

SITUATION B: Intervention avec usage de la force mortelle contre des cibles bien identifiées et nommées après que des coups d'avertissement aient été tirés dans le cadre d'un processus de d'avertissement.

REGLE SIX: CONTROLE DES SYSTEMES D'ARMES

SITUATION A:	Il est interdit d'obtenir, préparer, déplacer, et de faire usage des armes a feu en présence des forces en conflit.

SITUATION B: l'activité ci-haut décrite est permise en présence des forces en conflit mais elle sera explicitée par les remarques suivantes:

(1) Obtenir (type de système);

(2) Préparer (type de système);

(3) Déplacer (type de système); et

(4) Faire feu (type de système).

File: Military

Not for publication or dissemination before 24 Oct 94.

UNITED NATIONS DAY
24 OCTOBER 1994

FROM MAJOR-GENERAL GUY TOUSIGNANT
UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER

As the United Nations prepares for its 50th anniversary this year, it is opportune for us to reflect on our collective achievements in this international effort towards peace in Rwanda.

We now have more than 5000 troops on Rwandan soil, fulfilling a delicate and complex mandate. As United Nations soldiers, you are the glue that bonds all humanitarian effort and assistance in Rwanda. You are the soldiers that promote and ensure security for millions of Rwandans and hundreds of UN agency and NGO personnel. The level of personal discipline and self control which you have demonstrated since my arrival on the 15 August is second to none and is at the root of UNAMIR's successes.

In addition to fulfilling your basic mandate, you have assisted more than 6000 displaced persons and refugees in returning to their homes in all sectors of the country. In the last month, you treated more than 46,000 local patients, you immunised 21,000 children against meningitis, delivered more the 2,000 tonnes of grain and humanitarian relief supplies, thousands of gallons of potable water and intervened in many situations which could have degenerated and endangered lives.

It is through your actions that the international community has come to respect and associate the blue beret troops with peace and security. You should therefore be proud of your contribution to the global peace process in which you are taking part.

SRSG

file: Military

MEMORANDUM

1000-5 (CC)

15 Oct 94

Distribution List

GATE CONTROL UNAMIR HQ

1. Ever since the 15 Aug 94, the Canadian Defense and Security platoon has been tasked to provide security for the UN HQ area. However, due to other committment within theatre for the D & S Pl, many different soldiers from the Canadian Contingent have been providing the security at the gate for UNAMIR HQ.

2. Those soldiers were given specific instructions for the execution of their duties and are not familiar with all faces of pers working in UNAMIR HQ. As a reminder, drivers are req to TURN OFF the vehicles headlights as they approach the gate, STOP and have ALL pers within the vehicle show their ID cards for ease of identification and access to the HQ.

3. Your full cooperation in this matter and the widest distribution of this letter would be greatly appreciated.

J.F.D. Gagnon
Lt
Camp Commandant
11152

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2) Military

MEMORANDUM

22 JUL 94

Distribution list

Subject: Notes of meeting MGen Kagame/Force Commander on 20 July 1994

1. The following points were discussed between RPA Chairman High Commander and FC UNAMIR at his temporary HQ in Kanombe.

a. Future Force Structure The deployment of UNMOs, CIVPOL and at least one company size element in each of sections 1,2,3, and 5 was well received and encouraged. The Engineer Coy versus the Inf Coy in sector 1 area was deemed most valuable. The deployment of 2 mechanized battalions and one motorized battalion in sector 4, with UNMOs and CIVPOL was considered necessary in order to establish the same environment required for secure humanitarian work and for avoidance of large movement of displaced persons.

b. Stopping displaced persons It was agreed that the support effort for refugees in Zaire and Tanzania should be done from inside Rwanda and not the reverse. Convoys should come into Rwanda from Tanzania/Uganda/Burundi to drop off aid inside country. It was decided that UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise, should provide security to and at those sites in Cyangugu, Gisenyi and Rusomo from the closest borders. Secondly, UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise should ensure security of BBG political and social affairs persons inside the Humanitarian Protected Zone so they can go and convince people to stay and/or return to their homes. Lastly, it was agreed that UNAMIR should have its radio station and in the interim, it could buy/use time on Radio Rwanda. A split should be built between innocent refugee and bad guys. This will help the farmers return to their homes. UN experts must come in to do their judicial job soonest.

c. Helicopter UNAMIR helicopter can start operating now out of Kigali. Corridors along the main paved routes should be followed first with clearance before hand.

d. Infrastructure Old UNAMIR infrastructure (from before the war) can be occupied now. New demands that have been formulated are agreed to. We will move out of main terminal and Presidential Hangar as soon as possible. The Ecole Superior may become the Ministry of Defence and High Command HQ (to be confirmed by MGen Kagame soonest).

e. Airport We will move out most of the APCs as soon as possible except those of the sole Coy that will remain on the airfield. CAO efforts, coupled with BBG Ministry of Transport getting Sabena to come back should put airfield back in order soonest. UNAMIR to continue assisting and increasing its technical and materiel handling.

f. French Forces leaving HPZ It was stated that UNAMIR should meet the 31 July 1994 deadline to start handover, using troops of Ghanbat into Gikongoro,

but the final/total implementation may most likely go beyond 22 August. No particular concern was expressed but it was confirmed that UNAMIR must monitor the HPZ line on both French and RPA sides in order to avoid violations. Recce of boundary (north) is to be finished soonest. It was impossible to determine how long the HPZ would be needed. Confirmed at least that French leave soonest.

g. Bureaucracy in HPZ With the departure of Kibuye Prefect, concern on the social/government structural vacuum is most disturbing. If some elements can be organized/protected to go in and assist/stabilize, UNAMIR/Operation Turquoise is to assist. A joint working group of BBG/Turquoise/UNAMIR to to set this up was deemed essential. Op Turquoise to lead in this for now.

h. Police It was decided that UNAMIR would assist BBG set up and get resources from a supportive country for establishing a Gendarmerie type national police force. UN CIVPOL are to get in touch/action with Ministry of Interior and Defence asap and see what can be built upon the old Gendarmerie structure.

i. Returnees It was stated that Rwandese wanting to come home could be assisted by UNAMIR out of Nairobi. It is of course taken for granted that we will do everything we can inside the country to move people home. Certain special cases were discussed regarding their needs of security/subsistance. UNAMIR in Kigali would help to start with and BBG after. Cases such as that of the ex-COS Gendarmerie, BGen Gasensi, BGen Rusotera and acolytes/family were agreed to.

j. Technical assistance A request was formulated for the military/linguistic expertise of Canada for reconstruction of national army. An assistance/exchange programme was requested. The return of French/Belgiques was not refused but was not realy encouraged at this time. Gen Gord Reay (Commander Canadian Army) will be in Kigali from 7-12 August and discussions will be held at that time.

k. RGF material We agreed that FC would ask Operation Turquoise to return all weapons, ammunition and aircraft of RGF elements in Goma etc. to UNAMIR or directly to RPA as these are Rwandan assets. UNAMIR could hold this materiel for a while until situation stabilizes.

l. Training area It was agreed that UNAMIR could train in area north of KIA but live fire will be done in Bugasera military training camp.

m. Move displaced out of HPZ Support was given to commence this activity immediately.

R.A. Dallaire
MGen
Force Commander

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION	INFO
A/DFC	SRSG
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HAC	MR BUO
CLO	

File : Military

INFORMATION BULLETIN

ORIGIN: G2

NATURE: MILITARY INFORMATION

SOURCE: PERSONAL OBSERVATION- INFORMERS

QUALITY. FAIRLY CERTAIN

1. THE RPF AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT ALLOWED ME TO VISIT THE DIFFERENT MILITARY CAMPS IN THE CITY OF KIGALI.

2. TWO INTERROGATION CENTRES OF THE RPF HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED THE FIRST WHICH IS MORE ACTIVE IS IN A HOUSE SITUATED BETWEEN THE CLUB SPORTIF BELGE AND THE ROUTE ALONG THE HILL OF THE FACULTY OF LAW. THE INDIVIDUALS INTERROGATED ARE GENERALLY TAKEN THERE IN A BLUE TRUCK WITH MANY ARMED SOLDIERS PRECEDING THEM IN A PICK UP WHEN FOUND GUILTY THEY ARE EXECUTED AROUND 12 00 HRS WITH A PISTOL OR SMALL ARMS. THE ACCESS TO THIS PLACE IS FORMALLY OFF LIMITS AND IS GUARDED BY ARMED MEN. THE SECOND CENTRE IS LOCATED IN A SMALL HOUSE IN KICUKYRO, IN AN ISOLATED PLACE IN THE HEAVILY WOODED VALLEY. THE EXECUTIONS ARE DONE DURING THE NIGHT

3 THE NEW RECRUITS WHO WERE TRAINING IN KONOMBE ARE NOW BEING USED AT THE CHECKPOINTS AND ON PATROLS IN THE CITY.

DRAFT

File: Security Council

MILITARY SITUATION

Since the end of the hostilities the general military situation in Rwanda has been relatively calm. After the 18 July 1994 cease-fire, the RPA forces took over full control of the country except for the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) controlled by the French Coalition Forces. Close cooperation at all levels was maintained between UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise through frequent contact between the two force commanders and the exchange of liaison officers. As a result of this close cooperation a detailed plan was developed for relief in place. The Rwandan government (BBGNU) immediately launched a concerted effort through political rallies to reassure the population in the HPZ and convince them to come back to their homes.

Just prior to the announced withdrawal, the possibility of "OP TURQUOISE" remaining in the HPZ beyond 22 August was being considered and discussed in order to allow UNAMIR forces to arrive in sufficient strength to assume the security of the Sector. It was believed that this course of action would reduce the exodus and reverse the outflow of refugees from Cyangugu towards Bukavu and also give the government time to set up a civil administration and make systematic effort to reassure the population about their security and the restoration of property. The President of Rwanda, however, urged UNAMIR to do all in its power to take over from "OP TURQUOISE" by 21 August 94. The new UNAMIR Force Commander, Major-General Guy Tousignant, who had assumed command from Major-General Romeo Dallaire on 19 August, supported that view and urged contributing nations to advance their deployment into Sector 4 wherever possible.

On 10 August 1994,, UNAMIR deployed its only in-theatre battalion, namely from Ghana, to Sector 4A in order to commence occupation of the French Coalition Forces' controlled HPZ. Subsequently, and after lengthy negotiations, the BBGNU in Kigali accepted the retention of the Franco-African Battalion and its transfer from the FCF to UNAMIR. The Franco-African Battalion, consisting of representation from Senegal, Chad, Congo, Guinnea-Bissau and Niger, remained deployed in Sector 4B. At the eleventh hour, the Battalion from Ethiopia arrived between 15 and 19 August to occupy Sector 4C in strength. Accordingly, at the agreed handover time of 1200 hours 21 August 1994, UNAMIR had three battalions in the HPZ which had the opportunity to conduct relief-in-place operations with the Op Turquoise forces for as few as two days and as much as nearly two weeks. The FCF commenced their departure from Rwanda at the handover time and completed their move to Zaire by noon 22 August 1994. Arrangements were successfully negotiated by UNAMIR and FALD with the Commander FCF and the French government for the continued immediate logistic support required until UNAMIR could assume full responsibility.

In early August it became evident that if UNAMIR was to take

over the HPZ, it had to have a rapid build up of troops in order to accomplish the task at hand. As indicated before, many countries answered the call for support in a timely fashion, and the Force grew from 1,624 on 15 August to 3,599 on the 21st of August. Even though this created an enormous strain on our over-stretched logistical capabilities, the expanded force occupied Sector 4 in sufficient time to assume the protection and security duties from the Coalition Forces.

Following the departure of "OP TURQUOISE" and the French Forces, UNAMIR successfully took over Sector 4 with three battalions and a Tactical Headquarters deployed in Butare. Newly arrived units were later deployed in Sector 3. UNAMIR troops established an immediate presence throughout the sector and provided protection and security for refugees, displaced persons, civilians, and NGO's throughout the zone. The transition went smoothly and was helpful in reassuring the population. No significant action nor sign of military action by the RGF was attempted and no mass exodus of refugees occurred. The return of stability in Rwanda and especially in Sector 4 contributed to the undertaking of the following subsequent measures:

a. The contribution of confidence building and political initiatives.

b. The integration of RGF military forces in the national army.

c. The restoration of civil administration in Sector 4.

d. The coordination with the government on security issues.

It was viewed important that the government, as part of the post-war transition, gradually but firmly take control of its sovereign territory on both the civilian and military level. In order to achieve this the following plan was implemented:

a. Increased and intensified UNAMIR security in Sector 4 through active mobile and static patrolling, road blocks, vital point protection and escort of persons and convoys.

b. Commencing 2 September a voluntary disarmament and reintegration program of FCF installed gendarmerie which were considered illegal by the Government.

c. Installation of Prefects into Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu on 6 and 7 September. Parallel to this, the government, in cooperation with and under UNMO escort from UNAMIR, deployed accompanying security elements consisting of RPA platoons in each location. During successive incremental deployments, these elements were increased to company and battalion sized units during the subsequent two week period.

d. Plan to screen and integrate Communal Police in

Sector 4. To that effect UNAMIR has asked the government to despatch a Police Administrator to Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu to screen and hopefully integrate them and leave them in place as part of the National Gendarmerie.

e. Assist in the transport of refugees and displaced persons by utilizing all UNAMIR trucks when available or empty resupply trucks on their return journey.

Since my last report, unconfirmed information gathered from incoming refugees and other sources, indicates that an estimated 30-35,000 ex-RGF troops are presently located in Zaire (20,000) and in Burundi and Tanzania (10 - 15,000). Little is known about the RGF in Burundi and Tanzania but in Zaire it is known that they are concentrated in camps close to Goma and Bukavu with their HQ in Goma. It is estimated that approximately 50 percent of the RGF in Zaire still have their personal weapons. It also appears that two-thirds of RGF personnel are poorly trained since they were recruited during the war. Some unconfirmed reports of infiltration of small groups of RGF troops from Zaire into Rwanda, suspected food and weapons caches and possibly sighting of heavy weapons could indicate some preparation for guerilla warfare. It is also reported that the ex-RGF is demoralised and disorganized but it is assessed they have the capability to mount small scale insurgency operation with no real coordinated campaign likely until they re-group and re-organize further. The threat of large scale attack seems to be minimal at this time.

Throughout the country the RPA conducts foot and vehicle patrols and operates numerous vehicle road blocks/ check points to monitor personnel and vehicle movement. Frequently these road blocks appear to have a specific purpose, such as vehicle registration/ownership verification, weapon searches, or personnel identification checks with a view to apprehend criminals. Occasionally the RPA conducts cordon and search operations apparently for weapons or personnel checks. They also protect vital points, such as commercial factories and utility infrastructure throughout and all major international border crossings. Additionally, in the absence of the Gendarmerie, they also attempt to maintain law and order and are the only manner in which criminals are apprehended and detained.

Even though relations between UNAMIR and the RPA have been cordial and cooperative, their have been incidents reported of movement restrictions being imposed on UNAMIR troops. Formal discussions between senior UNAMIR personnel and BBGNU representatives reveal that officially, and in accordance with the UN Status of Mission Agreement with Rwanda, there are no restrictions placed on the movement or deployment of UNAMIR personnel and vehicles throughout Rwanda. As illustrated by the three week delay in providing clearance to occupy accommodation and concurrence to deploy troops in Sectors 1 and 2, as well as the periodic, local limitations placed on the movements of UNAMIR

troops in Sectors 3 and 5, the reality on the ground is sometimes different. Some local RPA commanders have indicated that they have been given orders to deny UNAMIR access to areas where RPA troops are deployed. Once these incidents are brought to the attention of the Minister of Interior, the Prime Minister, the Vice-President or President of the BBGNU, they are usually quickly resolved.

REVISED OPERATIONAL PLANS OF UNAMIR

I am pleased to advise the Council that the rapid reinforcement of UNAMIR in early August has contributed significantly to the reestablishment of security. Nonetheless, the task is far from complete and delays in reaching the mature force structure may precipitate a loss of momentum.

The successful occupation of the former French Humanitarian Protected Zone by UNAMIR troops has provided the stability necessary to commence gradual reintegration of RPA forces to the South West of the country. In order to facilitate this reintegration, it has been necessary to concentrate our efforts in this potentially volatile area. Accordingly, the requirement to extend UNAMIR's influence and supervision throughout Rwanda is yet to be fulfilled.

The current troop deployment is as follows:

Sector 1. The deployment of the Nigerian Independent Company is in progress; currently only 64 troops deployed. Deployment of remainder not yet confirmed. 32 UNMOs currently patrolling in the Sector.

Sector 2. Two ad hoc Platoon groups from Canada and Ghana are conducting patrols in Sector 2 effective 23 September 1994. 59 UNMOs operating in the Sector although the majority are at MILOB Headquarters or operating under central control from Kigali. We are anxiously awaiting the arrival of Zambia in Sector 4A so that the Ghanian Battalion can redeploy to this Sector.

Sector 3. Sector is occupied by the Malawi Company, UNAMIR Tactical Headquarters, a Casualty Collection Point from the Australian Medical Contingent and 58 UNMOs.

Sector 4. The Ghanian Battalion is in Sector 4A with 25 UNMOs and 23 Para Field Ambulance (UK), the Franco-African Battalion occupies Sector 4B with 24 UNMOs, and the Ethiopian Battalion is in Sector 4C in conjunction with 21 UNMOs.

Sector 5. 35 UNMOs are operating in this Sector. Although not part of UNAMIR, 2 Field Ambulance (Cda) is also in this Sector providing medical and humanitarian assistance. We are awaiting the arrival of the Tunisian main party before we can establish a true presence in this Sector.

Throughout these sectors the deployed troops and UNMOs have been given the following tasks:

I. Denial of insurgent activity.

II. Provision of escorts (armed/unarmed) as required.

III. Identification and listing of all refugee/displaced persons' camps, establishment of safe haven areas for displaced persons and provision of security.

IV. Conduct of protective operations through road blocks, check points (static and random), vital point protection, observation posts, cordon and search, patrols, etc.

V. Monitoring of border crossing by refugees and armed individual/groups.

VI. Control movement on the main routes.

VII. Protection of airfields/strips(s).

VIII. Detention/arrest any suspected individual/ group.

IX. Guard UN installations.

X. Provision of security and assistance to NGOs with distribution of food, water and medical support.

XI. Identification of food and water distribution points at commune level.

XII. Provision of transport for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

XIII. Coordination with the RPA regarding the security of the people.

XIV. Assistance to the affected people in settling down to their respective homes, in the distribution of house building material and farming tools and in the coordination of all activities of the NGOs.

XV. Maintenance of routes, repair of bridges and the provision of water points. Assistance in the restoration of essential services and facilities.

XVI. Clearing of mines, unexploded ordinance and booby traps.

XVII. Provision of medical support to refugees/ displaced persons.

XVIII. Augmentation of AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL capability at KIGALI International Airport.

XIX. Assistance to UNREO/UNDP in coordinating the activities of UN and NGO agencies operating in Rwanda.

XX. Conduct of humanitarian relief assessment reconnaissance.

XXI. Dissemination of information concerning human rights abuses to UN human rights rapporteurs.

As the stability in Rwanda has increased with the elimination of the Humanitarian Protection Zone and the subsequent integration of Sector 4 under BBGNU control, the mandate as specified by resolution 918 and 925 should be amended to recognize that UNAMIR should no longer be tasked specifically to ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda (Resolution 925). Concurrently, the emphasis and primary effort is shifting from stabilization, security, protection and monitoring duties to security duties complimentary to the RPA, provision of security, monitoring, and assisting the national reconciliation through the provision of humanitarian support related to the Rwandan Emergency Normalization Plan. The later is provided under the umbrella of overall security and protection through a vigilant military presence throughout the country, with specific emphasis on concentrations of civilians in communes and camps.

In essence, the UNAMIR concept of operations remains virtually unchanged, although the deployment concept has evolved to cater to the expanding force and the emphasis has shifted somewhat to the provision of support to the humanitarian effort. This shift in emphasis is designed to compliment the Rwandan Emergency Normalization Plan. UNAMIR's principal tasks are as follows:

a. to ensure stability and security throughout RWANDA;

b. to stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of refugees and the displaced population;

c. to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda as humanitarian organizations arrange the return of refugees; and

d. to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.

In the expectation that the remaining troops committed to UNAMIR operations will be deployed during the coming weeks, the Force Commander plans deployment in six sectors, as indicated on the map annexed to the present report. Those sectors will be occupied as follows:

a. Sector 1 (north-east): one independent mechanized infantry company group from Nigeria (deployment in progress);

b. Sector 2 (south-east): one mechanized infantry battalion from Ghana (currently in Sector 4, awaiting relief in place by Zambia);

c. Sector 3 (south): two independent motorized infantry companies from Malawi (deployed) and Mali (awaiting deployment);

d. Sector 4 (south-west): three mechanized/motorized infantry battalions from Zambia, Ethiopia and the Franco-African contingent (deployed, less Zambia which is anticipated early October);

e. Sector 5 (north-west): one mechanized infantry battalion from Tunisia (awaiting deployment in early October); and

f. Sector 6 (Kigali City): one composite infantry battalion from India (awaiting deployment in early October).

The Force headquarters will continue to operate from Kigali along with specialist units for communications, logistics and medical support from Canada, United Kingdom and Australia, respectively. United Nations Military Observers and United Nations Civilian Police deployment throughout the country will continue. The desired effect is to maintain security in all sectors through which refugees/displaced persons are able to access safe passage and UNAMIR assisted humanitarian support.

As the trend towards security and stability continues, redeployment and thinning out of UNAMIR troop concentrations will be initiated to accord with the reintegration program. The Force Commander is presently developing options to effect this end.

Fld: Military

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

VISIT TO UNAMIR, KIGALI

NAMES OF VISITORS: COL W.P. RAMSEY
LCOL R.W. SHOEBRIDGE
LCOL W.B. COATES
LCOL P.F. MCINTOSH
MAJ D.A. KERR

DATE OF VISIT: 6 TO 8 JULY 1994

RESPONSIBLE: LCOL M. AUSTDAL

PROGRAMME

DATE	TIME	ACTIVITY	REMARKS
5 JUL	1415	RECCE TM ARR NAIROBI	
6 JUL	1100	ARR ENTEBBE	
6 JUL	1600	ARR KIGALI-AMOHORO HOTEL	
6 JUL	1600 1900	SETTLE IN/DINNER	
6 JUL	1900 2000	ATTEND EVENING BRIEF	
6 JUL	2000	MEET WITH FC	
7 JUL	0830 1200	MISSION BRIEFS	
7 JUL	13OO 1430	VISIT KING FAYCAL HOSPITAL	
7 JUL	1430 1600	VISIT KIGALI HOSPITAL	
7 JUL	1600 1900	DISCUSSION WITH BRANCH HEADS AS REQUIRED	

7 JUL	**2015**	**DINNER WITH UNAMIR STAFF**	
8 JUL	**0600**	**DEP FOR NAIROBI**	

File: Military

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

1000.1/FC/M&C

23 June, 1994

See Distribution

INSTRUCTIONS ON UNAMIR MEDALS PRESENTATION PARADES

1. Presentation of medals to qualified UNAMIR personnel will take place on Saturday 25 June 1994. There will be four (4) separate medal presentation parades for Force HQ, MILOB Gp, Ghanbatt and Tuncoy. The Force Commander will review each of the four parades. The commitment of the Force to operations will be at a minimum for the period of the medals presentation parades.

GROUPING AND VENUES

2. Grouping and venues for the medals parades are as specified below:

a.	Force HQ (incl F/HQ MILOBs)	-	Force HQ Compound
b.	MILOB Gp/CIVPOL	-	Amahoro Stadium.
c.	Ghanbatt	-	Airport.
d.	Tuncoy	-	Hotel Meridien

TIMINGS

3. Timings for the parades are as detailed below:

a.	Force Headquarters	-	0800 - 0930 hrs.
b.	MILOB Gp/CIVPOL	-	1000 - 1130 hrs.
c.	Ghanbatt	-	1300 - 1530 hrs.
d.	Tuncoy	-	1600 - 1730 hrs.

PARTICIPATION

4. It is expected that each group/unit will ensure maximum participation in these parades.

REHEARSALS

5. Details about rehearsals are left to the individual groups/units to work out, but all must ensure that the parades come off successfully.

DESIGN OF MEDAL PARADES

6. The parade will take the following form:

a. Guest Seated.

b. Parade forms up.

c. Arrival of DFC/COS (Ghancon Comd), CMO,

OC Tuncoy - Parade called to attention.

d. Arrival of FC - Parade called to attention. General Salute

e. FC inspects Parade.

f. Citation read.

g. Presentation of medals - FC presents to the front row

- DFC/COS, CMO, OC Tuncoy present to the rear rank.

h. Force Commander's address.

i. FC Departs - General Salute.

j. Parade Dismissed.

PRESS COVERAGE

6. The Military Spokesman is requested to make the necessary arrangements for the Press to cover the parade in great detail.

7. It is expected that all will co-operate to make these joint UNAMIR medal parades memorable ones.

RA DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:

Milob Gp HQ
Ghanbatt HQ
Tuncoy HQ

Information:

SRSG
CAO

Internal:

DFC/COS
COO
CHAC
C LOG O
C Plans
CMPO
Military Spokesman

File: 1) Military SITREP
2) Security Council

Overview of the Military Situation

1. Gen Situation. The general situation remains tense. Exchanges of arty/mortars, HMG and Small Arms fire have reduced after the intervention of French troops, however sporadic exchanges of fires are continuing. RPF is maintaining its tight grip on RGF positions in the city. Fighting are mostly centred in Urugwiro, Nyamirambo, Kimihurura, Kychiru, around Hotel Milles Collins and the city centre. Militia activities in the RGF controlled areas are continuing throughout the country. Gendarmerie are jointly fighting with RGF. French intervention has raised the morale of government forces and they are much more determined to give a good fight throughout the country specially in Kigali. Some infirmations indicate that RGF is now planning counter offensive in the city area. Fighting was reported in and around Butare in the south, with sporadic exchanges of fire in Ruhengeri in the north. A large number of displaced people was reported crossing the borders of Rwanda into neighbouring states of Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire. RGF welcomed French intervention in Rwanda. On the other hand RPF warned that the French to remain within UN prescription and if they try to intervene in Rwanda affairs, they would be treated as their enemy. Demonstrations were held in neighbouring Burundi and in some RPF controlled areas against the French initiative. Government held areas including Kigali are reported to be decorated with the French flag.

2. RPF Activities. RPF continuing their efforts to squeeze RGF positions within the city. They are trying to cut off all axes of government forces in Kigali and continue shelling and firing in RGF positions, thus trying to break the will of RGF to continue fighting. These shelling are causing casualties to government forces and civilians. During the period, RPF launched offensive operations in a number of isolated pockets in Kigali but did not have much success. RPF has night fighting capabilities which they use to the maximum. In the south they have advanced upto the outskirts of Butare. It is reported that they had a clash with French troops around Butare. In short RPF has slowed down its offensive actions and are closely monitoring French activities. They are recruiting and training Tutsis in a large scale and putting them in front lines after a short training.

3. RGF Activities. A significant change of RGF was observed after the intervention of French troops. They are much more firm and effective in the battle field. A number of RPF attacks were repulsed in Kigali. RGF is strongly holding their positions in Kychiru, Urugwiro, Nyamirambo, Kimihurura, Mont Kigali and city centre. They are retaliating fires with mortars, HMG and Small Arms. RGF have reorganized in Kigali and planning to recapture some of the lost areas in the city. Information reveals that they are running shortage of ammunition specially artillery and mortars. RGF are motivating Hutus to join them in protecting their land from Tutsis. Militia activities in RGF held areas continue to be on the increase. They are manning road blocks and check points, however fleeing in the western parts of the country where the French are operating.

4. French Coalition Forces Activities. The French entered Rwanda on 23 June 1994 and have since been operating in the western part of the country. The coalition forces are reported to have deployed about a company strength in Butare and Gikongoro in the south. This early deployment contradicts earlier plans to deploy at a later stage. It is also reported that they had a clash with the RPF in the outskirts of Butare. In the deployed area, French are securing the refugee camps and disarming militia. It is reported that they have evacuated 94 children to Goma. French ORBAT shows that they have adequate teeth to launch offensive operation in Rwanda. Presence of French attack aircrafts and helicopters in the theatre indicates their determination to sort out Rwanda problem.

5. Own Military Situation. Induction of French troops in the theatre has given a new dimension to UNAMIR. Thirty seven UNMOs from African Francophone countries namely CONGO, TOGO and SENEGAL were withdrawn from Rwanda due to threats from RPF. Egyptian UNMOs were also withdrawn as asked by RPF. RPF has imposed new restrictions to UNAMIR personnel which has made our movement difficult. FC and DFC are trying to meet Maj Gen Paul Kagame for the last two weeks but failed. UNMOs and Tunisian troops were withdrawn from Hotel Milles Collins as the area have turned out to be a battle zone. However, UNMOs go daily to RGF held area (in Kigali) in the morning and return in the evening. UNAMIR has establish liaison with French command by employing an UNMO team in Goma. Routine works are being conducted in the area. FC has finalised the deployment of new extended force in Rwanda and waiting for the force to arrive. Initially Kigali City will be secured by GHANBATT and then fan out in other parts of the country.

→ File: Military SRSG's Office Annex

TO: See Distribution

From: Bangladesh Contingent Commander

Date: 25 January 94

2/26/1/94 File No: PF/941/01

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF SRSG
Date 26 jan 94
No. 365 By

Subject: **VISIT BANGLADESH MILITARY DELEGATES**

Reference:

A. Force HQ's memorandum No 1000.3(MA) dated 19 January 94(not to all)

B. Force HQ letter No 1000.7(COS) dated 11 January 94(not to all).

1. In inviting attention to references above, the correct composition of Bangladesh Military Delegates is given below:

a. Lt Gen Muhammad Noor Uddin Khan	Chief of Army Staff Bangladesh Army
b. Brig Ruhul Alam Chowdhury	Director Operations and Plans, Armed Forces Division, Prime Ministers Secretariat
c. Brig Sayeed Ahmed	Director Military operations, Army Headquarters
d. Col Khandoker Kamaluzzaman	Private Secretary to Chief of Army Staff
e. Major Md Tariqul Alam	Assistant Private Secretary to Chief of Army Staff

2. A fresh copy of the visit programme is given at annexure 'A'. Biodata of the Chiefof Army staff, Bangladesh Army is also given at annexure 'B' to this letter. A briefing is arranged for the delegates at the conference room (ground floor) at 0850 hours on 29 January 94. Following personnel are requested to make it convenient to be present please:

a. CAO.

b. DFC/COS

3. Move Con Organization(Attention : Sqn Ldr Shah Azad). Please make necessary amendment to Bangladesh Permanent Mission

in UN, New York letter(already forwarded) No Pol-89/93 dated 29 Dec 93 addressed to the office of the Secretary General, UNO, New York.

ASRARUL HAQUE
Colonel
Country Senior/
Contingent Commander

Annexure

A. Visit Programme.
B. Biodata of the Chief of Army Staff

Distribution:

External:
Action:

Kigali Sector HQ
DMZ Sector HQ
MILOB HQ
RUTBAT

Lt Col Nazrul
MILOB Gp HQ

Lt Col Mowla
Kigali Sector HQ

Lt Col Mustafiz
DMZ Sector HQ

Internal:
Action:

FC
DFC
COO
CMPO
C Log O
Mov Con Pl
MA
ADC to DFC
CAO
SRSG's Office

ANNEX 'A'

VISIT PROGRAMME
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, BANGLADESH ARMY
28 - 29 JANUARY 94

1. **28 January 1994**

a.	1435 hrs	Arr from Nairobi by KQ 472	Will be recieved by FC/DFC
b.		Moves to Hotel Meridien	Under arrangement of Country Senior
c.	1600-1630 hrs	Calls on SRSG	Under arrangment of SRSG's office
d.	1930-2100 hrs	Dinner at RUTBAT	Under arrangment of RUTBAT
e.	2115-2145 hrs	Talks to all available Bangladeshi Offrs	do

2. **29 January 94**

a.	0815-0845 hrs	Calls on Force Comd	Under arrangement of FC's office
b.	0850-0930 hrs	Briefing at Force HQ	Under arrangement of Ops Branch
c.		**Visits Bangladesh Contingent**	Under arrangement of RUTBAT
	0935-0940 hrs	Inspects Gd	
	0940-0950 hrs	Meets offrs/JCOs	
	0955-1025 hrs	Addresses Troops	
	1030-1145 hrs	Briefing by CO	
	1200-1245 hrs	Attends Lunch with Troops	
e.	1600-1800 hrs	Golf at Kigali Golf Club	Under arrangement of ADC to FC
f.	1930 hrs	Quiet Dinner	
g.	2115 hrs	Dep Hotel for Airport	
h.	2230 hrs	Dep for Nairobi by UY 802	Will be seen off by FC/DFC

ANNEX 'B'

BIO DATA OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUHAMMAD NOOR UDDIN KHAN

CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, BANGLADESH ARMY

Lieutenant General Muhammad Noor Uddin Khan was born in 1938 in the greater district of Dhaka. Joined Pakistan Army in 1956 and was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. General Noor Uddin in his 37 yerars of military career held many key staff and command appointments. Started as a General Staff Officer-3(Operations) in an Infantry Brigade, he was General Staff Officer-2(Plans) in Military Operations Directorate in General Headquarters of Pakistan Army, Director of Military Operations and Chief of General Staff in Bangladesh Army. He raised and commanded one Infantry Brigade and was General Officer Commanding of three Infantry Divisions for 8 years. He took over as the Chief of Army Staff in August 1990

A graduate in civil engineering, he attended many courses at home and abroad including Staff College at Quetta, Pakistan, Joint Warfare Course in UK and Senior International Defence Course in USA. Widely travelled, General Noor Uddin visited North America, Europe, Africa, China, South Asia, South-East Asia and West Asia. He is married with two daughters and a son who is also serving in the Army.